William S. Cormack. Revolution and Political Confict in the , 1789-1794. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. xiii + 343 pp. $59.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-521-47209-8.

John Hardman. French Politics 1774-1789: From the Accession of Louis XVI to the Fall of the Bastille. New York and London: Longman, 1995. x + 283 pp. $29.58, paper, ISBN 978-0-582-23649-3.

John Rogister. Louis XV and the of , 1737-1755. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. xxv + 288 pp. $69.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-521-40395-5.

Julian Swann. Politics and the Parlement of Paris under Louis XV, 1754-1774. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. x + 390 pp. $41.99, paper, ISBN 978-0-521-48362-9.

Reviewed by Kenneth Margerison

Published on H- (September, 1997) H-Net Reviews

For the last decade and a half historians have Three of the four authors--John Rogister, Ju‐ been industriously ploughing the fertile feld of lian Swann, and John Hardman--whose books are eighteenth-century French political culture.[1] under review in this essay concentrate on aspects The emphasis in this endeavor has been on ideol‐ of the political history of Old Regime France, and ogy and the language that expresses it. Historians all three either directly or indirectly argue that of political culture have identifed and analyzed political culture provides no valid insight into the the various discourses developed during the sec‐ political . In fact these historians, ond half of the century in an efort to understand all of whom make extensive use of archival better the underlying bases of the political activity sources, argue that Old Regime political activity in this period. Discourse, as viewed by these histo‐ took place entirely apart from the public sphere. rians, provided the means by which political op‐ Politics in this period, according to these analyses, ponents battled each other in the public sphere in was practiced behind closed doors in the king's hopes of winning the approval of public opinion. chateau at Versailles or within the hidden recess‐ According to Keith Baker, one of the most notable es of the Palais de justice in Paris. Politics was the scholars of this phenomenon, political power it‐ work of the king's ministers, magistrates, and, self rested with those who controlled the language sometimes, his courtiers, mistresses, and wife. Po‐ of politics. Historians who accept the legitimacy of litical disputes were not public afairs, and public the concept of political culture assume that politi‐ opinion mattered little in the decisions reached in cal activity takes place within the framework of a the halls of power. Thus, by its very nature poli‐ variety of competing political languages.[2] tics could have nothing to do with discourse or Could politics actually have been practiced in ideology. If a political language was developed this fashion in Old Regime France with its abso‐ and propagated among the public, it had no efect lute monarchy, the absence of a nationally elected on political decisions or the implementation of representative body, and restrictions on the free‐ those decisions. Even in those instances where it dom of speech and press? Even after 1789 when might appear that ideological considerations or representative institutions and free communica‐ public opinion had infuenced a political outcome, tions were in place, were politics actually shaped some deeply hidden motive or secret activity by political culture rather than personal relation‐ could be discovered to provide a more convincing ships, rivalries, and ambitions? Traditional politi‐ rationale for a particular political result. Concen‐ cal and social historians, accustomed to working trating on France, William S. Cor‐ with archival materials, may remain a bit uneasy mack, the fourth author, interprets political activi‐ about conclusions regarding political activity ty quite diferently. Largely basing his study on drawn from the publications of individuals who archival research, Cormack, nevertheless, argues were not themselves in positions of authority. Did that revolutionary politics must be understood as the language of these publications really repre‐ part of a society-wide political culture. Thus all sent the positions of the or the min‐ four authors raise, from diferent perspectives, istry, and, if so, did they have any bearing on po‐ the issue of the value of political culture as an an‐ litical practice or outcome? One might even legiti‐ alytical tool for better understanding the politics mately ask if historians of political culture do not of eighteenth-century France. merely study words instead of a political reality Politics in mid-eighteenth-century France, ac‐ which can only be recovered by empirical re‐ cording to John Rogister, was confned to the search on individuals and the events and situa‐ tightly restricted world of Louis XV, his ministers, tions of their political lives. the upper clergy, and the magistrates in the pre‐ eminent court of the realm, the Parlement of

