NO. 43 JULY 2021 Introduction

Canal Istanbul: Turkey’s Controversial Megaproject Its Likely Impacts on the Montreux Convention and Regional Stability Tuba Eldem

On June 26, the Turkish government began constructing the first bridge over Canal Istanbul, the huge waterway project designed to run parallel to the Bosporus Strait. Ankara has presented the megaproject as a strategic move that will turn Turkey into a logistics base and grant it geo-political leverage over both regional and internation- al trade and transportation routes. However, Turkey’s political opposition considers Canal Istanbul to be a rent-seeking project designed to attract international – prob- ably Chinese and Arab – investment in the hope of reviving Turkey’s deteriorating economy. The Canal may also affect the Montreux Convention, the decades old treaty that governs the Turkish Straits. Given the rivalry between the US and Russia, ques- tions around the Montreux Convention will add another point of contention, increase tensions and may also present serious consequences for Turkey.

On April 5, Turkish police detained 10, and presence of non-littoral states’ warships summoned four, of the 104 retired admirals in the Black Sea to 21 days. The announce- who, in an open letter, expressed their con- ment triggered an immediate reaction from cerns that Canal Istanbul would jeopardise Moscow, which labelled the move a “pro- Ankara’s existing rights over the Turkish vocative measure”. Although the US ulti- Straits as granted by the Montreux Con- mately cancelled the deployment of these vention. The detainment of the admirals warships amid rising tensions, this series coincided with Washington’s notification of events nevertheless reminded those that it would deploy two warships to the watching of both the geo-strategic impor- Black Sea amid Russia’s military build-up tance of the Turkish Straits and the critical along Ukraine’s borders. On April 9, Tur- role of the Montreux Convention in Black key’s Foreign Ministry announced that the Sea regional security. two US warships would pass to the Black Sea and remain there until May 4. Wash- ington’s notice adhered to the Montreux Convention, which requires 15 days’ advance notice to be given and limits the

The Turkish Straits as a from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan pass Critical Maritime Chokepoint through the Turkish Straits. Rapid and con- tinued growth in exports from the Black The Bosporus and the Dardanelles, collec- Sea region is expected to increase depend- tively known as the Turkish Straits, connect ence on the Turkish Straits, particularly the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. They when it comes to wheat. The Turkish Straits are among the most critical maritime choke- are considered a highly critical waterway points worldwide. As major strategic water- not only because of the volume of trade that ways, the channels are home to natural passes through them each year, but also be- maritime traffic congestion and carry cause no alternative maritime routes exist. significant geo-economic and geo-strategic importance. Given that 90 percent of world trade is carried out via the sea, blocking Canal Istanbul: A Controversial such chokepoints, even temporarily, could Megaproject Dividing the Nation lead to substantial spikes in the costs of traded goods as distances, sailing periods Canal Istanbul, announced in 2011 by and shipping costs increase, the impacts Turkey’s then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip of which would be felt by exporting and Erdogan, will be a 45-kilometre-long, 275- importing economies alike. Controlling and metre-wide and 20.75-metre-deep artificial securing maritime chokepoints, thus, repre- waterway running in parallel to the Bos- sents an objective for every major geo- porus, connecting the Black Sea to the Sea strategic player. of Marmara. The Turkish government As noted in a 2017 US Energy Informa- argues that the estimated $10–20 billion tion Administration report, the Turkish project will reduce oil tanker traffic Straits, seeing 4 percent of global maritime through the Bosporus Strait and minimise oil pass through their waters, are one of the the risks and dangers associated with seven critical chokepoints for the maritime maritime congestion. Around 43,000 vessels transit of oil. They also occupy an impor- transit the Turkish Straits each year (more tant geo-political role in the EU’s oil supply than the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal from Central Asia and the Caucasus. The combined) and they are less than 700 metres construction of pipelines linking Azer- wide at their narrowest point. The Bosporus baijan and Kazakhstan to the Black Sea via is the world’s narrowest strait for interna- Georgia and Russia after the end of the Cold tional navigation purposes and it is also one War substantially increased the amount of the busiest. Since the 1950s more than of oil shipped through the Straits, reaching 461 maritime incidents have occurred here, its peak in 2004 at more than 3.4 million including more serious ones in 1979 and barrels per day. Although the volume of 1994. The government expects that the oil transiting the Turkish Straits fell to 2.4 relatively straight route of the artificial million barrels per day in 2016 as Russia Canal Istanbul, compared to the sharp shifted its crude oil exports toward the bends of the Bosporus, will help to prevent Baltic ports, oil traffic through the Straits is accidents and relieve congestion as tanker expected to increase in step with Kazakh- traffic would be diverted to the new canal. stan’s growing production. Turkey’s Minister of Transport estimates The Turkish Straits were also cited as one that revenue from tolls would be at least of the eight critical chokepoints of global one billion dollars annually and could grow food security in a 2017 Chatham House to five billion dollars when maximum report. One fifth of global wheat exports capacity is reached. and one sixth of global maize exports pass However, critics of the project cast doubt through the Turkish Straits, making them on these claims on several grounds. Envi- the world’s most significant transit point ronmentalists and the Chamber of Environ- for the grains. 77 percent of wheat exports mental Engineers argue that the Canal

