h OR WARD TO if B # % strategy, tactics and programme of the af rican national congress SOUTH AFRICA
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Handtekoniog/SlgfiEiure FORWARD TO FREEDOM Documents on the National Policies of the African National Congress of South Africa
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CONTENTS i
Strategy and Tactics of the ANC:
Revolutionary Programme of the ANC: An analysis of the Freedom Charter in the light of the 'p>»*cgt^orined phase of our struggle 19
The Freedom Charter: Full text os odopted on June 26. 1955 ot Kliptown, Johannesburg 29
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Haodtekeninp^S'pnatufe .... - STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS
he struggle of the oppressed people os yet broken the chains of colonialism ond of South Africo is taking place rocism which hold them in oppression. In T within an international context of transiMozambique, Angola, South West Africo, tion to the Socialist system, of the break Zimbabwe and South Africo White racialist down of the colonial system os a result of and fascist regimes maintain systems national liberation and socialist revolu which go against the current trend of the tions, and the fight for sociol ond econo African revolution ond world development. mic progress by the people of the whole This has been mode possible by the world. tremendous economic and military power We in South Africo are part of the xone at the disposal of these regimes built with in which nationdl-JiJtyjrotion is the chief the help of imperialism. content of the struggle. On our continent The main pillar of the unholy ollionce of sweeping odvonces hove been registered Portugal. Rhodesia ond South Africa is the which hove resulted in the emergence to Republic of South Africa. The strategy ond independent statehood of forty one states. toctics of our revolution require for their Thus the first formol step of independence formulotion and understanding o full has been largely won in Africo and this appreciation of the interlocking and inter fact exercises a big influence on the weaving of International, Africon ond developments in our country. Southern African developments which play The countries of Southern Africo have not on our situation.
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Role by Force 1910. The 50 years which followed m s not o period of resignation or of acceptance. South Africo wos conquered by force ond It was a period of development and of it today ruled by force. At moments when regrouping under new conditions; o White autocracy feels Itself threatened. It period in which newly created political *r •• . * -U does not hesitate to use the gun. When formations. of the people continued to the gun is not in us legal and admini struggle with the enemy ond grew Into strative terror, fear, social ond economic maturity; a period In which, above all, pressures, complocency and confusion ge national consciousness began to assert nerated by propaganda and "education", Itself agoinst tribal sectionalism. This ore the devices brought into play in an period witnessed the emergence and attempt to harness the people's opposition. development of the primary organisation Behind these devices hovers force. Whe of the liberation movement — The African ther in reserve or in actual employment National Congress. It also saw the evol- force is ever present and this hoy been so vement of national organisations reflect since the White mon came to Africa. ing the aspirations of other oppressed non-White groups — the Coloureds and Unending Resistance to White the Indians — and the creation of eco Do;nination nomic and political organisations — the South African Communist Party! Trade From the time alien rule was imposed Unions which reflected the special aims there hos been — historically speaking — ond aspirations of the newly developed unbroken resistance to this domination. and doubly exploited working class. This It hos taken different forms at different was a period of organisational growth. times but it has never been abandoned. It was punctuated by struggles involving For the first 250 years there were regular : ♦. techniques ranging from orthodox mass armed dashes, battles and wars. The campaigning to general strikes, to mass •» ! fr I superior material resources of the enemy, acts of defiance. It Culminated in the the divided and often fragmented nature decision taken in 1961 to prepare for of the resistance, the unchallenged armed confrontation. December 1961 saw ascendancy of imperialism as a world the opening stages of this campaign in system up to the beginning of the 20th the simultaneous acts of sabotoge which century, the historically unterstandable occured in most of the main urban centres absence of political cohesion ond leader on the 16th. ship in the people's camp; these and other factors combined to end the first The Move to Armed Struggle phase of resistance against alien domi nation. But the protracted character of Why was the decision for armed struggle this resistance unequalled anywhere else taken in 1961. Why not 1951 o r '1941 or in Africa is underlined by the fact that 1931? Is it that the character of the state the armed subjugation of the indigenous had so altered fundamentally that only people wos only really accomplished by in 1961 did armed struggle become the the beginning of this century. The defeat only alternative? Not at all. There has ' of the Bambata Rebellion in 1906 marked never been a moment in the history of the end of this first phase and set the South Africo since 1952 in which the stage for the handing over of the admini White ruling class would have given pri stration of the country to local whites In vileges without a physical battle. Why