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Paris. What specifcally interests Rogister are the magistrates ultimately led to the exile of the Par‐ relationships between important ministers and lement in 1753-1754, to the arrest of its least tem‐ the parlementary leaders which provide the key, perate members, and to its replacement by the he believes, to understanding the nature of the Chambre royale du Louvre. Rogister argues that great political dispute of the 1750s, the refusal of Louis, with the encouragement of the prince de sacraments afair. These relationships were col‐ Conti, also played an active personal role in the ored by the internal workings of both the king's resolution of the crisis by making overtures to councils and the Parlement of Paris as well as by Maupeou and drafting the Law of Silence on Uni‐ the political alliances and rivalries that existed genitus. within both bodies. Having undertaken an ex‐ For all of the detail provided on the various haustive examination of the archival evidence rel‐ political maneuvers surrounding this afair, Ro‐ evant to his subject--much of which resides in pri‐ gister's study has some strange omissions. The vate family collections scattered across France-- parti janseniste, for instance, hardly appears in the author has acquired an intimate knowledge of the narrative of events. There are indeed radical the important personalities and the day-to-day op‐ magistrates, identifed as zeles, but Rogister eration of the king's government. makes clear that these are not all Jansenists. After The major focus of the volume is the denial of a brief description of and the nature of sacraments afair which began in 1752 when the the Bull , the account proceeds as if the archbishop of Paris, , be‐ refusal of sacraments issue had virtually no con‐ gan enforcing a policy of refusing the sacraments nection to the Jansenist attack on this papal pro‐ to dying clergy and members of religious orders nouncement. The Grand Remonstrances were who refused to accept the Bull Unigenitus, the pa‐ drafted by Jansenist partisans including the abbe pal condemnation of Jansenist principles issued in Mey, the author of Apologie de tous les jugements, 1713. The intervention of the Parlement of Paris, a major contribution to Jansenist political theory. designed to prevent the implementation of this Rogister mentions the authors, but says little policy, ultimately led to bitter and acrimonious re‐ about their motivations and nothing about their lations between Louis XV and the magistrates of Jansenist convictions. In describing the impor‐ the court. Rogister describes in great detail how tance of the remonstrances for the concept of the this situation ultimately degenerated into open Fundamental Laws, he makes no references to the political hostilities. The actions of the Parlement Jansenist infuence on this argument. were to a large extent the result of First President Rogister's view of politics in the eighteenth Rene Charles de Maupeou's belief that the govern‐ century is one of secret transactions within a ment was trying to undercut his authority. When closed circle of infuential men, whereas much of the Parlement decided to draft remonstrances in the Jansenist program had been developed in the January 1753, Maupeou refused to play a role in public sphere by numerous Jansenist theoreti‐ the process, thus leaving the way open for more cians. The Grand Remonstrances would seem to radical elements among the magistrates to infu‐ be an example of the point of convergence be‐ ence the document's form (p. 163). The resulting tween public and non-public political activity. Ap‐ Grand Remonstrances of 3 April 1753 made par‐ parently refusing to consider the possibility that ticular claims for the Fundamental Laws of the the magistrates might have found some of the realm including an insistence on the rule of law Jansenist-inspired political language appealing, and the requirement of the sovereign to obey this Rogister provides no convincing explanation as to law. Louis XV's refusal to accept the remon‐ why the entire Parlement accepted such a docu‐ strances and the subsequent judicial strike by the

