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English Arabic Technical Computing Dictionary

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English Arabic Technical Computing Dictionary English Arabic Technical Computing Dictionary Arabeyes Arabisation Team http://wiki.arabeyes.org/Technical Dictionary Versin: 0.1.29-04-2007 April 29, 2007 This is a compilation of the Technical Computing Dictionary that is under development at Arabeyes, the Arabic UNIX project. The technical dictionary aims to to translate and standardise technical terms that are used in software. It is an effort to unify the terms used across all Open Source projects and to present the user with consistant and understandable interfaces. This work is licensed under the FreeBSD Documentation License, the text of which is available at the back of this document. Contributors are welcome, please consult the URL above or contact [email protected]. Q Ì ÉJ ªË@ éÒ¢@ Ñ«YË QK AK.Q« ¨ðQåÓ .« èQK ñ¢ ÕæK ø YË@ úæ®JË@ úGñAm '@ ñÓA®ÊË éj èYë . l×. @QK. éÔg. QK ú¯ éÊÒªJÖÏ@ éJ J®JË@ HAjÊ¢Ö Ï@ YJ kñKð éÔg. QK úÍ@ ñÓA®Ë@ ¬YîE .ºKñJ ËAK. éîD J.Ë@ ÐYjJÒÊË éÒj. Óð éÓñê®Ó H. ñAg éêk. @ð Õç'Y®JË ð á ÔgQÖÏ@ á K. H. PAJË@ øXA®JË ,H. ñAmÌ'@ . ¾JÖ Ï .ñÓA®Ë@ éK AîE ú ¯ èQ¯ñJÖÏ@ ð ZAKñÊË ø X @ ú G. ø Q¯ ékP ù ë ñÓA®Ë@ ékP . éJ K.QªËAK. ÕÎ @ [email protected] . úΫ ÈAB@ ð@ èC«@ à@ñJªË@ úÍ@ H. AëYË@ ZAg. QË@ ,á ÒëAÖÏ@ ɾK. I. kQK A Abortive release êm .× (ú¾J.) ¨A¢®K@ Abort Aêk . @ Abscissa ú æJ Absolute address Ê¢Ó à@ñ J« Absolute pathname Ê¢Ó PAÓ Õæ @ Absolute path Ê¢Ó PAÓ Absolute Ê¢Ó Abstract class XQm.× ­J Abstract data type XQm.× HA KAJ K. ¨ñK Abstract datatype XQm.× HA KAJ K. ¨ñK Abstract interpretation × XQm. ÉK ðZH Abstraction YK Qm.' Abstract machine èXQm.× éJ Ë@ Abstract method èXQm.× é®K Q£ Abstract syntax tree èXQm.× éJ K. èQm. Abstract syntax èXQm.× éJ K. Abstract X Qm.× Accelerated Graphic Port f ¨QåÓ úGAJ K. Y®JÓ Accelerator ¨ f QåÓ Accent é»Qk Acceptance testing éJ J.ÊJË@ PAJ.Jk @ Accept ÈñJ.¯ Access control list ÈññËAK ÕºjJË@ éÓZA ¯ . Accessibility ékA K@ Accessible hAJÓ Access level ÈññË@ øñJÓ Access memory ÈññË@ èQ»@ X Accessory ú ÍAÒ» Access XA ® K Accounting management HAK .AmÌ'@ Q Account HAk Accumulator . Õ»@QÒ,Ó f»QÓ Accuracy é¯X Acknowledgment Qº ,àA ¯Q« Acoustic coupler úGñ àPA ¯ Acquire H. A»@ Acronym PAJk@ Action Z@Qk. @ Activate ¡J K Active ¡J Activity A Actor É«A¯ Actuator ɪ Ó Adapter ­J ºÓ Adaptive answering éJ ®J ºK éK.Ag. @ Adaptive learning ù® JºK ÕΪK Adaptive routing ù®J ºK éJ k. ñK Adapt ­ JºK Add-In ¬A Ó Additional ú ¯A@ Additive ú×AÒ @ Address book áK ðAJªË@ Q¯X Address bus áK ðAJ« ɯA K Addressee éJ Ë@ ÉQÓ Addressing éKñ J« Address à@ñ J« Add é¯A@ Adjacency PðAm.' Adjacent PðAm.