Joint Force Quarterly

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A landing on a foreign coast in face of hostile troops has always been one of the most difficult operations of war.

— Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart

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CONTENTS

A Word from the Chairman 4 by John M. Shalikashvili

Introducing This Issue 6 by the Editor-in-Chief

Paradoxes of War 7 by Grant T. Hammond

Dealing with Anarchy 17 by Frederick L. Wettering and John N. Petrie JFQ

Revolutions in Military Affairs 24 by James R. FitzSimonds and Jan M. van Tol

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Revolutions OUT OF JOINT in Military Affairs JFQ Roles and Missions Roles and Missions: Back to the Future Joint Littoral Warfare 32 by Carl H. Builder

Joint Operations in the Civil War

World War II Campaigns Logistics: The Way Ahead 38 by Gary H. Mears and Ted Kim Spring94

A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL Thunder and Lightning: Joint Littoral Warfare 45 by Carl E. Mundy, Jr. PHOTO CREDITS The reproduction of the portrait of General of the Army George C. Marshall on the cover is Army Prepositioning Afloat after the original in the National Gallery of Art by Thomas E. Stephens. The cover insets (from 51 by Richard A. Chilcoat and David S. Henderson top) show Blackhawk and Cobra helicopters being loaded on USS Capella after Desert Storm (U.S. Army/Robert Reeve), Marine am- JFQ FORUM phibious assault vehicle coming ashore during Restore Hope (U.S. Navy/Terry C. Mitchell), Mulling the Campaigns Allied tanks in Italy during World War II (U.S. Navy/Naval Historical Center), Douglas 58 of World War II Skymaster transport on Okinawa (U.S. Marine Corps/Duncan), and USS West Virginia steaming off the coast of Okinawa. Joint Power Projection: Operation Torch The front inside cover and cross-over page by John Gordon IV depict a CH–53E Super Stallion (left) and a 60 CH–53 Sea Stallion (right) flying over an amphibian assault vehicle and a mechanized landing craft (foreground) as a utility landing Southern Italy: Strategic Confusion, craft brings Marines to shore from amphibian 70 Operational Frustration assault ship at anchor (U.S. Navy/Jeff Elliott). The background illustration on these pages by Peter F. Herrly and Lillian A. Pfluke is of Marines advancing (U.S. Marine Corps). The insets (from top) are of F–16s from Misawa Air Base, Japan (U.S. Air Force/Lem Robson); Interservice Rivalry hulks of Sherman tanks inland from Anzio near 76 in the Pacific Cisterna in mid-1944 (U.S. Navy); the United Nations crest; and the Australian guided by Jason B. Barlow missile destroyer HMAS Brisbane (Royal Australian Navy). The back inside cover captures an F–16 Grave of a Dozen Schemes taking off during Team Spirit ’93 (Joint Combat by H.P. Willmott Camera Center/Ken Wright). 82

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SPRING 1994 / NUMBER 4

Challenging Joint Military Intelligence 92 by James R. Clapper, Jr. Joint Force Quarterly A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

Is U.N. Peacekeeping a Growth Industry? Editor-in-Chief 100 by Eugene V. Rostow Hans Binnendijk Executive Editor Patrick M. Cronin Managing Editor Robert A. Silano Associate Editors Martin J. Peters, Jr. Calvin B. Kelley

Of Chiefs and Chairmen: Art Direction 106 Nathan Farragut Twining Typography and Design Division Government Printing Office

FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET Joint Force Quarterly is published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, 107 Letters to the Editor National Defense University, to promote understanding of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special THE JOINT WORLD operations forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, con- 108 Doctrine, Education, and Documentation tingency planning, combat operations conducted by the unified commands, and joint force development. 113 A Quarterly Survey of Joint Literature The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and OFF THE SHELF topics of common interest to the Armed Forces. Please direct manuscripts, letters, and editorial communications to: 114 China’s Military Classics: A Book Essay by Arthur Waldron Managing Editor Joint Force Quarterly National Defense University 117 Falaise, The Highway of Death, and Mogadishu: Fort Lesley J. McNair A Book Review Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 by Steve E. Dietrich Commercial Telephone: (202) 475–1013 Defense Switched Network (DSN): 335–1013 120 Much More Than “From the Sea”: A Book Review FAX: (202) 475–1012 / DSN 335–1012 by John N. Petrie The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within 123 Australia and the Gulf War: are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the De- A Book Review partment of Defense or any other agency by Alan L. Gropman of the Federal Government. Copyrighted portions of this journal may not be re- produced or extracted without permis- 126 Cumulative Index (1993–94): Issues 1–4 sion of copyright proprietors. An ac- knowledgment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever material is quoted from or based on its contents. POSTSCRIPT This publication has been approved by 128 A Note to Readers and Contributors the Secretary of Defense. May 1994

ISSN 1070–0692

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Joint Force Quarterly A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

Publisher GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff AWordfrom th Chairman of the Advisory Committee LTG Paul G. Cerjan, USA National Defense University Members of the Advisory Committee BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman Brig Gen Marvin R. Esmond, USAF Armed Forces Staff College Maj Gen John C. Fryer, Jr., USAF National War College Brig Gen Hal M. Hornburg, USAF The Joint Staff BG Randolph W. House, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College VADM R.C. Macke, USN The Joint Staff Col Andrew Nichols Pratt, USMC Marine Corps Command and Staff College Maj Gen Peter D. Robinson, USAF Air War College RADM Jerome F. Smith, Jr., USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces MG William A. Stofft, USA U.S. Army War College RADM Joseph C. Strasser, USN Naval War College Col John A. Warden III, USAF Air Command and Staff College COL Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA Marine Corps War College Chairman of the Editorial Board n what turned out to be a cool Hans Binnendijk May evening in the devastated city Institute for National Strategic Studies of Berlin, the final act of the Members of the Editorial Board drama was played out. With Soviet Richard K. Betts O Columbia University troops only blocks away, grim figures moved Eliot A. Cohen up the steps of a bunker, carrying a limp The Johns Hopkins University COL Robert A. Doughty, USA corpse. As “Stalin’s organs” lit up the night U.S. Military Academy sky with bright flashes of orange, punctu- CAPT George L. Drummond, USN Armed Forces Staff College ated by the deafening roar of the largest con- LtCol Robert C. Figlock, USMC centration of artillery fire in history, a circle Marine Corps War College Aaron L. Friedberg of men laid the lifeless bundle on the Princeton University ground, soaked it in petrol, and struck the COL Robert A. Gimbert, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College match that turned a mass murderer into Alan L. Gropman vapor and ash. Hitler’s death ended years of Industrial College of the Armed Forces war that had begun when Nazi forces pulver- COL Peter F. Herrly, USA National War College ized Poland’s frontier and ignited the most Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF terrible conflict ever seen. With his suicide, Naval War College William T. Hodson the world was free to start anew. Information Resources Management College Americans and Europeans will join COL Richard L. Irby, Jr., USA th U.S. Army War College hands this spring to mark the 50 anniver- Mark H. Jacobsen sary of the counter-invasion of Europe, an Marine Corps Command and Staff College Thomas L. McNaugher effort made irreversible on June 6, 1944 Brookings Institution when the greatest armada ever assembled set John J. Mearsheimer University of Chicago sail from Portsmouth harbor for the short Col Philip S. Meilinger, USAF voyage to the beaches of Normandy, a voy- Air Command and Staff College LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) age that would liberate Europe. Hudson Institute This issue of Joint Force Quarterly revisits Stephen Peter Rosen Harvard University the lessons learned from some of the cam- James H. Toner paigns of that war. But while the articles in Air War College JFQ Forum examine specific strategic and LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Harvard University operational aspects of the European and Pa- LTG C.A.H. Waller, USA (Ret.) cific theaters, I want to elevate the historical RKK, Limited

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level of this retrospective by dwelling for a new world under the rule of law and nur- moment on the larger, enduring lessons of tured by free markets and the spread of World War II. democratic institutions. The first lesson was the strategic realiza- We embraced these three lessons and tion that the fate of Europe and America was made them the focus of our Cold War policies one and the same. During the 19th century and strategies. But in embracing them we cre- Americans could watch as Europeans fought ated an uneasy alliance between experience each other, using the expanse of the Atlantic and wisdom, on one hand, and the attitudes moat as a barrier to involvement. Conduct- that go to the heart of our national being, on ing business with those states in need of the other. As a nation of immigrants we have loans and goods to field armies and sustain a deep yearning to leave behind the problems their populations was typical of the extent of the proverbial “old world.” To this day we of American interest in European conflicts of remain wary of becoming involved in the the last century. By the dawn of this century, seemingly endless rivalries of Europe, the however, the Atlantic was little more than a Middle East, and Asia. Similarly, rugged Amer- pond. Our affairs became so intertwined ican individualism, an instinct that goes back with those of Europe that we could no to core democratic values, causes us to chafe longer avoid the reach of political intrigue at the prospect of collective action, even and war on the Continent. After being when it appears to be the only alternative drawn into two world wars by events in Eu- and clearly to our advantage. Finally, as citi- rope, we vowed never again to sink into the zens of the oldest democracy, Americans have trap of disengagement. And for fifty years, a native distrust of power, in any form, in-

Naval Historical Center throughout the entire Cold War, we honored cluding our own national power. Every occa- American soldiers that lesson. sion when we are called upon to use our marching through an The second lesson was that collective ac- power, regardless of how noble and grand the English coastal town tion—regardless of its drawbacks, intricacies, aim, we find ourselves caught in a vise, to board landing ships and frustrations—is almost always preferable pressed on the one side by a sense of respon- for Normandy. to unilateral action. It took the shock of two sibility and on the other by a fear that we world wars and the advent of the Cold War might be abusing our power. before we finally abandoned George Wash- The commemoration of Normandy and ington’s dictum to avoid alliances. But in de- other great battles and campaigns of World parting from his warning we did so with War II coincides fortuitously with our entry quintessential American enthusiasm. In the into a new era. These events are reminders wake of World War II we became the most of what happens when we flirt with isola- ambitious architect of interlocking alliances tionism or disengagement. They make us re- to ever come upon the international scene. call that the world has grown far too small, Our security arrangements spanned the and that economic and other national inter- globe, created by one treaty after another. ests have grown far too large, to disengage When we completed this system of alliances from Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. the United States was tied by mutual defense They clearly remind us that the Armed agreements to every continent, save for Forces must be strong and ready, superbly Africa and Antarctica. equipped, comprised of our finest young The third and largest lesson was exerting men and women, and able to deploy to any our great strength to shape the world or suf- region of the world where American inter- fer the fate of a rudderless ship caught in a ests are threatened. storm, buffeted in every direction, trying These are the enduring lessons of World desperately to avoid being capsized, flung War II. We must carry them into the future. from one course to another, and always at the whim of some external force. We mas- JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI tered the complexities of global leadership, Chairman assumed enormous responsibilities, and in- of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vested our power and resources to create a

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INTRODUCING THIS ISSUE

of the combined joint task force for Europe is designed to provide just such flexibility. CHALLENGES The increasing emphasis on peace operations puts a premium on doctrine for civil-mili- in a Timeof Transition tary (or interagency) efforts across a range of situations short of full scale war. Like coalition warfare, peace operations require complex multinational decisionmaking and a high degree of coordination with the military estab- lishments of other countries. But peace operations also involve deploying capabilities in am pleased to become the editor-in-chief of highly constrained political environments a journal that has earned a significant niche where decisive force often cannot be used. Be- in professional military circles after only yond developing doctrine for such difficult but Ione year of publication. Joint Force Quarterly diplomatically important tasks, the primary has sought to enter the debate on the challenges needs of multinational peace operations arise that face the Armed Forces. These interrelated in the areas of command and control, intelli- challenges include jointness, coalition warfare, gence, training, logistics, and force mixes to peace operations, rightsizing, and revolutions in forge reliable multinational capabilities. military affairs. Each challenge has common Another challenge is posed by rightsizing roots, from a transformed international system forces in concert with rationalizing service to exponential improvements in information roles and functions. The ability to cutback technology. One key in dealing with these chal- forces to meet the requirements of budgetary lenges is doctrine, the foundation of military constraints as well as two nearly simultaneous operations and a conduit for introducing inno- major regional conflicts is thus far a somewhat vative ideas to future warfighters. elusive goal. Jointness is the means to achieve Institutional changes in the wake of the rightsizing by shedding Cold War infrastruc- Goldwater-Nichols Act greatly increased mili- ture without slipping once again toward a hol- tary effectiveness by integrating warfighting low force. It is also a way of linking today’s capabilities under the rubric of jointness. In this military to that of the 21st century. period of declining force structure, jointness Revolutions in military affairs must be also increases cost effectiveness. But the joint clearly identified and adapted to what some age has just begun. To build on accomplish- call “the military after next.” This challenge in- ments achieved thus far, we must strive for a volves both a revolution in military thinking higher degree of jointness, including joint cul- and operational concepts and an evolution in ture. This entails preserving service culture to technological innovation. Efforts to reshape promote tactical combat advantages while, at battlespace and to harness information are in the same time, transcending parochialism and the vanguard of these processes. An article in creating a true joint culture. The object is to in- the current issue entitled “Revolutions in Mili- still jointness in the Armed Forces as an irre- tary Affairs” represents the first contribution to versible trend in military affairs. what will be a continuing look at this chal- The continuing prospect of coalition war- lenge. JFQ intends to focus on such revolutions fare presents a challenge that is scarcely new. through an essay contest to be formally inau- For most of our history—from Yorktown to gurated this summer under the cosponsorship Desert Storm—coalitions have been part of the of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Net American way of war. The greater emphasis on Assessment) and the National Defense Univer- coalition war arises from a complex of contem- sity Foundation. porary issues: reducing forces, burden sharing, These five challenges both pose problems and legitimacy for conducting operations in the and provide solutions for the 21st century. JFQ post-Cold War era. As a result there is a pressing seeks contributions that clarify the nature of need both to incorporate the lessons learned these challenges and improve the effectiveness from coalition wars of the past and to frame of the Armed Forces. I encourage our readers, doctrine to underpin coalition warfighting for military and civilian alike, to submit their inno- the future. To address this need we must vative thoughts in the form of articles, commen- strengthen security organizations in regions of tary, letters to the editor, and professional notes. particular importance to the Nation, develop greater interoperability with those organiza- HANS BINNENDIJK tions, and create enough institutional flexibility Editor-in-Chief so that we can forge key alignments within larger organizations. For example, the concept

6 JFQ / Spring 1994 Paradoxes of War By GRANT T. HAMMOND

U.S. Navy (Ed Bailey) Oil field set ablaze by retreating Iraqis. ncreasingly the use of force is a last resort objectives that lead to new international of industrialized nations. This is an ad- alignments. Although this image is common mission of defeat since war can no longer and compelling, it is increasingly irrelevant; Ibe rationalized in economic terms. Force it reflects outdated, simplistic, even roman- is most effective when one possesses it but is tic ideas about winning and losing. It is an not compelled to use it. Conventional or nu- image of war based on paradoxes that clear conflicts, the Persian Gulf War should be obvious on reflection, but that notwithstanding, are not worth the costs for have been elusive in developing new con- the losers, and in many cases not for the vic- cepts for national security policy and mili- tors. Bankruptcy, moral or financial, may be tary strategy. the shared outcome for all parties to future Paradoxes are variously defined as tenets conflicts. contrary to conventional wisdom, argu- The image of war, shaped over centuries, ments that yield seemingly self-contradic- is precise, graphic, and evocative. It is tory conclusions, and statements that run marked by battles: expenditures of blood counter to common sense. While much has and treasure sufficient to achieve military been said about the search for a new

Summary

War is apt to defy its traditional image in the future. If the end of past wars was to win by fighting better than one’s adversary (violence marked by a hardware-driven, physical contest to destroy the enemy’s means), the end of future wars may be not to lose by not fighting an adversary (peaceful competition characterized by a software-driven, moral and cerebral contest to change perceptions). This is not simply a choice between conventional and unconventional images of war. We must reinvent war by redefining its nature. Armed conflict as it has been known is beyond the capacity of most nations today. Military victory no longer enjoys the cachet that it once bore. By understanding the paradoxes of war we will help to ensure the future success of the Armed Forces.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 7 P ARADOXES OF WAR

paradigm of national security, there is a real. The Armed Forces must make major ad- good deal to be gained from reexamining justments to be successful in such conflicts. old paradoxes. The importance of paradoxes The accompanying table (Images of to understanding war is so vital as to be War) contrasts the received wisdom about transforming. Future wars are likely to be war with the reality. The conventional image fought with different insights, using differ- is the paradigm for describing, explaining, ent means, and on different levels. Absent and predicting war; the unconventional appropriate strategies, operational concepts, image reflects the reality of waging war in and tactics under this new set of circum- the future. stances, the Nation will fail to prevail. This is not a case of either/or. We need not select one image of war to the exclusion The Image of War of the other. Rather, we must reformulate Perceiving war as a contest marked by the the notion of war to include the unconven- use of force is a woefully incomplete, tragi- tional as well as the conventional. The na- cally simplistic, and fundamentally flawed ture of wars—the arms with which they are view. The consequences of such an image are fought, objectives for which they are waged, profound. By not grasping and means by which they are sustained—is while war has been a major the nature of war, waging at once more basic and complex than one war has become a need- instrument of change across would believe. lessly spendthrift exercise The elements of the paradoxes of war history, it is an increasingly in lives and resources, how- are not novel. Most have been known for unaffordable activity ever well fought. Wars are millennia. Sun Tzu argued nearly 2,500 years messy, unpredictable, ago that war is based upon deception, and costly, inefficient, and often ineffective. that the acme of skill is to subdue enemies While war has been a major instrument of without fighting them.1 While the reluc- change across history, it is an increasingly un- tance to accept this truth is the subject of affordable activity by most measures. It has other discourses, suffice it to say that the in- been a means of state creation and state de- sight found in these paradoxes when taken struction. Slaughter on a grand scale using collectively leaves no alternative but to alter unsophisticated but lethal weapons will con- the paradigm of war. Failing to do so will vir- tinue. Further, war will evolve into a more tually guarantee the inability of the Nation carefully crafted form of conflict with a differ- to compete successfully in the post-Cold ent set of dynamics than in the past. War world. The Persian Gulf War then— War may be transformed by changes in which some argue the coalition forces did ends as well as in means. Conflicts may not win and Saddam’s army did not lose—is occur in periods outwardly indistinguishable but a foretaste of the disappointment to be from peace and may not involve any forcible experienced unless we change our under- rearrangement of territory, interests, or re- standing of war. sources. Such conflicts may be managed shifts in the status quo. In short, a future war Conflict versus Competition among industrialized states, even if effective When a contest by force of arms occurs and efficient, could be virtually invisible. It the results of peacetime military decisions is likely to be an information war at least in are either validated or invalidated. It is prior part, waged between the perceptions of ad- to a physical contest that weapons are de- versaries. It will involve legions of data signed and procured, strategy and tactics are flows, competing information systems mar- developed, and training is accomplished. shaled and sequenced like troops, aircraft, Thus wars are often won or lost before a shot and ships. The sand table will be mental and is fired. Great leaders, technological break- emotional virtual war, no less deadly and throughs, and luck may change outcomes, but such events are rare and do not constitute a sound strategy. The Battle of Britain Grant T. Hammond is professor of international exhibited all three factors but the outcome relations and chairs the Department of National was nonetheless extremely close. Security Studies at the Air War College. His latest In his essay “The Moral Equivalent of book is Plowshares into Swords: Arms Races in War” William James stated: “The intensely International Politics, 1840-1991.