3 H-Net Reviews ment outside of Maupeou's refusal to take a hand of this episode cannot blithely ignore the in its drafting and difculties among the four Jansenist infuence on the actions of the magis‐ commissioners charged with the task. Surely the trates. Yet Rogister appears to be determined to magistrates did not adopt the Grand Remon‐ demonstrate that the entire history of the rela‐ strances simply because the traditional discipline tionship between the Parlement of Paris and imposed on them by their leadership had broken Louis XV can be understood through the political down. maneuvers of the ministers and the most impor‐ Rogister is equally disdainful of that other pil‐ tant magistrates. In following this course he ig‐ lar of Old Regime political culture: public opinion. nores well-documented evidence, much of which Although a furry of publication activity accompa‐ appears in Dale Van Kley's The Damiens Afair, re‐ nied the entire refusal of sacraments afair, he is garding the power of ideas on the Parlement.[3] If probably correct in concluding that public opin‐ Van Kley's arguments are unconvincing, then they ion had little direct infuence on the fnal form of should be addressed rather than simply passed the compromise between Louis XV and the Par‐ over in silence. But Rogister has so immersed lement. However, to argue that "the King and the himself in the minutia of the refusal of sacra‐ Parlement eventually resolved their diferences ments afair that he seems to be almost unaware and agreed on the compromise solution of 1754 of its larger ramifcations. without any pressure from outside the existing Julian Swann's exhaustively researched ac‐ narrow political structure" presumes a very re‐ count of the Parlement of Paris during the last stricted defnition of political pressure (p. 258). two decades of Louis XV's reign is in many ways The fact that the Chambre royale du Louvre at‐ similar to Rogister's work on the earlier period. tracted little legal business certainly placed pres‐ Like Rogister, Swann makes extensive use of sure on the government to restore public conf‐ archival sources and stresses the importance of dence in the judicial system. More to the point, the relationships between magistrates and partic‐ Controller General Jean-Baptiste Machault ular ministers for understanding political realities d'Arnouville urged Louis to take a more moderate of the era. Swann also demonstrates an excellent attitude toward the magistrates because the gov‐ grasp of the internal operations of the Parlement ernment would inevitably need to register new f‐ and the king's councils. Swann's study, however, nancial legislation (p. 228). Such legislation would possesses several strengths not present in Rogis‐ never have been accepted by the public without ter's work. Spending considerable time on the proper registration by the Parlement. Finally, problems posed by the Bull Unigenitus and the even Rogister concedes that the government could political ramifcations of the refusal of sacraments not overlook the rising tide of publications deal‐ controversy for parlementary authority, he pro‐ ing with the constitutional nature of royal author‐ vides considerably more insight into the opera‐ ity (p. 231). tion of the parti janseniste in the Parlement. In Rogister's evidence regarding the role of per‐ marked contrast to Rogister, Swann makes consid‐ sonal rivalries and ministerial intrigues adds erable use of secondary sources to support his much to our understanding of the refusal of own argument as well as to challenge the asser‐ sacraments afair and reveals that ideology alone tions of historians with whom he disagrees. Final‐ cannot explain events in the 1750s. Rogister's ly, Swann creates a more clearly defned analyti‐ scepticism about the power of public opinion to cal framework for the events he describes. afect directly royal decisions in this period is not Swann argues that the Parlement of Paris's without merit. Nevertheless, the political history actions between 1754 and 1771 were more limited

4 H-Net Reviews in scope and wielded less infuence than histori‐ archy and the government. However, the ans sometimes claim. Controller-General Henri Jansenist successes were dependent on political Leonard Jean-Baptiste Bertin's attempt to extend circumstances. In the 1760s, for instance, the parti direct taxation in the form of the vingtiemes after janseniste, described here by Swann as "puppets the Seven Years' War, for example, failed primari‐ on [Etienne Francois, duc de] Choiseul's string," ly as a result of complicated ministerial politics, were able to bring about the expulsion of the Je‐ not parlementary opposition. During the suits only because this minister and Madame de afair the Parlement's ire centered on the narrow Pompadour, Louis XV's mistress, sought such an issue of the violation of legal procedure in the outcome (p. 213). case against Louis-Rene de Caradeuc La Chalotais, Well aware of the work of Dale Van Kley and the procureur general of the Parlement of Rennes, others who have emphasized the importance of and his associates. In turn, Chancellor Rene Nico‐ the Jansenist infuence on the development of las Charles Augustin de Maupeou created his fa‐ parlementary constitutionalism, Swann, never‐ mous reform largely to shelter the duc d'Aiguillon theless, pays scant attention to the publication ac‐ from parlementary attacks stemming from the tivity of the Jansenist avocats who did much to Brittany Afair. Thus, instead of expanding royal develop and advance the language of constitution‐ authority at the expense of an increasingly radical alism which dominated public opinion in the political institution, Maupeou merely sought to se‐ decades before 1789. Swann neglects this aspect cure his own position by protecting the infuential of parlementary political activity due to his scepti‐ d'Aiguillon. Viewed from this perspective, the cism about its importance. In his view, parlemen‐ magistrates were less concerned with advancing tary political actions seldom bore a direct rela‐ constitutional issues than protecting judicial tionship to fashionable discourse in the public . The government, on the other hand, sphere because politics was always conducted far acted to fulfl the personal ambitions of its minis‐ from the public view. Instead of a grand political ters rather than to bring meaningful reform to struggle between the government and the magis‐ France. trates over the constitutional structure of France, Swann, unlike Rogister, does not try to re‐ the actions of the magistrates were a more down- move Jansenists from the political history of the to-earth afair resulting from political maneuver‐ 1750s and 1760s, but he puts their activity into the ing at Versailles or defense of specifc legal prece‐ broader perspective of the entire membership of dents. In the author's words: "In order to under‐ the court. The success of the parti janseniste, stand the behavior of the Parlement...it is neces‐ which consisted of only 15 to 20 magistrates out of sary to leave the disembodied world of 'discourse' a voting membership of 150, rested with its ability behind, and return instead to the personalities, to link Jansenist causes with general judicial max‐ social and institutional background, and argu‐ ims and historical precedents which upheld the ments of the magistrates themselves" (p. 366). authority of the Parlement. Furthermore, the But was the world of discourse as disembod‐ Jansenist magistrates were skilful in exploiting to ied as Swann implies? Swann's own evidence their own advantage divisions among their non- seems to indicate that such was not always the Jansenist colleagues, as demonstrated by Swann's case. For instance, he recognizes the infuence masterful accounts of the Parlement's major de‐ that the Jansenist avocat Adrien Le Paige had on bates. Such tactics were perfectly suited to the re‐ the language of parlementary remonstrances (p. fusal of sacraments afair where the court's ability 185), and he describes the ability of Jansenist to maintain what it understood to be the rule of magistrates to provide a theoretical underpin‐ law was seriously challenged by the church hier‐