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z th,\tCUT'fcn'cur truei rr,v 136S!i » .g s r ly .r...... I. w »ijcc o.7m4 <•.«*3* . * i 3I, wfgens ny m u M p .'s, •MamMsT T I m i! 1 > "*'*• «• then did orgonisotions like the African be as counter-revolutionary os the odvo* Notional Congress not call for armed cocy of Its opposite in other situations. struggle? Wos it perhaps that they were Untintely, lllplanned or premature mani not really revolutionary or that it was only festations of violence impede and do not in the early 60‘s that they began to appre advance the prospect for Revolutionary ciate the correct strotegy? Is there perhaps change and are clearly counter-revolution substance in the occusations by some of ary. It is obvious therefore that policy our detractors that until the early sixties and organisational structures must grow the liberation movement was lacking in out of the real situation if they are not to military fervour and the desire for radical become meaningless cliches. change? In other words was its policy not a revolutionary one? What is our measu Conditions for Armed Struggle ring rod for revolutionary policy? A look at this concept will help towards a more Future historians may well be able to profound understanding not only of the pause at some moments during the evolu past but of the future. It is therefore not tion of our struggle and examine critically out of place to devote a word to It both its pace and emphasis. But in gene In essence, a revolutionary policy is one ral, without the so-called reformist activi which holds out the quickest and most ties of the previous halfcentury, the pros fundamental transformation and transfer pect of advancing into the new phase of power from one class to another. In real would have been extremely small. This is life such radical changes are brought so because even in the typical colonial- about not by imaginary forces but by type situation armed struggle becomes those whose outlook and readiness to act feasible only if: is very much influenced by historically * there is disillusionment with the pros determined factors. pect of achieving liberation by tradi To ignore the real situation and to play tional peaceful processes because the about with imaginary forces, concepts and objective conditions blatantly bar the ideals is to invite failure. The ort of revo way to change; lutionary leadership consists in providing * There is readiness to respond to the leadership to the masses and not just to strategy of armed struggle with all the its most odvanced elements; it consists enormous sacrifices which this involves; of setting a pace which accords with * There is in existence a political leader objective conditions and the real possibi ship capable of gaining the organised lities at hand. The revolutionary-sounding allegiance of the people for armed phrase does not always reflect revolution struggle and which has both the expe ary policy, and revolutionary-sounding rience and the ability to carry out policy is not always the spring-board for the painstaking process of planing, revolutionary advance. Indeed, what preparation and overall conduct of the appears to be "militant" and "revolution operations; and ary" can often be counter-revolutionary. * That there exist favourable objective It is surely a question of whether, in the conditions in the international ond given concrete situation, the course or local plans. policy advocated will aid or impede the In one sense conditions are connected prospects of the conquest of power. In and interdependent They ore not created this — the only test the advocacy of by subjective and ideological octivity only armed struggle can, in some situations, and many are the mistakes committed by
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5SSG -O H ' t heroic revolutionaries who give o mono although historically inevitable and poly to subjective factor ond who confuse necessary, certain of the bosic minimum their own readiness with the reodiness of others. conditions alreody mentioned must be present and certain minimum preparations These conditions ore brought obout not must hove been mode. only by developing political, economic ond social conditions but also by the long Tempered in Struggle hard grind of revolutionary work. They depend on such factors os the response of In the light of those considerations, it is the enemy, the extents to which he unmasks clear that it was only after the victory of himself and the experience gained the anti-imperialist forces in the Second by the people themselves not in academ ic World War and the tide of Independence seminars but in actual political struggle. In Africa, Asia, ond Latin America, com We reject the approach which sees as bined with the iig-iogs of struggle inside the catalyst for revolutionary transforma South Africa In the last fifty years which tion only the short-cut of isolated confron by the beginning of the sixties demanded tations and the creation of armed resis a move in the direction of armed struggle. tance centres. Does this mean that before The fifties were among the most stirring on octuol beginning can be made by the ond struggle-filled decodes in the history armed challenge we have to wait for the of the liberation movement Thousands evolvement of some sort of deep crisis in upon thousands of militant cadres were the enemy camp which is serious enough tempered during this period and masses to hold out the possibility of an imme of our people both in town and country diate all-round insurrection? Certainly side participated in a variety of forms of not! We believe that given certoin basic struggle. The moulding of moss political factors, both international and local, the consciousness reached a new Intensity. actual beginning of ormed struggle or The response of the authorities was such guerrilla warfare can be made and that the overwhelming majority of the hoving begun can steadily develop condi people learnt through their own partici tions for the future all-out war which will pation in the struggle and confrontation eventually lead to the conquest of power. with the state, that in the long run the Under the modern highly sophisticated privileges of the minority will only be police state (which South Africa is) it is wrenched from It by a reversion to armed questionable whether a movement can combat. Indeed, during this "peaceful" succeed in a programme of mass political stage in our struggle hardly a year passed organisation beyond a certain point without m assacres of our people by the without starting a new type of action. army and police. Also, it is not easy to determine the point Each phase in the unfolding of the at which sufficient concrete political and struggle of the fifties played a port in organisational preparations have been setting the stage of our new approach. A carried out to give our armed detachments rebirth of the spirit of deliberate defiance the maximum chances of survival and of the White man's low was stimulated by growth within any given area. There is no the great D efiance Cam paign of 1952. instrument for measuring this. But we must The response of the state towards the not overdo the importance of the subjec Congress of the People Campaign and tive factor and before embarking upon a the odoption of the Freedom Chorter path which is in one sense tragic, demonstrated Its Intention, to crush what