× Adjust éK ñ Administration Q Administrative øP@X@ Administrator Q Ó Admin QK YÓ Advanced ÐY®JÓ Advance ÐY®K Affine transformation ù®ËAK ÉK ñm' Affordance èPAÓ @ Agenda èQº ®Ó Agent ñ®Ó Aggregate type ÉÒm.× ¨ñK Aggregate × ÉÒm. Aggregation ©J Òm.' Aggregator ÉÒm.× Aging ÐXA®K AGP Agreement A ® K@ Agree ¯@ñÓ Airbrush é«AJ. X@XQÓ Air restrictor Y J®K éjJ ® Alarm clock éJ.JÓ Alarm éJJ K . Aleph ­Ë @ Alert box éJ J.JË@ ©K.QÓ Alert P@Y K @ Algebraic data type øQ.g. HA KAJ K. ¨ñK Algebraic structure éK Q.g. éJ K. Algorism é JÓPP@ñ k Algorithm éJ ÓPP@ñk Aliasing bug á Ég Aliasing á , éJ Jº K Alias éJ J» Alignment ¬A®¢@ ,­J ® Align ¬A®¢@ ,­J ® Allocate m' Allow hAÖÞ Alphanumeric øY« øYm'@ . Alpha A®Ë @ ALSA éÓY®JÖ Ï@ éJ KñË@ ºJJ Ë éJ K. Alteration () ­K Qm' ,¬CK@ ,[É@] (àñË) Èñ Alternating ú G.ðAJK Alternative ÉK YK. Alter Qª K Amateur packet radio è@ñê ËÐQk é«@ X @ Amount éJ Ò» Amper Q J.Ó@ Amplify Õæ j Amplitude ©ð Analogue computer úÎKAÖß H. ñAg Analog Q ¢ Analysis ÉJÊm' Anchoring ZAP@ Anchor ¡.QK , èAQÓ Angle bracket èPñºÓ Angle éK ð@P Animate ½K Qm' Animation é»@Qk Annotation éJ Af, ®J ʪK, HA ®J ʪK, éJ m ' Announcement àC« @ Announce àC« @ Anonymous remailer Anonymous Õæ B@ Èñêm× . Anti-aliasing á Ë@ éË@ P @ Antialiasing á J Ë@ éË@P @ Antichain XAÓ XA® Antisymmetric ÉKAÒ JÓ B Antivirus software HAð Q ®Ë@ áÓ éK AÒmÌ'@ l×. AKQK. Anti virus HAð Q ¯ XAÓ ,HAÔ g XAÓ Anytime algorithm éJ J¯ð B éJ ÓPP@ñ k Apostrophe AJ Ê« éÊA¯ Appear Pñê£ Append Am Ì'@ Applet iÖß QK . Appliance éË @ Application J J.¢ Apply J J¢ . Approval P@Q¯@ Approved éJÊ« XAÓ Approve P@Q¯@ Approximate úæ KQ®K Approximation algorithm . I KQ®K éJ ÓPP@ñ k Arbitrary . ù®J » Architecture éJ K. Archive site ù®J P @ ©¯ñÓ Archive ­J P @ Archiving é® P @ Arc ñ¯ Area 鮢 JÓ Arena éJ.Êg Argument ù¢ªÓ Arity éJ .KP Arrangement (HAJ AK P) éJ. KQ K Arrange I. KQK Array é¯ñ ®Ó Arrowhead ÑîD ZP Arrow key ÑîDË@ hAJ®Ó Arrow ÑîD Article éËA ®Ó Artifact .Qk Artificial intelligence ú«AJ¢@ ZA¿X Artificial neural network éJ «AJ¢@ éJ »ñ éºJ. Ascender Y«A,«ñ¯QÓ Ascending ø Y«A Aspect-oriented programming I. K@ñm.Ì'AK. éêk. ñÓ ém.×QK. Aspect ratio QªË@ úÍ@ ¨A®KPB@ éJ. Aspect IKAg . Assembler . ¨ fÒm.× Assembly code ©J Òm.' èQ® Assembly language ' éJ ªJ Òm. éªË Asserted Y»ñÓ Assertion YJ »ñK Asset management Èñ@ Q Assignment problem (ém.×QK.) á ªK éËZÓ Assignment á ªK Assign á ªK Assistant Y«AÓ Associative array (ém.×QK.) ù¢.@QK ÈðYg. Associative memory éJ ¢.@QK èQ»@X Asterisk (*) éÒj. JË@ éÓC« Asymmetrical modulation á ø Q£AJKB Ò Asymmetric Q£A J JÓB Asynchronous logic ú æÓ@QKB ¢JÓ Asynchronous ú æÓ@QKB Atomicity ¨ñk. QË@ éJ Ë@ Atomic ø PX Atom èP X At sign @ éÓCªË@ Attachment ¯QÓ Attach A ¯P @ Attempt éËðAm × Attenuation ­J ®m' Attenuator × ¡ÊÓ ,®m Atto- K@ Attribute éJ Ag Audiographic teleconferencing ' YªK. á« ù ¢J ¢m ù ªÖÞ ¨AÒJk. @ Audiographic ' ù ¢J ¢m ù ªÖÞ Audio ùªÖÞ Audit J ¯YK Authenticate J Kñ K Authentication J Kñ K