Felles Makt – Felles Ideologi? En Sammenlikning Av Lovgivning I Stortinget Og Rettsutvikling I Høyesterett Mellom 1976 Og 2013
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Felles makt – felles ideologi? En sammenlikning av lovgivning i Stortinget og rettsutvikling i Høyesterett mellom 1976 og 2013. Universitetet i Bergen Det samfunnsvitenskapelige fakultet Instituttet for sammenliknende politikk Masteroppgave Våren 2014 Ragnhild Kisen i Abstract The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between the parliament and the Supreme Court in Norway. First, by studying the relationship between these two institutions on an institutional level, and secondly, try to explore if there is any reflection between the political party preferences when they implement a new law and the juridical votes when the judges apply the law in practice. The research question is interesting because it is determined in the Constitution of Norway, that one of the most important fundamental factors of the democracy of Norway is the balance of power. This balance of power should be divided into three different branches: The Parliament, the Government and the Supreme Court. There have been many changes in the society in Norway as well as on the international arena since the constitution of Norway was written 200 years ago. These changes have made the Supreme Court in Norway more influential, and a more realistic way to see how the power of balance in Norway really works, is to see the Government and the Supreme Court as one branch, where they share one power. Especially when the judges are present in the plenary (plenumssaker), and they are practicing “prøvingsretten” the Supreme Court are acting like a political institution. I make a case study of this relationship to understand the mechanisms of how the relationship between the Government and the Supreme Court works. By reading every “plenumssak” between 1976-2013, in all 62 cases and amount of reports of the political discussion when the law used in the “plenumssak” was implemented in the Parliament, I found a basis for a comparison between the political discussion and the voting of the judges. The analysis confirms that the Parliament and Supreme Court have a mutual dependency in their relationship. They are not only sharing one of the power branches, they are also sharing the same ideology. A majority of the judges that I could find an ideological tendency of their voting records are voting social democratic. In my analysis I also compared my results with the results that Grendstad et. al(2011c) got in their study of the ideological point of view the judges in the Supreme Court to confirm or deny my results. ii Acknowledgements The process of writing this thesis has been challenging, rewarding and an experience for life. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Gunnar Grendstad for introducing me to research of the Supreme Court in Norway. His knowledge and engagement of this topic has been a huge motivation for me. His supervision has been great and he has given me invaluable advise on both substance and structure. Benedicte Frøseth has also done a great job collecting some of the basic data information for this project. I would also like to thank Jørn Ruud for helping me to find all of the resources I needed in the library. I would never made the process of collecting data without his help. A large thanks to Terje Jacobsen for helping me with STATA, and Hilmar L. Mjelde and my dad Torodd Kisen for reading my drafts through the process and giving me feedback. Last, but not least, I would like to thank all other fellow students, friends and family for their support, with a special shout to Kristin, Marte, Kristoffer and of course my mother, Inger Ødegaard. Ragnhild Kisen Bergen 28. Mai 2014. iii Innholdsfortegnelse 1 INNLEDNING ............................................................................................................. 1 1.1 PROBLEMSTILLING OG DENS RELEVANS OG BIDRAG ................................................................. 3 1.2 BEGREPSFORKLARINGER .................................................................................................... 5 1.3 OPPGAVENS STRUKTUR ........................................................................................................... 6 2 TRE SENTER FOR MAKTUTØVELSE I NORGE. ............................................................... 8 2.1 FORHOLDET MELLOM STORTINGET OG HØYESTERETT – ET TEORETISK PERSPEKTIV ............................... 8 2.1.1 Modellen for eksterne institusjonelle faktorer i Norge ............................................. 9 2.2 DET POLITISKE NORGE ............................................................................................................ 9 2.2.1 Organisering av Stortinget ...................................................................................... 11 2.2.2 Partigrupper og fagkomiteene ................................................................................ 11 2.2.3 Odels- og Lagting ..................................................................................................... 12 2.2.4 Plenum ..................................................................................................................... 12 2.2.5 Forarbeider til lovforslag og lovendringer i Stortinget ............................................ 12 2.3 HØYESTERETTSDOMMERNE OG DERES ARBEID ............................................................................ 14 2.4 HØYESTERETTS FUNKSJON OG OPPGAVER .................................................................................. 15 2.5 JUSS OG POLITIKK, EN LANGVARIG DISKUSJON ............................................................................ 16 2.6 HØYESTERETT, DEN TREDJE STATSMAKT .................................................................................... 18 3 DOMMERADFERD I HØYESTERETT ........................................................................... 20 3.1 REALISME VERSUS FORMALISME .............................................................................................. 20 3.2 DEN JURIDISKE MODELLEN ..................................................................................................... 21 3.2.1 Den juridiske modellen i Norge ............................................................................... 23 3.3 HOLDNINGSMODELLEN ......................................................................................................... 24 3.3.1 Holdningsmodellen i Norsk kontekst ....................................................................... 25 3.3.2 Rettskildene for dommerne i Norge ........................................................................ 26 3.3.3 Kritikk av holdningsmodellen .................................................................................. 26 4 METODE ...................................................................................................................... 28 4.1 EN KVALITATIV TILNÆRMING PÅ DOMMERADFERD I HØYESTERETT.................................................. 28 4.2 CASESTUDIET ...................................................................................................................... 29 4.2.1 Avveininger ved bruk av casestudiet ....................................................................... 31 4.2.2 Oppsummering av hvorfor casestudiet er det mest hensiktsmessige forskningsdesignet for denne studien .............................................................................. 34 4.3 TRIANGULERING .................................................................................................................. 35 4.4 DOKUMENTANALYSE ............................................................................................................ 35 4.4.1 Utfordringer med bruken av dokumentanalyse ...................................................... 36 4.5 STATISTISK METODE - KORRELASJONSANALYSE OG BIVARIAT REGRESJONSANALYSE ............................. 38 5 DATA ........................................................................................................................... 40 5.1 EN BESKRIVELSE AV POPULASJONEN OG DET ENDELIGE UTVALGET ................................................... 40 5.1.1 Plenumssaker .......................................................................................................... 40 iv 5.1.2 Tid ............................................................................................................................ 41 5.1.3 Referater fra Odelstinget i Stortinget ...................................................................... 41 5.1.4 Det perfekte sammenlikningsgrunnlaget, ekvivalens 1 .......................................... 42 5.1.5 Ekvivalens 2 ............................................................................................................. 43 5.1.6 Saken i Høyesterett ................................................................................................. 44 5.1.7 Ekskluderte saker ..................................................................................................... 44 5.2 DET ENDELIGE UTVALGET AV SAKER SOM JEG SKAL BRUKE Å ANALYSERE FOR Å BESVARE PROBLEMSTILLINGEN .................................................................................................................. 46 5.3 UTFORDRINGER OG MULIG SKJEVHET I DETTE UTVALGET ............................................................... 48 5.4 OPERASJONALISERING AV VARIABLER ................................................................................. 49 5.4.1 OPERASJONALISERING AV VARIABLER PÅ INSTITUSJONELT-NIVÅ .................................................. 49 5.4.2 Koding av variablene