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U (RIP IV ed ond opplied. The head-on mobile shorp and open break with the processes r warfare of the traditional African armies of the previous period which had cor of the past could not meet the diallenge. rectly given emphasis to militont struggle The riot the street fight the outbursts of short of armed confrontation. unorganised violence, individual ter The third was the need to present an rorism; these were symptoms of the mili effective method for the overthrow of tant spirit but not pointers to revolutionary White supremacy through planned rather technique. The winning of our freedom thcfn spontaneous activity. The sabotage by armed struggle — the only method left campaign was an earnest indication of open to us — demands more than passion. our seriousness in the pursuit of this new It demands an understanding and an strategy. All three needs were served by implementation of revolutionary theory this convincing evidence that our libe and tedmiques in the actual conditions ration movement had correctly adjusted facing us. It demands a sober assessment itself to the new situation and was crea of the obstacles In our way and an appre ting an apparatus octually capable of ciation that such a struggle is bitter and clandestinely hitting the enemy ond protracted. It demands, too, the domi making preparation for a more advanced nance in 'our thinking of achievement phase. The situation was such that without over drama. We believe our movement activity of this nature our whole political acted in accordance with these guidelines leadership may have been at stake both when it embarked upon the detailed prep inside and outside the country and the aration for the launching of guerrilla steps whidi were simultaneously taken struggle. We understood that the main for the recruitment and preparation of physical environment of such a struggle military cadres would have met with les# in the initial period is outside the enemy response. strongholds in the cities, in the vast stretches of our countrysldewJhe. opening The Relationship between the steps in 1961 — organised sabotage Political and Military mainly in the urban areas — served a special purpose and was never advanced When we talk of revolutionary armed as a technique which would, on its own, struggle, we are talking of political either lead to the destruction of the state struggle by means which include the use or even do it great material damage of military force even though once force {although guerrilla activity in the urban as a tactic is introduced it has the most areas of a special type is always impor for-reaching consequences on every tant as an auxiliary). At the same time ospect of our activities. It is important to there was a threefold need to be met in emphasise this because our movement order to lay the foundations for more must reject all manifestations of militarism developed and meaningful armed acti which separates armed people’s struggle vity of the guerrilla type. from its political context The first wos the need to create a military Reference "has already been made to the apparatus and, more particularly to recruit danger of the thesis which regards the large numbers of professional cadres who creation of military areas as the generator were to be trained and who would form of mass resistance. But even more is the core of future guerrilla bands. involved in this concept One of the vital The seco n d was the need to demonstrate problems connected with this bears on effectively to all that we were making a the important question of the relationship
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' Ek scnifiseor oat hicrdie doKumen! »'n ware aMrul.'afefcnf is I certify that Ihia document is a true reproduction/copy ot tfto van die corspronklike wat deur my porsooniik teslgtig te en origins! vvhich was examined by mo and that, from my &*»an.a- flat, volc&ns my waernentings, dio oorspror.Ki.::e nie op e /30 tior.s. the original has not tce«i altered in any manner. m ! .vysu sowr/sig ■ f & e / e r / / 1 9 3 S - 0 7 - I \ en:ny/S>p«-,9tur«; y? between the political and military. From enemy's military occupation, have to be the very beginning our Movement has activated in a multitude of ways not only brooked no ambiguity concerning this to ensure a growing stream of recruits The primocy of the political leadership is for the fighting units but to harross the unchallenged and supreme and all revo enemy politically so thot his forces are lutionary formations and levels (whether dispersed and therefore weakened. This armed or not) are subordinate to this calls for the exercise of all-round political leadership. To say this is not Just to Invoke leadership. tradition. This approach is rooted in the "Very nature of this type of revolutionary All-round political leadership struggle and is borne out by the expe rience of the overwhelming majority of Guerrilla warfare, the special, and in our revolutionary movements which have case the only form in which the ormed engaged in such struggles. Except in very liberation struggle can be launched, is rare instances, the people's armed neither static nor does it take place In a challenge against a foe with formidable vacuum. The tempo, the overall strategy material strength does not achieve dra is to be employed, the opening of new matic and swift success. The path is filled fronts, the progression from lower to with obstacles and we harbour no illu higher forms and thence to mobile war sions on this score in the case of South fare; these and other vital questions Africa. In the long run it can only succeed cannot be solved by the military leader if It attracts the active support of the ship alone, they require overall political mass of the people. Without this lifeblood judgments intimately involved with the it is doomed. Even in our country with people both inside and outside the actual the historicaLJi&dcground and traditions areas of armed combat If more aware of armed resistance"*-still, within the ness of oppression combined with heroic memory