Unified China and Divided Europe Chiu Yu Ko, Mark Koyama, Tuan-Hwee Sng∗ June 2014 Abstract This paper studies the causes and consequences of political centralization and fragmentation in China and Europe. We argue that the severe and unidirectional threat of external invasion fostered political centralization in China while Europe faced a wider variety of moderate external threats and remained politically fragmented. Our model allows us to explore the economic consequences of political centralization and fragmentation. Political centralization in China led to lower taxation and hence faster population growth during peacetime than in Europe. But it also meant that China was relatively fragile in the event of an external invasion. Our results are consistent with historical evidence of violent conflicts, tax levels, and population growth in both China and Europe. Keywords: China; Europe; Great Divergence; Political Fragmentation; Political Centralization JEL Codes: H2, H4, H56; N30; N33; N35; N40; N43; N45 ∗Chiu Yu Ko and Tuan-Hwee Sng, Department of Economics, National University of Singapore. Mark Koyama, Department of Economics, George Mason University. Email:
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[email protected]. This paper has benefited from seminar presentations at Academia Sinica, Shandong University, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong, the Economic History Society Meetings at Warwick University, the Washington Area Economic History Workshop at George Mason University, the applied game theory workshop at National University of Singapore. We are grateful for comments from Warren Anderson, Christophe Chamley, Mark Dincecco, James Fenske, Noel Johnson, Debin Ma, Joel Mokyr, Noah Smith, Meng Xue, Helen Yang and many others.