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Poetry and Diplomacy: Telling It Slant by Biljana Scott

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Poetry and Diplomacy: Telling It Slant by Biljana Scott Training, Language and Culture doi: 10.29366/2018tlc.2.1.3 Volume 2 Issue 1, 2018 rudn.tlcjournal.org Poetry and diplomacy: Telling it slant by Biljana Scott Amsterdam: John Benjamins. EDULEARN16 (pp. 7236-7241). Spain: IATED. Kockaert, H. J., & Steurs, F. (Eds.). (2015). Handbook of Manik, S. (2015, 24 July). On difficulties of compiling parallel Biljana Scott University of Oxford [email protected] terminology (Vol. 1). John Benjamins Publishing corpus of socio-political terms. In Proceedings of Published in Training, Language and Culture Vol 2 Issue 1 (2018) pp. 51-66 doi: 10.29366/2018tlc.2.1.4 Company. Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences (pp. Recommended citation format: Scott, B. (2018). Poetry and diplomacy: Telling it slant. Training, Language and Kramarevski, A. I. (2008). Anglo-russkiy politicheskiy 465-473). Elsevier Ltd. doi: 10.1016/ slivar’ [English-Russian dictionary of politics]. j.sbspro.2015.07.467 Culture, 2(1), 51-66. doi: 10.29366/2018tlc.2.1.4 Moscow: Antea 2000. McLean, I., & McMillan, A. (2009). The concise Oxford The study looks at some defining similarities and differences between poetry and diplomacy. It shows that both Larsen-Freeman, D., & Cameron, L. (2012). Complex systems dictionary of politics. Oxford University Press. pursuits make extensive use of underspecification and illustrates how each deploys a variety of shared tropes, from and applied linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Ozhegov, S. I. (2012). Tolkoviy slovar’ russkogo yazyka ambiguity to metaphor, neologisms and parataxis. Despite these similarities in language, the reasons for resorting to Press. [Russian language dictionary] (28th ed.). Moscow: implicit communication differ significantly, with only one exception – redress. Redress, which is the attempt to find a LDCE (2015). Longman dictionary of contemporary English. Oniks. counterbalance to anomalies and injustices, requires the ability to keep two or more potentially conflicting views in mind. The article concludes that ambivalence is a necessary attribute of both a poet and a diplomat and that well- Harlow: Longman Pearson. Ponomarenko, E. V. (2016, 24-31 August). Functional judged ambiguity is an essential vehicle for redress. Malakhova, V. L. (2017). O slozhnostjah nauchnogo properties of English discourse in terms of perevoda s anglijskogo jazyka na russkij [On linguosynergetics. In Proceedings of SGEM2016 (pp. KEYWORDS: diplomacy, poetry, ambiguity, language and thought, redress, communication challenges of translation of scientific economic texts 355-362). Albena, Bulgaria: SGEM. from English into Russian]. Voprosy Prikladnoj Raymond, W. J. (1992). Dictionary of politics: Selected This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is Lingvistiki, 2(26), 21-39. American and foreign political and legal terms. properly cited (CC BY 4.0) Malyuga, E. N., & Orlova, S. N. (2016, 4-6 July). Teaching Virginia: Brunswick Publishing Corporation. professional English terminology to students Roeder, W. S. (2006). Dictionary of European history. New of economic universities. In Proceedings of York: Philosophical Press. 1. INTRODUCTION duplicitous, because the language they use is so The first issue of Training Language and Culture inscrutable. In an age of KISS (Keep it Simple, cites these words of Dr Johnson on its front cover: Stupid), clear writing and a popular distrust of ‘Language is the dress of thought’. In this article, I experts, complexity and ambiguity are viewed consider whether there are any significant with distrust. Yet multiplicity of meaning can be an similarities in the language and thinking of two advantage, not least in being less binary and seemingly very different pursuits, poetry and binding than the black and white of literal diplomacy. I start by asking whether poets and language – assuming, that is, that literal language diplomats make use of the same linguistic is itself transparent (Empson, 1930; Bernstein, resources. I then consider how similarities in dress 1976; Scott, 2001). This section looks at examples may obscure differences in thought and conclude of the intentional use of underspecification – those that the most significant commonality between areas of language that most readily give rise to poetry and diplomacy lies as much in their power multiple interpretations – in both poetry and of redress as in their dress. diplomacy. 