of many people and the special examples by armed bands were enough, developments of the immediate post, the the struggle would indeed be simple. involvement of the masses is unlikely to There would be no collaborators and tt be the result of a sudden natural and would be hard to find neutrals. But to automatic consequence of military clash believe this is to believe that the course es. It has to be won in all-round poli of struggle is determined solely by what tical mobilisation which must accompany we do In the fighting units ond further the military activities. This Includes edu involves the fallacious assumption that cational and agitational work throughout the masses are rodc-like ond incorruptible. the country to cope with the sophisticated The enemy is as aware as we are that the torrent of misleading propaganda and side that wins the allegiance of the "information" of the enemy which will people, wins the struggle. It is naive to become more Intense as the struggle believe that oppressed and beleagured sharpens. When armed clashes begin they people cannot temporarily, even in large seldom involve more thon a comparative numbers, be won over by fear, terror, lies, handful of combatants whose very condi indoctrination, and provocation to treat tions of fighting-existence make them liberators os enemies. In fact history pro incapable of exercising the functions of ves that without the most intensive all all-round political leadership. The masses round political activity this is the more of the peasants, workers and youth, likely result It is therefore all the more beleagured for a long time by the vital that the revolutionary leadership is
^ ------r;ST*’-— -— r—wi. m l & TfST ■K:dS?5rWWf-W«'ir f f van die oorspronWike wat deur my parsoor.ift is en original which was examined by mo and >■•>' I dat, voigsns my waornernir-.gs. dlo oosof-«>n.;;irw c:. snigs lions. t*o original t>as not tssn altered In any r-.sr.ncr. ! wyse $ e e > / * s / / c V386 notion-wide ond ho* it* roots both inside regime. Already now before the crisis deep and outside the actual areas of combat. ens the imperialist portners of South Above all, when victory comes, it must Africa have done much to develop the not be a hollow one. To ensure this we economy and armament programme ol must also ensure that what is brought to South Africa. In a situation of crisis they power is not an army but the masses as may pass over from support to active a whole at the head of which stands its intervention to save the racist regime. organised political leadership. This is the If there is one lesson that the history of perspective which is rooted at all levels guerilla struggle has taught h is that the of our liberation movements whether m aterial strength and resources of the within or outside the army. Our confi enemy is by no means a decisive factor. dence in final victory rests not on the G u erilla w arfare almost by definition pre wish or the dream but on our understand sents a situation in which there is a vast ing of our own conditions ond the histor in b alan ce of material and military ical processes. This understanding must resource between the opposing sides, h be deepened and must spread to every is designed to cope with the situation in level of our Movement We must hove a which the enemy is infinitely superior In clear grasp not only of ourselves and of relation to every conventional factor of our own forces but also of the enemy - warfare. It is par excellence the weapon of his power and vulnerability. Guerrilla of the materially weak agoinst the mate struggle is certainly no exception to the rially strong. Given its popular character rule that depth of understanding, and ond given a population which increasingly knowledge of realities, both favourable sides with and shields the guerrilla whilst ond unfavourable, make for more lasting at the same time opposing and exposing commitment and mtorejjluminating leader the enemy, the survival and growth of a ship. How then do we'view the enemy people's army is assured by the skilful we face - his strength and his weakness? exercise of toctics. Suprise, mobility ond What sort of structure do we face and tactical retreat should make H difficult for how dogged will the enemy resistance the enemy to bring into play its superior be? fire-power in any decisive bottles. No individual battle is fought in circumstan The Enemy — his strength and weakness ces favourable to the enemy. Superior forces can thus be harrassed, weakened and, in the end, destroyed. The absence On the face of it the enemy is in stable of an orthodox front of fighting lines; command of a rich and varied economy the need of the enemy to attenuate his which, even at this stoge when it is not resources and lines of communication required to extend itself, can afford on over vast a re a s; the need to protect the enormous military budget He has a rela widely scattered installations on which his tively-trained and efficient army and economy is dependent; these are among police force. He can draw on fairly large the factors which serve in the long run manpower resources. In addition the to compensate In favour of the guerrilla major imperialist powers such ' Britain. for the disparity in the storting strength W.Germany. France, the United States of the adversaries. The words 'in the^ong and Japan who have an enormous stoke run' must be stressed because it would in the economy of our country constitute be idle to dispute the considerable mili a formidable support for the Apartheid tary advantages to the enemy of his high
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nzrrr rtfs cat fc'er&s Coku.-nent «.'n r.-erp efclrufc/BfektU e. | 1 certify.that this docuTienl is e. true reprxJuctisn/oopy of the o’'? corspronkiike wot cieur my perscc-r.lik fceslgtig te on c: ivhich was examined by me anc the?, * w i my observa n t , v o ic e s my waamerrtirifis. CUs corcpror.HIiR? n!r op ©nige < tions.^ne original has rot been stored !n an/ rr.ar.ner. | v.7 s6 fictfjrsitj S f y g , £ £ 0 ,2 r / £
1985 -0 7 -ti