SWP Comment 43 July 2021

2 would imperil Istanbul’s tenuous water Druzhba and the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan supply and devastate the surrounding eco- pipelines) and the use of larger ships that system, including the natural equilibrium can carry more cargo. The Union of Cham- between the Black Sea and the Sea of Mar- bers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, mara. The Chamber of Geological Engineers and the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality warns that the Canal will exacerbate ex- argue that the true driver of the project is pected damage from the next major earth- the economic rent that will be generated quake in the coming decades. Maritime by new zoning plans and licensing of real- authorities and marine scientists underline estate developments on the 36,453 hectares that 66 percent of the accidents in the Bos- of land around the Canal. porus in the last 15 years occurred due to technical failures, not due the sinuous geography. They also note that the number A Real Estate of accidents has decreased by 39 percent Development Project? thanks to a series of measures undertaken by successive Turkish governments since The feasibility report prepared by the Minis- 1994. These include the adoption of a traf- try of Infrastructure and Transport supports fic separation scheme in 1994, the Maritime the above claims that real estate zoning Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits would result in significant revenue, to the of 1994 (revised in 1998), the radar-based sum of an estimated $10.5 billion. This is vessel traffic services system of 2003, and because Canal Istanbul involves the con- more recently, the Instructions for the struction of two new “smart cities” along Implementation of the Rules Regulating the its banks that would host at least half a mil- Turkish Straits Maritime Traffic Scheme of lion residents and various amenities like a 2018. Captains of freight ships point out marina, container port, logistics centre, six that the risk of accidents is expected to be bridge crossings, two deep subway crossings even higher in the new canal with its depth and a conventional railroad crossing that of only 20.75 metres, especially for tankers would run to Istanbul’s new airport. The with a draft of more than 17 metres. They government expects that the associated go on to note that rescue operations will be construction activity alone would provide a more complicated in the Canal as its width welcome boost to Turkey’s ailing economy is only 275 metres. Retired generals and and help to mitigate unemployment, which admirals fear that the Canal will negatively reached 13.4 percent in February 2021 impact the defence of the European part according to the Turkish Statistical Insti- of Istanbul, as it will effectively transform tute. The project is also expected to bring the city into an island while also isolating in fresh foreign direct investment (FDI), Thrace from the rest of Turkey. Economists especially from Gulf Arab nations, led by object to the Canal by arguing that the Qatar. While FDI to Turkey has declined Turkish economy is not strong enough to significantly in recent years, the share of bear the burden of a project of such scale. revenue from real estate sales to foreigners They also find the government’s revenue has increased rapidly. The share of real estimates to be overly optimistic consider- estate in net FDI, which was 13 percent in ing that the number of vessels passing 2007, increased to 54 percent in 2019 and through the Bosporus has fallen by 43 per- 57 percent in 2020. With foreign currency cent between 2006 and 2020, from 54,880 reserves in Turkey dwindling and the Turk- to 38,404 per year. This diminishing traffic ish lira falling against the US dollar and can be attributed to decreased oil reserves, euro, investment in the real estate sector Russia’s shift to exporting oil via the Baltic has, thus, become the principal way to Sea ports, the formation of new passage- bring in foreign cash and strengthen the ways in the Arctic Sea, pipelines that allow economic parameters ahead of future elec- transit to bypass the Bosporus (such as the tions.