8 JFQ / Spring 1994 Hammond

Images of War resorting to force. If the acme of martial skill is to subdue an Conventional Image Unconventional Image enemy without fighting him as Sun Tzu suggested, then we violent conflict peaceful competition must invest heavily in the physical contest intellectual contest mental and the moral aspects waged in space waged in time of war, not merely the physical. This means that intelli- act of destruction process of creation gence, deception, diplomacy, begun and ended by physical attack begun and ended for moral purpose and other measures assume a focused on adversary’s means focused on adversary’s perceptions much higher priority. Knowing an adversary’s culture, religion, tangible measures intangible measures and perceptions is as important hardware-driven software-driven as training, organizing, and determined by winning battles determined by peacetime preparedness equipping forces. Again, this is not a novel insight but it is un- aim of war is to win aim of war is not to lose deremphasized. Our infatua- win by fighting better better to win by not fighting tion with national technical means often eclipses more basic knowledge. Cultural anthropology may be as impor- sharp competitive preparation for war by the tant to success in war as intelligence gath- nation is the real war, permanent, unceas- ered from satellite imagery. ing...the battles are only a sort of public Knowing how one’s adversary—the lead- vindication of mastery gained during the ership and society—sees things is paramount peace intervals.”2 Thus the thing called war is and may well determine success or failure in not real war, and it is won or lost, planned a contest. The Tet offensive, although unin- or sought, fought or avoided tended, is an example. Despite the physical cultural anthropology may in the minds of those who defeat of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong be as important to success prepare for it in periods of forces, Tet represented a political and moral supposed peace. An interval victory of immense proportions for Hanoi. in war as intelligence of nonhostility is not be- Americans had come to believe that the nign but instead a contest in enemy was incapable of launching a major preparedness. It constitutes the essence of attack, and subsequently many people the demonstration of fighting capability turned against the government for lying which we call war.3 To wait for armed con- about the conduct of the war. flict as the test of strength may be to lose. It Space versus Time will be too late to amass the human capital, Most images of war are linked to destroy- materiel, and moral purpose to ensure vic- ing an enemy, controlling resources, main- tory. taining sovereignty, and rearranging territory. Physical versus Intellectual Yet wars are won or lost, begun and ended, If one could determine winners in ad- and conducted in time as well as space, with vance, it wouldn’t be necessary to compete time normally the more important factor. in order to validate previous analysis. But Had Germany won a victory over Russia there is no absolute certainty which is the sooner and not had to wage a winter cam- reason why the stadium, track, ring, and paign, had American aircraft at Midway not other venues attract the wagerer. The same is found the Japanese just prior to turning back true of wars. Billions of dollars are bet on the to their carriers, and had Israel not learned to outcome of contests conducted by the force evade SAMs in the Yom Kippur war, the out- of arms. But if one knows an adversary and comes of those conflicts would have been his orientation; understands his culture, lan- vastly different. But it is only recently and guage, and personality; grasps his frame of largely through the work of John Boyd4 that reference; and shapes his choices, one might influence his actions and reactions without

Spring 1994 / JFQ 9 P ARADOXES OF WAR

and rearrange information. Such mental abilities—the capacity for improvisation— are the essence of war. Both destruction and creation are processes of war.6 Things don’t always proceed as planned and the consequences of losing wars or destroying more than necessary in the process are major risks in both preparing for war and the contest of arms itself. Understanding the necessity for destruction as a condition for creation is the beginning of wisdom. New ideas can rearrange the cosmos. War, even notional war via arms races and deterrence, rests upon mental destruction and creation that must precede efforts at physical destruction and creation. Thus war, a product of the minds of men, is a U.S. Navy (Mike Poche) Navy SEAL team. product of mental destruction and creation, not merely physical destruction. It is waged we have come to appreciate the role that time for creative purposes, to bring about a new plays in war and the importance of cyclical end-state fundamentally different from what time in the nature of conflicts. went before. War is destruction but is always Conquest of territory has little to do an act of creation. To win one must create a with success in modern war involving tech- new set of circumstance. Success or failure in nologically advanced societies. But the tim- not having to fight—as well as in the con- ing of an attack, intelligence, supplies, and duct of war—is dependent on one’s capacity fire support are critical to success or failure. for creativity and vision. That vision may be Gaining or losing territory merely confirms applied by appeasement or force, intimida- timing. Put simply by Nathan Bedford For- tion or deterrence, and strategies of counter- rest, winning is getting there “first with the value or counter-force. Ultimately war is a most men.”5 Getting there at the right time creative act, for it seeks to bring about some- is as important as getting to the right place. thing new, including relationships different from those which existed beforehand. Destruction versus Creation In order to create, one must destroy. Physical Attack versus Moral Purpose Whether one constructs an edifice and rear- War in this century has hinged in the ranges the landscape in the process, designs main on questions of moral purpose rather a new product from previously unconnected than mere physical attack. Although some components, or has an idea that transforms slogans of attack (such as “Remember the extant assumptions, relations, and insights, Maine”) have served as rallying cries, the na- one destroys the present, the inherited, to ture of conflict is best captured in camp create the new. Destructive deduction is a songs; in the literature, art, and cinema of prerequisite to learning. Creation rests on a the home front; or in propaganda posters flash of insight, a brilliant extension, a novel that mirror the moral essence of soldierly methodology or juxtaposition of ideas; and virtues such as kill or die. Images count and it leads to new possibilities. Creation also re- motivate. The significance of physical attacks quires integration, imagination, and innova- in two world wars (for example, sinking the tion. One must go beyond the bounds of Lusitania and attacking Pearl Harbor) cer- conventional wisdom in revising, recombin- tainly cannot be discounted as causes for ing, and reordering concepts that lead to drawing the United States into those con- progress. One has to demythologize, un- flicts. But freedom of the seas, going to war learn, and forget past ways of ordering infor- to end all wars, the imperative to aid Britain, mation in order to see things more clearly and the dangers posed by a Fascist-dominated world were issues of equal or even greater importance. U.S. involvement in

10 JFQ / Spring 1994 Hammond

Korea and Vietnam hinged as much on the process. Wars can occur by accident and mis- moral abhorrence of communism and need understanding or through knowing one’s to play the role of a credible leader and ally enemy only too well.8 But the perceptions of as on prosaic self-interests or military threats. would-be adversaries are just as important as America stated that Korea did not fall within the means by which they accomplish their its strategic interests and that Vietnam was ends. Perception precedes capability. Realizing basically a matter of principle. The lack of that one has something to fear is an a priori clear economic self-interest in both situa- for acquiring the wherewithal to defend one- tions made a mockery of Marxist critiques of self or to attack an adversary. As Geoffrey American foreign policy. It took a dozen Se- Blainey describes the concept of an arms race: curity Council resolutions to convince It is commonly seen as an intentional prepara- Congress of the righteousness of liberating tion for war, a competition which brings war closer, Kuwait and even then the vote was close, de- but it may be rather a deliberate postponing of war, spite the threat which Iraqi aggression posed an attempt to use stronger threats in preference to to oil supplies for industrialized nations. war. Whether it ends in war depends not on accidents Those wars ended with considerations of and misunderstandings; it depends ultimately on the values and morality as much as the conse- rival nations’ perceptions of their power to defeat one 9 quences of physical attack. In World War I, another. Germany sued for peace based on Wilson’s Modulating an adversary’s perception is Fourteen Points and in turn got article 231 critical. Creating illusion—or misconcep- of the Versailles Treaty, the infamous war tion—so he may deceive himself is the high- guilt clause. Such terms and the lack of a est act of the military art. To have him de- definitive defeat on the battlefield gave rise cide not to undertake a course of action that to an era which E.H. Carr characterized as is not in your interest (by having him see it The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1937 in the is not in his) is the penultimate use of diplo- title of his book on the interwar macy and force in pursuit of national objec- commitment, loyalty, period. At the end of World War tives—subduing an enemy without fighting religion, zeal, and ritual II the Japanese held out, despite him. But to do so in a way that he doesn’t conventional destruction of realize it has occurred is the ultimate strate- are force multipliers their cities and two atomic gic accomplishment. Thus an important ele- bombs, until they were given ment of war is perceptions on which action guarantees on the survival of the emperor. is taken or avoided. Modulating perceptions This was a moral issue of such great impor- is just as critical as acquiring capabilities: tance to Japan that it was virtually non-ne- they should be mutually reinforcing. gotiable even in the face of total defeat. Tangible versus Intangible In Korea the truce talks stalled for nearly The traditional measures of success in two years over the issue of repatriating pris- war include enemy territory taken, casualties oners of war. In Vietnam concern for a so- inflicted, and infrastructure and assets de- called peace with honor, as hollow as that stroyed. These are large, fairly public events phrase is today, dominated policy and was given added meaning by CNN cameras on coupled with the inability to wage a war that both sides of the fighting in the Gulf War. the public deemed immoral. The decision to How relevant are they? Do they represent a halt the Persian Gulf War was at least charac- scorecard in ancient or modern warfare? terized as arising out of moral concern for What about intangible measures? What are needless slaughter on the so-called “highway they and how might they be important to of death” and the accomplishment of the strategic calculus? Such questions are worth purpose for which the war had been ostensi- considerable thought. The answers suggest bly waged, liberating Kuwait. that intangibles matter more than other mea- Means versus Perceptions sures, that commitment, loyalty, religion, The means of war, the capabilities, and zeal, and ritual are force multipliers. The bean counting comparative force levels are Japanese code of Bushido, the omerto of mafia judged to be important and are what often soldiers, the discipline of Indian warriors, the capture attention; yet they are but the out- ward aspects of a much more complicated

Spring 1994 / JFQ 11 P ARADOXES OF WAR

women to make extraordinary sacrifices for their beliefs. Heroism and greatness are often seen as defying the odds. The triumph is not

U.S. Air Force (Perry Heimer) due to faith in arms, but to devotion to prin- Iraqi tank north of ciples, ideology, God, country, or Volk. In- Kuwait City. tangibles—what one will die for—motivate privations which prisoners endure rather action, and have little or nothing to do with than reveal information to an enemy, all the physical capabilities at our disposal. speak to the power of intangibles. Dedica- tion, motivation, and courage, and their ab- Hardware versus Software sence, are as important to success in war as The size of military units and relative quantitative measures of military strength. lethality of weaponry—the standard bench- Morale is always the great unknown in com- marks for comparative force level analysis— bat. Underdogs sometimes defy rational odds while not inconsequential, are becoming in- and win. Commitment can be more impor- creasingly secondary. Bean counting is less tant than weaponry, a fact that Finns, Is- relevant to winning a war than more sophis- raelis, Americans, and others have learned ticated knowledge. Increasingly military ca- from experience. pabilities are concerned with software rather The wisdom of this paradox is contained than hardware—with those ideas, concepts, in Stalin’s quip: “The Pope! How many divi- and linkages that gather, sort, disseminate, sions does he have?” 10 None. But that did and apply information. Although an obvious not mean that a Polish Pope couldn’t con- analog, software in the computer usage tribute to the rise of Solidarity in a staunchly sense is only part of the unconventional Catholic country. This posed a dilemma for image of war. No modern military force can the Soviet Union that had to be handled operate without remote sensors, computer more gingerly by the Kremlin than if the interfaces, telecommunication linkages, or Pope had been born in the Apennines. Man- navigational and surveillance systems—all power and weapons are important, but so dependent upon sophisticated software. are symbols and values. Causes, allegiances, and affinities are major determinants of human action. Values are the motivation for initiating, sustaining, or rallying men and

12 JFQ / Spring 1994 Hammond

bring victory . . . by forcing rival states to give way without an armed encounter.”11 Preparing for war and deterring it, intimidat- ing an adversary by acquiring force but not using it (an arms race, however costly), was cheaper than war and more efficient. As William James pointed out, preparedness is unceasing, sharply competitive, and deter- mines who will gain mastery by force. But such competition is even more. If conducted skillfully, there need not be a clash of arms. The real success of preparedness is to have force and not have to use it, to intimidate an adversary by a threat of force rather than its application. The lesson is simple: a cold war is better than a hot one. Winning versus Not Losing It is not necessary in many cases to win a war in the traditional military sense of battlefield victory to profit politically from the en- U.S. Navy (Mark Kettenhofen) counter. Increasingly the center of gravity is Kurdish refugee camp public opinion. A preoccupation with fight- at Yekmel. ing only short, high-tech, low casualty wars is But that software is itself the product of virtually a tenet of U.S. national military a larger and more complex vision and archi- strategy. It is a weakness, not a strength. The tecture of a higher order of complexity. The Gulf War is only the latest version of this concept of communication as a process, of fetish. If war lasts long enough or the casual- data as a product, of time measured in ties are high enough (like Korea and Vietnam) nanoseconds, and of the systemic vision of the adversary does not have to win militarily. data as crucial to action is itself a revolution Rather, he has only to not lose. The same made possible by technology. The informa- may be said of the Gulf War where Saddam tion age and the ability to render hierarchies Hussein did not need to win, only survive. ineffective is crucial to understanding future Ironically, he is still in power and his nemesis, high-tech wars. We are now approaching the George Bush, has left the scene. Depending military-political equivalent of the priesthood on one’s score card and priorities, it is not of all believers. No particular node or hierar- necessary to win militarily to win politically. chy is required to empower an agent to exer- Saddam crushed the Kurdish and Shiia oppo- cise command and control. Clausewitz’s cen- sition, and his Republican Guard and nuclear ter of gravity gives way to a set of complex capabilities were not as badly damaged as non-cooperative centers of gravity. Tradi- originally thought. He did not win but nei- tional targeting becomes so complex that it is ther was he defeated politically. The end state almost impossible in an era of notebook of the Gulf War does not look much different computers and data networks that are global, in many ways from the pre-war conditions of redundant, and nearly instantaneous. Knowl- 1990. Despite being defeated decisively ac- edge itself is the ultimate software, diffuse cording to traditional score card metrics, Iraqi and deadly, and more fundamental than the forces did not really suffer a crushing defeat hardware which does its bidding. Networks since for the most part they did not fight. not weapons, brains not arms, and ideas not They survived and may be roughly as things become the real targets of warfare formidable militarily in the near-term as they were before the Gulf War. Battles versus Preparedness Observing the long period of relative peace in Europe during the 19th century, one historian noted: “Armed forces were not intended primarily for use in war; they were to

Spring 1994 / JFQ 13 P ARADOXES OF WAR

Fighting versus Not Fighting maneuver, positioning, timing, and conse- Preparedness is essential, but its purpose quences several moves ahead. One wins by initially is to acquire weapons without hav- convincing an adversary to concede, not by ing to use them. As Bernard Brodie stated, destroying him through taking his pieces particularly for the nuclear era, “Thus far the from the board. War is an art as much as a chief purpose of our military establishment science, a human and not mechanical pro- has been to win wars. From now on, its chief cess. As such, it is subject to the entire spec- purpose must be to avoid them.”12 The mili- trum of human frailties. Understanding our- tary mind finds redundancy a proper test of selves as well as our adversaries is a difficult efficiency. The more overwhelming the but necessary exercise. Focusing on these force, the fewer the casualties suffered. For paradoxes may help to prevent the self-decep- democracies firepower is preferable to man- tion of incomplete images of war and its power, though totalitarian regimes reverse causes, conduct, and consequences. the equation. To a civilian efficiency is de- War is the product of human interac- fined as having just enough to accomplish tion. It has definable qualities and character the task. Any extra is unnecessary and waste- only with reference to the way in which it is ful. To the military overkill and redundancy envisioned and carried out by people. There in the form of overwhelming force is pre- is little, if anything, purely immutable about ferred for efficiency. Better yet is the ability war. All wars are unique. “War” is a linguistic to deter so one will not have to fight. Intimi- and mental category like the reference to dation may be preferred to combat unless “humankind” as people; but we should not pure punishment is the intent. Proven supe- be more precise about its attributes than riority is preferred to parity, parity is better very low level generalizations allow. War than inferiority, and suicidal sacrifice is bet- may assume whatever form or substance ter than surrender. But intimidation by that one wants to give it. It is not static but amassing force, inferred if dynamic. It is not readily definable, pre- there is little, if anything, not outright superiority dictable, or rule-following. Military institu- purely immutable about war (through technology, tions which fight wars are much more so. force levels, commitment, We should not confuse the characteristics of and diplomacy or decep- military forces or their capabilities with war, tion), and winning without fighting are or the process of conflict among or between preferable to a contest of arms. states and state-like groups. Acquisition of sufficient force, training, We will never know in detail or advance and national will are prerequisites for intimi- the ways in which war will occur, unfold, or dation short of war. Often it is only by end. Nor can we take for granted that the as- demonstrating a willingness to go to war sumptions which we bring to war are shared that the requirement to do so can be by either allies or adversaries. We can’t con- avoided. There is a wide variance in the way trol them, but we can shape them. We must capabilities may be used to accomplish na- challenge assumptions, be creative in ap- tional objectives. Failing to look at the un- proaching a conflict, and discard any limita- conventional image of war may lead to de- tions on our vision. feat through a number of routes. We can Writers as disparate as St. Augustine of divest ourselves of capabilities (means), be Hippo and T.S. Eliot have reminded us that unclear of our objectives (ends), or be inca- all time is present time. The past is present pable of matching the ends and means. Such memory, the present is current reality, and could well prove fatal. the future is present expectation. We are tethered to the present and to an under- From Paradox to Paradigm standing of our situation in ways that are In sum these paradoxes reveal what may difficult but not impossible to overcome. We be a simplistic and potentially disastrous view need not accept someone else’s definition of of war in terms of its costs and consequences. the situation, alternatives, or preferred out- Competition leading to confrontation and ul- comes. Neither ends nor means are imposed timately to war is far more sophisticated than most decisionmakers and the public realize. The game is chess, not checkers: it involves

14 JFQ / Spring 1994 Hammond

enemy’s perceptions and will should be the EC–130 mission supporting Deny target. War is first and foremost neurologi- Flight. cal, a mental process. It involves getting into an enemy’s decisionmaking loop13 to con- found his plans by creating indecision and confusion. It is, positively and negatively, a way to shape the environment—in short, to impose mind over matter. What are the consequences of these insights? In Lenin’s words, “What’s to be done?” The answer is that there are profound consequences and much to be done. If these paradoxical insights are correct, they suggest a revolution in the way we define, prepare for, and fight war as well as a transformation in our understanding of its nature and role in the 21st century. War, according Combat Camera Imagery (Ken Wright) to Richard Szafranski, will become increasingly “neo-cortical.” It will be waged with- on us. We can plan and conduct war in ways out traditional weaponry. It will involve a that are limited only by our own imagina- complex of interlocking intelligence, com- tion and creativity. munications, diplomacy, and psychology in Our perception of the world may not re- continuous cold rather than hot wars, at least flect reality. We should challenge our as- among advanced industrial societies. There sumptions, descriptions, explanations, will continue to be war caused by ethnic ri- methodologies, and conclusions. There are valries—bloody affairs of unremitting cru- different ways to deal with problems. Finding elty. But some will reject this sort of struggle them demands courage, purpose, and persis- and fight in other ways with different tence. Like the near-sighted Texan who when weapons. Not to heed the demands of such challenged to a duel selected double-barreled conflicts is to surrender by default. In terms shotguns across a card table as his weapon of of preparing for third wave wars of the infor- choice, it is possible to redefine the condi- mation era as portrayed by the Tofflers,14 or tions, stakes, and outcome. the vision of “cyberwar” as conjured by John When actual conflict is required we Arguilla and David Ronfeldt,15 knowing the must fight better and smarter. No doubt subtleties of the unconventional image of there is a role for technological exploitation war is essential, for the image acknowledges but it is not a panacea. Salvation lies in fig- a condition of instability, not merely a uring out how to marshal one’s talents to threat, and represents a desire to shape the spar intellectually, morally, and technologi- international security environment. cally with opponents so as not to have to The focus must be on preparing for war fight save under grave and rare circum- so as not to fight it, at least not in the con- stances. This calls for a new concept of war. ventional sense. Doing so requires reformu- Although it is not a precise analogy, the lating both military training and education. term war of nerves which originated in 1939 What happens on our playing fields—in to describe psychological tactics of bluff, seminars at Carlisle, Leavenworth, Newport, threat, and intimidation suggests the idea. Montgomery, Quantico, Norfolk, and Wash- We may destroy an enemy’s will not by de- ington—will be as important as exercises, feating armies or leveling factories but by campaign plans, deployments, and in some convincing him that it is not in his self-in- cases actual employment of military forces. terest to fight. The consequences of misunderstanding the The decision to fight involves imposing essence of war and the necessity to prepare one’s vision of the world on reality, either for it are huge. present or future. Focusing directly on an If we succeed in the mental and moral preparation of the battlefield, most contests will not be necessary. We will have achieved

