“Otherwise, It's War”: US-Taiwan Defense Ties and the Opening Of
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Chapman University Chapman University Digital Commons War and Society (MA) Theses Dissertations and Theses Spring 5-2021 “Otherwise, it’s War”: US-Taiwan Defense Ties and the Opening of the People’s Republic of China (1969-1974) Robert 'Bo' Kent Chapman University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/war_and_society_theses Part of the American Politics Commons, Diplomatic History Commons, International Relations Commons, Military History Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Kent, Robert 'Bo'. "'Otherwise, it’s War': US-Taiwan Defense Ties and the Opening of the People’s Republic of China (1969-1974)." Master's thesis, Chapman University, 2021. https://doi.org/10.36837/ chapman.000282 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in War and Society (MA) Theses by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. “Otherwise, it’s War”: US-Taiwan Defense Ties and the Opening of the People’s Republic of China (1969-1974) A Thesis By Robert ‘Bo’ Kent Chapman University Orange, CA Wilkinson College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in War and Society May 2021 Committee in charge: Charissa Threat, PhD., Chair Matteo Jarquin, PhD. Kyle Longley, PhD. The thesis of Robert Kent is approved Charissa Threat, PhD., Chair Matteo Jarquin, PhD. Kyle Longely, PhD. May 2021 “Otherwise, it’s War”: US-Taiwan Defense Ties and the Opening of the People’s Republic of China (1969-1974) Copyright © 2021 by Robert Kent III ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study was written by one person, but it is not the work of one person alone. I owe a great deal to all who have supported me throughout the writing of this thesis. I would like to thank Dr. Charissa Threat, Dr. Kyle Longely, Dr. Matteo Jarquin, Dr. Greg Daddis, Dr. Bill Cumiford, Dr. Robert Slayton, Dr. Rafael Luevano, Dr. Shira Klein, and Stacey Laird for their support of my academic career. I would like to also thank Dr. Thomas Reins for his mentorship across the five years I have been at Chapman, and for helping further my interest in US-PRC relations. This thesis would not have been possible without any of you. I have also been blessed enough to receive the support of my entire family over the course of my studies. If I were to name each person individually, this section would be the length of my thesis. I can say without reservation that all of you are the reason I could fulfil my dream of attending this school in the first place. My profound thanks to you all. I would like to finish by thanking some of my friends from school who have stuck around me throughout this program. I’d especially like to thank Robbie Del Toro, Griffee Albaugh, Nathan Huffine, Kolby Reinke, Jonathan Banks, Michael MacInnes, Joseph Dickinson, Lee Sottile, Sandy Serwin, Nick Hirsch, Wally Zermeno, Nick Durell, Emily Olague, Greg Falcon, Maiya White, Rebekah Moore, and Vanessa Zenji. I’ll always be thankful that I crossed paths with you all. IV ABSTRACT “Otherwise, it’s War”: US-Taiwan Defense Ties and the Opening of the People’s Republic of China 1969-1974 by Robert Kent In 1969, President Richard Nixon inherited a much different Cold War than that which existed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Writ large, the project of ‘containing’ communism appeared to be falling apart. The Soviet Union was ascendant in Eurasia, the Vietnam War was continuing to grind down American power projection, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was emerging as a potential partner on the world stage. Despite the uncertainty of the situation, both President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger saw these circumstances as an opportunity to reshape the global balance of power. Key to this plan was a diplomatic ‘opening’ to the PRC, which would engender a tripolar balance of power to counter the Soviet Union’s grip on Asia. Yet, the major obstacle in the way of this plan was the ongoing American recognition of the Nationalist Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and the existing defense treaty Washington and Taipei. For decades, Peking was adamant that Washington needed to forswear all support for Taipei as a precondition for full diplomatic ties between the United States and PRC. Unfortunately, such a formula appeared to give Communist China a path to reunify Taiwan with the Mainland through military action. To maintain peace in East Asia and to protect American V credibility, the United States could not afford to allow the PRC to use force to settle its dispute with Taiwan. This thesis argues that the Nixon Administration sought to use diplomacy with the PRC and its security ties with the ROC to ensure a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait crisis during the US opening of Communist China. In