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3 Project Finance: Bosporus railway tunnel) and for the Yavuz China’s Trojan Horse? Sultan Selim Bridge over the Bosporus in 2018. Later in 2019, this time together with Nonetheless, project financing remains in the Bank of China and the China Develop- limbo. Citing the UN-backed Principles ment Bank, the ICBC offered $1.7 billion for Responsible Banking, some of Turkey’s to the Hunutlu coal-based thermal power biggest banks are reluctant to finance the plant project in Adana province, which was project due to environmental concerns cited by the Xinhua News Agency in Sep- while also contemplating the inherent risks tember 2019 as a “flagship project” linking in financing such a large project that could China’s BRI with Turkey’s pre-planned be thwarted at a later stage. The reluctance “Middle Corridor”. In 2015, a Chinese state- of some Turkish lenders makes it more owned consortium acquired a 65 percent likely that state and foreign financing will share of Istanbul’s Kumport terminal in the take centre stage. Ambarli port complex near the Bosporus. On April 30, Minister of Infrastructure Kumport terminal, the third largest port in and Transport Adil Karaismailoglu declared Turkey, handles 16 percent of the country’s that financial institutions from the Nether- container traffic. This investment suggests lands, Belgium, China and Russia were that China might indeed be interested in interested in the project. As part of its Mari- financing Canal Istanbul and maritime time Silk Road Initiative, China is reported- ports in Turkey. According to the Turkish ly showing greatest interest in the tender. TV channel TGRT, the financing of Canal China seeks to control “maritime choke- Istanbul was one of the priority items on points” and has undertaken port-related the agenda during the visit of Chinese cooperation with countries along the Medi- Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Ankara on terranean and Black Sea. Turkey’s estrange- March 25. ment from the West following the abortive military coup of July 15, 2016 provided an opportunity for China to improve coopera- A Geo-strategic Pivot? tive relations with Turkey that had begun back in 2010. In November 2016, Turkey Maybe more than the environmental and and China signed an agreement on Turkey’s economic costs, the geo-political implica- inclusion in China’s Belt and Road Initia- tions of Canal Istanbul have rung alarm tive (BRI), through which Beijing promised bells both at home and abroad considering to invest $750 million in Turkish infrastruc- that Ankara has been presenting mixed ture. Since then, the volume of China’s FDI messages with regards to the Montreux in Turkey has increased more than three- Convention. On the one hand, President fold. Erdogan seems to consider the Montreux Back in 2018, the press reported that Convention as disadvantageous to Turkey’s China was willing to invest $65 billion in regional power aspirations. On December total into the project and could immediate- 18, 2019, he stated that “there is no right ly transfer $30 billion as a deposit. More given to us in Montreux. Ships come and go recently, the Industrial and Commercial through the Straits as they wish […] Canal Bank of China (ICBC), the Bank of China, Istanbul will not be like that. We will have and the Hong Kong-based British bank a new legal regime when we make this HSBC are cited as potential financiers of the investment, just as the Suez Canal and project. The ICBC and the Bank of China others”. Erdogan reiterated in Istanbul on are significant sources of BRI financing in December 23, 2019 that Canal Istanbul Turkey and in other parts of the world. The would reveal what Turkey had gained and ICBC acquired a 75.5 percent stake of the lost due to the Convention. These state- Turkey’s Tekstilbank in 2014 and provided ments triggered 126 retired ambassadors a $2.7 billion loan for Marmaray (the sub- to release a joint statement on January 31,