Spring 1994 / JFQ 15 P ARADOXES OF WAR

military: Subdue the enemy without fighting him. It may literally be the only way we can afford to compete in the future. JFQ

NOTES

1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 77. 2 William James, Memories and Studies (New York: Longmans, 1911), pp. 273–74. 3 For a more complete assessment of an arms race strategy of intimidation, see Grant T. Hammond, Plow- shares Into Swords: Arms Races in International Politics, 1840–1991 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). 4 John R. Boyd, “A Discourse on Winning and Los- ing,” unpublished briefing; though not published, Boyd’s work has been cited in nearly fifty sources. 5 Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations, 16th edition (Boston: U.S. Army (Dennis Kurpius) Little, Brown, 1992), p. 541. 9th Infantry Division 6 John R. Boyd, “Destruction and Creation,” unpub- in the Mekong Delta. the acme of skill, subduing an enemy with- lished monograph. 7 Richard M. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chi- out fighting him. More importantly, he was cago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). defeated in peacetime by a strategy so so- 8 See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in In- phisticated and compelling that he decided ternational Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University that it was not in his self-interest to chal- Press, 1976). lenge either the Nation or our allies by force 9 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 141. of arms. That we caused this to happen 10 Attributed to Stalin by Churchill; Bartlett’s Familiar should seem preposterous to our adversary. Quotations, 16th edition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992), But it can be so if we learn to fight war in p. 638. terms of our adversary’s decision framework. 11 Raymond J. Sontag, European Diplomatic History, Weapons rarely lose their lethality. Peo- 1871–1932 (New York: Century, 1933), p. 146. 12 Bernard Brodie, editor, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic ple will remain passionate in their convic- Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), tions to the point of violence. States will p. 76. continue to attempt to shape the interna- 13 Boyd’s “OODA (observation, orientation, decision, tional environment by force of arms. Mas- action) loop” describes interaction with the environ- sive hemorrhages of violent blood-letting, ment and sensory data. The faster the cycle time in decisionmaking, the more complex the processes. senseless to some and inevitable to others, 14 Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival will no doubt occur. We cannot prevent at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown, many of these, nor should we. But we 1993), see especially chapter 9. should learn to be more capable and effec- 15 John Arguilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar Is tive in deterring if we are able, fighting if we Coming!” Comparative Strategy, vol. 2 (April–June 1993), pp. 141–65. must, and winning if we can. Better under- 16 General Merrill McPeak stated, “This is the key standing of the evolution of war and its point: the effective employment of air and space power paradoxes can lead to a new paradigm. has to do not so much with airplanes and missiles and To deceive enemies and not ourselves engineering as with thinking and attitude and imagina- may or may not always be possible, but we tion.” See “Flexibility and Airpower” in Air Force Update (June 1993), p. 6. must try. Not doing so is an admission of in- competence or acceptance of failure. Neither is a hallmark of our Armed Forces. To ensure INTERNET users who want to share their that they never occur, as the Chief of Staff of thoughts on “Paradoxes of War” directly 16 the Air Force argues, requires changing our with the author may forward them to: attitude and emphasis on thinking and [email protected] imagination. Such a strategy must be based on a prerequisite of mental mobilization and an acceptance of the ancient injunction of Sun Tzu as a new paradigm for the American

16 JFQ / Spring 1994 DEALING WITH ANARCHY By FREDERICK L. WETTERING and JOHN N. PETRIE

oday historic forces are destroying or sub- dividing post-colonial Tand other nation- states for various reasons. In the 1960s the emergence of nation- states through decolonization gave rise in the United Nations to what became known as the right of self-determination.1 The process drew the rights of the sovereign, in this case those of the colonial master, into question in a manner not envisioned by the drafters of the U.N. Charter.2 These new nation-states emerged during the Escorting Somalis to Cold War. The stability pro- medical care. vided by the superpowers en- U.S. Air Force (James Mossman) abled them to accept responsibilities and receive benefits under the mantle ous agreements, of which Yalta3 and the U.N. of what is called the Westphalian system. Charter are the best known. The result was a While the nation-state system can be system of borders and states that had not traced to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, met objective criteria in the past but that the modern structure was imposed by the were now recognized. Regimes were installed victors of World War II and codified in vari- with the protection of the great powers;

Summary

Removing the element of superpower coercion from the affairs of certain nation-states has brought about the collapse of many contrived boundaries drawn after World War II. The resulting demise of ill-conceived nation-states has fast become a trend. The United States risks being bogged down if it attempts to prop up disintegrating states. Yet policymakers as well as the public seem reluctant to watch has-been states unravel. The plight of these states also appeals to humanitarian instincts, suggesting that the cost of reordering the political map of the world could be high. Though future involvement is likely to be carried out by coalitions, inevitably the United States will be the senior partner. Politico-military options on where, when, and to what extent to intervene will require both military planners and commanders to come up with the right force mixes for the new world disorder.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 17 DEALING WITH ANARCHY

pseudo-states with no claim to International Security and Coalitions internal political legitimacy The implications of the sea change in were maintained directly or the nation-state system for national security indirectly by threats of inter- strategy are profound. Current world affairs vention. In addition, historical suggest that any American attempt to main- realities were often ignored tain the status quo or status quo ante given vis-à-vis the representative na- the accelerated collapse of many nonviable ture of the regimes and the de- states and regimes is likely to be ineffective limitation of national bound- and even quixotic. The breakdown in the aries. Some states have old order of nation-state legitimacy creates recently collapsed because the opportunities for mischief and aggrandize- long-accepted definition of a ment by those states with a penchant for nation-state—an identified such behavior. States with a power projec- population, recognized bound- tion capability will be able to take more op- aries, and the authority to ex- portunistic actions. Even a narrow view of ercise power over enclosed ternational interests leads to the conclusion ritory—was not rigorously that American leaders will eventually be applied by the international forced to authorize further interventions. community on admitting As problems arising from state delegit- them to the system. Such imization threaten other nation-states—such pseudo-states are unable to as civil war, genocide, starvation, and the in- confront internal contradic- ternationalization of conflict as well as exter- tions of conflicting religious, nal intervention—the world will expect the ethnic, or racial identities. United States to provide the necessary leader- Three factors that sup- ship and resources to resolve the problems. pressed internal contradic- Experience indicates that such expectations tions until recently disap- can easily be translated by America into a peared. The most important mandate for action. Leaders of both political U.S. Air Force (Cokran) was the Cold War during parties call for continuing the U.S. leadership Felling the Berlin Wall in November 1989. which the superpowers recognized new role in the world. Once seized by foreign hu- claimants to statehood to quickly gain influ- manitarian concerns, public opinion almost ence over de facto regimes that sought legiti- demands that national leaders intervene to macy. A second, less important but still vital rectify the problems. However, there are seri- factor was the concurrent loss of influence ous limitations on such exercises of power. of metropole countries over their former There are resource constraints and interna- colonies.4 The third was support from the in- tional legal and political limitations caused ternational system which was essential to by a lack of consensus and willingness to use the internal stability of governments and and abide by conflict resolution procedures. economies in the new states, support that And when the potential cost of such involve- derived from the first two factors. Also, the ment becomes real, public enthusiasm for ac- international consensus for maintaining the tion can rapidly turn into a call for with- status quo under rubrics of territorial in- drawal and thereby define a policy failure. tegrity and no external intervention was To minimize the lack of consensus, of severely eroded. While the international the infrastructure for peacekeeping and community has not abandoned them, ex- peacemaking in international organizations, ceptions to these rules of conduct have and of dedicated resources, the United States markedly increased. must build coalitions in response to crises. Including forces from other nations not only creates international acceptance, it also can reduce overall costs. The efficacy of coali- Frederick L. Wettering is a former staff member tions suggests using international organiza- of the National Security Council and Captain John tions like the United Nations. But there N. Petrie, USN, is a surface warfare officer and should be no illusion that U.N. action is the joint specialist; both currently teach at the National War College.

18 JFQ / Spring 1994 W ettering and Petrie

answer in all or even in most situations. improved skills and equipment for rapid de- U.N. action requires consent, or at least ac- ployment; more flexible and fungible forces; quiescence, of all permanent members of the and high-tech and general purpose force Security Council. The nature of some issues supremacy over any adversary. simply will not permit this course of action. It is extremely difficult to discern mea- While a veto may not have been evoked of sures of effectiveness for the unknown, espe- late, that does not mean it will not, or cially if planners cannot establish a credible should not, be used. Furthermore, certain worst case and the budget militates against situations—especially self-defense or collec- such methodology. One approach is to mea- tive self-defense—must be dealt with imme- sure the utility of available military capabili- diately and can be endangered if military ac- ties against the most likely types of missions tion is delayed by putting it on the Security when categorized in terms of response time- Council’s agenda. The Charter recognizes liness, that is, operations in which success and accommodates this reality. Coalition- requires rapid response by combat forces, building, at least for now, must be an ad hoc rapid response and sustained support of diplomatic tool which if increasingly desir- combat forces, or commitment and support able is not always available. The United of forces over a protracted period. States will have to plan the response and Rapid response operations are measured bring its coalition partners along if diplo- in hours or days and have objectives which macy permits. can be accomplished by surprise or over- Resource constraints and the escalating whelming force. Recent operations in cost of intervention can be met and amelio- Grenada (1983), the drop of airborne forces rated only in part through diplomacy. The into Honduras to dissuade the Sandinistas more than $40 billion raised by the Bush ad- from violating Honduran sovereignty ministration to finance Desert Shield/Desert (1987), and Panama (1989) meet such a defi- Storm, albeit a skillful accomplishment, is an nition, as would noncombatant evacuation exception. More com- operations (NEOs) like evacuating American collective self-defense can be monly the United States embassy and other noncombatant personnel has failed to meet its from both Monrovia and Mogadishu (1991). endangered if military action U.N. obligations on Another example is the Franco-Zairian com- is delayed by putting it on time. Thus the Secretary bined air drop on Kolwezi to rescue hostages the Security Council’s agenda General is forced to jug- during the Shaba II incursion of rebel Katan- gle the books and pass gan forces from Angola (1978). the hat to pay for peace The Armed Forces have a successful operations. National priorities are in- track record in recent rapid response opera- escapable and may well limit the frequency tions which suggests that their planning and and extent of participation in coalition and tactical capabilities are generally sound. unilateral operations. This demands signifi- Other prerequisites for success are impor- cantly greater scrutiny of situations calling tant. Such operations require good intelli- for U.S. involvement. gence about the situation on the ground. They also require objectives located on ter- Strategy and Missions rain and geography which accommodate ac- Domestic and international pressures cess and are suitable for the forces tasked. In may shape the situation, but they need not addition, these operations must strive for be adverse or impossible. The answer is simplicity of execution; that is, the objec- bringing appropriate resources to bear where tives must be limited in number and easily they can succeed and, at the same time, en- understood and attained. joying and sustaining domestic and interna- Prerequisites are obvious when they are tional support. Where that is not possible, ignored. One incomplete intelligence prereq- intervention will not improve the situation uisite was the American raid on the Song Te in the long term. Some capabilities ear- prison in North Vietnam (1970). Geographic marked for funding have a demonstrable prerequisites are likewise important. Objec- utility for these circumstances, including tives have to be within tactical reach of air maintenance of highly-skilled core forces; forward deployed land, sea, and air forces;

Spring 1994 / JFQ 19 DEALING WITH ANARCHY

or sea forces and located on reasonable ter- While complex missions can be carried rain capable of landing helicopters or C– out, objectives nonetheless must be made ex- 130s. The aborted Iranian hostage rescue plicit rather than implied. The Somalia mis- mission (1980) stretched—or even ex- sion fails this test. While it initially had a ceeded—reasonable geographic constraints. simple objective of creating a secure environ- Dragon Rouge was an operation which ment for famine relief, the mission incurred violated simplicity. Americans supported a number of implied tasks to include elimi- Belgian paratroopers in a drop in the Con- nating hostile threats, disarming or deterring golese (Zairian) city of Stanleyville (Kisan- combatants, breaking up tribal militias, and gani). The objective was to rescue hostages even the obligation of providing or establish- held by some particularly savage rebels. The ing police, judicial, and administrative func- airdrop was combined with a ground force tions once the area was pacified. Further, column of allegedly CIA-supported merce- these tasks cannot be achieved without re- naries, V Commando Brigade under Mike solving internecine struggles which are part Hoare. The drop was not close enough to of the Somali culture. Many of these tasks where the hostages were being held and the eventually were made explicit. Finally, the mercenaries did not arrive in time at the tar- mission lacked a well defined, broadly agreed get area. Some hostages were executed by on end game and was undertaken with the their rebel captors while others, including assumption of a time line of two months to U.S. diplomats, escaped in the confusion.5 which only the United States had agreed in Operations requiring sustained support, terms of an endpoint. The consequences of particularly in the Third World, are subject the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993— to the same con- over nine months after the initially antici- straints, but there pated departure of U.S. troops—and the sub- Somalia called for a new, or in may be flexibility in sequent congressional mandate for an early fact rediscovered, set of military longer operations. pullout demonstrate the challenges of sus- roles in the American inventory The geographic fac- taining domestic consensus for humanitarian tor remains vital. missions where no broadly understood na- American campaigns tional interest is involved. in Italy and Korea demonstrate the chal- The Somalia situation called for a new, lenges of terrain, and Indochina serves as a or in fact rediscovered, set of military roles reminder of the challenges inherent in jun- in the American inventory. These roles will gles and tropical rain forests. These historical undoubtedly be needed for protracted opera- cases indicate that stiff resistance can extract tions in Third World delegitimized areas. For a tremendous toll, take up valuable time, missions of duration the military must de- and negate many advantages of general pur- velop what can be called restabilization pose forces (such as the relative speed of de- skills—in concert with civilian agencies and ployment, mobility, air superiority, and su- nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—to perior firepower). When reduced to the same create constabularies, judiciaries, and gov- tactics which indigenous forces use, such op- ernments made up of indigenous personnel. erations involve costs no rational comman- Earlier in this century the Armed Forces had der can seriously entertain without extreme extensive experience in conducting such consequences arising from a failure to un- missions. Then it was called colonial, or dertake them. more accurately, military occupation. Such The importance of terrain and geogra- operations are defined in law6 that indicate phy was proven at Gallipoli in World War I. responsibilities assumed by nations that More recently, in the British campaign in place military forces in the position of acting the Falklands conflict (1982) geography for a sovereign in his territory. Marines did negated most British advantages and—with- this in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and out the benefits of extraordinary levels of Nicaragua as did the Army in the Philip- foreign support and Argentine bad luck— pines. The Armed Forces also performed sim- could well have doomed the expedition. ilar missions in liberated Germany, Austria, and Japan, and more recently took on the same kind of missions, albeit briefly, in Grenada and Panama. Military police dealt

20 JFQ / Spring 1994 W ettering and Petrie

such situations. Beyond doubt, graduates of the U.S. Army Military Police School are better suited than Marines for patrolling the streets of Mogadishu and recreating a Somali constabulary. This is not to say that the Marines were not the best qualified force in the world to cross the beach and provide the necessary guarantees for military police to go about their duties. In fact U.S. forces in Somalia succeeded at almost every turn. But the mission was prolonged and also evolved to a point where the expertise needed was not found among the forces originally deployed. Nonetheless, remarkable accomplishments were recorded by those lacking a clear policy mandate, leaving them with an incomplete plan, and potentially without the most capable forces to carry out the tasks. It is fortu- U.S. Air Force (Dean Wagner) Military police securing nate that general purpose forces have proven Arraijan, Panama. with an anarchic situation in Operation to be so adaptable. Hawkeye to restore order on St. Croix after Why then are the experts not there? Ob- hurricane Hugo.7 Special Operations Forces vious political and mission-planning lessons (SOF) in Panama used psychological opera- can be learned from the Somali case of state tions (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA) units to delegitimization and collapse. They include reconstitute the government and establish a defining political tasks as thoroughly as pos- police force under civilian control during sible prior to setting out; providing military Operation Promote Liberty.8 police in urban areas as soon as areas are se- In past military occupations local popu- cured; and deploying SOF, intelligence, engi- lations have been screened (as in de-nazifica- neer, medical, legal, logistic, and other com- tion) and undesirables barred from recruit- bat support and combat service support ment. U.S. military police, judge advocate personnel immediately after an anarchic sit- general, civil affairs, administrative, and sup- uation. If specialists from the Department of port personnel have organized, trained, and State, Agency for International Develop- supervised new infrastructures while combat ment, U.S. Information Agency, and Central forces provided the requisite stability to per- Intelligence Agency are required, they mit less glamorous but essential military na- should be introduced under the aegis of the tion-building functions to be carried out. appropriate unified command if the CINC While the Armed Forces have the skills, takes control of the area in question. their capabilities are no guarantee of success. Unfortunately, forward deployment, That might require tasking forces and a de- mobility, and rapid response produce situa- gree of authority which is difficult to obtain tions where bias exists towards dispatching under law. Forces employed under the aegis and retaining shooters at the expense of of the United Nations tend to be constrained combat support elements. Shooters alone to fulfill only those missions which can com- cannot establish the appropriate level of mand an international political consensus control or the environment necessary for a (the Security Council mandate expressed in a mission which remains successful even after resolution). Indeed, Somalia raises serious their withdrawal. Further, their flexibility questions about the role of the military in an- and—in the case of the Marines—their broad archic situations. The sight of heavily armed range of capabilities at the organizational Marines being confronted by swarms of So- level tempts military and civilian decision- mali boys intent on mischief points to the makers to have Marines handle short-term fact that sometimes there are too many operations on their own. Deploying a greater shooters and too few nation-builders. Military police are trained and equipped to handle

Spring 1994 / JFQ 21 DEALING WITH ANARCHY

number of more diverse or specialized units very difficult for the National Command Au- involves considerable expense and potential thorities to recover these specialists in Soma- domestic and international political costs. lia-type situations where there is no domestic Consequently, balancing talent among the political consensus to support the call-up of forces on the scene—especially the so-called Reserve and Guard units, which is always a tooth-to-tail ratio—can quickly become in- politically risky move for a President. appropriate if missions require or evolve into To illustrate this problem it should be entirely different situations. noted that over 75 percent of PSYOP and 97 percent of CA capabilities, 50 percent of the military police assets, and 50 percent of the Seabees are in the Reserve components.10 Air National Guard C–130s demonstrated an ability to support the original feeding operation in Somalia and the U.N. demobilization effort in Angola, both in 1992. The effort during Desert Storm to solicit volunteers was an inspired attempt to ease this problem, but in the last analysis the solution lies in the composition of forces available for contingencies. A logical rejoinder to the above strategy might be why not leave it to the United Na- tions or some other transnational body to set up and administer such territories; recruit police, judicial, and administrative supervisory personnel; and take responsibility for such a program. There are two reasons why the

Combat Camera Imagery (Efrain Gonzalez) American military must rediscover this capa- Caring for victim of bility: the professed policy of working with mortar attack in Inappropriate force structure is even and through the United Nations by exercis- Sarajevo. more likely in U.N.-led or sanctioned situa- ing leadership in these situations means that tions. The initial tasking in such instances is the Armed Forces will frequently form the generally the lowest common denominator leading elements of such organizations. Fur- of the various political assessments and polit- ther, the U.N. track record on administration ical wills that come to bear on a Security of such operations is generally poor. In any Council decision to act or authorize action. case, such operations under U.N. authority The idea of accepting responsibility for what require Chinese and Russian agreement or constitutes a military occupation of a mem- acquiescence (surely no one can expect the ber state will be very hard to sell indeed. Do- level of concurrence from the Russians and mestic response will not be receptive either. Chinese developed in the Gulf and Somalia Nonetheless, this is becoming clear to plan- operations to continue indefinitely). ners. One report suggests the lesson may Another possible argument against these have been learned from the plan for an unex- proposals might be that any force so estab- ecuted intervention that provided for “engi- lished by the United States may be resented neers, military police, and medical units... by local inhabitants and possibly over- to improve Haiti’s military, police force, med- thrown upon departure of U.S. forces. To ical services, and communications.” 9 But in overcome this possibility better use must be that case a lack of shooters to kick in the made of traditional restabilization skills. On door made the action both tactically impossi- the other hand consider the unfortunately ble and politically unthinkable (albeit at the far more likely consequence of the entire eleventh hour). U.S. intervention effort being undermined There remains the problem of the avail- upon the departure of U.S. forces should ability of such anarchy-appropriate forces. such a strategy not be employed. To argue Much of the capability for such vital special- that many foreign forces or a collection of ties lies in the Reserve components. Right-siz- U.N. forces from smaller states can assume ing will threaten to increase that balance. It is this responsibility is unrealistic.