Haadteker.ing/Sisft&tijre level industrlolisotion, his reody-to-hond One of the more popular misconceptions reserves of while manpover and his concerning guerrilla warfare Is that a excellent roods, railways ond olr transport physical environment which conforms to which facilitate swift moneouvres and a special pattern is indispensible — thick speedy concentration of personnel. But jungle. Inaccessible mountain areas, we must not overlook the fact that over swamps, a friendly border and so on. o period of time many of these unfavour The availability of this sort of terrain is, able factors will begin to operate In of course, of tremendous advantage to favour of the liberation forces: the guerrillas especially in the early non- * The ready-to-hand resources including operational phase training and other food production depend overwhelm preparatory steps are undertaken and no- ingly on non-White labour which, external bases are avoilable for this pur with the growing Intensity of the pose. When operations commence, the struggle, will not remain docile and guerrilla cannot survive, let alone flourish, co-operative. unless he moves to areas where people ® The White manpower resources may live and work and where the enemy can seem adequate initially but must be engaged in com bat If he is fortunate become dangerously stretched as enough to hove behind-him a friendly guerrilla warfare develops. Already border or areas of difficult access which extrem«ly«4j3ort of skilled labour — the con provide temporary refuge it is. of monopoly of the*Whites — the mobili course, advantageous. But guerrilla war sation of o large force for a protracted fare can be. and has been, waged In struggle will place a further burden every conceivable type of terrain, in on the workings of the economy. deserts, swamps, in farm fields, in built-up * In contrast to many other major guer areas, in plains, in the bush ond in coun rilla struggles, the enemy's economic tries without friendly borders or Islands and mdnpower resources are oil situ surrounded by the sea. This% whole ated within the . theatre of war and question is one of adjusting survival tac there is no secure external pool (other tics to the sort of terrain in which opera than direct Intervention by a foreign tions have to be carried out state) safe from sabotage, mass action In any case, in the vast expanse that Is ond guerrilla action on which the South Africa, a people's force will find a enemy can draw. multitude of variations in topography, * The very sophistication of the economy deserts, mountains, forests, veld ond with its well-developed system of com swamps. There might not appear to be munications makes It a much more a single Impregnable mountain or impe vulnerable target. In an undeveloped netrable jungle but the country abounds country the interruption of supplies to In terrain which in general is certainly any given region may be no more than no less favourable for guerrilla operations a local setback. than some of the terrain in which o th e r In a highly sensitive modern structure guerrilla movements operated success of the South African type, the success fully. Also the issue must be looked at ful harrassment of transport to any in the context of guerrillas, who are major industrial complex inevitably armed and operate in the terrain. The inflicts immense damage to the eco combination makes an area impregnable nomy as a whole and to the morale for the guerrilla. South Africa's tremen of the enemy. dous size will make It extremely difficult
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m u i w m i u p m ■ Ek 8fcfti«seer iiy hierdiO co kw ta n U n *vai^ai^^XtnT I certify that tr.is document is a true reproduction,'cc^y cl ths van die corspronklike v/at deur my pcr-ocnU fcs^cric is c ris:r,a; vr^icii was examined try ms ?r.d th?t, f«5«> •*.>: T -; | d"t, vo!«?':-.s my v/£5ff«8mir.si. Sie o a ffp .v n ■- r- -;, t '• '-■'• s. Ifce erirjr.ai not tecti tllsrcd to ■ - if not impossible, for the White regime of the classical colonial framework. f to keep the whole of it under armed Whilst at the one level It Is an ''inde surveillance in strength and in depth. pendent" notional state, at another level Hence, an early development of a rela it is a country subjugated by a minority tively safe {though shifting) rear is not race. What makes the structure unique beyond the realm of practicality. and odds to Its complexity is that the exploiting nation is not, as in the classical The White Group imperialist relationships, situated in a geographically distinct mother country, The above are only some of the important but is settled within the borders. What is factors which hove not always been more, the roots of the dominant nation studied and understood. It is necessary have been embedded in our country by to stress these factors not only because more than three centuries of presence. they give balance to our efforts but It is thus an alien body only in the histor because — properly assessed — they help ical sense. destroy the myth of the enemy's invin The material well-being of the White cibility. • , ______group and its political, social and eco But above all a scientific revolutionary nomic privileges are, we know, rooted in strategy demands a correct appreciation its racial domination of the indigenous of the political character of the forces majority. It has resisted and will resist which are ranged against one another doggedly and passionately any attempt in the South African struggle for libera to shift it from this position. Its theorists tion. Is the enemy a monolith and will and leaders ceaselessly play upon the he remain so until his final defeat? What theme of "We have nowhere else to go". is the main content of the struggle for They dishonestly ignore and even twist liberation ond, flowing from this, which the fact that the uncertainty about the is the main revolutionary force and who future of the oppressor in our land Is are its potential allies and supporters? an uncertainty bom not of our racialism These are questions of capital importance. but of his. The spectre is falsely raised of They play a vital part in determining the a threat to the White men's language r: tactics of the revolutionary struggle, the and culture to ''justify” a policy of cultural broad alliances for which we must strive, discrimination and domination. By eco the organisational structures we create nomic bribes and legal artifices which pre and many other fundamental approaches. serve for him the top layers of skills ond They must be considered within the frame wage income, the White worker is success work of the special feature of the objective fully mobilised as one of racialism’s most situation' which faces us. South Africa's reliable contingents. In every walk of life IV M social ond economic structure and the White autocracy creates privilege by oper ; ■ relationships which it generates are per ation of the law and. where necessary, the haps unique. It is not a colony, yet it has, bun and with a primitive ond twisted In regard to the overwhelming majority ‘‘proof' of Its own superiority. *• * » f 1» I h: of Its people, most of the features of the Nevertheless, the defence of all-round i *; »\ \\l I - classical colonial structures. Conquest and economic, social and cultural privileges domination by an alien people, a system combined with centuries of indoctrination of discrimination ond exploitation based and deeply felt theoretical rationalisation on race, technique of Indirect rule; these which centre on survival, will make the and more are the traditional trappings enemy we face a ferocious and formid-