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4 2020, calling for the abandonment of this How Would the Montreux project that “could lead to Turkey losing its Convention be Affected by the absolute sovereignty over the Bosporus and Construction of a New Canal? Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara” by opening the Montreux Convention up to The Montreux Convention of 1936 is a discussion. Reminding their audience of multilateral treaty regulating maritime Russia’s enduring claims to the Straits as transit through the Bosporus, the Darda- well as the US’s long-time interest in revis- nelles and the Sea of Marmara. The con- ing the Convention, the former ambassa- struction of a manmade canal would not dors underlined that Canal Istanbul may directly affect the rules of Montreux as end up serving the interests of those states. international law on the sea separates the Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu criti- regime of straits and those of manmade cised the joint declaration on February 2, canals. The implementation of new regu- 2020, decrying it as “a purely politically lations governing the Canal may, neverthe- motivated statement” while arguing that less, raise controversy and thereby open Canal Istanbul would not put the Montreux provisions of the Convention to discussion. Convention at risk as Turkey would not One possible point of contention could force any vessel to use the waterway. arise from the definition of the Turkish Discussions on the Montreux Convention Straits in the preamble of the Montreux have, however, resurged with the publica- Convention as a single unit that comprises tion of an open letter signed by 104 retired the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and admirals on April 3, 2021. The letter called the Bosporus. The proposed canal, however, on the government to “refrain from any would only connect the Black Sea and the kind of action that could make the Mon- Sea of Marmara, and ships would still need treux Convention a matter of international to traverse the Sea of Marmara and the controversy” and was released shortly after Dardanelles to access the Aegean Sea. This Turkey’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Con- may prompt the following controversies. vention on March 20. Turkey’s withdrawal Regarding merchant vessels, Turkey has from the Istanbul Convention was pushed no right to ban the passage of merchant through by presidential decree, triggering vessels traversing the Bosporus as the Con- a debate on presidential powers and parlia- vention affirms the principle of freedom of mentary oversight. Speaker of the Parlia- transit and navigation in the Straits without ment Mustafa Sentop suggested on March any time limit (Article 1) and guarantees all 24 that, in technical terms, it could be pos- merchant ships free passage during peace- sible in principle to withdraw from other time (Article 2). However, it also enables international conventions, including the Turkey to issue “taxes and charges” for Montreux Convention, by presidential sanitary control, service of lighthouses, etc. decree. Ankara lambasted the admirals’ let- (Article 2 and Annex I). Currently, Turkey ter as a tacit “coup threat” and launched collects around $25 thousand for ships legal proceedings against the retired ad- carrying a capacity of 100 thousand net mirals. Commenting on the letter on April tons. Under the Convention, tax and 5, Erdogan sought to cool the controversy charges cover round trip passage (valid for but held his ground: “We have neither an six months) through the entire waterway ongoing work nor an intention to pull out from the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara and of the Montreux Convention at present, but the Dardanelles. It may stir controversy we’ll not hesitate to review any agreement if charges would be levied by a new canal, with a view of securing a better one for our especially given that pilotage and tug country if such a need arises in the future”. service fees that were made compulsory by Turkey in 1994 were again made optional in 1998. This reversion is the result of Russia and other states’ objections to the

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5 fees at the International Maritime Organi- naval vessel may pass through the Darda- zation; they saw them as contrary to “uni- nelles and the Sea of Marmara and visit versally recognized provisions of the Law of the Port of Istanbul under mutual military the Sea by which no regulations issued by relations organised by the Turkish General a coastal State may deny, hamper or impair Staff. As Kurtulus Yucel suggests, such a the rights of freedom of passage through visit may not be addressed by the Montreux international straits” and also as contrary to Convention as the warship does not com- “the terms of the Montreux Convention”. plete the full trip foreseen under Montreux. Regarding the passage of warships, the This prompts the question: can a military Environmental Impact Assessment report vessel coming from the Aegean Sea and published by the Ministry of Environment visiting the Port of Istanbul (or any Turkish and Urbanization in 2020, recommends port in the Sea of Marmara) enter the Black Turkey either to ban the passage of war- Sea without providing advanced notice? ships through the new canal or to apply If such passage were possible, how would the terms of the Convention to it. If Turkey Turkey control whether warships entering follows the first option, then no problems or leaving the Black Sea comply with re- will arise. However, if it opts for the second, strictions related to tonnage, class and then such a regulation is likely to be con- duration? Thus, it is foreseeable that even tested as the Convention imposes several if the Canal might not affect the Montreux restrictions on the passage of warships, in regime directly, the application of the regu- terms of their mode of entry, the duration lations of the Canal could cause signatory of their stay, their tonnage and their class. states to argue that Turkey is in violation Article 13 requests Black Sea littoral states of the Convention, thereby leading to pro- to provide the relevant Turkish authorities posals for the Convention’s denunciation with at least 8 days’ notice and non-littoral or amendment. states 15 days’ notice of an intended transit. Article 14 limits the number of non-littoral naval vessels that can pass through the Scenarios of Straits at any one time to nine. The maxi- Convention Modification mum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces which may be in the course of transit Article 28 of the Convention allows any one through the Straits at any one time should of the signatory states, including Turkey, also not exceed 15,000 tons. Yet, Article 11 Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, grants littoral naval ships a greater tonnage Romania, Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, to allowance on the condition that these request a demand for its denunciation. If vessels pass through the Straits individually, this happens, the signatory powers will escorted by no more than two destroyers. hold a conference to negotiate a new con- Article 18 limits the duration of non-littoral vention. The Montreux Convention is to naval warships’ stay in the Black Sea to 21 continue in force until two years after such days, and the aggregate tonnage of warships notice has been given, although the prin- belonging to all non-littoral states present ciple of freedom of transit and navigation in the Black Sea at any one time cannot shall last “without limit of time”. exceed 45,000 tons. Annex II of the Con- Article 29 allows the signatory states to vention prohibits the passage of aircraft initiate a proposal to amend one or more carriers. If Turkey allows warships to pass of the provisions following a period of five via the Canal, questions may arise about years from the date of the entry into force passage permissions as well as tonnage and of the Convention in 1936. To be valid, any class restrictions. request for modifications to Articles 14 or If, on the other hand, Turkey uses its 18, which concern aggregate tonnage and statute for foreign warships visiting Turkish the number of war vessels in the Straits ports in the Sea of Marmara, a non-littoral and the Black Sea, must be supported by