Authenticity ém Authentify é¯XAÓ Authoring ­J ËZH Authorization J kQ K Authorize J kQ K Author ­ËZÐ Autocompletion ø ZA®ÊK ÐAÖß@ Autoconfiguration ú Í@ ÉJ º Autodetect ú Í@ ­» Autoloader × ú Í@ÉÒm Automata theory ú ÍB@ ÈAªJB@ éK Q¢ Automated testing ú Í@ PAJ.Jk@ Automatically AJ Ë@ Automatic baud rate detection H@XñJ ËAK IJ Ë@ é«QåË úÍ@ ­ » . Automatic hyphenation úÍ@ É@ð ¡Qå Automatic úÍ@ Automation éK ZA®ÊK Automaton ú Í@ɪJÓ Automounter ú Í@I. »QÓ Autotrace ú Í@ ©J.K Auto ø ZA®ÊJJ Ë@ Auxiliary storage ' ú ¯A@ áK Qm Auxiliary ú ¯A@ Availability Q¯ñ K Available Q¯ñ JÓ Avatar PAJ¯ @ Average seek time é¢ñJÓ Im '. èYÓ Average ¡ñJÓ Axial øPñm× Axiomatic semantics éJ îE YK. HAJ ËBX Axiomatic set theory éJ îE YJ.Ë@ HA«ñÒj . ÖÏ@ éK Q¢ Axiom éJ îE YK. Axis Pñm× B Backbone site « ø XAÔ ©¯ñÓ Backbone XAÔ« Back door ÐA¢JË ø Qå ÉgYÓ Backend ù®Ê g úæîDJÓ Back-end éJ ®Êg éK AîE Back-face culling Back-facing Background processing éJ ®ÊmÌ'@ ú¯ ém.Ì'AªÓ Background éJ ®Êg Backing store Y«AÓ áK Q m' Back link èXñªK. éÊð Backlog Backport g ú 溫 ÉÔ Back-propagation ù®Ê g PAK@ Back quote éËZAÓ AJ Ê« éÊA¯ Backronym AJ º« Qk . ñÓ Õæ @ Backside cache × ù ®Êg ZI. m Backslash ú溫 ÈZAÓ ¡k Backspace ­Ê m Ì ¨@Q ¯ Backtick éËZAÓ AJ Ê« éÊA¯ Backtracking ù ®Êg ©J.K Backup rotation ù £AJ Jk@ I. ¯AªK Backup software AJ Jk@ l×. AKQK. Backup ù£AJ Jk@ Backward analysis ­Ê m Ì'@ úÍ@ ÉJÊm' Backward chaining ­Ê m Ì'@ úÍ@Y® Backward compatibility é®K.AË@ H@P@YZÈ@ ¯@ñK Backward compatible AJ ®Êg ¯@ñJÓ Back ¨ñk. P Balance à P@ñ K Bandwidth A¢JË@ Qª,K XQË@ A¢JË@ Banner éK @PPAª Bareword Barrel shifter Bar ¡ Qå Baseband ú æ A@ A¢ Base class ú æ A@ ­J Baseline ú æ A@¡k Base memory éJ A@ èQ»@X Basename ú æ A@ Õæ @ Base èY«A¯ ,A @ Batcher ©¯YÓ Batch file HAª ¯YË@ ­ÊÓ Batching ©J ¯YK Batch processing HAª ¯YËAK. ém.Ì'AªÓ Batch éª ¯X Battery éK PA¢. Baud rate XðAJ.Ë@ ÈYªÓ Baud XñK. Bay éj J¯ Beam Beamer HAK . Beam search ©J ÓA«X Im '. Bearer channel éÊÓAg èAJ¯ Beeper Q®Ó Beep Q ® Begin ZYK. , éK @YK. Behavior ¼ñÊ Bell curve ú æ Qk. úæjJÓ Bell Qk. Benchmark Z@XB@ AJ ¯ Best effort (... éÓYg) Yêk. É ¯@ Beta abstraction ' AJ K. YK Qm. Beta conversion AJ K. ÉK ñm' Beta reduction AJ K. È@Qg@ Beta testing AJ K PAJJk@ . Beta version AJ K. P@Y@ Beta AJ K. Bibliography éQê¯ ,©k. @QÖÏ@ Bidirectional printing ' èAm. B@ éK ZA JK é«AJ.£ Bidi èAm.'B@ øZAJ K Big-endian Q J.ºJ ¯Q£ Bijection ÉK.A®K Bilinear patch éK ZAJ K 骯P Binary coded decimal AKZAJ K P ÓQÓ øQå« f Binary exponential backoff øZAJ K úæ @ Xñ¯P Binary large object Ñm øZAJ K àZA¿ Binary package éK ZAJ K éÓQk Binary search ' ø ZAJK Im . Binary tree éK ZAJ K èQm. Binary øZAJ K Binding handle AJ.KP@ J .®Ó Binding-time analysis AJ.KPB@ I ¯ð ÉJ Êm' Binding ¡.QË@ HAÓñÊªÓ Bind ¡.P Bioinformatics éK ñJ k éJ KAÓñÊªÓ Bipolar I.
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