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Hr r>i‘: t>'eoin 'v'Fif nsT-.-- oble foe. So long os the threat from the the White working d o ss or a substantia' liberation movement woi not powerful section cjf It, may come to see that theif «nough to endanger the very existence true long-term interest coincides whit that of White baoskop there was room for divi of the non-White workers. W e must miss sion — sometimes quite sharp In the White no opportunity either now or In the future political camp. to try ond moke them oware of this truth Its motivation amongst the ruling class and to win over those who ore reody to wos competition for the lion’s shore of the break with the policy of racial domination. •polls -from the exploitation of the non- Nor must we ever be slow to take advan White people. It always centred around tage of differences and divisions which the problem of the most effective way of our successes will inevitably spark off to "keeping the native In his ploce". In such isolate the most vociferous, the most un on atmosphere there were even moments compromising ond the most reactionary when White workers adopted militant elements amongst the Whites. Our policy class postures against the small group must continually stress in the future (os which owns South Africa’s weolth. But the it has In the past) thot there is room in changed world mood and international South Africa for all who live in it but only situation inhabited these confrontations. on the basis of absolute democracy. The laagerminded'*,y/hite group as a whole moves more ond more in the direc The African Masses — tion of a common defence of what is the Main Force considered a common fate. for Liberation These monolithic tendencies are reinforced by a Hitlerlike feeling of confidence So much for the enemy- Whot of the that . the fortress Is impregnable and liberation forces? Here too we are colled unassailable for all time. This process of upon to examine the most fundamental oil White solidarity will only be arrested features of our situation which serve to by the achievements of the liberation mould our revolutionary strategy ond tac movement For the moment the reality Is tics. The main content of the present that apart from a small group of revolution- stoge of the South African revolution Is ory Whites, who have an honoured place the national liberation of the largest ond os comrades in the struggle, we face what most oppressed group — the African is by and large a united ond confident people. This strategic aim must govern enemy which acts in ollionce with, and every ospect of the conduct of our struggle is strengthened by world Imperialism. All whether it be the formulation of policy significant sections of the White political or the creation of structures. Amongst movement ore in broad ■ agreement on other things, it demands in the first place the question of defeating our liberation the maximum mobilisotion of the African struggle. people os o dispossessed and racially This confrontation on the lines of colour — oppressed nation. This is the mainspring at least in the early stages of the con and it must not be weakened. It involves flict — is not of our choosing; it is of the a stimulation and o deepening of national -enemy's making. It will not be easy to confidence, national pride and national •leminate some of Its more tragic conse- assertiveness. Properly channelled and quenses. But it does not follow that this properly led, these qualities do not stand will be so for oil time. It is not altogether in conflict with the principles of Internatio impossible that In a different situotion nalism. Indeed, they become the basis
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is a trus rep'ouwctior./copy c- i tfva « | v a i die oorsprorsklike v/at deur my persoonlik bessgtig is e* J ■ . t original which was examiriecl by me and that, front my ofcocrvs- J I c'rt, veigens my waarnerrlings. die ocrt-p-'o.-iS-.s op cross ; f U:c original hr.fc not been atte.iC er:/ r.uiti'iCf. * for more lasting and more meaningful thus lay the basis for a new - and co-operation; a co-operation which it self- deeper internationalist — approach. impoted, equal and one which It neither Until then, the national sense of griev bated on dependence nor givet the ance Is the most potent revolutionary appearance of being to. force which must be harnessed. To The national cha^pter of the struggle blunt It In the interests of abstract mutt therefore domTnfttw* u u l approach. concepts of internationalism is. in the But it it a national ttruggle which it long run, doing neither a service to taking place In a different era and in a revolution nor to Internationalism. different context from thote which charac- terited the early strugglet againtt colo- The Role of the nialitm. It It happening in a new kind Coloured and of world - a world which it no longer Indian People monopolited by the imperialist world syttem; a world In which the exittence The African although subjected to the of the powerful socialist system and a most intense racial oppression and ex significant sector of newly liberated areat ploitation, is not the only oppressed natio hat altered the balance of forces; a world nal group in South Africa. The two million in which the horizons liberated from strong Coloured Community ond three- foreign oppression extend beyond mere quarter million Indians suffer varying formal political control and encompass forms of national humiliation, discrimi the element which makes such control nation and oppression. They are part of