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6 another signatory state. In the case of second is the removal of the 21-day dura- modifications to any other article, it must tion limit, which would allow NATO vessels be supported by at least two other signatory to maintain a steady presence in the Black states. Notice for any request for revision Sea. The third is the tonnage restrictions for must be given to all parties three months warships, which were already a point of prior to the end of the five-year period and contention between US and Turkish diplo- should contain details of the proposed mats during the Russian-Georgian War of amendments and the reasoning therefor. 2008, when Turkey rejected the transit of If an agreement on these proposals cannot the US’s 69,552-ton hospital ship as it be reached, a conference representing the exceeded tonnage restrictions. The fourth signatory states will be held in which deci- concerns the exclusion of aircraft carriers sions would be taken by unanimous vote. from accessing the Black Sea. The fifth There is an exception to this rule for pro- might be to limit tonnage of commercial posed amendments to Articles 14 and 18, ships, which would increase Russia’s oil for which a three-quarter majority of the export costs and slow its access to the signatory states must be secured. The said, market. this majority must include three-quarters From the perspective of the EU, preserv- of the signatory Black Sea littoral states, one ing the status quo is important for its en- of which must be Turkey. In this context, ergy and security interests. The EU, which although Turkey cannot single-handedly receives a large bulk of its oil via the Bos- force an amendment to the Convention, porus, would arguably be concerned about it has de facto veto power for revisions to the potential of higher costs of transport Articles 14 and 18. The existing five-year due to transit tolls associated with the new period ends on November 9, 2021, and a canal. The adverse environmental effects proposal for amendments must be put forth of the Canal that could possibly affect the on August 9, 2021. Aegean Sea may also increase tension be- If the Montreux Convention is formally tween Turkey and EU-member Greece. The challenged, it is likely that any new treaty EU may use the Barcelona and Bucharest would involve a group of countries differ- Conventions as well as the EU Coastal and ent from the high contracting parties of Marine Environment Policy as leverage 1936. The US would likely want to be rep- against the project. From a security perspec- resented given its interests and obligations tive, the restrictive provisions of the Mon- to regional allies. In the face of current and treux Convention are not a disadvantage for future Russian naval expansion, it is highly the EU because Romanian and Bulgarian likely that Washington would look favour- naval vessels can pass through the Straits ably upon revision of the Convention. As a without restrictions. Yet, in the case of a matter of fact, in 2009, then-US Ambassa- threat against their members in the Black dor to Turkey James Jeffrey proposed break- Sea, the EU may look favourably upon ing the Convention to Retired Vice Admiral revising these restrictive terms of the Con- Atilla Kiyat, arguing that “nobody can do vention. In such a scenario, Black Sea anything when both Turkey and the US littoral states including Ukraine, Georgia, wanted it”. The US could, therefore, argu- Romania and Bulgaria, may also look ably look favourably upon revising the fol- favourably upon modifying the Conven- lowing five rules of the Montreux Conven- tion. The post-Brexit United Kingdom, tion to constrain Russia’s room for ma- which is a party to the Convention, would noeuvre. The first is standardisation of the arguably act similarly to the US regarding notification period to 15 days for all war- possible revisions or a denunciation. ships, which would send a signal to Moscow Russia, however, would be deeply con- that the international community could cerned about any attempt to alter the status slow the deployment of Russian naval quo as the Convention constrains unwel- forces entering the Mediterranean Sea. The come Western presence in the Black Sea