2. LANGUAGE 2.2 Ambiguity 2.1 General remarks Poets and diplomats seem to make a virtue of Poetry is often considered difficult, and diplomacy ‘telling it slant’. As Emily Dickinson (1998) puts it: © Biljana Scott 2018 50 Training, Language and Culture This content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License Training, Language and Culture 51 Training, Language and Culture doi: 10.29366/2018tlc.2.1.4 Poetry and diplomacy: Telling it slant Volume 2 Issue 1, 2018 rudn.tlcjournal.org by Biljana Scott Tell all the truth but tell it slant – China, which affirms that there is only ‘One ‘One line in particular has the official title for Chinese foreign policy, and Success in Circuit lies China’, despite there being two governments with provoked controversy, namely several speeches and articles promoting taoguang ... claims to that status: the People’s Republic of taoguang yanghui, which yanghui indicate the pride and determination that The Truth must dazzle gradually China and the Republic of China. The wording of drives this policy. The American reaction to this Or every man be blind – the communiqué, in not specifying the political literally means hide brightness, phrase, in contrast, was one of deep suspicion. status of the Republic of China, leaves it to the nourish obscurity but has been Informed by a history of mutual distrust, In poetry, multiple meanings give rise to richer Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait to translated as hide our capacities Americans inferred that those prospective actions readings, all of which can potentially co-exist. This resolve their dispute among themselves while also and bide our time’ would most likely be detrimental to the interests of is evident in the Dickinson extract where all the leaving the choice open for other countries to the U.S. The Chinese public were roused to anger substantive words are open to interpretation: how make, with the result that some countries have providing room for manoeuvre, not all ambiguity by those self-same words, reading in them an does one tell the truth slant and at what point does diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of is necessarily constructive to all parties at all appeal to hold back and lie low rather than stand a slant truth stop being a truth and become China and others with the Republic of China, but times. This final example of ambiguity combines up and be counted among the leading nations of something else, such as a white lie or fake news? never both (Shanghai Communiqué, 1972): poetry and foreign policy in the form of Deng the world. China’s ‘century of humiliation’ at the What constitutes a Circuit, and does one (should Xiaoping’s 24-character strategy, a series of hands of Western powers was the determining one) always come back to the point of departure, ‘The United States acknowledges that all Chinese guidelines for the Party following his death (Keith, frame of reference for the Chinese man in the as the word suggests? Might there even be a on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is 2018). Deng’s recommendations read like a poem, street. For a casual observer, however, nothing connotation of running circles round others or of but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. written in regular four-character phrases which much makes sense in either the form or content of winding someone round one’s little finger? What The United States Government does not challenge echo both a traditional style of Chinese poetry as this policy guideline. Thus, a single four-character justifies the presupposition that truth is blinding, that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful well as the chengyu, or proverb (Yip, 1997): expression managed to elicit at least four distinct and how should we understand the divergent settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese reactions: pride, distrust, anger and, where the connotations of the verbs to blind and to dazzle? themselves.’ ‘Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with general foreign public is concerned, perplexity. In affairs deeply; hide our capacities and bide our ambiguity, as in metaphor – discussed next – Questions such as these, and many others like Ambiguity of referent is also evident in the phrase time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and frames of reference are instrumental in priming them, give rise to valuable reflections. socialism with Chinese characteristics, which has never claim leadership.’ particular interpretations. In diplomacy, so-called constructive ambiguity acted as an umbrella term for very diverse similarly allows one and the same piece of principles, policies and priorities over the last half One line in particular has provoked controversy, 2.3 Metaphor and connotations language to accommodate two or more divergent century, while implying that a common identity namely taoguang yanghui, which literally means In the taoguang yanghui example, ambiguity arises positions. and nationalism nevertheless underlies these hide brightness, nourish obscurity but
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