meaningful — economic emancipation. It the non-White base upon which rests is also happening In a new kind of South White privilege. As such they constitute Africa; o South Africa In which there Is an integral part of the social forces a large and well-developed working class ranged against White supremacy. Despite whose class consciousness and In which deceptive and, often, meaningless con the Independent expressions of the work cessions they share a common fate with ing people - their political organs and their African brothers and their own libe trade unions — are very much part of ration is Inextricably bound up with the the liberation front Thus, our nationalism liberation of the African people. must not be confused with chauvinism or A unity in action between all the op narrow nationalism of a previous epoch. pressed groups is fundamental to the ad It must not be confused with the classical vance of our liberation struggle. Without drive by an elitist group among the such a unity the enemy strength multiplies oppressed people to gain ascendancy so and the attainment of a people's victory that they can replace the oppressor In is delayed. Historically both communi the exploitation of the mass. ties have played a most important But none of this detracts from the basi part in the stimulation and Inten cally national context of our liberation sification of the struggle for freedom. drive. In the last resort ft Is only the It Is a matter of proud record that success of the national democratic amongst the first and most gallant martyrs revolution which - by destroying the in the armed combat against the enemy existing social and economic relation was a Coloured Comrade, Basil February. ships — will bring with It a correction The jails in South Africa are a witness to of the historical Injustices perpetrated the large scole participation by Indian against the indigenous majority and and Coloured comrades at every level of
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^—*- *»« ■ i ------Ek ssrrifiseer dat hierdie doKument >n ware atdruk/swtf! is • I ceriiJy that this document is a true reproduction/copy cl ths van d:e oorspronklike wat deur my persoonlik besi;::£ te sn original which was examined by me and that, frcm my cr~erva- dgit, vo'gens my waarnemings, die oorspronkY-'.e n'e c ? eosse t ions, the original has not been altered in any manner. wyse gevvysig t
Handteker.ing’Signature our revolutionory struggle. From the very mitted revolutionaries irrespective ol their inception of Umkhonto they were more racial background? thon well represented in the first contin gents who took life in hand to help lay Our Fighting Alliance the basis for this new phase in our struggle. Whatever instruments are created to This mood was not only reflected in the give expression to the unity of the liber deeds of its more advanced represen ation drive, they must" accommodate two tatives. As communities too the Coloured fundamental propositions: and Indian people have often in the past, Firstly the must not be ambiguous on the by'their actions, shown that they form part question of the primary role of the most of the broad sweep towards liberation. oppressed African mass and. The first series of mass acts of deliberate Secondly, those belonging to the other defiance of the conqueror's law after the oppressed groups and those few White crushing of the Bambata rebellion, was revolutionaries who show themselves ready the campaign led by that outstanding son to moke common cause with our aspi of the-Indian people — Mahatma Gandhi. rations, must be fully integrated on the Thereafter the Indian community and its basis of Individual equality. Approached leaders — particularly those who came to in the right spirit these two propositions the fore in the 40's — played no small part do not stand in conflict but reinforce one in the injection of more radical and more another. Equolity of participation in militant mood into the liberation movement our national front does not mean as a whole. The stirring demonstrations ol a mechanical parity between the the fifties from Defionce Campaign to various nationol groups. Not only would the Congress of the People, to the general this In practice amount to inequality strike, and the peasant revolts and mass (again at the expense of the majority), demonstrations, saw many «xamples of but It would lend flavour to the slander united action by all the oppressed people. which our enemies are ever ready to Indian workers responded In large num spread of o multiracial alliance domi bers to almost every call for a general nated by minority groups. This has never strike. Indian shopkeepers, could always been so and will never be so. But the be relied upon to declare a day of Hartal sluggish way in which the Movement In in solidarity with any protest which was side the country responded to the new being organised. Memory is still fresh of situation after 1960 in whidi co-operation the outstanding response by the Col between some organisations which were oured workMt^of the Western Cape to legal 15 t‘-*% ^ ’ i E a ssiiiiiseor „ ------GOKbfrtOftt hioraie cjoki »f. VVUffc cijOfL’rjafakrif ic l certify tftot this document is a true rcpf0tiuct,on/cop> of vaa die corspronkltoo «at dour my psrsoonlik tes - ig h original which was exa.-r.iocd by .ts a .- ; h . from ;r.y c L l'-v , tot. volgons my waame.Ttings. die o o n c ’ o i ' ■ v -r - - Irens, i t s orig-na! h w not U toi f *yso gewysi present stoge of our struggle. This ap Coloured and Indian people should see proach Is not a pandering to chauvinism, themselves as an Integral part of the to radolism or other such badcward atti liberation movement ond not as mere tudes. We are revolutionaries not narrow auxiliaries. nationalists. Committed revolutionaries are our brothers to whatever group they be The Working Class long. There can be no second class parti cipants in our Movement It is for the Is there a special role for the working enemy we reserve our assertiveness and class in our notional struggle? We have our justified sense of grievance. olready referred to the special character The Important task of mobilising and of the South African social and economic gaining the support of other oppressed structure. In our country — more than in non-White groups has already been any other part of the oppressed world — referred to. Like every other oppressed it is inconceivable for