Georgia by David Aphrasidze Capital: Tbilisi Population: 4.3 million GNI/capita: US$4,920 Source: The data above was provided by The World Bank, World Bank Indicators 2010. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Electoral Process 4.50 5.00 5.25 5.25 4.75 4.75 4.50 4.75 5.25 5.25 Civil Society 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.75 3.75 Independent Media 3.50 3.75 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.25 Governance* 4.75 5.00 5.50 5.75 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a National Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.75 6.00 6.00 Local Democratic Governance n/a n/a n/a n/a 6.00 5.75 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 Judicial Framework and Independence 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.50 5.00 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 Corruption 5.25 5.50 5.75 6.00 5.75 5.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 Democracy Score 4.33 4.58 4.83 4.83 4.96 4.86 4.68 4.79 4.93 4.93 * Starting with the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis and ratings for national democratic governance and local democratic governance to provide readers with more detailed and nuanced analysis of these two important subjects. NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. 212 Nations in Transit 2010 Executive Summary eorgia’s journey toward democracy started in the late 1980s and went through several major hurdles after the country gained independence in 1991. The Gcivil war and ethnic conflicts shaped a Georgian “failed state” in the early 1990s. The ethnic wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia subsequently grew into the Russian-Georgian conflict that reached its peak in August 2008. The country’s relative stabilization under President Eduard Shevardnadze from the second half of the 1990s was stopped by an emerging corrupt and inefficient hybrid political system. Then, in 2003, Georgia’s population seemed to “awaken” with the Rose Revolution; the new government of President Mikheil Saakashvili launched profound reforms in almost all fields of the public and private sectors. Yet the failure of the government to engage the political opposition led to street rallies during the autumn of 2007, culminating in dispersed demonstrations and closure of oppositional television stations. Followed by the early elections of the president and Parliament, the November 2007 events marked a significant setback for Georgia’s democracy. The August war in 2008 further contributed to the internal political crisis. A new political crisis unfolded in 2009; from April to late June, a handful of opposition parties organized protest rallies, picketing parliamentary buildings, the president’s office, the public broadcaster’s building, and closing main streets in downtown Tbilisi. The opposition demanded the resignation of the president and new national elections. With some exceptions, both the government and the opposition restrained from violence. President Saakashvili reiterated his offer from the previous year to launch a second wave of democratic reforms, creating a state commission to draft a new constitution, setting up a working group to create a new election code, and slating local elections for spring 2010. Furthermore, steps were announced to increase the independence of the media and the judiciary, though by the end of the year it remained unclear to what extent the government would be willing to implement these and other reforms. National Democratic Governance. The year started with protest rallies organized by the opposition that signaled a political crisis in the country. Both the government and the opposition managed to overcome the crisis without excessive use of force, and several meetings took place between the president and representatives of the opposition. Although no remarkable results were achieved, there was a noticeable change in the political discourse. A state commission including the parliamentary minority and nongovernmental groups was created to draft a new constitution, and a working group with even broader political participation developed improvements to the electoral legislation. A mutiny in a battalion of the Georgian army raised questions about the effectiveness of civilian control over the military. A number of Georgia 213 kidnapping cases along the conflict zones kept the situation strained but without major complications. Georgia’s national democratic governance rating remains at 6.00. Electoral Process. There were no elections in 2009, but the legacy of the 2008 polls continued to impact national politics. In response, there were street rallies that aimed to compel early presidential and parliamentary elections. In September, Parliament adopted an amendment to the constitution allowing 10 opposition politicians (out of 12) elected by party lists to re-enter Parliament after they had refused to recognize the legitimacy of the elections in May 2008. By the end of 2009, only one politician had taken the offer. The year did, however, feature significant improvements in the electoral legislation; a working group with broad participation of opposition parties developed several rules, including the nomination of a Central Election Commission head and procedures for filing violations. The amendment was approved by Parliament in December 2009 and is significant for the upcoming local elections in the spring of 2010. While positive developments including achieving a political consensus over the direct election of the Tbilisi mayor and amending the electoral code ahead of upcoming local elections marked positive developments in 2009, their impact will only be seen in the coming year. Georgia’s electoral process rating remains at 5.25. Civil Society. Georgia’s civic sector, which was relatively vibrant prior to the Rose Revolution, now struggles to find its niche. The main challenge is civil society’s limited impact on policy formulation. Authorities are mostly reluctant to accept policy recommendations from nongovernmental organizations, considering them unprofessional and politically biased. Local funding sources are still limited in the country. The newly founded Civic Institutionalization Development Fund of Georgia aims to support civic activities by offering small grants. This is the first attempt by the state to provide funding for the civic sector on a wide scale. Several organizations and grassroots initiatives propagate anti-liberal nationalistic and religious values. Georgia’s civil society rating remains at 3.75. Independent Media. The Georgian media landscape is one of the most developed in the South Caucasus. There are several independent television stations with news programs, dozens of independent newspapers, and a fast-growing number of online broadcasters and news forums. The media legislation is recognized as fully compliant with international standards. In 2009, one representative of the parliamentary minority was included in the Georgian National Communication Commission (NCCG). However, media independence overall is challenged by an insufficient level of professionalism and editorial independence. The lack of information and transparency about those holding shares in television stations and the frequent rotation of ownership leave room for doubt about their independence. In 2009, two major private television stations changed owners. The Board of Trustees of the Georgian Public Broadcaster was substantially reshuffled and a new general director appointed. Georgia’s independent media rating remains at 4.25. 214 Nations in Transit 2010 Local Democratic Governance. Georgia’s legislation outlines three levels of governance—national, regional, and local. Beyond the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia is divided into the Autonomous Republic of Adjara and nine regions governed by presidential appointees. The president also proposes the candidacy of the head of the Adjara government to the local parliament and has the authority to dismiss both Parliament and the prime minister in several cases defined by law. Local governance comprises 64 municipalities and 5 self-governing cities including Tbilisi. In 2009, the Ministry for Regional Development and Infrastructure was established to oversee local self-governance as well as to develop a new local governance strategy. While reform measures are foreseen with the establishment of the new ministry, the actual performance of local self- governance in 2009 did not improve, thus Georgia’s local democratic governance rating remains at 5.50. Judicial Framework and Independence. The Georgian judiciary still struggles to emancipate itself from political pressure. A new ombudsman was elected by Parliament in September 2009 and described the human rights record in the country as “grave.” The Ministry for Corrections and Legal Assistance was created to improve conditions in prisons as well as the penitentiary and probation system in general. The situation in Georgia’s prisons is improving notwithstanding several reported instances of human rights violations. Georgia’s judicial framework and independence rating remains at 4.75. Corruption. The perception and experience of corruption appear to have decreased in Georgia since the Rose Revolution. Georgian citizens are confronted less with low-level corruption on an everyday basis. Yet several experts have questioned the potential existence of top-level corruption that may evade solid evidence. The government established a new council to update the anti-corruption strategy and action plan signed by the president in 2005. In addition, the government continued a liberal economic policy during 2009 and announced a new wave of economic liberalization measures.