Protest Networks, Communicative Mechanisms and State Responses: Ethnic Mobilization and Violence in Northeast India

Pahi Saikia Department of Political Science McGill University, Montreal

September 2009

A Thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D)

ABSTRACT

Disputes between Georgia and two of its regions, Abkhazia and Ajaria in the 1990s, led to considerably different outcomes---while the Abkhazians became embroiled in a full-blown civil war with the state of Georgia, the Ajarians remained conspicuously calm. Similarly, in 1967-70, while the Igbo and Hausa-Fulani regions engaged in a violent confrontation with the Nigerian state, the adjoining Yoruba territory prevented such hostilities and stayed relatively peaceful. Variations such as these have been a recurring theme in the study of contentious politics along ethnic lines. Despite similarities in historical and structural experiences, some ethnic groups are able to avert violence while others turn to highly disruptive forms of contention to secure their goals related to group rights, cultural recognition, political and territorial autonomy. What accounts for these variations? Why do some ethnic groups seeking cultural and political autonomy engage in extraordinarily high risk violent movements while others respond with relative quiescence? These are some of the important questions, an exploration of which constitutes the central focus of this dissertation.

Although a host of explanations exist on the cause of these variations, this study tends to adopt a process-oriented approach while incorporating theoretical perspectives borrowed from contentious politics besides rationalist and social psychological assumptions of ethnic violence. At the most general level, this dissertation makes the fundamental claim that although the desire for material ends does play a crucial role; it is the emotional struggle over the relative status of group identity and core ethnic symbols that affords a group the ultimate mobilizing potential for collective action. Beyond this, a well-crafted analytical framework that includes the mobilizing structure, the organizational resources and state responses is developed to understand the correlation between the mobilizing process and the outcome of ethnic movements. The utility of this framework is demonstrated through a comparison of three tribal minority ethnic groups in the north-eastern part of India, where one group seeks to create a separate ethno-federal territory through high-levels and sustaining violent insurgent actions, another employs relatively low levels of violence for a shorter duration while a third group advances

moderate claims and resorts to relatively peaceful contentious actions. Further, the level of ethnic violence is determined by the consistency and extent of state accommodation of ethnic demands, and the nature of state repression. The study indicates that consistent state accommodation is most conducive to the containment of violence and widespread rather than targeted repression produces support for higher levels of anti-state violence.

The analysis finds that popular support and participation are crucial to shape the trajectories and strategies of ethnic movements. What leads to variations in the level of popular following across cases, is the availability of vertical networks, the degree of commitment, legitimacy and effective communicative strategies adopted by decentralized activist organizations. This in turn, generates collective mobilization and produces the mechanisms for the sustenance of violent rebellion. Furthermore, the study finds that consistent state accommodation is most conducive to the containment of violence. It indicates that widespread rather than targeted repression produced support for higher levels of anti-state violence.

RÉSUMÉ

Les disputes entre la Géorgie et ses deux régions, Abkhazia et Ajaria, au cours des années1990, ont méné à des resultants tres differents--pendant que l'Abkhazia est entré dans une guerre civile avec l'état Géorgien, l'Ajaria est resté calme. De même en 1967-70, pendant que les Igbo et les régions Hausa-Fulani se sont engagés dans une confrontation violente avec l'état Nigérian, le territoire Yoruba est resté relativement pacifique. Des telles variations constituent un thème principal dans l'étude de la politique querelleuse ethnique. Malgré des similarités dans les expériences historiques et structurelles, certains groupes ethniques évitent la violence pendant que d'autres l‘emploient de façon extreme pour protéger leurs buts rattachés aux droits de groupe, la reconnaissance culturelle, l'autonomie politique et territoriale. Qu'est-ce qui explique ces variations? Pourquoi certains groupes éthniques cherchent-ils l'autonomie culturelle et politique malgré les risques des mouvements violents pendant que d'autres y répondent plus tranquillement? Ceux-ci sont les questions principales analysées dans cette mémoire à travers un etude de trois cas differents dans le nord-est de l‘Inde ou on voit qu‘un groupe, les Bodos, cherche a créer un térritoire éthnique en utilisant de la violence extreme et soutenue, pendant qu‘un autre groupe, les Dimasas, emploient des niveaux de violence rélativement bas pour des durés plus courtes alors qu‘un tiers groupe, les Misings, expriment des affirmations plus moderées et employant des actions de dissidence plus paisibles.

Bien que nombreuses explications existent pour la cause de ces variations, cette étude emploie une approche focalisée vers les processus en incorporant des perspectives théoriques de la politique querelleuse et en plus des hypothèses psychologiques rationalistes et sociales de la violence ethnique. Au niveau général, cette mémoire montre que la structure de mobilisation des ressources d‘une organisation expliquent le niveau de soutien en faveur de la mobilisation ethnique et que les différentes réponses publiques expliquent le niveau de violence. La disponibilité des réseaux fortement « verticales », legitimité du leadership, engagement continu, l‘efficacité de la communication et le niveau de centralization des organizations activists determine le degré de soutien populaire et resources materielles nécessaries pour méner à une mobilization collective et réussi, ce qui est nécessaire pour qu‘un groupe s‘engage dans une mobilization violente et

mantient une rebellion. Empiriquement, je fait une analyse des processus de mobilization et rébellion violente chez les Bodos qui montrait clairement ces characteristiques alors que les Dimasas et Misings, qui ne profitait pas de ces avantages, étaient fortement limités dans leurs efforts de transformer leur mouvements dans des rébellions intensifiés et soutenues. En outre, cet étude trouve que la repression generalisée, plutot que la repression selective, produit du soutien pour des niveaux plus hauts de violence contre l‘etat. La repression selective transforme la rebellion violente dans un mouvement plus modéré et de-radicalisé. L‘etude montre en plus que les compromises de la part de l‘etat et le fournissement de certaines motivations sélectives aux chefs des mouvements sont les facons les plus efficaces de contenir la violence.

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ...... 11 LIST OF FIGURES...... 12 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... 13 ABBREVIATIONS...... 17 CHAPTER ONE...... 20 INTRODUCTION...... 20

Developing the Argument...... 22

General Definitions...... 25

Why Assam? Selection Criteria...... 27

Specific Case Studies...... 30

Note on Methodology...... 32

Interviewing Process and Data Collection...... 34

Selected Research Locations...... 38

Layout of the Dissertation...... 43

CHAPTER TWO...... 45 THE PROBLEM OF EXPLAINING ETHNIC VIOLENCE: REVIEW OF

EXISTING LITERATURE...... 45

Introduction...... 45

Discerning Issues of Violent Contention: Research Question,

Variables and Hypotheses...... 47

Intra-group resources...... 49

Symbolic Motivations...... 50

Political Opportunities and Constraints...... 51

Hypotheses...... 51

Review of Existing Literature...... 53

Fundamental Conceptual Concerns...... 56

Rationalist Assumptions on Individual and Group Behavior...... 60

Problems with Rationalist Approaches...... 64

Socio-Psychological Motivations of Group Behavior...... 67

State-Movement Interaction, Increasing

Propensities to Mobilize Violently...... 70

Framework Explaining Ethnic Movement Outcome...... 73

Societal Resources and Sustainability of Violence...... 74

Popular Resonance of Symbolic Appeals and Historical Identities:

Effective Communicative Mechanism...... 82

State Repression, Inconsistent Accommodation and Escalating

Militant Activities...... 88

Conclusion...... 98

CHAPTER THREE...... 101 Basing Differences: Ethnic Identity Construction, Popular Awareness and Separatism of the Bodos...... 101

Introduction...... 101

Historical Overview of the Bodos (Pre-Colonial Phase)...... 104

Socio-linguistic and Socio-religious Reform:

Foundation of a Separate Bodo Identity (1860-1920)...... 109

Politicization of Bodo Ethnicity (1920-1947)...... 111

Language Movement (1960-1970)...... 113

Political Movement (1970s-1993)...... 119

Empirical Evidence of Violent Mobilization

First Phase (1988-1992) ...... 121

First Phase of Negotiation: Bodo Accord (1993)...... 122

Escalating Militancy: Second Phase of

Violent Mobilization (1993-2003)...... 129

Renewed Negotiations: Bodo Accord (2003)...... 132

Conclusion...... 134

CHAPTER FOUR...... 136 Potential Causes of Violent Mobilization...... 136

Mobilizing Structures: Horizontal and Vertical Networks...... 138

Efficacy to Communicate Ethno-linguistic Identity: Increasing Capabilities

To Adopt Violent Tactics...... 147

Accelerating Conditions for Intensive Political Mobilization (post-1980s)...... 154

Failed Accommodation, State Monopoly on Violence

And Increasing Militancy, (Post-1993)...... 161

Consequences of Failed Accommodation and State

Repression on Violent Mobilization...... 171

Actual and Potential Denouncers: Alternative

Targets of Rebel Violence ...... 175

Settler Population as Substitute Targets of Violence...... 178

Conclusion...... 188

CHAPTER FIVE...... 190 Ethno-nationalist Movement of the Misings...... 190

Introduction...... 190

Pre-Colonial to Colonial Period (1800-1926)...... 192

Politicization of Ethno-Cultural Identity...... 194

Language Movement (1956-87)...... 197

Political Autonomy Movement (1987-2001)...... 202

State Responses and Selective Incentives: First Attempt to

Accommodate (1990-1996)...... 204

State Responses and Selective Incentives: Second Attempt

To Accommodate (1996-2001)...... 208

Salience of Language Identity in Strategic Mobilization...... 211

Mobilizing Resources: The Societal Dimension...... 219

Geographic Dispersion: An Impediment to Establish Vertical Links...... 222

Accommodation and Selective Incentives: Creating the

Environment for Moderating Political Claims...... 227

Conclusion...... 231

CHAPTER SIX...... 232 Ethno-political Movement of the Dimasas in favour of

Greater Political Autonomy...... 232

Introduction...... 232

Construction, Negotiation of Dimasa Identity: Overview

Of the Pre-Colonial Period...... 233

Colonial and Post-Colonial Period (1854-1967)...... 236

Politicization of Dimasa Identity (1967-1980s)...... 239

Student Activism and Emergence of Radical Politics (post-1980s)...... 244

Phase of Rising Militancy in North-Cachar hills (1980s-2000)...... 247

Empirical Evidence of Rebel Violence...... 253

The Argument:

Movement Networks and Mobilizing Resources...... 255

Salience of Ethno-cultural Symbols through Cultural Revivalism...... 260

State Repression: Impact on Violent Mobilization...... 267

Dimasa-Hmar Violence of 2003...... 272

Hmars as Alternative Targets of Violence...... 275

Conclusion...... 282

CHAPTER SEVEN...... 285 Conclusion...... 285

Extending the Argument beyond Assam: The Case of Mizos...... 292

Comparison of Mizos with Bodos, Dimasas and Misings...... 296

Implications and Scope of Future Research……………………………...... 302

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 307

APPENDIX A...... 318

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1. Summary of Variables and Cases...... 96

Table 4.1.Incidence of violence ...... 174

Table 4.2. Community wise encroachment of land in the

Bijni Circle (Kokrajhar district)...... 184

Table 6.1. Distribution of Scheduled Tribe Population in North Cachar

Hills...... 275

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig.1.1. Map of Assam indicating the areas where the Bodos, Misings and Dimasas are located...... 31 Fig.1.2. Communicative process, political openings/strains, resource accumulation and effects on ethnic mobilization...... 73 Fig.3.1. Incidence of violence in the Bodo areas (1988-1993)...... 125 Fig.3.2. Incidence of extremist violence in the Bodo areas from 1994-2003...... 131 Fig.4.1. Bodo Population in different districts of Assam [in descending order]...... 146 Fig.4.2. State repression in Bodo areas...... 170 Fig.4.3. Correlation between State Repression and Rebel Violence...... 173 Fig.5.1. Variables explaining the outcome of Mising Autonomy Movement...... 210 Fig.5.2. Map of Assam showing different districts...... 223 Fig.5.3. Distribution of Misings population in selected districts of Assam...... 224 Fig.6.1. District Map of North Cachar Hills...... 234 Fig.6.2. Incidence of violence in the Dimasa areas...... 254 Fig.6.3. Level of State repression in Dimasa areas...... 269

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

One accumulates numerous debts from a large number of people who contribute in different ways during various stages of writing a dissertation. This dissertation has benefitted enormously from a wide range of people whose support brought this work to fruition. First and foremost my supervisor, Prof. Narendra Subramanian deserves my gratitude for his generosity with his time, immense patience and invaluable advice at every stage of writing and doing the research. I am grateful to him not only for enkindling an interest in the subject of ethnic mobilization but also for guiding me how to think about different patterns of contention, for stressing the value of posing important questions and most significantly for guiding me how to find answers to those questions.

Prof. Stephen Saideman deserves sincere thanks for providing different perspectives on the literature while taking his course on Ethnic Strife and World Politics and for offering the opportunity to participate and gain insights from the seminars and talks held from time to time by the Montreal Research Group on Ethnic Conflict. I owe immense thanks to Prof. Khalid Medani for his encouraging words and valuable comments to sharpen my analysis. Apart from the guidance of these scholars, I was extremely fortunate to have been taught by Prof. Filippo Sabetti, Prof. Michael Brecher, Prof. Philip

Oxhorn and Prof. Barbara Haskel, who imparted me with the basic knowledge to carry out social science research.

There are many more people whom I cannot possibly list here but who listened to my arguments in formal discussions in the conferences where I presented my work, as well as through exchanges in several informal settings and helped me with their suggestions and stimulating questions. My special thanks to Prof. Thorsten Janus and Prof. Douglas

Woodwell for their extensive comments and fruitful advice on my work. I must also acknowledge Prof. Rakesh Gupta for his constant encouragement and motivation throughout the past years of my research.

Many of the ideas were developed during my fieldwork in India where I spent almost seven months in the winter and summer of 2007. The kindness and willingness of many people I interviewed, particularly those in Guwahati, North Cachar hills, Bodoland and the Mising areas of Assam, greatly aided me to build up my arguments. Many people chose to participate in the interviews as they wanted to share their views with a wider audience. I wish I could do a better job of conveying their message to the outer world as some people whom I met in those areas do not have access to even the basic means of modern communication. My fieldwork in those remote and inaccessible areas would not have been possible without the generous help and support of some local residents. I am especially indebted to S. Kamprei, U. Bathari, J.A. Tapadar, Ganesh Kutumb, Ranoj

Pegu, the members of the Dimasa Students‘ Union, the All Bodo Student‘s Union and

Bodo Sahitya Sabha for their warmth and counsel and M.Basumatary and B. Pawegam for facilitating my visits to some of the remote villages in the Bodo and Mising areas. I owe my gratitude to P. Jibung and his colleagues for some unforgettable moments during

my stay in N.C.hills. It is important to acknowledge M.S.Prabhakara for being gracious enough to share some of his rarest collections on Assam politics.

Among my friends in Canada, special thanks goes to Adama and Diane for making me feel at home when I first reached Canada; Nicole, Bahar, Anusha, Ece, Nasreen and

Gopika with whom I shared some cheerful moments in Montreal; Salim for being extremely helpful on countless occasions; Ali Munhanif and Suranjan for their kindness and help in various ways all these years at McGill. I must extend my special thanks to

Alessandra for helping me out with the French translation of the abstract. I also express my appreciation to the staff of the Department of Political Science. Special thanks to

Helen, Tara, Mari, Angie, Pina and Andrew.

My family who has been a constant source of inspiration deserves more than words can merely express, especially my parents, grandparents and my sisters Moushumi and

Amrita and for their confidence in me; Ranjit, Bikram, Rajib, Pompi and my in-laws for being so supportive and always reminding me of the lighter side of things. I am extremely grateful to my parents for their sensitivity, love and encouragement to work hard and stay focussed.

Finally, I express my deepest acknowledgements to Bipul for offering me his wonderful companionship, time and unflinching support to keep up my morale and

complete my work. I truly believe that without his constant care and understanding it would have been difficult for me to remain steadfast and complete this dissertation.

ABBREVIATIONS

AASU All Assam Students‘ Union

AATL All Assam Tribal League

ABWWF All Bodo Women‘s Welfare Federation

ABEF All Bodo Employees Federation

AGP Assam Gana Parishad

ABSU All Bodo Students‘ Union

ASS Assam Sahitya Sabha

ASDC Autonomous State Demand Committee

BLT Bodo Liberation Tigers

BSS Bodo Sahitya Sabha

DHD Dima Halam Daogah

DRDC Dimaraji Revival Demand Committee

DSU Dimasa Students‘ Union

HPC Hmar Peoples‘ Convention

MADC Mising Autonomous Demand Committee

MAK Mising Agom Kebang

MBK Mising Bane Kebang

MMK Mising Mime Kebang

MNF Mizo National Front

NDFB National Democratic Front of Bodoland

PTCA Plains Tribal Commission of Assam

TMPK Takam Mising Porin Kebang

To Ma and in the memory of my Deuta

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Ethno-nationalist violence involving minority ethnic groups has attracted increased attention amongst scholars due to the protracted nature of these conflicts along ethnic lines, claiming lives and threatening the stability of states in places as diverse as Asia,

Africa, Balkans, and the Middle East. The subject has long concerned the academic community not only because of the destructive consequences of these violent conflicts but also because of varying implications for power relations between majority and minority groups, intra and inter-state politics.1 What are ethnic minority groups contesting about? What strategies do these contending groups pursue to steer their claims? While navigating their claims, ethnic protest and mobilizations of some ethnic minorities have often resulted in their engagement in considerable levels of violence both with the state apparatus as well as other ethnic groups. This dissertation explores why some minority ethnic groups are susceptible to violent mobilization while others mobilize using less disruptive methods of contention.

Nation-building in the post-colonial phase in India took place amidst existing ethno- cultural and religious diversities. During this period, the nationalist leaders of India

1Inter-state politics may be affected as a result of symbolic and material support mustered by a separatist group from a neighboring country. Mizos and Nagas in India are just a few examples that fit into this category. Indo-Burma relations were strained because of perceived assistance that the Burmese military junta provided to the insurgents of northeast India. Virtually all insurgent groups in India‘s northeast enlisted a lot of external support Pakistan, China, Thailand and Bangladesh in the form of military training, supply of arms and financial aid. India‘s strained relations with these countries had been effected by this factor to a certain extent. 20

embarked on a balancing mission by designing a federal state apparatus, slightly tilted in favor of the Central government. The balancing act thus entailed the division of the territories of India into fourteen federal units, on the basis of dominance and geographical concentration of ethno-linguistic communities [SRC Report, 1955, 229-37]. Although this practice proved to be temporarily productive, neat divisions along similar lines seemed to be practically difficult in areas like the north-eastern region of India. The leaders of the Indian state at that point of time were confronted with the herculean task of integrating the diverse communities inhabiting the north-eastern part of the country, which as some scholars would suggest, represent nothing less than a ‗patchwork of tribal and mixed linguistic communities‘ [Dube 1984, 146]. The region is a complex mosaic of different tribal ethnic groups with some shared ethnic characteristics as well tremendous varieties in terms of historical memories, distinct cultural features, beliefs, languages or dialects. The state of Assam, which is the focus area of this dissertation, alone includes a variety of such groups which are numerically less in number than the dominant and majority Assamese speaking group. The Indian state decided to lump together the heterogeneous groups of the north-eastern region into one federal unit---the state of

Assam. In addition, the central government created local administrative units allowing some of the tribal communities to gain control and administer the affairs related to their local economy, culture, customs and beliefs.

Creation of an ethno-linguistic state and devolution of local power through the decentralized institutions of limited autonomy however, did not effectively contain the conflicts that were emerging in the region. These arrangements proved to be insufficient

to make the region cohesive. Different tribal communities mobilized to achieve greater territorial autonomy and separate states both within and outside the Indian boundaries.

This phenomenon had become significantly visible in the 70s and 80s. While the number of groups mobilizing since then has been increasing, what is even more puzzling is the variation in terms of degrees and strategies of mobilization used by these groups seeking greater autonomy. Some have mobilized peacefully, while others have taken to armed conflicts. As Brass points out, although political mobilizations have occurred among several of the tribal groups of Assam, only a few have developed into bitter and violent movements [Brass, 1991]. How do we account for the variations in the trajectories of mobilization adopted by protesting ethnic minorities? The primary objective in this dissertation is therefore, to analyze the factors that might explain why some minority ethnic groups engage in violent mobilization while pursuing greater autonomy. While drawing empirical materials related to three minority ethnic groups of Assam---the

Bodos, Dimasas and Misings, the purpose is to examine not only the conditions and contours of violent mobilization but also to address the question related to the timing of ethnic mobilization of these groups.

DEVELOPING THE ARGUMENT

This dissertation identifies some background conditions which shaped contentious actions and accelerated the movements for autonomy and identity formation in the late

60s and throughout the 70s. As a first step to my argument, I contend that the search for explaining the process of mobilization should begin by considering two enabling

conditions---effective communicative mechanism and the mobilization of societal resources to carry out the rebellion. The process of mobilization first involves the act of convincing potential supporters of the movement. Following the views of social movement scholars, I believe that movement participation can broadly consist of three different levels of supporters and participants. The first set of movement participants can be counted as the core activists, who are most committed and remain at the forefront of movement actions. The next level of participants may be loosely categorized as those involved in the activities of social movement organizations on an average basis such as attending regular meetings, demonstrations or other movement actions. The third level of participation may be derived from the general populace with little or no experience and knowledge about activism but whose support is essential for sustenance of protest activities. Their participation may be considered as occasional and sporadic.

With such a variegated level of involvement and support within a group, it becomes challenging for the movement leaders to organize a mass-based movement. Even if the group experiences underlying grievances, the issues have to be narrated in such a manner that the group members get collectively motivated. The process of mobilization may involve both material as well as non-material bases of contention that the members of the group can easily identify with. While the former relates to tangible sources, such as economic resources (land, jobs, etc.), the latter refers to symbolic aspects related to ethnic symbols, historical narratives, etc. where an individual shares the source of his/her identity (i.e. relevant group membership based on a social dimension, ethnicity, etc.) with other members of the group. Political and social salience of these identities or ethnic

grievances motivates the protagonists to achieve the preferred benefits and rights in a collective way. However, there is a need to emphasize that all collective identities may not gain salience at the same time and across different ethnic groups. Within a given collective identity, people are likely to attach themselves only to specific sub-group identities (e.g. language, customs, etc.) depending upon the immediate social context and their material or socio-psychological needs and interests (distinctiveness, belonging, respect) [Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 86]. Adherence to particular group identities therefore, becomes more pronounced due to a system of inter-group relations, characterized by asymmetries and differentials over distribution of power and control over resources.2

Collective identities embedded in such inter-group relations are likely to spur the challenge amongst competing groups to secure an estimable portion of those resources.

It is within this context that collective identities gain salience and gets politicized.

Politicization unfolds as a sequence of continuous denial or irregularities to fulfill group expectations. Typically, this involves orchestrating claims for indemnities levelled against the out-group, perceived to be involved in the predicament.3 The key to understand the variance in the degree of mobilization across groups are a consequence of the ability of movement leaders to politicize ethnic grievances. To look at it differently, the ability of movement leaders to mobilize the group members on the basis of a particular ethnic identity or ethnic grievance will depend on the degree of salience that the group members attach to those symbolic elements and the ability of the movement

2 Power can be based on the ability to allocate material rewards and resources or possession of immaterial resources such as status, reputation or worth for group members. 3 The out-group may involve the state or another ethnic group. 24

leaders to make those elements ‗situationally available‘ to the group members through effective repertoires of contention.4

Next, I investigate the role of mobilizing social networks in the process of coordinating, recruiting and disseminating the ideas of the movement. Mobilization of networks operates at two different levels—within the group members at the community level and a channel of interaction established between the movement leaders and participants. The process of mobilization is finally dependent on the exogenous forces or the type of responses of the political system that can enhance or constrain further prospects and tactics used by activists to advance their claims.

GENERAL DEFINITIONS

Ethno-political mobilization may be defined as a process by which members of a group collectively organize around an ascriptive identity (for e.g. language, religion, customs, origin) or interests to achieve collective goals. Collective goals may encompass increased participation in the bureaucracy, enhanced political representation, socio- economic power and privileges, cultural rights or control over a piece of territory.

Separatist movement can be broadly defined as a process whereby an ethnic group seeks to secede or create an independent state or to achieve autonomy or federal status within an existing state by redrawing its territorial boundaries. A broader definition

4 Drawing from the social movement literature, repertoires of contention are the tools of activism such as widespread pamphleteering, mass demonstrations, sit-ins, etc. that help people understand what they are protesting about. In other words, these are the means to broadcast movement appeals. 25

seems to be useful because goals may often overlap or shift between separatism and secession (or vice versa) or lesser autonomy (for e.g. cultural) to separatism. For example the Moros in Southern Philippines shifted their demands from independence to autonomy. Similarly, the Dimasas in India shifted their demands from autonomy to the formation of a separate state within India.

Disruptive collective action can be described as the tools of political mobilization used by a protesting group. Protesters may practice either non-violent or violent disruptive tactics or both depending on the responses of the political system. Some of the most conventional non-violent disruptive tactics used during protests are sit-ins, demonstrations, strikes and boycotts. Violent disruptive tactics involve direct confrontational strategies like bombings and physical attacks.

Contentious politics involves different forms of political struggle, including violent as well as non-violent tactics used by contenders to make their claims. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly provide a broad based definition of contentious politics that refers to ‗episodic, public and collective interactions among makers of claims and the objects‘ [McAdam,

Tarrow & Tilly, 2001]. Contentious politics can therefore, encompass issues concerning civil war, riots, strikes, demonstrations, ethnic conflict, revolutions, civil disobedience or everyday resistance. The scope can be domestic or transnational.

WHY ASSAM? SELECTION CRITERIA

In addition to my profound personal interest in the people and politics of the area, I believe that Assam, identified with a veritable mix of different ethnicities and cultures reveals a significant amount of observable attributes for research on ethnic studies and ethnic conflict. Ethnographic accounts reveal that minority tribal ethnic groups make up a distinct portion of Assam‘s population. According to recent censuses there are nearly 23 tribal groups in Assam constituting nearly 13 percent of the total population of the state

[Census Report 2001]. These groups vary not only in terms of their size and spatial distribution but also dialects, culture and ways of life. Bodos constitute the largest tribal group of Assam and account for nearly 44.1 per cent of the total tribal population of the state. Next to them are the Mishings and they are of nearly 16.3 per cent. Dimasas make up of approximately 2.3 percent of the total tribal population.

Ethnic identification of the Bodos, Dimasas and Misings as tribals, have become strikingly conspicuous since the post-colonial period. The British divided the territories of India‘s northeast into ‗excluded‘ and ‗partially excluded‘ areas and categorized the people inhabiting these areas as ‗backward‘ or ‗forest tribes‘. This engendered the creation of different categories of people living in the northeast based on their ethnic origins, socio-cultural divisions and habitation as Indo-Mongoloids and Indo-Aryans; as tribes and non-tribes and further within the tribal groups, as plains tribes and hills tribes.

The typical pattern of delineating and redrawing of territorial boundaries during the colonial period was associated with the interests of the colonial rulers to administer these

areas in an indirect manner. Later, this shaped the construction of a distinguishing and bounded ethnic identity known as Kacharis, as separate and distinct from the majority ethnic group---the Assamese-speakers. Adversely, this resulted in isolationalism and backwardness of the tribal groups. In the post-colonial period, when state-building process was at its pace, the broader Assamese society was divided in terms of differences in social hierarchy and power structure. The prevailing discourse was that while the

Assamese-speaking majority people were relatively modernized and developed, the tribal groups were considered to be significantly alienated and backward.

Articulated expressions of these groups as tribes and more specifically, as the original inhabitants of the region became increasingly pronounced when they mobilized for redefinition of their group status and rights as ‗distinct nations‘ and as worthy of special group-based rights and privileges which they feel have been denied by the colonial as well as the post-colonial state.5 Owing to these differences and contestations based on discrete identities of these groups, the Indian state made attempts to redefine, restore and promote some of their dispossessed rights and practices. Following a Presidential notification passed in the year 1956, the state labelled these groups as Scheduled Tribes and conferred them, special concessions and privileges that include reservation of seats on the educational institutions, government jobs and state legislatures. The state also instituted certain ways to protect the areas inhabited by these communities as protected tribal lands. The institution of such a protective discrimination regime was nevertheless marked by lack of uniformity. Some were granted with partial devolution of local powers

5 Various anthropological findings confirmed that these groups were the original inhabitants of the region but were pushed out of their original lands as a result of later political conquests by the Ahoms who ruled Assam from 1228-1826 A.D. [Betielle, 1998, 39 (2)] 28

of autonomy (for instance, the Dimasas) while others with limited powers to protect their lands without any devolutionary power (for e.g Bodos and Misings). Later, these arrangements seemed to have wider political implications. One of the most visible consequences of the irregularities in continuous mapping and reshaping of tribal territories was displayed in the form of ethno-political reclaiming for greater territorial autonomy by these ethnic minorities.

My own choice of the nomenclatures throughout this study is to use the terms ‗tribal ethnic group‘, ‗tribal communities‘ or ‗tribal ethnic minorities‘ interchangeably, to refer to the tribes of India‘s northeast. The rationale for this is the degree of consciousness as distinct collectivities and as tribes and the extent of political organization to maintain them as such. I use the term to refer to a group of people forming a community by claiming descent from a common lineage. Like an ethnic group, the members are tied by perceived rather than real affinities. A tribal community is unified by a collectively held social organization for purposes related to administration and day to day lives.

The categorization of the tribes of India‘s northeast is however, based on a rather anachronistic notion developed by classical colonial anthropologists, which depicts tribes as isolated, small, self-contained, self-sufficient and autonomous communities practicing subsistence economy with little or no dependence on external economy [Goswami, 1984 pp. 55-60]. Unlike the hinterland dwellers of indigenous communities in Latin America, the Dayaks of Indonesia or the autochthon tribes of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, groups called tribes in northeast India maintain a certain degree of interdependence with

the non-tribal communities. Therefore, to relegate the living conditions of these groups as

‗primitive‘ would be inappropriate. More notably, barring certain traditional forms of behavior, such as, distinct social practices, physical characteristics, dress codes, food habits and other cultural features, most of them have intermingled with other non-tribal communities and some dwelling in the urban areas, have even adopted modern ways of living. They have also been continuously exposed to the processes of state-building and commercialization. Nonetheless, the incorporation of these groups into the socio- economic and political structures of the state took place on a subordinate basis as a consequence of several majoritarian policies passed by the post-colonial state. A gradual pattern of institutionalized marginalization increased their predispositions towards assertion of discrete ethnic identities. Thus, Assam fits as an important case according to these characteristics. In addition to its diverse demographics, the choice of Assam as a case study is premised on remarkably high and persistent levels of ethnic movements in the state, launched by numerically small and competing tribal minorities seemingly poised to create self-governing administrative units. Ethnic movements in the region vary in terms of levels, nature and intensity of mobilization.

SPECIFIC CASE STUDIES

The comparability of the Bodos, Misings and Dimasas is dependent on similarities in their common lineage, grievances and ethno-political claims. All these groups belong to the Indo-Mongoloid race and therefore they share common ethnic origins. These groups speak languages and dialects, with origins in the Tibeto-Burman group of languages

using the Roman script which are very different from the majority language of Assam

(Assamese) and the preponderant language in India (Hindi). Each group is territorially concentrated in particular areas of Assam. The Bodos are mainly concentrated in the western and central areas of Assam, Dimasas in parts of southern Assam, and the

Mishings mainly in the north-eastern areas of Assam [Refer to Fig. 1.1].

Fig. 1.1. Map of Assam indicating the areas where the Bodos, Misings and Dimasas are located.

In addition to grievances related to political and economic opportunities, these ethnic groups have expressed their resentments for specific cultural policies. These groups have mobilized since the post-independence period (late 1950s) against institutional and mass exclusion by the state. The nature of their demands have been more or less similar, the demand for greater autonomy or separate states within the administrative provisions of

India---a) the Misings demanding a greater autonomous region in Assam‘s north-eastern areas; b) the Dimasas, a separate state called Dimaraji, in Assam‘s southern areas in the

North Cachar hills; and the Bodos, a separate state comprising of areas in Assam‘s western boundaries. Ethnic mobilization involving these groups has been manifested not at the national level but at the regional/provincial level. I address ethnic mobilization of these groups at the local level. Despite these similarities, these groups have shown considerable variance in their patterns of mobilization. The Bodos and Dimasas adopted violent strategies in 1980s. Violent mobilization of the Bodos was much more intense than the Dimasas. The third group, the Misings have mobilized by using less disruptive means. My objective is to explore these variations related to these three dissenting groups.

NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

Previously and in different contexts in Asia and Africa, scholars have studied cases, where symbolic politics as related to resurgence of tribal identities at the local level have played a significant part in the eruption of unprecedented levels of violent ethnic conflict.

Given the diversity of cases examined by different scholars and the uniqueness of each case employing cultural, economic, demographic amongst other variables, as tools for analyzing ethnic violence, one is faced with methodological issues and difficulties in predicting and controlling the generalizable outcomes. A set of scholars propose that in order to account for predictors of ethnic violence, it is useful to examine a large number of cases in an elaborate manner. While following this methodological analysis one can process enormous amounts of data that might render effective in order to observe the general trends in analyzing such conflicts. Other scholars however, find these large-N analyses inadequate and argue that small-n controlled comparisons of cases make

generalizations better and increase the probability of obtaining valid causal inferences.6

This methodology works well in the comparison of cases in the context of local level unit of analysis and the varied effects across small number of cases within a country [Snyder,

2001, 93–110].

My study does not aim to offer a general theoretical model of ethnic violence but tries to explain the mechanisms specific to each case. Each case has a unique story and historical detail which enables me to compare the finer nuances of each case using a ‗real world‘ problem approach. According to King, Keohane and Verba a 'real-world problem approach' which is opposed to a 'theoretical contribution approach', enables one to frame a comparative case study around a search for explanation of important real world questions. This method leads one to a more focused and relevant description of the cases.

This, they proclaim is a precursor to more formal, experimental design and hypothesis- testing method. According to Ragin, 'the case-oriented approach attempts to approximate experimental rigor by identifying comparable instances of phenomenon of interest and then analyzing the theoretically important similarities and differences among them'

[Ragin, 1987, 31]. Similarly, as Lijphart argues, historically descriptive comparisons often generate hypotheses that can be further refined and formally tested later by using more observations [Lijphart, 1971, 682-693].

6 As emphasized by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba [1994: 208, see also 30–31], our theories usually have observable implications at many levels of analysis and ―what may appear to be a single-case study, or a study of only a few cases, may indeed contain many potential observations, at different levels of analysis, that are relevant to the theory being evaluated. 33

While applying the common comparative case study method, this study tries to capture the uniqueness and particularities of the political strategies advanced by each group. In fact this research concedes the idea that in order to better account for specificities and particular nuances, one needs to have an in depth analysis of historical and descriptive complexities of each case. Preferably, the objective is to identify the critical variables specific to a particular case study while analyzing the processes and likelihood of ethnic mobilization turning to violence. With a careful selection of some of the key conditions, examination of each group in this dissertation primarily rests on tracing the processes and identifying the causal connections that link some of the most important explanatory variables--the necessary and sufficient conditions to the ultimate outcome of ethnic movements.7 My comparative case study loosely employs Mill‘s

Method of Difference which is also referred to by Przeworski and Teune as the ‗most similar systems design‘ [Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 33]. My cases fit this model of analysis as they share a host of similarities (origins, ethnic grievances, demands) but reveal observable differences in terms of the outcome (patterns of mobilization).

INTERVIEWING PROCESS AND DATA COLLECTION

The analysis is based on interviewing as an important means of data collection. In addition to interviewing, I examined several secondary sources of data including relevant government reports, archival records, regional newspaper reports, books, several publications and memorandums of each organization sent to the state government as well

7 Lijphart [1971] suggests, in most comparative case studies the investigator is forced to limit analysis to only specific, carefully selected or 'key' causal factors (explanatory variables) and not all possibly relevant ones. 34

as the central government throughout the course of the agitations. Analysis of a host of secondary sources essentially provided me with a general overview of the issues examined in this dissertation. Nonetheless, it needs to be admitted that a weighty constraint was observed in terms of paucity of documented historical and archival data, which proved to be a serious handicap to this study. This however, did not make the research totally impracticable. Although one cannot rely upon any scripted documentation of the history of these groups,8 an in-depth study of the available secondary sources renders this study possible.

The interviewing process during my field research in Assam from December 2006 to

August 2007 was mostly designed to involve people belonging to different groups. The data was collected in different locations in Assam, in the capital city Guwahati, the hub of state politics and particular areas inhabited by the Bodos, Dimasas and Misings.

Before proceeding to these areas, I approached some of the prominent figures belonging to each group in Guwahati in December 2006. One was an eminent educationist, Tabu

Taid who had been actively involved in developing the original Mising language, another was a prominent student activist of the Dimasa Student‘s Union, Sanmoni Kamprei and the third was the President of the Bodo Literary Society, K. Mushahary. Their responses were quite cordial and they enriched me with some preliminary knowledge about these communities, places where I could visit and meet the common people, particular ethnic organizations and most importantly some of the books and other secondary materials that

8 Except the Ahom buranjis (historical records) which provide an important source of reference for the study of these groups, there is no scripted documentation of the history of these particular groups. Besides the buranjis, oral accounts that were passed on from one generation to the other were intricately recorded by later anthropologists and historians. This study draws from a lot of these sources. 35

I could refer to, for further information and understanding. In each visit I was assisted by a local who could communicate and translate the views expressed by people speaking in their local dialects.

Before visiting the specific areas, I planned out certain minimum standards to select the interview participants and tried as much as possible to adhere to these standards. I used several criteria to select the group members. First, I ascertained that the individuals from each ethnic group varied in terms of their social background (occupation, age, education and gender) and other particularities (participant/non-participant in mobilization). I found it convenient to interview individuals belonging to different age groups. My participants consisted of individuals who were active working members of

Bodo, Dimasa and Mising literary and cultural organizations and erstwhile activists. I also interviewed young adults, mostly college students and graduates who are currently involved in the students‘ organizations of the Bodos, Dimasas and Misings, the leading organizations responsible for mobilization during the autonomy movements. I tried to gather as much information as possible from people who were directly involved in movement participation. Due to some practical limitations, at times I had to rely on representative sampling by choosing participants that represented particular background characteristics.

Since my aim was to examine the struggle for autonomy, how and in what respect these groups were contesting to achieve their proposed claims, the cogency and credibility of their decision to mobilize through particular strategies, this standard

allowed investigating their beliefs and attitudes on key issues related to my research.

Except for few political leaders and activists who had a particular discourse and position on the subject, I tended to engage in informal conversations with the ordinary people. The discussions revolved around open-ended questions which allowed an ‗ordinary‘ Bodo, or a Dimasa living in a rural area, to freely participate and express their views. By and large my discussions revealed that most of them were able to comment on the research subject in general terms. Some showed keen interest in narrating specific incidents that occurred during the agitations (for instance, those related to police arrests, attending public rallies and participating in demonstrations, etc). People who lived in the semi-urban areas and small towns, those who were socio-economically better off and better educated could provide me with some filtered information on the question of viability and the socio- economic changes that were brought about in these areas after the agitations. This observation is more applicable to the Bodos and Misings who achieved some form of autonomy after the agitations, a subject that will be discussed in detail in the later chapters.

In addition to participants from each group, I conducted interviews of some experts and local politicians who held important positions of power in the state bureaucracy and legislature. Although some of the views expressed by these people seemed to be biased, interviewing these members immensely helped me to gain insights and broaden my understanding on the decision-making processes that took place during and after the movements.

SELECTED RESEARCH LOCATIONS

BODO AREAS: KOKRAJHAR DISTRICT

My field research was conducted in a variety of locations in Assam. In the Bodo areas, parts of Kokrajhar district served to be an important site of my analysis. The district located in the northern banks of the Brahmaputra, comprises of an approximate area of 3,169.22 sq. km. The 2001 census figures enumerated the district‘s population to be 930,404 approximately. Although the area is mostly occupied by Bodos, other ethnic groups such as the Koch-Rajbonshis, Santhalis Bangladeshis, Nepalis, Bengalis and

Assamese form a significant portion of the population. My visits were confined to some villages and small towns within the precincts of the district. To be more specific, I chose

Kokrajhar town, Dottoma, and Bhumka as prime locations of my study. I also visited a semi-urban area called Basugaon to interview a founding member of the Bodo literary organization. Basugaon contains places of historical significance. It was the capital kingdom of the Koch dynasty and some historians consider the Bodos as a part of this dynasty.9

The town of Kokrajhar was an obvious choice because the place had been one of the important centers of protest activities and the main administrative center of the ABSU,

BSS and other ethnic organizations of the Bodo society. During the days of the agitation,

Kokrajhar town and the adjoining areas were engulfed in intense violence, loss of civilian lives and destruction of public properties. Brewing ethnic tensions between the Bodos

9 The first attempt to identify the Bodos, Kacharis, Rabhas, Rajbonshis as different tribal groups was made by British anthropologists. Some historical records suggest that these groups had the more or less same lineages in the Indo-Mongoloid race. [Karlsson, B.G., 2000] 38

and other ethnic communities (particularly Santhalis and Bangladeshis) led to expulsions and displacement of thousands of people belonging to all these communities. Relief and rehabilitation camps run by the government and some other NGOs tried to accommodate the displaced people in different areas of the district.

Dottoma is about 50 kms away from Kokrajhar town. It is considered to be a rural area. In recent years, the place has received enormous attention of the Bodo Territorial

Council because of its historical relevance related to the Bodo movement. A memorial park and tombstone and a public library in the village, commemorates the ‗visionary leadership and sacrifice‘ of a former Bodo leader, Upendranath Brahma, who is also regarded as Bodofa, the Father of the Bodo nation. He passed away due to some serious illness in the midst of the agitation. Brahma was a prominent figure and considered to be the brain behind ABSU‘s mass based mobilization which later took a violent turn in late

80s.

Another important place of interest in Dottoma was the ABSU office located near the memorial park. ABSU has a very structured, organized and decentralized way of functioning with offices at the district, the sub-district and village level in different parts of the state. On my way to this place I had the opportunity to pay a brief visit to another branch of the organization that works at the village level. As many other offices located in different districts, the Dottoma office was one of the prime decision-making centers that had been functioning since the days of the agitation. Secondly, this office serves at the sub-district level and attracts a substantial number of young male recruits.

This formed an important part of my field research as my study considers leadership qualities and organizational strategies of activist organizations (ethnic), the two crucial components that shaped popular awareness and mobilization of the Bodo people on the issue of autonomy.10 Organizational participation can be considered as a first step in this direction. My interaction with some of the members of the unit enlightened me on certain facts related to this. The place acts as a social unit, hostelling young students interested in the activities of the organization. Without doubt, the interactive relationships between the leaders and the ordinary members within these organizations have continuously served as an important vehicle in educating the basic skills of activism and constructing a collective identity.

Bhumka is a village located few kilometers away from the main town of Kokrajhar.

The village is composed of a homogeneous population. Some of the surrounding villages are occupied by Santhalis and Nepalis. The villages are segregated and the people belonging to each group had negligible inter-personal relationships. This phenomenon had become more noticeable in the aftermath of inter-ethnic violence in the 90s. During the movement, this place had experienced several incidents of state violence during operations of counter-insurgency which included torture of the villagers during police investigations and gender related violence. The memory of a gang rape of young girls and middle-aged women of this village involving state security personnel in late 80s is still fresh in the minds of many.

10 I am inspired by social movement theorists on their views related to various aspects of organizational leadership and its importance leading actions, defining and diffusing movement ideas and strategies. For further reference refer to [Snow, David & Sarah.A, Soule, 2004]. 40

DIMASA AREAS: NORTH CACHAR HILLS DISTRICT

North Cachar hills district is located in the Southern half of Assam. The district is bordered in the east by the state of Nagaland and Manipur and in the west by Khasi and

Jaintia hills of Meghalaya. My visits were restricted to a) Haflong, the main town, a semi- urban area and the administrative center of the N.C.hills district council; b) Maibong, a site of historical significance for the Dimasa-Kacharis, located nearly 47 kms away from

Haflong and two villages (Dimasa populated) in and around the Haflong area. The district is spread over an area of 4888 sq. km (approx.) and it comprises of a population of nearly

186, 189, as per the census records of 2001. Although Dimasas retain a substantial majority (almost 35-40%), the district encompasses several other tribal groups such as

Zeme Nagas (migrants from adjoining areas of Nagaland), Hmars, Hrangkhuls, Ralte,

Baite (all these groups have their origins in the Kuki tribe of Manipur and Mizoram),

Karbis (settlers from the adjacent district of Karbi Anglong), Jaintais (tribes from

Meghalaya) and some non-tribal groups (Bengalis, Assamese, Nepalis) constituting a minority. The tribal population is scattered throughout the district in different segregated villages.

In addition to collecting evidence on my basic research project, through in-depth interviews and discussions with some focused members of the group in all the above mentioned areas, another purpose of my visit was also to ascertain normal lifestyles of the Dimasas, their intra-group interactions and relationships with other ethnic groups in these areas of interest. One of the villages that I toured was a critical site of communal violence between the Hmars and the Dimasas in 2003. Although the actual trigger of the

clashes is controversial, a general observation was that the Dimasas have general grievances against the Hmars and some other tribal communities (particularly the Zeme

Nagas), who are considered to be settlers and to have migrated from neighboring states of

Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland. The main resentment against the Hmars is based on socio-economic factors; the latter‘s occupation of Dimasa land, education, and employment. The Dimasa villages still retain their traditional customs and local authority run by the Kunang (headman) and the Dilik (assistant) with the help of other elderly people in the village. The community in the villages as well as in the semi-urban areas is very tightly knit. A certain level of group differentiation and memorialization that the community was distinct seemed to have been continuously reinforced in the minds of the people. Verbal and written representations of the group‘s mythical as well as historical narratives provide a template to understand social construction of these identities.

Another noticeable observation was a negligible level of inter-personal interaction between the Dimasas and other competing tribal ethnic communities, the geographic segregation and other societal differences.

Among those interviewed in Haflong and Maibong were: some members of the

District Council of N.C.Hills (the General Secretary, official in-charge of the Publication department); Rongsling Dimasa, a prominent member of the surrendered militant organization (DHD); members of the Dimasa Students Organization and a few members of the Jadikhe Naiso Hasam, (a socio-cultural organization) and the Dimasa literary society. The interview participants in the villages included some ordinary villagers, the village headmen and some school teachers.

MISING AREAS: NORTH LAKHIMPUR DISTRICT

Field trip to the Mising areas included visits to places like Gogamukh, a sub-district level unit of administration and headquarters of the Mising Autonomous Council, in

Lakhimpur district and two villages in the nearby areas of the district. My visit was undertaken at the time of their annual festival held every year in the month of April. This provided me the opportunity to be a part of their celebrations. Observations were accompanied by interviews with key members of the group who were involved in the autonomy movement. The interview participants included the B. Pawegam, President of the Mising Bane Kebang (Grand Assembly of the Misings), G. Kutumb, a retired bureaucrat, P.Chayengia, the General Secretary of the Mising Autonomous Council, selected members of TMPK (Mising students‘ union), and few working personnel of the

Mising Autonomous Council.

LAYOUT OF THE DISSERTATION

Chapter 2 offers an examination of existing literature on ethnic violence, and several strands of social movement literature specifically on dynamics of contentious politics, collective action, etc. It provides a detailed analysis of the conditions that facilitate a group‘s ethnic mobilization; the factors that increase the likelihood of violence. Finally, I integrate these conditions into an analytical framework to explain the dynamics of different outcomes.

Chapter 3 and introductory parts of Chapters 5 as well as Chapter 6, expound the historical processes that led to the formation of ethnic identities as a frame of reference for ethnic and separatist movements. Chapter 4 analyzes the factors which led to violent mobilization of the Bodos. The same pattern is followed in Chapters 5 and 6 regarding the cases of the Dimasas and Misings. These chapters illustrate why ethnic mobilization of the Misings and Dimasas took different turns. Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of the dissertation, outlines the reasons that account for variant outcomes and some contributions that this dissertation proffers to the study of ethnic mobilization and ethnic movements beyond Assam involving tightly knit groups with differing intra-group networks of mobilization. In conclusion, an attempt is made to offer some implications for further research that needs to be carried out in these areas.

CHAPTER TWO

THE PROBLEM OF EXPLAINING ETHNIC VIOLENCE REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION

Ethnic violence can be broadly conceptualized as a phenomenon, whereby violent attacks are perpetrated along ethnic lines, in which at least one party is not a state (or a representative of a state). Such acts are motivated by animosity towards hostile groups and the victims are chosen by ethnic criteria [Fearon and Laitin, 2000]. The concept ineluctably draws theoretical attention to the relationship between ethnicity and violence.

As Brubaker and Laitin observe, ―…one needs to pay sustained attention to the forms and dynamics of ethnicization to the many and subtle ways in which violence, and conditions, processes, activities and narratives linked to violence can take on ethnic hues‖ [Brubaker and Laitin, 1998, 428]. Accounting for this relationship is therefore, crucial and provides at least one compelling reason to focus my attention on Assam which has been witnessing considerable violent ethnic mobilization since 1960s. Violence perpetrated by the

Assamese speaking majority on the Bengali speaking minority during the course of language agitation in late 1960s, violence against Bangladeshi Muslims during the Assam movement in late 1970s and 80s can be considered as events which were prototypical of being both violent as well as ascriptive.

Arguments often implicit in the discussions of violence perpetrated along ethnic lines therefore, entails that there should be prior, ethnic cleavages amongst groups based on ascriptive features such as language, religion, descent, culture, race, etc. This generates a sense of cultural distinctiveness and the ways, in which groups conceive of themselves in relation to others that affect the processes of ethnic identification and their transformation into imagined political communities [Anderson, 1983]. This provides the solidarity necessary for group organization and mobilization against the ethnic others.