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7 while also providing Russia an opportu- Meral Aksener, as well as Istanbul Mayor nity to develop an anti-access/area denial Ekrem Imamoglu sent strong messages to (A2/AD) capability. Arguably, the impor- the international community and possible tance of the Turkish Straits for Russia has financiers that the guarantees for loans will increased with the start of the Syrian Civil be limited to Erdogan’s tenure. Still, Erdo- War in 2011. The Turkish Straits provide a gan seems to be determined to carry out the unique connection between Moscow’s naval project not only to enhance Turkey’s geo- bases in Tartus, Syria and in the Black Sea. political leverage but also as a matter of After all, at 134, Russia accounted for 63 personal prestige. If the project is material- percent of the total 214 warship passages ised, Erdogan will be able to one-up Otto- © Stiftung Wissenschaft through the Turkish Straits in 2019. Russia, man Sultans, such as Suleiman the Magnifi- und Politik, 2021 therefore, insists on the application of the cent, who had attempted to build such a All rights reserved Convention to Canal Istanbul as expressed canal but eventually failed due to construc- by President Putin in a call with Erdogan tion challenges. He would also challenge This Comment reflects on April 9. In 2019, Russian Ambassador to the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who the author’s views. Turkey Aleksei Erkhov stated that Moscow attained his greatest diplomatic success The online version of considers the project an internal matter so with the Montreux Convention. Building a this publication contains long as it does not change the Montreux new canal under full Turkish sovereignty functioning links to other regime. Given that Russia is dependent on would undermine Russia’s influence while SWP texts and other relevant the Turkish Straits to export its wheat, oil potentially advancing US and British inter- sources. and natural gas, the tolls for using the new ests by providing their navies greater pres- SWP Comments are subject canal could make it less economical to ence in the Black Sea. to internal peer review, fact- transport goods, having negative conse- For the EU, the project represents a stra- checking and copy-editing. quences for the Russian economy. Thus, tegic dilemma. On the one hand, the EU For further information on Turkey’s “encouragement” of ships using could benefit strategically from dealing a our quality control pro- the Canal to collect tolls may spark a con- blow to Russian influence, but on the other cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- testation from Russia. In such a scenario, hand, Ankara’s exclusive control of the berlin.org/en/about-swp/ Russians may insist on limiting Turkey’s Canal may be detrimental to Brussels’ long- quality-management-for- ability to act unilaterally, yet to what term interests as it may result in a more swp-publications/ degree Russia could succeed will depend assertive and autonomous Turkey that does on whether it can convince other maritime not consider European interests. Given the SWP powers, especially China, to join them. geo-strategic implications of the project, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik most prudent course of action for European German Institute for policymakers would be to keep diplomatic International and Prospects and Pitfalls channels open with all Turkish stakehold- Security Affairs ers on this issue, as failing to do so would Given the prevailing uncertainty over the mean surrendering the initiative to Erdo- Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin source of financing and Turkey’s enduring gan’s ambitions alone. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 debt crisis, double-digit inflation and Fax +49 30 880 07-100 weakening domestic support for the gov- www.swp-berlin.org erning party, the chances of realising the [email protected] project remain low. Unlike previous mega-

ISSN (Print) 1861-1761 projects, it does not enjoy strong public ISSN (Online) 2747-5107 backing. A recent survey revealed that doi: 10.18449/2021C43 49 percent of the population opposes the project, while only 38 percent were in favour of it. The leaders of Turkey’s main opposition parties, Kemal Kilicdaroglu and

Dr. Tuba Eldem is a CATS Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS) at SWP.

The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the German Federal Foreign Office. SWP Comment 43

July 2021

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