22 JFQ / Spring 1994 W ettering and Petrie

The initial forces which enter someone Regrettably, the state of the world is else’s territory should have unit cohesion, such that many of these arguments will soon common tactics, ease of communication, be put to the test. National and military good mobility, and available air and sealift. strategy underscore the importance of re- Further, lift must be responsive to tasking gional stability to American interests. Recent and be able to support both opposed and ad- calls for U.S. involvement have been judged ministrative insertions of forces. Today those as not related to those interests. Neverthe- capabilities—coupled with the political will less, they demonstrate the importance of to become involved—do not exist in many sending the right force with the right sup- places outside of the United States. Political port to similar situations when national in- will here depends heavily upon public opin- terests are at stake. Such situations lie ahead. ion and is excep- Now is the time to prepare those forces initial forces should have unit tionally difficult to which will be needed for future missions cohesion, common tactics, ease sustain in the face and to streamline the requisite support to of unanticipated carry them to success. JFQ of communication, good mobility, costs or losses. and available air and sealift Each reversal NOTES during one of these 1 General Assembly Resolution 2200 (XI session) of situations moves December 16, 1966; see General Assembly Official Record, the threshold for consensus further away. vol. 23, supp. 16 (A/6316), pp. 49–52. 2 The U.N. Charter, and annexed Statute of the In- Activating the Reserve components to de- ternational Court of Justice, entered into force on Octo- ploy a successful force also becomes more ber 24, 1945. difficult politically. This is not a design for 3 For the Declaration on Liberated Europe and re- success. When the national interest is en- lated matters, see communique signed at the Yalta Con- gaged decisionmakers clearly have a better ference (February 11, 1945), in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Pa- argument but the center of gravity for these pers, The Conference at Malta and Yalta (Washington: operations has obviously shifted to U.S. pub- Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 968–87 (espe- lic opinion. cially, pp. 977–78). Anarchy created by breakdowns in na- 4 For example, see Francis Terry McNamara, France tion-state sovereignty is likely to compel in- in Black Africa (Washington: National Defense Univer- sity Press, 1989), pp. 207–08, on French retrenchment tervention to implement U.N. decisions, from Africa beginning in 1984. sometimes by force. This will probably be 5 Fred E. Wagoner, Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of the done by coalitions, albeit with the United Hostages in the Congo (Washington: National Defense States in the lead. Current military strategy University Press, 1980). is well suited for such contingencies. In an- 6 It is argued that the law of war requires the United States to administer territory which its forces enter ab- archic situations the Armed Forces must consent a government capable or willing to exercise the duct restabilization operations with skill. sovereign’s responsibilities—or when operational exi- While combat forces may establish tempo- gencies do not allow local government to meet them. rary order, without the addition of combat Restabilizing any territory after intervening where anar- support and combat service support person- chy might otherwise reign implies moral and legal as well as pragmatic considerations. Such situations create nel like military police, order will vanish as similar responsibilities which face an occupying force combat forces are withdrawn. This will al- once it defeats or otherwise bars indigenous authority most assuredly be the case in Somalia. It is from providing for civil order and the requisite infras- unlikely that the United Nations or other in- tructure. See chapter 6 of Department of the Army Field ternational organizations can provide such Manual 27–10, The Law of Land Warfare. 7 Briefing by MG Charles A. Hines, Commandant, restabilization skills in a timely or effective U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Ala- manner unless they build on the structure bama, August 10, 1992. already possessed by the U.S. military. 8 U.S. Department of Defense, Special Operations It is imperative that cadres involved in Command, “United States Special Operations Forces: restabilization, many of whom are Re- Posture Statement, 1993.” 9 See, for example, Inside the Pentagon, April 8, 1993, servists, be available on short notice. Cur- p. 1. rent law inhibits the National Command 10 John M. Collins, “Roles and Functions of U.S. Authorities from calling up Reservists with Combat Forces: Past, Present, and Prospects” (Washing- vital restabilization skills in less than brigade ton: Congressional Research Service, January 21, 1993). size-units or in numbers over 1,000.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 23 REVOLUTIONS U.S. Navy (Daniel G. Lavois) in Military Affairs By JAMES R. FITZSIMONDS and JAN M. VAN TOL

n the early morning hours of the 15th of Blitzkrieg has been termed a revolution May, 1940, Prime Minister Churchill rein military affairs or RMA—a fundamental ceived an urgent telephone call from French change in the nature of warfare that the IPremier Reynaud. “We are beaten,” Rey- Wehrmacht used to inflict a rapid, stunning naud said in distressed English, “we have lost defeat on a qualitatively comparable, numer- the battle.” It had only been five days since the ically superior force. Many factors con- German army launched a broad offensive into tributed to the Allied collapse, but the France and the Low Countries. “Surely it can’t essence of the German victory was the inno- have happened so soon,” Churchill replied, in- vative operational exploitation of systems credulous at the rapidity of the defeat.1 Six common to both sides: the tank, airplane, weeks later, France formally surrendered. and radio. Speed, surprise, and deception,

Summary

Technological change may revolutionize warfare in the next century. Nations which can exploit emerging technologies through innovative operational doctrine and organizational adaptation may achieve significant gains in relative military effectiveness. In the past, America has had sufficient time to adapt in the midst of war to military revolutions that developed in peacetime. However the proliferation of technology may no longer afford the luxury of observing developments from the sidelines. The role of the military in developing concepts to exploit emerging technologies will be crucial in order to stay ahead of competitors. Junior officers in particular must be encouraged to think about the implications of the emerging revolution in military affairs.

24 JFQ / Spring 1994 FitzSimonds and van Tol

combined with superior tactical and opera- her sister Ironside. There is not now a ship in the En- tional performance, gave the Germans a de- glish navy apart from these two that it would not be gree of relative operational superiority to madness to trust to an engagement with that little which the Allies failed to adapt in time. [American] Monitor. 2 While nations have always pursued inno- —The Times (London), 1862 vation to increase military effectiveness rela- It is difficult to precisely and consis- tive to potential adversaries, accelerating tently define the term revolution in military technological change, coupled with associ- affairs, though it is generally clear ex post ated operational and organizational changes, facto when something of a revolutionary na- has altered the character of war more pro- ture has occurred. An example of an RMA foundly in the last two centuries than ever might be the universal change across warfare before. The railroad, telegraph, steam-pow- driven, for instance, by the development of ered ironclad, and rifle caused dramatic in- the airplane or atomic bomb. Another sort creases in military effectiveness between the might be the conversion from wooden sail- Napoleonic wars and the American Civil War. ing ships to steam-powered armored hulls in Similar changes accompanied the introduc- the latter half of the 19th century. Still an- tion of the machine gun, airplane, and sub- other might be a consequence of major so- marine prior to World War I. By the outbreak cial or political upheaval, such as the French of World War II the internal combustion en- levee en masse which dramatically altered the gine, improved aircraft, radio, and radar made scale of land warfare. One feature common possible revolutionary leaps in long-range, to each, and perhaps the essence of an RMA, highly mobile operations such as Blitzkrieg is not the rapidity of the change in military and carrier air strikes. The development of effectiveness relative to opponents, but nuclear weapons at the end of World War II rather the magnitude of the change com- and their subsequent mating with ballistic pared with preexisting military capabilities. missiles marked perhaps the most profound Technological advances are usually a req- revolution in military affairs to date. uisite for an RMA, but technology alone is The stunning victory of the Armed Forces not enough to achieve leaps in relative mili- in the Gulf has stimulated increasing discus- tary effectiveness. As illustrated by Blitzkrieg, sion of the possible emergence of a new RMA, profound change only takes place when new which will again lead to major changes in the concepts of operations incorporating new nature of conventional warfare. Such a revo- technologies are developed. Often this will lution may be driven by the rapidly develop- require or result in new military organiza- ing technologies of information processing tions which reflect the new conditions. and stealthy, long-range precision strike. History suggests three common precon- The following discussion has two pur- ditions to the full realization of an RMA: poses. The first is to present the question of an ▼ Technological Development—Since the In- emerging revolution in military affairs and sug- dustrial Revolution there has been a stream of new gest why it may be significant. The second— technologies which intentionally or otherwise and perhaps more important—is to encourage have had military applications. For example, devel- the readers of Joint Force Quarterly, particularly opment of a powerful, reliable internal combus- junior officers, to think and write about the ex- tion engine made possible the self-propelled vehi- plosive technological advances of our day and cle and airplane. Mere invention, of course, is not their implications for the way militaries will be enough; the new technologies must also be developed into practical military systems (or systems of organized and operate in the future. systems as technologies become ever more com- What Are RMAs? plex). While the tank was introduced at Cambrai Whereas we had available for immediate pur- in 1917, it was years before it was reliable and ro- poses one hundred and forty-nine first-class warships, bust enough to spearhead rapid ground advances. we have now two, these two being the Warrior and ▼ Doctrinal (or Operational) Innovation—To fully exploit the potential of new systems, operational concepts incorporating and integrating the new technologies must be developed into coher- Commander James R. FitzSimonds, USN, and ent doctrines. Military organizations must also Commander Jan M. van Tol, USN, are assigned to train to use and interactively improve them. After the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the the tank’s introduction into combat, it took more Secretary of Defense.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 25 REVOLUTIONS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Experimental stealth U.S. Navy (George F. Champagne) ship Sea Shadow in San Francisco Bay. decades of doctrinal experimentation and devel- Perhaps counter- prolonged peace opment to produce Blitzkrieg. intuitively, revolu- provides the time ▼ Organizational adaptation—The most pro- tionary changes do found changes require significant bureaucratic ac- not generally occur and resources for ceptance and institutional change. The success of during war. The fact experimentation Blitzkrieg required not only the technology of the of change may be tank and a coherent doctrine of armored warfare, but also substantial organizational and even cul- most dramatically manifested in combat, but tural changes which were reflected in the new historically the most profound RMAs are combined arms operations centered on the Ger- peacetime phenomena (the atomic bomb man Panzer division. may be the exception that proves the rule). For example, the transition from wooden It is the synergistic effect of these three sailing ships to steam-powered armored hulls preconditions that leads to an RMA. Indeed in the last century was one of the more dra- it is the increasing recognition of the impor- matic revolutions in military history, yet tance of the doctrinal and organizational el- there were no major wars at sea in this period ements that has led to the term revolution in which underlined that fundamental change. military affairs gaining currency over expres- Militaries are driven to innovate during sions such as military-technical revolution peacetime by the need to make more efficient which implied that technology was the pre- use of shrinking resources, by reacting to dominant factor. major changes in the security environment, or by recognizing the possible implications of

26 JFQ / Spring 1994 FitzSimonds and van Tol

technologies was engendering a new revolution in military affairs.” 3 They were particularly interested in the “incorporation of information sciences into the military sphere” M1A1 Abrams in Saudi and in the idea of a “reconnaissance-strike Arabia. complex.” 4 The events of the Gulf War convinced them of the validity of their hypothe- sis.5 Desert Storm indeed suggests that a new RMA is emerging.6 It may have provided a glimpse of a major transition to a different type of warfare heavily based on information processing and stealthy long-range precision strike weapons. What are some of the possible implications of this transition? Information processing has always been part of warfare. In the future, however, it U.S. Army may be central to the outcome of battles and engagements. If so, establishing information dominance over one’s adversary will become a major focus of the operational art. Infor- mation warfare is still an ill-defined term. However, it might encompass a range of concepts, including but not limited to: ▼ comprehensive intelligence regarding an enemy’s military, political, economic, and cultural “targets” while denying the same to him ▼ disruption/manipulation of enemy C3I DOD systems and defense of one’s own F–117 Stealth fighters. ▼ space-based information usage and denial ▼ sensor-to-shooter data fusion ▼ flexible information/intelligence data bases ▼ use of simulations to support operational decisionmaking. To the extent these notions have opera- new inventions or techniques for their art. tional validity, they may also drive signifi- Prolonged peace provides the time and re- cant organizational changes.7 sources for experimentation. Equally impor- Stealthy long-range precision strike may tant, this is the period of least risk if wrong become the dominant operational approach. choices are made. Consequently, long periods By reducing the strike timeline from target without major wars have generally resulted in sensor-to-shooter by orders of magnitude the greatest changes. while increasing the effectiveness of weapons Full exploitation of emerging technolo- in terms of range, target discrimination, and gies can span decades. The lengthy develop- lethality, such systems conceivably could pro- ment of Blitzkrieg was noted earlier. Simi- vide conventional forces the ability to rapidly larly, it took time to move from Kitty Hawk destroy an opponent’s critical military targets to strategic bombers and carrier task forces. at minimal cost and with little collateral dam- The commercial analog is instructive; for in- age. Some proponents even believe this ap- stance, it took business years to fully exploit proach extends to the destruction of an the telephone’s potential or, more recently, enemy’s strategic centers of gravity. exponential increases in computing power. There may well be other technologies, Is Another RMA Emerging? employed operationally in ways as yet un- In the early 1980s the Soviets noted that foreseen, that emerge to dominate future “the emergence of advanced non-nuclear wars and preparations for them. Use of advanced simulations may greatly reduce cost and increase the speed of various military

Spring 1994 / JFQ 27 REVOLUTIONS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS U.S. Navy (Jon Guzman) USS Monsoon, a new class of coastal patrol ship, off the San Clemente Islands.

technical improvement, doctrinal development, and organizational adaptation. Could the modern systems such as stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and smart weapons, the Joint Combat Camera Center concepts of operations Navy F/A–18C. that employed them, activities. Commercial technologies such as and the military organizations of the Gulf microelectronics, telecommunications sys- War be the “1918” equivalents in the context tems, space systems, nanotechnologies, ro- of a future “1940” war? botics, and biogenetics, whose potential is Why Do RMAs Matter? only starting to be explored and which will RMAs matter principally for two rea- be widely available, may also have enor- sons. First, being second best may lead to mous implications for mili- catastrophic loss in future wars. Since the there is a substantial cost tary effectiveness. Moreover, only objective benchmark for determining these technologies and their for failure to recognize the relative effectiveness of forces (that is, operational employment may revolutionary changes success in combat) is unavailable in long pe- radically affect the whole riods of peace, there is great potential for in warfare gamut of military affairs, asymmetries in combat effectiveness be- from combat operations and tween militaries, observable only when the training to logistics and deployment prac- next war has occurred. For example, the tices to optimizing the responsiveness and British and French experimented with tanks flexibility of the industrial base. and aircraft in the interwar period, but their In thinking about the proposition of an effectiveness was disastrously inferior to that emerging RMA, it may be instructive to com- of the Wehrmacht. However, few observers pare the present with the interwar years. By would have guessed at this reality in 1939. 1918, systems like planes, tanks, and radios Obviously, there is a substantial cost for fail- were considered state of the art and repre- ure to recognize revolutionary changes in sented quantum leaps over 1914. Yet the warfare before an opponent does. combat power represented by these same sys- Secondly, as equipment life cycles, espe- tems in 1940 was orders of magnitude greater cially for platforms, steadily grow to encom- than in 1918. The promise they held in 1918 pass decades (B–52s were designed in the only became decisive after two decades of late 1940’s, carriers last 40-plus years), many of the principal weapons systems of 2025 will likely be designed and built in the next

28 JFQ / Spring 1994 FitzSimonds and van Tol few years. Since militaries are stuck with information distribution networks, and navi- force structures they choose for long periods gation systems. Future revolutions will occur (though designs allowing for frequent sys- much more rapidly, offering far less time for tem modifications ameliorate this to some adaptation to new methods of warfare. The extent), it is more crucial than ever to think growing imperative in the business world for now, in peacetime, about the impact of pos- rapid response to changing conditions in sibly revolutionary changes in the nature of order to survive in an intensely competitive war and about what will matter in winning environment is surely instructive for military wars in twenty or thirty years. Paradoxically, affairs. Corporations repeatedly have to make however, this may be more difficult even as major changes in strategy to accommodate it becomes more important. the full implications of technologies which Today, with the United States arguably have already existed many years. the only superpower for the foreseeable fu- In the military context, as with the tank, ture, one might ask why this issue is espe- aircraft, radio, and other systems in 1918, the cially pressing. Replicating the U.S. force key technologies are out there and available structure is clearly beyond the reach of all but for many nations to exploit. This places a a few other nations, even in the long term. premium on remaining at the forefront in This may not, however, be relevant. Even the identification and implementation of the small- to medium-sized powers may be able developments which will maintain, if not in- to exploit specific technologies for significant crease, relative military effectiveness well military leverage in certain areas. Fifty years into the next century. Doing so can only ago the Japanese fielded a highly capable mil- come from encouragement of innovative itary, technically advanced in selected as- thinking about the relevant questions. pects, which was more than a match for Innovative Thinking American forces during the early years of the Stationed at Camp Meade, Maryland just after Pacific war. Yet Japan’s economy on the eve of World War I, Dwight Eisenhower and George Patton World War II was maybe 15 percent the size both began articles for military journals describing of this Nation’s. A more serious possibility is their experiments utilizing new doctrine for the em- the emergence of a major competitor or coali- ployment of tanks. “Then I was called before the tion to seriously challenge the United States. Chief of Infantry,” Eisenhower later recalled. “I was Such a military peer might employ the same told that my ideas were not only wrong but dangerous critical technologies which will serve as the and that henceforth I would keep them to myself. Par- basis of our Armed Forces and thus pose a di- ticularly, I was not to publish anything incompatible rect threat to American vital interests. with solid infantry doctrine. If I did, I would be 8 The current rate of change suggests that hauled before a court-martial.” state of the art in any technological context Today’s breathtaking technological will be an extremely short-lived phe- achievements notwithstanding, developing nomenon, particularly with respect to the the concepts of operations that incorporate technologies that were key to the success of new technologies and organizations to per- Desert Storm: space systems, telecommunica- mit effective exploitation of new capabilities tions systems, computer architectures, global is even more critical than acquisition of the technologies themselves. Indeed, the most compelling lesson from the 1920s and GENERAL HEINZ GUDERIAN 1930s is that some militaries were much bet- (1888-1954) ter than others at developing and imple- Between 1914 and 1918 [Guderian] served mainly with menting successful concepts and also mak- the staff on the Western Front. In 1922 his task was to ing the organizational changes to fully help develop the mechanization of the German army: by exploit new technologies. 1929 he had become convinced that tanks in all-arms, Innovation is not necessarily or even armoured (Panzer) divisions would in the future dominate land warfare. With Hitler’s support, but obstructed primarily a function of budget. Many of the by traditionalists, he promoted the creation of the interwar innovations came at a time of low German armoured forces which spearheaded the budgets and small forces. Blitzkrieg was de- invasion of Poland in 1939. veloped while Germany was tightly re- — From The Penguin Encyclopedia of Modern Warfare stricted by the Versailles Treaty. American by Kenneth Macksey and William Woodhouse carrier naval aviation developed under a