However, ethnic identification by itself may not necessarily explain how and under what conditions such groups engage in conflictual behavior and violent mobilization [Fearon and Laitin, 1996].

In this chapter, I present the basic research questions, the variables and the hypotheses. Additionally, I perform a review and assessment of the existing literature that discusses the causes of ethnic violence. The focus of this study is limited to investigating the interactive dynamics of three sets of interdependent conditions. The first condition relates to the mobilizing structures or the resources---the availability of vertical and horizontal networks considered necessary for organization of the movement, mobilization of supporters within the community and sustenance of violent mobilization. The second condition relates to the effective communicative mechanism referring to the means through which actors (intellectuals, political leaders or nationalist leaders) define a problem and the situation the group experiences as unjust. The problem is best fashioned out of existing cultural symbols, common grievances, identities, norms, etc. that are likely to have resonance with the preferences or interests of potential constituents.

Effective communicative networks are required to motivate and convince the potential constituency or group members that their collective support and participation is essential to dispel the existing problem. These two factors constitute the background conditions, the important endowments of the group essential for accomplishing the task of collective mobilization. The third dimension focuses on the external environment, the opportunities or constraints imposed by the responses of the political system that encourage violent reactions. Variations in these enabling conditions have a critical impact on the mobilization potential of the movement leaders as well as the outcome of ethnic movements. In short, the attempt is to investigate the interactive dynamics of these variables that shape wide-ranging consequences of ethno-political movements.

The dissertation draws from the literature on ethnic violence, contentious politics and resource mobilization. This will provide a theoretical background not only to examine the questions posed in the dissertation but also to capture the state of empirical and conceptual research developed so far. Finally, I briefly outline some of the contributions of my research to the literature.

DISCERNING ISSUES OF VIOLENT CONTENTION: RESEARCH QUESTION, VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES

This dissertation seeks to conduct an inquiry into the explanatory and prognostic power of three different approaches to understand ethnic violence---one based on individual or collective interests, broadly identified with rationalist assumptions

[resource]; the second one based on individual or group-level motivations mostly

identified with socio-psychological approaches [communicative networks] and the third recognized as the political process approach that emphasizes the relationship between movements and the responses of the political system. It focuses on three different aspects of my research question:

Question.1. Under what conditions, does collective mobilization (both for violent and non-violent protests) of an ethnic group takes place? Are these conditions consistent with rationalist suppositions or socio-psychological approaches or the political process model?

Question.2. Once collective mobilization occurs, what factors can explain whether the mobilization will turn to high intensities of violence, relatively moderate levels of violence or non-violence?

Question.3. Once violent mobilization occurs what explains the duration---sustenance or breakdown of such methods of mobilization?

To answer these questions, I probe into the approaches mentioned above and construct alternative arguments in one of the sections. I use these theories to test the following variables and hypotheses:

As discussed in the introductory chapter, the aim is to explain the variance in the value of the dependent variable, the level of violence (D). I examine the processes that explain---relatively high intensities and longer duration of violent mobilization (D1), and peaceful mobilization (D2). In addition to these, I explore a third possibility: moderate intensities and shorter duration of violent mobilization (D3). The dependent variable can be linked to two sets of independent variables through a causal process that determines whether a group will resort to violent methods of mobilization. The causal sequencing of

these variables not only motivates the group to violence but has serious implications for the intensity and magnitude of violence. Intensity and magnitude of violence is indicated by the number of armed attacks by the militant groups, estimate of deaths and injuries from political violence, damage and destruction to government and public properties.

INTRA-GROUP RESOURCES [MOBILIZING STRUCTURES]

The first set of independent variables focus on the potential capabilities of the mobilizing group. For this I probe into the resources that are available for the mobilized group and which the group requires to direct collective goals. Contrary to many established findings, my focus is not on tangible resources like finance or profits gained from lootable natural resources which, I find is important but insufficient to understand the dynamics of violent mobilization. This is of particular concern in societies where the movement leaders or activists have limited access to economic resources and thus do not have the leverage to attract group members to join in the rebellion by using economic incentives. Instead I highlight the importance of immaterial but durable assets which a group accumulates and draws on for support and participation in high risk activism, including violent mobilization. The first asset regards community based networks which I refer to as ‗lateral attachments‘ or ‗horizontal ties‘ that exist within the group and which provides the group members with a collectively held ‗capital‘ founded on intra-group solidarity, a sense of trust and community loyalty that group members adhere to. This holds validity in societies with tightly knit community ties, one of the main focuses of this study. The second level of resource mobilization relates to ‗vertical networks‘ between the organizational leadership or the core activists and their relationships with the

common people, and how these connections are nurtured to diffuse protest ideas and actions. This sort of network depends on the instrumental capacity of movement activists and ethnic organizations to work in close association with the community members who are otherwise less connected to the agitation.

SYMBOLIC MOTIVATIONS [COMMUNICATIVE PROCESS]

The second set of variables can be categorized as group-level motivations or grievances that enable the group to get mobilized for collective action. These motivations are determined by the degree to which the members of a group attach salience to ethno- territorial identity, cultural attributes and ethnic symbols. Group members share a common anxiety and fears of losing those identities and collective mobilization stems from the motivation to preserve these collectively shared identities. Latent feelings of fear and resentment are effectively articulated and coordinated by actors such as political leaders, ethno-nationalists and cultural revivalists to inflame popular dissent. These actors constantly remind the group members about the discrepancies they experience in the order of ethnic status or hierarchy. By using a collective referent, a master narrative, they tend to project symbolic threats within a ‗crisis frame‘,11 and exaggerate notions that the group is near extinction or will be annihilated unless they collectively challenge the existing structures of power and dominance. My study reveals that movement activists and ethno-nationalist organizations draw upon a group‘s ethnic symbols, particularly,

11 Anthony Obershell [2000] uses this term in the context of Yugoslavia. As he puts it, ―Elite contention and mass media propaganda awakened the dormant crisis frame, suppressed the normal frame, and spread insecurity and fear‖

language and past autonomy exercised by a group to construct their mobilizing discourses.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

The first and the second sets of independent variables can thus be grouped as the underlying or background conditions paving the way for radical political actions. These conditions are necessary but not sufficient for violent mobilization. They have to be correlated with a third set of variables which drive the mechanism towards violence.

Therefore, I investigate a third set of independent variables comprised of political opportunities and institutional constraints and their effects in the strategic decisions of movement activists to engage in violent mobilization. I argue that a strategy of political concessions, selective incentives or cooptation of movement activists (potential insurgents) can have a countervailing effect on their motivations to launch violent rebellion. On the contrary, inconsistent concessions and state repression impose constraints to pursue the aims of the movement by non-violent means.

THE HYPOTHESES

The arguments made in the dissertation can be derived by testing at least six important hypotheses that can be tested against the above sets of variables.

INTRA-GROUP RESOURCES

Hypothesis 1a. Mobilization potential for high-risk activism is highly dependent on the availability of horizontal/lateral networks that exist within the community.

Hypothesis 1b. Mobilization potential for high-risk activism is highly dependent on the ability of the activists to nurture and activate the vertical networks established between the core activists and organizations and the common people to diffuse movement ideas and protest actions. Where vertical networks are weak, violent methods of mobilization is unlikely to succeed.

B) COMMUNICATION OF SYMBOLIC APPEALS

Hypothesis 2a. Politicization of symbolic identities, such as language or cultural beliefs will be accompanied by violent ethno-political mobilization only if symbolic appeals resonate with the beliefs and interests of the group members and if the movement activists engage in effective communicative strategies to narrate these appeals.

Hypothesis 2b. Politicization of symbolic identities, such as language or cultural beliefs is likely to be accompanied by non-violent ethno-political mobilization if symbolic appeals do not gain much socio-political salience or resonate with people‘s beliefs and interests and if the movement activists are less capable of effectively communicating those appeals.

C) POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

Hypothesis 3a. Propensity of groups to mobilize violently increases if the state continuously adopts inconsistent policies of accommodation and indiscriminate methods of repression. When the state uses selective methods of repression, violent mobilization will be less intense and is more likely to be moderated or de-mobilized.

Hypothesis 3b. Propensity of groups to mobilize violently is less if the state adopts a strategy of cooptation, selective incentives and certain degree of political openness indicated by political access to potential insurgents.

The following chapters make an attempt to test these variables against the cases.

REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE

Scholarly investigations into violent ethnic mobilization have used a variety of approaches. Authors have applied concepts ranging from ethnic security dilemma to the role of economic incentives and other variables and their relationship to violence. The exploration of these assumptions inspires numerous ways of looking into the questions posed in this dissertation. Nevertheless, to chart out the main differences in the developments of different ethnic movements I find these variables overly aggregated.

They fail to provide deeper and systematic answers for variations from case to case. A possible solution to this problem lies in first delineating the sources that explain motivations for violence from those that account for moderation and tranquility. While considering the benefits of such a method, scholars have pointed to the potential risks that one might run, if one engages in explaining the occurrence of one phenomenon

(quiescence) without making earnest attempt to identify the reasons that account for the other i.e. violence. For instance, Horowitz contends that ―[A]n undifferentiated quest for the sources of civic peace is an unprofitable enterprise; there is a need to contrast violent episodes with instances of non-violence [Horowitz, 2001, 467].‖

These observations can be supported by evidence gathered from some of the notable small-N comparative studies accomplished in different political contexts. Waldmann compares and contrasts violent ethnic conflicts in Basque and Northern Ireland to the

(largely) non-violent forms of protest in Catalonia and Quebec. His study finds that the transition in the mobilization phase from non-violence to violent outbursts in the former two cases can be explained in relation to the loss of middle-class control over these ethnic movements [Cited in Conversi, 1997, p. 4]. In another notable work on patterns of ethnic mobilization in a South Indian state, Subramanian finds that ethnic mobilization in Tamil

Nadu had been rather tolerant and peaceful as compared to Hindu, Sikh and Kashmiri nationalist movements identified with high levels of violence. His analysis highlights the interactive relationship of political parties and society at large that shape the variations in terms of ethnic mobilization in the different cases [Subramanian, 1999]. Other authors like Varshney argue that high levels of inter-ethnic civic engagement explains the maintenance of communal peace and absence of Hindu-Muslim violence in contrast to low-levels of communal engagement that explains the occurrence of ethnic violence

[Varshney, 2002]. His study compares three different pairs of cities in India that share similar background conditions, yet produce strikingly different outcomes in terms of

Hindu-Muslim violence. In a nutshell, the whole purpose of laying out these examples is

to emphasize the need to place variance across cases ‗at the heart of ever growing research on ethnic mobilization. Perhaps this is by far one of the best possible ways to provide some of the biggest advances in understanding varying aspects of ethnicity and ethnic violence‘ [Varshney, 2002, 6].

While agreeing with these strands of research paradigms, this study analyzes three different cases that show significant variations in outcomes (the dependent variable) when the collective grievances are relevantly similar in all the three cases. The similar conditions are correlated to fear of ethnic domination or marginalization by the state that is influenced or directly controlled by the more powerful ethnic group. Strategies like forced assimilation and discriminatory policies on key social, political and economic issues were designed by the majoritarian state either to consolidate power or gain legitimacy or simply to justify ethnic dominance over groups that are less privileged.

These strategies had a bearing on status relations and exacerbated feelings of insecurity and fear amongst these groups that were relatively disadvantaged.12 Besides discriminatory government policies, issues like unequal resource allocations and demographic pressures (increase in settler population in the areas inhabited by the aggrieved minority leading to competition for land) also caused ethnic resentments.

Particular forms of violence encompassing violent protest demonstrations (bombings of government establishments, police and army personnel) and ethnically motivated

12 Ethnic status involves an element of dominance and subordination. It is a question of who is in political power and who follows them, whose languages are spoken and whose symbols predominate. Petersen [2002] p.41 55

terrorist attacks are of special concern in this study.13 Security personnel, government officials and non-combatants (civilians), particularly those who cooperated with the state in some way; who seemed to be ideologically different, and other ethnic groups who were considered to be ‗outsiders‘ or ethnic migrants have been the main targets of violence committed by ethnic rebels.

FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTUAL CONCERNS

Essentialists or primordialists claim that ethno-political violence is motivated by inherent biological drives e.g. defense of kin, territoriality etc.14 Primordial attachments, as recent research has shown, alone cannot explain the timing of violence. For instance, they fail to explain why the Chinese villagers in West Kalimantan were targeted by

Dayaks in 1967, but remained untouched in the subsequent riots [Davidson, 2008]. Anti- primordialists argue that, ethnic hatred has to be linked to electoral politics and competition for scarce resources. Contrary arguments place ethnic violence in the historical and regional contexts rather than attributing it to generic psychological irrationality or cultural stereotypes [Mamdani, 2001]. More specifically, historical rather than primordial ethnic sentiments seem to be salient to describe the narrative of violent conflict. With respect to post-colonial societies, scholars argue that contemporary ethnic cleavages for instance, between the Hindus and Muslims in India were not the result of primordial antagonism but the creation of colonial rulers partly because this suited the

13 Horowitz [2001] gives a detailed account of each of these forms of ethnic violence. p.19-28. 14 According to essentialism, ethnicity is based on fixed and inalterable characteristics of individuals or a group rooted in deep social, historical and genetic foundations. Proponents of this approach believe in a natural division of people into ethnic groups thereby making ethnic differences a permanent feature of society. Motivation for ethnic and kinship ties accordingly emerges from subjective and psychological forces, which are internal to the individual and related to basic human needs for security and survival. 56

functioning of colonial power.15 This assumption applies well to my case studies where official recognition of the tribal communities as ‗backward tribes‘, ‗forest tribes‘ or

‗aboriginal tribes‘ took place during British colonialism which crystallized the porous and ambiguous communities that existed in the pre-colonial phase [Singh, 2002].

To this extent, tribal antagonisms may be described as an outcome of colonial constructions rather than of primordial ethnic sentiments. Moreover, one needs to take cognizance of the difficulties that one might face while trying to explain how the relationship between these ethnic groups and their adversaries can suddenly turn from cordiality to hostility and violence. Rather than being ingrained in ‗ancient hatred‘, the relationships between the conflicting ethnic groups in this study, seem to be more a modern phenomenon that had been produced by interplay of changing forces and interests. For e.g. Inter-group violence between the Bodos and Santhals (as will be discussed in one of the following chapters) during the course of the agitation cannot be reduced to the dynamics of historical animosities pitting one group against the other, with the Bodos reasserting their traditional claims to supremacy and domination over the areas inhabited by the Santhalis. Contrary to the image of historical incompatibilities, preceding the outbreak of episodes of violence, each group lived side by side peacefully, without any existential threat to each other‘s security. To draw some more examples, primordial perspectives shed little light on why Dayak-Madurese violence in West

Kalimantan occurred only in late 1967, although popular primordialist explanations exist that the violence between these two groups are rendered as natural outcomes of cultural

15 On Hindus-Muslims see Varshney, p 34. 57

incompatibilities or ‗two crude cultures, Dayaks versus the Madurese, locked in a dynamic inherently prone to brutality.‘16

Due to these inadequacies in primordialism, scholars have shown an increasing inclination towards alternative constructivist assumptions based on ethnicity as the product of human agency, a creative social act through which commonalities in cultural practices, ecological adaptation, political organization, etc. become woven into a consciousness of shared identity. The emphasis is on contingency, flux, and change of ethnic identity that sets actors‘ preferences for mobilizational activity. More precisely, the ability to manipulate the masses towards violent reaction lies in the capacity of actors or ethnic leaders to use particular tools (symbolic as well as economic) of mobilization for purposes of violence.

The constructivist literature is voluminous and ranges from inductive approaches dealing with large-n data sets [e.g. Gurr‘s MAR, Olzak, 1992, etc.] to case-based findings and small-n comparisons. Some identify variables like economic and political competition as triggering violent collective action [Olzak, 1992], while others stress the socio-psychological and symbolic motivations of violent ethnic conflict with particular emphasis on group worth and competing claims to group legitimacy [Horowitz, 1985].17

As Horowitz argues, ―fundamental issues, such as citizenship, electoral systems, designation of official languages and religions, the rights of groups to ‗special positions‘

16 Davidson [2008] p 13. Although Dayaks are characterized as kind, innocent, and tolerant, if agitated, they are believed to run amok spontaneously, taking heads indiscriminately. Similarly, Madurese are seen as fanatical Muslims, rugged, who to save face, are believed to be keen to stab adversaries from behind, a cultural practice known as carok. 17 Brubaker and Laitin [1998] provide an excellent account of these studies. 58

in the polity, become the recurrent subjects of politics of ethnicity [Horowitz, 1985, p.187].‖ These become the critical ingredients in the spirals of intense sentiments and explosive violence that ensue [Tambiah, 1996, p.22].

This vast amount of findings and heterogeneity in the literature compelled me to focus and select two branches of constructivism----one deals with the discursive approaches which illustrates the importance of socio-cultural and socio-psychological factors, and the other with ‗selective incentives‘ or rational choice, promises of individual gains offered to individuals in return for participation in a particular action. These approaches examine the importance of elites in social construction, benefits, sanctions, and coercion in group mobilization. Coercion or selective disincentives can include a vast multitude of punishments ranging from social ostracism, death or injury that is meted out to individuals who refuse to comply with the proposed collective action [Laitin, 1999,

Kalyvas 1999, Mueller, 2000]. My study tends to analyze, underline and regroup some aspects of these two sets of constructivist approaches.

Working within these frameworks, this study also integrates elements drawn from the social movement literature on intra-group attachments or social networks, and theories of contentious politics.18 Based on these theoretical foundations, it seeks to investigate how a group‘s perception of collective ethnic identity, inconsistent concessions, state repression, societal ties and vertical networks can determine a group‘s susceptibility to armed rebellion. Instead of taking ethnic violence as an inevitable consequence of

18 I prefer to use the term contentious politics as it encompasses a range of movement outcomes from small- scale protest demonstrations to large-scale violent rebellions. In this sense, ethnic rebellion can be considered as one version of contentious politics. Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam [2001] 59

political, cultural and economic grievances (structural variables) and manipulative power of external agents (agency), or simply an as outcome of purely rational or social- psychological determinants, this study is interested in explaining violent ethnic mobilization as a process involving the sequence of events and mechanisms that precede and intersect to produce violence, that is, the initial factors leading to organization around shared ethnic identities, mobilization of societal resources that the movement organizers have at their disposal and the shifts in the political environment (opportunities and constraints) [Kalyvas, 2006, p.22]. I now turn to analyze two main approaches explaining motivations for ethnic violence.

RATIONALIST ASSUMPTIONS ON INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP BEHAVIOR

Until recently, most scholarly writings on rebel motivations, especially civil war theorists, have emphasized the role of economic resources and financial viability tied to preferences and calculations of non-state combatants when taking decisions of getting involved in an armed conflict [Collier, 2002]. Economic resources derived through unofficial taxation by ethnic organizations and ethnic militias, extraction of natural resources and even looting provide the opportunities to finance and sustain violent rebellion. As Collier argues, ‗the sustenance of a rebel organization and the subsequent nature of the rebellion are highly affected by the objective to seek funds or loot motive of the rebel group [Collier, 2002].‘ Such rebel groups may be driven financially to prolong the rebellion, as long as they can benefit from these resources rather than reaching at a political solution. Revenues gained from diamonds in Sierra Leone, illegal sale of drugs in Liberia and to a lesser extent in Chad and Burundi, Shining Path‘s (Peru) benefits

accrued from illicit production of cocoa, are excellent examples that fit into this description of economic motivations and the drawing in of a multiplicity of group members into intensified rebellion.

Along similar lines, scholars arguing from the perspective of ‗selective disincentives‘, focus on aspects like forcible sanctioning, lynching, etc. employed by rebel leaders to gain compliance from uncooperative group members who show less inclination to participate in ethnic violence.19 Scholars have applied these concepts to exemplify cases of ethnic violence as diverse as Guatemala (during La Violencia); Serbia, where the SPS

(Socialist Party Serbia) accused those who questioned the war of treason, and tortured or killed Serbs identified as ‗disloyal‘ to the Serbian cause [Gagnon, 1995; Kuran, 1998]; in

Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge manipulated norms of ‗face‘ and ‗honor‘ in an effort to shame those who refused to kill, with the result that ‗defectors‘ or ‗traitors‘ were often killed [Hinton, 1998]; Algeria [Kalyvas, 1999] and Rwanda [Bhavnani & Backer, 2000].

Another set of explanations focus on the dynamics of strategic bargaining and point out that the final decisions of extreme ethnic violence can be best explained as an outcome of three strategic dilemmas: information failures, commitment problems or as the utility-maximizing strategy of predatory elites. According to Fearon and Laitin, ethnic wars occur primarily because of information failures (a situation when each side conceals its true desire and capabilities) and commitment problems, which prevent the competing groups from reaching a negotiated settlement that all would prefer. These scholars

19 Kalyvas [1999] throws light on this perspective and tests these assumptions against the case of civilian massacres in the Algerian civil war. 61

elaborate on examples from post-Soviet Eastern Europe where ethnic majorities (state holders) have been unable to credibly commit themselves not to exploit the ethnic minorities in the newly created states for instance, via a regional autonomy deal or a constitutional agreement, whereby the former makes promises to protect the interests of the minorities [Fearon, 2004]. Under such circumstances the anticipation on the part of ethnic minorities is that regardless of what the majority leaders have agreed to, there is a high probability that the latter will revoke the deals whatsoever made, and engage themselves in majority politics in the new political arrangements. Given this anticipation, the best possible alternative left for the ethnic minorities is to fight for separation from a state which is weak and cannot provide a solid guarantee.

Figueiredo and Barry Weingast propose an alternative model that focuses on the role of predatory elites. The claim is that ethnic violence can be construed to serve the interests and purposes of powerful elites to maintain their political power. These elites can successfully manipulate ethnic tensions by misleading supporters in believing that the other side is to be blamed for the violence, thereby leading the emerging tensions to escalate to full-scale armed conflict.20 Another strand of writing from similar perspectives explains how inter-ethnic violence emerges as a consequence of intra-ethnic politics

[Fearon and Laitin, 2000]. Elites foment ethnic violence to build political support; this process has the effect of constructing more antagonistic identities, which favors more violence. For instance, Brass who presents an actor-oriented approach of ethnic violence between the Hindus and Muslims in India, argues that Indian elites engaged in contests of

20 Figueiredo and Weingast [1999]. Even Gagnon supports this [1994/95]. 62

power sometimes find it in their interest to publicly frame violent incidents as

‗communal‘, an interpretation that is then accepted by publics favoring more violence

[Brass, 1997].

Another section of instrumental theorists offer answers through the lens of security dilemma and anarchy. Beginning with Barry Posen, the concept has been extensively applied by later scholars to study intra-state ethnic violence in specific contexts such as former Yugoslavia. What makes elite strategy a critical concept according to these analysts, is the ability of the elites to introduce ethnic identity as a focus of security. The driving motivations under a situation of anarchy and uncertainty are fear and insecurity which ultimately stimulates ethnic groups to engage in defensive arming. Further, each group‘s defensive steps to increase its own security are construed as a threat to the other, and in turn make the other groups less secure [Posen, 1993]. This in turn continues to increase hostility between the groups and spurs attempts by the latter groups to increase their own security thereby resulting in a spiral of violence. The spiral takes place in a situation when the state is declining or when states lack effective institutions for minority participation and supporting laws that guarantee their freedom and physical security

[Snyder, 1993]. Such a situation occurs when a multinational state declines and the regime is no longer capable of providing security to the ethnic groups, creating a vacuum, in which groups compete to establish self-help mechanisms and control a new regime that will protect their interests. Fear of an uncertain future thus prepares each group with offensive capabilities, the consequence of which is violence. This was eminently evident during the breakup of former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Saideman extends the

concept of security dilemma to examine the critical role of existing states with ethnic security problems. According to this line of research, the state, without being collapsed, plays a critical role either in mediating, controlling or fomenting violence and deliberately disregarding its duty to control ethnic violence [Saideman, 1998]. He expanded the definition of security dilemma to include economic, physical and political security. Scholars like Anthony Obershall moved a step forward to argue that insecurity and fear can be effectively spread by propaganda by nationalist elites even when daily experience contradicts the allegations of hostility and threat [Obershall, 2000]. The emphasis is on the role of elites who can control information through their grip on media and shape beliefs through clever framing of particular situations of crises.

PROBLEMS WITH RATIONALIST APPROACHES

Despite providing important insights, the above approaches can capture only part of the problem to explain the outcome of separatist movements. A major shortcoming is that they fail to consider the importance of state capabilities to demobilize separatist movements. The state being the main contender will continuously vie to offset the legitimacy of the movement leadership and the group‘s collective behavior. It can do so by providing both positive inducements including ---a) economic incentives, such as provision of goods and services to police informants, or disincentives to the group members in the form of--- b) psychological (threats) as well as c) political and military sanctions (counterinsurgency laws, arrests, detention, etc.) [Schwarz,1991]. In El

Salvador, Burma, Nepal, Peru, Kashmir and numerous other places the military intimidated or forced peasants into ‗strategic hamlets‘ or massacred villagers suspected of

helping or showing sympathy to insurgents [Fearon & Laitin, 2000]. Group members finding themselves in a quandary will act in ways that benefit them the most. Being utility maximizers, individual actors take decisions on how to follow the commands of the state or the elite leadership, or neither, depending on the benefit that the individual agent obtain compared with the overhead cost he/she incurs by providing support. This means that material capabilities of the rebel group may not be sufficient indicators to explain the course and outcome of separatist rebellion.

Sometimes, more than material motives, ethnic leaders reap the benefits of group members‘ desires to attain collective worth, or fight against fears of cultural extinction, ethnic domination and a range of alternative non-economic motivations such as safeguarding symbolic resources (language, customs, customary land, etc.). These approaches therefore fail to take account of these factors that can motivate individuals supporting violence. As Kauffman rightly claims, these theories fail to recognize the explanatory power of non-material factors such as communal attachments of group members [Kauffman, 2006]. Another major shortcoming is that, the literature drawing on selective disincentives rule out the importance of positive incentives that can influence the members of a group. In other words, they give little attention to collective motivations based on group loyalty, considerations for status and esteem of the community/group. For instance, Petersen points out that sustained individual participation in rebellious actions is enabled by psychological motivations such as the value of small victories, or emotions such as fear and resentment [Petersen, 2001]. His analysis provides empirical evidence drawn from cases of armed resistance in Eastern Europe. His work on armed resistance on the Lithuanians reveals that different episodes of violence perpetrated by Lithuanians

against the Soviets from 1940-1991, was driven by emotional antipathy and status concerns of the Lithuanians against the Russians. From a similar perspective, while explaining armed insurgencies during the El Salvadorian civil war in 1970s, scholars have found that communal motivations, such as moral commitments and emotional engagements with respect to asserting social equality and dignity of the campesinos

(subsistence farmers) against the landed oligarchy and the repressive state, seemed to be the most powerful predictors of protest participation [Wood, 2003].21

Similarly, predatory elite behavior explanations run into trouble when they consider individual group members simply as reactive players following ethnic appeals of their leaders. If the main objective of the leaders is to capture power and material resources, how and exactly why do ethnic appeals used by them have powerful resonance? One possible way is to misrepresent the actual facts. However, these narratives have been found to be slightly adhoc and unconvincing. For instance, scholars arguing from the perspective of symbolic politics believe that ethnic violence cannot be exclusively accounted to the manipulative power and strategies of predatory elites. Kauffman offers a good illustration of cases in Sudan and Rwanda where civil war and genocide respectively, were driven by hostile ethnic myths and emotionally driven symbolic politics, rather than information failures, commitment problems or power-conserving motive of predatory elites. In both these cases, ethnic mythologies and fears made predatory policies so popular that leaders had little choice but to embrace them by manipulating associated ethnic symbols, even though these policies led to the leaders'

21 For the Lithuanian case refer to Petersen [2001], For campesinos insurgency in El Salvador refer to Elizabeth Wood, [2003]. 66

downfalls [Kauffman, 2006]. The next section deals with some of the socio- psychological interpretations.

SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS OF GROUP BEHAVIOR

Socio-psychological analysis of ethnic violence moves away from a purely rationalist foundation of ethnic violence and instead emphasizes the importance of situationally constructed and inter-subjective interpretations of symbolic identity to explain mass participation in ethnic violence.22 Fundamental assumptions of this approach suggest that the expression of ethnic identity is a product of historically, socio-economically and politically grounded process of inter-subjective understandings that sets actor‘s preferences for particular mobilizational activity. For proponents of this theory, the major sources of contention can thus be found in the existence of historical myths and collective memories, ethnic symbols and collective emotional orientation grounded in feelings of hostility and fear, which may mean an overall threat for the survival of an ethnic group

[Lake and Rothchild, 2002, p.28]. Without explicitly utilizing the term ‗security dilemma‘ these theorists have sought to acknowledge the subjectivity of ethnic security dilemma, by explaining the mechanisms under which threats to ethnic identities are constructed through myths, rituals, commemorations, narratives and other cultural representations [Atran, 1990].

The case for socio-psychological motivations for mass participation in violent rebellion has been most influentially presented by Donald Horowitz and others. Following this

22See Benedict Anderson‘s Imagined Communities [1991], Horowitz [1985]. 67

perspective, Horowitz argues that violence is in reality closer to a pickup game. It certainly requires some minimally qualified activists to get things going. Beyond that, however, elite actions and interests are limited by the constraints of the field in which group interactions occur [Horowitz, 1985, p 64-75]. To put it differently, how do we discern the circumstances under which elite manipulation of ethnic sentiments and loyalties can succeed? Horowitz starts with Tajfel‘s finding on group psychology and argues that this could be possible when ethnic conflict turns into a fight for group advantage; when the contest is for dominance and maximization of group benefits and superior group worth rather than the gratification of individual benefits [Horowitz, p.144-

146].

Kauffman argues that ethnic conflicts flow from ‗non-rational‘ factors, including political memories, myths and emotions aggravated by conditions of scarcity, and a general fear and uncertainty [Kauffman, 2006, p. 57-58]. His approach rests on the assumption that ethnic identification is based on mythic construction of history and past memories of injustice or atrocities experienced by an ethnic group that allows the opportunity for elites to whip up fears of group extinction, justify hostility to the other group and provides the opportunity to mobilize. Kaufman hypothesizes that the process that leads to ethnic violence is one of symbolic politics, in which incumbent leaders or counter-elites manipulate emotionally-laden ethnic symbols to mobilize their followers around ethnic agendas aimed at political dominance. These hostile agendas then create a security dilemma which leads to an escalating spiral of violence. Similarly, Roger

Petersen distinguishes three different emotions that can motivate ethnic violence: fear of

a threat from the other group; hatred of it; or resentment of its higher status (which is usually implied by its political domination) [Petersen, 2001].

These theories provide clues to a variety of analytical puzzles on ethnic violence. By combining environmental conditions and emotional motivations for stirring up ethnic violence, these approaches provide some useful tools to carry out systematic research on ethnic violence. Critics however point out that they are unable to link causally the symbolic representations of ethnicity and violent conflict. They also fail to provide explanations of the manner and the extent to which posited beliefs and fears are subjectively held and internalized by the addresses. For instance, through symbolic representation of the Muslims in India and Tamils in Sri Lanka as ‗evil‘, ‗demonizing‘,

‗dehumanizing‘, ethnic violence has often been justified by the perpetrators involved in such acts. Nevertheless, difficulties arise in understanding the timing, the context and the extent to which such posited beliefs propagated by Hindu nationalists or the Sinhalese against the Tamils, were widely believed in times of ethnic riots in 1983 in Sri Lanka or communal violence in India post-1990s [Brubaker and Laitin, 1998]. Even if we consider that group fears and insecurity contribute to violence in some cases, the same kinds of stimulating conditions (group fears and resentments) and symbolic discourses may lead to different movement outcomes (peaceful vs. violent). For instance, not all minority ethnic groups, including the Misings, Deoris, Koch-Rajbonshis, and others in Assam, protesting against majoritarian language policies, and also making claims for recognition of their languages and scripts have resorted to violence as a means to enhance group positions in the broader Assamese society. Therefore, the problem lies in the tendency of

these theories to over-predict ethnic violence; their inability to explain variance across cases and analyze satisfactorily the exact timing and location of violence.

Striking deficiencies therefore exist in the ability of the above two schools of thought, to capture many complex factors that determine the specific mechanisms and track the particular sequences of events that typically contribute to channelize ethnic movements towards violence. While taking cognizance of the need to bridge the gaps in the existing theories, this study rather attempts to integrate crucial elements from the approaches examined. It argues that collective motivation for violent mobilization cannot be reduced to pure interest and individual cost-benefit analysis of actors but has to be supplemented by certain non-material resources available within the group that motivate collective participation. Preferably, the emphasis is on some socio-cultural dimensions of decision- making based on fears of ethnic domination and cultural extinction which is actively disseminated by movement activists in a way they believe will inflame popular protest.

Additionally, I incorporate insights from the political process approach to investigate the interactions that take place between the political institutions (state) and leaders of the separatist movements that has a critical impact on the outcome of ethnic rebellion.

STATE-MOVEMENT INTERACTION, INCREASING PROPENSITIES TO MOBILIZE VIOLENTLY

The nature, course and outcome of ethnic movements cannot be understood without paying proper attention to the interaction of the dissident group and the political system.

This is of particular significance, since the authorities in control of the political system serve as the final adjudicator of any change, reform or deliverance of collective goods

and services for which the movement is aimed at. In fact, the ebb and flow of protest activities is largely shaped by the political system, its disinclination or compliance with demands of the protesting group. Social movement theorists working in this tradition, adopted concepts like ‗political opportunities‘ and ‗constraints‘ to analyze this relationship between social movements and the state [McAdam, 1982]. Since 1970s and

80s the concept has been widely applied to explain the fate of social movements in different political contexts. Although the term has been interpreted in innumerable ways, scholars have arrived at some consensus in the general understanding and the use of the concept to social movements. In the most fundamental sense, political opportunity has been conceptualized as the shifts in the institutional structure, its openness or closeness and ideological disposition of those who control state institutions. In this formulation, the term is considered to be a facilitator or an inhibitor that informs the timing and fate of protest movements. In other words, political opportunities translate contentious claims to actions by allowing the protesters to have access to known and flexible repertoires of contention and by building mobilizing structures around social networks and organizations.23 Contentious interaction between the state and separatist leadership can possibly lead to state pursuing two different policies, a) policies of acceptance and b) policies of denial. Drawing from Heraclides, ‗policies of acceptance‘ may institute accommodation such as protecting the rights of ethnic minorities by addressing their claims for greater territorial autonomy. On the other hand, states may pursue ‗policies of

23 Tilly‘s notion of repertoires of contention and Tarrow‘s conception of modularity are particularly important to take note of. According to Tilly, repertoire of contention is the complete set of protest tactics available to a social movement at any given time. Social movement actors do not have to reinvent movement tactics at each place and in each conflict. Rather they employ flexible repertoires of contention that allows for the adoption of tactics that have earlier been employed and that are believed to be effective. Examples of protest tactics used in the modern times include boycott and strikes. Imitation of protest tactics leads to diffusion and to ‗waves‘ of certain forms of protest [Tilly 1978; Tarrow, 1998]. 71

denial,‘ by imposing restrictions, majoritarian policies (language, etc.), forced assimilation, institutionalized discrimination or repression of minorities [Heraclides,

1989, 197-212].

This study argues that the dependent variable (violent outcome) is shaped by the interaction of the state and the dissident group which leads to two different responses of the state----a) closure of the political system or its institutions to effectively meet the demands of ethnic movements, b) openness or partial accommodation, leading to significant political concessions. These create the political opportunities and constraints for the mobilizing group [Brockett, 1991].

To sum up, this study is a self-conscious effort to establish a causal linkage between three sets of conditions that shape violent mobilization---(a) the interactive and dispersion dynamics of movement actions and tactics through community and hierarchical connections (resources, McAdam, 1982), (b) development of a widely shared understanding of narratives and symbolic threats within the minority community (framing process, Snow&Benford, 2000), and (c) interaction of the dissidents with the institutionalized structures of the state (political opportunities, Tilly, 1978). Figure 1.2 depicts a simple pattern of interaction of these factors that constitute the theoretical framework to guide my analysis.

Societal networks Symbolic construction Political environment (Resource (Communicative (Opportunities/ mobilization) mechanism) Constrains)

Ethnic mobilization (Movement outcome)

Fig.1.2. Communicative process, political openings/strains, resource accumulation and effects on ethnic mobilization.

FRAMEWORK EXPLAINING ETHNIC MOVEMENT OUTCOME

The first part of the framework consists of the necessary conditions and the second part comprises of the sufficient conditions that enables violent mobilization. These conditions are used to explain variations across cases. The first part of my framework builds on elements drawn from resource mobilization theory which helps me to understand social movement networks, movement coordination and their implications on violence. The second part draws from socio-psychological explanations of political mobilization and ethnic violence and social movement interpretations on collective protest actions. Some of the key elements borrowed from social-psychology pertain to symbolic politics. The final part draws on perspectives from political process theories by emphasizing on strategic interaction of the state and the ethnic movement, state

repression and its effects on ethnic mobilization (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001, p.16). I now turn to lay out briefly the explanatory significance of some of these approaches.

SOCIETAL RESOURCES AND SUSTAINABILITY OF VIOLENCE

Effective mobilization of societal networks facilitates a dissident group to turn their protest repertoires into violent forms of mobilization as well as to sustain those actions.

This process is best conceived in my view, as a function of dense collective networks, the societal pool of resources that the movement draws from. This is required not only to generate the armed rebellion but also to sustain it. My analysis suggests that by focusing exclusively on formal institutional factors in the absence of informal societal networks one simply misses out the salience of these ties and their function during violent contention as potential enabling conditions and the ‗sustainability mechanisms‘[Petersen,

2001]. The specificity of such alliances is first and foremost governed by intra-group alliances, shared informally within the members of the community and secondly, by hierarchical ties established between the organizational leadership of the movement and the members of the group. The first one is identified as horizontal or lateral networks that are primarily pre-existing within the group while the latter is mostly created over a time span while participating in collective protest actions and is identified as vertical networks

[McAdam, 1988]. The interactive and communicative processes required for unravelling and expanding protest actions and their sustainability depends on how these networks reinforce and strengthen each other. In a way they are highly interdependent.

A general belief is held that sub-ethnic identities based on tribe, village or clan affinities generally disappear as modernization (urbanization, mass literacy, etc.) occurs.

Accordingly, these lower-aggregate affiliations are perceived to play rudimentary role in modern state politics [Schatz, 2004]. Contrary views however highlight the critical importance of localized networks in identity politics. Kazakhstan, Somalia and many other cases in the Middle East, East and North Africa, Southeast Asia are some examples where sub-ethnic identities are very much a part of modern state politics. Institutions based on local affiliations serve as alternative modes of governance other than the ones sought to be created by the dominant state. Following from this scholarship, this study finds that community networks, both within individual village networks and urban-level of community ties do not diminish with progressive modernization. Alternatively, instead of being integrated into the larger society, there is a possibility that increasing levels of modernization politicize and harden intra-group affiliations, where the loyalty of group members are directed more towards kinship associations and local authorities rather than towards the overarching identities of the dominant ethnicity and the higher state authorities.

Tribal communities of Assam including the Bodos, Dimasas and the Misings provide an ideal setting to analyze informal associational networks as bases and social support for contentious action. Members of each of these communities are endowed with shared socio-cultural characteristics, arrangements and institutions that bind the group tightly beyond the private sphere of home and family through interlocking community networks of tribal clanship and residential contiguities (Details provided how these networks work

in analytical Chapters 4, 5, and 6).24 These ties exist by virtue of informal, friendship or neighborhood familiarity and everyday interactions within the village community or urban dwelling and become the conduit linking group members across class lines and other cleavages, thus reducing the cost of making intra-group relationships during conflict situations. Classic empirical examples may be drawn from the works of Williams and Bohstedt [1988]. These scholars provide a historical analysis on how radical collective action practices, more particularly rioting gets imitated, framed and spread in tightly knit societies. They employ these ideas to examine food riots in Devonshire in the late 18th century. Their findings specifically revealed that food riots were far more common in those communities which had dense networks formed through market transactions than the ones which were more loosely knit. In a similar vein, Morris [1981] discusses the ways in which direct network ties facilitated the spread of protest tactics during the civil rights movements of 1960s. His research shows that sit-ins during the movement were coordinated through pre-existing organizational and personal links. In this sense, informal societal networks functioned as the favorable bases of movement support and participation during the Bodo, Dimasa and Mising agitations.25

24 One would assume these ties to be much stronger and visible at the village level. This supposition however, should not preclude the existence of dense interpersonal contacts in the urban (or rather semi- urban) areas, or small towns where these groups live. In the semi-urban areas such ties exist through neighborhood proximity, frequent community gatherings, etc. Despite growing acceptance of alleged individualization within these communities, especially in the semi-urbanized areas, one would come across deeply rooted traditional and customary relationships that closely connect members of these communities. Changes in the community structures, especially in the small towns from a communal way of living towards more nuclear-based families might raise questions about the strength of town-based groups acting as strong social bases of diffusion. However, my observation is well-stated. These are grounded on facts that one can come across in these societies. 25 By movement support, I refer to direct and indirect services that the group members provide to the rebel organizations during the active phases of rebellion. These may range from overt and direct ways by joining the rank and file of the armed organization, or indirect and covert support by providing food supplies and shelter, in addition to maintaining secrecy of information. For further reference on how village networks work as mechanisms of contention refer to Van Rossem, Ronan [March 1997].

Vertical ties connect activist organizations with the potential supporters through established lines of interaction with the active movement organizations. Strong vertical ties have to work in tandem with the community networks to promote consistent bases of collective mobilization. How do we assess the functionality and effectiveness of strong vertical relationships? In other words, what determines the capability of movement organizers to tap these resources for high-risk activism? This study finds that organized, well-structured and decentralized organizational leadership (identified with Bodos) determines the ability of the movement activists to obtain the resources embedded in community networks. This allows distribution of movement tasks and the skills beyond the core leadership of the activist organizations who is at the center of decision-making.

Links between the movement organizers (core) and the unconnected group members

(periphery) are better established by this form of movement organization. The decentralized units that function at territorially segmented units of operation at different levels (semi-urban and rural areas) are not independent entities but they rather share the tasks delegated to them by the core command of the organization. In sum, the advantages of this type of structure include easy flow of information, division of labor, making direct contacts with the local community members, higher degrees of absorption of potential supporters, movement coordination, easy ways of recruiting cadres, managing and controlling the recruits. This leads to effective communication of movement narratives and the strategies adopted by movement activists.

The scope and scale of decentralized and well-structured organizations in terms of diffusing movement ideas and translating those ideas into actions are greater than

movement organizations that are relatively less structured and more centralized

(identified with the Dimasa and the Mising case). A highly centralized organization controlled by a bureaucratic form of machinery at the top of the command structure, may be assisted by few volunteers working at the grassroots level. However, the prospects of enlarging the pool of potential adherents may be hindered if the movement organization acts in a highly centralized manner, by controlling power and resources at the central level. Lack of decentralized units prevent the activists to obtain sustained logistical support throughout the movement as the group members may feel less connected to the organizational elites, and in turn, this may create problems of establishing a favorable principal-agent relationship. Absence of decentralized units of such organizations constrains the movement organizers to spread the movement ideas and devolve the control of material resources and strategies of the movement to the local members. This in turn, will have an impact on the process of recruitment and policing capabilities of the movement leaders or to control defection of supporters. Moreover, centralization restrains the movement organizers to coordinate and monitor their mobilization activities across a wider geographical area.

In addition to organizational endowments, settlement pattern of a group becomes important to assess the functionality of vertical networks. My argument is consistent with studies on ethnic movements which show that high levels of geographical concentration increases the propensity of groups to mobilize people for radical protest actions [Toft,

2003, Weidmann, 2009]. The motivation of a politically mobilized group to fight for territorial separation/autonomy will be higher if a substantial portion of the population is

spatially concentrated in precise and well-defined territories or a particular region. The desire to gain control over such a piece of territory may stem from the symbolic and material value attached to territory. From a symbolic perspective, the group may be emotionally attached to the place where they have a long duration of settlement, prior to the arrival of other ethnic groups. The claims may also be legitimized on the basis of a widespread notion or myth of traditional control over those lands which indicates that the territories are perceived as exclusively belonging to the group, the original settlers and all other groups who have settled later in those areas are considered as usurpers or outsiders

[Vasquez, 2000].

Defending group rights over those lands therefore, adds a powerful dimension to the group‘s ethno-territorial identity. From a materialist perspective, by acquiring control over those territories the group will be ensured of political self-determination and economic gains from land related resources. The main motivation behind the demand for

Bodoland is the protection of the language and identity of the Bodos as the group is considered to have deep roots in the region where they are settled. Persistent demands of a ‗Bodoland for Bodos‘ incorporates both these principles and provides credibility to the claims for a territorial solution to the conflict.

Besides providing motivation, contiguous location of a group, affects the opportunity to organize and coordinate the activities of mobilization. From a resource mobilization approach, authors argue that territorially concentrated groups have better capabilities and access to resources for initiating and sustaining ethnic mobilization. Resources may be

conceived in tangible as well as intangible terms that the group leaders can derive from in-group members in the form of economic support, rebel recruitment, or immaterial support through societal networks. Lichbach's argument in this regard is quite convincing as he contends that geographical concentration of a dissenting group increases the ability to coordinate, communicate, and reduce organizational costs of collective mobilization.

He states that, ‗the extent and intensity of interactions among dissidents increases as a result of increased concentration, which in turn, increases their communications (e.g. of grievances). [W]ith reduced distance between dissidents; it is easier to administer rewards for compliance and punishment for noncompliance‘ [Lichbach, 1995: 158–159].

Although the advantages of territorial concentration abounds, geographically concentrated ethnic group might experience serious impediments to mobilize because the state can easily target the members of the group residing in a contiguous area and thus can successfully demobilize dissident actions. Scholars note that a `wide geographic scope can sometimes work to the advantage of a dissident movement as it works against the government‘s ability to repress [Lichbach, 1995, 160]. Despite these contrary arguments, the evidence provided in this study suggests that geographical concentration of groups enables mobilization for collective violence.

On the contrary, geographical dispersion impedes motivation and lowers the capability of groups to mobilize violently for a territorial cause. Organizers of the movement will have fewer resources (economic, political, societal networks) at their disposal if the members of the group reside in distant and non-contiguous geographical areas. This will also have negative implications on the capabilities to coordinate movement activities. In

this study I argue that geographic dispersion of a mobilized group is one of the reasons behind the relatively moderate methods of mobilization. Thus, according to this approach, scattered settlement of the Misings limited the capability of the leaders to mobilize violently for territorial autonomy.

Geographically concentrated groups are therefore considered to be advantageous for activists to build vertical networks. The salient feature of this relationship lies in the capacity of the activist organizations to connect actors across different passive sub- groups of the movement, both passive and active members, who would otherwise be unable to communicate because of specific barriers, especially if the group members are geographically dispersed.26 The activation of this link therefore, narrows the gap between the small coterie of leaders, the organizers at the top and in-group members and facilitates dissemination in areas distant from the epicenter of ethnic mobilization, the center place where major demonstrations, sit-ins and other protest activities are mostly focused. It is important to note that activist organizations may seek exclusive support from the bulk of the population and prevent them from defecting to the other side—the opponent group (state). However, in practice only a small section of the group may ultimately serve as active supporters or potential rebels. The rest of the population may join the rebellion out of ‗coercion or persuasion‘ or may simply remain neutral without showing overt political affiliation [Kalyvas, 2006].

There is another possibility which is consistent with the arguments that I provide in this study. The tendency to collaborate with the activist organizations increases as these

26 This concept is much akin to brokerage ties. Although earlier scholars have used it to explain diffusion across groups I use it to explain the mechanism within group members. [Gould and Fernandez, 1994]. 81

organizations are anti-state which made people more supportive of these organizations.

Under these circumstances, the formal institutions of the state are perceived less as guarantors of collective security (for instance socio-economic, political and physical security) but more as potential contributors to ethnic fear and insecurity.27 In fact, in the face of stiff opposition to ethnic movements and indiscriminate application of repressive state policies, the dominant state is considered to have a nominal presence in providing collective goods and security. Activist organizations and ethnic rebels try to fill this void by portraying themselves as vigilante organizations protecting the interests of group members against the state. Thus, where state authorities are looked at with suspicion, local networks became the horizons of trust and security and thus a compelling reason to support activist rebellions. Group members may respond to such an environment with overt and covert forms of defiance against repressive state authorities.

POPULAR RESONANCE OF SYMBOLIC APPEALS AND HISTORICAL IDENTITIES: EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIVE MECHANISM

Ethnic polarization is the diffusion of the idea that ethnic identities are mutually exclusive and incompatible. It has been a commonplace in the literature on ethnic violence to realize that ethnic polarization between the differentiating groups by itself may not be the actual catalyst tied to political organization of minority ethnic groups for violence. Violent mobilization that ensues as a result of ethnic polarization, is a function of increased political and social salience that individuals or a group attaches to relevant ethnic categories in order to gain control and access to material or non-material resources.