doing so, the US side aimed to find a balance between a diplomatic partnership with Peking and a defense relationship with Taipei. This challenges conventional views about the Nixon Administration’s willingness to unilaterally abandon its commitments to Taiwan in order to open the People’s Republic of China. This thesis further contends that the roots of the modern American approach of ‘strategic ambiguity’ towards the ROC has its roots in the policies which the Administration perused from 1969-1974. VI TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements IV Abstract V Abbreviations VIII Introduction 1 Historiography 9 Chapter 1: Taiwan and Nixon’s Asia 18 New Agendas 20 The ‘Other’ China 26 Rapprochement Redux 30 Growing Pains 37 Once More Unto Peking 44 Chapter 2: Managing Turbulence 54 Damage Control 65 Showdown at the UN 71 Chapter 3: Sleight of Hand 81 Preparations and Assurances 87 Mr. Nixon Goes to Peking 90 Fallout 97 More Than a ‘Decent Interval’ 100 The Soviet Counterweight 105 A Long Stalemate 107 Conclusion: Strategic Ambiguity 111 References 117 VII ABBREVIATIONS CCP Chinese Communist Party CIA Central Intelligence Agency DoD (US) Department of Defense Eximbank Export-Import Bank FMS Foreign Military Sales KMT Kuomintang MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group MAP Military Assistance Plan MDA Mutual Defense Agreement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSC National Security Council NSDM National Security Decision Memorandum NSSM National Security Study Memorandum PRC People’s Republic of China ROC Republic of China SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization UN United Nations US United States USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VIII Introduction War in Asia was on President Richard Nixon’s mind the morning of February 1, 1973. In a White House meeting that day with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, he addressed the interlinked issues of the winding down Vietnam War, the improved relations with the PRC, and the ongoing troop withdrawals from the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. This last issue, in particular, had loomed over the Administration’s head since he took office. Since 1954, the United States had maintained both an alliance with the ROC and a strong troop presence there, but now, it was gradually scaling back its deployments on the island. The process of doing so was causing apprehension among policymakers in Washington. As the President noted in this conversation, “[what] we have to have in mind is what the hell we do on Taiwan.”1 The Nixon Administration was walking a fine line between Taipei and Peking, fearing the notion that the PRC might see the American troop withdrawals as an assent to annex the ‘rogue province’ of Taiwan through military means. That the communists had sought for the past four years to pressure Nixon into annulling the 1954 defense treaty added fuel to this fire. These terms were unacceptable to Washington. Reneging on its defense commitments to Taiwan would soil US credibility, cost Washington an important asset in the Asia-Pacific region and place the ROC on the island at risk of annihilation. Hence, the Nixon Administration remained adamant that for a total American withdrawal from the island, the Communists on the mainland would have to forswear any designs of military action against Taiwan. In the meantime, it was imperative that the United States use its security ties with the ROC as a means to ensure a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan Straits crisis- “otherwise,” Nixon noted minatorily, “it’s war.”2 1 “Nixon in China Again,” February 1, 1973 in Douglas Brinkley and Luke A. Nichter, The Nixon Tapes: 1973 (Boston ; New York: Mariner Books, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016), 34. 2 “Nixon in China Again,” February 1, 1973 in Brinkley and Nichter, The Nixon Tapes: 1973, 35. 1 This short observation by the President was not simply a statement of hyperbole, but instead reflected the potentially dangerous tensions that existed between Peking and Taipei well into the 1970s. Simultaneously, the conversation also reflected the continuing interest which the United States had in settling the Taiwan Straits crisis through peaceful means, even after Nixon’s 1972 visit to China. Too often, however, scholarship has misread the US-ROC defense relationship under Nixon. In works which examine Nixon’s ‘opening’ of the PRC, Taiwan is largely sidelined within the context of the developing ties between Washington and Peking. Those who have examined Nixon’s approach to Taiwan during this time have in large part characterized it as a ‘sellout’ of the ROC. In their formulation that the Nixon Administration had shorn itself of the responsibility of defending Taiwan, this study affirms that scholars of this ‘sellout’ camp are asking the wrong questions.