Public Transportation Safety Board Rail Abbreviated

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

RAIL ABBREVIATED REPORT FORM

PTSB Case No. Property Name Accident Date 10058 New York & Atlantic Railway January 8, 2009

Accident Type OnInjuries J Fatalities Accident Cause 0 0 Derailment Insufficient amount of brakes set

Location Borough, City, Village, Town Deer Park Suffolk

On Thursday, January 8, 2009, at approximately 9:10 a.m., the New York & Atlantic Railroad freight train # RS-60 was performing switching operations in the Pineaire Siding off of Main Line track #1 at mile post 38.8 in Deer Park, NY. This track is used jointly with the LIRR and is subject to LIRR operating rules. Train RS-60 consisted of 24 cars and the crew had just cut away 13 gondola from the rest of consist when the cut away cars began to roll westward, gaining speed while rolling approximately 1700 feet until reaching the derail at the west end of the siding. Upon reaching an applied derail at the west end of the siding, nine cars went over the derail fouling the main line and the other four cars derailed with one car rolling over on its side dumping a load of construction and demolition debris down the embankment and onto the adjacent property. There was no hazardous debris involved. Seven of the freight cars were damaged; three significantly. There was also infrastructure damage to the third rail, the railroad ties, the running rails and the siding switch and derail. The total damage cost was estimated to be in excess of $350,000. Photo #1 –View of derailed cars in switch area with equipment fouling track #1 and rolled over on the siding.

NYAR rule # 104.14 states when determining the number of handbrakes to set, some key factors comes into determining the amount required. These factors include the grade and adhesion, the number of loaded cars and empty car as well as weather conditions. LIRR Operating Rule #961 regarding handbrake application and which also applied, states that a sufficient number of handbrakes, a minimum of two on each end, must be applied on all trains or cuts of cars left standing or yarded on any track to make them secure, unless otherwise provided. In a statement given by the conductor to the MTA-PD, the conductor claimed that he applied six hand brakes. Upon arrival at the scene, NYAR officials found only two hand brakes applied on the two east cars of the cut out. The grade of the track had a westerly descending grade of .68%. The two hand brakes applied would not provide sufficient holding given the grade and the amount of cars and the weight. The engine event recorder from train #RS60 provided a timeline that indicated less than one minute elapsed between the engine stopping and the subsequent cut. That time frame does not allow sufficient time for a crew member to apply six hand brakes as claimed by the conductor. There was no physical evidence or claim by the crew that indicated that any hand brakes were applied to any car on the west end of the cut. This was verified by the first officials arriving at the scene who inspected the train.

Track conditions were not considered to be causative however the failure of the derail to properly perform was contributory to the severity. The crew of NYAR-RS-60 was sent for toxicological testing as governed by the company policies and the results were negative. The weather condition at the time of the incident was clear and cold with a temperature of 35 degrees and was not considered to have played a role in this accident.

Corrective Action:

An accident review team was formed, including a representative from the FRA, to review the circumstances of the accident and is considering amending the hand brake and switching procedures for freight cars versus passenger equipment. The review team also reviewed the type and use of various derails and their operation. As a result of the accident and the review team’s assessment, the derail was replaced with a split rail derail which is considered more effective at a location such as this.

As a result of the investigation, the conductor was charged with failing to apply sufficient hand brakes to secure the cut off cars; violating both LIRR rules and federal guidelines. For his failure, the conductor was terminated.

The Public Transportation Safety Board staff finds that the most probable cause of this accident was the failure of the conductor to set a sufficient number of handbrakes to secure the cut off cars. Based on these reported facts, the corrective actions taken by all parties involved and the termination of the conductor, the Public Transportation Safety Board staff makes no recommendations regarding this accident.

Investigated by Approved Date David Hess Jerry Shook April 28, 2009