These resources may pertain to political power or socio-economic benefits such as

27 This dynamics is well presented in chapter 4. 82

employment, education, etc. or preservation of cultural and historical symbols such as language, beliefs, customs and notions on ethnic homeland. On the whole, these conditions are intrinsically linked to group threats and apprehension of being extinct and further overwhelmed and subordinated by ethnic others (dominant group) that motivate the group members to coalesce around particular ethnic identities. Building political coalitions (e.g. parties) or political mobilization along the lines of relevant ethnic identities becomes a means to have access to competing resources (ethnic status, economic well-being and political power). This dissertation argues that unequal distribution of symbolic and tangible resources, particularly those associated with cultural symbols (language and tribal identities) and historical claims to political autonomy created feelings of antagonism against the Assamese and played a critical role in ethnic mobilization and preparing the Bodos and the Dimasas for violence.28

More precisely, ethno-political mobilization of the Bodos, Dimasas and Misings reflects three cornerstones of group identities---symbolic value attached to customary land, historical autonomy and discrete ethno-cultural symbols particularly, language and its practices which became the ethnic criteria, linking the members of these groups in an emotive bond and a sense of solidarity. Movement activists played a vital role to bolster a self-identified notion of ‗historical separateness‘ that sets these groups off from the majority community. Activists used these ideas as the dominant political narratives and heightened the political awareness of respective group members about their entitlements and actual discrepancies over the distribution of resources based on these salient

28 Observed through the lens of security dilemma, a concept that has been widely used by scholars to explain the emergence of inter-ethnic violence fear of losing economic, physical and political security of the group plays a critical role in preparing a group for offensive or defensive violence. Saideman [1998] 83

identities.29 The aim was to redefine each group‘s rightful place and geographical positioning within a separate political territory as this will ensure them to alter their positions in the status hierarchy and avert any threat of being further dominated. The intimate connection between separate territorial autonomy and the preservation of ethno- political identities is rightly expressed by Monica Toft who argues that the control of homeland means that a group‘s language can be spoken, its culture expressed, and its faith practiced within its homeland [Toft, 2002].

There are good reasons to question the incendiary nature of politicized ethnic narratives (symbolic appeals of activists) as the most compelling determinant for ethno- political rebellion. As some might argue, symbolic articulation of protest themes may not by itself crystallize into massive support and collaboration of group members for intense collective actions. First, movement claims about history may not be widely and consistently believed by group members. Second, other than the core activists, members may join the protests as a way of showing in-group loyalty without even getting carried away by such narratives.30 Despite these discrepancies, while borrowing insights from socio-psychological perspectives, I argue that a conscious, strategic effort made by the

Bodo, Dimasa and Mising activists to make ethnic appeals and give a shared meaning to minority grievances over certain discriminatory cultural (language) policies adopted by the state, and the desire to gain autonomy and greater political rights in a region, increased the propensity of these groups to justify hostilities against the state. In addition to the mere existence of symbolic materials, the mobilization process reflected the

29These issues are discussed in more detail in the respective empirical chapters. 30 I am inspired by Kuran‘s views on ‗reputational cascades‘. Group norms become embedded when more and more co-ethnics induce each other in self-reinforcing waves to demonstrate their in-group loyalty [Kuran, 1998]. 84

anxieties over relative opportunities (including, language rights, land, etc.) and ethnic status of minorities. Legislation of ethnic policies signalled enhanced political power and greater role of the dominant community in the public institutions (government offices, educational institutions, etc.) and the simultaneous fears of the minorities of being further alienated and marginalized from the prospects of achieving higher social mobility.

But what were the relevant differences in the processes of mobilization in the three different cases that influenced the level of popular support and in turn, the outcome of each movement? In other words, how do we explain the situation under which politicization of symbolic identities will have popular resonance and thus shape the course of sustained radical political action in some cases and not in others? I argue that popular resonance of ethnic appeals depends on the ability of the movement activists to effectively propagate and communicate the movement frame and make people believe that the collective action narrative is salient and best represents the popular concerns of the potential constituents. The narrative material will have enhanced effects on popular mobilization only if the targeted population strongly perceive that the incentives will be reasonably higher if they respond their leaders‘ claims. For instance, as a territorially concentrated minority, endowed with both societal networks and organizational advantages, the Bodos had a general belief that the group had reasonable chances of obtaining greater regional autonomy, based on their societal endowments and capabilities to bargain. This perception influenced level of popular participation and support for collective violence.

People‘s participation and support for the movement involves time, resources and high amount of risks particularly, if the protest actions are highly disruptive or violent. In order to legitimize their stated objectives, the goal of the movement activists is to highlight particular aspects of the ‗cultural tool kit‘ or the symbolic material that reflect collective beliefs and interests of the community. The suggestion is to highlight the constraints that opportunistic ethnic leaders may experience to activate ethnic categories or cleavages and mobilize their co-ethnics simply on the basis of their personal motives or political gains. For instance, the tribal groups of Assam generally believe that they are historically and ethnically separate and distinct from the dominant community. Language, tribal customs and local village autonomy are some of the fundamental aspects of identity that these groups are consciously aware of and consider essential to be preserved by state institutions.

In addition to such subjective attitudes and beliefs, the perceptions and expectations for cultural preservation are largely influenced by the objective importance that members attach to specific symbols of group identity. This can vary across groups depending on the political and social relevance that the members of a particular group add to those ethno-cultural symbols for the acquisition of collective rights and higher social mobility.

Therefore, I argue that the persuasiveness of the narrative material to drive popular support is highly contingent on collective as well as individual expectations to gain political privileges, better employment opportunities and higher or equal ethnic status vis a vis the dominant group. Institutionalization or official recognition of those symbols within decentralized state institutions may ensure the group with such guarantees. The

mobilizing potency of the activists and the current movement strategies for the acquisition of such decentralized political institutions therefore, have to be tied to the provision of tangible or intangible benefits that group members may expect to achieve through these institutions.

Secondly, the ability of the ethnic leaders and organizations to promote intense public actions depends on the level of acceptance, trust and legitimacy that these actors acquire within the community, based on their long-term commitment for movement goals.

Leadership credibility is established over a period of time, through organizational channels and interpersonal relationships created by ethnic organizations and charismatic leaders with the members of a group. In short, the narrative material, the goals, strategies and communicative efficacy of the leadership, in ‗getting the message across‘ a wider section of the group, largely shapes the degree of popular support and material resources required for considerable success of mobilization—a necessary prerequisite for the group to engage in radical actions. The Bodo ethnic organizations and the activists clearly exhibited these characteristics as opposed to the Misings, who lacked these advantages and were thus prevented from establishing the popular bases for radical goals. Bodo ethnic organizations, especially the BSS and ABSU, effectively engaged in conscious and strategic efforts to highlight ethno-linguistic identity and local political autonomy, as the most important pillars based on which, a separate Bodo state could be built.

Contemporary ethno-political strategies adopted by Bodo nationalists were connected to the group‘s historical experiences of local autonomy. Mobilizing potency of the Bodo activists was largely determined by strong commitment and communicative skills of

ethnic organizations and charismatic leaders like U.N. Brahma, the most outspoken and passionate Bodo nationalist. These served as the important channels to articulate and disseminate symbolic appeals through widespread protest campaigns and publicity strategies such as public meetings, pamphleteering and mass demonstrations, thereby legitimizing their strong position regarding autonomy. These strategies enabled the Bodo nationalists to obtain a sustained and organized support of the people that was effectively utilized to launch popular radical campaigns against the state authorities.

The Dimasa and Mising movements on the other hand, failed to emerge with similar forces and collective action repertoires. Dimasa and Mising ethnic organizations and leaders were strikingly limited in their efforts to turn their movements into full-fledged, intensified and sustained rebellions. Competing factions that emerged within these movements propagated opposing goals and further prevented the activist organizations to build popular support that was required for the adoption and sustenance of radical political actions.31

STATE REPRESSION, INCONSISTENT ACCOMMODATION AND ESCALATING MILITANT ACTIVITIES

The essential dynamic running through any contractual relationship between the state and the conflicting group is that the supervening authority (for instance, state) reserves the right to regulate the use of coercion accountably and wisely when the mobilizers transgress acceptable means of protest (peaceful demonstrations) and instead use violence

31 Although the Dimasas experimented with violent strategies, they failed to turn their ethnic insurgency into a mass based, intensified and sustained violent campaign. 88

on their own prerogative. Nevertheless, usurpation of the contractual obligations on the part of the state, might entail infringement of these regulations, if the state continuously abandons policies of acceptance; alternatively pursues denial policies and predisposes itself to illegitimate use of coercion. The initial responses of the Indian state towards ethnic mobilization of tribal minorities for territorial separation (both secessionist and non-secessionist movements) in the north-eastern states reveal intransigence and prolonged aggression. The case of Nagaland and Mizoram may exemplify this situation.

Separatist demands of both these groups were responded with continuous denial policies for a prolonged period without any signs of political concession. This escalated the militancy of the MNF and NSCN (IM).

How does one explain the intransigent attitude of the Indian government with respect to ethno-territorial claims? One of the core assumptions in the literature is that while considering any ethno-territorial claims (secession or separate statehood within the state boundaries) the government will be initially prompted to resist any remapping of the existing boundaries.32 This is primarily because of strategic concerns (e.g. Mizo,

Nagaland) if the separatist group inhabits the border regions, combined with symbolic worth of the territory or fear of demonstration effects. An uncompromising stance towards the territorial claims of the Bodos and Dimasas is certainly related to the perils of a domino effect in the region that had been witnessing similar demands of territorial autonomy made by numerous other minority ethnic groups. These demands proliferated

32 Goertz and Diehl [1992] are concerned with the tangible and symbolic value of a piece of land which makes both sides unwilling to reach at a negotiated settlement. The state will be least motivated to part away with the territory if it is rich in natural resources such as oil, minerals, fresh water, and fertile agricultural land or if it provides access to the sea or other major routes of commercial interest. 89

in the region since the 1980s. The central government was apprehensive of the fact that if it yielded to the demands of the Bodos, then the state will have to succumb to similar pressures generated by other groups. Thus the government tried to contain further growth of such separatist sentiments by being rigid and extremely intransigent.

A brief review of the existing literature on repression reveals that the variable has been used extensively by scholars to explain the interactions between the state and its potential challengers and the effects on ethnic mobilization. Given the empirical heterogeneity in repressive actions of states, this study lends weight to some important dimensions of repression identified by earlier researchers. This study conceptualizes state repression as state actions to impede mobilization, outlawing particular forms of protest, harass and intimidate activists, physically assault, imprison, and/or kill movement participants [Stockdill,1996]. This includes both institutional/formal and situational/indiscriminate forms of repression. The former relates to actions that are legally sanctioned (bans, martial law, etc.) that can hinder the rebel group‘s ability to mobilize resources (guns, people, money, etc.), and the latter include actions of state agents in direct contact with protesters when they apply coercive methods in a relatively indiscriminate and spontaneous fashion (detention without trial, physical torture while interrogation, gendered violence, etc) [della Porta, 1996]. These theoretical debates thus consider repression an effective way to demobilize collective action. Examples may be drawn from the experiences in Mexico (1968) and Beijing (1989) where excessive repressive measures were used by the state that ultimately quelled students‘ movements.

Alternative arguments have been advanced by social psychologists like Gurr who believe that instead of hindering political mobilization, violent repression may increase the likelihood of protests by the rebellious group [Gurr, 1986]. Gurr argues that state repression further intensifies the frustrations underlying violent protests and therefore contributes to its escalation. Studies on Palestinian protests in the Israeli-occupied West

Bank during 1976-1985 and South African collective behavior reveal that an increase in repression led to an increase in violent collective action [Khawaja, 1993, Olivier, 2003].

While these findings have acknowledged that there is a positive relationship between state repression and dissident violence, few fully examine the distinction between different methods of repression used by state agents. Except few scholars [Koopmans,

1997], this issue has not been dealt with adequately in the literature. Aside from these discrepancies, previous research fails to offer insights on the pattern and character of violence that may vary in relation to the constraints imposed by state repression. My aim is to fill these gaps in the literature. Adding perspectives to the approaches adopted by social psychologists, this study develops the basic argument that lack of political accommodation and widespread repression employed by the state agents will lead to a sharp increase in rebel violence. The nature and character of rebel violence will vary in relation to the methods of repression used by the state agents. One observable implication of my argument is that there will be an escalating effect on rebel violence if the targets of state repression are randomly chosen. Critics might argue that if the government uses coercion indiscriminately while targeting citizens, supporters, and sympathizers randomly, merely on the basis of suspicion or frustration, the rebel groups may

experience severe restraints to obtain the resources and logistical support from the non- combatants. This strategy may also be used to undermine the ties that exist between the rebel groups and the civilian population. In addition to shaping the behavior of non- combatants and inhibiting their support to the rebels, this method of repression may be used as an indicator to show the military capabilities of the state agents. This strategy may be used as a coercive mechanism against the rebels to force them to surrender and to give the impression that if they fail to do so, their in-group members, the potential constituents, may face the grave consequences of severe state repression.

My argument is that despite the efforts of the state to demobilize the rebel group, the latter can still manage to obtain an important degree of compliance in the form of covert support of the non-combatants. Apart from material assistance, defiance to cooperate with state agents by maintaining silence or neutrality by non-combatants during intensive counter-insurgency operations, may tacitly aid the rebels to sustain the rebellion. Covert assistance or silence may be the result of either sympathy for the cause of the movement or fear of social sanctions or both.

I argue that a strong backlash effect of rebel violence results if two conditions hold--- widespread repression and strong protest networks that develop over the course of the movement. In order to survive the mounting losses in the hands of state armed forces, rebel groups tend to blend in and disappear amongst the members of the group as a result of which the rebels and non-combatants are not easily identifiable. The outcome is---- brutal, more offensive and unselective counter-insurgency campaigns. The non-

combatant population therefore bear double costs----fear of being targeted by state agents combined with the fear of being penalized by rebels for non-compliance [Kalyvas, 2006].

In closely knit societies, where horizontal networks are strong and where there is an easy flow of information, it becomes easier for rebels to distinguish between the collaborators and the denouncers. In such a setting, supporting the rebel organizations may provide the credible guarantees of security against indiscriminate violence of state agents. Members of a group are motivated to remain loyal and allegiant to activist organizations not just because of the apprehension of being socially stigmatized and disgraced by the community but also due to fears of being identified as actual or potential denouncers and face negative consequences. Community becomes a place of refuge thereby, consolidating the protest networks.

Another possible reason why protest networks may become stronger during high-risk conflict situations is a sense of emotional reaction (sympathy, anger, alienation, desire for avenge) that is triggered by state repression. Intensive repression generates a sense of outrage and integrates people into protest networks, as a result of which more and more people are attracted to the rebellion. Commitment of the rebel group to abide by their goals despite excessive costs of being repressed generates the perception that the state is illegitimate and that the rebel groups can credibly provide collective protection and security (a public good) to the group members, the future constituents. In other words, indiscriminate state repression against the civilian population of the group can deepen in- group cohesion and bolster vertical networks. It was under these circumstances that the

Bodo agitation drew wide amount of support from erstwhile inactive group members

beyond the rank-and-file organizers and activists. This largely contributed to widespread violence and endurance of the movement.

On the other hand, if the government uses repression in a highly selective manner, targeting core insurgents or movement dissidents, there is a likelihood that rebel violence will increase in the short-run, but sustained application of precise methods of repression may lead to moderation and final breakdown of the violent movement. This pattern was evident in the case of the Dimasas. Under this situation, there is less probability that the movement will develop strong protest networks and produce a sharp and enduring backlash effect.

This study also reveals that rather than simply giving up the fight, rebel groups, especially those committed to their longer-term goals may choose to confront the state by changing their pattern and strategies of violence.33 In other words, as the state tries to diminish the capabilities of the rebel group, the nature and targets of rebel violence may change. Violence is used more strategically and by careful selection of rebel targets. The rebel group will try to avoid direct confrontation with the state armed forces as much as possible while continuing to impose indirect costs on the state by selectively attacking non-combatants that are considered to be out-groups. Non-combatants (individuals or groups) become the surrogates or substitutes of dissident violence.34 Potential substitute

33 Weinstein [2007] makes a good distinction between opportunistic and activist rebellion. My cases are identifiable with the latter type of rebel groups. p.204 34 Horowitz explores this issue from a similar perspective and uses the term cumulative aggression. My emphasis is on the fact that substitutes need not be identified with scapegoats because the targets are chosen not because they are potentially weak or simply because they are accessible but rather because the rebel groups have prior grievances against them or some kind of association (formal/informal) with the actual adversaries (state agents) [2001], p.138. 94

targets are carefully selected from amongst those groups or individuals belonging to a particular group, against whom the dissidents have prior resentments. Calculated and selective violence is often redirected against parallel antagonists.

My research provides evidence that violent mobilization of the Bodos and the Dimasas was largely facilitated by state‘s execution of severe repressive policies. Coercive policing tactics had a tremendous impact in augmenting violence. My emphasis is on the premise that indiscriminate and widespread repression accompanied by gendered violence and other coercive strategies produced a backlash effect and led to escalation of militancy during the Bodo movement. The pattern of rebel violence changed as the state used repression indiscriminately. Rebel violence was redirected at non-Bodos and individuals who had both formal as well as informal association with state agents.

Detailed account of this pattern and analysis of rebel violence has been provided in

Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.

Next I turn to provide a detailed breakdown and summary of the variables and cases in a tabular form.

Table 1.1. Summary of Variables and Cases

Case 1. Case 2. Case 3. Cases Bodos Dimasas Misings ______Independent Variables Background conditions 1.Nationalist 1.Nationalist organizations 1. Social capital and community A) Resource Mobilization organizations have access to social links provide limited resources to have access to capital and community ties nationalist organizations. social capital and during early phase of the intra-group movement. solidarity networks

2.Strong Vertical 2. Vertical ties are weak 2. Vertical ties are weakest ties established

Advantages: Reasons: Reasons:(factionalized leadership, (Spatial (leadership gets nationalist organizations propagate concentration of factionalized/internal opposing movement goals, the group & rivalries, opposing goals, competition for social support) organizational competition for social & geographical disadvantages) cohesion) support & geographical disadvantages) B)Communicative 1.Successful 1. Politicization of tribal 1. Politicization of ethno-linguistic mechanism/efficacy of politicization of identities (historical identity least successful. propaganda ethno-linguistic autonomy) less successful identity 2.Popular 2. Popular resonance of 2. Popular resonance of symbolic resonance of symbolic appeals was appeals was almost negligible. symbolic appeals weaker. strong. 3.Reasons: strong 3.Reasons:Weak 3. Reasons: communicative communicative processes, Weak communicative processes, skills and decentralized institutions movement was confined to middle strategies, current lost credibility over time, class intellectuals, strategies well legitimacy and trust of viability of decentralized tied to history, movement leadership was institutions were questioned, widespread belief not strongly established, in the credibility weak commitments. legitimacy and trust of movement of decentralized leadership was not strongly institutions, established,weak commitments. strong commitment, legitimacy and trust of movement leadership strong.

State Responses 1.Peaceful 1.Partial accommodation 1.Partial strategies fail to accommodation/substantial produce desired concessions results. 2. Inconsistent political 2. Continuous concessions 2. Peaceful strategies produced denial policies desired results. 3. Targeted methods of 3.Indiscriminate repression 3.Selective incentives to leaders of and widespread nationalist organizations repression The Outcome Intense and Moderate levels of Peaceful mobilization sustained violence, de-radicalized violence

Table 1.1. illustrates that differences in the accessibility of societal resources, the communicative mechanism and the responses of the state, influenced the relative success and failure of popular mobilization which, in turn, led to different outcomes in the levels of contention. The first case (Bodos) indicates that specific a) group-level endowments such as strong community ties and vertical networks; b) particular organizational characteristics and ethnic strategies, conditions that enhanced the effects of symbolic appeals and development of a strong and reactive ethno-political identity for a separate state c) inconsistent policies of accommodation and widespread repression of the state, these factors together influenced popular endorsement for the violent strategy. As a territorially concentrated ethnic minority, there was a widely circulated notion amongst the Bodos that they had the responsibility to defend their rights for territorial autonomy.

The ethnic leadership and the group members shared this ethno-nationalist vision. An efficient and committed leadership endowed with strong community and hierarchical networks increased the capabilities and the perception that the group had reasonable chances of winning the bargain for a separate federal unit. Coercive state policies dramatically impacted on movement strategies, the outcome of which was highly intense ethnic insurgency that received sustained support of the Bodo people.

Where the state applied policies of partial accommodation and provided selective incentives to the ethnic leaders, the outcome was relatively peaceful and less disruptive methods of contention. The Mising movement fits this explanation. Wavering goals of the leadership, weak communicative skills, combined with objective disadvantages of the group such as dispersed settlement limited the efforts of the activist organizations to

advance radical claims. Although the Dimasas activists used symbolic appeals to legitimize their claims, these seemed to have carried less weight to allow the Dimasas to undertake mass-based violent campaigns for a separate state. Internal disputes between the core leadership organizations weakened their legitimacy and solidarity networks within the community and consequently undermined the original goals of the movement.

The central government‘s tactical shift in counter-insurgency operations finally led to de- radicalization of the low-scale violent campaign.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined several existing theories of ethnic violence including rational choice and social psychological approaches. I also develop upon theories drawn from social movement literature on intra-group networks, repertoires of contention, and resource mobilization used to explain support and participation in violent settings. The chapter illustrated what each theory stands for and analyzed their applicability to explain specific cases chosen in this research. Individually, each theory proved to be inadequate to produce a model that could be successfully developed to explain the variant outcomes of different ethnic movements as shown in this study. Rationalist practitioners have virtually ignored the role of cultural symbols, significance of group history and narratives that are transformed into politicized ethnic identities and may provide the underlying condition for violent rebellion. Intellectual resources drawn from social-psychology bridges this gap by evaluating a wide range of variables such as cultural symbols, narratives, beliefs and shared historical understandings about a group‘s historical autonomy and ethnic identities. This approach enables us to understand how political

contention around symbolic resources may become a motivating source of violent ethnic movements.

Socio-psychological approach is however, silent on the question of variance in the level of contentious actions across cases. More specifically, this approach cannot sufficiently explain how variance in the institutional (state) responses may have an influence in the level of political contention---high-levels of violent mobilization, peaceful mobilization and finally de-radicalization (moderation). As this research argues, the form and extent to which the incumbents adopt their repressive policies may exacerbate radical behavior of the dissident group. What brings about aggravation of rebel violence is something that requires deeper exploration. Chapter 4 and 6 explain this dimension by analyzing the impact of state repression on different patterns of violent behavior. On the contrary, selective incentives and partial accommodation under certain conditions is associated with peaceful mobilization. Targeted repression will transform violent rebellion into moderation and de-radicalization, a subject explored in Chapter 6.

The framework developed in this chapter also specifies that close community ties and strong organizational linkages of the activist organizations with the group members are potential assets that the activists count on to outweigh high risk of repression during intensive insurgent actions.

The framework that I develop in this study may not capture all the dynamics to explain the process of violent contention, but it does incorporate some of the important aspects of the strategies and patterns of violent mobilization. The framework would seem to work well in situations where rebel groups may not have enough access to economic

resources, such as profits from natural resources, land and other subsistence goods at their disposal to offer to the recruits in exchange of their loyalty or support; where the content of relationship between the rebel organizations and the lower level of supporters can be discerned by a range of non-economic motivations and symbolic ingredients.

From this perspective it will be useful to unravel the complexities of movements that organize at least partly around identity politics. To conclude, by integrating crucial components related to rationalist assumptions (individual motivation), socio-cultural

(group-level motivations) and institutional (political opportunities) traditions, the framework constructed in this study tends to embody three different dimensions (micro, meso and macro level of analysis) to explain different outcomes of ethnic movements.

The interplay of these forces starts a dialogue between the approaches applied in this study—the approaches that often operate within separate analytical spheres in the field of contentious politics.

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CHAPTER THREE

BASING DIFFERENCES: ETHNIC IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION, POPULAR AWARENESS AND SEPARATISM OF THE BODOS

INTRODUCTION

The efforts of homogenization and policies of assimilation designed by the post- colonial state to integrate different ethnic categories within the broader fold of composite

Assamese nationalism opened the floodgates to a raging torrent of ethno-nationalist movements in the north-eastern region. Some of these movements were active since the colonial period. These movements were propelled against historical alienation experienced by formerly excluded and disadvantaged groups. The emergence of these movements were significant manifestations of grievances related to socio-economic and political disparities and threats to group identity that increasingly became apparent in the first few decades of state-building (1947-1970s). The dominant elites of the region during this phase tried to shape a strong regionalist identity that affirmed their powers and privileges over the region. Increasing regionalist domination that was sought by regional elites however, proved to be costly for ethnic minorities which in turn created the anxieties of these communities over their relative status in relation to the largely dominant Assamese-speaking community. Bodo ethno-nationalism developed within the context of state-building as a reaction to growing regional dominance of the Assamese- speaking group. The movement sought to create a separate federal unit for the Bodos.

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Writings on ethnic mobilization in Assam, indicate that economic imbalances formed an important basis for political mobilization of minority ethnic groups, including the

Bodos [Bhattacharjee, 1996, Bhagabati, 1991, Baruah, 2005]. These writings suggest that during the post-colonial period, traditional self-sufficient economy of the minority ethnic communities were replaced by money economy which led to social stratification, social mobilization, occupational differentiation and changes in the traditional power relations, between the tribal and non-tribal groups. These changes occurred as an ongoing process of modernization and privatization of land held by these communities and a process of transition from shifting agriculture to settled methods of cultivation [Baruah, 2005].

However, due to lack of social awareness and alternative support from the state, the affected communities were not incorporated into the modern sectors of the economy.

Another factor which contributed to the failure of accommodation of these groups was the unevenness in the social transformation between the tribal and non-tribal ethnic groups (mainly the Assamese). The former groups experienced late social changes due to their isolation as partially excluded communities, in the colonial period. As a result, significant imbalances arose in terms of allocation, and competition for scarce resources, including land, as well as jobs in both the government and private sectors.35 Altogether, these fed into ethnic grievances of the tribal communities and provided the incentives to mobilize for autonomy.

An exclusive focus on these grievance-based factors, however, does not explain when and under what conditions groups resort to violence. The same irregularities in resource

35 Peculiar geo-political features of the region combined with British policies of administering the region contributed led to both physical and psychological separation between the tribes, between tribes and non- tribes and between hills man and plainsman etc. [De, Soumitra,1997] 102

distribution may result in fierce conflict and violence in some cases but not in others. If we consider the case of Misings, Rabhas and Deuris in Assam, although these groups have equally experienced socio-economic inequities, they have not reacted violently in the same manner as the Bodos. My contention is that disparities in the allocation of resources as indicated in the case specific writings, may serve as important bases for political mobilization. However, the correlation between these grievances and violent mobilization is not as simple as the picture has been painted by these writings. Similarly,

I argue that by simply focusing on economic motivations one tends to overlook other collective-utility assumptions linked to culture, symbols, etc. underlying group motivations to support violent mobilization. Material incentives may act as inducements for compliance for a relatively small number of individual actors, for instance, the cadre members of the rebel group, but not for the entire group, or at least fairly large number of group members whose collective support on a regular or an irregular basis is indispensable for sustained protest actions.36

Taking these debates into account, this chapter traces the broad patterns of the ebb and flow of Bodo nationalism within a historical context. While doing so, the chapter tends to situate ethno-nationalist violence of the Bodos in the 1980s and seeks to delineate the conditions that increased the potential for the group to mobilize violently.

This chapter argues that several factors provided the impetus for the development of

36 Lichbach [1995] and Petersen [2001]: profits may be material in nature in the form of payments or social such as attainment of social honor or respect. Collective support and participation on a regular basis refers to going to annual meetings, and actions regularly, or belonging to social movement organizations. Irregular participation refers to sporadically taking part in campaigns without consistent support or participation.

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ethno-nationalist violence of the Bodos. Tensions over growing relevance of ethnic categories for the allocation of socio-economic resources, demographic imbalances caused by increase in migrants combined with state policies of forcible subjugation in place of minority accommodation altogether coalesced to create conditions for violence.

The chapter provides a coherent and sequential account of the processes regarding the formation of Bodo ethnic identity in five different phases. The first phase (till 1860s) sketches the historical background, the evolution and a brief settlement history of the

Bodos. The second phase (1860-1920) discusses the socio-religious activities and the formation of a separate Bodo identity. Discussion of the third phase (1920-1960) demonstrates the politicization of Bodo ethnicity. The fourth phase (1960-1970) revolves around the discussion of organized resistance against the imposition of cultural policies by the state. The last two phases relate to the political movement, the period of violent mobilization and the responses of the state. The period from 1970s-1993 considers the initial phase of radicalization of the movement and partial moderation. The last phase

(1993-2003) is related to renewed violence followed by final demobilization and return to peace.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE BODOS (PRE-COLONIAL PHASE)

Bodo-Kachari is an ethnic group of Assam, having their origins in the Indo-

Mongoloid race. According to the census report of 2001, the Bodos constitute nearly 11.5 percent of the total population of Assam. One of the earliest references to the word Bodo can be found in available ethnographic information of the midst 19th century colonial

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period. The word Bodo was found to be first cited in a letter dated 18th December, 1856.

The letter was written by Rev. Hesselmyer, a British official, who worked for the

Christian missionary in Tezpur, in connection with a study conducted by the colonial government to record the participation of the Kacharis in the schools run by the British government.37 The letter remarked that the Bodo-Kacharis who were numerously settled in the district of Darrang and along the foothills of Bhutan remained considerably excluded from the few schools that hitherto existed.

Although the exact place and location of Bodo genesis is still a matter of speculation and reasoning, historical chronicles suggest that the Bodo-Kacharis moved periodically over a considerable amount of time from southeast China via Tibet and Bhutan in the ancient times and settled in the Himalayan plains below the foothills of Bhutan and

Arunachal Pradesh, areas located on the northern banks of the river Brahmaputra.

Gradually they moved further inland and settled in different parts of the region in and around the areas adjoining Nepal, north Bengal, Garo hills of Meghalaya, North Cachar hills and the Cachar plains in the southern part of Assam, Tripura and also some adjacent areas of Bangladesh. Accordingly, a British anthropologist, Sidney Endle divided the

Bodos into Northern and Southern groups, each consisting of a number of sub-groups scattered through different parts of Assam. These anthropologists used the exonym Bodo-

Kachari to identify numerous tribes who are considered as descendents of this group of

Assam‘s autochthon tribes. Over time, with the effect of various exogenous pressures, such as intermarriages, conversion, etc. the successive generations transformed and crystallized into distinct communities. Moreover, with the passage of time they forged

37 Bhupinder Singh Committee Report, 1991. 105

recognizable cultural identities and distinguished themselves as Saraniyas, Sonowals,

Thengal Kacharis, Dimasas and Barmans. In large part, the broad patterns of the autochthonous and monolithic Bodo identity of the present Bodos trace their lineage in the autochthonous Bodo Kacharis which is inclusive of all tribal people who speak or used to speak one of the languages of the Bodo family; and whose historical landscape situates along the entire northern belt of Assam and small patches in the southern fringe of Assam [Baruah, 1999, p.176].

Till the arrival of Ahoms in 1228 AD, the politico-administrative boundaries of the

Bodo-Kachari kingdom was centered in those areas. Historical findings suggest that some of the powerful royal dynasties of Kamrupa, (denoting ancient Assam) belonged to the

Bodo-Kachari rulers. Noted historian Kanak Lal Baruah maintains that ―the tribes speaking Bodo languages seem to have occupied the plains of Assam for a very long time

[Baruah, 1966, p.20].‖ Predominant position of the Bodos in the pre-Indic culture of

Assam has also been talked with much alacrity by Edward Gait who observed that the wide extent and long duration of Bodo domination is manifested by the frequent usage of the prefixes ‗di‘ or ‗ti‘ to name the rivers of the Brahmaputra valley. These prefixes refer to the Bodo interpretation for water. More plainly, the literal adaptation of naming the water bodies in the valley became increasingly expressed in Bodo versions. Except a few rivers in the eastern part of the Assam valley which bear traces of Ahom origin and which are dubbed with the prefix ‗nam‘ such as Namtsik, Namsang, etc. numerous other rivers that are spread across the east and west of the valley‘s adjoining areas are identified in

Bodo terminology such as Dibru, Dikhu, Dihing, Dihong. This indicates that the Bodo-

Kachari nomenclatures have sustained and gained relative importance in common

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parlance. From a similar standpoint, a British historian who wrote extensively on the history of Assam observed that,

…….the Kacharis are believed to be very closely allied to the Koches, and also so far at least as language is concerned, to the Chutias, Lalungs, and Morans of the Brahmaputra valley, and to the Garos and Tipperas of the Southern hills. Having regard to their wide distribution and to the extent of the country over which Bodo language of a very uniform type are still current, it seems not improbable that at one time the major part of Assam and North Bengal formed a great Bodo kingdom, and that some at least of the Mlech kings mentioned in some of the old copper plate inscriptions belonged to the Kachari or some closely allied tribe [Endle, 1911].

Due to internecine wars with the Ahoms, the Bodo-Kachari chieftains, however, finally lost their controlled territories to the Ahoms in the sixteenth century. Thereafter, the Ahoms continued to regulate the political as well as other socio-economic matters of these areas until the British took over the Ahom territories in 1828 A.D.

The colonial administration devised a process of social categorization of the Bodos and other aboriginal groups by introducing the Inner Line Regulation Act of 1873.

Subsequently, these groups were categorized as ‗backward tribes‘, ‗forest tribes‘ or

‗aboriginal tribes‘. In addition to these policies of recognition, the British government passed the Assam Land Revenue Regulation Act of 1886, which was later revised in mid-

1930s. Accordingly, the Revenue Department of the Government of Assam, divided the areas inhabited by the tribal minorities into several excluded (inhabited mostly by hills tribes) and partially excluded territories (inhabited mostly by plains tribes).38 These areas were under the indirect rule of the British administration and the groups were given the autonomous authority to regulate their affairs through a system of tribal chieftainship.

38 Bhupinder Singh Committee Report, 1991. 107

Under this provision the tribal chiefs were in charge of managing the local affairs pertaining to these territories. These legislations were drawn to regulate the areas inhabited by tribal minorities and were premised on direct rule by the Governor of the province with the assistance of the district authorities. The prominent aspects of this practice were a system of governance based on paternalistic rule by the district officers.

With the aim of preserving tribal cultures, local traditions and customary laws, these provisions excluded the tribal areas from being operated through the principles contained in the ordinary legislations of the areas which were contiguous to these territories. The prescribed rules also led to restricted entry of non-tribal communities into these areas, thereby allowing a favorable environment of strengthening the tribal leadership. Colonial rulers vindicated these provisions on the grounds that the tribes were primitive, simple, unsophisticated and were marked with unmatched improvidence. Their distinctive cultural features (language as well as social organization) were portrayed as those requiring civilizing influence and paternalism of the British administrative system. The concept of excluding them was based on the idea that ‗there was no political material on which to found political institutions in the areas inhabited by these tribal communities

[Prakash, 1999].‘ Geographical marking of the tribal communities during the colonial period interminably solidified ethnic identification of the Bodos as separate and different from the non-tribal communities.

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SOCIO-LINGUISTIC AND SOCIO-RELIGIOUS REFORM: FOUNDATION OF A SEPARATE BODO IDENTITY (1860-1920)

A core component of Bodo identity is their belief in Bathouism, a religious creed that forms the pillar of Bodo religious and spiritual practice. Bathouism refers to the worship of Bathou, a form of veneration of Bodo ancestors called obonglaoree. Certain pronounced practices of Bathousim, like consumption of pork, chicken and brewing and drinking of rice beer called zou and zumai, were strongly disdained by upper-caste Hindu communities. Due to these practices, the caste Hindus often relegated these tribal groups to a somewhat subservient ranking in the socio-cultural hierarchy and disparagingly referred to them as Mellaches, a derogatory term, used for someone who is typically a non-observer of Hindu Brahmanic religious doctrine. It was against this backdrop that

Kalicharan Mech (1860-1938) fought vehemently against the subjugation of Bodo society along with his epoch-making efforts to rejuvenate Bodo spiritual beliefs and customary ways of operating the society. With this objective in mind, Kalicharan led a Sanskritic movement for the socio-economic reformation of the Bodo society and laid the foundations of the Brahma sect (Dharma); also referred to as Brahmaism in 1907, whereby he preached the tenets of Vedic religious philosophies.39 In no time,

Kalicharan‘s ideas formed a composite theme in the Bodo society and he came to be popularly known as Kalicharan Brahma. Consequently, many of his followers formally adopted ‘Brahma’ as a title and as an outward expression of their ethos in Brahma‘s spiritual beliefs. Some even reinstated Bathouism, with significant reforms in the

39 His intellectual and philosophical conceptions were deeply influenced by Bengal renaissance and more particularly, the socio-religious reformation activities of the Brahmo Samaj, which later culminated in the foundation of the Brahmo religion. In addition, Sankardeva‘s teachings on Vaishnavism also remained an integral part of Kalicharan‘s philosophy. Bhattacharya,1996. 109

traditional forms of worship. Thus, the ideas spread by the socio-religious reform movement in the 19th century as a response to disparagement and exclusionary treatment experienced by the Bodos proved to be quite influential and convincing to Bodo society.

Besides traditional beliefs and customs, Bodos also showed extraordinary loyalty to their original dialect and language. In the early part of the twentieth century, a sizeable section of the rising educated Bodo middle professionals involved themselves in the process of intellectual development and upward social mobility of the Bodos, especially through the development of traditional language and vocabularies. These intellectuals formed a socio-religious body called the Habraghat Bodo Sonmiloni, in 1912 in Goalpara district. This organization published a book entitled Boroni Fisha O Aayen in 1915. Jadav

Pegu succinctly stated that, ―Through the book, the intellectuals made a clarion call to the people on the necessity of reorganizing themselves for recovering the lost glory of the

Bodo community.‖ This was followed by the formation of the first literary society of the

Bodos in 1918 called the Dakhinkul Bodo Sahitya Sanmiloni at Dudhnoi, Goalpara district. The most remarkable achievement of the time was the publication of its first journal called Bibar which was written in Bodo language, using the Deodhai and

Assamese script [Bhattacharya, 1996]. The middle-class intellectuals of the early twentieth century thus dedicated themselves most prominently to the study and writings of the language, history and folklore of the Bodos thereby, inculcating a sense of self- awareness and preservation of traditional culture within the society. These literary pursuits together with the socio-religious activities indeed created a new surge of social consciousness that had a great impact in the later years of social mobilization of the community.

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POLITICIZATION OF BODO ETHNICITY (1920-1947)

The newly emerging middle class intellectuals presented themselves as the vanguard of the interests of the Bodo society. Their contribution to the Bodo society is significant not only with regard to their solemn efforts to regenerate traditional culture and literature but also in securing their collective rights and correcting perceived injustices, discrimination and alienation from the mainstream of political and economic development. They initiated strategic moves in this direction and formed the Kachari

Youth Association (Kachari Jubok Sanmiloni) in 1920s. The organization made specific demands before the Indian Statutory Commission (Simon Commission) in 1929, for the group‘s entry into the public sphere, through a provision of political and economic rights for the Bodos. Subsequently, the Association submitted a memorandum to the

Commission for the provision of separate electorates for the Bodos, so that the group could have adequate number of representation in the provincial assembly. Following the recommendations of the Simon Commission, four seats were reserved in the provincial assembly for the plains tribes, including the Bodos.

The group represented by the All Assam Tribal League (AATL) formed in 1933 got the first opportunity to participate in the Assam provincial assembly elections held under the provisions of Government of India Act in the year 1935 [Pegu, 2004]. After the elections, the Congress party led by Gopinath Bordoloi formed a coalition government through an alliance with the elected members of the tribal league. Roop Nath Brahma was one of the first prominent Bodo members to be elected to the provincial assembly.

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In 1947, when the British colonial rulers were preparing to pass over the powers to the

Indian National Congress, Dharani Dhar Basumatary, a Bodo leader of AATL, was chosen as a member of the Constitution making body to represent the interests of the

Bodo society. The AATL however, could not achieve much for the Bodos politically and later transformed itself into a socio-cultural organization. In the post-colonial phase, the

Indian government constituted a sub-committee of the Constituent Assembly called the

Northeast Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas Sub-Committee under the chairmanship of Gopinath Bordoloi, in order to conform to the desired needs and status of tribal minorities. While attending to the special needs of the Bodos and other excluded communities, the Bordoloi Committee entered into a decentralized arrangement with the

Indian state. Eventually, the areas where the plains and hills tribes inhabited were incorporated under a protective discrimination regime. Most of the issues drafted in the agreement were drawn from the colonial policies on land regulation, which found expression in the Assam Land Revenue Regulation Act of 1886. During the colonial period, the Revenue Department of the Government of Assam, divided the areas inhabited by tribal minorities into several excluded (inhabited mostly by hills tribes) and partially excluded areas (inhabited mostly by plains tribes).40 The Bordoloi Committee retained most of the provisions of the Act while amending and adding a new provision, referred to as Chapter X, of the Indian constitution in 1947 and included these areas under the proposed scheme.

Accordingly, the areas inhabited by the Bodos were classified as ‗tribal blocks‘ and

‗tribal belts‘. While belts were constituted with larger areas, blocks had smaller areas.

40 Bhupinder Singh Committee Report, 1991. 112

Once promulgated, the Assam Land Revenue Regulation Act, 1947 (Chapter X), restricted possession and actual transfer of land owned by the Bodos to outsiders, including non-tribes [De Soumitra, 1997]. In other words, any transfer, exchange or lease of land within the belts and blocks could take place only amongst people belonging to the protected categories [Misra, 2000, p.21]. By imposing a restriction on the possession and actual transfer of land owned by tribes to non-tribes, these provisions were intended to protect ‗tribal‘ lands of being penetrated by ‗non-tribes‘. Moreover, these conditions were meant to safeguard the traditional customs, rights and practices and to preserve the distinct culture and identity of the tribal people.

LANGUAGE MOVEMENT (1960-1970)

Claims to ethno-nationalism of the Bodos can be interpreted as closely intertwined with issues of institutional and social exclusion based on language policies. For the most part of 19th and early 20th centuries, the Bengali-speaking inhabitants in Assam had consolidated their position in the educational system, in the professions and in the state administration [Weiner, 1981]. This was primarily a consequence of colonial policies allowing preferential treatment to the educated Bengalis for purposes of administrative positions. After decolonization, an emerging urban-educated middle class section amongst the Assamese-speaking majority, made attempts to change and transform their earlier subservient position in relation to the advantaged section of Bengalis. Their main aim was to assert their cultural, economic and political dominance in the Assamese society. As this section of the middle class grew in strength and numbers, the major

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policy objectives of the Assam government, mostly dominated by this section, was to expand the employment opportunities for the Assamese people in general and the

Assamese-middle class in particular.41 The Assam language agitation spearheaded by socio-cultural and student led organizations such as the Assam Jatiya Mahasabha (Assam

National Assembly, formed in 1936), and the Assam Sahitya Sabha (Literary Society of

Assam), in late 1950s and early 60s can be perceived as one of the most vigorous moves made by the Assamese middle class in this direction.42 By the end of 1950s, these organizations heightened their demands on the state government and threatened to launch a non-violent movement if the government failed to take prompt measures to make

Assamese the sole official language of the state.

The government however, eschewed an immediate compromising solution to solve the issue which compounded the situation and set the stage for anti-Bengali riots, popularly known as the ‗Bongal-Kheda‘ (drive away the Bengalis) agitation of 1960s. The

41 In Assam, the government has been dominated by the Assamese middle class since independence. The state thus dominated by this section has often been responsive to the demands of the dominant group and also reflected their interests. Their dominance in the Assamese society became prominent with the work of organizations such as the Assam Sahitya Sabha, the Assam Students Union with definite socio-political goals that gained ground from late 19th cent. [Sharma, 1990]. 42 With the drive of socio-political inclusion by the Ahoms, developed a weak current of ethnicized notion of the Assamese nation defined partly by language and partly by Assamese way of life. Subsequent trends of Assamese nationalism thrived in the wake of cultural renaissance pursued by a section of the Assamese intelligentsia. The Assam Sahitya Sabha (Literary Society of Assam) formed in early 1900, comprising of members mostly belonging to this class played a key role in fostering a unified notion of Assamese identity. Vehement moves of consolidating language-based Assamese nationalism during this period (first decade of the 20th century) also emerged as a reaction to the colonial policies of replacing Assamese language by Bengali, as the official language, which was later reverted. Assertion of identity became more pervasive due to this when the Assamese middle class had to compete with the immigrant Bengalis in the distribution of resources, such as government jobs. Rapid increase of Bengali population from Bengal and former East Pakistan, redefined not only the demographics, but also the discourse of Assamese nationalism, now defined and resonated more assertively in terms of territory as those who inhabited in Assam, and those who were indigenous speakers of Assamese language. This nonetheless, problematized the question of who constitutes an ‗indigenous Assamese‘ and propelled their quest for realization of ethno-nationalism of the non-Assamese speakers of the region.

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developments culminated into a series of protest demonstrations, public meetings, blockades of roads, closures of educational institutions and picketing in government offices in different parts of the state. Counter-protests fomented by Bengalis demanding

Bengali as the alternative official language followed. While opposing the aggressive moves of the Assamese nationalists, certain tribal organizations also plunged into the movement. Mounting tension on all sides was accompanied by some of the worst forms of violent demonstrations and killings of people belonging to both the communities. This led to displacement of thousands of Bengalis. Consequently, they fled to the neighboring states of West Bengal and Tripura and areas in and around Barak Valley of Assam, which had a substantial presence of Bengali population.

Despite vociferous opposition from the non-Assamese population, the Congress government led by B.P. Chaliha finally yielded to the demands of the Assamese-speaking majority and passed the Assam Official Language Act of 1960. Thereafter, Assamese language was declared as the sole language of instruction in the state educational institutions and a statutory requirement to obtain employment in the government offices in the state [Chaklader, 1987]. Implementation of these policies practically implied that people who were proficient in Assamese language would be more preferred in terms of employment in the state administration and the organized services including enterprises in both the private and public sectors (for example, tea plantation, fertilizer plants, oil refineries, etc.). The legislation was predominantly associated with affirming the rights and control of the urban educated Assamese-speaking majority to control the levers of economy and politics of the region. Although these moves were primarily directed

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against the Bengalis, adverse implications of the law were significantly felt by the tribal groups. This created a sense of threat and ethnic marginalization amongst the tribal population and other non-Assamese speaking communities, including the Bengalis and widened the fissures between the tribal and non-tribal leaders of the region [Datta, 1990].

Militant claims for separatism advanced by tribal leaders of the region were symptomatic of this emerging gap between the tribal and non-tribal leaders. As an immediate reaction to the language policy, the former group of leaders constituted a political party called the

All Party Hill Leaders‘ Conference (APHLC) on July 6, 1960 at Tura, Meghalaya. The party propagated the interests of the tribal communities and sought for the creation of separate hill states such as Mizoram and Meghalaya. Although the Bodos shared this bitterness and frustration with the APHLC and other non-Assamese groups, their mobilization efforts at this time, were more consequential in laying the grounds for a peaceful cultural movement rather than an expression of overt political demands for complete territorial separation from the existing state of Assam.

The Bodo language movement was organized by the Bodo Literary Society, more popularly known as the Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS), formed in 1952 by prominent intellectuals like J.N. Basumatary, Prasenjit Brahma and Shailendra Brahma amongst others. The organization, which has its background in the literary and intellectual pursuits of the late nineteenth century advocated by Bodo socio-cultural organizations, has been enthusiastically engaged in the promotion of the language and culture of Bodo society.

Over the years, the organization has sought to advance the Bodo language through numerous publications of popular literature on folklores, history, art and culture of the

Bodos. Furthermore, the organization has been engaged in organizing popular cultural

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festivals for reinvigoration and promotion of Bodo folk dance, music and various other cultural and art forms.

While opposing the moves of the state to assimilate and acculturate the tribal ethnic groups, the BSS articulated its resistance by utilizing different channels of agitation. The main thrust of BSS activities during the initial years of the literary movement were related to the promotion of Bodo language as a medium of instruction at the primary and secondary levels of school education. With this objective, the Bodo leaders submitted a memorandum in 1953, to Chief Minister of Assam, Bishnuram Medhi and other members of the Assam Pradesh Congress Committee. Bases of their demands were derived from certain legal safeguards provided through Articles 29, 30, 350 and 350 A of the Indian

Constitution. These conditions are deemed to protect the cultural interests, thereby granting the right to conserve language, culture and script of linguistic minorities.43

Despite a strong constitutional basis, the state government was reluctant to concede to these demands. The latter‘s indifferent attitude bolstered the BSS leaders‘ dissident activities. Finally, they launched a mass based campaign in the district of Kokrajhar on

16th November 1960. As a response to their actions the government constituted a committee under the chairmanship of a Bodo leader, Rupnath Brahma to assess the socio cultural needs of the Bodo society. The main recommendation of the committee was to

43 Article 30 confers the right to establish and administer their own educational institutions. Article 350-A inserted through the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act of 1956, confers the right to the children belonging to linguistic minority groups to use their "mother tongue", at the primary stage of education. If a state compels a linguistic minority, to study a regional language at a primary stage, i.e. the language other than their own, then this can be considered to be in contravention with Art. 29 of the Indian constitution. [Basu, 1976]. 117

allow Bodo language to be used as a medium of instruction at the primary level of school education. However, the question of upgrading the language to the secondary level and the recognition of the Roman script for the Bodo language were left underrated and unresolved until late 1960s and mid-1970s respectively.44

In the meanwhile, the state government passed another provocative language policy on 11th November 1972 while endorsing the recommendation of the Academic Council of the Guwahati University. Accordingly, it was declared that Assamese will be the only medium of instruction at the university level of education. Although English continued to be the alternative medium of instruction, Assamese was introduced as a compulsory subject in the regions where non-Assamese speakers were a majority. The new curriculum prepared on the basis of this policy, made Assamese the core language and relegated Bodo and other minority languages to a secondary position. Altogether, these developments reinforced Bodo concerns about marginalization and further evoked a more vociferous reaction in the form of disruptive actions such as public demonstrations, boycott of educational institutions, blockades and closures of government offices and private institutions. During this phase of the agitation, the BSS was strongly supported by ethno-political organizations such as the Plains Tribal Commission of Assam (PTCA) and the All Bodo Students‘ Union (ABSU). Together these organizations strongly denounced the cultural policies and alleged that the passage of such policies demonstrated nothing but unprecedented discrimination and attempts to infringe the rights of minority ethnic groups to maintain their distinct cultural attributes. They

44 Though the claims for upgradation were eventually approved in 1968, the script controversy was not resolved until 2000, when central government intervened and the Bodos accepted the Devanagri script in place of Roman script, after much debate and controversy. 118

expressed their fears of extinction and gradual loss of the most cherished symbols of

Bodo identity.45

POLITICAL MOVEMENT (1970s-1993)

Politicization of ethnic identities and cultural activism in the 1960s provided a strong foundation for the subsequent phases of Bodo ethno-nationalism. The movement established Bodo language as a cardinal component of ascriptive identity and coherence in the Bodo society. Bodo nationalism was thus conceived as a distinct nation by virtue of ethno-linguistic distinctiveness of the community. The bulk of ethno-nationalist discourse after the cultural movement inevitably pointed out a strong relationship between language and ethno-territorial identity of the Bodos and provided the main rationale for the nationalist organizations to campaign for self-determination that was primarily centered on ethno-linguistic issues. The later phase of cultural revivalism indeed coincided with the movement for political autonomy.