Spring 1994 / JFQ 29 REVOLUTIONS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

strict arms control regime in a fiscally con- The other critical requirement is the strained environment. The amphibious doc- ability and willingness of relatively junior trine of the Marine Corps—which J.F.C. officers who are now out in the field and Fuller characterized as probably “the most fleet to think about the future. As younger far reaching tactical innovation of the people more recently out of school, they are war”—originates in the conceptual work of likely to be in closer touch with new and Major Earl H. Ellis in 1920 under the vision- emerging technologies which have potential ary tutelage of the Marine Commandant, military application. As operators, they are Major General John A. Lejeune. aware of the operational and organizational Why some innovations succeed and problems that they must deal with daily and others fail, and why some militaries inno- hence are prime clients for possible solu- vate rapidly while others languish, are mat- tions. Finally, they will also be the senior ters for debate.9 History provides no clear leaders who must win the wars twenty to guidance on overcoming institutional resis- thirty years from now. tance to change and no final explanations of Unfortunately, these same officers have the relative roles of civilians, military maver- published little to date in professional jour- icks, or visionaries. However, in one form or nals on the idea of an RMA, nor have RMAs another, the military role in implementing been a focus of study at the service col- innovative ideas is crucial. As one observer leges.11 There may be several reasons for this. noted, “many important wartime technical Arguably the present force drawdowns put innovations such as the tank, proximity such a premium on preserving what exists fuse, and microwave radar, and organiza- that discussion of concepts which might tional innovations such as new doctrines for threaten current programs is effectively sti- submarine warfare and strategic targeting fled. Then organizations that have had re- functions for American bombers, were pur- cent success, as has the U.S. Armed Forces, sued at the initiative of military officers or probably feel less impetus for institutional with their vigorous support.” 10 change than if they had been less successful. What may be key to “winning the inno- And lastly, countries have historically not vation battle” is a professional military cli- had good records of military innovation in mate which fosters thinking in uncon- periods such as the present when they can- strained fashion about future war. This is in not envision a well-defined military problem part a function of having leaders on the as the focus of planning and acquisition. order of a LeJeune who will encourage inno- The failure of military officers to think vation and—subject to reality checks—actu- about potentially crucial ideas such as an ally test and implement innovative ideas to emerging RMA can carry with it the seeds of Patriot missile maintain a preeminent military position. defeat, not least because the absence of a sig- system. nificant military contribution to the discussion of future wars will result in the subject being restricted to academics and think tanks. Although the latter have important ideas to bring to the table, inherently they can neither be as intimately familiar with military problems as professional officers nor as effective in implementing innovation from within the services. Journals such as JFQ should play an important role in giving exposure to new ideas. Military officers, especially junior ones, should contribute views on emerging RMAs, or at least evaluate the implications of the stunning changes occurring today. As a starting point, the authors suggest the following broad questions: ▼ How will the emerging RMA change the nature of warfare in the next several decades? Joint Combat Camera Center

30 JFQ / Spring 1994 FitzSimonds and van Tol

NOTES BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM (“BILLY”) MITCHELL (1879–1936) 1 Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: ...by September 1918 [Mitchell] was commander of a Houghton Mifflin, 1949), p. 2. Franco-American air force of 1,500 machines. He used the 2 Quoted in John Taylor Wood, “The First Fight of force in mass (sometimes with formations of 200 aircraft) in Iron-Clads,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (New the Saint-Mihiel battle and the Meuse Argonne offensive. By York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956), p. 692. then he was a fervent champion of airpower, proposing the 3 Mary C. FitzGerald, “The Soviet Image of Future parachuting of airborne infantry behind the German lines in War: Through the Prism of the Gulf War,” Comparative 1919, and of strategic bombing by independent air forces on Strategies, vol. 10, no. 4 (October–December 1991), p. 393. the British model. 4 Ibid., p. 398. — From The Penguin Encyclopedia of Modern Warfare 5 Mary C. FitzGerald, “The Soviet Military and the by Kenneth Macksey and William Woodhouse New Air War in the Persian Gulf,” Airpower Journal, vol. 5., no. 4 (Winter 1991), p. 64. 6 The emerging nature of RMAs is the subject of an unpublished manuscript by Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., ▼ What military applications do burgeoning entitled “The Military Revolution.” commercial technological developments have? 7 A cogent proposal for consolidating information ▼ What implications do new technologies management recently appeared in these pages: see Martin have for concepts of operations? For the way the C. Libicki and James A. Hazlett, “Do We Need an Informa- military is organized? tion Corps?”, Joint Force Quarterly, no. 2 (Autumn 1993), ▼ How might potential adversaries exploit pp. 88–97. the military revolution to America’s detriment? 8 Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to ▼ What should the U.S. strategy be for deal- Friends (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 173. 9 ing with future military competitors? Should such See for example Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: a strategy aim at inhibiting those competitors? Cornell University Press, 1991); Barry Posen, The Sources These questions are just a starting point. of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between Indeed, figuring out what the right questions the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and James S. Corum, The Roots of the Blitzkrieg: are is a challenge in itself. But assuredly, offi- Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, cers must think beyond the issues of force Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1992). drawdowns and the Five-Year Defense Plan. 10 Rosen, Winning the Next War, p. 255. As Paul Bracken has pointed out, “We should 11 Antulio J. Echevarria and John M. Shaw, “The New be looking beyond the military we are plan- Military Revolution: Post-Industrial Change,” Parameters, vol. 22, no. 4 (Winter 1992–93), pp. 1–10, and John W. ning to have at the end of our current force Bodnar, “The Military Technical Revolution: From Hard- restructuring—we should be planning now ware to Information,” Naval War College Review, vol. 46, for the ‘military after next.’” 12 JFQ no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 7–21, appear to be the only articles on RMAs in professional military journals in 1993. 12 Paul Bracken, “The Military After Next,” The Wash- ington Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1993), pp. 157–74.

The Joint Force Quarterly ESSAY CONTEST ON Revolutions in Military Affairs

announces an annual essay contest cosponsored by the Office of the Secretary of JFQ Defense (Net Assessment) and the National Defense University Foundation to encourage innovative thinking on Revolutions in Military Affairs and how the Armed Forces can best prepare to remain dominant as the nature of warfare changes. All essays will be considered for publication in JFQ. The contest will be open to military officers and civilians from this country as well as abroad. Cash prizes of $2,000, $1,000, and $500 will be awarded to the three top entrants. In addition, a prize of $500 will be awarded for the best essay submitted by either an officer candidate or officer in the rank of major/lieutenant commander or below (and equivalent grades). All winners will also receive a selection of books dealing with innovation. Look for entry rules and other details in the next issue of JFQ (Summer 94).

Spring 1994 / JFQ 31 Roles & Missions: Back to the Future By CARL H. BUILDER

The Secretary and the Chiefs in August 1948 at the Newport Confer- ence (from left): Lt Gen Lauris Norstad, Deputy Chief of Operations, Air Staff; Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief

of Staff of the Air U.S. Navy Force; LTG Albert C. Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Opera- his year’s roles and missions de- Air Force to continue their dispute over air tions, Army Staff; GEN bate is likely to be the liveliest roles. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal Omar N. Bradley, Chief since the internecine warfare that and the Joint Chiefs of Staff separately tried of Staff, U.S. Army; Secretary of Defense T led to the Key West truce of 1948. to redraft the order, but without gaining James D. Forrestal; The National Security Act of 1947 was the agreement. The conference convened from ADM Louis E. Denfeld, culmination of contentious efforts following March 11 to 14, 1948 at Key West “appeared Chief of Naval Opera- World War II to unify the Armed Forces and to reach agreement on the fundamental is- tions; VADM Arthur W. to create an independent Air Force. When sues, chiefly between the Navy and the Air Radford, Vice Chief of 1 Naval Operations; President Truman signed that act, he also is- Force,” but subsequent meetings (in Wash- and MG Alfred M. sued Executive Order 9877, defining the ington and Newport) and memoranda re- Gruenther, Staff Direc- functions of the Armed Forces. Differences in vealed that issues of interpretation remained. tor, Joint Staff. the language between the act and the order, In the end, “the decision was not in any wise however, left an opening for the Navy and a victory or defeat for any service,” and all the parties accepted an “obligation to work amicably to settle any differences.” 2 A truce had been arranged; and it is the prospect of The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the position of the RAND Corporation.

32 JFQ / Spring 1994 Builder

lifting this 46-year-old cessation of hostilities pertinence of those forces constrained to op- that has everyone holding their breath. erations on land or at sea. That is when the Not everything, of course, is up for grabs. roles and missions debate began. The cre- Each service has an uncontested claim on ation of an independent air force entrenched core military operations in a particular the debate; and military operations in space medium—on land, at sea, across the beach, have extended it into still another medium. and in the air—that the others do not want to These are classic turf battles. They occur assume, sometimes even going so far as to at the margins between the media domi- denigrate the importance of operations in nated by the four services. Air and space op- media other than their own. What is clearly erations have become essential to land and of concern to the services, and what makes sea operations. Moreover, air and space sys- their hackles rise, are roles and functions that tems are seldom limited to supporting sur- could conceivably overlap with their own and face operations even when they are specifi- then be expanded, challenging their preemi- cally designed to do just that; they can often nence in a traditional domain or medium. be applied effectively to military ends in any Those overlaps typically arise when a of the media. And when those systems and service devoted to military operations in one their capabilities become the basis for budget medium finds that it must conduct opera- and force structure arguments, the debate tions in another medium to insure its ability turns into a battle for institutional prestige to operate effectively in its prin- and survival. That double spillover—from each service has an cipal or traditional domain. one medium to another, and then from capa- One hundred years ago, such bility to budgets—is what plagued the first uncontested claim on circumstances were rare. The great debate over roles and missions almost core military operations only two military media were fifty years ago. in a particular medium the land and sea—domains of This is not a debate that the services will armies and navies—sharply sep- seek. Too much is at stake. These are issues arated by the shorelines and they would rather see worked at the margins with only occasional interactions at the in- of their turf through bargains and agree- terfaces (like shore bombardment, coastal ments among themselves. Unfortunately for defense artillery, and occasional raids them, the debate is now being provoked by ashore). Marines, as sea-going men-at-arms, the bill-payers, whose concerns lie else- had not yet staked a claim to the interface where. For the public, as expressed through between the land and sea as their particular the Congress, the issue is not turf but per- domain. Armies and navies could be assured ceptions of waste in the form of duplication: that almost every engagement would remain Why do we need four different tactical air on land or at sea, without a threat of signifi- forces? Why not just one? Why do we need cant encroachment by their opposites. three different space programs, one for each But transportation technology has of the military departments? Why do we changed all that. Military operations in the need two ground forces? These are the pub- air blurred the sharp distinction between the lic’s questions that will fuel the debate. land and sea. Armies and navies needed to But the debate will open a much bigger operate in the air in order to secure their op- can of worms. Public questioning will lead erations on land or at sea. At first, armies and to even tougher questions that the services navies used the air only for supporting opera- would never raise if left to themselves. What tions—observation, artillery spotting, and is the role of the Army when the Nation no scouting. But the airmen had different ideas longer has to defend itself from predatory about how to use the air as a new medium enemies? Do we still need the Navy when for military operations, even challenging the the threat to our commerce on the seas is not other navies but piracy? Why do we need the Air Force operating independently Carl H. Builder is a senior staff member at the when the principal purpose of airpower is to RAND Corporation. He is the author of The Masks support surface forces? Those are the gut of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and questions that lurk below the surface of the Analysis, and The Icarus Syndrome, an analysis of impending debate. airpower theory in the evolution of the Air Force.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 33 Reading the Body Language For these reasons, the stated or public THE ARMY sees itself, ultimately, as the essential arti- postures adopted by the services in the sans of war, still divided into their traditional combat roles and missions debate will not neces- arms—the infantry, artillery, and cavalry (armor)—but sarily reflect their real concerns, interests, forged by history and the nature of war into a mutually or motivations. To read the supportive brotherhood body language of the ser- of guilds. Both words, vices as they debate, we brotherhood and guilds, should keep in mind the are significant here. The following anxieties: combat arms or branches of the Army are ▼ True service concerns guilds—associations of can be their vulnerabilities which they may very reason- craftsmen who take the ably prefer not to reveal. With greatest pride in their the possible exception of the skills, as opposed to Marine Corps, the services are their possessions or po- Combat Camera Imagery (James Bowman) uneasy about their justifica- sitions. The guilds are tions for the future—as separate institutions or joined in a brotherhood because, like brothers, they have beyond shadows of their former selves. a common family bond (the Army) and a recognition of ▼ The leadership of each service must their dependency upon each other in combat. represent and preside over diverse factions What is the Army? It is first and foremost the Na- within their own institution; hence, they tion’s obedient and loyal military servant. It takes pride in may prefer not to reveal their true affections being the keeper of the essential skills of war that must for one faction or interest at the expense of others. be infused into the citizenry when they are called upon ▼ The services may not be entirely to fight. proud of their motives when hard choices What is it about? It is about keeping itself prepared must be made. Like the new car buyer who to meet the varied demands the American people have justifies the purchase as a way of saving on historically asked of it, but especially prepared to forge repair bills for the old car, the real reasons America’s citizenry into an expeditionary force to defeat don’t sound very good except in the privacy America’s enemies overseas. And in this latter role, the of one’s own head. Army accepts (with understandable unease) its utter de- Nevertheless, there are intellectual pendence upon its sister services for air and sea transport devices that can help in anticipating the and firepower. culturally-driven service motivations in —Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War the roles and missions debate. Although these devices will not true service concerns can help much in understanding the arcane argu- ▼ Who are the elite factions in each service; be their vulnerabilities, ments that will attend the and how might shifts in roles and missions debate, they can be surpris- threaten them? which they may prefer not ▼ ingly reliable guides to the Which offspring might the services throw to reveal to the wolves if they must to save themselves? positions taken. In effect, they provide simpler models Anticipating the Positions of why the services will act in the ways they Here are my guesses at the answers for do, even though expressed reasons will be each of the services. Again, the answers do quite different. Here are some questions we not reflect what the services will say, but the should ask ourselves, well before the services positions I think they will be driven to by take up their debating positions. their deeper interests. ▼ What does each service treasure most For the Navy, the most treasured posses- that might be put at risk in the roles and mission is its capital ships; and for the last fifty sions debate? years these have been the big carriers. The ▼ What systems (and roles) could be banned most important question in the roles and or excluded, say, by treaty or national policy missions flux for the Navy is whether the de- without threatening a service? bate could jeopardize the justification for

34 JFQ / Spring 1994 Builder their carriers. Naval aviators have dominated the evolution of their service, but not because of the Navy’s intrinsic love of aviation. They ascended to the top of the Navy food chain because tail-hook aviators provide the justification for the Navy’s capital ships; U.S. Navy (Tracy Lee Didas) and capital ships still provide the justification for everything else on, under, and over the sea. Capital ships and their constituents, THE NAVY, more than any of the other services and once entrenched in the Navy, have not over anything else, is an institution. That institution is been overturned from within, but by marked by two strong senses of itself: its independence trauma from without. Wood and sail and stature. yielded to iron and steam in battle before The Navy’s stature as an independent institution is they did in the minds of naval officers. on a level with that of the U.S. Government (which the Battleship admirals lost their ships to Navy must sometimes suffer). bombs and torpedoes dropped by carrier Who is the Navy? It is the supranational institution air rather than to the peacetime argu- that has inherited the British Navy’s throne to naval ments and theories of naval aviators. supremacy. What is it about? It is about preserving and Since there is no se- wielding sea power as the most im- rious challenge to portant and flexible kind of military the capital ship power for America as a maritime stature of the big nation. The means to those ends are carriers from within the institution and its traditions, the Navy,3 a chal- both of which provide for a perma- lenge from outside is nence beyond the people who serve the most threaten- them. ing prospect that —Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War could emerge from a shift in roles and U.S. Navy (Terry C. Mitchell) missions. The Air Force posed just such a challenge in the late 1940s in arguing the preeminence of strategic air warfare. Today, such a challenge the air. They learned their lesson at Guadal- would have to center on the need for sub- canal; and although they might trust the stantial amounts of sea-based tactical avia- Navy to transport them across the sea, they tion. The awkward position for the Navy is don’t for their air support once they are defending the idea of several tactical air committed into combat. forces, for it cannot and does not want them Air support for the Marines doesn’t all. That is precisely the opposite position of mean close air support, in the sense that the the Air Force which would gladly own them Army and Air Force use the term. For the all, only to make the sea-based portion of Marines, air support means security from at- tactical air forces smaller and subordinate, tack from the sky over their heads, transport perhaps eventually to wither away com- through the air, and supporting fires from pletely. the air. The Marine Corps will not give up So, for the Navy, the aspect to watch is any of those critical functions and rely on whether the roles and missions debate another service to provide them, even if threatens the big carriers. The Navy’s stake is they are assured that all operations are joint. the justification for its capital ships, not its The Army may not be particularly interested existence. in using the air for land warfare; but the For the Marines, the issue is self-reliance, Marines know they must use the air for am- and that means the certainty of their air sup- phibious and littoral warfare. port. The Marines never forget a lesson once So for the Marines the aspect to watch learned, and one of those lessons was not to for is whether or not the debate impinges on trust anyone else to provide support from

Spring 1994 / JFQ 35 their retention of all that they need to operate independently when they are THE AIR FORCE, conceived by the theorists of air committed to combat. They expect to power as an independent and decisive instrument of war- win the debate. The stake for the fare, sees itself as the embodiment of an idea, a concept Marines is independence in combat, not of warfare, a strategy made possible and sustained by their existence. modern technology. The bond is not an institution, but the For the Army, the love of flying machines and flight. salient issues in the Who is the Air Force? It is debate will be associ- the keeper and wielder of the de- ated with assuring cisive instruments of war—the mobility and protect- technological marvels of flight ing its land forces that have been adapted to war. from threats through What is it about? It is about en- other media. The suring the independence of those Army is not so much who fly and launch these machines to have and use them for

concerned about the Combat Camera Imagery (James Bowman) use of the sea, air, or what they are—the ultimate space for land warfare as it is about get- means for both the freedom of flight and the destruction ting to where the war is and being vic- of war. timized by attacks from the media other —Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War than land. For global mobility, the Army remains dependent upon the Air Force and Navy to provide or insure the security of its transportation; to assume those functions for itself would be opera- the Army for the quick, austere insertion of tionally liberating but fiscally crushing. Air ground forces in the face of opposition. For and space defense against attack on land the past fifty years the Army could largely forces is the Army’s greatest interest in the dismiss that Marine capability because big domains over its head. If airplanes and bal- wars would require heavier, more sustainable listic missiles were somehow banned, the land forces that only the Army could bring Army could only be relieved, even if that to bear. But now the prospect of big, long ban required them to give up their own wars is rapidly receding; and the Army is (mostly rotary wing) aviation. Part of the worried that the Marine Corps may have the Army would like to own the air and space land forces that will be the most in demand defense functions, but it is not in the main- and, hence, find greater support. stream and will not rally the leadership In 1948 the Army worried that the founded in the Army’s three senior combat Marines might “contemplate the creation of arms or branches. a second land army.” 4 Today the Army is un- The Army’s deeper concern is not so easy that the Marine Corps might be the much the division of roles as between the only land army the Nation wants to main- services, but the Army’s tain in readiness to project force overseas the Air Force and Navy have role in the post-global war during an austere peacetime. nothing that the Army era. Having been the for- For the Air Force, the issue is the owner- ward defender of the West- ship of the best and most airplanes. They wants, but the Marines do ern ramparts for forty-five would prefer to own all the aircraft, espe- years, the Army now finds cially all fast, high-performance planes. Bas- itself trapped between its affection for the re- ing aircraft, on land or at sea, is not the issue cent past and its longer tradition of service for the Air Force, though they would prefer to the Nation. The Air Force and Navy have to see them all land-based, primarily because nothing that the Army wants, but the that is the way to give them higher perfor- Marines do. The Marine Corps, by virtue of mance. Of all the airplanes they are willing its combat history and special relationship to give up, it would be the slow, low, small with the Navy, has gained credibility over flyers. The Air Force wouldn’t fight hard to keep the close air support function or A–10s if the Army wanted them. Next would be the

36 JFQ / Spring 1994 Builder theater or tactical transports, the “trash the services, but they are not of equal weight haulers.” So for the Air Force the cultural to the protagonists. On one side, the stakes clues are to be found in what they treasure are money; on the other, they are visions most and which offspring could be thrown which the services have of who they are and to the wolves first if forced. what they are about. Given the disparity of But the Air Force will enter the debate those stakes, the tactical aviation functions followed by a larger ghost. As the newest ser- are likely to be changed only on the mar- vice and having had to fight long and hard gins. Close air support to the Army could be for independence, the Air Force, despite forty- a sacrificial lamb. The search for savings or five years of challenging the other services for appearance of more significant change will preeminence in power and budgets, remains have to be taken elsewhere. relatively insecure about its independence. And elsewhere is most likely to be found Most of the issues in the roles and missions in roles and missions that are mostly associ- debate have their roots in, or have been exac- ated with the Cold War—in nuclear forces erbated by, the existence of an independent and military space. These are the ones that Air Force. The Air Force cannot help but no longer (if they ever did) go to the hearts worry that some may find resolution of the of the services, and they will be the easiest Gordian knots of the roles and missions de- ones for which the services might accept bate in the dissolution of the Air Force. So the transfers in ownership. If the changes which Air Force will hope that the debate can be evolve from the debate can be limited to nu- kept to roles and missions and not become a clear and space roles, the services will be challenge to the existence of the four military able to breathe easier—until the next time. services or three military departments. If the Much more by way of change is not impossi- debate spills over to those larger questions, ble, just improbable. JFQ the Air Force will feel exposed. What about space? It will be an issue be- NOTES cause of the external perception of duplica- 1 Alice C. Cole et al., The Department of Defense: Docu- tion, not because any service wants all the ments on Establishment and Organization, 1944–1978 marbles. The military space program is a big (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Histori- cal Office, 1979), p. 275. ticket item; and the services have learned 2 Ibid., p. 291. that their shares of the budget pie will not 3 During the Cold War submariners began building a long benefit from carrying burdens for na- credible challenge to the supremacy of carrier aviators tional programs. Yet, no service can afford to within the Navy, but the end of the era drastically un- abandon this important medium completely dermined their prospects. 4 Cole, The Department of Defense, p. 282. to another service to look after their needs. So their posture toward military space will be ambivalent. They don’t want to be cut out of the program, but none of them want the program dumped on them as a black hole in their budget. This is one they might rather see become a DOD or joint program. If the services tend toward these postures in order to protect their most vital yet unspoken interests, what outcome should we expect from this year’s roles and missions debate? The current debate, like the one more than forty years ago, has been insti- gated by the bill-payers; and concerns over duplication (implying waste) will run or- thogonal to service concerns over turf (preeminence in their media). Both concerns will intersect again, most clearly at the dis- position of tactical aviation. There the stakes will be greatest for both the bill-payers and

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Abrams tank being loaded on C–5A.