5 H-Net Reviews ning, developed largely by the Jansenist political tant. Each minister carried out the responsibilities theoreticians among the court's corps of avocats, of his ofce with little regard for any general gov‐ for parlementary action (pp. 103 and 207). The ernmental or royal policy. Determined to be his Parlement's decisions were, of course, also infu‐ own prime minister in the manner of Louis XIV, enced by alliances which certain of its members Louis XVI refused to appoint anyone to shape had formed with particular ministers or by the ministerial policy, but also remained unwilling to evident desire of some Jansenist magistrates to take this responsibility upon himself. Each minis‐ advance their own positions. Nevertheless, the ter met with Louis XVI in a weekly travail where importance of the work of Jansenist publicists in the goals and activities of a particular ministry shaping the parlementary political program re‐ were established. Louis XV's old minister Mau‐ mains. Furthermore, these publications, especial‐ repas, who was recalled to the council on the ad‐ ly after the Maupeou reform, had a very real po‐ vice of Louis' aunts, attempted to provide some litical infuence upon the public which was still unity to the ministry by sitting in on the travail of being felt in the late 1780s. As in Rogister's case, the various ministers and infuencing the appoint‐ Swann's fascination with the nitty-gritty of poli‐ ment of new ones. However, his eforts did not tics--ministerial maneuvers and self serving mag‐ yield anything like the kind of solidarity that one istrates--and his apparent irritation with histori‐ associates with modern ministerial government. ans who have dealt with words more than action Unity also proved elusive because small groups of appear to have blinded him to the full range of ministers often met with the king apart from the human political activity in eighteenth-century entire council as committees. While these meet‐ France. ings facilitated the conclusion of certain business, John Hardman shares Rogister and Swann's they often undertook action--most notably the conception of Old Regime politics as a contest hid‐ calling of the --without the den from public view in which a very limited set support of the entire council. Additionally, each of players conducted afairs. Hardman, however, minister exercised independent budget authority develops his topic from the viewpoint of the king's no matter what limits the controller-general government rather than the Parlement of Paris. might have established on annual expenditures. The account rests on a wide variety of archival Because of these arrangements, the government and printed sources, but Hardman especially re‐ of Louis XVI, like that of his grandfather before lies on the detailed manuscript journal of the him, remained unable to develop a consistent di‐ abbe de Veri, the confdant of Louis' chief minis‐ rection. ter, Jean Frederic Phelypeaux, comte de Mau‐ Complicating this problem was the increas‐ repas, for insight into the politics of the period. ingly perilous state of royal fnance. Historians, Hardman's work provides the reader with consid‐ well aware that the monarchy's fnancial woes ul‐ erable factual and anecdotal information includ‐ timately led to its destruction, have devoted much ing the reasons for appointment and dismissal of attention to the plans and policies of the govern‐ every minister who served Louis XVI up to the fall ment's principal fnancial ofcer, the controller- of the Bastille. In short, Hardman has produced a general. Nowhere does the failure of the govern‐ very detailed history of the ministers and min‐ ment appear more starkly than in the series of istries of Louis XVI. failed fnancial reforms undertaken during Louis A number of themes emerge from this study XVI's reign. Far from being the most powerful and of politics in the late eighteenth century. The dis‐ important of Louis's ministers, however, Hard‐ unity of the ministry is perhaps the most impor‐ man informs the reader that the controller-gener‐ al in fact possessed an inferior status within the