Towards the beginning of 1970s, Bodo nationalists led by PTCA and ABSU committed themselves to push for the creation of an autonomous territorial unit called

Udayachal. The leaders proposed that Udayachal should have the status of a Union

Territory that will ensure the Bodos greater autonomy and relative independence in terms of political decision-making. Formation of federal units like Manipur, Meghalaya and

Tripura and two Union Territories of Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh in the 1970s by remapping territorial boundaries of Assam provided an exceptional stimulus for

45 While expressing their fears some of my interviewees cited the example of the Ahoms, who had once ruled over Assam but who have almost forgotten their core symbols such as the original Tai language. 119

Udayachal. The Bodos considered themselves equally deserving for autonomy that had already been acquired by other tribal communities. Although PTCA emerged as the main advocate of Udayachal, its efforts in this direction soon attenuated when the members moved away from its ethno-nationalist goals and instead succumbed to power politics in the state. The organization assumed the responsibility as a full-fledged political party and contested the elections of 1977 to the state legislative assembly. After winning the elections, PTCA formed an alliance with the Janata Party to form a coalition ministry.

Following their success, PTCA contested two consecutive elections in 1983 and 1985. In

1983, the party managed to win three Assembly seats and was co-opted by the Congress

Ministry. Similarly, in 1985, PTCA managed to capture three Assembly seats and one

Parliamentary seat. Although PTCA still tried to portray itself as a vanguard of Bodo interests its political agendas on Udayachal and other issues related to the provision of better socio-economic and educational conditions for the tribal groups immensely failed to appeal the Bodos. PTCA‘s drive towards political power disillusioned the supporters of the political movement and indeed opened the doors for ABSU to push for more radical goals. Their goals shifted from an autonomous unit to the formation of Bodoland, a separate state within India where they can establish a regional government that will be controlled and dominated by Bodos. PTCA‘s success in the 1983 and 85 elections was therefore, ephemeral and could not withstand the pressures of ABSU, a more committed and radical force that was gaining popular support and dominance within the movement leadership.

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ABSU‘s agitation signalled the espousal of a more intensified struggle. ABSU leaders submitted several memorandums to the central and the state governments from 1985-

1987, to press for demands regarding their envisaged Bodoland. The memorandums laid out the grievances and expectations of the community. It consisted of a 92-point petition asking the government to 1) lay the foundation of a separate state on the northern part of the Brahmaputra valley, 2) create an autonomous district, called Nilachal, in the tribal areas on the south banks of the Brahmaputra River, and 3) to include Bodo language in the 8th Schedule of the Indian Constitution, thereby providing official status to their linguistic identity. The charter of demands however, did not receive a positive response from the state government. Few months later on 2nd March 1987, ABSU spearheaded an organized and intensified movement under the leadership of Upendranath Brahma. The next section turns to present concisely how the events that unfolded in the 80s and throughout the 1990s proved to be decisive for ABSU‘s increasing orientation towards violent conflict.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF VIOLENT MOBILIZATION

Early actions for an organized campaign were initiated in the form of peaceful protest demonstrations and mass rallies held from time to time. I divide the discussion into two parts. Part one deals with the first phase of violent mobilization from 1988 to 1992 and the second part deals with the phase beginning in 1993 and lasting till the end of 2001.

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FIRST PHASE OF VIOLENT MOBILIZATION (1988-1992)

On 12th June 1987, ABSU leaders and their supporters organized a peace rally at

Judge‘s field in the capital city of Assam (Guwahati), in support of the call for the creation of Bodoland. The meeting was a capstone of the organized movement, the preparatory work for which was much underway weeks before the launch of the radicalized campaign. Hundreds of people gathered in support of the cause. The leaders vowed to do or die until Assam was divided into two different halves between the Bodos and the Assamese-speaking community. The popular slogan voiced during the meeting and which lasted throughout the struggle was to divide Assam fifty-fifty with equal rights and representation for the Bodos. After the meeting, the crowds got involved in a tussle with some Assamese. State police intervened and the skirmish led to the death of a high school student, Sujit Narzary who was attending the meeting. Since then, the Bodos consider Narzary, as the first martyr who sacrificed his life for the cause of Bodoland.

Following the incident, ABSU volunteers organized several demonstrations and hunger strikes in August 1987. This resulted in a sequence of arrests, injuries and deaths of a number of activists and civilians including unaccounted destructions to public life and property. The successive interaction which then took place between the state police and the Bodo dissidents passed through various cycles of violent action and reaction.

Incidents of arson and killing, explosions and destruction to life and public properties became a part of the intensified movement. The period also witnessed extortions and episodes of violence targeted against non-Bodo communities including the Santhalis,

Nepalis and Bangladeshis. There were reports of mass kidnappings of tea garden

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managers, extortion and indiscriminate killings of tea garden laborers by Bodo extremists and retaliatory killings inflicted on Bodos by non-Bodos at many places including

Udalguri and Darrang districts in the Bodo areas. The cycle of killings and counter- killings that followed between the Bodos and non-Bodos affected many villages and displaced people from their homes. Occasional clashes that took place between PTCA members, (whose leadership the ABSU despised as irrelevant) and ABSU supporters also marked the militant phase of the movement.

ABSU continued to pursue its double strategy of carrying out its vigorous movement while also seeking to exert influence through some sort of political bargaining with the government. However, both the Congress government at the Center and the regional government‘s capacity to propose a political solution to the problem seemed to be rather bleak. Instead the state attempted to downplay the crisis by resorting to tactics of repression against the dissenters. As a part of the stringent measures, counter-insurgency operations were given a high priority. Consequently, state police assisted by the army and paramilitary forces were deployed in different Bodo-dominated areas that were declared to be disturbed areas and marked by violence. A series of anti-terrorist legislations like the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987 (TADA), Assam Disturbed

Area Act and prohibitory orders were also rigorously enforced in these areas in 1989, along with the official approval to arrest and imprison suspected Bodo subversives without trial. After these laws were passed, state security forces exercised combing operations and raids in the Bodo-inhabited villages. Many ABSU activists were successively arrested and detained under the act of TADA. According to some local press reports, Assam Task Police Force (ATPF) personnel played a blatantly communal role in

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these searching operations. Violence perpetrated by police personnel severely injured and killed civilians during these operations. An example of such an episode of police excesses may be cited from an incident, which occurred on 9th May 1988 at a village called Sonal

Serfung in Udalguri; where many ABSU activists were reported to be arrested, detained and tortured in the process merely on the basis of suspicion. The local press also unearthed these facts concerning the treatment of Bodo activists under these acts.

While responding to state repression, the agitators carried out intense protests and reacted by blowing up bridges, disrupting road and railway services thereby preventing all means to check the police from entering Bodo villages. The casualties suffered by the security forces were however retaliated through violence inflicted on civilians including incidents of gang rape and torture of villagers. Some of the worst cases of gang rape during counter-insurgency operations ensued at several places like Bhumka, in the district of Kokrajhar and in Baghmara in the district of Barpeta, in the year 1988 and later in June

1998 at a village called Paikarkuchi in the district of Nalbari. These incidents merely emboldened the feelings of separatists.46 Most of the respondents during my personal interviews cited these incidents. The respondents fixed the responsibility of these acts on the security forces and blamed them for fuelling the frustration and anger that was already prevalent. 47

46 22nd June, 1998, The Indian express. 47 Respondents of Bhumka village narrated the incident of raid and combing operation carried out by the state police during searching operations. They recounted how the villagers were tortured and women raped by the state police personnel during the operation. Interesting fallout of this incident (as expressed by these villagers) was a sense of fear and antagonism against the Santhalis who lived in the nearby villages. People expressed that earlier they had the least threat from the Santhalis. There were instances when ABSU activists took refuge in some of the Santhali villages during the agitation. The Bhumka incident however changed the whole scenario in inter-ethnic relations and led to an undesirable shift in their opinion towards the Santhalis. Many of them believed that the Santhalis were used as police informers by the police to 124

Figure 3.1 provides a graphical representation of the available evidence on the incidence of extremist violence. The diagram (Fig. 3.1) illustrates evidence on the incidents of violence in the Bodo areas from 1988-1993. It indicates the nature of violent acts in which the militant groups were involved which ranged from explosions, assassinations/target killings of civilians, attacks on police and government property/institutions to inter-group violence.

Fig.3.1.Incidence of violence in the Bodo areas (1988-1993) Sources: The data has been compiled by using materials collected from various media reports (mostly newspaper briefings, reports), weekly assessments and reports published by the Institute for Conflict Management. locate the hideouts of Bodo activists. Although the validity of these narratives are based on mere speculation, the possibility that these incidents were diffused and publicized within a crisis frame to create a sense of fear and antagonism within the community, against the non-Bodos cannot not be totally ruled out.

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Figure 3.1. shows the ebb and flow of violent incidents from 1988-1993. From the figure, it can be interpreted that the years 1989, 1992 and 1993 witnessed the highest number of violent activities unleashed by Bodo extremists. Civilian attacks, bomb explosions and inter-group violence were considerably high in the year 1989. The year

1989 was also quite notable for inter-ethnic violence with the non-Bodo communities.

Prolonged agitation throughout the later part of 80s was marked by long periods of blockades, closures and other violent incidents. To give an example, a 72-hour closure declared by ABSU volunteers on 27th April 1988, in the sub-divisions of Kokrajhar and

Udalguri, was marked by at least 28 bomb blasts in a single call for protest called by

ABSU activists.

FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATION: BODO ACCORD 1993

Implementation of harsh repressive policies adopted by the state reflected that the door to negotiation had been almost been closed. Anti-insurgency tactics continued till the beginning of 1990s, when the AGP government‘s regime was coming to an end and power eventually shifted into the hands of the Congress Party both at the center and in the state level of governance. In the meanwhile, it became increasingly clear to the state that the affinities for the Bodo-nation seemed to grow stronger over time and those sentiments could no longer be suppressed by use of mere force and aggression. The newly formed state executive realized this unfolding situation and thus shifted its attitude from intransigence to reconciliation.

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After the dissolution of AGP government in November 1990, the Congress Party reopened its dialogue with the Bodo activists. The efforts culminated into a series of talks throughout the early period of 1990s in New Delhi. The talks however, failed to end the crisis and instead led to resumption of hostilities. The year 1992 witnessed some of the worst forms of violent activities unleashed by Bodo extremists. In an earnest move to diffuse the tension, the state government and the center called on the activists for another round of negotiations. Subsequently, the government signed the first tripartite agreement in 1993 with ABSU and BPAC. The accord recognized special rights and guarantees for the Bodos and underlined the need to constitute a democratically elected Bodo

Autonomous Council (BAC). The Council would have the right to control and administer the local affairs of certain specified areas in the region‘s northern valley, which was inhabited by a fairly large number of the tribal communities. Furthermore, the Council was empowered to regulate on matters pertaining to control, use and management of natural and productive resources such as forests land, and a wide range of other issues such as: cottage industry, animal husbandry, agriculture, public works, sericulture, adult, primary and higher secondary education, cultural affairs, village councils and rural development, health and family welfare, irrigation, social welfare, trade and commerce, town and urban planning, etc. in the specified territories. The accord also ensured that the council will receive sufficient financial assistance from the central government on a periodic basis. These funds were to be routed through the treasury of the state government. A stipulated amount of funds were also allocated in the state government budget for the council. In addition to these provisions, the General Council of BAC was

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entrusted with its own powers to raise finances by levying taxes on various subjects including land, transport, entertainment, etc.

The first memorandum of settlement thus marked a new phase of state policy towards conciliation. Though the terms of the agreement fell far short of the original demands for the creation of a full-fledged state, it nevertheless laid down the internal foundations of a certain degree of territorial autonomy. The signatories hoped that the implementation of the accord will terminate the long-standing conflict. Despite immense optimism, the contract dissipated even before the first elections could be held to select the members of the council. Serious disagreements arose between the government and Bodo leaders on the question of delineation and demarcation of geographical areas that were to be included under the jurisdiction of BAC. Although the authority of the BAC was extended to 2570 villages that were geographically contiguous and were within the Bodo dominated areas, the Bodo leaders came up with a list of additional 515 villages inhabited by both Bodo and non-Bodo communities and demanded that these villages should also be included as parts of BAC. The government however refused to include those villages on grounds that the Bodos failed to constitute even 50% of the population in those villages, a basic requirement that the Bodos had to fulfill to consider those areas as an integral part of Bodoland. Another reason why the first deal severely failed was in relation to the question of non-Bodos living in those areas. The non-Bodos provided little support to the autonomous institution as the autonomy proposal did not include enough guarantee of their rights within the region. Government‘s reluctance to concede those territories was therefore highly influenced by grave opposition of non-Bodos residing in

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the Bodo areas. As a result of these controversies, the accord was prevented from being implemented and the whole practice of accommodation was finally stalled.

ESCALATING MILITANCY: SECOND PHASE OF VIOLENT MOBILIZATION (1993-2003)

The first phase of the movement revealed that neither the tactics of repression nor negotiation succeeded in resolving the conflict. This heralded a situation when prospects of peace seemed to be quite obscure. A low-intensity conflict indeed took greater precedence over a negotiated settlement. Maximal violence was chosen as the only alternative by militant groups like NDFB that had already been operating in the Bodo region and BLT (also known as the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force or BLTF) which was formed in June 1996 during the second phase of the violent campaign after the failure of the first deal. Although both these organizations emerged as champions for the cause of

Bodoland, they had fundamental differences with regard to their goals and support for the cause. While BLT advocated the objective of securing a Bodoland within the Indian state,

NDFB stood for a more radical and extreme goal to secede and create a separate state outside the territories of the Indian Union. These differences were not just limited to the organizational level but invited variegated response from the people. BLT‘s objective to achieve a homeland within the confines of the Indian state appeared to be more viable both politically and economically, than NDFB‘s demand for a separate country for the

Bodos.48

48This was also revealed during my interviews of Bodos. 129

Despite inter-organizational differences, the BLT and NDFB pursued extremely violent tactics throughout late 1990s and early 2000 and continued their offensives against the government forces. As one of the surrendered members of BLT expressed in these words, ―We strongly believed that a vigorous armed struggle was the only way to pressurize the Indian government or the administration towards an acceptable solution and to attain our destined objective. They [the government] respond only to violence. So we started an armed struggle with a double strategy to create pressures on the government to accede to our demands and to break down the government forces completely.‖49 In addition to violence focused primarily on government representatives (police personnel, government officials) and government infrastructure, the rebel groups systematically targeted civilians of non-Bodo communities residing in the Bodo-dominated areas.

Figure 3.2 provides a graphical representation of the available evidence on the incidence of extremist violence in the Bodo areas from 1994-2003.

49 Interview with a former BLT member, 2007. 130

Fig. 3.2. Incidence of extremist violence in the Bodo areas from 1994-2003.

Sources: The data has been compiled by using materials collected from various media reports (mostly newspaper briefings, reports), weekly assessments and reports published by the Institute for Conflict Management.

Figure 3.2. shows the ebb and flow of violent incidents from 1994-2003. From the figure, it can be interpreted that the years 1994, 96, and 98 witnessed the highest number of violent activities unleashed on the civilians. Bomb explosions were highest in 1995 and 96. Targeted attacks on police, army and government institutions were significantly higher in 1995 and 96 and were relatively low in the subsequent years. Inter-group violence was considerably high in the years 1994, 1996 and 1998. The latter years witnessed some of the worst episodes of violence between the Bodos and Santhalis when

Bodo militants spearheaded systematic attacks on Santhali villages in Western part of

Assam (mostly Udalguri, Darrang and Kokrajhar districts). Following the events, the

Santhalis formed their own militant group called the Adivasi Cobra Militant Organization

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and engaged in retaliatory killings of the Bodos. Violence and counter-violence intensified inter-ethnic conflict towards 1998, which led to hundreds of deaths and huge displacement of civilians belonging to both the communities. According to estimates, nearly 250000 civilians had taken to refuge in the relief camps provided by the government in the wake of the conflict.

RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS: BODO-ACCORD 2003

Following the same lines as the earlier phase, an increased intensity of extremist violence led to reinforcement of repressive techniques. As a result of considerable influence wielded by state security forces, the stronghold of the militant groups was finally weakened towards the end of 2003. The year 2003 indeed acted as a turning point, when BLT responded to the Central government‘s call to start fresh negotiations. The year was also marked by en masse surrender of nearly 2,641 cadres of BLT in Dec. 2003 and subsequent integration of former BLT cadres into the Central Paramilitary forces of the state.50 Cessation of hostilities was finally affirmed in the tripartite deliberations held at New Delhi on 10th February, 2003, when BLT declared unilateral ceasefire and signed the memorandum of settlement with the central and state government representatives.

Unlike the previous model, the new deal of autonomy was based on increased powers of self-governance and territorial autonomy. Under the amended provisions, a

Bodo Territorial Council was created and entrusted with legislative, executive, administrative and financial powers of administration in the Bodo dominated territories.

50The Hindu, 17th December 2003. 132

The powers of administration were extended to a number of departments related to management of land, forests other than those reserved by the state government, water resources for purposes of agriculture, establishment of village and town committees, matters relating to village and town administration, inheritance of property, conducting marriages and divorces and other social customs, etc.51 It also provided for adequate safeguards and protection of the rights of land and other issues of non-tribal communities.

In addition, it was ensured that Bodo language will henceforth be used as the official language of BTC, although Assamese and English continued to be in use for various official purposes. With the approval of the Parliament in December 2003, the Bodo language was finally included as one of the recognized Indian languages in the Eighth

Schedule of the Indian constitution.52

Despite criticisms from NDFB who did not support the pact, BLT arrived at a compromise to form the territorial council, while leaving aside the discussions on certain contentious issues, including the inclusion of additional villages to the areas under BTC for the time being.53 Popular elections to the council were finally held in May 13th, 2005.

Till then, the Interim Council looked over the administration of the areas of BTC. The newly elected BTC consisted of 46 members, including 40 elected (30 reserved for tribals, 5 for non-tribals, 5 for others) and 6 representatives nominated by the government. Since the implementation of the accord, an 11-member Executive Council

51 Ibid. 52 Bodo Sahitya Sabha, yearly review, Ansumi Library Publications, Guwahati, 2003. 53 An NDFB statement issued to media declared: ―The creation of the council was a futile exercise and will go down in history as the day a group of opportunists surrendered the Bodo dream before New Delhi.‖ Outlook India, May 16, 2006. 133

acts at the apex of BTC. Former BLT leaders controlled most of the significant positions of the Council. The headquarters of the council has been established in Kokrajhar district.

The surrendered members of BLT formed a political party in 2005 called the Bodo

People's Progressive Front (BPPF-H). The party contested the Assam state assembly elections in April 2006 and subsequently emerged as a major player in the state executive. The Congress government formed an alliance with BPPF amongst other political parties. Elections and executive power sharing finally evolved as an important means to accommodate Bodo demands for greater autonomy.

CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this chapter was to provide the historical evidence for the emergence of Bodo ethno-nationalism. The chapter demonstrated that Bodo nationalism was primarily the result of ethnic marginalization and state-induced assimilation. It has underlined how ethno-linguistic identity became politicized and received continuous attention throughout the nationalist discourse, which in turn was linked to reinforcement of cultural boundaries. Early part of the ethno-nationalist movement was therefore imbued with cultural nationalism expressed through a moderate platform. Both the cultural revivalists and political nationalists tried to build up a consensus on the idea of a

Bodo nation strongly defined by discrete ethno-cultural symbols, such as language. From

1970s onwards, territorial demands were prominently displayed in the process of political mobilization. ABSU‘s maximalist agenda was aimed at ending overt and coercive subjugation of the Bodos by means of territorial separation. It has been observed in this

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chapter that separatist ethno-nationalism assumed violent proportions towards the end of

80s. The next chapter identifies the conditions that played a crucial role in encouraging the radical organizations to carry out a violent campaign.

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CHAPTER FOUR

POTENTIAL CAUSES OF VIOLENT MOBILIZATION

In our descendants’ memory lies our hope. That requires our story to be set down, to become history, like the stories of our forefathers before us. In this sense, history is the precondition of destiny, the guarantee of our immortality, the lesson for posterity. Since we must live through our posterity, the offspring of our families, that history and its lesson must belong to us and tell our collective tale. Hence our myths, memories, symbols must be constantly renewed and continually re-told, to ensure our survival. The nation becomes the constant renewal and re-telling of our tale by each generation of our descendants. Anthony Smith [Smith, 1987, p.208]

These words typically represent the voices of Bodo nationalists. The conscientious efforts of these nationalists to revive and glorify the group‘s origin and development as a nation were not just intended to emphasize ethnic continuity and cultural heritage of the

Bodos or to provide foundation as an ‗imagined nation‘ but to finely sculpture collective sentiments regarding their rights to control their homeland. To reiterate, these claims were deeply implanted in the notion of the group‘s first arrival and habitation in and around the divested region which they conceive to be their native land, a fact which affirms an unquestionable right to their self-determination.

Apart from the claims on redrawing of state boundaries, Bodo nationalists diverged significantly from the state‘s views on the evolution and development of the Assamese society and the position of the non-Assamese speaking tribal minorities within the umbrella of the ‗greater Assamese society‘. They rejected the initiatives of the state to integrate the tribal minorities and labelled these initiatives as coercive assimilationist campaigns which were rather threatening to their native identities. The nationalist

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organizations strongly commented and asserted their unshaken and oft repeated belief expressed in this regard, in the following words, ―despite the fact that the tribal groups had originally inhabited the region‘s territories, the term ‗Assamese people‘ has been quite conveniently appropriated by caste Hindu Assamese. The term then applies only to this section of Assam‘s population, whose espousal of effusive and sentimental notions of

‗greater Assamese society‘ is allegedly only a cover for the exploitation of the original inhabitants of Assam‘s historical territory [Prabhakara, 1989].‖ Separatist tendencies and animosities of the Bodos against the dominant political system thus stemmed from a sense of perpetual victimhood and concerns about future political status and exploitation of the group. Political separation was considered to be the only road to salvation by Bodo ethnic organizations. ABSU and its successive militant factions thus actively espoused violent tactics while seeking a federal solution.

While drawing on this background information, the primary goal of this chapter is to address two research questions. First, why did the Bodo nationalist organizations choose the path of violent activism as a means to resist their subordination and to secure a federal unit within India? Second, what explains the sustenance of violent activism? The chapter offers a detailed analysis of the factors that motivated violent separatist activities of the

Bodos. The analysis consists of three different dimensions. The first dimension relates to the mobilizing structure---the availability of vertical and horizontal networks that served as the background conditions for mobilization of social capital within the community and sustenance of radical actions. The second dimension relates to the mobilizing potential or the efficacy to communicate the ethnic appeals, which constitutes the second enabling

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condition that determined the capabilities of the group and predisposed the radical organizations to mobilize for violent actions. Discrete ethno-linguistic identity of the

Bodos enhanced their capabilities to bargain for cultural and territorial goals. The background conditions do not play an independent role as the main drivers for separatist mobilization but can act as potential facilitators used by the separatist leaders as tools for mobilization. The third dimension focuses on the external environment, the opportunities or constraints imposed by the political system that encourage violent reactions.

MOBILIZING STRUCTURES: HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL NETWORKS

The decision of the Bodo leaders to take the risks of conducting violent acts and to cope up with the potential hardships experienced during the armed rebellion was largely influenced by the pattern of horizontal relationships within the community and the vertical links that the organizers of the movement had established directly with the members of the community. The emphasis is on the premise that sustained support and participation of group members both as rebel recruits as well as non-combatants can be obtained by drawing on horizontal networks, that is, the pre-existing networks within a community bounded by social routines, shared beliefs and cultural norms. Repeated interaction of the community members through formal and informal social institutions

[associations, cultural settings, etc.] facilitates free flow of information, building interpersonal trust, reciprocity, loyalty and the fear of being punished as social defectors.54 As network theorists argue, a group‘s sense of shared identity and kin relations has a direct impact on solidarity which motivates group members to participate

54Constructing ‗cultures of solidarity‘ that can exist within communities, [McAdam, 1982]. 138

in collective activism. The implication is that the in-group members are joined together by something more than economic motivations, thereby making these networks better suited to overcome problems of collective action. 55 Active and unflinching commitment for such actions however, comes from a small minority of the group members.

Collaboration of in-group members with the activist organizations may be the result of a combination of factors like coercion, persuasion, sympathy, preferences or real commitment for the cause.

An examination of the Bodo movement reveals that the presence of integrated and localized networks that existed within the community were instrumental in influencing mobilization and recruitment of non-combatants for political action. Informal societal networks presumably served as important facilitators for movement participation. People joined the movement activities (demonstrations, public rallies, and meetings) in huge numbers mostly because they were tied to each other through pre-existing community

(horizontal) affiliations at the most local level, in the villages and urban areas, as a result of which group members were subject to a mix of persuasion (neighbors, friends, leaders), fear of social sanctions, genuine political preferences and sympathy for the activist organizations. My interviews revealed that most of the villagers attended the public meetings, joined the blockades and protest demonstrations based on persuasion, loyalty to friendship networks and sympathy for the cause. Many people were inspired by the public speeches delivered by the ABSU leaders particularly staunch nationalists like

U.N.Brahma, who attracted a lot of supporters to the movement.

55Some authors would argue that material incentives or rewards are likely to influence collective motivation. [Popkin, 1979] 139

Community based allegiances (tribal) in the Bodo society served as the basic infrastructure for collective actions where common grievances and strategies of resistance and protest networks were constructed and coordinated by activist organizations during the agitation. Evidence suggests that the period between 1987 and late 1990s witnessed intensive activities of mobilization undertaken by Bodo activist organizations to coordinate movement activities across spatially segmented and locally confined solidarity networks. By developing direct vertical links at an individual level as well as at an organizational level throughout the Bodo areas with the non-combatant population, the core activist organizations educated the people about the goals and activities of the movement and built up certain degrees of trust and credibility that was necessary to coordinate and direct the agitation. In the later phases of the movement, the vertical interactions seemed to be quite intensive as the activists had to deal with constraints imposed by state authorities. Perhaps the most striking reason why vertical networks tended to be effective during this phase was state repression.

Indiscriminate repression by the state may be used as a coercive tactic to collect information or to uproot the bases of rebel support that are embedded in the community.

However, if vertical ties are strong then state repression will further foster violent actions on the part of the rebels as they are ensured of sustained support, albeit in a covert form from the members of the group. With strong protest networks already in place, brutal methods used by the government security forces during the Bodo agitation proved to be counterproductive and produced an effect that was completely contrary to what the state agents had expected. Instead of breaking down the ties that were established between the

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activist organizations and the community members, indiscriminate methods of repression employed by the state authorities reinforced vertical networks. The members of the group demonstrated increased compliance to the activist organizations.

In this sense, strong vertical networks that were developed during the rudimentary stages of the Bodo movement by the activists of the All Bodo Students‘ Union (ABSU), acted as a motivating factor as well as a strong indicator that influenced the capabilities of the leaders to sustain the armed rebellion. The leadership of the Bodo movement had two important endowments which enabled them to engage in repeated social interaction with the members of the group located in distant and remote areas of the region. The first had to do with the organizational structure of the main activist organizations. Borrowing insights from the works of Gamson, [1975], Tarrow [1994], Piven and Cloward, [1977], I argue that activist organizations can create effective vertical networks if they allow for the establishment of those networks with the people at the grassroots through a decentralized, organizational structure, operating at different local level units.

Decentralized organizational structures provide a favorable organizational environment to ethnic organizations, permits the core activists to have better access to resources and establish closer ties to local bases of support.56 The second endowment had to do with the pattern of territorial settlement of the Bodos.

Beginning in the early 1980s, political mobilization of the Bodos was led by ABSU, an organization that emerged as a strong and coherent platform to spread the ideas of a

56 A discussion on this particular organizational characteristic has been provided in the theory chapter (chapter 2) on the section that explains the framework of this study. 141

separate Bodo nation. ABSU became the largest and most influential ethnic organization formed by young and energetic student activists and served as the most popular front of the Bodos. It was the first organization with a clear-cut political agenda to establish a separate state for the Bodos. In the late 1980s, the organization under the leadership of nationalist leaders like U.N. Brahma sought to expand its activities and capture the support of the masses at the grassroots level. During the 20th annual conference of ABSU held at Bashbari in 1987, the organization called for the formation of a separate Bodo state and elected Brahma as the President of the organization. Brahma, born in Dottoma, in Kokrajhar district in 1957, shouldered the responsibility of the organization since

1978, first as the President of the Goalpara unit of ABSU and then as the Vice-President of the Central Committee in Kokrajhar district. Brahma emerged as the most passionate

Bodo nationalist and a popular mass leader of ABSU. Since the early days of his graduate studies, Brahma showed enormous sympathy to the cause of Bodoland. After completing his post-graduate studies in Guwahati university Brahma became highly involved in the activities of ABSU. Just a year after his election as the President, Brahma adopted a discrete nationalist agenda for separate statehood and announced a general mobilization of the masses to garner maximum support of the Bodo people. Thousands of people demonstrated their overwhelming support in the public meetings and street demonstrations in favour of ABSU.57 Brahma and his colleagues stepped up their activities with the help of activists and voluntary members of ABSU recruited at different decentralized units of the organization involved in the activities of the movement.

57Appendix A shows some selected photographs of the Bodo movement where people participated in huge numbers. 142

ABSU functions through a decentralized structure of command and control at three different levels: central, district and sub-district that made it viable to organize the movement through direct interaction of ABSU members with the local population, in the villages as well as in the semi urbanized regions (towns). Decentralization of power and resources (human and material) combined with highly disciplined methods of functioning enabled ABSU to broaden its base, recruit and educate the people on Bodo nationalism and the basic skills of political mobilization. The organization was highly successful in consolidating popular support of the Bodos through a series of collective action repertoires in the form of public gatherings, demonstrations, cultural rallies, religious prayer meetings and pamphleteering. Mobilization activities became intense under the leadership of U.N. Brahma, viewed as one of the most legitimate representatives of the

Bodos.

ABSU worked in close cooperation with other ethnic organizations like the BPAC,

All Bodo Women‘s Welfare Federation (ABWWF) and the All Bodo Employees

Federation (ABEF). Each one of these organizations became highly involved during the agitation and played active roles in building an extensive network of potential supporters and participants throughout the Bodo society. They gathered community members belonging to different sections and imparted the fundamental ideas of the movement and the challenges that lay ahead from the state, their formidable opponent. While BPAC was entrusted with the task of educating the elderly people, the ABEF and the ABWWF took the responsibilities of the Bodos working as government employees and the Bodo women, both in the urban and rural areas of the Bodo region respectively. Bodo activist

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organizations therefore, showed immense capabilities to make the symbolic narratives situationally available to unconnected group members across the Bodo region by engaging in effective repertoires of contention. Their effective communicative strategies helped people to understand what exactly they were protesting about and what could have been the tangible gains out of those collective efforts.

Popular exposure to movement ideas through these coordination networks galvanized the support for protest events, and linked otherwise segregated activist groups to form broader cycle of protest networks. Protest networks became stronger in response to state repression. Anti-state protest networks became stronger and consolidated during late 80s and 90s when the state authorities used indiscriminate force against the dissidents.

Activist organizations persistently seized the opportunity to diffuse information on violent state repression (gendered violence, arrests, illegal detention and torture of Bodo activists), through dense vertical networks. One of the most prominent examples of anti- state propaganda took place after the death of Sujit Narzary, a young student activist

(discussed in chapter 3) who was killed in 1987, during a public meeting held in

Guwahati. Narzary‘s death became a starting point which reflected the development of strong protest networks against the state. In the ABSU propaganda, Narzary was epitomized as the first martyr who lost his life while fighting for the cause of the Bodo nation. ABSU activists disseminated Narzary‘s death via their decentralized networks, street demonstrations and leaflets distributed across the Bodo dominated areas seeking support and sympathy to oppose the darker side of strategic state actions. Subsequently, tens of thousands of supporters gathered at different places to take part in anti-state

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demonstrations. The incident served as a precipitating event that fostered consistent mobilization of protesters even during periods of harsh state actions. It indicated how suppression of peaceful protest actions by state authorities during that period, ignited further dissent and provided a justification for potential violent mobilization.

In addition to a decentralized organizational structure, the ability of the Bodo activist organizations to generate consistent behavioral support of the population was largely facilitated by the pattern of territorial location of the Bodos. Huge geographical concentration of the Bodos in the southern portion of Assam proved to be conducive for the activist organizations to forge direct links with the non-combatant population. In addition to being a majority in the region, the Bodos are highly segregated from the settlement of the non-Bodo population. Figure 4.4 illustrates the pattern of settlement of the Bodos in different districts of Assam. Evidence shows that the group is more or less evenly distributed in four major districts (Barpeta, Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Nalbari and

Darrang). Bodos constitute nearly 83.20 (Darrang) to 95.01 (Barpeta) percentages of the total population in these districts that also remained the epicenter of violent mobilization.

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Fig. 4.1. Bodo Population in different districts of Assam [in descending order] Source: Census Report of Assam 2001

Geographical contiguity and close proximity of the Bodos had tremendous effects on the leadership position and their strategies of mobilization. During the armed rebellion, this settlement pattern enhanced the capabilities of the rebels to challenge the government forces and overcome the risks of repression. High degree of concentration provided Bodo activists with easy access to both material and symbolic resources required for a coherent military strategy of the rebels. Apart from providing the material resources to rebels, spatial concentration of the group acted as a symbolic motivation.

Such a pattern of settlement engendered a sense of cohesiveness among the Bodos. It made them conscious about a strong ethno-territorial identity and their historical attachment to the territories where the group is currently settled. Collective motivation to

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secure these territories largely emanated from these emotional attachments and intrinsic worth of the territory that the group believed in. Besides these perceptions, people were motivated by the objective advantages of controlling a geographically contiguous territory because securing and defending a contiguous territory is generally considered to be much more feasible and advantageous both politically and economically, than non- contiguous territories [Goemans, 2006]. People in general were responsive to current ethnic strategies of their leaders based on these perspectives.

EFFICACY TO COMMUNICATE ETHNO-LINGUISTIC APPEALS: INCREASING CAPABILITIES TO ADOPT VIOLENT TACTICS

In this section I discuss how language issues came to be linked to the question of

Bodo identity after the language agitation of 1960s. The movement hardened the affiliation of the group to language identity and increased its political salience. Since then, Bodo language became a strong reference point of the activists, a mark of polarization which later influenced the patterns of violent contention in the 80s. Ethno- linguistic appeals were effectively used by ethnic organizations like ABSU to gain support for the political movement. Failure of the state to cope with the demands for official recognition of the Bodo language broadly redefined the existing cleavage along ethno-linguistic lines. Political bargaining between the state government and the Bodo leaders failed to provide official accommodation of their language based grievances thereby increasing the potential of the leaders to exert more pressures on the government by resorting to disruptive forms of protest. The most potent factor that propelled a gradual drift towards disruptive forms of protest for ethno-linguistic separatism was the

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appearance of a more radical section of young Bodo nationalists, strongly committed to separatist ideals, their intense and organized involvement in the language movement, and their growing disenchantment with the inadequate responses of state authorities to reduce pronounced disparities between the majority and minorities that emerged out of the prevailing institutional arrangements and policies adopted by the state. Although the discourse of violence focused on issues other than language, such as land related grievances, language became the instrument through which discontentment of the group was expressed. This is mainly due to the fact that language recognition was accompanied with the distribution of tangible emoluments like higher education, jobs in the public offices, elevated positions in the political executive, and symbolic benefits that enhances group prestige and linguistic parity positions vis a vis the dominant community. By imposing a common identity via cultural assimilationist policies, the state government limited these entitlements and alienated the ethnic minorities.

As we noted in the previous chapter, the challenges that were confronted by the

Assamiya dominated post-colonial state were to accommodate the region‘s numerous ethno-linguistic groups identifying themselves with mutually unintelligible spoken dialects and literary form of distinct languages. The chapter reviewed that the period between 1960 to early 70s was marked by Bodo ethno-linguistic nationalism, the rise and culmination of cultural revivalist activities that had been gathering momentum since the early twentieth century. The main forces behind ethno-linguistic nationalism of the Bodos were the middle-class intelligentsia led by the Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS). The intelligentsia seemed to be acutely sensitive to state policies of homogenization as these

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enactments stood in their way of social mobility. Simply put, these policies prohibited their direct access to positions of power and economic privileges and altered the principles of pluralism and ethnic coexistence that existed. The process by which the state tried to assimilate minority groups, by enacting subsequent policies of cultural assimilation thus contributed to estrangement and broadened the gulf between the Bodos and the state. The tensions that emerged in response to assimilationist efforts of the state erupted into open and incessant conflict between the state and the intelligentsia as the state failed to accommodate their demands related to increasing the usage of the Bodo language in public institutions (schools, etc.) and the adoption of Roman script as proposed by the Bodo nationalist organizations. To reiterate, the Bodos initially used the

Deodhai (an ancient script) and Assamese script with certain modifications in the vowel sounds for purposes of writing. However, they wanted the Roman script to be officialized for literary usage. They considered the Roman script to be much more amenable to the peculiar phonetic sounds of the language [Pegu, p 88]. Moreover, most of the Indo-

Mongoloid ethnic groups of the region had already adopted the Roman script for their indigenous languages. In 1974-75 the BSS therefore called on the state to recognize the adoption of Roman script. The state government however, resisted the demand and instead proposed them to consider Devanagri as the official script for written representation of the language.58 The state feared that the provision of official status to the Bodo language along with the Roman script would embolden their demands for

Udayachal (Bodoland) and would thus constitute a first step towards legitimizing their ethno-territorial (regional) identity. After much controversy, Devanagri was finally

58Devanagri is a syllabic script used in writing Sanskrit and Hindi and most other pan-Indian languages including Assamese. 149

adopted although much later, at the annual session of the BSS held at Simborgaon,

Kokrajhar in the year 2000.

Lack of accommodation during the 70s unleashed more reactionary forces and led to anti-state protests and violent demonstrations in the Bodo dominated region. Mobilization activities that initially took the form of petitions and public memorandums throughout the

60s stepped up to disruptive repertoires of protest actions.59 Progressive strength gained by young Bodo nationalists changed the fate of the movement. 1970s witnessed the transformation of the movement from a minor organizational force dominated by middle- class intelligentsia to a wider political platform that sought to embrace different ethnic organizations and a wider section of the group promoting cultural politics of the Bodos, a process which the de-legitimized regime (state) failed to hold back. The agitation was no longer centered to the organizational tasks of the moderate section of nationalist organizations like the BSS, but included more radical forces like ABSU. It was precisely in 1970s that ABSU began to expand its activities. ABSU leaders gave priority to a confrontational strategy against the state. They believed that moderate strategies of political incorporation that were earlier adopted by members of PTCA were repugnant as they infringed their rights to attain preeminent positions of power and socio-economic privileges. The leaders utilized the discursive resource of language to articulate their separatist politics, expressed over and over again through nationalist writings and speeches. ABSU‘s accumulated grievances were clearly formulated in their writings and

59 Repertoires are the ensemble forms of political action which constitute the means of agitation for a social movement, such as the creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, processions, rallies, demonstrations, pamphleteering, etc. [Tilly 2004: 3-4]

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speeches that were later published as a collection of treatises entitled ‘Bodoland

Movement: A Dream and Reality (1986-2001)’. ABSU‘s propaganda clearly justified the actions of the radicals as an irresistible response to an illegitimate political system.60 The volume explicitly stated in these words,

―Instead of recognizing our discrete identity the chauvinistic Assamese ruling class made attempts to smother our language by implementing policies of linguistic chauvinism. The Assam government did everything in this regard to make us firm in our resolve to believe in our ethnicity and creation of a separate state. After its campaign to impose Assamese language the government in 1985 under the leadership of Prafulla Mahanta in 1985, released a circular of Secondary Education Board of Assam according to which Assamese language as a subject was made compulsory to the non-Assamese speaking students in educational institutions. ….the ruling class had the myopic policy of monolithic culture. They tried to assimilate all the ethnic minorities in the region by imposing other cultural attributes. For instance, Assamese dress codes were made compulsory for girls attending schools in Assam. The smaller linguistic groups with their distinct culture would have gradually disappeared as a result of these policies. The Bodos have been very conscious of their own customs, tradition, language and culture. Therefore, they would have hardly compromised their stand on these matters. The obstacles faced by the Bodos to protect and enrich their glorious tradition, language and culture subsequently led them to the thought of a separate state….… this is the only way to liberate the Bodos and other tribal minorities of Assam from the suppression, political exploitation and persecution, to give economic opportunity and political power and to develop at par with other communities of India.‖61 (p.g. II, III)

When ABSU took the control of the movement leadership, it became immensely clear that minor accommodation of language rights would hardly undermine ABSU‘s separatist overtones. By late 1980s, ABSU‘s confrontationist strategy received widespread popular appeal. The organization adopted several propaganda techniques which acted as a powerful drive to generate widespread support for the movement. The 80s in fact witnessed a profusion of extensive mobilization campaigns such as massive protest demonstrations, blockades, hunger strikes, seminars, workshops, cultural rallies and

60 Bodo leaders strongly believed that the state was illegitimate as it identifies itself with the interests of the dominant community. This interpretation guided their approach to radicalism. 61 Bodoland Movement: A Dream and Reality, 1986-2001, Saraighat Offset Press, Bamunimaidam, Guwahati, 2001, pg. II. 151

public sessions organized by ABSU at different places in the Bodo areas. These campaigns further spread the movement and drew in numerous supporters from different social groups. To cite some examples, several cultural rallies were held at places liked

Dudhnoi by ABSU activists from 18th to 21st Feb. 1987 where hundreds of people gathered and took part in the rallies. These rallies were meant to raise the consciousness on discrete ethnic identity of the Bodos. On 14th June, 1987, ABSU activists organized several silent processions to mourn the death of Sujit Narzary at several places in

Kokrajhar district. Public prayer sessions and oath taking ceremonies were held in July

1987 to fight until they achieved Bodoland. On 9th July, 1987 ABSU organized a seminar in protest against the language policy of the Assam government passed in 1985 when the

AGP government passed a circular imposing Assamese as the compulsory subject for the non-Assamese medium students of Assam. ABSU volunteers launched several disruptive campaigns from 22-26th May and June 1988 that blocked the rail and road transit systems in the state.62

During the anti-government demonstrations, the protesters openly voiced their feelings of disappointment, mistrust and hostility against the curtailment of cultural and language rights of the Bodos. Based on these propaganda campaigns, young Bodo nationalists strongly pressed for bifurcation of Assam into separate Assamese and non-Assamese speaking states (meaning plains tribes). Accession of Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) leaders in the 80s to high-ranking positions of power in the state cabinet and their repressive strategies further crystallized the commitment of ABSU leaders for such

62ABSU Treatise, 2001. Photographs of some of these examples have been cited in the appendix of this dissertation. 152

claims and eliminated the possibilities of any compromise or the acceptance of positive inducements that were being offered to the Bodo radicals. The next section presents an analysis on how the explicit designs of the state in this direction in the years following the Assam agitation (1980s onwards) consolidated ethno-linguistic identity of the Bodos, and laid a firm basis to reinforce their separatist claims. A Bodo leader noted in an interview in this regard, ―The attitude of the Assam government during the peak years of the agitation in the 80s simply fuelled the anger of the youth. After much pressure and bloodshed the Bodo language has been recognized as an associate official language in the areas dominated by Bodos; while we still maintain that it should have had the same status as the Assamese language.‖63

Language as a politicized identity thus augmented the capacity of ethnic organizations to legitimize their claims for cultural and political autonomy on ethno-linguistic basis.

Adoption of effective communicative strategies to popularize the group‘s ethno-linguistic grievances further contributed to the success of mobilization of the ABSU activists.

People were attracted to these appeals because they widely resonated the material interests of the group members as well as their concerns for enhancing their worth vis a vis the dominant community.

63Interview with the President of BSS, 2007. 153

ACCELERATING CONDITIONS FOR INTENSIVE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION POST-1980s

The changing dynamics of state level politics in the late 1980s created the conditions for the Bodo radicals to express themselves through more radical means. The new set of leadership in the Assam state assembly sealed the prospects for Bodo autonomy and enabled the ABSU leaders to shift their protest strategies to violence. Transition to more aggressive strategies by ABSU was fuelled by the emergence of a militant form of regional identity asserted by the Assamese nationalists. The years from 1979 to 1985 was marked by a phase of militant nationalism of the Assamese-speaking majority in Assam, on the question of disenfranchisement and deportation of undocumented migrants from neighboring Bangladesh. During this period, Assam was engulfed in a wave of political turbulence and some of the worst forms of anti-migrant violence. The immediate circumstances, which led to such a situation was the disagreement on the holding of the elections in 1979, to the state legislative assembly and certain unfilled seats to the parliament, on the basis of an electoral list prepared by the Election Commission. The list showed an unexpectedly large increase in the population of Assam. The alarming rise in the population was attributed by many to illegal migration of people from Bangladesh.

Though the exact figures of illegal migrants from Bangladesh were purely conjectural, the issue of demographic change in Assam due to migration-related population increase had already acquired enormous significance as a matter of political concern and was widely contested by different political organizations.

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The unanticipated increase of Assam‘s population after the Commission‘s report sowed the seeds of discontent and aggravated fears in the Assamese society. The fear that gripped the people was based on the assumption that the local population would be swamped by the illegal migrants. This brought together the students‘ organization of the

Assamese, several other regional organizations and the Literary Society of Assam

(Assam Sahitya Sabha) to pressurize the central government for re-evaluation of the electoral rolls and subsequently remove those from the electoral rolls who had entered the region illegally. Failure to reach at an agreement with the central government on this issue, finally laid the grounds for a civil disobedience movement led by the student activists. This agitation henceforth was marked by a series of blockades and violent activities. The movement finally ended in 1985 after a series of negotiations and an agreement---the Assam Accord, signed between the student leaders and the central government in August 1985.

The signing of the Assam Accord, which incorporated significant concessions to the agitating group, marked a new phase in the political history of Assam. Soon thereafter, the central government declared fresh elections in Assam. The election results manifested a sharp transition from a government traditionally dominated by the Congress party to one dominated by the newly formed regional party, the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) comprising principally of members belonging to the Assamese students‘ organization.

While disrupting erstwhile-uncontested primacy of the Congress party, the AGP obtained a substantial percentage of the votes in the 1985 state legislative assembly elections. AGP

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won 64 seats and 35.17 percent of the popular votes and Congress (I) won 25 seats and

23.43 percentages of popular votes [Baruah, 1999, p 139].

AGP‘s projection as a regional party, representing the interests of the people inhabiting Assam, including their tribal brethren, generated a kind of optimism in the minds of tribal minorities. Although the agitations of these groups were directed against the state government, the bastion of the majority Assamese-speakers, there seemed to be a congruence of opinion amongst the various student bodies, both tribal and non-tribal, on the issue of illegal migration in Assam as demographic change had detrimental effects not only on the non-tribals but also the tribal inhabitants in different parts of Assam. Non-

Bodos (for instance, Bangladeshis) constituted a substantial proportion of the population in the Bodo areas which was perceived as a cause of demographic imbalance and resource scarcity (land alienation) of the Bodos. How and under what circumstances these factors caused Bodo resentments and subsequently interacted with patterns of violent conflict against the settlers during the Bodo agitation is discussed in more detail in this chapter in a later section of this chapter.

While sharing a common ground with the Assamese nationalist organizations on the issue of illegal migration, the tribal activist organizations felt the need to espouse the cause of expulsion of undocumented Bangladeshi migrants from Assam. As a mark of endorsement to the cause, All Bodo Students‘ Union, Dimasa Students‘ Union and other organizations strongly supported AASU in the boycott of 1979 elections. The protest was launched against the decision of the Congress-led central and state government of

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Assam.64 It appeared that if their counterparts (Assamese student leaders), with whom most of these tribal student leaders had shared at least the basic ideals of protest and agitation, had come to power, the barriers to accommodation of their interests that were earlier raised by the Congress leaders would significantly lower down. In fact, as late as

August 1985, when the Assam Accord was ratified, the general view amongst the tribal student leadership was that the existing political arrangements would be altered in a fair manner in their favor. Within this context, their claims were pressed for even harder.