LOGISTICS: U.S. Army (Jesse Seigal ) THE WAY AHEAD By GARY H. MEARS and TED KIM

Summary

Shrinking forces, increasing requirements, and dwindling overseas bases are sounding alarm bells across the logistics community that future crises may not provide the lead time and massive support which made the Gulf War a so-called logistics miracle. Ignoring the realities of a changing security environment on strategic mobility—airlift, sealift, and war materiel prepositioning—could recreate a hollow force that proves costly in lives and terrain lost. Specific attention should be devoted to enhancing strategic mobility, the mix of Reserve and active forces, and theater reception capability. Moreover, a total asset visibility tracking system must pinpoint the exact positions of items in the pipeline and CINCs’ requirements for material and supplies must be accurately identified to ensure that stock levels closely approximate needs.

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fter Operation Desert Storm, If we are going to be successful in avoid- terms like logistics miracle were ing frontal attacks, then we must also have invoked to characterize our vic- an agile logistics capability to keep up with tory. During the war itself vari- combat forces and effectively support opera- A tional plans like the “left hook” of the Gulf ous analogies were drawn to capture the enormity of the task at hand. Deploying to War. Finally, we want to avoid becoming a the Gulf was described as somewhat akin to hollow force like that of the 1970s when moving the citizens of Richmond, Virginia, F–15s sat around for want of engines. Our to Saudi Arabia with their personal belong- most important obligation as we enter this ings, cars, tools, and other possessions; some new security era is to maintain a properly months into the process, we added in the sized, combat effective, strategically agile entire population of Des Moines. While no force capable of meeting any challenge to one will deny the scale of the achievement, national security. Our focus of the future I’m not sure that it was a miracle given all must address these issues if we are to suc- the resources at our disposal. The best logis- cessfully deploy the Armed Forces beyond ticians from around the world worked with our shores. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to Strategic and Operational Logistics make things happen. We had military capa- With the significant force structure re- bilities designed to counter a global Soviet ductions of the past few years, we sought to threat and underwritten by a decade of im- maintain a streamlined logistic capability to pressive defense budgets. In addition, we support two nearly simultaneous but se- had six months to deploy a force which had quential major regional conflicts. To meet trained and worked together in an environ- new demands during this era of budget and ment with a high operational tempo; the force structure cuts, we must make funda- military was at its peak which provided a mental changes in our logistic support forces substantial margin for error. That margin, and how they do business—specifically in however, is quickly evaporating before our areas of strategic mobility, war reserves, the eyes, and it will continue to do so. mix between active and Reserve forces, iden- We are in a period when the Armed tifying future requirements, theater recep- Forces are being significantly reduced in size, tion capability, and total asset visibility. and yet are increasingly called on to meet These strategic and operational issues are key new operational commitments overseas. to deploying and supporting forces to meet Compounding this situation is a decline in mission requirements across the entire oper- overseas basing. These realities place higher ational spectrum well into the next century. stakes on logistic capabilities. A reduced lo- Logistics responsibilities are already gistic force must now support increased changing at the national level. In the past power projection requirements. Protecting nations have been responsible for providing

U.S. Army (Jesse Seigal ) U.S. interests means fighting and winning logistics support to their own forces. We two major regional conflicts if necessary. have, however, made a recent significant Added to this are new roles and functions as- change in NATO so that national support sociated with peace operations and humani- need not always be direct. Support can now tarian assistance. We are more likely to be be provided directly or by agreement with involved in operations short of all-out war. If other nations. This will help establish and this Nation is to succeed with a strategy of sustain future multinational forces. If na- active engagement and peaceful partnership, tions are willing to take part in peace opera- we must have an unencumbered overseas tions but are incapable of sustaining them- military power projection and sustainment selves, they can at least go out and make capability. arrangements for another country to do it for them. The Armed Forces must also move Lieutenant General Gary H. Mears, USAF, is in the same direction. When we assemble a Director for Logistics (J–4), Joint Staff, and was joint or combined force, each service is indi- formerly Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics at vidually responsible for manning, training, Military Airlift Command. Lieutenant Colonel equipping, and sustaining its component— Ted Kim, USA, is a member of the Plans Division directly, by cross-service agreements, or (J–7), Joint Staff.

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LOGISTICS

through other arrangements. In the future, Even with an average of 8–10,000 hours of we will have to think and rely more on projected service life remaining on each air- those other arrangements. craft, we should not assume that the C–141 One of the most pressing operational will remain the prime airlifter much longer. dilemmas facing the military today is the in- C–5 aircraft are also aging. System relia- creasingly constrained capability to rapidly bility, critical spare part shortages, and pro- project large numbers of personnel with longed maintenance periods barely allow for their equipment to trouble spots worldwide. a 66 percent operational effectiveness. Our While this was done in the Gulf, similar future core airlift capability is enormously conditions may not exist in the future. But dependent on fielding the new C–17. We the need for projecting power is have worked to attain an initial operational overseas projection growing—in size, likelihood, and capability of 12 aircraft by 1995 with full op- importance—as we rightsize, re- erational capability of 120 aircraft by 2003. capability is a critical duce overseas basing, and lose vast The C–17 program is under scrutiny and sub- element of our post- materiel reserves positioned around ject to termination at 40 aircraft unless pro- Cold War military the world for a global war. Overseas duction and test milestones are met. If the projection capability is a critical el- program is scaled back we must go forward strategy ement of our post-Cold War mili- with a general transport to immediately sup- tary strategy. The best trained and plement the current fleet and to perform the equipped, most powerful and capable forces core airlift function in the future. will become absolutely irrelevant if we need Toward that end Congress set aside four to six months to move them to a trou- funds for possible acquisition of a non-de- ble spot. The Nation’s credibility is directly velopmental airlift aircraft to complement linked to credible power projection. the C–17. Depending on the number of C–17s ultimately procured and ongoing re- Strategic Mobility quirements analysis, there is the option of Projecting force to meet major regional supplementing or increasing the present ca- contingency time-line criteria depends on a pacity by acquiring new C–5s or currently strategic mobility triad comprised of airlift, produced wide-bodied commercial aircraft, sealift, and prepositioned war materiel. The such as the 747–400 or the MD–11. Up- United Nations also relies on our mobility ca- graded C–5s would fill the outsize cargo lift pabilities; today the United States supports void while the commercial designs would virtually every U.N. military deployment. But optimize bulk and oversize cargo delivery to once again, the requirements are increasing developed airfields. With state-of-the art while our capabilities are decreasing. technology for efficient operation as well as Airlift. Many elements make up our for meeting environmental standards, such strategic airlift capability. The most troubled aircraft would free the military-design fleet relates to the core airlift capability, the for more demanding mission scenarios. C–141. Simply put, we depend on C–141s as Purchasing used commercial aircraft also the airlifter of choice to deliver large pay- could provide a relatively low-cost increase loads of equipment and troops as well as to in our airlift capacity. Leasing commercial perform airdrop missions in wartime. Al- aircraft is an option that would exploit the though we have 214 C–141s, they are too old industry’s current excess capacity and offer to do the job. They have been flown exten- crew and maintenance support to reduce sively over the last few years meeting urgent military personnel, training, and overhead requirements from the Gulf War to humani- costs while strengthening our bond with the tarian operations such as Somalia, and closer commercial air transport sector. to home for disaster relief in the wake of Lastly, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Hurricane Andrew. Twenty C–141s were re- provides up to 50 percent of our wartime air- tired in the past year. But we are recovering lift capacity. We must re-energize this part- from the extreme fleet operational and pay- nership. In war CRAF will be called upon to load restrictions of 1993 with a projected, move over 30 percent of air cargo and 90 unrestricted get-well date of December 1994. percent of all troops. We could not have fought the Gulf War the way we did without CRAF although the Gulf War experience was

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Mears and Kim United Nations (J. Isaac) Allied forces assisting displaced Iraqis. Engineers directing truck on board American Falcon. U.S. Air Force (James Mossman )

not a good one for U.S. flag airlines. Those sealift. During the massive military build-up airlines which supported military require- of the Reagan years relatively few dollars ments felt that they were placed in unfair went toward improving sealift. Conse- business positions vis-à-vis their competi- quently, it took six months to deploy a tors. DOD must provide for adequate busi- counterattack force when it should have ness incentives to offset revenues lost when taken a third of that time. wartime contingencies activate CRAF assets. Based on the lessons of the Gulf War, Also, the existing governmental insurance defense dollars have been programmed for and indemnification ceilings must be raised sealift construction. The centerpiece of the to cover replacement costs Navy’s strategic sealift program is the Large, based on lessons of the should aircraft be damaged or Medium Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ship. lost on CRAF missions. The Construction and conversion programs are Gulf War, defense dollars commercial airline industry is underway to provide 19 such ships by 2001. have been programmed understandably reluctant to They will furnish two million square feet for for sealift construction risk planes when DOD may strategically positioned afloat war reserves as not be able to reimburse their well as three million square feet of wartime losses fully and immediately. sealift surge capacity. Afloat war reserves are Today, our Civil Reserve Air Fleet is smaller key to maintaining global strategic agility. than in 1990. This trend must be reversed. It has taken decades to get adequate Sealift. During the Gulf War build-up, funding for a fast sealift capability. While the General Schwarzkopf remarked: “When this Bottom-Up Review validated the need for war is over, the record must show that main- these ships, we must nevertheless protect the tenance and care of our scarce national funding throughout this decade to obtain sealift assets is crucial if we are going to them. This is the minimum required to sup- maintain a credible contingency force for port our strategy, and losing the funds for any the future.” There were many reasons why it of the 19 vessels will increase the risk to our took so long to deploy ground forces from capability from medium to high (or possible the United States to Saudi Arabia, chief among them the inadequacy of strategic

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mission failure). In other words, deployment afloat prepositioned capabilities as early as of two heavy divisions for a major regional this current fiscal year. Since near- and long- contingency would be severely degraded. The term ship programs are intended for future ships are even more critical to fighting and contingencies, it is sometimes tough to de- winning a second nearly simultaneous major fend them in the budget process when com- regional contingency. Without them it is peting against other requirements. We can no questionable whether we can meet the enor- longer allow programming delays or cuts. mous strategic lift requirements within estab- Strategic mobility funding requirements can- lished planning time lines. not be continuously used to pay bills for War Reserve Prepositioning. The third part other programs in the budget. These new of our strategic mobility triad is preposi- cargo vessels are absolutely essential if the tioned land and afloat materiel. There have United States is to remain engaged worldwide been major changes in both areas in the last with a credible power projection capability few years. Land preposi- They will provide strategic agility to respond humanitarian operations tioning has been substan- to any global trouble spot. tially reduced because of generally require support Active and Reserve Forces changes in war reserve More and more the Armed Forces are force capabilities instead of strategy with the end of the being committed to what were once de- Cold War. Previously we combat capabilities scribed as nontraditional military roles, maintained war reserve ma- namely, overseas humanitarian operations. teriel sets for many divi- This trend is likely to increase. Humanitarian sions in Europe; now we are steadily drawing operations generally require support force ca- down to brigade-sized sets. Moreover, we no pabilities instead of combat capabilities. Hu- longer acquire and position war reserve manitarian assistance requires assets basic to stocks in preparation for a global war contin- logistic support, a prime example being the gency. Our new war reserve strategy calls for forces involved in airdropping supplies in acquiring and positioning stocks for only the Bosnia. Another example is Somalia. Though two most demanding major regional contin- there has been a significant reintroduction of gency scenarios. The basis of this strategy is combat troops to Somalia the mission re- that if we can sustain those scenarios, we can mains primarily humanitarian. Close to 70 support all less demanding contingencies. percent of all active non-divisional supply Obviously, our afloat prepositioned materiel units assigned to Army Forces Command is a key force enhancement to making this (FORSCOM) have deployed to Somalia to strategy work. meet this requirement. Some 30 percent of Since we no longer procure at Cold War FORSCOM petroleum and field services force levels—to position large quantities of equip- structure also is committed. This indicates ment and supplies to meet each and every how little—only 40 percent—of the Army’s possible contingency—what is positioned total logistic force structure resides in the ac- afloat has grown in importance. Referred to tive component. Our strategy and missions as swing stocks, they can be moved quickly no longer allow us to do business this way. from one region to another providing the- That the active force must be augmented by ater commanders with immediate war re- individual Reservists and civilian contractors serve stocks to meet regional contingencies. indicates that the active and Reserve compo- Eight of the new LMSR ships will be dedi- nent mix must be restructured. cated to afloat prepositioning. They will con- The bulk of combat service support has tain equipment and supplies to sustain the always been in the Reserve. This means re- initial combat brigade elements deployed to taining in the active force only what is an objective area. The goal for the Army is to needed for initial phases of contingencies eventually have 27 ships for afloat preposi- and, when requirements near or surpass ca- tioning; the Marine Corps is to have another pabilities, mobilizing elements of the Re- 13 (known as Maritime Prepositioning Force serve. Rarely in the past has that need arisen. ships) dedicated to its wartime needs. Since Over 190,000 personnel were mobilized for the first new LMSRs will not be available until FY96, parallel programs will provide interim

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strategy cannot be ignored. By all indications the Clinton administration is intent on supporting humanitarian needs worldwide. Ab- sent a proper mix of active and Reserve forces or support to combat force ratio in the active component, our abilities to meet contingencies in the future will be severely constrained.

U.S. Air Force (James Mossman) One last note with regard to the Reserve: Shrink wrapping we must change the Presidential selected Re- helicopters for serve call-up authority to provide flexibility shipment. in dealing with U.N. and other humanitarian requirements. Currently, the President can mobilize up to 200,000 Reservists. We need to permit their activation for up to 360 days instead of the presently authorized 180 Temporary base in days and also authorize the Secretary of De-

Saudi Arabia. Joint Combat Camera Center fense to call up 25,000 Reservists for those situations short of a major regional contin- Desert Storm; previously, no large numbers gency. With changes specialty units needed of Reservists had been mobilized since the to effect rapid deployments could be called Vietnam conflict in 1965. Mobilization of up, for example, air crews to support round- the Reserve is easier said than done. It in- the-clock cargo flights. volves difficult, complex decisions with a Total Asset Visibility range of political, military, and economic Winning the battlefield information war implications. Experience indicates that remains a major modernization objective for prospects for a Presidential selected Reserve all the services. We cannot fight and win call-up to support humanitarian missions is conflicts without keeping up with ever-in- unlikely in today’s environment. The last creasing requirements for information. For mobilization for humanitarian reasons was both tank commanders and theater CINCs, during the Berlin Airlift in the 1950s. Given decisions cannot be made without real time these realities, we must study the mix of ac- information. Total asset visibility is intended tive and Reserve compo- to give decisionmakers timely information nent logistic units within logisticians should know on materiel items. Logisticians should know the framework of humani- the exact location and the exact location and status of virtually any tarian mission require- item, be it a damaged aircraft repair part en status of virtually any item ments. The present mix route to depot or a smart munition in the worked for global war and pipeline for a CINC. The application of deci- major regional contingencies, but it is not sive force by a CINC totally depends upon efficient to support large-scale humanitarian knowing the location of critical weapon sys- missions where the logistic support forces tems, munitions, or repair parts. Today’s lim- primarily help foreign nationals—or Ameri- ited inventories magnify this need over what cans for that matter—during disaster relief was once standard and plentiful. Work has operations. When the limited active logistic been underway to create this capability for units are committed to humanitarian mis- twenty years, but we are far from achieving sions, they are unavailable to carry out the the desired result. Many of us have seen the principle mission of supporting and training Federal Express television commercial in with their assigned organizations. which an office worker, under intense pres- The services must consider humanitarian sure to tell the boss the status of a delivery, mission needs in force planning. While retrieves the required data in seconds. That preparing to win major regional contingen- is the ability that CINCs expect today. cies remains our chief consideration, the real- Clearly, total asset visibility is an enhance- ities of the security environment and defense ment that is essential to offsetting the significant reduction of inventory assets.

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Determining Requirements Theater Reception With reduced defense budgets we can- Once a robust strategic mobility triad is not afford to procure and stock materiel in in place, our major force projection weak- the same way as during the Gulf War. Stocks ness will be a constrained theater reception must precisely equal what the CINCs need and distribution ability. This limitation to fight the next battle. Quantifying logistic could seriously impede a CINC’s ability to requirements is an area which still needs prosecute a war. In-theater movement, in much work. We are starting to implement a most notional contingencies, provides the new capability-based requirements determi- most demanding logistic challenge. We are nation process. When in place it will be a likely to operate in developing nations major force enhancement. where there are poor highway and rail net- As the result of a munitions require- works as well as a limited airfield and sea- ments analysis initiated last year under the port throughput capacity. With mobility im- direction of the Joint Staff, wartime needs provements in place, for example, are being identified using a methodology CENTCOM could expect to receive as much agreed to by the CINCs, services, Defense In- as a half-million short tons of materiel and telligence Agency, and Joint Staff. This re- supplies daily by C+54. To deal with the quirements determination process meets the magnitude of this requirement, a Theater needs of all the CINCs, builds and incorpo- Logistic Support General Officer Steering rates an estimate of out-year threat capabili- Committee has been formed to enhance the- ties into the process, and establishes for the ater logistics; the committee is evaluating first time a methodology for allocating the theater logistic process, total asset visibil- threat destruction to the CINC’s service ity, and materiel distribution. Its work is vi- components. The end result will be a much tally important to determining the next se- more accurate determination of our needs ries of logistic force enhancements. based on battle plans. This is a credible determination process from all vantage points In August 1990, General Schwarzkopf which provides a high confidence level that knew what he needed in theater to accom- CINCs will have the necessary means to de- plish his mission. On learning that it would cisively destroy an enemy. In addition, there take months to get heavy combat forces in will be substantial reductions in what is pro- place, he remarked: “Once again...the cured, stocked, and shipped to a theater to fighting dog is wagged by the logistics tail.” fight the next battle. We can’t afford to keep another CINC wait- During the Gulf War build-up, over ing. Delays in providing men and materiel 400,000 anti-tank rounds were requested to may result in unnecessary loss of lives and ensure the destruction of 5,000 enemy tanks. terrain. Readiness to fight and win the next In many cases, requirements for anti-tank major regional contingency, while sustain- and other preferred rounds exceeded world- ing daily forward presence, requires funda- wide stock levels or requirements identified mental change. Enhancing the strategic mo- for a global scenario. In other words, our pro- bility triad, the mix of active and Reserve curement requirements and theater CINC re- forces, total asset visibility, the ammunition quirements were out of synchronization. We requirements determination process, and did not have a rationalized system which theater reception logistics must be pursued. linked procurement calculations and pro- Force structure reductions could lead to a lo- jected CINC requirements. Only some 43,000 gistically hollow force if downsizing impedes rounds were fired. A number of conditions these logistic force enhancements. JFQ contributed to the low expenditure rate, from the CINC’s superb tactical planning and execution to the decision to terminate hostilities before destroying the total enemy force. Without drawing an overly simplistic conclusion, it is safe to say that had a requirements determination process been in place, we would not have had to commit as many ships to moving ammunition to the Persian Gulf.