6 H-Net Reviews ministry. Although able to draft elaborate fnan‐ and Swann, does recognize that public opinion (of cial plans to deal with the monarchy's fscal prob‐ a very limited public to be sure) had some efect lems, this ofcial lacked the stature and simple on the conduct of government, his single-minded authority to limit the departmental expenditures focus on the alliances and quarrels between min‐ of any of the secretaries of state thus negating al‐ isters, courtiers, and the king himself, with little most any eforts undertaken to rectify budgetary reference to the larger political world, leaves the problems. Attempts by the controllers-general to reader with an incomplete picture of political life obtain authority over the expenditures of the sec‐ under Louis XVI. Necker's Compte rendu and the retaries of state led to much ministerial infghting attacks on this publication by his opponents and the ultimate defeat of the controller-general played to the political world at Versailles as well as demonstrated most vividly by the dismissals of as the larger audience of France. Calonne also rec‐ Anne Robert Jacques Turgot and . ognized the importance of politics beyond Ver‐ Charles Alexandre de Calonne difered from his sailles which accounts for his convening the As‐ predecessors, however, in that his reform plan sembly of Notables and his attempts to appeal was developed on a grander scale and his fall was over the head of these assembled worthies to the intimately related to his rivalry with the Louis general public when his program ran into trouble. Charles le Tonnelier, baron de Breteuil (the minis‐ By the time Louis XVI had signalled the revival of ter for the maison du roi), his deteriorating rela‐ the , politics had moved far be‐ tionship with the Parlement of Paris, and his deci‐ yond the confnes of the royal court. Hardman sion to convoke the Assembly of Notables. does not adequately deal with the attempts of Historians of the period will fnd much of val‐ Calonne or Necker to connect government policy ue in Hardman's research and analysis. Hard‐ to public opinion or with the failure of the min‐ man's reconsideration of Necker's fnancial prac‐ istry in general to recognize its inability to contin‐ tices, which contests some of the more recent ue to function as if the political world was limited laudatory evaluations of his frst ministry, makes to the intrigues at Versailles. Hardman's book clear the objections of contemporaries to Necker's makes a signifcant contribution to the under‐ published account of the state of royal fnances, standing of political history in the last years of the the famous Compte rendu of 1781. His examina‐ Old Regime in France; it provides an exhaustively tion of Calonne's policies places the failure of his detailed study of the workings of the royal min‐ program in the context of the long standing rival‐ istry and the activities of its ministers; but it is not ries between the leading fgures in the ministry a complete history of politics in those years. and the Parlement of Paris. Hardman also pro‐ Unlike the other volumes discussed here, vides his reader with a very precise examination William Cormack eagerly embraces the connec‐ of the infuence, or in many cases the lack of in‐ tion between political culture and political histo‐ fuence, that exercised over the ry. Although much of the book presents a tradi‐ decisions of the Louis XVI. tional narrative of events, the author suggests that The thematic organizational scheme the au‐ his study of the French navy "will contribute to thor employs to analyze the operation of Louis the development of the new interpretative para‐ XVI's ministry detracts from the readability of the digm suggested by Furet, Baker, and others" (p. book, but Hardman's unwillingness to connect 16) by linking events to the manifestation of revo‐ court politics to the larger political arena, espe‐ lutionary ideology. The ideological development cially in the late 1780s, is the study's most glaring which most interests Cormack is that of national weakness. Although Hardman, unlike Rogister sovereignty as described by Keith Baker in Invent‐ ing the . Specifcally he is inter‐