The euphoria and optimism however, existed only for a short period of time. It was widely believed by the Bodos that AGP‘s portrayal as a representative party was merely used as a mobilization tactic. Once the AGP came to power, the leadership did little to address the concerns of the tribal groups. On the contrary, the leaders joined the move of the erstwhile Assamese chauvinistic leaders to pursue the interests of the dominant community. The AGP enthusiastically legislated policies that overtly represented the interests of the Assamese to the exclusion of the minority ethnic groups. AGP government under the leadership of Prafulla Mahanta released a circular of Secondary

Education Board of Assam in 1985 according to which, Assamese language was made a compulsory subject in the schools of Assam even for students whose mother tongues were different from Assamese. Furthermore, the AGP government passed certain land policies which caused large-scale eviction of tribal people from the forested areas in the region [Hussain, 1987, p.1329]. Many pointed out that these legislations totally ignored the interests of the tribal population. Their proposals on the status of Bodo language, the

64 The elections were opposed because these organizations wanted a revision of the electoral rolls before the poll could be held. The electoral rolls revealed undocumented numbers of migrants more notably Bangladeshi migrants. 157

implementation of education law, problems related to tribal land encroachment and other issues never received an answer from the AGP government. Policy preferences of the state were therefore, perceived to represent a strong bias towards the Assamese. These views were clearly pointed out by ABSU leaders during the agitation and later by a former ABSU general secretary during my interview.

With the gradual penetration of the Assamese into the networks of state patronage, it became highly evident that the minority leaders would hardly attain the gains through available political channels. The Assamese leaders were able to capture lucrative positions of power and administration in the state while side-lining their Bodo counterparts who had supported the AGP leaders through an informal and loosely formed pre-election alliance. These developments aggravated the tensions between the tribal and non-tribal leaders. A former ABSU activist expressed in an interview the sense of betrayal and disgruntlement at their treatment by the AGP government in these words,

―We supported the AASU leaders in all possible ways since we considered their cause as genuine. As a part of the fighting force we even joined the AASU leaders during their negotiations with the central government. But after they gained power it became quite apparent that the AASU leaders failed to share their goals. We expected them to raise the issue of land alienation, the Bodo language and our principal concerns of autonomy but the AASU leaders ignored them. Instead they vied for special privileges and constitutional safeguards for themselves (referring to the Assam Accord).65 Moreover, the

65 Clause Six of the Assam Accord contained provisions related to special privileges and constitutional safeguards that would be provided to the indigenous people of Assam for furtherance of composite Assamese nationalism. Although the term indigenous people of Assam was meant to encompass the inhabitants of Assam, the exact definition and the criteria (whether it was based on ascriptive/ethnic or geographical terms) of being an original inhabitant of Assam was filled with uttermost ambiguity. The 158

leaders were just pushing their own agenda. The aftermath of the election was nothing but a clear manifestation of power struggle, which in turn alienated our prominent leaders. Their voices were simply silenced immediately afterwards.‖

Thus, the aftermath of Assam agitation was an important contextual factor which not only increased political uncertainty but also indicated a series of denial policies; lack of representativeness and intransigence on the part of the newly-elected state leadership.

Much similar to the former political authorities, the new leadership showed a demonstrable lack of concern to renegotiate the terms of Bodo autonomy and instead became a narrow base of power controlled by the dominant group (despite intra-elite factionalism). The room for negotiation or compromise seemed to be virtually closed.

This inspired the Bodo activists to challenge the state through direct armed confrontation.

Brahma, the ABSU president openly stated that, ‗Assam will burn again if Bodoland is not given. We have the boys with us who are trained in using sophisticated devices and we can retaliate with violence.‘66 For extreme radical leaders like Ranjan Daimary, Prem

Singh Brahma, (founders of NDFB and BLT) and their coterie of supporters, to act,

‗practically‘ meant abandoning methods of petitioning or further dialogues and adopt violent strategies.67

Accord was met with strong criticism from the Bodos and other groups. According to Bodo activists the ambiguity was a conscious effort of the Assamese leaders to further entrench their domination and forcefully integrate the minority communities into the broader Assamese society. Accordingly the Bodo leaders argued that their (Bodos) claims and construction of territorial identity and justification to those claims are rooted in the notion of Bodos being the original inhabitants of Assam. This representation propagated by Bodo nationalists is in sharp contrast to the embedded references and historical narratives of Assamese nationalists, something which was incompatible to the interests of the dominant community. 66 Hindu, Sept 1st 1989. 67 Peaceful rallies and demonstrations led by ABSU leaders took violent turns through clashes and counter- clash with the security forces and the adverse community. 159

As the movement became violent, the state deployed the Indian army and other paramilitary forces to take control over the law and order situation in the disturbed areas of the Bodo region. On March 26th 1989 fourteen companies of the Central Police

Reserve Force were deployed by the state to control rebel activities in the disturbed zone.

The government declared the Bodo areas as a disturbed region, imposed stringent measures and sanctions on the movement of the activists. It was only towards the beginning of 1990s that an effort was made by the AGP government to start a dialogue with the Bodo rebels to resolve the conflict. In July 1990, the AGP government led by

Chief Minister, P.K. Mahanta, proposed an alternative arrangement of settlement.

Although the government ruled out any possibility of fragmenting Assam, it proposed a system of power devolution, more specifically the formation of a three-tier system of local self-government under the provisions of the Panchayati Raj Act (1973).

Accordingly, a district council was to be constituted with limited responsibilities to administer the Bodo-dominated areas. ABSU and BPAC however, out rightly rejected this formula and made their stand quite clear that they would not go for any settlement short of statehood. AGP government‘s moves were therefore, characterized by lengthy periods of inactivity and unsuccessful attempts to reach at an acceptable solution. Few months later by the end of 1990s, the next government (Congress) reiterated its intention to sit for a dialogue with the ABSU leaders. The Congress signed the first accord of settlement with ABSU in 1993. The accord however, failed due to divergences of opinion on the issue of territorial demarcation (Chapter 3). The government rejected the demands of the Bodo leaders to include a number of villages within the Bodo autonomous council.

Perils of a domino effect also prompted the government to reject those demands.68 The

68 Refer to Barbara Walter [2003] for reputation costs causing obstacles to negotiate. 160

Assam government was apprehensive of the fact that if it yielded to Bodo demands for remapping or dissociation of the proposed areas from the existing system of direct jurisdiction exercised by the state government, then it will have to succumb to similar pressures generated by numerous other minority groups in the region [Misings, Koch-

Rajbonshis, etc.].

An uncompromising stance adopted by the government in this regard, however, aggravated the situation and led to an invigorated phase of violent mobilization by BLT and NDFB. Intense phases of attacks and counterattacks between the government forces and the Bodo militants and against non-Bodos in the Bodo areas engulfed the years through late 1990s to early 2000. It was only in the year 2003 that the state and the BLT showed some signs of negotiation and reciprocity. The year 2003 acted as a turning point, when BLT responded to the central government‘s clarion call for harmony, declared unilateral ceasefire and finally approved the memorandum of settlement under the Sixth

Schedule of the Constitution (99th Amendment), 2003. The government however, did not show any inclination to yield to NDFB's demand for secession. Unlike the previous model of 1993, the new deal of autonomy was based on increased powers of self- governance, short of separation, a Sixth Schedule form of territorial autonomy.

FAILED ACCOMMODATION, STATE MONOPOLY ON VIOLENCE AND INCREASING MILITANCY, POST-1993

The empirical evidence as depicted in Chapter 3 illustrates that the years 1989, 1992,

1993, 1996, 1998 and to some extent 2000 witnessed the highest number of violent

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activities unleashed by Bodo revolutionaries. Given the contradictory claims of tribal activists on the one hand and the state on the other, it often becomes difficult to ascertain whether the violence had been initiated by the government forces or the contesting group.

The Bodo activists claim that violence on their part was induced by the atrocities faced by the Bodo people when the state police tried to repress peaceful demonstrations and protest rallies. Government‘s side of the narrative for use of force on their own volition however, rests on the assumption that central paramilitary forces and the army were called in to take control over the law and order situation that was disrupted by Bodo dissident activities and that the state security forces acted as neutral peacekeepers. Given these discrepancies, it is difficult to ascertain whether government repression during the

Bodo agitation was used as a pre-emptive or a reactive measure. This also points out the difficulty in identifying the threshold, the starting and end points of repression that marks a boundary beyond which there was an acceleration of insurgent violence. Divergent claims notwithstanding, what transpires from the interviews and other sources is that there seemed to be a rough sequencing of events and counter-events which ultimately led to a significant and intense build-up of violence. Dissident violence in this vein was not only an expression of despair and anguish on the part of the Bodos but a careful consideration that developed after prolonged discussions and deliberations amongst the core leaders. In the initial phases, small acts of contention (non-violent) on the protesters‘ side might have created conditions for counter-reactions that eventually led to a spiral of violent outcomes. Growing incidence of repressive measures within this context proved to be the focal points for the explosive nature of the movement and influenced the decisions of the extremists to radicalize their position and use excessive violence. In

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order to examine this dynamic relationship let us begin by reiterating some selected incidents of extremist activities and relevant state policies.

During the first year (1987-88) of radicalization, Bodo activists were involved in less disruptive strategies. Their activities were marked by peaceful demonstrations, marches, and public meetings. These prevailing tactics were however accompanied by inconsistent accommodationist policies. Some of the peaceful protests were blemished by violence perpetrated by members of the opposition group and by the state police whose involvement was in the pretext of controlling the prevalent crisis. Although intermittent moves were made by the government and the Bodo leaders to negotiate, they failed to produce a tangible outcome. Gradually, there seemed to be an expansion of overt confrontational activities initiated by ABSU activists in the form of strikes and protest closures often followed by bombings, armed attacks and assassinations. On 27th March

1989, ABSU called for a 360 hours state-wide strike in order to show their dissatisfaction over repeated inconsistencies of the government authorities to meet their demands. The protest call which finally ended on July 10th 1989 resulted in more than fifty fatalities including both civilians and police personnel. ABSU‘s main demand during this closure call was the dismissal of the ruling AGP government. This closure call was preceded by the state Home Ministry‘s invitation to ABSU for renewed talks, scheduled to be held on

23rd March, 1989.69 The peace proposals were not just extended to the ABSU leaders but were also offered to representatives from several political parties and organizations of other tribal minorities, struggling for greater autonomy. ABSU leaders however, rejected such an offer on the pretext that their demands could be addressed only at a tripartite

69 Frontline Magazine, Apr. 1st 1989. 163

meeting that would consist of representatives from the concerned ministry of the Central government. The Bodo leaders were unhappy at the inclusion of other tribal organizations

[the Mising Students Organization and the Dimasa Students Organizations] that had their own set of grievances and demands for particular kinds of autonomy. The leaders therefore, felt that taking part in such discussions will diminish the returns that the Bodo leaders expected to gain out of their contemporary mobilizing strategies.

In the meanwhile, the state government unleashed its full-scale counter-insurgency campaign against the Bodo extremists by deploying additional paramilitary forces, imposition of bans and prohibitory orders on Bodo extremist organizations in addition to exercising stringent policies like the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (1967), Armed

Forces (Special) Powers Act, (1967) and TADA Act of 1987. On 6th July, 1989, the

Political Affairs Committee of the Assam‘s Cabinet Ministry officially notified Kokrajhar district as a disturbed area. The application of this act practically implied that the security forces were empowered to fire upon persons‘ contravening certain orders and in such actions the police personnel concerned were assured immunity against prosecution.

Accordingly, the act states that ―any magistrate or police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector or havildar in case of armed branch of the police (meaning paramilitary forces such as the CRPF of army), if in his opinion it is necessary to do so in the maintenance of public order after giving such warning, if any as he may consider necessary fire upon or otherwise use force even to the causing of death against any

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person who is acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in any disturbed area……‖. 70

By implementing these policies, terrorism was broadly redefined. Security officials could accordingly prosecute individuals involved in an act with the intention of threatening the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of the country; striking terror in any section of the people of the country; involved in an act of violence by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive devices or inflammable substances or firearms or other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature, in such a manner as to cause or likely to cause death or injuries to any person or persons; damage or destruction of property; disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community within the Indian territories.71 These legislations were designed in such a manner that the investigative powers during counter-insurgency operations rested in the hands of state police. In the process, police personnel rather than the prosecutors had the authority to charge any suspected person of an alleged offence or to keep him/her in custody. The laws as applied, authorized the investigators (police) to arrest any individual without a warrant if he/she had been suspected to commit or likely to commit any cognizable offence.72 In the process, the investigators could even use some amount of force as against the detainees.73 Needless to mention, these Acts had already been employed along with other regulations in the north-eastern region [e.g. Mizoram,

Nagaland] in order to deal with the chaotic situation linked to several other separatist

70 Institute of Conflict Management, [2001] 71 TADA Act, 1987. 72 Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 as amended in 2004. 73 Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958. 165

insurgencies (NSCN, ULFA, etc.). Bodo militancy only allowed the state to expand its already established counter-insurgency operations in the violence prone areas of the proposed Bodoland territories.

On the whole, the state applied the most rigorous policies of demobilization in the years 1988 and 1989 in the first phase of radicalization. The legislations that were exercised typified a complex amalgamation of both institutional and informal repressive policies.74 These coercive techniques continued in the second phase of radicalization and were most severely put to force after the first round of settlement fell apart in 1993.

Reports reveal that institutional repression was accompanied by illegitimate and rather indiscriminate methods of coercive tactics. Execution of institutional policies were sufficiently severe and were marked by the involvement of security personnel in episodes of gender related violence, custodial deaths of suspected terrorists and a number of human rights violations. Surveys conducted by human rights organizations and newspaper reports reveal that many detainees were arrested arbitrarily. Sometimes defendants who claimed not to belong to any terrorist organization were imprisoned illegally without being produced before the court. In numerous instances, the detainees were physically and mentally tortured to extract information about the movement or for alleged links with the militant groups, during cordon and search operations.75 These coercive methods were premised on the grounds that the application of force would

74 These concepts have been discussed in Chapter 2. 75 An important limitation that this study faces is the lack of information on the exact figures of detainees in police custody who were allegedly tortured during the course of counter-insurgency operations. The information that could be collected from the official sources does not necessarily comply with the ones that were gathered from other secondary sources. In this regard my analysis heavily relies upon secondary sources, mostly newspaper clippings and interviews. This might call for a fair amount of criticism at least for one reason that the interview data was mostly collected from respondents belonging to the affected group. The government‘s side of the story however does not conform to these findings. 166

enable restoration of political order and security to civilian institutions. Civilians most often serve to be potential supporters of the rebel groups by way of providing not only material support but also necessary information related to ambush and evasion of government forces. Therefore, civilian cooperation, either voluntarily or by coercive means becomes a necessary element of such operations.76 The brunt of violence due to enhanced powers of the security forces on the one hand and insurgent attacks on the other hand, had to be borne out by the civilians. A report brought out by the "South Asia Forum for Human Rights‖ revealed that TADA was widely abused and misused by the police authorities while it was in force and that it had not succeeded in checking terrorism. The report clearly spelt out that a number of accused who were arrested and were being prosecuted under TADA, were still languishing in prisons and their cases were still pending trial before the designated courts notwithstanding the fact that TADA itself had lapsed in the year 1995. 77

A second form of indiscriminate repression relates to gendered violence that was used in a spontaneous fashion by security personnel during several counter insurgency operations. While some episodes were unmistakably covered, others had passed substantially unreported by the local press. Forced submission of women formed an integral part of political silencing used by the state. If we draw parallels of such incidents from other parts of the world, one would observe that gendered violence have been typically distinctive and exemplary of coercive policies employed by the state during counter-insurgency operations. Rape and molestation of women by military and security

76 Role of civilians in facilitating insurgent operations may be documented from sources such as the Marxists in Peru. See Sanchez, [2003], pp. 185-98). 77 Report published by South Asia Forum for Human Rights, 1995. 167

forces had often been used as a common tactic to intimidate, humiliate and degrade women of opponent ethnicity. A common pattern observed in many cases is that the main aim of the perpetrators is to ensure that women and their families would be demobilized to take part in anti-government protest activities. In Chiapas and to some extent in Peru, rape and the threat of rape were often deployed by the military as both physical and symbolic violence to discourage women from participation in community and other regional forms of organization supporting the Zapatista movement. More than actual rape, the threat of rape and the psychological control that had been frequently exerted over indigenous communities through male army presence had served as one of the strongest weapons used against indigenous women [Lynn, 1999, pp.822-842]. Although the rate and the pattern of gendered violence perpetrated on Bodo women was less than the magnitude and barbarity with which such acts were evidenced in the above mentioned cases, the process is generally consistent with what happened in other parts of the world where such extreme tactics became part of military campaigns and that had an impact on the subsequent course of ethnic movements.

Taking stock of some selected episodes of gendered violence will provide a rough idea of the degree to which these policing tactics were linked to radicalization of the Bodo movement. These incidents were consistently narrated by most of the respondents during the interviews that I conducted. On 10th May, 1990, at least 12 women, including minors were reportedly gang raped by personnel belonging to the Assam Police Task Force and the Madhya Pradesh Special Armed Forces in two villages of Barpeta district, located in the Bodo dominated area. The incidents were reported to have taken place in Baghmara

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and Akhranguri villages in Barpeta when the male members of the families were apparently away. Investigations suggested that most of the male members of these villages had gone to participate in a ceremony that was performed to commemorate the demise of the ABSU president U.N.Brahma, who passed away on 1st May, 1990.

According to Pramila Rani Brahma and Supriayarani Brahma, who were acting as the

President and the Joint Secretary of the All Assam Tribal Welfare Association, an organization that had been actively involved in the Bodo agitation and Bodo women‘s issues in particular, the police personnel entered the villages in the wee hours of the day and took advantage of the situation as most of the male members of the families were away for the rituals. Although the raiding party, led by the SDPO of Patacharkuchi police station, entered the village on the pretext of accomplishing their assigned task of routine searches, their sole purpose was to intimidate, molest and rape defenseless Bodo women.78 The Barpeta incident was reminiscent of another gang rape that took place at a village called Bhumka in the district of Kokrajhar when at least ten Bodo women were allegedly gang raped by Assam Police personnel in January 1988.

The following diagram (fig.4.2) roughly illustrates state repression from 1988 to 2003.

78 Hindu 20th May, 1990. 169

Figure 4.2. State repression in Bodo areas

The level of state repression remained fairly consistent throughout the rebellion. The analysis in this study has found that coercive behavior of the state encompassed indiscriminate methods of repression aimed at the members of the rebel organizations

(BLT and NDFB) where the policing authorities often failed to make fine distinctions between the rebels and non-combatants. These tactics were found to be significantly high over the time period (1988-2002) covered in this study. According to the data, which are summarized in Figure 4.2, the state made major inroads against the rebels after 1989 (first phase of insurgent violence). The campaign remained consistently high from 1996 to

2001. These periods recorded censorship, imposition of bans and several deterrence tactics employed by state agents against the combatants leading to arrests, injuries and deaths of combatants, the main indicators of state coercion. On several occasions, the

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state agents made no effort to identify the rank-and-file members of rebel groups and in the process engaged in indiscriminate and widespread acts of violence perpetrated against the civilian population of the contending group. The period after 1993 witnessed an incessant increase in the frequency and scope of state repression.

CONSEQUENCES OF FAILED ACCOMMODATION AND STATE REPRESSION ON VIOLENT MOBILIZATION

From the course of events in the aftermath of the first accord of settlement, it is evident that persistent tensions between the state and the Bodos escalated as a result of the state‘s repressive policies designed to prohibit the movement of the rebels. The state consistently tried to diminish the capacities and the resources of the rebel groups by applying widespread repression. Nevertheless, contrary to many established findings

[Tilly 1978, Brockett 2005; Muller 1985; Weede 1987], rather than diminishing rebel violence, widespread state repression had an escalating effect on the aggressive actions of the rebels. Extremist organizations like NDFB and BLT adopted brutal and extreme strategies. These pressurizing strategies were evident both before and after the first peace accord was signed. To cite examples of some of the retaliatory actions that were undertaken by the Bodo rebels in late 1980s and early 1990s; on 12th April, 1990 fifteen people were killed including fifty others were injured in two bomb explosions on railway tracks between Bijni and Chapakhata and between Sesapani and Fakirgram in Kokrajhar district.79 In another incident, the western end of the Manas road bridge on National

Highway 31 near Bijni was damaged in another explosion in the same district. ABSU

79 Hindu, 13th Apr. 1990. 171

leaders declared another extended call for 1001 hours of strike on 24th November 1992.80

ABSU‘s General Secretary Rabi Ram Brahma explicitly noted that ‗the failure of the

Government of India to follow up with the assurance to continue the talks at the end of their tripartite meeting on 18th Oct 1992, (the ninth round of talks) and their guarantee to muster up the leaders for fresh discussions with specifically defined alternatives within the next two weeks of the meeting, compelled the rebels to move ahead with their pressurizing tactics. Further, he stated that they made all the efforts to arrive at a settlement but the union and state government instead sent the army and police to massacre the Bodo people. The Bodos were prepared to be exterminated but were not ready to give up and compromise on their original demands for separation.‘81 The ABSU leadership was convinced that the government will continue with its half-hearted negotiating techniques and therefore continued to apply these aggressive tactics.

A summary of empirical data illustrated in figure 4.3 might be helpful to understand the reciprocal relationship between state repression and Bodo insurgent violence. Militant violence recorded an increase in its magnitude and incidence in 1989, 1992 in the first phase with each passing year of the excesses committed by the government forces and subsided in 1993, when the accord was signed. Rebel violence rose overwhelmingly in

1994, 1996 and 1998 after the agreement broke down and anti-insurgency laws were reinstated and extended further.

80 Hindu, 25th Nov. 1992. 81 Hindu, November 23, 1992. 172

Fig. 4.3. Correlation between State Repression and Rebel Violence

In order to explain this correlation this study analyzed the character and form of rebel violence over the time period from 1989-2002. The main indicators used to evaluate these dimensions were the tactics used by the rebels and the nature of rebel targets. Ethnic violence throughout the rebellion was a diverse mix of different tactics such as bomb explosions in public places, transit systems, etc. as well as calculated attacks on public properties, police forces, army and government representatives and execution of non- combatants. During the later stages of the rebellion (1993 onwards) as the movement progressed and as counter-insurgency measures became more and more widespread and stringent, the rebel groups emphasized more on selective methods of violence. BLT and

NDFB became more organized and used violence more strategically and in a planned manner by carefully selecting their targets mostly non-combatants, individuals as well as groups (particularly government supporters and non-Bodo population). These organizations together contributed to a considerable share of organized violence during

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the later phases of the rebellion in late 90s. Targeted attacks on government agents

(security personnel) during this phase were carried out on a much lower scale as compared to the level of excesses committed against non-combatants. Rebel groups significantly refrained from using the typical tactics such as bomb explosions that had the potential risk of causing fatalities to the members of one‘s (rebel‘s) own group even if the target population was carefully chosen. Therefore, they resorted to these tactics in a limited manner as they feared that this might alienate the group members and ultimately prove to be counter-productive for the movement. Empirical data (summarized in table

4.1) on the civilian casualties and deaths caused by bomb explosions reveals that the magnitude of deaths and injuries caused by this form of violence during the first phase

(1989-93) was much higher than the magnitude of human losses borne out by bomb explosions during the second phase of the rebellion.

Table 4.1. Incidence of violence Character of violence Casualties and deaths (%)

1989-1993 1993-2002

Explosion 54.0 % 19.2 % Attacks on govt. agents 3.5 % 4.8 % Attacks on non-combatants 42.5 % 76.0 %

Source: Newspaper Reports from 1987-2004

Data reveals that calculated and selective methods of violence became more widespread and a distinguishing feature of rebel violence after 1993. The incidence and magnitude of non-combatant fatalities showed a rise from 42.5% (1989-1993) to 76%

(1992-2002). Significant proportion of the targets belonged to non-Bodo population. The

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violence committed on security personnel recorded a minor increase from 3.5% to 4.8%.

Understanding why and under what circumstances the Bodo rebels tended to change their tactics and targets of violence requires more explanation.

ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL DENOUNCERS: ALTERNATIVE TARGETS OF REBEL VIOLENCE

Conventional findings suggest that states generally possess superior capabilities and military resources--established, trained and better equipped armed forces. Armed rebel groups on the contrary, are numerically small with limited resources in their hands as they have to build up their organization from scratch. With all the advantages, states may reserve near monopoly of using military force to inhibit the growth of rebel organizations, especially during the early stages of mobilization. Despite fewer resources, there is little reason to expect that the asymmetry of power and coercive capabilities between the state and the rebel groups will limit rebel capacities to inflict tremendous costs on the state. Rebel groups can overcome these disadvantages by changing their tactical repertoires of protest and violence. As weaker opponents they can employ violence strategically by using methods of violence against selected individuals or the members of an ethnic group.82 In the process, targets are meticulously chosen by rebel groups on the basis of target characteristics and relationships that the dissident group shares with the potential recipient of violence. 83 Perpetrators of violence must have some underlying fears or antipathy against the targets (individuals or groups) that governs the

82 Refer to Stathis Kalyas [2006] for further discussion on the difference between indiscriminate and selective violence. 83 My argument is consistent with the view that mere accessibility or weak capabilities need not be the basic criteria while selecting the substitute targets by the rebels. [Horowitz, 2001]

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process of selection during a crisis situation. Rebels may use this strategy to divert violence from their main opponents (state) to another set of set of targets (non- combatants) [Chapter 2]. Selective violence against alternative targets of non-combatants may not necessarily be a militarily efficient strategy to outdo the forces of the government but the rebel group does succeed in certain ways to paralyze the state by switching over to such a scheme of using violence. This strategy can impose indirect costs on the state since it is unable to provide security to its constituents against rebel violence [Hultman, 2007]. Fear of losing legitimacy in the eyes of potential constituents may compel the state to make significant concessions to the fighting rebels. From this perspective, selective attacks will raise the leverage of the leaders to bargain for maximum possible gains.

Quantitative data on selected incidents of Bodo rebel violence enables us to trace that as the cycle of violence aggravated, tactical repertoires and the pattern of rebel violence showed an increase in selective killings of non-combatants. Newspaper reports and interview data shed light on the nature of the victims executed by the rebel groups.

Evidence reinforces the claim that the Bodo rebels increasingly targeted non-combatants suspected of having possible links to the government forces or affiliation to rival organizations or because they belonged to averse ethnic groups. The attacks were mostly committed as a retaliatory move against counter-insurgency campaigns or simply to show their frustration against the state. Rebel group‘s violence against the ‗substitute targets‘ was an alternative form of dissident violence directed against the state.84 Most of the

84 Petersen [2001 p 80] uses the term substitute violence. Although some of these targets were not the direct source of Bodo grievances they became the objects of selective violence as a way to signal the government. 176

targets were members or sympathizers of PTCA and non-Bodo ethnic groups.85 PTCA members were chosen because they were not supportive of separatist ideals propagated by ABSU. Moreover, the party was co-opted by ruling parties of the state government.

To cite some examples of targeted violence against non-combatants who seemed to be sympathetic to the government forces, on 27th August, 1991, Bodo militants killed the

PTCA president, his son and a bodyguard in the district of Kokrajhar. On 19th July 1992, eight people, including both women and children were killed and seriously injured when a gang of marauding Bodo rebels raided a village called Sapakhati near Udalguri district.

The area had been reasonably concentrated by Bangladeshi Muslims and most of the victims were reported to belong to this community. According to informed sources, the attack was carried out in retaliation for the arrest of Rattan Daimary, a leading cadre of the BSF by armed forces on 1st July 1992. Although deep rooted antagonism related to land issues might have partly engineered the attacks, reports suggested that it had more to do with the alleged involvement of the victims in the arrest of the Bodo militant.86 In

February 1994, at Mora Dhansiri village near Rowta in Darrang district, six people were killed by Bodo militants. Most of the victims were identified as Nepalis. Reports confirmed that BLT cadres sought revenge by slaying the villagers for their alleged involvement in the arrest of BLT‘s district commander from the village on 12th February

1994. A leaflet that was signed by B. Bilfang Mena, Operational Commander of BSF and that was later recovered from the site of the incident stated, ―let us die for the Bodo nation but not let the nation die for us. On February 12th you have arrested Bodo

85 The Bodo activists considered PTCA as rivals. This dimension has been discussed in Chapter 3. 86 20th July, 1992, Hindu. 177

commander and a national worker Nerswen Swargiary, and this is a defensive and retaliatory measure against you who were involved in the arrest.‖87 Between 1988 and

1992 Bodo rebel organizations killed more than 20 people suspected of providing intelligence support to the state agents. BLT and NBFB violence against this selected section of non-combatants was aimed at punishing and deterring individuals/groups who were involved or were suspected of having alleged links with the government forces in acts of informing them about the hideouts and operations of the rebels. Violence against suspected police informers (non-combatants) was used by the rebels as a form of ‗indirect aggression‘ to impose indirect costs on the government forces that relied heavily on the civilian population to obtain information.88 The rebels believed that by picking out the actual as well as potential defectors and attacking them, the government forces will be constrained to have access to their local network of intelligence that rests with the non- combatant population.

SETTLER POPULATION AS SUBSTITUTE TARGETS OF REBEL VIOLENCE

A second pattern of violence which gained immense proportions during the Bodo agitation was onslaughts against non-Bodos, particularly settler population who increasingly became the targets of violence perpetrated by Bodo extremists. The extremists engaged in a violent drive of expulsion unleashed against non-Bodo communities, since that became an ineluctable requirement from their perspective, to substantiate their demands for territorial autonomy. On 15th September 1998, nearly 48

87 Feb 24th 1994, Hindu. 88 Security personnel normally use different ways of securing information from the civilians. Intimidation, physical torture and bribes are some of the methods that are used to extract information. My research in Assam revealed that non-Bodo communities were often used as informers by the police personnel. 178

people were killed and over 500 houses were burnt in an armed conflict between the

Bodos and the Santhalis in Gossaigaon sub-division of Kokrajhar district of Assam. In another incident in the Ranipur-Dalgaon area populated mainly by Santhalis, Bodos armed with sharp weapons and guns attacked and killed about 14 Santhalis.89 Nearly six days prior to these clashes, the general secretary of the Adivasi Seva Samity (ASS), (a

Santhali organization formed in response to Bodo militancy),90 Satyan Soren and his four-year-old son were killed by Bodo extremists. In the days that followed, Santhali extremists set ablaze several Bodo houses in villages like Bodomdhari, Sindhrijhar and

Sapkata. Following these incidents, nearly 70,000 people from each community sought shelter in government provided relief camps. In the next few days, accounts of the killings spurred the tensions that had already surfaced between the two communities and put the Bodo militants in the offensive. This time the Bodos avenged the attacks inflicted on their community by rampaging makeshift camps and villages housed by the Santhalis.

The build-up to this internecine violence between the Bodos and Santhalis in 1998 was preceded by some of the gravest episodes of anti-migrant and inter-ethnic violence that occurred in mid-1996 between these two communities. The most conspicuous incident triggering the clashes that began in April 1996 was the killing of three Bodo women in a rural area in Kokrajhar district.91 The bodies of these women were later reported to be found in the Santhali villages in an area called Gossaigaon, in Kokrajhar district. The tragic incident enraged the Bodos and produced some of the most ruinous

89 Frontline, [1998]. 90 Other militant organizations of the Santhalis include the Birsa Commando Force (BCF), the Adivasi Cobra Militant Force and others. 91 The three women were killed in reaction to the assassination of a Santhali political leader just before the Assam Assembly elections of 1996. [Qureshi, 2004]. 179

kinds of sequential inter-ethnic violence in May 1996. Violent encounters on both the sides left more than hundred people dead and almost 100,000 dispossessed of their homes and properties.92

Bangladeshis, Assamese and Nepalis residing in the [projected] Bodo territories were also singled out during the agitation. These killings were reportedly organized by Bodo militants. The crusade against these non-Bodo groups was intended to drive them out of the Bodo territories [Horowitz, 2001, p.413]. To cite some examples of such campaigns, on May 27th and 29th and then again on June 22nd and July 24th in the year 1994, Bodo extremists burnt down houses of Bangladeshis in the outskirts of Kokrajhar and Barpeta districts resulting in approximately hundred casualties and leaving more than 10,000 forsaken of their shelters and material belongings.93 On 9th October, 1998 more than 10

Assamese and Bengalis were killed in the district of Darrang allegedly by BLTF extremists.94

The evidence indicates that the first few attacks on non-Bodos, particularly

Bangladeshis and Santhalis erupted in the districts of Darrang, Udalguri and Kokrajhar, mostly in the rural areas. Interestingly, violence flared up in different areas of Bodoland where the Bodos had no historical record of friction with the settler communities. Besides the huge number of fatalities, casualties and displacement, violent conflict between the

Bodos and settler communities had more irreparable consequences. Inter-ethnic violence

92Agence France Presse, 05/23/96 93 http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/indassam.htm Similar incidents were reported in the later phase of the struggle. Some of the grievous ones occurring in the years: 1996 and 1998. 94Statesman, 10/09/98 180

that was once inconceivable became possible and real after these incidents. Settler communities, primarily Santhalis sprang up in retaliation, formed their own armed bands and avenged the killings of their co-ethnics. Although the accurate figures are unavailable, reports revealed enmasse burning down and destruction of houses and properties of people belonging to both these communities with estimates on a range within 50 to as many as 100,000 individuals being affected by violent conflict.

Why were the Santhalis and Bangladeshis selected as the major targets of rebel violence? I argue that the selection of these communities as the prime targets was consistent with a set of underlying grievances that the Bodos held against the Santhalis and Bangladeshis. Despite long duration of their residence in the Bodo areas, the

Santhalis and Bangladeshis are mostly considered to be migrants. While the Santhalis have their origins in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Jharkhand in India, the

Bangladeshis belong to neighboring areas of Bangladesh. Their migration to Assam can be traced back to the colonial period when the British government adopted the practices of resettling the Santhalis and Bangladeshis in the tribal lands for plantation and rice cultivation. Bangladeshis are better equipped in settled farming and have since the colonial period been involved in wet rice cultivation. Santhalis were brought in to work on the British tea plantations as indentured labourers. In the post-colonial period the movement and settlement of these groups in Assam have been spontaneous.

Ethnic grievances of the Bodos against these communities emerged from certain socio-economic factors. Demographic pressures and loss of protected lands of the Bodos

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to non-Bodo communities particularly, Santhalis and Bangladeshis, who were held to have arrived later than the Bodos, threatened and undermined the economic security and survival of the Bodos. These ethnic groups particularly, the Bangladeshis were better equipped in settled farming which proved to be advantageous for them to settle and relocate themselves in the tribal lands. Settled farming was promoted by the state on grounds that the land management systems practiced by the tribal groups, who were heavily dependent on swidden farming, were quite primitive and therefore incompatible with modern ways of cultivating land. These changes were put into effect without any further assistance in terms of providing alternative economic opportunities to the affected communities (Bodos). State seemed to be a major player in bringing about these changes which further altered the tenure conditions of cultivable land and in turn limited the accessibility of land-related resources to the Bodos to a considerable extent. The settler population began to appropriate these lands for purposes of cultivation.

The process of land encroachment was much facilitated by the role of the state authorities who were allowed a certain degree of leverage to decide and shape certain policies related to the acquisition of traditional (tribal) lands of the Bodos and the settlement patterns of migrants or non-Bodos in the tribal lands. To take some examples, the state government has the authority to use the areas protected under the Assam Land

Regulation Act, 1947, for purposes of forest reservation, ordinary cultivation or other ancillary use, such as granting land for tea plantations; or for any other developmental purposes such as, the establishment of co-operative societies or other financial

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institutions, as may be approved by the state government.95 Santhalis are mostly employed as labourers in the tea plantations of Assam including the Bodo areas. In addition to land use patterns, the act also empowered the state government, to decide on relevant matters related to the settlement patterns of population in the tribal areas. For instance, Clause 3, of Section 163 of the act mentions that people belonging to classes other than the protected sections, who have been residents of the belt or block areas before being notified as such, or those who fall in the category of protected classes living elsewhere in the state, may be settled in the tribal areas with the previous approval of the state government.96 These provisions practically implied that the state had a significant potential to determine the actual patterns of land distribution and settlement of non-tribal population in the tribal areas. Registration of ownership rights and settlement of the settler (unprotected) groups often transpired through direct and indirect involvement of the state authorities.

What were some of the consequences of these state activities on land use and settlement patterns of migrants? First, this led to an exodus of non-Bodos and immigrant communities, mostly Bangladeshis, Santhalis and even Nepalis from neighboring districts to the Bodo areas. District wise census data on spatial distribution of population reveals that the districts of Goalpara, Kokrajhar, Darrang (violence affected areas) recorded a decadal rise in immigrant population (mostly from erstwhile East Pakistan). Analysis of census data since 1931 shows that there had been an increase in the immigrant

95 The areas inhabited by the Bodos were placed under a protective discrimination regime under the Assam Land Revenue Regulation Act, 1947 (Chapter X), and were classified as ‗tribal blocks‘ and ‗tribal belts‘. The provision under this act restricted the possession and actual transfer of lands owned by the Bodos to outsiders, including non-tribals. [De Soumitra, 1997]. 96 Majumdar, K.C.&Chowdhury [1995]. 183

population, from 20% in the pre-independence period to nearly 80% in 1991. Even my visit to some of these places (mainly Kokrajhar and Darrang districts) gave the impression that the areas consist of a complex mix of Bangladeshi and Santhali villages and a range of small and dispersed Nepali villages and agricultural settlements. Table 4.2 provides a rough estimate of land encroachment by different communities in some of the selected areas in Kokrajhar district which was highly affected by violence.

Table 4.2. Community wise encroachers in Bijni circle (Kokrajhar district)

Community Number of Families Bangladeshi 342 Muslim Santhali 170

Nepali 69 Displaced 153 Others 30

Source: Compiled from Publication of the Government of Assam titled, “Land Administration in Protected Belts and Blocks in Assam” (1991).

Second, the extent of land alienation, denotification or encroachment of protected tribal lands increased over the years and thus led to a gradual process of demographic change. A comparison of total land alienated and encroached in the Bodo dominated areas since 1949 to 1981, to total land reserved as tribal lands (also in areas affected by violence) reveals that the incidence of tribal land alienation was quite sizeable in late

1950, 60s and 1970s. According to studies carried out in several tribal villages in 1991, the areas covered by tribal belts and blocks were recorded to be approximately 17135.46

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sq.kms in 1977 that declined to approximately 16759.46 sq.kms towards 1981.97 This was noted to be higher than average percentage of lands that were denotified by the state government and encroached till late 1970s. Exponential growth (both real and apprehended) of the settler groups and their settlement in the Bodo areas thus, inevitably contributed to demographic pressures and reinforced economic problems such as land- alienation. This in turn, produced intense feelings of hostility against the settler communities. These feelings were heightened by excessive state interference and increased capacity of state authorities to shape the policies with respect to the acquisition of traditional (tribal) lands of the Bodos and the settlement patterns of migrants in the tribal areas.

The underlying grievances related to demography and land issues gained enormous amount of political significance and became the center stage of militant political actions after the first accord failed [post-1993] on account of irreconcilable differences between the state and the Bodo leaders over the question of remapping and demarcation of the geographical boundaries of the Bodo autonomous region, particularly those areas that were inhabited by the non-Bodo communities. The issue had high distributional stakes for both the parties. The government was reluctant to relinquish direct control over the areas consisting of non-Bodos and transfer the authority to the Bodo Autonomous

Council. Although the authority of the BAC was extended to 2570 villages that were geographically contiguous and were within the Bodo dominated areas, the Bodo leaders came up with a list of 515 additional villages inhabited by both Bodo and non-Bodo communities and demanded that these villages should also be included as parts of BAC.

97 Ibid. p.g 87. 185

The government however, refused to include those villages. The most obvious reason for the state government‘s refusal to compromise on this issue was the fear that ceding those areas to the Bodo leaders will jeopardize the interests of non-Bodo ethnic groups that constituted a substantial portion of the population in those areas. Additionally, the state was concerned about its own loss. The government was apprehensive of the fact that it might have to incur significant costs of losing potential constituents and their votes required for the existing local-self governing institutions from the non-Bodo constituents of the region. The powers of governing those areas were earlier vested in the Panchayati

Raj institutions (PRI) [Panigrahy, 2007]. These institutions would have ceased to function once BAC took charge of the areas. PRI‘s are considered to be the third tier of decentralized governance in India. These institutions have evolved as the bastion of power politics of major political parties (for e.g. Congress and AGP in Assam) in the state (province) at the local level. Members or affiliates belonging to regional parties contest for the elections of Gram Sabha, the major governing body of these local-self governing institutions. The state had a major stake in devolving the power of exercising authority over those villages to the Bodos. Bodo activists however, stood resolute against the decision of the state and believed that incorporation of the disputed areas was necessary for Bodoland. Amidst controversies the accord failed. Inconsistent accommodation strategies of the state raised significant doubts on the intentions of the government to deliver real powers of autonomy to the Bodo leaders.

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Anti-settler violence in this context was therefore, consistent with these antipathies that had been accumulating over the years. The killings were significantly fostered by the disposition to show direct and displaced hostilities against the non-Bodos and the state authorities as the latter was viewed to be highly involved in the protection and settlement of non-Bodo communities (Bangladeshis and Santhalis) through official as well as unofficial channels. In other words, selective violence against non-Bodo communities that were more widespread in the aftermath of the failed accord became an alternative channel to express frustration and anger against the state authorities who had shown inconsistencies to redress these underlying resentments. Violence against the non-Bodo communities was significantly meant to inflict indirect costs on the political authorities.

This was also a way of signalling the inability of the state to protect its constituent population (non-Bodos) from the scourge of insurgent violence. From the rebel‘s perspective, these were the strategies used to express their dissatisfaction as well as to pressurize the government to make relevant concessions. The settler communities were given the choice either to leave their villages or face grave consequences if they continued to reside in the Bodo region. Violent aggression and expulsion thus worked in tandem to forcefully legitimize the voice of resistance and dissent.

To summarize this part of the discussion, targeted killings of the non-combatant population became a dominant strategy used by the Bodo rebels to deter the defectors and to raise the costs of the government forces. By employing these methods the rebels demonstrated the capability to withstand the attempts of the government to debilitate their capacity and strength---a clear cut-policy used to bargain with the state. Rebel groups

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significantly refrained from using unselective violence and from committing excesses against their own population in order to build up their reputation and to engender cohesion within the members of the group. In other words, by avoiding indiscriminate killings of their own population they endured the dangers of alienating their own population and exhibited their willingness to guarantee collective protection and security to their future constituents. This worked in favour of the rebels. Despite the costs of repression, group members were highly motivated to commit themselves to the longer- term goals of the activist organizations.

CONCLUSION

The chapter has advanced the claim that the motivations for ethnic violence cannot be simply reduced to optimal material benefits that can be obtained by joining or supporting the core activist group fighting the ethnic movement. At the same time, violence is neither an expression of unintelligible emotional madness nor a mere reflection of unconditional allegiance produced out of fears to avoid the penalties of defection. Instead of overwhelmingly focusing on either of these approaches, the chapter treats violence as an outcome of three interactive forces. In its search for factors that account for the causes of violent ethnic mobilization, the pervasive nature and sustenance of such mobilization, this chapter has concentrated on explaining the process of radicalization as a convergence of three interrelated conditions: 1) accessibility of strong societal resource base that shields the rebels from excessive state repression and encourages support for anti-state violence of rebels 2) promotion of separatist demands through effective communicative techniques around a commonly shared ethnic symbol to motivate the group members

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towards collective action; 3) sustained use of coercive state policies that creates a political context for radicalization against indiscriminate repression. The chapter proposed that inconsistent accommodation and consistent use of widespread and indiscriminate methods of repression by the state actually provoked greater outbursts of collective action by stimulating support for the movement and by attracting erstwhile inactive members into the protest. Activist rebellion in this sense corresponds to continuous mobilization of resources beyond the confines of specific organizational structures; the capacity to utilize ideational resources embedded in solidarity networks within the community as well as vertical networks between the core leaders and the followers of the mobilized group. State responses (openness versus closure) further influences the variant patterns of activist rebellion, the intensity, norms of reciprocity, commitment and consistent support for activism.

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CHAPTER FIVE

ETHNO-NATIONALIST MOVEMENT OF THE MISINGS

INTRODUCTION

The majoritarian policies adopted by the Assam government in 1960s produced a chain of reactionary movements in which tribal ethnic minorities of Assam sought for cultural as well as political autonomy. Among them were the Misings, who mobilized for autonomy as a means to obtain cultural recognition, political representation and above all, enhance their powers to control local resources. Like other ethnic minorities, the ethno- political objectives of the Misings seemed to be largely influenced by socio-economic, political and cultural resentments against the state. However, unlike other ethnic groups such as the Bodos and the Dimasas, the Misings did not campaign for total separation from Assam. Instead they sought to create an autonomous territorial unit that will enable the group to exercise decentralized political powers as well as fiscal autonomy and that will remain as an integral part of Assam. Although the Misings pushed for this goal, they finally moderated their demands and settled for something less than their original claims for territorial autonomy. Apart from this fundamental difference in the original objectives, the ethno-nationalist movement of the Misings revealed striking differences from the Bodos and the Dimasas, with respect to the methods of mobilization adopted by the Mising activist organizations to seek autonomy. While the former groups were significantly radical, the pro-autonomy movement of the Misings was marked by moderate means. In order to understand these variations, this chapter tries to analyze

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some of the background conditions, the mobilizing frame, structures and state responses that determined the peaceful methods of mobilization of the Misings.

The chapter begins with a brief historical account of the experiences of the Misings prior to their incorporation as an integral part of the post-colonial state of Assam in 1947.

The historical analysis will offer an understanding of the initial conditions that fostered ethnic grievances and prompted the group to opt for mobilization over complete subordination. The discussion in this chapter is divided into different parts. Each part explores how the movement passed through different phases of mobilization and the processes which turned the movement that was mostly confined to middle-class intellectuals in the 1950s and 60s to a relatively wider base of activism in the late 80s and

90s. Next, the chapter analyzes myriad policies used by the state that ranged from moderate levels of coercion to cooptation of local elites. The chapter then examines why the activists instead tended to emphasize on peaceful protest strategies. Despite the presence of some pre-existing societal networks, the nationalist organizations could not harness them for radical political action. By looking at state strategies together with the framing efforts of movement activists and the inability of the activist organizations to mobilize organizational as well as societal resources i.e. factors that explain the strength of the ties between the potential supporters and the core leadership of the ethnic movement, one can offer an explanation on the compromising attitude and quiescent methods of political mobilization adopted by the Misings.

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PRE-COLONIAL TO COLONIAL PERIOD (1800-1926)

The Misings shared similar histories of migration with the Tibeto-Burman groups settled in India‘s north-eastern region. Historical records reveal that the Misings were found to inhabit the easternmost part of Assam in the foothills of the Himalayas; bordering Assam‘s neighboring state of Arunachal Pradesh [Mipun, 1987]. Gradually, they descended to the nearby plain areas and settled in the territories mostly along the northern banks of the river Brahmaputra, Subansiri, and Ronganadi, in the eastern most part of Assam. The community has been settled in these areas since the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries A.D. when these territories were controlled by the Chutiya kings.98

The main ethnic markers that differentiate the Misings from the dominant Assamese- speaking group are their physical features, customs, beliefs, language, dress codes and family structure. Their ethno-political identity is centered on these ascriptive markers that have often been used by ethno-nationalists to emphasize their cultural differences from the dominant group. Although the nationalists often emphasize on a distinct ethnic boundary between the Misings and the dominant group, anthropological records reveal that the group had highly intermingled with the dominant community through social links, since the end of the 13th century. Following the invasion of the region by the

Ahoms, the Misings came in close contact with the plains people of Assam [Mipun, p.18]. The Ahoms spread their kingdom towards Sadiya in the easternmost part, conquered the Chutiya kings and established their own suzerainty. Although the Misings

98Chutiyas ruled over different parts of Assam for nearly three hundred years before the Ahoms came to Assam. The Ahoms overpowered the Chutiya kings in the 16th century. [Gait,1967] 192

initially resisted the Ahoms through small-scale sporadic uprisings, they finally came to an agreement with the Ahoms and developed working relationships with the Ahom chiefs. The Ahoms recognized limited powers of autonomy of the Mising chiefs in the villages inhabited by Misings and in return the Misings agreed to help the Ahoms to fight against other groups who tried to attack the bordering areas of the Ahom kingdom. Due to their skills in archery, Misings were recruited to serve in the military operations of the

Ahom kings [Mipun, 1987, p. 18]. These interactions enabled the Misings to increase their political as well as economic relations with the Ahoms which facilitated their coexistence with other lowland communities in the subsequent phases in history. Thus, the political history of the Misings can at best be described to be based on village based autonomy managed by tribal chiefs which was maintained even after the decline of the

Ahom kingdom when the British assumed the responsibilities of administering the areas inhabited by the Misings. Unlike the Bodos or the Dimasas the Misings did not have the historical experiences of statecraft nor kingship.

Further, it was during the period of interaction with the Ahoms that the Misings came under the influence of Vaishnavaite form of Hinduism and gave up some of their earlier tribal rituals, beliefs and practices. The Misings also had high rates of acculturation into the dominant Assamese society. Rates of adaptation of Assamese language were very high among the Misings and some have even adopted the Assamese as a primary language of communication and identity. These sections of the Mising community are collectively identified as the Saranias. They are also known as Temar, Samaguria,

Bongkhual, Bihia and Bebejia and are considered to be more fluent in Assamese

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language than Mising. Scholars like Jatin Mipun have gone far to the extent of arguing that except a few words of Mising language used in common parlance; the traditional

Mising language has been completely forgotten by the Saranias [Mipun, 1987].

Therefore, at the beginning, Mising identity was vaguely defined as the group had integrated some of the relevant traits of the dominant social system (including language) and some of the aspects of Vaishnavaite Hinduism. It was only in the early part of the twentieth century, in response to ethno-linguistic nationalism of the Assamese-speaking community, that the Mising cultural revivalists began to configure a distinct form of

Mising identity around the centrality of language, culture and distinct patterns of social behavior that are still maintained by the Misings, more visibly in the rural areas.

Linguistic appeals formed an integral part of the rhetoric of Mising activists during the subsequent phases of ethno-nationalism. These nationalists sought to return to traditional

Mising language and enhance its increased usage in the Mising society through legal recognition of language rights at schools and other public institutions.