liberation to have group (including the Africans) we must meaning without a return of the wealth not naively assume that mere awareness of the land to the people as a whole. It of oppression will, by itself push the In is therefore a fundamental feature of our dian and Coloured people In the direc strategy that victory must embrace more tion of opposing the enemy and aligning than formal political democracy. To allow themselves with the liberation movement. the existing economic forces to retain their The potential Is, of course there, because interests intact is to feed the root of racial in a very real sense the future of the supremacy and does not represent even Indian and Coloured people and their the shadow of liberation. liberation as oppressed groups is Inti Our drive towards notional emancipation mately bound up with the liberation of is therefore in a very real way bound up the Africans. But active support and parti with economic emancipation. We have cipation has to be fought for and won. suffered more that just national humi Otherwise the enemy will succeed in its liation. Our people are deprived of their never-ending attempt -te^create a gop due in the country's wealth; their skills between these groups and the Africans have been suppressed and poverty and and even recruit substantial numbers of starvation has been their life experience. them to actively collaborate with It The The correction of these centuries-old eco bottom of the barrel will be scraped in nomic injustices lies at the very core of the attempt to create confusion about the our national aspirations. We do not un objectives of the liberation movement. derestimate the complexities which will More particularly, the enemy will feed on face a people's government during the the Insecurity and dependency which is transformation period nor the enormity of often part of the thinking of minority op the problems of meeting economic needs pressed groups. They will try to roise a of the mass of the oppressed people. But doubt In their minds about whether there one thing is certain — in our land this Is a place for them in a future liberated cannot be effectively tackled unless the ■ I South Africa. They have already spread basic wealth and the basic resources ore the slander that at best for the Coloureds ot the disposal of the people as a whole and Indians White domination will be and are not manipulated by sections or replaced, by Blade domination. individuals be they White or Black. It is therefore all the more important, con This perspective of a speedy progression sistent with our first principle, that the from formal liberation to genuine and 16 ■ ii' i: ■J-i" ■■1 ■waiwi i '. Jj.JIWI., . j j ...... is I I certify tnst this document io « t— ^ I vcn i.o oorr.;;rcnWik« v;M deur my I «ia»i*i V*I<* v.., *'*r.tood tv n - > ; ; « cist, vc/gt;:* my c.. :• - | «ions. !• ■£ o?*sin*S hes not £*.—• ------losting emancipation is made more real programme of research, examination and by the existence in our country of a large analysis of the conditions of the different and growing working class whose doss strate of our people (in particular those consciousness complements national con on the lond), their locol grievances, hopes sciousness. Its political organisations - and aspirations, so that the flow from and the trade unions hove played a fun theory to application — when the situotion damental role In shaping ond advancing mokes application possible will be un our revolutionary cause. It Is historically hampered. understandable that the double-oppressed ond doubly-exploited working class con stitutes o distinct ond reinforcing loyer of our liberation and Socialism and do not *tond in conflict with the national interest. Its militancy and political consciousness as a revolutionary class will play no small part in our victory and in the construc tion of a real people's South Africa. Beyond our borders in Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia are our brothers s.-_ and sisters who similarly are engoged In a fierce struggle against colonialist and racist regimes, --^e fight an Unholy Alliance of Portugal,"RHodesla and South Africa with the latter as the main economic and military support. The historic ZAPU/ ANC-Alliance is a unique form of co operation between two liberation move %L- ments which unites the huge potential of the oppressed people in both South Africa ond Zimbabwe. The extension of co-oper- otion and co-ordination of all the people of Southern Africa as led by FRELIMO, ZAPU. SWAPO, MLPA ond the ANC Is o vital part of our strategy. What then is the broad purpose of our military struggle? Simply put, in the first phase, it is the complete political and economic emancipation of all our people and the constitution of a society which accords with the basic provisions of our programme — the Freedom Charter. This, together with our general understanding of our revolutionary theory, provides us with the strategic framework for the con crete elaboration and implementation of policy in a continuosly changing situation. It must be combined with o more intensive irus lopraauclton.'copy of the van die oorspronkiiKe wat deur my persocnhk bet-igtig is er. original which exsr.Sncl by me sr.c Uwt, from ~ y ctserva- dc!. vclsons my wssrr.amipgs. ^ J oor^5">r.'Ili'e °p enigt. :;ons. jr.e c-rjgin,-.! hap r.ci been a'.'. j cc ir ?.'v wyse gr.vyji^f / A ( ? f / / £ . Ms A.v/ 1985 -07-1 Hand'.f-Ksninp'S'ffr.’-'e * Collection Number: AK2117 DELMAS TREASON TRIAL 1985 - 1989 PUBLISHER: Publisher:-Historical Papers, University of the Witwatersrand Location:-Johannesburg ©2012 LEGAL NOTICES: Copyright Notice: All materials on the Historical Papers website are protected by South African copyright law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, or otherwise published in any format, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Disclaimer and Terms of Use: Provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained therein, you may download material (one machine readable copy and one print copy per page) for your personal and/or educational non-commercial use only. People using these records relating to the archives of Historical Papers, The Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, are reminded that such records sometimes contain material which is uncorroborated, inaccurate, distorted or untrue. 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