7 H-Net Reviews ested in the infuence of popular sovereignty on tion, destabilization of the navy followed the in‐ the traditional command structure of the feets in terference of local political authorities into its line the port cities of Toulon and Brest. According to of command. The opening of the port at Toulon to his argument, beginning in 1789 the French navy the British feet was a particularly disastrous ex‐ experienced serious political turmoil due to inter‐ ample of local infuence over the navy. Despite ef‐ ference in its operations by the municipal govern‐ forts on the part of the feet's ofcers to resist the ments, the Clubs, the general populace of plans of the newly installed anti-Jacobin munici‐ Toulon and Brest, and the various national assem‐ pal authorities to make an alliance with the blies. As mutinies and general disorder supported British navy, the sailors refused to contest the au‐ by local authorities swept through the navy, the thority of the local ofcials. Cormack concludes ofcers lost control of their feets. Not only did the that the navy had been so efectively dominated navy prove to be an inefective force during the by local political authority that by 1793 the sailors entire revolutionary decade, but its chaotic state identifed the municipality with the nation and re‐ led to such humiliating consequences as the mu‐ mained loyal to it to the point of surrendering the nicipality of Toulon's opening its port to the feet to British control. This situation was fnally British in 1793. reversed, and then only temporarily, when Andre The breakdown of naval authority began dur‐ Jeanbon Saint-Andre arrived at Brest determined ing the Toulon afair of 1789 when a work stop‐ to use Terror to bring order and respect for na‐ page in the arsenal followed Commandant Fran‐ tional authority to the navy. cois-Hector, comte de Albert de Rioms' disciplin‐ Cormack's study is based on extensive re‐ ing of two arsenal employees who had disobeyed search in the Archives de la Marine as well as the his directive not to join the local . Service historique de la Marine at Toulon and In Cormack's analysis, the municipality's arrest of Brest. These sources provide much insight into Albert de Rioms and the Constituent Assembly's the relationships between the naval leadership refusal to support the action of the commandant and the municipal and national political authori‐ demonstrated that the sovereign will of the peo‐ ties during the frst half of the revolutionary ple had begun to replace traditional naval author‐ decade. In particular, Cormack emphasizes the ity. At Brest a mutiny spread throughout the feet limits which the assemblies placed on the activi‐ with the implementation of the reformed, but still ties of a succession of ministers of marine, the harsh, naval Penal Code and the arrival of Albert frustrations of the commandants in preparing the de Rioms in 1790. The sailors, supported by the lo‐ feets for naval engagements, and the various at‐ cal Jacobin Club, persuaded the municipality to tempts of the revolutionary government to bring intervene on their behalf, and the afair ultimate‐ the navy up to fghting capacity. Less well devel‐ ly escalated into a general attack on the aristocrat‐ oped are the popular movements and political ic ofcer corps. The assembly's willingness to ac‐ motivations and activities of the municipal gov‐ cept a modifcation of the Penal Code demonstrat‐ ernments in Toulon and Brest. Cormack's under‐ ed, according to Cormack, that once again popular standing of these political situations rests largely sovereignty had bested executive authority. on secondary literature which appears to limit his Cormack is convinced that the problems re‐ ability to develop the underlying relationships be‐ garding the naval command structure had little to tween the local inhabitants and the sailors of the do with the aristocratic character of the ofcers. feets. Unlike the army, where the ofcers refused to ac‐ More seriously, Cormack's decision to place cept the new egalitarian standards of the Revolu‐ his analysis of the political history of the revolu‐