POLITICIZATION OF ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY (1926-1956)

The politicization of Mising identity and the moves towards decentralized institutions cannot be explained without analyzing the political developments of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial period. With the disintegration of the Ahom kingdom in 1826, the British occupied Assam and gradually expanded their influence in different parts of the region. As the British officers advanced towards the interior of Assam, they developed a distinct pattern of categorization of the population as backward tribes, forest dwellers and non-tribal people. Apart from ethnic categorization, the areas where the

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former groups lived were placed under special administration of the British government.

This process not only reinforced differences between the tribals and the non-tribal communities but also generated a form of collective identity of the Misings. It is important to note in this context that apart from some of the observable differences of language, lifestyle and physical appearances, Mising nationalists often validate their narratives on the basis of historical records left behind by British anthropologists. The colonial accounts have indeed served as a cognitive basis of ethnic distinctiveness and foundation of a common Mising identity.

For the purposes of administrative convenience, the British authorities brought the

Mising territories under a system of indirect rule, whereby the local chiefs were ensured of some degree of autonomy over their areas and in return, they maintained law and order in those areas on behalf of the colonial authorities. Following the administrative act

Montague-Chelmsford Report of 1918, the areas that were autonomously controlled by the Mising traditional chiefs, were brought under the indirect administration of the

British. The areas were eventually categorized as backward tracts of Lakhimpur, Balipara and Sadiya, the last tract running upto the borders of Tibet. These territories were administered by the Governor-in-Council. In 1936, on the basis of recommendation of the

Simon Commission, the backward tracts were further regrouped as ‗excluded and partially excluded areas‘ and were jointly administered with the North East Frontier

Agency (NEFA) of Assam, a British agency that had territorial borders with Tibet. The regrouping of these territories meant that any reform and legislation passed by the Assam provincial legislature with respect to the administration of different areas of the province,

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would not apply to the Mising territories. Instead, the Governor of Assam who functioned as an agent of the British government was entrusted with the sole responsibility of controlling and managing the administration of the backward areas. These arrangements were maintained till the British government transferred its powers to the leaders of independent India.

At the end of WWII, when the British government was preparing to transfer the powers to the Indian government, the Mising leaders like other peripheral minorities of the northeastern region, showed their concerns about their future status and political autonomy. The leaders organized themselves and made demands for special protection of group rights and recognition of the Mising areas as autonomous territories. Historical marginalization and isolation of the group as an excluded and backward community was intended to serve as bases for those demands. Consequently, in May 1947, few middle class intellectuals led by Padmeswar Doley formed a socio-political organization called the Northeast Frontier Miri-Abor Sanmilon. The committee sent its recommendations to the British government which stated that the Indian government should create an autonomous unit for the Misings, Abors, Daflas and Charak tribal communities on the basis of ethnic affiliation that the Misings shared with these communities [Mipun, 1987].

The demands clearly stated that the autonomous unit should have specified territorial boundaries that should extend to the areas bordering Tibet in the north, river Brahmaputra in the south, Sadiya in the east and river Subonsiri in the Western part of the province of

Assam. The self-governing unit should be empowered with powers to make laws related

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to the local matters of these communities. By constituting such an autonomous unit these groups would be ensured of political representation and powers of governing their region.

The demands made by the middle class intellectuals clearly manifested the desire of the Misings to be integrated into the Indian union without unconditionally surrendering their traditional forms of local autonomy. By choosing the option of an autonomous area within Assam, the Misings wanted to end the prolonged alienation and social exclusion of the community and benefit from the processes of modern state-building. However, subsequent policies designed by the state government guaranteed them neither equal socio-economic opportunities nor sufficient amount of territorial autonomy. Much to their dissatisfaction, the areas where the Misings lived were bifurcated from NEFA (an upland area) and were integrated with the plain areas of the Assam province.99 These areas were categorized as ‗transferred territories‘. The transferred areas were protected under the scheme of ‗tribal belts and blocks‘ and were therefore, prevented from being encroached by non-tribal groups. By guaranteeing these provisions, the government certainly sought to safeguard traditional control over lands; nonetheless these measures did not reflect any signs of conceding the group with political autonomy, i.e. local governments did not have significant control over policies.

LANGUAGE MOVEMENT (1956-87)

First few decades of state-building were characterized by concentration of political power and limited representation of ethnic minorities in Assam. In order to overturn the

99The state of Arunachal Pradesh was later created out of the areas within NEFA. 197

longstanding dominance of the Bengalis the Assam government legislated majoritarian ethnic policies on key issues related to socio-economic development of the Assamese- speaking group. The state used these strategies not only to consolidate power but also to justify ethnic dominance over minority ethnic groups. The policies had a significant bearing on inter-group relations and disrupted the fragile relations that were established between the relatively advantaged Assamese and the less privileged ethnic minorities like the Misings.

Language policies which were legislated by the Assam government in 1960s marked a turning point. By implementing the language law the Assam government supported by other nationalist organizations sought to widen the scope of Assamese language not only as a basic requirement for government jobs and in higher institutions of learning but also to increase its usage in public life. Implementation of these policies meant increased allocation of resources to those who were most proficient in the Assamese language but created new obstacles for minority ethnic groups to redress past imbalances of education and employment opportunities.100 They feared the increasing ethnic competition in the allocation of important government offices and positions and found it difficult to challenge the dominance of the Assamese-speaking group. These groups were worried because their languages and dialects were not given equal weight as the regional language. These policies therefore, became a primary point of controversy and further politicized cultural identities, particularly language.

100According to constitutional provisions, the Schedules Tribes have reserved seats in the government jobs. But in order to qualify for those positions the candidates have to qualify in the regional language that was made compulsory by the government. As a result, it became necessary for the minorities to be proficient in Assamese. 198

As a result, vigorous efforts were made by cultural revivalists and political activists to promote their original languages and scripts. The state government came under intense pressures from the Bodos, Dimasas, Misings and other tribal groups in the region with demands for the recognition of minority languages as a medium of instruction in the primary and higher institutions of learning. They believed that promotion of their mother tongues as a medium of instruction will increase their ability to gain privileges equal to those of the privileged majority. Above everything else, this will prevent the dominant language from overrunning local dialects and languages of tribal minorities. Outright expression of resentments took the form of various language movements in the state.

The Mising society witnessed a language movement in 1970s when the Mising

Literary Society known as the Mising Agom Kebang (MAK) that was originally formed in 1924, launched a cultural revivalist movement to fight against the implementation of the Assam language Act (1960) on grounds that the act restricted the material choices of the community, such as their access to jobs, higher education as well as representation in the political system. The movement sought to preserve local Mising culture and languages and reduce Assamese language proficiency as a major requirement for the socio-economic advancement of the Misings. While emphasizing these goals, the activists pushed for structural changes in the educational system by teaching Mising language in the primary level of school education, in addition to or in place of Assamese, primarily in the Mising dominated areas of the state.

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For the most part from early 1970s to the first half of 1980s, the movement was led by the intellectual elite and the Mising Literary Society. It was only in the mid-80s that this selected group of intellectuals were joined in by students, political leaders other social activists to organize collectively in support of the key issues of the movement.

First few years of the movement were primarily dedicated to publication and distribution of a substantial volume of literary works in the Mising language so that people could have adequate access to basic resources (books, articles, etc.) required for the expansion of the language as a medium of learning and instruction in schools. Some of the prominent literary works such as the Miri Lesson (Miri Path) written by Kamal Chandra

Padum and the Miri Dowan of Mising Agom written by Bibhishan Pegu were published during this period. The publication of these works exemplifies the efforts made in this direction to disseminate the basic skills of learning and teaching the language.

Besides the promotion of language, another key issue of the movement was to develop the language in its written form by using the Roman script instead of Devanagri that was used until then. The emphasis on the Roman script can be acknowledged as a manifestation of reactive nationalism whereby the tribal minorities (including the

Misings) expressed a strong sense of aversion to the Assamese language, written in

Devanagri script. By showing their willingness to accept the Roman script, the Misings expressed their differences from the Assamese and their symbolic attachment to tribal languages mostly written in the Roman script. The anti-Devanagri rhetoric was also propagated as a response to the involvement of the state government in the Roman vs.

Devanagri script controversy. The state government set up a committee to solve these

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controversies that gave its decision in favor of Devanagri. These recommendations were taken as an act of imposition by the pro-Roman script Mising activists. In a last ditch effort, these activists formed the Roman Script Council (Roman Lipi Parishad) which finally proclaimed the adoption of the Roman script. As a conciliatory move, the government accepted their proposal. Nonetheless, the protestors continued their protest activities unabated as the major demand on the recognition of the language still remained unaddressed.

The Mising leaders launched a second phase of the movement in the early phase of

1980s. By this time the Mising student‘s organization known as the Takam Mising Porin

Kebang (TMPK) acquired the responsibilities of organizing and coordinating the activities of the movement.101 Simultaneously, the political activists launched the agitation for territorial autonomy. Although not comparable in strength and broad social base that was acquired by the Bodo movement, the Mising nationalist organizations during this phase of the literary movement, managed to muster enhanced support among the general masses of the community. After much pressure through public rallies and protest demonstrations, the activists finally managed to persuade the government in 1987, to allow Mising language to be taught as a medium of instruction and as a language in primary schools in the areas inhabited by Misings.

101 TMPK was a leading organization in mobilizing the Mising people for political autonomy. TMPK has its origins in the Assam Miri Chatra Sanmilon, a students‘ organization formed in 1933. In 1985, at the annual session held in Majuli, the organization was named as the Takam Mising Porin Kebang. 201

POLITICAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT (1987-2001)

The Assam government‘s pronouncements on minority language issues in the late

70s and 80s indicated a move towards more flexible policies. After dealing with the language and script controversies of the Bodos, albeit in partial terms, the state government turned to provide considerable concessions to the Misings. However, these guarantees did not dampen the core resentments of the newly emerging band of young

Mising activists whose major demands went far beyond cultural rights and were related to issues of political autonomy. The focus now shifted to devolution of power and more precisely, to territorial issues. As a matter of fact, the last phase of the language movement coincided with the resurgence of demands for decentralization of local powers to the Misings by forming an autonomous body within Assam. Legal bases of these demands were defined in terms of the Sixth Schedule (Article 244) of the Indian constitution that allows the formation of a territorial area administered by a district council.

In 1987, while taking these demands into consideration, the TMPK (Mising students‘ organization) activists launched its campaign for autonomy. Unlike the Bodoland movement which attracted members associated with a host of ethnic organizations and elicited as deep a response from the activists and supporters as it did among the general masses, the Mising autonomy movement was marked by profound intra-ethnic divisions and controversies among the core nationalist organizations. Divisions emerged on the fundamental questions related to the form and content of the local self-governing unit.

The student leaders wanted greater territorial autonomy specified in terms of the Sixth

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Schedule (Art. 244) of the Indian Constitution. This provision would have allowed devolutionary powers to a district council, an autonomous institution with legislative, administrative and judicial powers over a number of policy areas that includes land regulation, natural resource management, customary laws, taxation, etc. The idea was to extend the administration of the district council to several districts of Assam, areas where the Misings constituted more than fifty percent as well as those areas where the Misings are a significant minority of the population. While TMPK leaders ardently advocated the idea, the older generation of leaders under the aegis of the Grand Assembly of the

Misings (Mising Bane Kebang) had reservations on this type of territorial arrangement that the TMPK leaders had been proposing.102 MBK and its supporters were not very convinced about TMPK‘s goal of redrawing territorial boundaries of the Mising areas.

The latter group of leaders argued that the Misings are widely dispersed in several districts of Assam. Moreover, the Misings live in areas that are highly interspersed with the Assamese population which makes it difficult for accurate demarcation of the Mising areas. MBK also felt that the idea of incorporating the areas where the Misings were a significant minority was totally impracticable. Therefore, they revealed willingness to accept a limited form of cultural and political autonomy in the Mising majority areas and showed staunch opposition to the idea of greater territorial autonomy under the Sixth

Schedule as proposed by the TMPK supporters.

Why did the MBK supporters show a lack of interest in TMPK‘s formula for autonomy? Part of the reason lies in the fact that the former group of leaders comprised

102Grand Council of the Misings (Mising Bane Kebang) was formed in 1924. The organization played an important role in the socio-cultural reform of the Mising society. 203

of some of the core sympathizers of the Congress Party. Moreover, this group represented the older generation of leaders who showed higher rates of intermixing with the

Assamese society. On the whole, the MBK supporters wanted to maintain a delicate balance between their goals for cultural and political autonomy by accepting limited autonomy that was offered to them by the ruling Congress Party. I explain this in more detail in the next section.

STATE RESPONSES AND SELECTIVE INCENTIVES: FIRST ATTEMPT TO ACCOMMODATE (1990-1996)

As discussed in the previous section, 1990s witnessed the emergence of growing factional divisions in the political orientation of the ethnic leadership. Within this context of growing internal rivalries, the TMPK accompanied by emerging socio-political organizations such as the Mising Mimang Kebang (MMK) or the Mising Action

Committee formed in 1992, and the All Mising Women‘s Association (Takam Mising

Mime Kebang) resolved to put pressures on the government for a positive outcome on the matter. Following this resolution, the pro-autonomy activists waged a more vigorous struggle by organizing public meetings, protest rallies and demonstrations in the major

Mising areas.

When the pressures increased, the Assam government led by the Congress Party leader Hiteswar Saikia (1991-1996) sought to accommodate some of the demands made by the pro-autonomy activists. The state government devised a scheme that allowed the leaders to form an autonomous council with powers to administer some of the local

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affairs of the Misings. The scheme however, totally disregarded the core issue of demarcating territorial boundaries or the specification of the areas that will remain under the jurisdiction of the Mising Autonomous Council (MAC). This seemed to be rather inconsistent with the original set of proposals that were presented by the activists. To make matters worse, although the proposals offered by the government stated that the council will have the right to exercise its powers in the Mising dominated areas

(Lakhimpur, Dhemaji, Sibsagar, and Jorhat districts), yet the jurisdiction was restricted only to those villages that were geographically contiguous and where the total population comprised of more than fifty percent of Misings.103 This virtually meant that the MAC will have the power to exercise its rights over a considerably smaller size of autonomous territory. This scheme was incompatible to the demands made by TMPK. TMPK leaders were reluctant to accept this proposal made by the government because empirical evidence revealed that except in one or two districts, that is, the sub-divisions of Jonai and Gogamukh, in Dhemaji and Lakhimpur district, the Misings hardly represented more than fifty percent of the population in the villages considered to be geographically contiguous.104 The TMPK members thus received the signal that the government was not only unwilling to compromise on the issue of territory but was intended to restrict the access of the group even to limited amounts of local autonomy.

To resolve the deadlock, TMPK suggested that the government should reconsider the issue of territory. Moreover, the leaders came up with a more reasonable, adhoc and a

103 It will be appropriate to use the term villages since most of the areas are still considered to be underdeveloped and rural. 104 Dispersed settlement of the Misings acted as an impediment to mobilize the people. A detailed breakdown of the settlement pattern is provided in a later section of this chapter. 205

middle-ground solution that were deemed to be acceptable to both the parties. The TMPK proposed that while continuing its deliberations on the Sixth Schedule, in the meanwhile the government can include the areas protected under the category of ‗tribal belts and blocks‘ under the jurisdiction of MAC. The Mising leaders felt that by doing this, the

MAC will be able to exercise some powers to manage their territories as compared to what the government had been initially offering. The government however, refused to accept these suggestions. Additionally, the government reserved the powers of legislation in its own hands, on all relevant matters of the MAC. More precisely, MAC was allowed to execute only those laws that were legislated and specified by the state assembly. With regard to financial matters, the funds required for the functioning of the council were to be allocated periodically from the state treasury. In sum, the provisions practically implied that the powers of the MAC were highly limited to following the supervisory functions of the government. Moreover, this virtually indicated that the council will have to function without any reasonable degree of autonomy (executive, legislative and financial).

These decisions further resurfaced the ensuing tensions. Despite series of discussions with the government, the TMPK and MMK activists could not make much headway to achieve anything satisfying. On the contrary, the state government devised a strategy to utilize the intra-elite division to its own advantages by providing selective inducements to some leaders who favored partial autonomy. As the TMPK awaited a positive response, the latter group accepted the Assam government‘s offers. With the backing of the state and the members of MBK, they formed a committee called the Mising Autonomous

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Demand Committee (MADC) and formally acceded to the limited offers at a general conference held in April 1995 at a place called Bilmukh in Lakhimpur district. The leaders eventually ratified the agreement on June 14th 1995 for the creation of an Interim

Mising Autonomous Council. The council was headed by Laxminath Pangging, a close ally of the ruling Congress party. He was later replaced by Doneswar Modi, a popular

Congress leader from Jonai parliamentary constituency.

Partial accommodation and selective incentives had at least two consequences for the political movement. First, it led to further polarization of the leadership and second it intensified the agitation of the TMPK. The TMPK members did not find the situation conducive to attain their goals through available institutional channels or by employing methods of mere persuasion. The result was further aggravation of discontent and intense protest actions. With substantial support and participation of local Misings, TMPK and

MMK leaders organized a second round of agitation. The agitation was however responded with moderate levels of state repression followed by arrests, detentions and police firing that claimed several injuries and fatalities of protesters. This contributed to expansion of the movement to other Mising areas such as Gogamukh in the district of

Dhemaji. Anjana Pegu, Naresh Taid and Mahananda Medok lost their lives during the agitation when the state security forces resorted to baton-charge and indiscriminate firing to disperse the protestors. The movement was also marked by small scale skirmishes between the supporters of the two opposing cliques, that is, the supporters of TMPK and

MADC. In some places, supporters of TMPK and MMK barred MADC members from entering the Mising villages.

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STATE RESPONSES AND SELECTIVE INCENTIVES: SECOND ATTEMPT TO ACCOMMODATE (1996-2001)

The assembly elections were held in Assam in 1996 and led to the victory of the

AGP. Change of leadership from Congress to the AGP ushered in a new era of hope in the Misings. The activists made fresh appeals to the newly formed AGP ministry. Despite initial efforts, the latter failed to address the core issues with respect to dissolution of the

Interim council and the remapping of boundary. As a result of these failed attempts, the

TMPK leaders decided to fight a legal battle with the government and filed a case against the state government in the High Court of Gauhati. The Court recommended the state government to reconsider the institution of the Interim Council and gave its final verdict on 11th March, 1998, to dissolve the council. Consequently, the Assam government

(AGP) negotiated a deal with the leaders of TMPK and the All Mising Women‘s

Association in April 1998. Subsequently, the activists agreed to temporarily suspend the agitation. They gave their consent to accept the decentralized structure in its present form

(limited autonomy) if the government promised to dissolve the Interim council and conduct popular elections to establish a new autonomous council.

The AGP government agreed, but due to its failure to implement the act, the TMPK resumed their agitation until May 2001 when a new government was formed in the state led by the Congress Party. In order to find a solution to the stalemate, the Congress government set up a ministerial committee that came up with a formula to divide the areas where the Misings were settled as ‗core‘ and ‗satellite areas‘. The recommendations of the committee stated that the core areas will consist of villages that were territorially

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contiguous and comprised of a population predominantly categorized as Misings and where more than 50% would belong to the Scheduled Tribe category. The satellite areas will consist of Mising villages that were territorially non-contiguous. Major responsibilities and powers of administering the core and satellite areas were entrusted to the Mising Autonomous Council. According to this arrangement 1239 and 392 villages were included in the ‗core‘ and ‗satellite‘ areas respectively.105 Although the TMPK leaders did not give up their original demands for greater autonomy, they finally accepted the deal. The newly created MAC started functioning as a decentralized governing unit with the supervisory powers and finances still under the purview of the Assam government.

From the above description, it is clear that the accord signed by the government with the TMPK activists recognized the right of the Misings to exercise limited autonomy. The outcome of the movement reveals a relatively restrained attitude adopted by the Mising activists when organizing for their political goals. The explanations also demonstrate that the Mising leaders showed their willingness to get involved in the normal political process by accepting the offers proposed by the government and finally, settled down for a less preferred deal. The above explanations however, do not offer enough answers for the reasons behind the motivations for controlled methods of political mobilization. The next section is an attempt to offer some answers to this question. It argues that the outcome of Mising autonomy movement was largely shaped by the absence of two potential background conditions---a) cohesive and distinct self-identifying social category

105 The Mising Autonomous Council Act, 1995 as amended by Assam Act No. VIII of 2001 and Assam Act No. XXI of 2005. 209

articulated by organized movement b) lack of strong mobilization networks as a result of geographic dispersion. The organizers of the movement could hardly employ the rhetoric of geographical cohesion, ethnic cohesiveness and salience of ethno-linguistic identity to justify their acts of resistance. It also discusses the accommodative responses of the state-

---an important facilitating factor that cannot be ignored while examining the moderate turn of the Mising movement. A combination of these factors weakened the leverage of the Misings to push for self-governance through a radical approach. These variables are incorporated into a simple framework as provided in Fig. 5.1.

Fig.5.1.Variables explaining the outcome of Mising Autonomy Movement

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SALIENCE OF LANGUAGE IDENTITY IN STRATEGIC MOBILIZATION106

Policies of accommodation adopted by the government on cultural issues, particularly language, alleviated part of the grievances of the Misings. But what were the effects of the movement on subsequent phases of mobilization? In other words, how far language identity of the Misings was considered to be relevant by the members of the group to make their socio-political preferences? To what extent did the Misings consider the role of linguistic identity as an important aspect to redefine their ethno-political status and relationship with the dominant community? Was the Mising language movement able to act as a strong and fertile condition for radicalization the way it happened in the case of the Bodos? The two movements were similar in the sense that both began as apolitical movements aimed at cultural revivalism but differed with respect to their impact. As we saw in Chapters 3 and 4, Bodo language movement of 1960s provided a solid foundation for the expansion, organization and radicalization of the territorial autonomy movement.

The movement symbolized a strong underlying force beneath much of the subsequent phases of Bodo nationalism. Since then, politicians and activists began to emphasize the

Bodo language as an important element of ethnic distinctiveness. In the Mising case, the impact was however, much weaker and less intense for later phases of mobilization. How do we assess these variations?

With the emergence and increasing influence of young activists, Bodo nationalism transformed itself from a relatively passive form of resistance to one that was characterized as more open, highly organized and aggressive nationalism. The political

106 I use the term strategic because movement activists strategically choose and calculate which identity will best suit their mobilization process that can be used to achieve their movement objectives. 211

activists staunchly believed that to prevent further ethnic domination of the ‗chauvinist‘

Assamese, the Bodos should be granted with substantial powers to define their cultural rights and ethno-linguistic identity. Therefore, they combined their cultural concerns with their demands for political autonomy which the activists felt could be achieved only if the group attained regional autonomy by creating a distinct federal unit that will be completely separate from Assam. In essence, the establishment of a separate state will allow them to maintain the Bodo language as a main official language, that is, a federal arrangement that will fulfill their long cherished ethno-linguistic aspirations. This essentially meant that by creating their own state, the group will have more independence and power in the processes of political decision-making, increased access and right to retain finances and other economic benefits generated within their territory. Above everything else, this will remove significant constrains that the group had earlier experienced when the government made language proficiency as a criterion to obtain socio-economic entitlements. People were attracted to these appeals because defending the claims of their leaders was considered to make a huge difference to their marginalized position. General consensus also prevailed at the organizational level between the BSS, the moderates, and ABSU, the main advocates of radicalism on the form and content, i.e. the political power that Bodoland, as a separate federal unit would have. Although the

BSS persistently identified itself as a socio-cultural organization without any clear political orientation, the organization nonetheless offered unprecedented support to the political activists on the issue of territorial separation. In sum, what started as a reaction to discriminatory cultural policies effectively transformed itself into a radical political movement. Following the agitation, ethnic and cultural issues, particularly language

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permeated the popular discourse of Bodo nationalism and was consistently propagated as a predominant symbol to organize around the question of regionalism.

In sharp contrast to the Bodos, the Mising political activists failed to promote language as a cardinal feature of a monolithic and exclusive Mising identity. Mising leaders significantly failed to attach an unequivocal political meaning to their cultural identity or to mobilize the people by emphasizing on unwavering loyalties to cultural symbols such as, language. At the same time, the leaders could not make passionate appeals to the

Mising community to renounce their linguistic or any other cultural affiliation with the

Assamese. This stands in sharp contrast to the efforts made by the Bodo nationalists who played a vital role not only in reinforcing the loyalties of the group to some of the most valued traditional symbols, but also in evoking intense reactions of the community to repudiate cultural practices associated with the Assamese. To take an example, during the

Bodoland agitation, the Bodo nationalists called upon the Bodo women to renounce the customary dress of Assamese women, which was till then compulsory for young girls attending schools. The activists instead propagated the idea that they should wear the dokhona, the traditional attire of the Bodos. Another significant impact of the language movement was the increasing preference to identify places in the Bodo areas with Bodo names. These appeals received an overwhelming response in the Bodo society.107 On the contrary, identification with language was much weaker among the Misings.

107 The place where the annual session of the Bodo literary organization was held came to be known as Iradgao Fouthar since 1996. Iradgao is the Bodo version of Govind Chandra, the last king of the Kachari dynasty. [Baruah, 1999] 213

Several factors may be singled out to explain these varying capabilities of the Bodo and Mising activists to propagate these symbols as the most typical elements of their identities or to inflame intense public reactions. A simple way to start with, is to consider the availability of pre-existing ethnic symbols and their socio-political salience that the nationalists can cultivate to foster group cohesiveness as well as represent their goals.

Among the different cultural symbols that existed, the Bodo nationalists could take advantage of a rich and developed language that acquired an enduring fascination of a broad segment of Bodo middle class literary elite as early as 1950s. These developments occurred much earlier than that of the Misings (1970s).

Besides, early development of the Bodo language in its literary form, its popular usage was relatively more widespread in its spoken form than the Mising language. This difference is revealing because the Mising community (discussed in an earlier section in this chapter) showed intra-ethnic differences on ethno-linguistic identity. For the

Saranias, linguistic appeals were less attractive both in symbolic terms as they are more attached and accustomed to the language they normally speak, that is, Assamese, and from a material perspective, the ease with which they can earn the perceived benefits

(jobs, education, etc.). In other words, Assamese language skills were more readily available for these Misings.

Due to these intra-group divisions within the Mising society, the activists failed to develop language as the quintessence of an exclusive Mising identity. Alternatively, these activists relied on a more ambiguous and weak notion of ethnic distinctiveness which

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could not provide the strength and durability as the Bodo nationalists acquired. As a result, the Mising literary movement failed to instill the kind of enthusiasm that the Bodo movement could evoke and that eventually led to an organized rebellion around the question of ethno-linguistic demarcation of territory. On the contrary, in the case of the

Misings, given the absence of clearly defined ethnic boundaries, these debates remained largely in the background. Moreover, the support for a clear-cut ethno-territorial identity seemed to be weak and highly mixed.

These ambiguities had an impact on the divisiveness within the leadership and their political goals. For some nationalists, mostly TMPK members, the main objective was to achieve territorial autonomy but for others who adhered to the ideology of MADC-MBK, encompassing the older generation and sympathizers of the ruling government, the goal was limited to the promotion of culture and linguistic rights. So when the discriminatory language policies were passed by the government, the Bodos felt a greater urge to preserve their cultural rights from being encroached by a hostile enemy. At the same time, the Misings were mainly concerned with revivalism and most importantly to develop the language and increase its use in the Mising society. The Mising revivalists were satisfied with the recognition of Mising language as a medium of instruction at the primary school level of education. For the Bodos, the issue was not just related to revivalism or the medium of instruction at the school level, but to acquire legal recognition as a separate subject to be taught at the university level of education in

Assam and also its incorporation as a language of the Eighth Schedule of the Indian

Constitution. Moreover, they wanted recognition of Bodo language as the main official

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language of Bodoland. Thus, etho-linguistic appeals did not have much popular resonance in the Mising areas. In other words, the narratives of ethnic differences were not seen legitimate enough by the Mising people to make radical political demands.

Apart from intra-ethnic differences, lack of ambitious leaders like U.N.Brahma or strong ethnic organizations like the ABSU involved in effective communicative strategies and inviolable commitment towards a specific political goal also had an influence on popular resonance and the success of mobilization. Although the aftermath of the Mising language movement witnessed the emergence of organizations like the TMPK, MMK and

MADC-MBK, neither of these ethnic organizations could serve as the most popular front for the Mising population. Throughout the early part of the political movement (80s) it was totally undefined as to what form of autonomy the leaders exactly wanted. Certainly, the TMPK did not advance any claims for physical separation of the Mising areas from

Assam. Nevertheless, when the TMPK came up with proposals on territorial autonomy and decentralization in mid-90s, it was not well-defined on what basis they had advocated their demands for decentralization. Moreover, TMPK‘s moves were not widely supported by the Mising population and it was unclear as to what portion of the Mising population actually wanted the form of decentralized institutions advanced by their leaders. Intra- group divisions that came to the surface in late 90s indicated that the movement demands for an autonomous administrative region did not resonate much with popular interests and beliefs.

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To reiterate, TMPK‘s communicative strategies could not produce enough popular mobilization that would have encouraged people in huge numbers to join their leaders in state-challenging activities. This had to do with---a) the lack of legitimacy of the demands made by TMPK and b) the credibility of the leadership. First, much unlike the

Bodos or Dimasas, the settlement history of the Misings as pointed out earlier, had no significant historical events related to conquest or occupation of Mising territories that would have had a major impact on the framing narratives of the activists or that would have left a deep imprint on Mising identity to produce a passionate desire to fight against any form of internal colonization by the dominant community. Ethnic identities may be derived from emotional attachment of a group to historical lands and engender a strong determination to protect such territories from being lost or controlled by usurpers. The

Bodos and the Dimasas perceived their situation in these terms. There is a general awareness amongst these two groups that they are historically and ethnically different from the dominant community and that the control of their ancestral territories by the dominant state and subordination of their rights to govern them is a threat to their ethnic identity. What mattered in these two cases was not the mere existence of such narratives, but rather how these narratives were tied to their current situation, their demographic pattern and how they were portrayed and transmitted to the populations. The Dimasa activists could partially accomplish this task in their framing process (a subject discussed in chapter 6) but the Mising leaders were the least successful while presenting their case to their co-ethnic as well as with the state during the bargaining process. Although the

TMPK leaders made attempts to maneuver the ethno-nationalist discourse, absence of ethnic cohesion within the community and the physical distribution of the Mising

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population in different non-contiguous areas of the region made it practically difficult for the leaders to enlist popular support for a campaign merely focussed on the discourse that a clearly defined Mising identity existed, with a homeland territory in the Subansiri region (areas inhabited by the Misings) and that requires to be protected from usurpation.108 It was difficult for the leaders to portray their cause as legitimate or representative of people‘s interests. Therefore, the movement mustered relatively weak level of participation. Misings did not come out with full force to support the cause of

TMPK. Even at the height of the political movement (late 90s), the largest public demonstration at Gogamukh, attracted only few hundred demonstrators out of a total population of 0.6 million Misings in the region. The strength was much weaker or rather negligible if compared to the level of popular participation in the demonstrations and public meetings of the Bodos during the Bodo agitation that was marked by the presence of thousands of supporters.

To sum up, the language movement which occurred in 1970s was itself less organized and mostly confined to a small section of middle-class intellectuals. The intra-group cleavages around issues of language had significant implications on ethnic cohesion and mobilizational capabilities of movement activists during and after the language movement. The aftermath of the language movement was therefore marked by internal ambiguities, absence of a coherent ethno-nationalist ideology and lack of consensus within the leadership. These factors worked in tandem and hindered the prospects of the

108 Population distribution of theMisings and its impact on mobilization is discussed in a later section in this chapter. 218

language movement in providing a solid base to produce an assertive form of ethno- linguistic nationalism in the subsequent phases of the ethnic movement.

MOBILIZING RESOURCES, THE SOCIETAL DIMENSION

My study has sought to capture the role of intra-group resources as an important factor that can shape popular mobilization and hence the move towards radicalization and support for violent ethnic movements. It also investigates the claim that the challenges faced by movement organizers to effectively diffuse their protest actions and mobilize a geographically fragmented group can be overcome if the organizers can develop strong protest networks with the members of the group. Variability in the capability of the core nationalist organizations to mobilize societal resources accounts for variant outcomes in ethnic movements. To reiterate, I have tried to represent violent mobilization as a three- step process, moving first from non-violent organized resistance, to acts of violent resistance and finally to the sustenance of violent rebellion. Besides other factors, the ability of movement organizers to gather popular support and participation for each stage is inextricably linked to pre-existing community networks as well as strong vertical ties established by core ethnic organizations with the members of the group.

The analysis in Chapter 4 has shown that the Bodo nationalist organizations successfully developed a strong social base or ‗potential beneficiaries‘ as McAdam puts it

[McAdam, 1982, p 21.] and cohesive force after their involvement in the language movement in the 1960s. The bases were developed out of the solidarity networks (non- material resources) defined along lines of Bodo language and other common ethnic

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symbols that were shared and consciously evoked not just as a self-identifying social symbol but also as a strong indicator of differentiation with respect to the dominant ethnic group. Mobilization of these resources facilitated the organization of a strong and cohesive fighting force that was required for popular resistance in the subsequent phases of Bodo ethno-nationalist mobilization. Apart from the existence of these non-material and symbolic networks, capability of the Bodo activists to develop a strong social base was bolstered by the type of goals (ethno-territorial) that the activists had consistently pursued, their legitimacy and their ability to deliver collective security and services to the group in the absence of formal state institutions as providers of those security (economic, physical and political). This was also instrumental in the endurance of militant actions despite higher risks faced during intensive state repression.

The Mising activist organizations (TMPK) had equal access to societal resources but they failed to generate these resources in order to redefine the status of the group in the ethnic hierarchy. As a tribal society, the group is tightly held by self-conscious sense of group identities based on common history, language, customary affiliations and informal village institutions. Despite the availability and salience of pre-existing social identities, the Misings did not represent these identities in terms of a generalized ethnocentric bias against the Assamese. Even though the activists tried to portray their identity as distinct and unique, these views did not necessarily add to an inflexible and intolerant attitude towards the Assamese. When the Mising activists drew on their pre-existing cultural values, their appeals carried less weight than their Bodo counterparts to support any claim for a separate territory for Misings. This was in sharp contrast to the Bodos whose belief

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in unique ethno-linguistic identity generated impermeable ethnic boundaries and prevented collective actions needed for peaceful coexistence with the antagonistic communities. Their focus was not only on cultural autonomy but complete separation from the territories of the Assamese. Thus the Mising activists failed to garner enough material resources through horizontal networks.

Apart from the absence of strong intra-group mechanisms, the Mising leaders did not have privileged access to vertical networks. Specific organizational characteristics of the leading activist organizations of the political movement, ambiguity in the goals of the movement leadership and increasing gulf between the leading organizations crippled the hierarchical networks from within. Unlike ABSU, TMPK did not possess the organizational characteristics that would have provided a favorable structure to respond to the needs of recruitment, coordination and organization of the autonomy movement.

The core of organizational leadership of TMPK remained relatively small throughout the movement. The organization also lacked the decentralized structures of authority to invest the available societal resources and expand the scope of the movement across a wider range of the Mising community. Division of labor and decentralization of the organization enables movement organizers to better coordinate the movement if different sub-units are tenaciously held by a strong and committed leadership at the central command of the activist organization. TMPK did not display such an organizational characteristic. Apart from the narrowed scope of the movement, the organizational leadership could not stick to unwavering goals of ethno-nationalism. The leaders frequently redefined their loyalties and seemed to be more attracted to selective benefits

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rather than being committed to the longer-term goals of the movement. The activist organizations were thus less successful to establish their credibility as providers of collective security and public goods. Failure to distribute movement resources and authority by TMPK acted as a major structural strain and prevented diffusion of the ideas and protest tactics. In the absence of strong relational networks between the movement organizers and the group members, the efforts of the Mising were quite limited to obtain sustained popular support and to propagate a radical form of ethno-nationalism.

GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION: AN IMPEDIMENT TO ESTABLISH VERTICAL LINKS

As I have proposed in this study, the pattern of geographic settlement of ethnic minorities contributed to contrasting effects on the ability of movement organizers to establish vertical links with the group members. This section demonstrates empirically how settlement patterns of the Misings had an impact on mobilization. The Misings are widely dispersed in several administrative units (districts) in Assam. They are mostly spread across the districts of Lakhimpur, Dhemaji, Jorhat, Dibrugarh, Sibsagar, Golaghat,

Sonitpur and Tinsukia as shown in the map in figure 5.2.

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Fig. 5.2. Map of Assam showing different districts

Figure 5.3. illustrates the percentage of Mising population in the major districts of

Assam.

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Fig 5.3. Distribution of Misings population in selected districts of Assam [Source: Census Report of 2001]

The data reveals that the Misings constitute less than fifty percent of the total population in all the districts where they are mostly found. The group does not reveal sufficient numerical strength to represent their case as a concentrated minority in a particular geographical region. Even in the districts of Dhemaji and Lakhimpur, the physical distributions of the Misings are interspersed with the Assamese settlements.

These areas exhibit a complex mix of Assamese and Mising settlements. In addition, only

51.15 percent of the total Mising population in Assam resides in geographically contiguous and compact areas in the districts of Lakhimpur and Dhemaji. The rest of the

Mising population is widely dispersed in the rest of the districts (as shown in the map) that are geographically separated, from the former two districts, the center of protest

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activities by the river Brahmaputra. Why is it important to consider this variable? What were the effects of dispersed settlement on popular mobilization?

Distance from the epicenter of mobilization had an impact on the effectiveness of creating vertical links and the pattern of mobilization displayed during the movement.

Unlike the Bodoland movement, the protest activists during the Mising movement did not spill over to areas beyond the loci of protest activities in the two main districts of

Lakhimpur and Dhemaji. As a result, the TMPK activists had to bear higher costs of mobilization during the movement. Difficulties of expanding the movement became more apparent as the leaders failed to convince their supporters and the government on a clearly demarcated territory for which they wanted self-government. Misings who expressed deep reservations on the viability of territorial autonomy condemned the pro- autonomy supporters for their attempts to present a case in favor of self-governance of the Misings. These respondents most succinctly put their views on this issue that given the geographical segregation of the Misings living in the districts of Jorhat, Sibsagar and the rest of Assam, territorial autonomy under the Sixth Schedule is totally improbable and unconvincing.109 Few things were repeatedly pointed out by Misings who were not in support of the Sixth Schedule type of autonomy. First, since more than 48 percent of the

Misings are widely distributed in non-contiguous areas, outside the two main districts of

Lakhimpur and Dhemaji. If a district council is established in Dhemaji based on the proposals of the Mising activists, all the affairs related to the administration and development of the Mising dominated areas in these two districts would be controlled

109Viability of this argument notwithstanding, most respondents who expressed these views were retired bureaucrats, advocates and some even members of the literary society with overt or covert political leanings with the Congress Party. 225

directly by the autonomous district council, a local-self governing institution elected by the people. Accordingly, the council would have the right to enact its own laws on a number of important issues based on the local interests of the people, such as matters related to land use and distribution, inheritance, marriage, divorce, creation of small-scale industries, etc. People living in these areas can also benefit from special development schemes and financial assistance that would be provided by the central government periodically. Misings residing beyond these districts would not however, be able to enjoy the expected benefits of autonomy. This is primarily because the governance and development of these areas are directly under the control of the state government. A state government official designated as the Commissioner for the welfare and development of tribals (including Misings), looks after the affairs of these areas. The proposed Mising

Territorial Area and the decentralized institution meant only for the Misings thus, would not represent the rights of autonomy of the other half of the Mising population. Spatial dispersion of the Misings weakened the capabilities of the leadership and the credibility of the demands to urge for the the option of Sixth Schedule type of territorial autonomy for the Misings. People were therefore less motivated to endorse the idea of such an autonomy.

The Misings therefore, represent an interesting case in which their settlement pattern combined with their acculturating tendencies did not urge them towards the goal for autonomy. While the Bodos seemed to be highly committed to distinguish themselves from the Assamese (culturally and politically) and thus to achieve their separatist demands even by using violent means, the Misings on the contrary, seemed to be less

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passionate about these mobilization strategies. Adoption of significant cultural attributes

(language, for instance) of the dominant ethnic group by a substantial portion amongst the Misings coupled with the group‘s settlement patterns undermined the zeal to perceive themselves ethnically different from the Assamese community. In addition to these impediments the potential conditions developed by the cultural movement could hardly provide the impetus for strong political mobilization which in turn could not develop effective movement networks. The cultural and political autonomy movements failed to coalesce into a single movement unlike the Bodos, where the two acted almost interdependently and reinforced each other. The Mising cultural revivalists represented their actions as autonomous and independent of any political motivations. Thus the leadership carried less weight to transcend the geographical barriers and to coordinate the movement in terms of a strong self-defining Mising identity, a clear-cut objective and organizational cohesion. In short, there is enough evidence to suggest that due to their geographic dispersal and integrative attitudes, the Misings lacked the motivation and the opportunities to use violent strategies while pursuing limited and internal ethnic autonomy.

ACCOMMODATION AND SELECTIVE INCENTIVES: CREATING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR MODERATING POLITICAL CLAIMS

Our understanding of the actual processes of ethno-nationalism of the Misings would be rather incomplete if we argue that the Misings were less motivated to engage in aggressive mobilization because of their weak structures of mobilization, combined with the absence of a strong self-defining ethnic category (language) that is equally valued by

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most members of the group and that contributed to inter-group hostilities during and after their involvement in organized resistance. Other than the absence of strong group-level motivations, the opportunity structure for collective mobilization, or more precisely, openness in the political system, proved vital for the Misings to address their concerns by using moderate means. This part of the chapter investigates the claim that selective incentives and accommodation prompted peaceful mobilization.

It is clear from the empirical evidence provided in one of the preceding sections that by employing strategies of partial accommodation and selective incentives, the state government was partially successful in its first attempt to demobilize the more moderate section of activists. Despite the ambiguities in the formal status of the autonomous territory that would be governed by the MAC, the more moderate section of political activists (MADC-MBK alliance) accepted the political incentives offered by the government. What mattered to them was an earlier settlement of the conflict. Indeed these activists justified their conciliatory move on this basis. In contrast to their accommodative approach, the TMPK activists initially declined to accept such offers. For them, the debate was not just territorial autonomy but how large and what kind of territories would be included in the autonomous council. They insisted that the institution should encompass the protected tribal areas not only in the districts where the Misings were predominant but also in other districts where they were a significant minority.

However, these demands had less chances of being addressed by the state. The government instead pointed out some of the practical difficulties to redraw the boundaries where the Misings live. Substantial portion of the Misings live in areas that are highly

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intermixed with the Assamese. The group is settled in such a way that the villages cannot be easily demarcated as separate administrative territories. This was precisely the rhetoric of the state government that convinced the moderates and attracted them towards the accommodative policies during the first phase of negotiation.

Despite intense pressures and anti-state demonstrations pursued by TMPK from 1998-

2001, the state government succeeded in its second attempt at negotiation to demobilize the TMPK activists. The settlement was made possible partly because of the inclination of the state to comply with some of the specific demands (inclusion of tribal belts) made by the TMPK and partly because of the willingness of the TMPK to negotiate. The accommodating attitude of the Congress run state government was to a great extent directed by the degree of openness and flexibility that the political system had shown towards the beginning of the year 2000 after dealing with long-standing armed conflicts with the Bodos and the Dimasas. Although complete accommodation was simply ruled out at that moment, the government was relatively more accommodative at this time. The government was well aware of the problems that the Mising leaders had been experiencing to legitimize their claims within the Mising population. Problems of legitimacy and the absence of popular support indicated that the Mising leaders were in a weaker bargaining position to push for Sixth Schedule form of autonomy through threats of violent mobilization. This condition explains why the state executive adopted an accommodative attitude as they knew that under the current circumstances, the Mising leaders could be pacified with a limited form of autonomy without setting up a district council.

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On the other hand, TMPK‘s real interest was crucially motivated by the potential benefits that the leaders expected to gain by attaining limited reforms. First, amidst internal conflicts within the leadership, the TMPK leaders had to rely on a loosely coordinated mobilization structure that the organization had forged to garner the support for territorial autonomy. The leaders virtually failed to incorporate a wide range of supporters for their purpose. Limited concessions that they were being offered would no doubt enable the leaders to maintain their credibility as the chief protagonist of the interests of the Mising community.

Second, by accepting the autonomy proposals, the TMPK leaders were ensured of an institutional base that they lacked so far which allowed them to exercise their political power at the local level. Despite being entrusted with limited capabilities, the decentralized institution enhanced the opportunities of the local Mising leaders and became the main instrument that affirmed their rights to generate economic resources and revenues in the Mising areas on behalf of the state government. A good proportion of funds were allocated by the state treasury for the administration of special departments of the autonomous council such as those related to health, provision of agricultural inputs, micro-credit loans, etc. This provided a certain degree of control over the expenditures of those funds to the officers-in-charge of specific departments. At the same time, the state government was anyway gaining from the terms of the negotiated pact. Due to high levels of dependence of the autonomous council on the state government this seemed to have established a vast network of patronage links and loyalty to the ruling regime.

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CONCLUSION

The chapter has analyzed the factors that facilitated collective mobilization of the

Misings. It has argued that the conditions that served as the main driving forces behind the content of radical ethno-nationalism of the Bodos were rather weak in the case of

Misings. The cultural and political movements were marked by weak capabilities of the leadership to organize an assertive form of ethno-nationalism. Although the fear of cultural extinction was not so severely felt, the Misings did have concerns about cultural domination and the preservation and promotion of their unique cultural traits. The cultural movement of 1970s was a clear manifestation of the intellectual elite‘s move in this direction. With reference to those years, one can safely draw the conclusion that the interests of the Mising leaders were consistent with their intention to achieve cultural autonomy.

It however, becomes difficult to acknowledge the exact goals of the subsequent phases of Mising ethno-nationalism. There is ample evidence that the leadership tended to emphasize on the achievement of a broad form of autonomy that would encompass cultural as well broader political objectives. The political leaders were indeed firm in their political goals and thus consistently formulated a program that emphasized their right to self-governance. If the leaders were inspired to embrace moderate and restrained means to mobilize, the reasons for this lie in internal incoherence, opposing goals and interests of the leadership, weak relational ties between the core leadership and the masses combined with a compromising and somewhat accommodative attitude of the state and the acceptance of selective inducements by the movement activists.

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CHAPTER SIX

ETHNO-POLITICAL MOVEMENT OF THE DIMASAS IN FAVOR OF GREATER POLITICAL AUTONOMY

INTRODUCTION

During the post-colonial period, ethno-political identities of tribal minorities [e.g.

Nagas, Mizos, etc.] in Assam emerged as the most evident form of ethnic identification.

These groups organized around claims for larger political representation by creating their own states or territorial units and by entering into a direct relationship with the central government so that they would no longer have to rely on the regional government for their recognition and socio-economic development. Despite repeated expressions, the

Indian government however, refrained from further fragmentation of the north-eastern region and instead sought to contain the agitations by using coercive means. These policies bolstered separatist tendencies. In late 1960s and early 70s, the government finally, succumbed to some of these pressures and created several new states out of the existing federal unit of Assam. The newly formed states were Nagaland created in 1962 and Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura created in the subsequent years in early 1970s.

The Dimasas, who were strong supporters of these tribal movements, mobilized along similar ethno-political lines and confronted the government with organized violence.

Their movement was largely shaped by the exclusivist policies adopted by the state

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government.110 The Dimasas distanced themselves from the Assamese because of fears of ethnic domination, excessive centralization and lack of accommodation of their demands to secure special protection of their cultural, economic, political rights and territorial privileges. This chapter offers an analysis of the emergence, politicization and mobilization of ethno-cultural identity of the Dimasas. It also examines the processes which describe the transition of peaceful political mobilization to coordinated ethnic violence. In addition, I investigate the circumstances that explain why the movement failed to sustain itself.

CONSTRUCTION, NEGOTIATION OF DIMASA IDENTITY: OVERVIEW OF THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD

The processes under which ethnic identity of the Dimasas were constructed, defined and renegotiated over a historical period of time, can be traced back to the group‘s migratory pattern, demographic settlement and ethnic lineage. For anthropologists and historians working from various shades of the spectrum since the colonial period, these issues had consistently been a matter of speculation. Despite varying interpretations, colonial writings do encapsulate some findings on the specialized traits of the Dimasas such as their Indo-Mongoloid physical features, tribal customary beliefs, practices and other socio-cultural expressions which suggest to some that their genealogical roots lie in

110 These exclusivist policies were also aimed at homogenizing in the face of threats from the advantaged Bengalis. The principle was also extended to the tribal minorities by bestowing special privileges to the Assamese-speakers while denying the same to the state‘s minorities. As Horowitz argues, the means of achieving homogenization are varied. Examples may be drawn from Sri Lanka where Tamils of Indian origin were denied their citizenship in 1949. Assamiyas were deeply resentful of Bengali-medium schools, and were on occasion wont to object to the use of Bengali languages in public places, such as buses, and in times of tension to force Bengali women wear only Assamese dress [cited in Horowitz, 1985 p.200 from Weiner, 1968, p. 286]. 233

Tibet or China. Numerous historical records and chronicles mark their lineage as

Kacharis, speaking Dimasa, with origins in the Tibeto-Burman group of languages.

British historian Endle categorized the Dimasas as Southern Kacharis who had an established system of governance in the southern banks of the river Brahmaputra, areas including the hills of the present North Cachar district (Fig.6.1. presents a detailed map of the district).