44 JFQ / Spring 1994 Thunder and

Marines disembarking Lightning: from USS Nassau during Desert Shield. Joint Littoral Warfare U.S. Navy (Ken Mark O’Connell) By CARL E. MUNDY, JR.

Summary he defining strategic advantage Coastal or littoral areas serve not only as protective barriers available to a maritime nation is but also as a way of projecting power. The United States the ability to wage war globally, should exploit this advantage. Since 70 percent of the world’s Tchoosing when and when not to population lives within 200 miles of the sea, most future engage in continental struggles. American contingencies are likely to involve littoral warfare. Land diplomacy has faithfully reflected this enor- basing abroad is becoming less feasible for various political mous leverage: we have enjoyed the luxury and fiscal reasons, so power will have to be projected in of waxing and waning between isolationism whole or part from the sea, through undulating tides, and to and interventionism based on domestic and points inland. While these operations will be joint, naval international forces and the mood of the forces are central to them and should capitalize on their country. Despite this tendency, since the innate ambiguity and ability to resize and reposition War of 1812, we have successfully main- themselves in ways that send signals to adversaries. The tained as a fundamental tenet of national fundamental areas of such operations are forward presence, defense that enemies should be fought on crisis response, and stabilization and enabling. the far side of the oceans. The sea is thus not

Spring 1994 / JFQ 45 JOINT LITTORAL WARFARE

been in the past. The nature of littoral warfare with all its complexity implies not only naval forces, but also air and land power. This occurs across the continuum of engagement, from presence and deterrence, through major regional conflicts. Operations in coastal regions where land, sea, air, and space converge demand closely integrating the capabilities of all services in what must be inherently joint littoral operations, with a naval foundation. The Bottom-Up Review As a follow-on to the base force strategy and force structuring, the Bottom-Up Review

U.S. Marine Corps was a second step in assessing the post-Cold LVTP–7 assault War security environment. The review pro- amphibian vehicles. cess identified four potential threats to na- only an insulator, but also a conductor for tional security that require attention: those who control it. ▼ Controlling the seas was a primary nuclear weapons in the hands of former Soviet republics, rogue states, or terrorists strategic task during the Cold War. The ex- ▼ regional conflicts of varying intensity but pression of this doctrine was maritime strat- geographically limited egy, a Mahanian derivative directed against ▼ dangers to democracy and reform, partic- the Soviet navy and its support structure, and ularly within former Warsaw Pact states designed to protect the sealanes and to em- ▼ economic dangers, resulting from a fail- body the naval contribution of our warfight- ure to sustain a strong, sound economy. ing strategy. This strategy was relevant for The Bottom-Up Review had no mandate decades, but the demise of the Soviet navy as to define strategy in perpetuity. Instead, it a serious threat has eliminated our only was a logical step broad enough to contain strategic blue-water adversary and irrevoca- competing imperatives that may have to be bly shifted the focus of joint planning. addressed as the security situation changes. Maintaining the ability to defend our Events in 1989 launched a political revolu- interests—to exercise a credible military tion, but it does not follow that we should component of our national strategy away make revolutionary changes in military from our shores—continues to be a primary strategy and force structure. In fact, until security objective as we emerge from the the smoke clears, a conservative approach Cold War. To promote global stability, it is in to strategy and forces is wise. That is why America’s interest to encourage the enlarge- the review is evolutionary, not revolution- ment of democracies and free-market ary. It may not go far enough for some crit- economies. Protecting interests and ensuring ics, but it remains a prudent and thoughtful strategic access to vital areas in the future re- initial response. quires the continued effectiveness of for- The Bottom-Up Review, just like the ward-operating forces, and when necessary, Chairman’s 1993 roles and functions analy- an ability to project power from the conti- sis, was not a zero sum effort. No service or nental United States. agency lost, and no service gained at the ex- While the Armed Forces have operated pense of others. The review was a logical fol- th in overseas littoral areas since the late 18 low-on to the roles and functions report. It century, littoral operations cannot be simply looked at capabilities and sought to maxi- naval campaigns, as they have frequently mize complementary service strengths, but within certain fiscal restraints. Whether per- fect or not, it was an honest attempt at a new General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, is Commandant strategic process, one based on a new world, of the Marine Corps. He previously served as with new and unclear imperatives. The oper- Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force ational requirement that emerged was based Atlantic and II Marine Expeditionary Force.

46 JFQ / Spring 1994 Mundy

on a perceived need to fight and win two in the often compressed battlespace of lit- nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. toral regions hinder a multilayered defense, This requirement reflected the relentlessly re- especially to landward. The broad array of gional outlook of the Bottom-Up Review. military threats, air and surface traffic con- gestion, and natural forces complicate lit- The Littoral Environment toral force employment, especially in com- Our strategic focus has expanded to in- mand and control. It is a tough medium in clude the world’s littoral, encompassing the which to work, but it is clearly a double- coastlines of some 122 nations. The littoral sided shield which protects our naval forces poses its greatest challenges to operations initially, but through which joint forces because forces must straddle a dynamic envi- must be prepared to penetrate in order to ronment mastering abrupt transitions from reach their objectives. blue-water and shifting tides to dry land. The operational challenge in littoral Forces established ashore must generate areas has intensified with its militarization, combat power from an initially very low particularly over the last two decades. Many level, and thus are uniquely dependant on nations are expanding their littoral forces. sea, air, and space forces for support. The dy- This has been driven by various factors, both namics of littoral com- internal and external. While this growth is bat vary dramatically, our strategic focus has ex- manifested primarily by naval expansion, it from the concerns of a panded to include the world’s also encompasses the acquisition of land carrier battlegroup and sea mines, ballistic and cruise missiles, littoral, encompassing the commander or subma- and advanced aircraft. Moreover, their em- rine commander nego- coastlines of some 122 nations ployment is likely to be in congested littoral tiating shallow water to areas, with crowded shipping lanes and civil- insert a special operations team to those of ian air corridors, combined with problems of an Air Force commander leading a strike uncharted shallows. Militarization not only package. Initially the air dimension appears challenges the projection of power to littoral to be consistent until critically varied land- areas but potentially threatens the peaceful ing, rearming, and refueling requirements use of regional seas. are considered. Demographically, the littoral environ- A Paradigm for Operations ment stands out as the area with the highest Forces operating in the littoral can be probability for employing the Armed Forces. best examined in three operational areas. Some 70 percent of the world population The first is forward presence—in effect, what lives within 200 miles of a coastline. Four is done daily in much of the world. The next out of five world capitals are within 300 is crisis response, and the last is stabilization miles of the coast. When crisis swirls around and enabling. These operational regimes an American embassy chances are great that roughly equate to an intensity ladder, mov- it occurs within operational reach of our lit- ing up the continuum of engagement. toral forces. Operations illustrating this Forward Presence. Forces provided for for- point were conducted during a long crisis in ward presence perform four valuable services southwest Asia in 1990–91. Simultaneously for warfighting CINCs. They project American we conducted operations elsewhere like influence through simple physical presence, Sharp Edge in Liberia, Eastern Exit in Soma- often within the medium of joint training and lia, Provide Comfort in Turkey and Northern other forms of constructive engagement. In Iraq, Sea Angel in Bangladesh, and Fiery this way they deter potential adversaries by Vigil in the Philippines. Each operation maintaining credible combat power. In certain tapped the unique capabilities of one or all areas, forward land-deployed forces are best of the services, and each was based wholly suited for this role. The decades-long presence or in part from the sea. This multidimen- of Army heavy forces in Western Europe is a sional aspect will remain a characteristic of signal example. future littoral operations. But in many areas of the world—particu- From strategic, operational, and tactical larly in the littoral—forward operating naval perspectives the challenge facing the Armed Forces in littoral warfare is great. Operations

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forces are best suited for such tasks. Political, Crisis response. Deployment options geographic, operational, and even fiscal con- must gain an employment advantage in straints may preclude land-basing. If land-bas- time and space. Strategic agility without oping fails conventional de- erational capability is useless. Clausewitz naval forces allow a joint terrence relies on the warns of postponing action in time and force commander to limit the capability to enter for- space to a point where further waiting brings cibly and defeat or reverse disadvantage. If the force present in the lit- footprint of forces ashore an enemy’s conventional toral area is not equal to the action contem- attacks. Deterrence, born plated and has to wait for reinforcement of credible forward presence in peacetime and past the optimum time for action, the bene- a timely response in crisis and war, is in the fit of strategic agility is lost, and the force in eye of the beholder; for this reason its viabil- place could reach its “culminating point” ity must be constantly demonstrated. upon engagement. Naval forces also possess the invaluable In the littoral areas, the movement from element of ambiguity by virtue of the presence to crisis response will be enabled by medium in which they operate. They can be naval forces. This is one of the advantages of postured, moved, shifted, and used— naval forces, preparing theaters for the entry cheaply—to send complex, subtle diplo- of heavier forces. The overt entry of heavy combat forces into a theater can be unneces- sarily escalatory, but naval forces can control escalation by the ambiguity of their operational patterns. They do not require forward basing or overflight rights, and they can loiter in international waters near the crisis region. Operations can be initiated from this sea base at the time, place, and manner of one’s choosing. Because of this, they control the invaluable and irretrievable element of time. Naval forces allow a joint force commander to limit the footprint of forces ashore and operate from a sea-base with command and control facilities, air control agencies, medical support, food and water production, and overall sustainment for land-based forces. This sea-basing may be

U.S. Marine Corps critical in situations where a large presence Marines in Somalia ashore could jeopardize world opinion or during Provide Relief. matic signals, and offer planners a choice be- unit security. It is ideal for the limited sup- tween visible and invisible presence. In port infrastructure called for in many hu- either case, however, they retain the benefits manitarian relief situations. of both logistic self-sufficiency and immu- One requisite for all forward-operating nity from political constraints which are forces, particularly naval expeditionary unique to naval forces. There is a fine line forces, is an ability to conduct preliminary between deterrence and provocation, and a operations and serve as lead elements for the large logistic footprint on the ground in an follow-on forces. To support these objectives, area like the Middle East could cross that forces must be capable of various operations line and inhibit future U.S. regional access ranging from humanitarian assistance to am- and influence. Consequently, Naval Expedi- phibious assaults. They may resolve a crisis or tionary Forces—largely carriers and manage it and provide a nucleus around Marines—will continue to provide the bulk which a joint task force can be formed. of our forward operating forces in these sen- Stabilization and Enabling. While possibly sitive areas. constricted the littoral battlespace still provides broad maneuver opportunities to strike

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an enemy, using surveillance and intelligence is more green than blue in character as it to determine critical vulnerabilities and cen- moves inland, and the green too shifts from ters of gravity. Securing access ashore (initial Marine forest green to Army green in much stabilization) demands the maintenance of the same way. potent forcible entry capabilities. These capa- The goal of the Marine Corps is to pro- bilities must be multidimensional, capable of vide a joint force commander with the capa- more than one means of tactical entry. This bility to maneuver within his theater over flexibility is fundamental to effectiveness in and from the sea in a similar manner to initial-entry crisis response. what he does over land. We want maneuver Depending on the situation, forcible to be seamless at water’s edge. Salt water entry may be achieved by an amphibious should be an avenue of approach, and the operation, perhaps combined with airborne beach a permissive boundary for joint force maneuver instead of a limiting graphic. If he is successful, a joint force commander’s “map” has no seam at the high water mark, and a potential enemy must see water as a key avenue of approach to be defended. The ability to maneuver against an enemy’s center of gravity depends heavily on the ability to project a highly mobile and sustainable landing force ashore. The assault echelon, the leading element of the landing force, may be tactically launched from amphibious ships as far as 25 miles out at sea. The assault may incorporate airborne and air assault forces when practicable. While maritime-based forces may be the most useful in immature, austere theaters, it is obvious that these forces will be unable to U.S. Marine Corps affect decisions ashore above a certain level Marine CH–46. of combat activity or in major continental operations. The Marine Corps contribution engagements. If we need to introduce heavy to a joint effort in the littoral is outlined in decisive combat forces ashore into a theater “Operational Maneuver From the Sea,” for an extensive land campaign, the Army which is the Marine Corps concept for pro- will be the force of choice, along with the jecting sustainable seapower ashore. Not Air Force. It is in the difficult, dangerous only does it envision improvements in am- process of getting large, equipment-intensive phibious warfare, but it incorporates the forces into a theater—enabling their entry— principles of maneuver warfare for operating that the Navy-Marine Corps team is of the around, over, and if necessary against a de- greatest use. In time naval forces will gener- fended shore. ally shift to a supporting role if a major land Maneuver becomes part of the contin- campaign is conducted. uum through which naval expeditionary Prepositioning ships, especially the forces move to a littoral area, a continuum Army’s, do not offer a forcible entry capabil- that remains unbroken at the high water ity. They are sequential and not simultane- line—unlike past amphibious operations ous reinforcing tools. Accordingly, Army which tended to be in difficulty beyond the ships do not needlessly duplicate naval for- establishment of the beachhead. Maneuver ward presence and crisis response forces. is a single, seamless operation extending They are complementary. from a secure base at sea over a hostile shore Maritime Prepositioning Ships. Marine op- with the objective of dominating an enemy’s erating forces include specifically identified center of gravity. All facets of seapower are air contingency forces, additional amphibi- synchronized in support of this effort which ous forces, and Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF) that have been adapted to strategic mobility and possess 30–60 days of

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sustainment. This sec- Southwest Asia. Operationally, these preposi- ond level of response tioning forces can reinforce each other. In the allows a joint force event of a major regional conflict of the mag- commander to tailor nitude of Desert Storm both forces are likely assets for the crisis at to rapidly build up combat power in theater. hand by selectively The amphibious force, rapidly reinforced with augmenting and rein- MPF, may secure a lodgement for follow-on forcing naval expedi- forces and buy time for mobilization. tionary task groups al- Moreover, APA and other enhancements ready on the scene. may sustain land warfare in theater, while Naval forces on the MPF reinforces amphibious maneuver first and second levels against an enemy’s coastal flank. APA and of response can MPF complement the two services’ strategic quickly achieve a unity and operational roles and ultimately provide of effort. They have a joint force commanders and the National U.S. Marine Corps Marine preparing common ethos, sub- Command Authorities with greater flexibil- to engage. scribe to familiar doc- ity. But joint force sequencing becomes even trine and operating procedures, and train to more critical with this expansion of afloat maximize cohesion. To truly understand prepositioning forces. Increased demand for joint operations is to appreciate that joint strategic airlift, and the stresses on limited forces are best built sequentially: they are arrival, assembly, and throughput facilities, “building blocks” rather than a “mix-mas- make imperative the need for a comprehen- ter” of “oars in the water.” sive understanding of force building to avoid Prepositioning Afloat Program. The Army piece-mealing of capability. Prepositioning Afloat (APA) program—which The ability to wage littoral warfare is an became operational on an interim basis this overwhelming strategic advantage which year and will be completed in 1997—offers must be continually refined. Although oper- another option for im- ations in littoral areas of the world retain a strategically, the Marine Corps proving the surge of predominantly naval flair, they now depend and the Army prepositioning combat forces to the- more on the ability to outmaneuver oppo- ater. Similar to the Mar- nents at sea, in the air, and ashore; in other programs work in tandem itime Prepositioning words, to wage effective joint warfare. How Force, APA places a this is done will depend upon the time and heavy brigade and the fundamental elements situation—but all forces must be employed of a theater infrastructure aboard 16 ships, in their optimum roles. An effective under- and is expected to be located within about standing of joint force sequencing is critical seven days from Korea and Southwest Asia. in delivering an effective joint capability. Like MPF, APA is capable of moving ships The benefits are great. As Thomas More to a secure port and combining embarked Molyneux wrote in 1759 at the height of the equipment with personnel flown to a nearby Seven Years’ War: protected airfield. Rapid build-up of combat A military, naval, littoral war when wisely prepared power in theater will be further enhanced by and discreetly conducted is a terrible sort of war. the surge movement of elements of two Happy for that people who are sovereign of the sea to heavy divisions aboard 11 Large, Medium put into execution! For it comes like thunder and light- Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships. ning to some unprepared part of the world. Strategically, the Marine Corps and the JFQ Army prepositioning programs work in tandem. MPF allows Naval Expeditionary Forces to serve as an enabling tool in order to respond to various lesser regional crises such as those in Bangladesh, the Chukk Islands, and Somalia. On the other hand, APA would primarily support CINCs conducting heavy, sustained land warfare in regions like Korea or

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Army Chilcoat and Henderson Prepositioning Afloat By ROBERT A. CHILCOAT and DAVID S. HENDERSON

Marines off-loading prepositioning ship.

Joint Combat Camera Center (Joseph Dorey)

Summary

Projecting forces from bases in the continental United States is the major way in which the Army responds to regional crises. Budget reductions, the return of forces from overseas bases, and the capability to deal with contingencies rely he shift in focus from forward de- heavily on strategic lift and prepositioned equipment in order ployed forces to those based in the for Army units to deploy in response to a CINC’s require- continental United States places ments. The “Mobility Requirements Study”—plus the Report greater emphasis on the need to on the Bottom-Up Review—highlighted the need for equip- T have a strategic deployment capability that ment to be prepositioned aboard ships under what sub- can deploy contingency forces to regional sequently became the Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA) crisis areas. With few ground forces sta- program. While some might view this program as duplicating tioned in or near their areas of responsibil- the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) of the Marine Corps, ity, commanders in chief (CINCs) rely upon APA actually complements MPF by providing heavy forces deployable forces to quickly deal with crises. able to operate at great distances from the theater port. Power projection is foremost among military

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requirements in securing national interests under review, underlying principles con- in the post-Cold War world, which contin- tinue to guide military planning. Each ser- ues to present diverse, complex, and danger- vice has a part to play in accomplishing mil- ous challenges to the Nation. itary strategy. For the Army it is “to organize, The 1992 “Mobility Requirements train, and equip forces for prompt and sus- Study” (MRS) recommended that an Army tained combat incident to operations on heavy brigade and basic elements of a theater land.” 1 Historically, the Army has relied on Army logistics infrastructure be put aboard forward deployed units to accomplish this ships and prepositioned in a geographically mission. But with the drawdown of de- strategic location. The prepositioned equip- ployed forces as well as in overall service ment is intended to speed arrival of heavy strength, more emphasis is being placed on mechanized forces in a region and ensure power projection to meet regional crises. early establishment of a theater army logis- The Army currently has a contingency corps tics base capable of sustaining forces during of five divisions (and requisite supporting prolonged operations. The CINCs and service forces) earmarked to deploy in response to chiefs accepted these recommendations and regional crises. The sequence of their deploy- the Army has begun to load ships accord- ment depends upon the plans of CINCs and ingly. Currently projected to be fully opera- JFCs. The divisions are based in the conti- tional in FY98, these ships constitute the nental United States and need considerable Army Prepositioned Afloat (APA) program, an strategic lift (both sea and air) and preposi- integral part of the strategic mobility triad. tioned equipment to get them and their sup- APA does not directly compete with the port systems to regional crises. The Persian Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) pro- Gulf War illustrated force projection in re- gram of the Marine Corps. In reality, APA sponse to such a regional crisis. Problems en- ships carry equipment that, when combined countered with the deployment of forces with soldiers to man it, form units that com- during that conflict have led to many plement the Maritime Prepositioning Force lessons learned. (MPF) which is comprised of MPS and During the deployment phase of Opera- Marines who support it. The programs can tions Desert Shield/Desert Storm, deficien- be used by joint force commanders (JFCs) ei- cies in the scheduling of forces became ap- ther together for synergistic effects in con- parent. In many instances, because of the ducting operations—capable of being sus- uncertainty of Iraq’s intent, combat forces tained ashore and over wide areas—or deployed before sufficient logistics systems separately. Together these two programs ex- were in place to support them. This led to emplify the phrase on the front cover of considerable difficulties in force sustainment Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed until logistics assets arrived. Forces, namely, “Joint Warfare is Team War- Congress tasked DOD before Desert fare.” APA complements MPF operations and Shield to study mobility requirements and de- is the base for a more rapid introduction of velop an integrated mobility plan. This task Army units into a crisis area. was passed to the Joint Staff which, working extensively with the services and using ex- Roles and Functions haustive computer simulations, developed a The Armed Forces are responsible for methodology to examine all areas of mobil- strategic nuclear deterrence, forward pres- ity/transportation. The areas studied included ence, crisis response, and reconstitution. base and access rights, availability of commer- While U.S. national security strategy is cial shipping, preserving American civil maritime capabilities, defense budget constraints, Brigadier General Robert A. Chilcoat, USA, is and lessons learned from the Gulf War. In Deputy Commanding General of Fort Jackson and January 1992, following service and regional previously served as Deputy Director for Strategy, CINC concurrence, the “Mobility Require- Plans, and Policy at Headquarters, Department of ments Study” was sent to Congress. The Bot- the Army. Major David S. Henderson, USA, is tom-Up Review has subsequently reinforced presently assigned to the War Plans Division in the recommendations outlined in the study, the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate of the specifically those dealing with prepositioned Army Staff. equipment and strategic lift.