8 H-Net Reviews tionary navy entirely within the context of the The work of the historians here reviewed in‐ ideology of popular sovereignty artifcially con‐ dicates that traditionally conceived political histo‐ strains the investigation of his subject. Examples ry has beneftted little from recent studies of polit‐ of this constraint can be found in his analysis of ical culture. Rogister, Swann, and Hardman dis‐ the origins of the Toulon afair of 1789 and the miss the elements of France's Old Regime political Brest mutiny of 1790. One might reasonably ask culture as either irrelevant or simply misleading why the new revolutionary ideology of popular when it comes to revealing political reality before sovereignty was a more likely cause of these af‐ 1789. In the revolutionary period, Cormack would fairs than the long- standing disputes between lo‐ like to develop a clear connection between politi‐ cal constituted bodies and the ministry of the ma‐ cal culture and political events, but he is either rine, the chronic underfunding of the navy which unwilling or unable (because of the state of the often meant sailors and arsenal workers went un‐ sources) to examine revolutionary language with paid for months at a time, or long-standing resent‐ the critical eye necessary to the task. One can ment against naval ofcers due to the harsh disci‐ hardly refrain from concluding that these studies pline meted out to sailors. Cormack makes clear demonstrate the difculty that some political his‐ that there were many points of tension between torians will fnd in making use of political culture the navy and the port cities during the Old as an analytical tool. For some, hostility to the Regime, but the revolutionary events appear to very concept of political culture will prevent them have no connection with past abuses and are por‐ from utilizing even the most concrete examples of trayed as simple manifestations of a new political the infuence of language or ideology on political ideology. activity. For others, the methodology will prove to Historians of political culture are insistent be so far removed from traditional archival re‐ that the underlying meaning of events can only be search as to make their understanding of its value understood through an examination of political of limited usefulness. language or languages. With this purpose in mind Nevertheless, the thorough research of Rogis‐ Keith Baker undertook his intensive examination ter, Swann, and Hardman dramatically demon‐ of the deputies' language regarding the nature of strates the limitations of relying exclusively on the nation's sovereign will in the Constituent As‐ discourse to arrive at conclusions regarding polit‐ sembly.[4] Cormack, however, attempts to apply ical practice. Political fgures often operated from Baker's conclusions to the circumstances in motives that these historians have shown to have Toulon and Brest without examining the language little or no connection to ideology or concern with of those challenging naval authority. Did the mu‐ public opinion, and historians of political culture nicipalities, the Jacobin Clubs, and the mutinous would do well to make better use of hard histori‐ sailors utilize such language in their protests? cal data to keep their own work from taking of Even if they did, were they motivated by ideology on fights of fancy. However, as these studies also or by something more concrete such as resent‐ demonstrate, excessively narrow interpretations ment over harsh discipline? Cormack is unable to of human political motivation and activity can determine in a meaningful way the infuence of a provide a picture of political reality just as mis‐ new revolutionary political culture on these leading as overly speculative accounts of the role events because he does not examine discursive of language and ideology on the course of events. evidence in conjunction with the archival materi‐ There is thus a compelling need for each school to als at his disposal. utilize more fully the methods of the other. Notes

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[1]. Notable examples of work in French polit‐ ical culture include Keith Baker (ed.), The Political Culture of the Old Regime (Oxford, 1987); Joan Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca, 1988); Keith Bak‐ er, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1990); Roger Chartier (trans. Lydia G. Cochrane), The Cultural Origins of the French Rev‐ olution (Durham, N.C., 1991); Sarah Maza, Private Lives and Public Afairs: The Causes Celebres of Prerevolutionary France (Berkeley, 1993); David Bell, Lawyers and Citizens: The Making of a Politi‐ cal Elite in Old Regime France (Oxford, 1994); and Dale Van Kley, The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil Constitution, 1560-1791 (New Haven, 1996). For a succinct def‐ nition of political culture see Keith Baker's intro‐ duction in The Political Culture of the Old Regime, p. xii. [2]. Keith Baker, "On the Problem of the Ideo‐ logical Origins of the French Revolution," in In‐ venting the French Revolution, pp. 17-18. [3]. Dale Van Kley, The Damiens Afair: And the Unravelling of the Ancien Regime, 1750-1770 (Princeton, 1984). [4]. Keith Baker, "Fixing the French Constitu‐ tion," in Inventing the French Revolution, pp. 285-95; 301-5. Copyright (c) 1997 by H-Net, all rights re‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ tact [email protected].

If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at http://www.uakron.edu/hfrance/

Citation: Kenneth Margerison. Review of Cormack, William S. Revolution and Political Confict in the French Navy, 1789-1794. ; Hardman, John. French Politics 1774-1789: From the Accession of Louis XVI to the Fall of the Bastille. ; Rogister, John. Louis XV and the Parlement of Paris, 1737-1755. ; Swann, Julian.

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Politics and the Parlement of Paris under Louis XV, 1754-1774. H-France, H-Net Reviews. September, 1997.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=1339

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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