Fig. 6. 1. District Map of North Cachar Hills

Referring to their demographic history, Edward Gait noted that the Dimasas were some of the earliest inhabitants of the Assam valley [Gait, 1984, p. 247]. Based on oral narratives, epigraphic as well as chronicled records available in Ahom Buranjis

(chronicles maintained by Ahom rulers), scholars contend that the Kachari kings had once consolidated autonomous powers and control over most of the areas of Kamruli

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(ancient name of Assam).111 However, internecine wars with some local rulers in the region, compelled the Dimasa kings to retreat and move towards the north of the river

Brahmaputra where they founded their seat of administration, called the Halali kingdom, at a place called Sadiya, currently located in the easternmost tip of Assam.112 Due to further military pressures, they were forced to withdraw from Sadiya and move to the southern banks of the Brahmaputra, between the rivers Dikhu, Kallong and Dhansiri, where they established their capital at Dimapur, which is at present located in the neighboring state of Nagaland [Gait, 1984, p.248]. Periodic conquests by the Ahoms in the early part of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries however, weakened the Dimasa kingdom and the Kachari kings had to relinquish possession of their territories in Dimapur and

Maibong. This forced them to finally establish their capital in Khaspur, situated in the plains of Cachar district.113 Khaspur dotted with historical remains of ramparts, water tanks, boundary walls and temples, has been retained as a symbolic place glorifying the

Kachari kingdom. Ruins of the Kachari kingdom found in these areas (both North Cachar and Cachar districts) remain as sites of immense archaeological attraction. [H.H Godwin

Austen, who carefully toured and investigated the place in 1873, noted that, apart from the fine masonry royal gateway, some ‗carved pillars were the most distinguished

111 This interpretation is mostly based on verbal history. Coin inscriptions represent epigraphic evidence of their political, economic, artistic history [Rhodes and Bose, 2006] 112 Barman, [1914, p. Foreword 14]. Sadiya is a small town in the district of Tinsukia in Assam. During the British period, Sadiya was the extreme northeast frontier station of Eastern Bengal and Assam province of the colonial state. A railway tract was constructed to connect Assam and Bengal. It was a small commercial market area where the tribes (Misings, Abors, Khamtis) of neighboring hills would sell local goods like ivory, wax, rubber and musk to barter for cloth, salt and metal goods. Sadiya serves as a headquarter of the Red Cross Society. 113 In 1409 the Dimasas defeated the Ahoms when they tried to annex the former‘s territory. However, the Ahoms inflicted crushing defeats on the Kacharis 1) first in 1526 and forced them to flee further south, where they settled their political unit at Maibong, (situated in the district of North Cachar), then 2) in 1698 A.D. when the Ahoms captured Maibong and the Kacharis shifted their capital to Khaspur. Khaspur is in the Barak valley, located 25 km away from the plains of Silchar, Cachar district. [Rhodes and Bose, 2006 p.49.] 235

features of the ruins. The tallest one was about 4.75 meters and the smallest one measured approximately 2.75 meters in height]‘ [Godwin, 1874, pp. 1-6].

Given this background, the preeminence of Kachari kingdom during this phase of

Assam‘s political history not only inculcated a sense of glorification and cultural cohesiveness to Dimasa-Kachari identity but also gave significant political meaning to it.

COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL PERIOD (1854-1967)

In 1854, the suzerainty of the declining Kachari chieftainship, passed into the hands of the British colonial rulers.114 Colonial occupation marked the beginning of a process of demarcation and redrawing of territorial boundaries that were formerly possessed by

Dimasa rulers and chiefs. The British government passed a series of regulations to administer these areas which were recognized as ‗backward‘ or ‗excluded tracts‘. The

Scheduled Districts Act of 1874, the Frontier Tract Regulation Act of 1880, the Govt. of

India Act 1919, and the Simon Commission of 1930, determined that these territories would be protected from incursions by ‗outsiders‘ or non-tribals and excluded from the general rules of civil and criminal procedures. This specifically implied that laws related to registration and transfer of property which applied to other areas of the province of

Assam would not be applied to these territories [Baruah, 1999, p.28]. Accordingly, North

Cachar was made an enclosed territory placed under indirect British rule [Marcus,

2009].115 Any visitor to these territories other than the Kacharis was required to carry a

114 Towards the end of the Kachari rulership, power was in the hands of less powerful but independent chiefs. Last amongst them was Tularam Senapati who relinquished his territories to the British. 115 The Simon Commission appointed in 1927 by the British Government stated thus, ‗nowhere in India is the contrast between the life and outlook of the hillmen and the totally distinct civilization of the plains 236

certificate issued by the provincial authorities. The idea was that the traditional authorities of these tribal groups could retain their powers to act on local matters related to both civil and criminal cases without the intervention of the provincial and federal legal system. However, the provincial governors were endowed with supervisory powers.

The people living in these territories were treated as socially, politically, culturally and biologically bounded units and were therefore categorized as tribes [Marcus, p. 48].

The process of territorial demarcation of the Dimasa areas continued in the post colonial period. In 1947, a section of middle-class Dimasa intellectuals joined with other tribal leaders, including the Karbis of bordering Karbi Anglong (or Mikir) hills and formed the Tribal Council. The council under the leadership of H.M. Haflongbar submitted certain proposals to the government of India, on behalf of the people residing in the excluded and partially excluded tracts of North Cachar and Mikir hills. The leaders suggested that the government should consider appointing a boundary commission entrusted with the responsibility of fixing the boundaries of the areas covering North

Cachar hills. Their main demand was to create a separate hills district, with enough functional autonomy, so that the Dimasas living in the adjoining plain areas in the districts of Nagaon, Cachar and Dimapur (Nagaland) could also be brought under a single administrative unit.

more manifest. The Commission classified the tribal areas as backward tracts. Lushai hills (Mizoram), Naga hills, Garo hills (Meghalaya), Khasi-Jaintia hills (Meghalaya) and North Cachar hills were categorized as such. Lakhimpur, Balipara and Sadiya frontier tracts (mostly Mising areas) were also included in this list. See Marcus [2009] 237

While taking cognizance of the tribal leaders‘ concerns, the Bordoloi Commission brought these areas under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution allowing substantial local autonomy to the hills tribes of the region.116 In keeping with the urge for a ‗protective discriminatory‘ solution, in 1952, the government placed the North Cachar hills and the Karbi Anglong hills region under the jurisdiction of two sub-districts, respectively. Civil administration of both these sub-districts was placed under the legal power of the District Magistrate, (the highest authority of a district) and their headquarters were located at Diphu, in Karbi Anglong hills. This administrative division was followed by the creation of two district councils in these areas, one for the Dimasas and the other for the Karbis, comprising of representatives of the main ethnic group

(Dimasas and Karbis) and other minority tribal groups living in these regions. The two councils were entitled to work independently of each other.

From historical and ethno-linguistic perspective, the Karbis are markedly different from the Dimasa-Kacharis. As Lyall, a British historian observed, ‗the Karbis have some linguistic and cultural affinities with the Mizos and Meitis, groups speaking Kuki-Chin languages and inhabiting adjoining states of Manipur and Mizoram. Thus, except for their

Indo-Mongoloid origin, the Karbis share nothing much in common with the Dimasa-

Kacharis. The Karbis were ruled by various tribal chiefs and kings whose centers of governance were located at places like Rongkhang, areas that are now located in the hilly region of Karbi Anglong district. The kingdom was however, thoroughly destroyed by continuous incursions and mastering over these territories by the Dimasas, Khasis and

116 Eventually local autonomy via the institution of district councils was provided to two hill districts: the N.C. hills and the adjoining Karbi Anglong district inhabited by the Karbis. 238

later the Ahom kings. In the present times, the ruins of a fort built by the Karbi kings at a place called Diyungmukh (Karbi Anglong) have been securely preserved to commemorate the existence of once fortified Karbi rulership. After subjugation, Karbi territories were administratively controlled by the Dimasa-Kachari kings and chieftainship of Tolaram Senapati. Finally, the British took over these territories.

Although they form a majority in Karbi Anglong, the Karbis are now dispersed in

Assam‘s several other districts. [Subba & Ghosh, 2003].

POLITICIZATION OF DIMASA IDENTITY (1967-1980s)

Although the arrangements under the Sixth Schedule seemed to placate the Dimasa elite, specific resentments soon emerged out of administrative anomalies and malfunctioning of the two sub-districts. After several rounds of meetings with the Dimasa elite, in order to break this bottleneck on 2nd Feb. 1970, the state government bifurcated the two sub-districts of Karbi Anglong and N.C hills and finally, constituted them as two separate and full-fledged civil districts of the state. The creation of the districts seemed to be too late and too little to assuage the claims for autonomy. In the meanwhile, the

Dimasa and the Karbi leaders shifted their demands from an autonomous area to the creation of a separate hill state. Consequently, the leaders and political organizations of these two groups combined their efforts and mobilized actively to amalgamate the two districts----N.C hills and Karbi Anglong into a state, [under Art.244 (A) of the Indian constitution] that would be autonomous and separate from Assam. Despite ethno-cultural dissimilarities, historical enmity and suspicion between the two groups, the leaders of these two groups fused their inter-ethnic differences into a common tribal identity, in

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accordance to which they chose to fight from a combined platform for greater autonomy.

As a part of their combined endeavor, the Karbi Students Association (KSA), the North

Cachar Hills Students Federation (NCHSF) and the Autonomous State Demand

Committee (ASDC, the main political party), stood as the main champions for greater autonomy. 117 Later, they rallied under the banner of Karbi Anglong and North Cachar hills Autonomous State Demand Committee (KANCHDCOM).

Political mobilization of these two groups for autonomy continued unabated and gradually became more intense. Their increasing consciousness can be linked to, at least, two important political developments in Assam---the promulgation of the Assam language bill by the state government in 1960s and second, the proposal to reorganize the adjoining areas of the Khasi-Jaintia-Garo hills into a state called Meghalaya which would be separate from Assam‘s existing territories. Once the government recognized the stirring calls from the neighboring Khasis, the Dimasas and Karbis escalated their claims for the creation of an autonomous state on a markedly parallel basis. The Dimasas and the

Karbis were inspired by the success of the Khasis and issued a joint statement to the government titled, ‘Reorganization of Assam-Injustice Done to Mikir and North Cachar

Hills District’.118 Instead of delivering the proposed autonomous structure to these groups, the government however, put forth an alternative plan---either to join the newly formed state of Meghalaya or remain in Assam and look forward to government‘s

117 ASDC was originally known as Peoples Democratic Front. It was formed in 1986. Its leadership mainly consisted of students. It was set up as a political organization to fight for the statehood of Karbi Anglong. Later on it emerged as a political party of the hills tribes, and actively participated in the state level as well as federal level elections in 1991, 1996 and 1998. 118 The Mikirs or Karbis are hill tribes of Assam residing in the hills as well as plain areas of Assam. They are dispersed in the areas near Cachar, Karbi Anglong and several other districts of Assam. 240

decision on the future prospects of an autonomous state. In the meanwhile, to allay the concerns of the agitating groups, the government offered to extend further powers to the existing administrative councils of the two districts.

The Dimasa and the Karbi leaders finally decided to disapprove of the idea of joining

Meghalaya. Instead they preferred to accept the other alternative, to remain as a part of

Assam while accepting the proposal of further devolution of powers (short of separate state). The leaders believed that this way they would benefit from the provisions of district level autonomy till they await the ultimate decision of the state on the envisaged plan. Several other reasons were cited in a joint memorandum for considering the option to remain within Assam. First and foremost concern raised by the leaders was related to relative socio-economic disadvantages of the Dimasas as well as the Karbis (Mikirs) in comparison to the Khasis and Jaintias. The literacy indices of these groups revealed that the percentage of literacy of the Khasis and Jaintias weighed higher than double (27% approx) the percentage of combined literacy rate of the Dimasas and Mikirs (12% approx). Therefore, it appeared that by joining Meghalaya, the latter groups would not be in a better position than their present status of remaining as an autonomous unit within

Assam. Moreover, the leaders were apprehensive about the inherent dangers of being culturally overwhelmed and dominated by the more numerous Khasis who they felt would be more privileged with respect to entitlement of public employment and other opportunities. Cultural dissimilarities and political dominance of the Khasis augmented the fears of the Dimasas and Karbis of being ethnically swamped. Except for some shared

Indo-Mongoloid physical traits, the latter two groups differ a lot from the Khasis in terms

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of religion, social customs, traditional beliefs, and language. Khasis are mostly converted

Christians (although they still retain earlier tribal beliefs) while the Dimasas and Karbis are by and large followers of a syncretism, a mixture of Hinduism and traditional tribal beliefs.

In early 1970s, the state government transferred the jurisdiction and control of several departments including agriculture, public works, flood control, irrigation, infrastructure, etc. to the district councils. Yet, ironically, this provision did not guarantee greater local autonomy, particularly, political and financial autonomy. As an example, important personnel of the N.C. hills district council were to be appointed by the ruling party of the state government. This virtually meant that these officers would owe their loyalty to the state legislature and the ruling party in control of the levers of power at the state level, rather than being accountable to the people at the local level. In addition to the nomination of these officers, the state government had the power to appoint a bureaucrat

(selected through Indian Administrative Services) to look after the affairs of the District

Council. His rank was higher than the Secretary as well as the Chief Executive Member of the council. Although this was greatly resented by then (1970) acting Secretary N.L.

Daulagaphu and other members of the N.C. hills autonomous council, the government felt that it was necessary to keep an eye on the council‘s day to day affairs through its trusted appointees.

With regard to financial autonomy, although the council was made liable to manage the funds allotted for various developmental purposes in N.C.hills, the former was hardly

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entrusted with the authority to plan or to reach at a decision on the required budgetary shares to meet its annual objectives. Section 13 of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution states that, ―the estimated receipts and expenditures pertaining to an autonomous district which are to be credited to, or is to be made from the Consolidated Fund of the state, shall be first placed before the District Council for discussion and then after such discussion, be shown separately in the financial statement of the state to be laid before the legislature of the state (Article 202) [Basu, 1976].‖ In reality, the stipulated condition in the constitution, its interpretation and actual implementation has been a matter of serious contention between the state government and the district councils. Persistent complaints had been raised by members of the district councils that they scarcely get a chance to discuss and deliberate on the financial budget before it gets formally presented each year, during the annual budget session of the Assam state assembly. They further claim that this practice hardly leaves any room for them to deliberate on the issues laid out in the budget and finally take a decision that would serve the socio-economic interests of the local people of these districts (Karbi Anglong and N.C.hills). Regular functioning of the council has since then been inseparable from the whims and caprices of the members of the state‘s ruling parties. In essence, rather than serving as an institution of benefit distribution and empowerment of the Dimasa society, the council had been functioning more as a subordinate organ of the state government, with less power over policy making and financial autonomy. The institution had become an arena of petty power politics between the local leaders and state paternalism with entrenched patronage links between the council personnel and the ruling government.

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STUDENT ACTIVISM AND EMERGENCE OF RADICAL POLITICS (1980s ONWARDS)

The sequence of events following the malfunctioning of the district councils in late

70s is crucial to understand the rise of a new set of dissident tribal leaders, the student activists. Much as the Bodos and Misings, the Dimasa and Karbi students‘ leaders found

80s as the most propitious time to concretize their demands and respond to the state with radical politics. Rising frenzy of the Dimasas and Karbis at this point was stimulated by the decisive weight of majoritarian identity politics after the anti-foreigners‘s agitation of

1980s (Discussed in Chap 4, mention page).

In December 1985, the Peoples‘ Democratic Front (PDF), a political party of the

Karbis, fought the elections to the state legislative assembly of Assam in alliance with the

AGP, the party dominated by the majority Assamese. One of the candidates of the PDF,

Haliram Terong won the elections and was chosen as a representative of Karbi Anglong.

Terang served in the AGP government as the Minister of State for Agriculture and

Irrigation. Barely six months after winning the elections, the delicate balance between the PDF and AGP was severely offset by AGPs allegedly growing anti-minority leanings and its espousal of ethnic policies on behalf of the Assamese-speaking majority. In the wake of this rising acerbity, the partnership between the tribal and non-tribal students‘ leadership ended. In Jan 1987, as a first reactionary move, the Karbi Anglong Students

Association and ASDC started their protests and called for a hundred-hour strike in the hill district of Karbi Anglong. The strike was followed by small scale and isolated incidents of attacks on Assamese-speaking inhabitants in the district and disruption of

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major routes of communication connecting the hill districts and the rest of the Assam. As a mark of protest against the AGP government‘s political latitude, the agitationists also pledged to boycott the visit of the Chief Minister, Prafulla Mahanta to N.C.hills district that was scheduled on 16th and 17th Sept. 1987. 119 After a year of abortive attempts in

March 1988, two tribal leaders including Terang resigned from the ruling government, showing immense dissidence on state‘s refusal to give serious consideration to their growing problems. The proximate cause of these resignations was however stated to be the refusal of the Chief Executive Member (CEM) of the council, Jayanta Rongpi to discuss the terms of the budget in front of the council members. In an open criticism against the AGP government, Terang revealed the state of their (minority leaders‘) standing in the ministry and remarked thus, ―I do not recall taking a single executive decision in my six months as minister in the government of AGP.‖ 120

Towards the late 80s and early 90s, after several years of activism and few rounds of discussions with the AGP government and later with the Congress ministry, a section of

ASDC, KSA and NCHSF showed signs of withdrawing from the agitation in July 1992.

The decision was taken in the wake of a series of deliberations held in June 1992 between the leaders of these organizations and Hiteshwar Saikia, the Chief Minister of the newly formed Congress government. Despite these initiatives, the Congress government however, took an abrupt decision in Nov. 1992 to dissolve the District Council of Karbi

119 Chief proponents were the Karbi Anglong and North Cachar hills Autonomous State Demand Committee (KANCHDCOM) 120 Terang‘s Charge against AGP Govt., Hindu March, 14, 1988. 245

Anglong. This decision placed the movement leaders in an ambivalent position.121

Conflicting propositions prevailed on the dissolution of the council. While the government lashed out at the council for mismanagement of funds and corruption, the

ASDC chided the government for its inability to release the funds at the appropriate timing, as a result of which their proper utilization was prevented. Contrary to state‘s accusations of misutilization of the unexpended portion of the financial resources by the council members, the latter disputed these allegations and finally filed a petition against the state government in the state judiciary. Simultaneously, the leaders decided to revive the movement by another sequence of protest calls in early 1993.

In the meanwhile, the High Court declared its order which went in favor of the movement leaders. Consequently, the state government, the union government and the movement leaders struck a deal in April 1995. Although the memorandum fell far short of the statehood demand, it was envisaged as a design that would assign more powers to the existing council members. Accordingly, the state government amended the Sixth

Schedule; extended some of the district‘s legislative as well as executive powers to the council and proposed to transfer the administration of nearly thirty additional departments to the district councils. The agreement specifically mentioned that ‗the state government will, before the beginning of the financial year, give an indication to the councils regarding the overall financial resources allocated to each district.‘122 Thereafter, the councils were authorized to prepare and pass their own budget and forward it to the government. This practically meant that the councils would be duly consulted if there was

121 According to sub-para 2 of para 16, sixth schedule, governor can dismiss if he is satisfied. These powers were earlier exercised by the AGP in 1986. 122 MAC Act. 1995. 246

any need of change to the initial budgetary proposals. In sum, in mid 1990s, the government offered what the Karbis and Dimasas had been asking for since the 1950s.

Paradoxically, the lag between the government‘s 1995 declaration to devolve more powers to the councils and their genuine execution made the efforts at settlement futile because in the meanwhile, the Dimasa and Karbi activists shifted their demands from an autonomous area to separate federal units for the two groups. The period also witnessed a nascent form of militant nationalism engineered by student leaders in mid-90s.

Organizations like the UPDS and DNF were formed by these leaders and they escalated their demands for separate states exclusively meeting the interests of the Dimasas and the

Karbis. The proximate causes of their radicalization and armed opposition had to do with the changing political circumstances in the state level politics after AGP came to power and the failure of the decentralized institutions in the hill districts of North Cachar and

Karbi Anglong.123 Inadequate infrastructural development, poor telecommunication facilities, lack of industrial growth in the region were some of the glaring issues that gradually fed into the accumulated grievances of the Dimasas and played a role in radicalization. Formation of states like Mizoram in the 80s also set the precedent for other minority groups in the region to push for their radical demands.

PHASE OF RISING MILITANCY IN NORTH CACHAR HILLS: 1980s-2000

The preceding section evaluated the development of a hostile political environment and a combative relationship between the Dimasa and Karbi leaders on one side and the

123AGP‘s policies have been discussed in Chapter 4. 247

successive governments in Assam as well as the governments controlling the central levers of power in Delhi on the other side. First few postcolonial decades till the 80s, witnessed a joint action undertaken by the Dimasa and Karbi leadership. This unified platform of resistance was however, denounced in late 80s and more avowedly in the 90s, when Dimasa ethno-political organizations, such as the All Dimasa Students Union

(ADSU), the Dimaraji Revival Demand Committee (DRDC) and their Karbi counterparts

(UPDS) moved away from their past partnership and advocated their separate ethno- nationalist doctrines. At this point, the Dimasas and Karbis interpreted their movements not in terms of just autonomy, but as requiring absolute separation of North Cachar hills and Karbi Anglong from Assam‘s territory, as two different entities. The DNSF and

DHD served as powerful instruments of the rebel movements of the Dimasas.

Before the emergence of these rebel organizations, the All Assam Dimasa Students

Union and Dimaraji Demand Revival Committee led an unarmed struggle and used less disruptive methods of protest. To reiterate, late 1960s witnessed ethnic mobilization led by the Dimasa elite for a kind of redistributive justice that would enhance their existing power and collective status. Mobilization became quite intense in the 70s and 80s when some prominent leaders of the Tribal Conference, like Daulagaphu, Langthasa, Rongpi

(identified as the older and experienced generation of leaders) were joined in by an increasingly large number of young and enterprising student leaders belonging to organizations like the ADSU, KSU and ASDC. These leaders denounced the existing structures of power devolution, and intensified their campaign for early deliverance of extended autonomy. Since late 1980s, ADSU and DDRC submitted a number of petitions

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and memorandums to the Assam government and the union ministry. Their memorandum that was issued in 1990s during Narasimha Rao‘s Prime Ministership and again in 2004 to the Union Home ministry under Congress‘s leadership, declared their aspirations as follows:

―Dimaraji is a long cherished aspiration of the Dimasa Indigenous People, one of the Indigenous Peoples in the North East India, the earliest known community in the region….As a consequence of numerous divisions of the Dimasa-Kachari territories, the Dimasas have been made a minority in several districts including Cachar, Karimgang (Barrack valley), Nagaon, Karbi Anglong, and Dimapur (Nagaland), all contiguous to N.C. hills. Although the Dimasas living in these areas share the same language, culture and religion, their constitutional status and recognition have widely varied. While the Dimasas living in N.C. hills and Nagaland are recognized as Scheduled Tribe (hills), those residing in Nagaon district, known as ‗Hojai Kacharis‘ and Cachar district where they are referred to as ‗Barmans‘ have been enumerated as Scheduled Tribe (Plains). The very backbone of the glorious Dimasa nation has since been broken, displaced and ruined……..The only way out for the existence of the Dimasas is to grant a full-fledged state called Dimaraji, to be created by carving out all the Dimasa inhabited areas from the districts of Cachar, Nagaon, Karbi Anglong, N.C.hills and few portions of Dimapur. This is the only fair and absolute means to meet the burning issues and problems of the Dimasa people who have lost their territories since the days of British colonialism. The grant of statehood would provide them their constitutional rights, facilities of self-governance, growth and peace.‖ 124

The rise of DNSF‘s armed resistance in early 1990s manifested their disillusionment with the peaceful strategies adopted by their predecessors. After nearly 2-3 years of armed initiatives DNSF‘s efforts were crushed by the security forces of the state. As a result, most of the members, except its self-proclaimed Commander-in-Chief, Jewel

Garlosa, relinquished their arms en masse in 1995; barely few months after their operation began in 1990s. Few months later in the same year, the militants however, reappeared. After much debate and deliberations within the Dimasa leadership, former rebel Jewel Garlosa and other prominent student leaders like Dilip Nunisa, Pranab Nunisa including others, rejuvenated the rebel organizations and tried to absorb more young

124 DSU Memorandum submitted to the Home Minister Shivraj Patil (2005). 249

members into a newly formed armed organization called the Dima Halong Daogah

(DHD). Although the group was numerically small, with a cadre base of hardly few hundred active members, this time, the rebel group was better armed and launched its militant activities more strongly. DHD operated primarily in N.C. hills. Material aid from

Naga militant organizations like NSCN (IM) is considered to be one of the most important reasons for DHD‘s reappearance with a bigger force. DHD‘s return to militancy also indicated that the rebel group had some amount of sympathy and support of the people of N.C.hills. Some people supported the DHD rebels because they believed in their ideas and their cause. Ethno-nationalist ideology based on economic and cultural development, increased political power and representation of the Dimasas motivated some local Dimasas to support the rebellion. These issues remained unfulfilled so far, due to inefficient functioning of North Cachar district council. DHD‘s promises generated some expectations for a better future. However, unlike the Bodos, DHD rebels had a low level of support from the local people. Previous wave of mobilization by DSU activists seemed to be ineffective. These activists failed to engage in effective protest repertoires like huge mass demonstrations, widespread propaganda or establishing direct contacts like the ABSU activists, as a consequence of which, the movement could gather moderate support and participation of the non-combatant population. Even the minimum level of support acquired by the movement activists seemed to have waned by early 2000. People were discontented with the shaky goals of the movement, particularly due to growing rivalries within the leadership during the second phase of the rebellion.

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By first few months of the year 2000, noticeable divergences of opinion occurred between the top leaders of the militant outfit on the issue of top leadership positions.

Conflict emerged when Pranab Nunisa, the former Commander-in Chief of the insurgent organization became the President after replacing Jewel Garlosa, a former founding member, who was otherwise deemed to have been in control of the position. Garlosa was accused of being involved in anti-DHD activities which was referred to as the prime reason why he was denied the leadership of the organization. In 2003, DHD disintegrated into two different militant outfits, whose command structures were centered on local elites who seemed to be rather disoriented from the original goals. Jewel Garlosa drifted from DHD and formed a dissenting clique under the banner of ‗Black Widow‘ or DHD

(G), on 31st March, 2003 and continued its skirmishes with the rival group and the state armed forces, till June 2009 when two prominent leaders of the organization, Jewel

Garlosa and his closest associate F. Dimasa were arrested by the Indian security forces.125

The other group [DHD (D)] entered into a ceasefire agreement with the state and union governments in 2003. DHD (D) however, maintained their designated camps (bases) in the valley and did not lay down their arms completely. Although Black Widow continued its armed activities after 2003, its military capabilities were extremely weak. The organization operated with cadre strength of barely two hundred recruits. Some council members were covertly linked with Garlosa and assisted the group with material support.

The Chief Executive Member of the N.C.hills district council, Mohit Hojai, a former

CEM Depolal Hojai and the joint director of the social welfare department, R.H. Khan, had alleged links with the Black Widow.126 They supported Garlosa with financial

125 Top Assam Militants Arrested in Bangalore, reported in newspaper, The Hindu, June 05, 2009 126 Ibid. 251

assistance to maintain the outfit. Covert support provided by these council officials arose out of personal motives. The council members maintained good relations with Garlosa as it served their purpose to polarize and further undermine the cause of earlier activist organizations. Black Widow was therefore used as a counter-force against the DHD (D).

Garlosa on the other hand, used violence more as a survival tactic and to indicate his presence in the valley. The group faced immense problems of receiving even the minimum assistance and supply of basic necessities from the local people as a result of which, Black Widow was engaged in high levels of extortions, kidnappings and random killings of local Dimasas, government officials and the members of the rival group, DHD

(D). These methods were primarily used to forcibly collect funds, terrorize and coerce people to collaborate with the outfit. These tactics however, proved to be extremely counter-productive as people felt more alienated and outraged by the coercive methods used by DHD to garner forcible support of the local people.

Internal rivalries thus undermined the morale, military effectiveness and cohesiveness of the movement. Now the competition between DHD (D) and the Garlosa group was to maintain each group‘s sphere of influence within the local Dimasa community by means of coercion rather than by persuasion or ideational beliefs. This exhibited wavering commitment of the rebel groups to the original cause of the movement as a result of which, the leaders lost the trust and credibility of the local people. Thus the movement could not sustain itself and was crushed by the state armed forces.

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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF REBEL VIOLENCE

The fundamental principle adopted by DHD during the beginning years of its active combat activities was to launch major offensives against police personnel, the army and other government officials. The pattern of violence transformed over time, from direct attacks on state agents and loyalists to individuals and groups belonging to other communities. Fig.6. 2. provides a sketchy evidence of the incidents of violence carried out by DNSF, DHD and DHD (G). The data in the graph represented below has been culled from newspaper briefings, and weekly assessments and reports published by the

Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi. The information indicates the nature of violent acts perpetrated by the two main militant groups. Their activities ranged from minor explosions, assassinations/target killings of civilians, attacks on police and government property/institutions to inter-communal violence. The instances of violence have been selected over the period of 1992-2006.

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Fig.6.2. Incidence of violence in the Dimasa areas

The graph demonstrates that attacks directed against state police (personnel mostly belonged to railway protection force) and few state government officials were low throughout the rebellion. Bomb explosions were high during the first few years of violence. This was more apparent in the years 1995, 1999 and to a certain degree in 2001.

Civilian assaults occurred throughout mid-1990s; particularly striking were the years

1997 and 1999. There was a substantial decline in 2000 followed by a gradual increase in

2001 and then the year 2003 when it reached the maximal point. Although the attacks took a backseat in the year 2004, the following year witnessed an abrupt increase in civilian casualties. Inter-ethnic violence remained low throughout the rebellion. However, the years 2003 and 2005 were salient, when the Dimasa areas became the theatre of

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intense inter-ethnic violence between the Dimasas and the Hmars and the Dimasas and

Karbis.

THE ARGUMENT: MOBILIZING RESOURCES, SYMBOLIC APPEALS AND STATE RESPONSES

MOVEMENT NETWORKS AND MOBILIZING RESOURCES: HOW DID THEY MATTER?

Rather than simply proposing that the members of a group are attracted to support or participate in the rebellion by individual profit inducements or forced compliance

(disincentives) imposed by rebel leaders, I conceive of the dynamics of collective behavior as a combination of several factors: material incentives, coercion as well as emotive connections within group members and symbolic appeals capitalized by activist organizations to generate support of group members. To make sense of how different levels of movement networks played out in the case of Dimasas, I looked at community networks that existed within the Dimasa society and the hierarchical relationships that were built up by the movement activists with the local Dimasas at the vertical level during the rebellion.

As outlined in the theoretical chapter, like many other tribal communities, the Dimasa society is based on strong community networks. In the rural areas, which comprise of nearly seventy percent of the Dimasa population, the families are held by very tightly knit links. Each village in the Dimasa society is structured along the lines of clan or lineage.

The Dimasa society is divided along forty two patrilineal clans (Sangfong) and forty two

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matrilineal clans (Julu/Juddi). However, unlike many stratified and vertically structured clan systems that exist in different parts of the world, the Dimasa clan system is based on structures that are non-hierarchical and egalitarian in nature, which means there is equality across clans [Roy, 2002]. Contrary to many findings in the context of Africa,

Middle East and Southeast Asia, clan based divisions in the Dimasa society has not led to inter-clan competition or the distribution of socio-economic goods or political offices and loyalty based on such affiliation. 127 To view it differently, instead of creating sub-ethnic cleavages, the lack of political significance of clan based networks allows intra-group coherence on solid foundations of a monolithic Dimasa identity.

Since a majority of the Dimasas reside in the villages, community networks are significant bases of organizing contentious actions. Local institutions are headed by an elected village chief, who wields substantial powers to regulate day-to-day affairs of the village. The headman acts as a link between the villagers and the district council. Such a form of institution provides a tertiary level of governance well suited in these areas where the state system seems to be totally constrained in terms of providing access to collective goods and privileges. Like other tribal areas in Assam, the state has not been able to penetrate much into the remote margins of these hilly regions and not much attempts have been made to develop these areas. Under these circumstances, village institutions are governed by traditional and unwritten codes of conduct without much state interference. Where government agencies have repeatedly failed to deliver public goods, these institutions have guaranteed the benefits and services insofar as the minimum

127 For further reference on modern clan politics refer to Schatz, [2004]. 256

subsistence niches of resources are concerned.128 For instance, except for extremely serious criminal offenses, the village institution is authorized to decide on matters related to local affairs of the village such as land related disputes, marriage, divorce, petty crimes, etc. People look forward to these institutions to address the distribution of basic resources concerning agricultural land, basic infrastructure like village roads, their security and other day to day needs. To cite another simple example of such an institution, the Dimasa villages have an informal institution called the Hangsao, which consists of unmarried youths living in the villages. Hangsao is a locally organized institution where young male members are involved in conducting small scale menial tasks in the village such as construction of village roads and other agricultural works like harvesting, weeding, etc. Members of the Hangsao also serve as defenders to provide protection and security to the villages. While acknowledging the beneficial impact of such relationships, village-based networks and institutions have lessened the cost of governance at the local level as well as maintaining intra-group relationships.

How far have these institutions served as important channels of mobilization during the Dimaraji movement? Empirical analysis provides mixed results on the issue of motivations of ordinary Dimasas and their support to the rebel groups on the basis of horizontal networks. Presence of strong societal networks did not increase the likelihood of people supporting the violent movement in huge numbers. The types and levels of support ranged from recruitment as cadres to the rebel organization, provision of food and shelter to the members of the militant organizations, maintenance of secrecy of information, and other services that were provided to the rebels during the heyday of the

128Collective security can be considered as a public good. 257

rebellion. Considerable evidence however, shows that only a small minority of Dimasas actively joined as committed rebels or supporters of the movement. Most ordinary people during their interviews revealed their neutrality and unawareness about the movement.

These respondents claimed that they did not provide any form of support to the movement. Some respondents particularly the younger generation expressed their feelings of alienation and embittered feelings against the state. Some were motivated to join the rebel groups out of affective ties to their co-ethnics, some for material gains and others reflected a combination of both these motivations.129

The role of Dimasa activists in mobilizing broad based support appears to be negligible when compared with the efforts of the Bodo activist organizations. Dimasa activist organizations failed to utilize societal endowments and turn these networks into a hotbed of support as efficaciously as their Bodo counterparts could do during the

Bodoland agitation. Two important reasons may be cited to explain the limited capabilities of the Dimasa Students‘ Union‘s (DSU) to establish strong vertical links with the local population. First, the organizational structure of the main Dimasa activist organizations—the DSU, the chief protagonist of the Dimaraji movement, functioned mostly at a centralized level. Ever since its emergence in the 70s, ADSU remained numerically small (as compared to the Bodo Students‘ Union and in proportion to its population) and centralized with a membership of few hundred activists and volunteers across the district of North Cachar hills. Majority members of DSU were organized into a

129 One of the cadres of surrendered DHD (aged 20-25 years approx.) that I interviewed, explained that his motivation to join the rebel group was economic compensation. The cadre earned somewhere around 1000- 1500 Indian rupees ($25 approx.) a month, which he found to be a valuable amount of money that could provide some support to his family. 258

single unit with an Executive Committee, consisting of the President, General Secretary and the spokesperson which operated mainly from a central office located in Haflong.

The Central Committee was assisted by student activists and volunteers, responsible for all kinds of mobilization activities related to local organization and information campaigns, propaganda, publication and communication of movement ideologies and the overall program of the organization during the agitation. The centralized structure however, prevented DSU from organizing a mass-based rebellion. Absence of decentralized units at the grassroots level limited the scope of DSU to dispense its mobilization activities beyond the district level unit. This also hindered the prospects of the organization to forge alliances with the local people across a wider geographical range of the N.C.hills region.

Geographical factors posed additional challenges for DSU to develop a significant following amongst the local Dimasas. Geographical conditions such as rough terrain, inaccessibility, remoteness and distant location of the villages were some of the major obstacles that paralyzed DSU to articulate their political agenda, spread the movement ideas and seize the opportunities to create strong vertical networks. As a result, DSU failed to garner enough logistical support of the people to launch a mass-based violent campaign.

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SALIENCE OF ETHNO-CULTURAL SYMBOLS THROUGH CULTURAL REVIVALISM

A central theme that runs through each story of ethno-nationalist movement in Assam tends to revolve around processes of socio-psychological mapping of group history, experiences as a beleaguered minority, past contention and the interaction with the dominant state. The content of ethnic grievances held by the Dimasas had much to do with special powers of autonomy that were granted to them by the Indian state. Special autonomous provisions however, seemed to mollify only a small section of the Dimasa elite as they gained from their political alliances with the ruling parties of the regional government. By and large, people were disgruntled by the status that the group was enjoying within the existing institutional structures, increasing powerlessness and above all the administrative anomalies of the Council. Even after special decentralization arrangements were made, the N.C.hills district council remained highly dependent on the state government. Therefore, the terms of the autonomy arrangements became highly controversial. Ethnic rebellion of the Dimasas was an expression of their grievances over the encroachment of their local autonomy that the group had achieved on the basis of social distinctiveness and separateness in Assam‘s political history. Comparative disadvantage (socio-economic and political inequities) of the Dimasas and increasing rivalry with the dominant state increased the salience of Dimasa identity. Progressive marginalization of their autonomous powers led to the emergence of reactionary forces, the radical Dimasa nationalists. These nationalists promoted their separatist goals for

Dimaraji by mobilizing on historical narratives and rhetorical strategies (collective action

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frame) that underlined the entitlements---grandeur and past autonomy and actual discrepancies experienced by the group.130

Analyzed from another perspective, ethno-cultural identity of the Dimasas gained political salience under the decentralized autonomous institutions. These institutions determined the group‘s pay-off structure, both material and non-material goods that the group members expected to gain on the basis of ethnic criteria or the terms of inclusion or exclusion of the Dimasas into these autonomous structures. In other words, discrete ethno-cultural identity of the Dimasas influenced the ethnic status, socio-economic resources and political choices of group members. These structures acted as the means through which people had the opportunity to select their local representatives contesting for the political offices of the district council. Voter preferences has been determined by ethnicity and belongingness of the contesting members or simply on the basis of a fundamental presumption that a local Dimasa can best represent the group‘s interests, rather than any other non-Dimasa representative or political leader (for instance, Hmars or Zemi Nagas). The Tribal Council that was founded in 1947 demanded that the federal

130The process of narrativization seemed to have flourished mostly in 1970s and 80s and came to a head in late 90s following the efforts of ethnic organizations such as the DNO, Dimasa Literary Society, DJH and DSU who worked in close coordination with the district council to preserve some of their valued monuments, statues, coins, historical artifacts and other remnants of the Kachari kingdom found in North Cachar hills and some places in the nearby region. Besides exposing the presence of these symbols to the wider audience, the aim was also to draw the attention of the people about the apathy of the state to recognize the importance and contribution of the Dimasas to the ethno-political history of the region. Initial actions were mainly concentrated on cultural revivalism and informational campaigning. The process entailed petitioning, publishing press articles, pamphleteering, etc. that depicted three key symbols of Dimasa identity: remains of key monuments of the Kachari kings in Khaspur, in the Cachar district, a statue of Sambodhan Thousen, an important political figure in N.C. hills and a variety of coins and other archaeological materials found in these areas. Khaspur was the last capital of the Kachari kings located in Cachar district. The place consists of a variety of archaeological remnants of the Kachari kings. Sambodhan Thousen is remembered for his noble participation in his struggle against the British colonial government who oppressed the local Dimasas by using their forced labor in menial jobs, like construction of railway lines connecting N.C hills to the rest of British territories. 261

and provincial laws should be applied to the local matters of the people of these areas only with the approval of the local leaders of the district, that is, the local Dimasa representatives elected to the state legislative assembly (MLAs), who had the better knowledge and competence to judge the local needs and manage the affairs of the group

[Datta Ray 1989, pp. 41-43]. Additionally, the Tribal Council proposed the Indian government that the permanent residents (implying Dimasas) of North Cachar hills should have the exclusive rights to participate in local level politics of N.C. hills. These instances can perhaps be considered as the earliest manifestations of the belief that the

Dimasa people in general, adhered to and the politicians capitalized upon the view that local leaders can adequately stand for the interests of the Dimasas of N.C. hills. Political mobilization of Dimasa political leaders have since then been consistently based on

Dimasa identity.

Diminished capacities of the local self-governing institutions over a period of time did not erode the political salience of Dimasa identity. Over a period of time, these institutions have indeed served as an active platform of political competition between the

Dimasas and non-Dimasas. If we look at the structure of governance of the N.C. hills dictrict council we will find that the council was initially composed of twelve members elected from amongst the local inhabitants of the district and four members, nominated by the state government. Initially, the offices were equally divided between the Dimasas and the non-Dimasas. However, in 1967 and later in 1979, the state government had to make certain readjustments of the electoral seats of the district council due to repeated pressures of the Dimasa elite who argued that the seats allocated to Dimasa

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representatives was disproportionate to the population of Dimasas in the district. Based on the group‘s majority status, the number of Dimasa representatives should be increased in relation to the non-Dimasas residing in the district. On the basis of the Delimitation

Act passed by the Union government, the state government finally provided that the electoral seats to the parliament, state legislative assembly and the territorial councils would be redistributed in terms of the latest enumeration of the population of the district.

Concordant with this legislation, the numbers of seats to the council for the Dimasas were raised from six to fifteen while that of the non-Dimasas were increased from six to eight elected representatives. Ethnic appeals succeeded in controlling the top-most positions of the council, including the offices like Chief Executive Member, the Chairman of different departments, being captured by Dimasas. Ethno-cultural appeals used by Dimasa political leaders thus became the sine qua non of decentralized politics.

Dimasa identity based on these ethno-cultural symbols was therefore used as a collective action frame by Dimasa nationalists and was propagated as incompatible or rather as antithetical and more developed culturally in relation to the majoritarian identity of the Assamese. Cultural differences and past autonomy of the Dimasas were consistently used to organize around a collective action frame to regain autonomous political status. Ethnic appeals of the Dimasa activists along these lines appeared to have a mixed impact on mobilization. DSU began its orientation, in a language that people could understand: the advantages of supporting the new set of political leaders in their fight for the common good and improving their current socio-economic situation in the proposed political set up. The activists however, failed to captivate people in huge

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numbers by using such rhetoric. Political campaigns (demonstrations, protest marches, strike etc.) organized during the movement remained relatively focused in selected areas of North Cachar hills, particularly Haflong; the administrative headquarter of the district.

In general, there was much less mobilization in areas like Maibong in the southern part of the district. Even the demonstrations that took place in Haflong failed to have a large following of the local Dimasa population. One of the most important reasons that explain such limited effectiveness of DSU‘s activist campaign as compared to ABSU, was its centralized organizational structure and lack of decentralized communicative networks that posed a major challenge to spread its ideologies or to muster immense support or collaboration of the civilian population. Perhaps, this was the most important reason why the rebel group (DHD) was easily crushed by the army after its first round of insurgency in the 1990s. The organization had problems of recruitment and thus operated with a relatively small group of cadres, probably less than a hundred recruits, most of whom were earlier activists involved in the students‘ organization. DHD‘s emergence was largely possible because of immense material support provided by NSCN, the main militant organization operating in Nagaland. Despite these external alliances, the organization could not withstand severe repression adopted by the government.

Following their failed attempts in the first phase of militancy, DHD leaders continued their clandestine political activities to rebuild the organization by establishing closer links not only with NSCN but also several other rebel outfits that were operating in the northeastern region. Although DHD managed to recruit approximately four hundred local

Dimasas, the organization could not develop into a strong and large-armed force. The organizational strength of DHD was much lower than that of the Bodo militant

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organizations which numbered approximately 2600 recruits.131 In its second phase of rebellion, DHD tried to establish its ties with the people. These efforts proved to be less effective to develop immense participation, primarily because of fragile vertical links that pre-existed since DSU‘s mobilization in the 80s. Lack of dispersed networks and weak communicative strategies adopted by activist organizations reduced the capabilities of

DHD to achieve a burgeoning support from the local people, an important asset that would have otherwise facilitated a relatively broad-based support for DHD‘s insurgent operations.

Apart from these factors, consistent flow of logistical support from local Dimasas for insurgent violence was prevented by intra-group conflict. DHD‘s internal politics was marked by outright conflict among the leaders and in turn proved to be organizationally disruptive. Internal factionalism that arose on the question of leadership worsened by the early part of 2000. The outcome of the internecine conflict was a fractured leadership.

Organizational in-fighting acted as a hindrance to provide credible guarantees to the people. Ordinary people were often caught in the cross-fire of internecine conflict between the two wings of DHD---DHD (D) and Black Widows. Stiff competition emerged between these organizations to recruit local people and increase the organizational strength of each faction. This often led to forced recruitment of local

Dimasas into the guerilla armies. Escalating differences nevertheless proved to be counter-productive for the movement and the rebel organizations and in turn, a relative triumph for the counter-mobilization forces---the state. These organizations drifted away

131Annual report brought out by the Institute for Conflict Management, Delhi, available at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist_outfits/bltf.htm 265

from the original goals of the movement (demand for Dimaraji) and instead engaged in a bitter and violent conflict with each other. In the face of intense fights within the nationalists, the issue of separate Dimaraji seemed to have taken a backseat. The state security forces on their part used this situation most strategically to carry out its counter- insurgency operations. Members of each faction were tactically used by the state agents to arrest or demobilize the actions of their counterparts in the rival group (DHD vs. Black

Widow and vice versa). As leadership coherence visibly weakened, high levels of uncertainty and a crisis of legitimacy of the movement came to the fore. People‘s perceptions, their attitudes and collective behavior were largely shaped by these internal conflicts. No matter how strong the village networks were, lack of cohesion and conflict within the core leadership demotivated people to provide relentless support and cooperation to the rebel group. Some local Dimasas pointed out that initially they had some faith in the rebels. However, substantial section of the Dimasa population was disgruntled by the fight between the two factions of DHD. People condemned their actions and some explicitly noted, ‗People‘s hearts and minds for Dimaraji cannot be achieved by force and terror for long. If the leaders are themselves confused about their objectives and fight for their own lives we have no reasons to show relentless loyalty to these organizations. What do we get in return from DHD? How can they guarantee security to the whole community when they are struggling to save their lives from each other? Even if the district council is flawed, we have no other alternative but to maintain good relations with the council members and the government for small business contracts, local-based jobs, etc.‘132 Dissatisfaction with DHD and the absence of

132 This view was expressed by local villagers as well as by the general secretary of a Dimasa social organization. 266

alternatives also produced secret collaborations of some local Dimasas with pro- government security forces.

Crisis of legitimacy thus plagued the Dimaraji movement from within and the movement did not have much following. In sum, besides inter-ethnic conflict, lack of credibility and commitment to movement goals and the process of mobilization failed to accomplish the task of obtaining relentless support of a huge number of constituents. As a result, the Dimaraji movement was limited in its scope of militant activities. The movement failed to transform itself into a mass-based violent conflict. It remained as a low-scale ethnic insurgency and was eventually de-radicalized in 2003.

STATE REPRESSION: IMPACT ON VIOLENT MOBILIZATION

The Indian state resorted to repression to deal with ethno-nationalist movements in the north-eastern region based on the idea that only the dominant state and its armed representatives are capable of providing security to the people and handling the disorder emerging out of ethnic insurgencies. Implementation of centralized policies and employment of repressive strategies molded the pattern of resistance of the Dimasas.

Quite similar to the Bodo agitation, the government showed little inclination to accommodate the demands for Dimaraji. By 1995, state armed forces had crushed the

DNSF and virtually forced the rebels to surrender enmasse. The rebel group seemed to have been almost eliminated. However, when DHD (offshoot of DNSF) re-emerged in its second phase of rebellion, state security forces increased their presence and became overwhelmingly visible in the region. Constant presence of the armed forces and their

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involvement in indiscriminate searching operations in the valley was perceived by many as an ‗act of intrusion into the tranquil domains of the Dimasa community‘. For some, the sight of established barracks in the valley sensitized the notion that the region was a militarized zone. 133

Della Porta rightly points out in this context that one cannot understand protest repertoires and their evolution without understanding the interaction between the police and the protesters [Porta, 1996]. Policing tactics to control the DHD militants in N.C. hills were highly influenced by counter-insurgency laws that had already been in use in

Assam.134 Extraordinary legal rights to arrest and detain individuals without any warrant and on mere suspicion of being involved in any disruptive or a terrorist act, prohibiting assemblage of five or more individuals in the areas declared as a disturbed zone, disallowing individuals to carry firearms, ammunition or any other explosive substances, applying physical force on any individual considered to have violated social norms or involved in a cognizable offence had been the quintessence of institutional policing methods employed by the state. Repression was marked by excessive intolerance and absence of any communication or accommodative intent between the security forces and the movement activists. Figure 6.3 provides some preliminary data of state repression.

133 Excerpts from the interviews of the spokesperson of surrendered DHD and a leading member of ADSU. 134 Discussed in chapter 4. 268

Fig. 6.3. Level of State repression in Dimasa areas

The figure shows the level of repression from 1992-2006. The graph depicts a relatively consistent level of repression throughout the rebellion with visible spikes during the years 1995, 1997, 1999 and in 2003. It provides a rough estimate of the approximate number of militants killed and arrested over a period from 1992 to 2006.

Data culled from various sources show that nearly 120 militants were killed while as many as 223 cadres of DHD were arrested during this period.135 With the anti-insurgency laws at its discretion, the state declared North Cachar hills district as one of the disturbed areas of the state and applied its full-scale institutional repression against DHD‘s insurgent tactics.

135 Most of the data has been compiled from findings brought out by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi; and newspaper articles especially, ‗The Hindu‘ and Assam Tribune. 269

How did state repression influence the patterns of Dimasa rebellion? There were two important effects---first, on the outcome of the movement and second, on the pattern of rebel violence. The state security forces changed their methods of repression from indiscriminate methods to careful selection of DHD rebels and their collaborators. Cases of indiscriminate methods of repression (civilian torture and coercion, gendered violence, etc.) significantly lowered down as the state faced fewer constraints to identify the rebels.

Diminishing vertical networks and internecine conflict between the two rival groups

(DHD and Black Widows) significantly lowered the costs of rebel identification. Physical tortures of rank and file arrested from time to time and the detainees in the police custody were invariably subjected to some amount of physical torture and violence. However, the type of arrests, forced surrender and state killings in this case was relatively calculated and selective. Targetted selection of the core members of DHD, the intermediate supporters and sympathizers enabled the state security forces to coerce the DHD to surrender and finally de-radicalize the movement.

Second effect of state repression was on the pattern of rebel violence itself. On 30th

June, 2000, DHD rebels staged a bold attack on state security forces in N.C.hills district, resulting in the deaths of six police personnel and injuring two others. On 8th Feb, 2001,

DHD militants killed 9 security personnel and injured three more in Dehangi, N.C.hills.

On 9th Dec 2002, DHD carried out another daring attack on the Assistant Superintendent of Police, two railway policemen and two other officials in N.C.hills. This pattern of violence targeted on state agents continued throughout the rebellion but the magnitude and intensities of these attacks remained considerably low.

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The second pattern of DHD violence had to do with the non-combatant population.

On 18th May, 2000, DHD rebels launched a severe offensive on fifteen people, including an executive magistrate in Haflong, N.C.hills. Those killed were alleged to be non- supporters of DHD. Similar attacks were carried out on civilians, mostly non-Dimasas during the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 at many places like Udarbond

(Cachar), Lumding (Nagaon), Balmul&Multhajao, (N.C. hills). Most of these were targeted violence. The magnitude and incidence of violence against non-combatants increased and the nature of targets changed in significant ways. Non-Dimasa groups in the district increasingly became the targets of selective violence. The years 2003 and

2005 were notably salient in this respect when violence was committed against non-

Dimasa groups which in turn transformed the Dimasa areas into a theatre of intense inter- ethnic violence between the Dimasas and the Hmars and the Dimasas and Karbis.

Why were the non-Dimasas considered to be the potential targets of DHD violence?

One way of answering this question is to take account of the methods of state repression.

Targetted state repression weakened the ability of the DHD rebels to attack state officials directly. Targetted repression is generally considered to be costly for the state agents because it involves enormous efforts to obtain precise information about the rebels and their hideouts especially, if the latter are engaged in severe guerrilla tactics and if they blend in well with the civilian population. In the Dimasa case, the process of identification was relatively easier. Information obtained from the rival groups of DHD facilitated precision in identifying, arresting and killing the rebels and their core associates during counter-insurgency operations. The rebels in turn, exhibited defiance by

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changing their tactics of violence. Instead of directly confronting the government officials and security personnel, the rebel group began targeting non-combatants, particularly non-

Dimasas living in N.C.hills. The next section presents the evidence of some of the selected incidents of targeted attacks on non-Dimasas, the Hmars.

DIMASA-HMAR VIOLENCE OF 2003

On March 5th, DHD extremists launched a massive and sporadic attack on two villages in N.C.hills, where the Hmars lived. The attack forced nearly 800 Hmars to flee their villages and take shelter at a place called Lakhipur, which lies at the border of

Assam and Mizoram. Following this incident, on March 26th, Dimasas made fresh attacks on other Hmar villages in the vicinity and threatened them to leave these areas failing which the Hmars would face disastrous consequences. These incidents were reportedly triggered by the kidnapping of three DHD rebels by the NSCM (IM) with the assistance of Hmar People‘s Conference (HPC-D) on 24th Feb. 2003. HPC-D is an insurgent outfit of the Hmars actively operating in North Cachar. 136 Although the abducted members were later released, the DHD took offense of this event and vowed to retaliate.

In response, shortly after this scourge, on the night of 31st March, 2003, a group of marauding Hmars armed with machetes and guns overran a bunch of villages inhabited

136 HPC was formed in 1986, as a political party spearheading a movement for autonomy in Mizoram. The Hmars were disappointed with the formation with the state of Mizoram and the provisions laid down in the Mizoram Accord of 1986, which they believe failed to take into account the issue of ‗Greater Mizoram‘ by incorporating all areas inhabited by Hmars in Miroram, Assam and Manipur under a single administrative unit. Since April, 1987, they launched an armed struggle for autonomy and became intensely violent in 1991. They have been actively functioning in Mizoram, Manipur and Assam‘s N.C hills. Verghese [2002]. 272

by Dimasas. The armed men were identified as HPC (D) rebels. They maliciously burnt down nearly seventy Dimasa huts and abducted nearly 30 villagers. Later the police recovered 23 corpses of those captured in Bhuban the hills, while the others seemed to be missing.137 The dead bodies were found severely riddled with bullet shots. The Dimasas struck back on 1st April, killing 23 Hmars near Mastul, in the nearby district of Cachar.

Then on April 9, nearly 40 DHD militants ravaged Hmar areas and set ablaze 25 hutments at Radzol, Harangajao in N.C. hills. This was followed by another attack in a

Hmar village at Hebron near Karbi Anglong district. Hmars retaliated on May 7th by killing DHD cadres at Redzol, near Haflong in N.C.hills.

Varying explanations had been given for the cause and the nature of these events.

These range from land-related grievance to inter-personal enmity between the militant outfits of the two communities. Some reports reveal that the violence started when DHD who had entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Union government on 1st Jan 2003, tried to set up a designated camp for DHD members near a Hmar village in North Cachar

Hills. This move was vehemently opposed by Hmars. Subsequently, as cited above, the

Hmars kidnapped three members belonging to the Dimasa militant outfit. In all likelihood this ignited the tensions between the two communities that had been simmering since late

80s. The Dimasa activists‘ side of the story well represents a widespread phenomenon which constituted systematic physical attacks inflicted against communities which the

137 Bhuban hills are located in North Cachar hills, an area where the three states of Assam, Manipur and Nagaland converge. Most of the Hmar insurgent operations are engineered from their base camps located in these areas. 273

Dimasa rebels considered to be settlers posing a threat to the Dimasas.138 Dimasas view that the presence of Hmars had been growing ‗exponentially‘ over the past few decades.

Their voluntary migration and intent on grabbing Dimasa lands is perceived to have a long-term effect on the indigenous Dimasa population. Progressive conception of being culturally and politically swamped by Hmars (including other non-Dimasa groups) had been a cause of uneasiness and suspicion for Dimasas. A founding member of DHD who surrendered in 2003 expressed his view, ‗the Hmars have a free movement in and out of

N.C. hills and do not require any permit. They originally belong to Mizoram but in the recent decades we have noticed an increased flow of Hmars from Mizoram. They have been involved in land encroachment and timber cutting in the forests of N.C.hills. More appalling is their inclusion in the N.C.hills voter‘s lists which all the more complicates the situation that we are in. The support that the Hmar terrorists receive from NSCN

(IM), their former ally but present challenger, is also quite disturbing.‘ State representatives however, described the cases as stray and isolated incidents of violence, and fallout of inter-personal rivalries and misunderstandings between some members of the two communities.139 Given these contradictory accounts, the pattern and dynamics of

Hmar-Dimasa hostilities needs to be assessed with some amount of caution.

138 The Dimasa rebels claim that the Hmars were migrants to these regions who had occupied the territories that originally belonged to the Dimasas and to which the Hmars did not have any inherent right to possess. Hmar activists challenge these views and draw on a different historical discourse. According to their narrative although their ethnic roots are traced to the Kuki-Chin group of tribes found in Manipur and Mizoram, the Hmars had settled in the N.C. hills as early as 1740 A.D. Hmar activists draw heavily on this discourse to situate their political claims in N.C.hills. 139 This was the version of a bureaucrat in charge of an important department in Assam secretariat in Guwahati. He was one of the chief advisors of the government during the talks held with DHD. 274

HMARS AS ALTERNATIVE TARGETS OF VIOLENCE

The demographic pattern of the district shows that tribal population consists of nearly

95% of the total population of N.C.hills while the remaining 5% comprise of non-tribals, mostly Bengalis, followed by Nepalis, Assamese and Biharis. The following table illustrates the percentage of different tribal groups out of the total Scheduled Tribe population in N.C.hills district.

Table 6.1. Distribution of Scheduled Tribe Population in North Cachar Hills

Ethnic Group Distribution(Total S.T.Population) 1. Dimasa 50.52% 2.Hmars 10.80% 3. Zemes 13.30% 4. Other tribes (Chakma, Mikir, etc.) 25.38%

Source: Census report 2001.

Rough estimate of area wise distribution of the above listed ethnic groups in N.C.hills shows that the Dimasas are most widely spread in N.C.hills. Hmars are more or less concentrated in small villages like Redzol, Hebron in Harangajao (southernmost part of

N.C.hills, near Borail reserve forest in the map provided in an earlier section of this chapter), Mahur (towards the south, near Haflong) and Haflong. There are almost forty six Hmar villages in the district. Baiteis and Karbis are mostly found in Garampani

(Krung Ming Reserve forest area near Karbi Anglong), Zemes (near Jatinga, towards

South, near Borail range) and Bengalis are nearly distributed over areas in Maibong,

Mahur, Haflong, Langting, Harangajao, Hatikhali and Dittokcherra. Some Assamese

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families also reside in the areas near Haflong. Interestingly, the numerical strength of the

Zemes is more than the Hmars in the region. However, the targets of violence were not the Zemes but the latter group.

A dominant socio-economic perception prevails---attribution of the blame on the

Hmars for taking hold of Dimasa lands. A sense of growing discomfiture of the Dimasas on Hmar settlement in N.C. hills was one of the many factors that precipitated violent hostilities in early 2000s. How well-founded were these fears and how did these feelings ultimately feed into brutal violence in 2003? Evidence of specific cases of the targeted groups (Hmars) acquiring land is not so strong to justify these claims. Empirical evidence suggests that land encroachment, mostly in the areas covered by unclassified forests, had been a common phenomenon in the N.C. hills region. Tribals, non-tribals and the government seem to be more or less equally involved in this process. Moreover, with limited amounts of available data and crude facts, it hardly leaves enough room for anyone to credibly interpret that the encroachers exclusively belong to the Hmar communities. Rather than simply stating that demographic pressures and resource scarcity related to land, primarily motivated the Dimasas to respond in violent ways, my argument firmly puts the 2003 attacks on Hmar as substitute violence. 140

Why were the Hmars chosen as targets of substitute violence? The best way to answer this question is by examining---first, the tensions that emerged out of the fears (perceived or real) of relative group advantage or disadvantage between the Hmars and the Dimasas.

This dimension can be analyzed by looking at specific socio-economic characteristics of

140 This concept has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 276

the Hmars. The second dimension has to do with the political activities of the Hmars, links with their co-ethnics and their politics across the borders of the N.C.hills region, particularly the neighboring states of Mizoram and Manipur. This means that the primary sources of resentments against the Hmars were conditioned by both political as well as socio-economic factors. Among all other non-Dimasa minority groups in the N.C.hills region, the Hmars are generally considered to be ‗diligent, ambitious and hardworking‘.

The group has relatively higher rates of literacy and has achieved considerable success in petty business, local government jobs and education. Despite the absence of clear evidence, a general apprehension is held that the Hmars will gradually become the main competitors and will substantially benefit from the region‘s resources at the expense of the Dimasas.141 As a result, the Dimasa leaders sought special protection and advancement of the rights of the Dimasas. In 1970s, the Dimasa leaders resorted to a pre- emptive measure and sought to enhance the position of the Dimasas by increasing the numbers of electoral seats for the Dimasas in the North Cachar district council.

Heightened pressures from these leaders eventually, led to an increase from six to fifteen seats reserved for the Dimasa representatives. The seats for all other non-Dimasa tribes were raised from six to eight elected representatives. The Hmars got a share of one seat for their membership in the Autonomous council which they consider to be a disproportionate share of representation in the council. The positions in the council

(including the Chief Executive Member) have consistently been dominated by the

Dimasas. Furthermore, in early 1980s, the Dimasa leaders proposed a new move whereby, they sought to reserve almost ninety percent of the government jobs in the

141 The growth of Hmar population seems to be largely based on speculation rather than an actual increase in the number of Hmars in the region. 277

valley for the Dimasas. Non-Dimasas on the other hand, vehemently opposed these acts and proposals made by the Dimasa leaders. They felt that these actions were discriminatory and these restricted the rights of the non-Dimasas residing for decades in the region. The situation indeed sowed the seeds of virulent communal politics involving the Hmars and the Dimasas.

Resentments about relative group positions magnified in the 1990s, when the Hmar

Student leaders and political organizations like the Hmar People‘s Union, became politically quite active in the N.C.hills region. These organizations sought to increase their share of benefits. One of the preliminary moves in this direction was made in the year 1988 at the Hmar Student leaders‘ convention held in N.C.hills. The leaders of the convention adopted a motion that the government should provide legal recognition of cultural rights, especially language rights of the Hmars living in that region. After several rounds of appeals, the government finally, approved that the Hmar language can be used as a medium of instruction in the primary level of school education, especially in the areas where the Hmars constituted a substantial portion of the population in the district.

Additionally, the Hmar leaders mobilized for local autonomy for the Hmar community.

The leaders stressed that the Hmars can be empowered only if they have their own autonomous institution where the people can obtain enough resources, representation and better political positions. The Hmar political organizations therefore, emphasized the need for devolutionary powers for the Hmars by setting up a separate administrative institution under the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Indian constitution.

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Constitutional guarantees provided by such an autonomous institution will reduce their dependence on the Dimasa dominated autonomous council.

Demands for institutional reforms and protection of Hmar rights made by the Hmar political organizations were a constant source of tension for the Dimasa leaders. Their political claims in the region magnified the threats of the Dimasas of being ‗smothered‘ by the relatively ‗enterprising‘ Hmars.142 These fears were intensified by a widespread feeling held by the Dimasas that the challenging capabilities of the Hmars to lay their political claims is enhanced both by human and material support that the Hmar political organizations have managed to garner from their co-ethnics in the neighboring states of

Manipur and Mizoram. The fears have been compounded by an increasing perception that the Hmars had been growing in numerical strength in the region. Dimasa nationalists strongly claim that in the past few decades, the migration of the Hmars from the neighboring state of Manipur had been exponentially growing in the region. The growth in the sheer number of Hmar population (real as well as illusive) had been largely conditioned by the conflict of Hmars in Mizoram for a separate state called Hmar-ram.

The Hmar People‘s Convention emerged in Mizoram, in 1987 as an armed wing of

Hmars fighting for the integration of the areas inhabited by Hmars in Assam, Manipur and Mizoram into an autonomous administrative unit which they called the ‗greater

Mizoram‘, a territorial claim that potentially increased the tensions between the Hmars and Dimasas because the proposed areas of the Hmars included the border regions of

Assam‘s N.C.hills district. The roots of the Hmar agitation can be traced back to 1950s

142 For details on these concepts refer to Horowitz, 2001, pg. 181. 279

when Hmars living in Manipur expressed their desire to join Mizoram and incorporate these areas into ‗Greater Mizoram‘. When this initial effort did not materialize, Hmar leaders decided to exert continued political pressures while at the same time, fully supporting the Mizo National Front (MNF) in its struggle to gain separate statehood from

Assam. Mizoram finally gained its statehood in June 1986. The formation of Mizoram did not make much difference to the condition of the Hmars. The tripartite accord signed by the Mizo leaders, the government of Assam and the Central government did not make any specific note of the political demands of the Hmars, except that the members of the group residing in Mizoram were granted certain rights and privileges as minorities of

Mizoram, thus leaving aside the question of Hmars in Assam. The Hmar leaders felt betrayed as they received nothing in return for their support to the cause of MNF.

Frustration and disillusionment thus compelled the Hmars to form the HPC, initially as a political party, which turned into an armed outfit in 1987. Since then, HPC had been engaged in a full-fledged armed rebellion with the Mizoram government and the central government of India. HPC found immense support and sympathy for their cause from their kin members in N.C.hills. After series of dialogues in 1990s, a section of HPC rebels surrendered their arms and agreed to accept the proposal of the government to form an autonomous council called the ‗Sinlung Development Council‘ in Mizoram.

Another section of discontented HPC members however, dismissed the accord and instead launched a bitter rebellion through their newly formed militant organization, the

HPC (Democratic) in 1995. Their demands were no longer confined to an autonomous unit but were extended to the formation of an independent state called Hmar ram. Active

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operations of HPC (D) have continuously been carried out from their base camps located in Churachandpur (Manipur), Cachar (Bhuban hills) and North Cachar (Jinam valley).

This had generated a clash of interest between the DHD (Dimasa militant group) and

HPC (D).

Continuous clashes between the Hmar rebels and the state has led to an increasing flow of Hmars residing in the border areas of Mizoram to the Dimasa region. Although the exact numbers are purely conjectural, this phenomenon had been a cause of serious concern for the Dimasas. The Dimasa nationalists capitalized on these perceptions and projected the Hmars as ‗ethnic strangers‘ forcibly occupying the traditional lands of the

Dimasas. Substantial claims have also been made by the Dimasa nationalists that material and symbolic support that the Hmar militants operating in North Cachar hills, receive from their co-ethnics across the region, had certainly enhanced the capabilities of the

Hmars to challenge the Dimasa rebels as well as to fight for their political rights in the district. In fact, during the 2003 inter-ethnic clashes between the Hmars and the Dimasas, the HPC (D) formed the Hmar Protection cell (Hnam Santu), exclusively meant to protect the interests of Hmars residing in the districts of Cachar and North Cachar.

To sum up, concerns about relative group positions, socio-economic benefits, competing claims on political power and autonomy in N.C. hills were some of the unique factors that contributed to the apprehensions and inter-group hostilities between the

Hmars and the Dimasas. Violence against the Hmars took place against the background of these antagonisms. The pattern and the timing of attacks were important. The former

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displayed a form of violence targeted against alternative and parallel adversaries in the wake of ethnic insurgency of the DHD in 2003. Due to tremendous pressures created by state repression, the Dimasa extremists were unable to inflict direct costs on the government security forces. Accumulated grievances against the state were channelled into violence against the Hmars in early 2003---the targets that were relatively more accessible than the state armed forces and against whom the Dimasas already had parallel resentments. As Horowitz rightly puts, ‗prior dislike for certain categories of people tends to make them more likely to become targets of substitute violence‘.143 In this sense, substitute violence was significantly borne out by Hmars.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that excessive dominance of the state and failure of the decentralized institutions of governance in the post-colonial period fostered the conditions for the emergence of ethno-nationalist demands of the Dimasas. The chapter explains that during the intial phase of mobilization (1970s-early 1990s), protesters relied more on petition campaigns and other peaceful methods. Protest techniques however, changed in 1994 when the Karbis and the Dimasas, who had been fighting for an autonomous unit from a unified platform, departed from each other while inculcating markedly strong and opposing ethno-political ideologies. Their divergence from a joint venture signalled a ragged relationship between the leaders of these two groups and the rise of radical ethno-nationalism. The period witnessed a switch in the demands of these two groups, from the formation of an autonomous district to the creation of separate

143 Although Horowitz uses the term displaced aggression, I find the term substitute violence more suitable for this study [Horowitz, 2001]. 282

states for the Dimasas and Karbis. This newfound aspiration urged the emerging leadership to take recourse to pressurizing tactics. A small core of activists opted for violent methods of mobilization and formed an insurgent force, the DHD. The gradual build-ups of a violent rebellion, the mobilization structure and institutional constraints have been extensively explored in this chapter.

DSU‘s initials efforts pertained to raising the consciousness of the local population.

The activists invoked the concepts of homeland for the Dimasas based on their settlement history and long duration of inhabitation in and around the region of North Cachar hills.

The organization called for the protection of a distinct Dimasa identity through its platform and sought to garner popular support for their cause. Findings however, suggest that ethnic appeals did not motivate high levels of support and participation in the rebellion. This was in sharp contrast to the Bodo movement where collective participation and commitment towards insurgent activities continued even in the face of mounting repression. High degrees of civilian support and participation (covert as well as overt) by the Bodo rebels were achieved by means of persuasion and successful mobilization by a highly decentralized and committed organization like ABSU.144

Civilian support was contingent on high degree of credibility and dedication of the activists. On the contrary, the recurrent themes in the case of the Dimasas were a ‗crisis of legitimacy‘ and intra-group factionalism tied to ineffective mobilization strategies adopted by relatively centralized activist organizations like the DSU. People in general, therefore, had no choice but to reject active involvement in the insurgency. The consequences of weak vertical networks were profound. Vertical networks were too

144 This is however not to emphasize that coercion was totally absent during the Bodo rebellion. 283

fragile to provide consistent support and to overcome the problems of collective action.

In the face of rising factionalism between the armed wings of DHD, state agents could easily suppress those networks. This facilitated the state security forces to change their tactics of repression from indiscriminate methods to careful selection of rebels and their supporters as a consequence of which, insurgency was crushed without ceding any meaningful concessions to the DHD rebels.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This dissertation was aimed at identifying the factors that led to three different outcomes of movements involving ethnic minorities. To this end, I began with a simple question about ethnic movements—why do some ethnic movements turn to high-levels of violence; some remain moderate with low intensities of violence while others remain relatively peaceful? The first outcome appeared to have captured the attention of a number of scholars not only because it involves high amount of risks related to human security but also other issues like changing power relations between the majority and minority ethnic groups within a country, the likelihood of a spill-over effect across the borders of a country due to the support that the rebelling group may acquire from a neighboring kin and a number of other related concerns. These issues have been systematically addressed in the literature. A striking deficiency still exists in the literature to analyze the conditions that can contribute to other potential outcomes produced by ethnic movements-- moderation and less disruptive levels of contention. Except a few scholars (Toft, Subramanian, Varshney, Waldman) earlier works have not adequately addressed these issues from a comparative perspective or tried to explain the variations from case to case in the eventual outcome of ethnic movements despite similar preconditions (grievances) that generate such conflicts. The suggestion is to bridge these gaps in the literature by investigating the interactive dynamics of three important factors--

--a) mobilizing resources, b) communicative mechanism and c) political opportunities. In this concluding chapter, I reiterate my argument against competing explanations of

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conflict and violence. This is followed by a brief discussion of the usefulness of the framework that I have developed, to explain similar situations of conflict beyond the cases analyzed in this study. Finally, I conclude with some implications of this study and the scope of future research.

I made the claim in this dissertation that socio-economic resentments of the tribal ethnic minority groups alone did not account for the episodes of violence in the Bodo and

Dimasa areas that occurred in the late 1980s to early 2000s. These explanations cannot determine why under similar concerns and grievances (e.g. ethnic domination of the majority ethnic group, unequal distribution of government jobs or executive positions, discriminatory cultural rights, demographic imbalances caused due to alienation and encroachment of tribal lands, etc.) the Bodos have engaged in sustained and high- intensities of violence, the Dimasas engaged in moderate levels of violence while the third group, the Misings pursued their goals for autonomy through less disruptive methods of contention. This study takes grievances as a beginning point to analyze the initial conditions that can shape ethnic mobilization. Major emphasis is however, placed on relative group-level capabilities and opportunities to explain the variance in the patterns of contentious actions. Here the focus is not on economic incentives that can determine the feasibility of ethnic rebellion but on a range of alternative non-economic motivations such as intra-group networks, desire to attain collective worth, safeguarding symbolic resources (language, customs, customary land, etc.) that the separatist leaders can strategically mobilize for collective actions. I argue that the popular resonance of ethnic appeals (communicative mechanism), societal resources (networks) and state

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responses determine the feasibility of ethnic rebellion---whether a group will pursue its goals by mobilizing peacefully or violently.

Mobilizing resources and narrative material available to the group are the intra-group mechanisms that determine a group‘s collective efficacy or capabilities to organize the rebellion. Strategic mobilization of shared beliefs and perceptions about perpetual victimhood and a sense of threat to a group‘s ethno-cultural identity can stir symbolic motivations to provide active or behavioral support for protest actions. I have argued that the variations in the level of contention can be explained by taking into account the degree to which people endorse the movement narratives and effective communicative strategies adopted by activist organizations to broadcast these narratives. Ethnic appeals have to resonate with collective beliefs about ethnic symbols, interpretations of exploitative histories, and current interests (material as well as symbolic) of the civilian population. Popular resonance is the initial condition for determining the variant patterns of participation and non-participation in movement activities. The outcome of mobilization (high levels of violence, moderate intensities of violence and peaceful mobilization) is determined by the ethnic organizations‘ mobilizing success. This study traces mobilizing success to the nature of activist organizations. The argument is that decentralized and well-structured activist organizations with a committed leadership are better capable of creating a conducive environment to narrate and disseminate the symbolic appeals to the otherwise unconnected members of the group.

Chapter 4 discussed why and under what conditions language identity of the Bodos was chosen by Bodo activists and ethno-nationalist organizations to propagate subjective

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consciousness of the group‘s regional identity. Language identity gained immense socio- political salience for the group as it was attached to people‘s life chances, including social status, employment, education and above all the opportunities of higher social mobility. Politicization of language based grievances was therefore, adopted as a strategic method to address some of these ethnically charged concerns of the civilian population.

The strategy had a tremendous impact on the subsequent pattern of radical mobilization.

Chapter 5 explained the reasons why Mising activists failed to develop their mobilization frame around ethno-linguistic identity of the Misings. The Mising leaders tended to popularize the ideas of cultural revivalism and campaigned on grievances like decline of the original Mising language and culture, negligence of the state institutions to preserve them and the efforts of forced assimilation by the state. The narratives and communicative methods used to popularize these frames, however, failed to generate widespread support amongst the broader population of Misings because these appeals did not resonate much with the beliefs and material interests of the broader population. The

Mising language agitation itself was indicative of low levels of popular activism on ethno-linguistic identity. The influence of the movement was minimal to create collective bases of collaboration and support for the later phases of the autonomy movement. Weak organizational capabilities and intra-group differences on language issues constrained the leaders‘ influence on popular perceptions and their support base. This narrowed down the prospects for the leadership to adopt radical means to push for their goals.

Chapter 6 examined the process of mobilization around Dimasa identity. Discrete identity of the Dimasas gained political salience within the autonomous institutions. The

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strength of the political movement initially developed around the symbolic discourse of

Dimasa identity. Weak protest repertoires adopted by the movement activists, leadership incoherence and contradictory goals however narrowed the scope of ethnic appeals to attract sustained support of the local population. As a result, the movement was confined to a low level of ethnic insurgency.

The second core argument in this study relates to the mobilization of societal resources. While symbolic appeals and communication of those appeals raises the consciousness of a group for collective action and provides the explanation of why and how particular ethnic categories get politicized and produces the potential conditions for participation (or non-participation) in violent actions against the opposing group, a successful mobilization of societal resources creates the mechanisms to maintain consistent support and participation for armed resistance. This study has analyzed the role of horizontal and vertical networks (resources) and their influence on goal setting of the leaders as well as strategic decision-making of the movement participants. Pre-existing community ties and hierarchical relationships between the rebel leadership and the non- combatants are salient to understand the scope, intensity and duration of ethnic rebellion.

While identifying the role of societal resources, the idea is not to deny the importance of material incentives (or disincentives) that serve as enticing factors to attract and retain the support and loyalty of group members. Besides restraining potential defectors from cooperating with the rival forces, material incentives can motivate people to provide sustained support for an ethnic rebellion. Collier argues that the sustenance of a rebel

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organization and the subsequent nature of the rebellion are highly affected by the rebel group‘s objective to loot or seek funds for the rebellion [Collier, 2002]. The logic of economic incentives can however, capture only part of the explanation. If we take the case of Sendero Luminoso in Peru, increased support for the rebel group from the peasants of Ayacucho, was only partially influenced by expanding profits obtained from cocoa production. Peasants were drawn largely due to excessive military offensives in the highlands, combined with the absence of state authorities and negligence of the region.145

Thus, to argue that economic motivations guarantee support and durability of ethnic rebellion seems to be insufficient. Instead one has to enquire into cases where these conditions are not conceivable because material resources may be in short supply and the rebel groups may not have access to enough economic resources to allure ordinary people to join the rebellion. The fact that the Bodo, Dimasa and Mising activists tried to invest in societal networks to carry out their efforts therefore, draws attention to relational networks that exist within the group.

Common values, solidarity norms, kinship loyalty embedded in local community networks of these mobilized groups played a significant role in the intial organizing efforts. Processes of rebel recruitment and support for the armed rebellions of the Bodos and to a certain degree, the Dimasas were rooted in these networks. Nevertheless, as this study reveals, the contribution of community ties to movement sustenance, hinges on unflinching commitment of core activist organizations and the leaders, the sine qua non, of vertical relationships with the non-combatant population. These resources were virtually absent in the case of Dimasas and Misings, and eventually contributed to the

145 For further details refer to Kay [1999]. 290

collapse of these movements. On the contrary, the Bodos were endowed with a strong and committed leadership that mitigated the costs of not only mobilization, recruitment, control, and coordination of movement activities but also of obtaining consistent collaboration of the civilian population during the armed movement.

Opportunities or constraints created due to state responses have been highlighted as the exogenous condition, the third enabling factor that can shape varying outcomes of ethnic rebellion. Inconsistencies shown by the state authorities to accommodate the interests of the Bodo leaders combined with widespread repression paved the way for high levels of contention. Targeted repression stifled the militant actions of the Dimasas rebel organizations and the movement leaders had to finally play down their separatist objectives without any accommodation. Selective inducements and partial accommodation of the interests of the Mising leaders provided them with access to the decision-making process and eventually contributed to less disruptive forms of protest actions. The analytical chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) have laid out these issues in detail.

The arguments presented in this dissertation can be utilized to compare the case of the

Mizo rebellion. The next section provides a brief empirical evidence of the Mizo rebellion.

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EXTENDING THE ARGUMENT BEYOND ASSAM: THE CASE OF MIZOS

In March 1966, the Mizos in India led by MNF started their armed insurrection against the Indian government. MNF‘s main objective was to create a ‗Sovereign, Independent

Greater Mizoram for the Mizos‘ i.e. an independent state that would be politically free from the Indian union [Nag, 1999]. MNF‘s demands were extreme and radical.

MNF‘s move towards secessionism emerged against the backdrop of rising Assamese nationalism, a feeling of marginalization as a result of such politics and the more proximate cause related to the famine of 1959 that occurred in Mizoram. The famine devastated the vegetation and crops of the local people, which immensely contributed to an already deteriorating socio-economic situation of Lushai hills.146 The state and the central governments however, failed to provide adequate relief measures to the Mizo people. This further aggravated feelings of alienation and antagonism from the governments. Similar perceptions were held against the Mizo Union (MU), a political party which dominated Lushai Hills District Council (now known as the Mizo District

Council).147 This was taken as an opportune moment by some of the rival political forces of MU whose main objective was to mobilize the people against the MU and end its dominance in the local politics of Mizoram. MNF emerged as one of the most prominent rival parties of MU after the natural calamity (famine). Mobilization went in favour of

146 Mizoram was earlier known as Lushai hills. 147 Mizo Union (MU) was a political party formed in 1946 by another section of Mizos, around the principal objectives to secure a rightful place for the common Mizos in the society and set up local-self governing institutions that were so far being dominated by traditional chiefs of the Lushai hills. Mizoram was earlier known as Lushai hills. MU entered into electoral politics and contested the elections of Assam State Assembly as well as the Lushai Hills District Council, now known as the Mizo District Council [Nag, 1999]. 292

MNF because of two important reasons: first, presence of charismatic leaders like

Laldenga and the organizational skills of MNF at steering the discourse of the movement.

Mizo leaders promoted their separatist ideology along the lines of a pan-Mizo identity, an inclusive ethnic category employed by Mizo nationalists to promote the integration of different tribes and clans (such as the Lushais, Hmars, Raltes, etc.) of

Mizoram. The idea was to broaden popular base of the nationalist organizations and to develop the consciousness of the local people that they were distinct and separate from the dominant Assamese. In addition to a pan-ethnic Mizo identity, the Mizo leaders consistently pointed out their strong historical and ethnic affinities with the Burmese.

Identification with the Burmese was consistently used by the leaders as a bargaining leverage during their interaction with the state authorities. The leaders emphasized that the Mizos shared strong historical affinities with the Chin people of Burma than the people of mainland India and that justifies their separation from India. Symbolic affinities with the Burmese were used as a precedent to mobilize for a separate hill state of

Mizoram. These connections were even more strengthened when the Mizo nationalists gathered tangible support (arms supply, finances, etc.) from Burma for their armed campaign.

Second most important reason that explains popular motivation to collaborate with

MNF‘s rebellion was the presence of strong vertical networks built by the leadership of the movement with the people during the socio-economic crisis. In the wake of the famine, MNF leaders took the task of providing immediate relief and assistance to the

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famine-stricken people.148 The organization had decentralized its tasks since their involvement in the relief activities. Different village level units were actively involved in transportation of basic food supplies and other essential commodities to the interior villages of Mizoram. It was during these relief operations that the MNF leaders gained immense popularity and built strong vertical networks with the common Mizos based on trust and collective security. As the formal state institutions significantly failed to meet the basic needs and expectations of the famine-stricken people, the people entrusted their loyalty to the MNF. Having established its strong hierarchical links with the civilian population, Mizo nationalists found it easier to educate, mobilize, disseminate and coordinate their protest activities which became increasingly violent towards March

1966. The rebels were engaged in highly disruptive activities such as destruction of roads and railway bridges through several bomb explosions as a consequence of which, the rail and road links of the region were virtually cut-off from the mainland. This prevented the government to send its security forces to Mizoram. The central government however, airlifted several battalions of the Indian army and other paramilitary forces to take control over the law and order situation in the district. Additionally, stringent counter-insurgency laws were enforced to control the insurgents in the region.

The state of interaction between the rebels and the state was marked by intransigence and rigidity on both the sides. The government security forces used indiscriminate and widespread repression which led to serious human rights violations during the counter-

148 It is important to note that before 1961, MNF was known as the Mizo Cultural Society and it primarily served as a socio-cultural organization, with Laldenga as the Secretary. During the famine (1959-60), the organization changed its name to Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF) and took a leading role to provide relief to the Mizos. 294

insurgency operations. Despite stiff measures to suppress and weaken the networks through severe repression applied by the state, MNF was able to sustain high levels of violence. This finding is consistent with the interpretation advanced in this study that severe and widespread repression fosters insurgency if the vertical networks are strongly built. The vertical networks that the MNF had built, immensely contributed to credibility and widespread popularity of the nationalists. This in turn, provided enough scope to the leaders not only to organize the people during the initial phases of mobilization but also to sustain the rebellion. The state on the other hand made continuous efforts to suppress and weaken these networks not only by engaging in indiscriminate repression but also by creating counter-rebel forces in the villages that involved local Mizos. To take an example, during stiff counterinsurgency operations, the state security forces constituted several village defence units (Protected and Progressive Village Defence units) in the villages of Mizoram to patrol the villages. These units were created based on coercion, psychological threat or material incentives provided to the local people, mainly those who provided information about the rebels to the police. The state set up these patrolling units as a means to regain its lost legitimacy as well as to break down the ties between the local people and MNF. Although these efforts proved to be somewhat effective to counter insurgency, the overall response of the people seemed to be equivocal.149 Material incentives (or disincentives) provided by the state during such operations were not enough to offset the rebellion. Contrarily, the MNF still managed to obtain both covert and overt forms of material support and assistance from the people. In the absence of credible alternatives, people were motivated to collaborate with the rebel group because

149 PPVDs were constituted by regrouping villages. Some studies suggest that by doing this the government in turn lost its legitimacy because it meant moving people from one village to another [Nag, 1999]. 295

the state, the alternative provider of collective goods, had significantly failed in this direction. This provided the opportunity for the rebels not only to sustain the rebellion but also ensured them a longer bargaining period.

As neither the MNF nor the government seemed to be willing to give up the fight or come forward for negotiations, the war went on for nearly two more decades (1966-

1987). When the situation reached a stalemate, immense pressures were applied by civil society organizations of Mizoram on both the warring parties to start a dialogue and end the war. Consequently the conflicting parties succumbed to these pressures and signed an accord on 1st July, 1976. The accord however, failed to be implemented as it had simply laid down that the status of Mizoram would be upgraded from an autonomous area to a

Union Territory called Mizoram. Mizo leaders found this deal unacceptable and renewed the insurgency. After nearly a decade of renewed insurgency, the leaders finally decided to settle down. Peace initiatives and intense pressures undertaken by the church and other civil society groups contributed to this move towards negotiation. Laldenga, the main rebel leader, gave up the idea of secession and signed the historic peace accord in 1986 with Rajiv Gandhi while accepting the formation of a separate state for the Mizos within the Indian union.

COMPARISON OF MIZOS WITH BODOS, DIMASAS AND MISINGS

If we examine the case of Mizoram from a comparative perspective, we will find that the case bears resemblance to the Bodos, Dimasas and Misings, in terms of the initial

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conditions for mobilization, the common resentments caused due to increasing dominance of the regional government, ethnic policies (language law, 1960), failure of decentralized institutions, and several other factors. The movement leaders of all the four mobilizing groups employed strong ethnic appeals to captivate the support and attention of the people. The cases however, differed in terms of the goals, strategies of mobilization, state responses and final outcome. The initial goals of the Mizo rebellion were far more radical and extreme than the other three groups. The former wanted independence and the latter two asked for separate states within the Indian Union, while the fourth group (Misings) claimed for an autonomous region. The Bodo and the Mizo leaders applied somewhat similar mobilizing tactics during their movements and engaged in effective diffusion and communication of their movement narratives. The leadership organizations (MNF and ABSU) had shown high capacities for coordinating collective actions. Strong hierarchical links, decentralized mobilizing units and charismatic leaders like Laldenga (Mizo) and Brahma (Bodo) contributed a great deal towards successful processes of mobilization and attracting huge numbers of the local population of the respective communities. These organizing characteristics were markedly absent in the case of Misings and to certain degree the Dimasas. Variations in the mobilization process

(communicative methods) and mobilization of societal resources determined the differences in the levels of contention. Mizo rebellion was marked by highest intensities of violence. Bodos too had similar levels of violence. Each rebellion was marked by sustained support of the people for the insurgencies.

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Another important factor, the interaction of the movement leaders of each group with the state and its responses to each rebellion immensely shaped the course and the consequences of these movements. State responses were however, contingent on specific goals of these movements. The Mizos asked for secession but settled down for a separate state within India. The Bodos demanded a separate state but ended up with a separate territorial unit with significant amount of autonomy under the district council. Misings were accommodated with partial autonomy which was less than what the leaders had asked for, i.e. a separate district council under the Sixth Schedule. The Dimasas were de- radicalized without any accommodation. Except the Misings, in all the other cases, the response of the state was marked by inconsistent accommodation, rigidity and even widespread repression (except the later phase of repression at times in the Dimasa region). It was only after nearly two decades of fighting in these cases (state vs. Bodos,

Mizos vs. State and Dimasas vs. State), that we witness a shift in state policies from excessive centralization and repression towards a more positive response and accommodation. How does one explain this shift in state responses? Second important question that needs to be addressed is that under what conditions do rebel leaders settle down for an offer which is less than what they initially stand for?

I argue that an accommodative response from the government‘s side is primarily determined by—a) timing, when the parties are caught up in a situation of deadlock, when neither side is winning nor is ready to come forward to a settlement; b) when the goals of the movement are less extreme and the state perceives those demands less threatening c) positive alternatives may be also sought when the government has to deal

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with similar demands from different minority groups in different regions at the same moment. A changed leadership in the center that is more flexible and willing to envisage a negotiation makes a difference in the terms of interaction between the state and the movement activists and conflict resolution. Flexibility of the political authorities in charge of the central government determines whether the state will accommodate or continue repression. Their intention is determined by the current political situation.

In the Mizo case, although the initial steps were taken by the Congress regime in late

1970s, the silver lining appeared more clearly when Rajiv Gandhi came to power in mid-

1980s and the government made confident attempts to loosen up its centralized policies.

Similarly, in 2003, the Congress-run state government of Assam and the BJP led coalition government in the Center took sincere steps to accommodate some of the interests of Bodos. Severe tactics of repression consistently adopted by the state had actually led to a situation of stalemate, as neither the rebels nor the state were ensured of winning unilaterally or showed any signs of withdrawing from the violent conflict. Apart from this situation, the most obvious interest for the Union Ministry was to control the situation as the violence had adversely affected the mundane affairs of people not only living in Assam but also other states in the northeast, a number of which was then governed by parties who were members of the coalition government at the center. 150 In the Mizo case, the state was also concerned about the political costs that it had to bear while managing ethno-separatist movements in Assam, Punjab and Kashmir in late

1980s.

150 Nagaland People's Front ruling Nagaland was a coalition partner at the center in 2003. 299

On the activists‘ side, they calculate the costs of being alienated by the same people if violence is prolonged for a longer duration. Group members may openly express their frustration about a stalemated situation and ask for a political solution to end an impending crisis. The leaders may moderate their demands and arrive at an agreement the terms of which may be less than what they initially stand for, if the potential benefits of accepting the negotiated pact are more than the cost of continuing the militancy. The leaders will accept the offered concessions if that guarantees the group a better constitutional status; second, if the leaders are able to maintain legitimacy within the group as the sole representative of collective interests and third, based on this calculation, if they expect to gain the political positions once peaceful transfer of power takes place through democratic elections.

Earlier studies suggest that intra-state conflicts based on territorial demands are intractable and difficult to be resolved [Walter, 2003]. This interpretation can be applied to the Mizo case where the territorial demands were rather extreme (secession). Instead of continuing with the militancy for an independent statehood, why did the Mizo leaders settle down for a federal structure? My argument is that the decision of the Mizo leaders to negotiate had much to do with the potential benefits that they expected to achieve by remaining as a federal unit of India. Federal arrangement ensured the Mizos economic independence and enhanced powers in political decision-making. Issues like external linkages with the Burmese (ethnic affinity, territorial location in the peripheral areas, material support, etc.) were definitely employed as bargaining tactics and provided the

Mizo leaders enough scope to advocate secessionism. Nevertheless, given the political

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instability in Burma and intense rebellion of the Karens in the immediate border regions of Burma, neighboring kin state, the leaders soon realized that it would be more viable economically as well as politically to remain as integral part of the Indian democracy.

In the rest of the cases, the initial demands were less extreme. The state on the other hand was concerned with precedent related to re-demarcation of intra-state territories. It was apprehensive that if the Bodos were allowed to form their federal unit, other minorities in the region would follow suit and mobilize for similar demands. The Bodo leaders accepted the deal to form an autonomous territory (district council i.e. short of a federal structure), as it provided them with more cultural rights and decentralized powers to control the affairs of the Bodo people in the Bodo region. Electoral inducements and executive power sharing arrangements with the state government provided them the incentives to negotiate. These calculations were made on the basis of relational networks that they had established during the course of the movement. The credibility and support of the people that MNF garnered over the years during the movement enabled the party to receive the highest number of votes in the democratic elections held in 1987 to the newly formed legislature of Mizoram. Similarly, in the elections held to the newly constituted

Bodo Territorial Council (BTC) (autonomous administrative unit set up in accordance with the deal) in 2003, after the peace accord was signed, people voted to power the members of Bodo People's Progressive Front (BPPF-H), the party comprising of ex- members of BLT, thus showing their solidarity and credibility in these organizations.

Later in 2006, the BPPF became a major player in the elections held to the Assam state assembly and agreed to the Congress‘s idea of power sharing.

301

Openness of the state to accept and accommodate local autonomy of the Misings was largely determined by the nature of ethnic demands advocated by the Mising leaders. The state seemed to be willing to accept some of their proposals for power devolution because the demands were less extreme. Moreover, the Mising movement leaders did not demonstrate the capabilities or the legitimacy to espouse a separatist cause or to push for the division of the Mising territories from Assam which made negotiation easier.

Similarly, the Dimasa leaders failed to garner clear and durable support amongst the local

Dimasa inhabitants for the breakaway of the N.C.hills region from Assam. Intra-group differences and infighting amongst the core leadership overwhelmed the fundamental goals of the Dimaraji movement. The leadership clearly exhibited signs of a legitimacy crisis whereby the movement-supporter networks were easily weakened. Even the minimum level of support that was gathered during the initial phases of the movement seemed to have eroded and further enabled the state to de-radicalize the movement without providing any meaningful concessions to the movement leaders.

IMPLICATIONS AND SCOPE OF FUTURE RESEARH

The analysis advanced in this dissertation has several implications for debates on contentious politics, particularly, minority ethnic politics in India. The framework developed in this study engages with two sets of literature that has so far dominated the field of ethnic conflict and violence. Rationalist approaches while focusing on preference rankings of individuals or members of a group places human agency as a function of rational choice and truly utility-maximizing expectations. These theories tend to gloss

302

over some of the fundamental sources of human agency such as cultural framing (ideas, leadership charisma, interpretation of resentments, etc.) that can motivate group members to organize a rebellion. Socio-psychological approaches tend to fill this gap by incorporating these variables that are often overlooked by rationalists. Theorists arguing from another rationalist perspective emphasize the role of institutions----the role of political structure that can shape and pattern the behavior of individuals (movement leaders or group members). Individuals respond to changes in the structural conditions in the political environment, degree of access/openness or closure/coercion in the political structure. The limitation of this approach is that it considers individual actions to be generated as a result of structural conditions and thus tends to ignore the process of framing and mobilization that initiates collective action. While emphasizing the processes and mechanisms of ethnic mobilization this dissertation makes an attempt to move beyond the debate on structure versus agency. The framework that I develop is premised on a congruence of both structure and agency related factors and thus can be considered as a corrective measure that establishes a reciprocal relationship between the agency- laden processes (discourse of ethnic appeals, mobilization of group networks and influence on individual preferences or micro-level processes of mobilization) and structure-laden factors related to the larger social structures such as state responses.

The framework may help understand the conditions under which state repression may strengthen protest networks and foster further radicalization of the movement. Group members may choose to make a tradeoff between short-term costs (repression) and long- term benefits (political as well as economic) if the leadership is committed to the

303

movement goals and gains the credence to provide the collective goods. As a result, rebellious actions may intensify despite severe repression. There is a need to analyze extensively the situations where the rebel groups cannot provide collective security and protection to the group and are instead engaged in coercive tactics or indiscriminate violence to seek collaboration from their own population.

This dissertation also calls attention to further explore cases where ethnic movements are launched by minority groups who share or adopt some cultural characteristics of the dominant ethnic group; whose members are not able to associate themselves with a clearly defined ethno-territorial identity that would be congruent with a specific state boundary, yet express their discontentment because of marginalization from the mainstream political process. Such groups therefore, mobilize for group rights and to receive a fair share of their resources within the existing structures of the dominant state through non-violent and legitimate political channels.

Furthermore the dissertation also raises concerns on the debates on crafting of decentralized institutions and executive opportunities that may facilitate ethnic accommodation thereby reducing the likelihood of such groups to pursue their goals through channels that are radical or extreme. Specific local self governing institutions

(district councils) have been created as corrective measures by the state to accommodate internal territorial autonomy and group rights of ethnic minorities in India‘s northeast.

The offer of autonomy to the Bodo leaders under these provisions (Article 244) of the

Indian constitution has been considered to be a conscious effort on the part of the state to

304

stem the tide of rising ethno-nationalist rebellions. Almost six years have passed since the

Bodo Liberation Tigers entered into a harmonious relationship with the state which led to the establishment of the Bodo Territorial Council with extensive powers of autonomy.

Despite a few rough edges and emerging differences amongst different leading Bodo organizations on certain issues related to accomplishments of the Council, the extension of local autonomy and informal executive power sharing have raised high hopes of the

Bodo people and other tribal ethnic minorities including the Misings, Sonowals, Deuris, etc. These groups have been mobilizing for a similar form of autonomy under the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Indian constitution. In Bodoland, carvation of a territorial council seemed to have addressed some of the major demands of the Bodos.

The functioning of similar institutions in N. C. Hills has nevertheless raised serious doubts about the devolution of power to the district councils as an effective mechanism to contain ethnic grievances of minorities. Centralization of authority by the state and the failure of special provisions of autonomy devolved to the Dimasas seemed to have eroded much of the meaning attached to these arrangements initially meant to provide sufficient self-governing powers to Assam‘s tribal minorities. Instead of dealing with the core grievances of the Dimasa people, decentralization had actually exacerbated political violence and instability in the region. Much of this resulted from high levels of centralization, improper utilization of centrally released funds for the development of

N.C. hills and high levels of corruption practiced by some important members of the council. Given these varying experiences, a future subject of research would be to understand if decentralized institutions can effectively accommodate minority group

305

interests and contain ethnic violence or is it simply a condition that enhances the capability of a minority ethnic group to push for further ethnic claims that are extreme or separatist. Finally, another challenge would be to determine the applicability of the framework developed in this study and examine other cases in similar contexts such as the Karens in Burma, the Moros in Phillipines, the Dayaks of Indonesia or other tribal groups in India‘s northeast, a substance of research that can be pursued in the future.

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Collected Documents, Bodoland Movement: A Dream and Reality, 1986-2001, Saraighat Offset Press, Bamunimaidam, Guwahati, [2001].

MAR Docuent available at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/indassam.htm

Memorandum of Settlement Bodo Territorial Council, Feb, 10th 2003, available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/documents/papers/memorandu m_feb02.htm

Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Dialogue with the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), 30th Mar, [2001].

316

Report of the States Reorganization Commission, 45, 229-237, [1955].

The Mising Autonomous Council Act, 1995 as amended by Assam Act No. VIII of [2001] and Assam Act No. XXI of [2005].

The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, Act 28 of 1958, 11th September, 1958, Institute of Conflict Management, Delhi, [2001]

TERRORIST AND DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT, Institute of Conflict Management, Delhi, [1987].

317

APPENDIX A

Selected Photographs of the Bodo rebellion

Photograph 1

Photograph 2

318

Photograph 3

Photograph 4

319

Photograph 5

320