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The “Mobility Requirements Study” bilities to the JFC. The Commandant of the identified key aspects of strategic mobility re- Marine Corps, General Carl Mundy, stated in lated to the entire transportation spectrum, these pages that: “Future military success including fort-to-port and port-to-foxhole. will...depend on maintaining a system of The study identified rail, strategic airlift, and joint warfare that draws upon the unique shipping requirements. It also recommended strengths of each service, while providing either building or converting 20 large the means for effectively integrating them to (380,000 square feet), medium speed (24 achieve the full combat potential of the knot), roll-on/roll-off ships and increasing the Armed Forces.” 2 fleet of container and cargo ships for moving As mentioned the function of the Army sustainment supplies. Eleven Large Medium is “to train, organize, and equip forces for Speed Roll-on/Roll-off ships (LMSRs) are for prompt and sustained combat incident to an initial surge movement of heavy divisions operations on land—specifically, forces to from the United States, while the balance, defeat enemy land forces and to seize, oc- combined with containerships and other cupy, and defend land areas.” 3 The function cargo vessels, are for prepositioning equip- of the Marine Corps is “service with the fleet ment afloat for a heavy in the seizure or defense of advanced naval the “Mobility Requirements combat brigade (rein- bases, and the conduct of such land opera- forced) and an initial the- tions as may be essential to the prosecution Study” identified key aspects ater army logistics base. of a naval campaign.” 4 Each service provides of strategic mobility, includ- This enables a heavy warfighting CINCs and JFCs with units that ing fort-to-port and port-to- brigade—operating inland have unique capabilities to accomplish ser- from a logistics base—and vice roles. JFCs can then determine how best foxhole essential elements of the to address crises by assigning units with spe- theater logistics base to cific missions that determine which forces to meet Army executive agency responsibilities use singly or in concert with others. Ideally for all services and to complement other then, forces provided to CINCs work to- forces which arrive early. These units in gether to accomplish the mission of JFCs by essence form the nucleus of the Army’s con- furnishing synergistic capabilities. tingency corps in theater. Maritime Prepositioning Force The Army developed a timeline for forces arriving in theater with a light division antici- In modern warfare, any single system is easy to pated to close and be operational by C+12, overcome: combinations of systems, with each protect- and a heavy brigade using prepositioned ing weak points in others and exposing enemy weak points to be exploited by other systems, make for an equipment and fly-in units to be operational effective fighting force.5 by C+15. The next goal is to close two heavy divisions by C+30 and the complete contin- Designed to rapidly introduce a force the gency corps of five divisions with its full sup- size of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) port base to be operational by C+75. To ac- in a secure area, MPF uses prepositioned complish this mission LMSRs are needed not equipment and fly-in personnel. This force only to preposition a brigade afloat but to can accomplish the following missions: pre- surge equipment and make round trips from emptively occupy and defend key choke the United States to transport equipment and points along strategic sea lines of communi- supplies to the theater. Moreover, container cation, reinforce an ally with credible force ships, crane and heavy equipment ships, prior to hostilities, support or reinforce an float-on/float-off ships, and Lighter Aboard amphibious operation, establish a sizeable Ships (LASHs) must carry sustainment items force ashore in support of a land campaign,6 for the contingency corps to the area. and other missions assigned by CINCs and While APA may appear analogous to the JFCs. Marine forces are task-organized with a MPS squadrons/MPF of the Marine Corps, ground combat element (GCE), air combat el- each service has a unique role and each pro- ement (ACE), combat service support element gram—APA and MPF—brings unique capa- (CSSE), and command element. Collectively the elements form Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) which may vary in size from a reinforced infantry battalion (with armor,

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artillery, and aviation) to a Marine Expedi- along with military intelligence and military tionary Force (MEF) of one or more reinforced police support not normally associated with divisions. maneuver brigades. Like MPF, this force re- Each MPS can provide combat and com- quires a secure port and airfield to off-load bat service support equipment (to include or receive personnel. But unlike MPF, APA engineer, transportation, and medical), and can provide a heavier ground-based force ca- 30 days of sustainment for MAGTFs of vari- pable of sustained operations inland, at ex- ous sizes to MEBs. Using crisis action mod- tended distances from the theater army lo- ules (CAMs) configured aboard the MPSs, gistics base. APA also provides the theater these forces perform missions that cover a and corps logistics base with heavy support full range of operations from peacetime dis- for the brigade until theater, corps, and divi- aster relief/humanitarian assistance to high sion support structures are established. intensity conflict. But to use this force The theater army logistics base has a port CINCs and JFCs must first secure a port or operations unit, transportation unit with line beach through which the ships can off-load haul capability (extended distance capability) and an airfield into which personnel and for all classes of supply, a combat surgical ACE fixed wing aircraft can be flown. This hospital (296 beds), water purification, and force conducts operations using infantry in essential elements to form a class VII reserve Assault Amphibian Vehicles in theater. The major added capability of APA Army prepositioning (AAVs) with artillery, tanks, and is sustainment stocks for the brigade for 15 both fixed and rotary wing air- days plus sustainment for the Army’s contin- ships can have a heavy craft. Limited transport capabil- gency corps until C+38. Beyond that time, brigade operational in ity hampers CSSE movement of sea lines of communication should be open a crisis area by C+15 supplies beyond certain dis- and further sustainment for theater forces de- tances. The operational radius of livered for distribution to all services based CSSE, without augmentation by on the CINC’s guidance through the theater theater army assets, is between 30 and 50 army’s logistics apparatus. miles from a port or beach area where the Deploying in Sequence ships off-load. The operational radius can be What do these forces provide CINCs and extended by establishing forward combat JFCs? An examination of the above capabili- service support areas and stockpiling sup- ties suggests many possible missions for each plies which is consistent with the Marine or both forces. The principal capability that role of securing and defending advance these forces provide is speed of deployment. bases and conducting other ground opera- Speed in this sense is relative compared to tions relatively close to the shore. the ability of having an airborne brigade or Army Prepositioned Afloat airborne/light division flown into a country. The package of capabilities offered by Both forces provide viable combat capabili- APA is consistent with the Army’s role of sus- ties with sustainment in very quickly. This al- tained combat ashore: a credible land-based lows CINCs and JFCs flexibility in how they heavy force, with a significant ground anti- choose to prosecute their campaign plans. armor capability, able to operate inland with While many possible scenarios can be extended lines of communication and for an formulated, assume a regional crisis which indefinite period once the necessary support demands the introduction of forces quickly structure is established. Another perhaps into a country facing a threat with signifi- more significant capability that APA pro- cant military capability. The CINC forms a vides is the theater army/corps logistics base. joint task force (JTF), appoints a JFC, and be- Army prepositioning ships can have a gins executing an operations plan. The CINC heavy brigade (with two battalions of tanks, requests movement of a MPS squadron and two battalions of mechanized infantry, a bat- APA to the area in anticipation of the deploy- talion each of artillery and engineers, and a ment of Marine and Army forces to meet his combat service support battalion) opera- requirements. Upon approval by the Na- tional in a crisis area by C+15. The combat tional Command Authorities these elements brigade comes reinforced with additional artillery support (MLRS and ADA batteries)

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U.S. Army (Pamela B. Simmons) Loading equipment at Antwerp to be prepositioned afloat. begin steaming to the area. As the crisis de- aircraft from ACE provide a significant day- velops the JFC announces C-day (begin de- light ground attack and all-weather air attack ployment). The plan requires an airborne di- capability (close and deep) and aerial recon- vision to secure airfield and port facilities for naissance of the area of operation. Naval car- follow-on forces. Within four days of the an- rier aviation, and/or Air Force aircraft, along nounced C-day, an airborne brigade is on the with Marine fixed wing aircraft, provide ground and has secured an airport and be- counter air protection. gins to secure a port. As the port is secured, As MPF completes off-loading and pier the MPS squadron, now offshore in interna- space becomes available, APA is called into tional waters, is directed into port to off-load port to off-load. Depending upon the tacti- its equipment which is met by Marines of the cal situation, the JFC decides through the MEB fly-in echelons. Within eight days a sec- Army component in what sequence to off- ond airborne brigade is on the ground to fur- load the Army ships. In this scenario the ther secure the area. No later than ten days JFC is concerned over a possible armor after the first MPS arrives in port, a MEB- threat and wants to bolster his perimeter. sized MAGTF is combat ready with combat, He opts to bring the heavy brigade in and combat service support, and sustainment deploy its assets along the perimeter. The stocks ashore. ACE rotary wing assets have brigade’s soldiers begin arriving at the air- dispersed to tactical airfields established by port, move to the port, and off-load their CSSE, ACE, and Naval construction element equipment. As each battalion is ready, it assets. The airport is still receiving the final moves out to conduct relief in place opera- elements of the airborne division, the last tions with airborne forces which assume combat brigade, and division support com- rear area security and reserve missions. De- mand. By C+12, the airborne division is fully pending on port space the brigade’s sustain- closed and operational. As the forces increase ment stocks may be unloaded with the in strength, the JFC directs them to deploy to heavy combat equipment. Many third a perimeter around the port or airfield com- world port facilities are unable to handle plex and await follow-on elements. Marine more than one or two ships at a time. Soma- lia is an example of how limited port facilities hamper off-loading operations and increase deployment time. Both systems have

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dling common items of supply for all services in theater. The establishment of this logistics infrastructure is enhanced by the early introduction of units carried by APA. This scenario is basically Desert Shield with the modification of when forces (that is, heavy brigade and logistics units) arrive in theater. Using an airborne brigade to secure the port or airport could just as effectively be accomplished by an operation using a Ma- rine amphibious task force or expeditionary unit as required. Combat and logistics capabilities offered by Marine and Army units complement each other. The Army force offers a significant inland sustained anti-armor capability while Marines provide an initial mechanized infantry and armor support near

U.S. Navy (Joe Bartlett) coasts together with significant deep and Marine amphibian close air support. Both provide sustainment, descending from but the Army corps and theater level logistics Maritime Preposition- ing Ship. “in-stream off-load” capabilities to off-load base is a significant capability, sustaining without port facilities. Once brigade equip- Army forces and providing common item ment is off-loaded, ships carrying the corps support to all services during sustained oper- sustainment base come in to port and off- ations ashore. This base also establishes a load equipment. Arriving port, terminal, foundation for follow-on combat service sup- and transportation units assume control of port units to build on. the port operations and free If the scenario changes to a nation- combat and logistics CSSE personnel previously in- building or disaster relief mission, the size volved in this function to re- and type of force used will be determined by capabilities offered by turn to their units and assigned CINCs and JFCs. A Marine expeditionary or Marine and Army units missions. The JFC expands his amphibious unit, using MPS stocks, may be complement each other lodgement by having MAGTF called upon for the mission. Operation Sea and the Army brigade move Angel in Bangladesh is one example. An al- further out, with the brigade ternative force may be a Special Forces bat- positioned on-line but considerably farther talion (or other Army unit) conducting na- inland than MAGTF. As brigade lines of tion-building activities. This mission communication lengthen, corps heavy requires significant combat service and com- equipment transports and supply assets pro- bat service support assets which are available vide the line-haul needed to supply the for- on two APA ships. Granted, the decision to ward support battalion. off-load APA, like the decision to off-load Based on JFC guidance added forces de- MPS, is expensive due to amount of sailing ploy to reinforce MAGTF and the Army and off-loading/back-loading. There may be brigade. As more room is needed to receive cheaper and faster alternatives to providing forces, the JFC orders MAGTF and the the support needed for nation-building or brigade to defensive positions further from disaster relief activities; but APA can supply the port. This places MAGTF outside the area these missions if the National Command where it can support itself. The corps trans- Authorities, Secretary of the Army, and portation assets that are in country are called CINC agree it is appropriate. upon to keep MAGTF connected to its logis- Team Warfare tics base. By C+30, two heavy divisions arrive The APA and the MPS give regional and are ready to conduct operations. The rest CINCs and JFCs capabilities to address of MEF is closing and both services are devel- crises. Rapid deployment of combat and sus- oping significant combat power. Between tainment forces provides CINCs and JFCs C+45 and C+60, the Army theater logistics infrastructure is established and begins han-

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Chilcoat and Henderson

flexibility. Tailoring the introduction of tom-Up Review. This was complemented by forces is also an option. Developing a solid the Army’s development of a strategic time- logistics foundation in either secure or line for deploying forces to crisis areas. The friendly ports may be more important than Marines already have MPS squadrons, each introducing combat forces. Deploying APA designed to introduce as much as a MEB-sized and off-loading the theater army or corps force with sustainment into a region. These logistics base with a sustainment package programs are not redundant, but provide dis- gives CINCs and JFCs capabilities to provide tinct, complementary capabilities. The Army better sustainment for deploying Army has no intention of moving into expedi- forces. Moreover, it facilitates using these tionary and amphibious operations. That is forces for nation-building, disaster relief, or part and parcel of the Marine Corps. Instead, humanitarian assistance missions. Again, the Army is striving to develop an ability to other more economical means of providing deploy forces into a theater quicker, provide this kind of support may be available, and significant inland heavy forces able to operate both CINCs and JFCs should consider them at great distances from the theater port with a before requesting the use of these assets, theater army and corps logistics base, and lay whether APA or MPS. the foundation for follow-on forces. This is in The Marines want to expand MPS capa- line with the Army role under Title 10. The bilities with more tanks, expeditionary air- theater base is also the foundation from fields, and logistics stocks for MPS squadrons. which the services can draw common items This initiative is called the enhanced MPF of support. Together the forces provide a JFC and is designed to bring two MEB-sized with a balance and synergy unequalled by the forces (with additional tanks and supplies) individual forces. As the Army Chief of Staff into a theater by C+10. With two MEB-sized has stated: “We will meet future challenges units, and accompanying ACE and GCE as- through the simultaneous application of sets, the MEF commander would be able to complementary [service] capabilities...that provide even more capabilities to a JFC. will offset quantitative and even qualitative The combat forces carried by MPF and force differences by our selective application APA are complementary by nature. MAGTF, of technology.” 7 JFQ with mechanized infantry, armor, and air support, has capabilities which an Army NOTES heavy brigade cannot easily provide, that is, 1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces a force capable of fighting in urban, jungle, (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986), p. 2–4. or mechanized environments. Conversely, 2 Carl E. Mundy, “Complementary Capabilities from the Sea,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 1 (Summer 1993), p. 17. an Army heavy brigade has more mobile 3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action, p. 2–4 ground-based, anti-armor capabilities than a 4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report on the Marine regiment (that is, a more robust Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the ground-based, all-weather/day-night anti- United States (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Febru- armor force able to sustain offensive or de- ary 1993), p. I–3. 5 Stanley R. Arthur and Marvin Pokrant, “The Storm fensive actions accompanied by a theater at Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 117, no. 5 army logistics base). Both serve as lead ele- (May 1991), p. 87. ments for further deployments of combat 6 MPF Staff Planning Course, Landing Force Training and combat service support units. The heavy Command Pacific, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, brigade is the foundation of a heavy divi- San Diego, California (HO–313–1–8.1–9). 7 Gordon R. Sullivan, “Modernizing the Army,” Army sion; MEB-sized forces serve a similar role in Research, Development and Acquisition Bulletin (May–June the MEF. Putting these two packages—with 1993), p. 3. all the reinforcing capabilities provided by their respective services—under a single JFC produces a unique, potent force capable of handling many different threats. The “Mobility Requirements Study” recommended increasing strategic sealift and also placing Army equipment aboard ships, two findings that were reinforced by the Bot-

Spring 1994 / JFQ 57 58 JFQ / Spring 1994 JFQ FORUM: Mulling the Campaigns of World War II

he campaigns of World War II were many and their lessons varied. Operation Torch in North Africa tested joint planning for the first time since the war with Spain in 1898. The southern Italy campaign revealed differences within the coalition over objectives and the combined command of land, sea, and air forces. In the Pacific the search for centralized control resulted in a serious impasse that was only broken when the Joint Chiefs created dual Army and Navy commands. U.S. dominance of the Pacific war effectively relegated the British to the status of a junior partner who nonetheless countered any American proposal for launching a campaign against the Japanese to relieve China with continual objections. A retrospective look at these and other strategic and operational aspects of World War II is instructive for contemporary military practitioners and students with interests in joint and combined operations, coalition warfare, unified commands, and campaign planning.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 59 JFQ▼ FORUM

Joint Power Projection: OPERATION

TORCH U.S. Army Troops in assault boat By JOHN GORDON IV preparing to land in North Africa.

peration Torch was the first major which assaulted Morocco deployed directly from Allied land-sea-air offensive in the Norfolk, Virginia, to the objective. European theater during World ▼ Forcible entry was required to establish a War II. Although it occurred more lodgement. O ▼ Torch was a joint operation requiring than fifty years ago, the operation offers close cooperation between the Army and the valuable insights on forcible entry and de- Navy in an era when interaction between the two ploying forces to distant areas of operation. services was uncommon. Indeed, in many ways Torch is a classic ex- ▼ Torch required close cooperation between ample of joint power projection. British and American and land, sea, and air forces In the future, the Armed Forces may which constituted the first major combined have to rapidly deploy great distances by air Anglo-American offensive of World War II. and sea to conduct forcible entries in austere ▼ The Navy initially controlled virtually all environments. Initial entry forces may be air assets, but provisions were made to rapidly heavily outnumbered and operate far from transition the preponderance of air operations to secure bases. That type of situation is much land-based Army air power. closer to Torch than it is to the military ▼ Like most forcible entry situations, Torch was a risky operation (opposing Vichy French planning of the Cold War. Consider these as- forces had powerful land, sea, and air capabilities, pects of Torch: and the Allies came ashore far from supporting ▼ The forces sent to North Africa made long friendly bases). distance deployments; the Western Task Force

60 JFQ / Spring 1994 Gordon

The principle lesson of Torch is how a that it was more feasible to conduct an of- joint operation was planned and conducted fensive in North Africa.3 to master the challenges of a complex long In late July 1942 an Anglo-American de- distance projection of power. This article fo- cision was reached to land in Morocco and cuses on the Army-Navy team that assaulted Algeria, rapidly advance into Tunisia, and to French Morocco. In geographical terms, Op- take the German Army Group, Africa, from eration Torch stretched from southern Mo- the rear. From that point on detailed prepa- rocco to the center of Algeria. However the rations began. On July 25 the code name Algerian force was a combined effort and Torch was officially adopted.4 raises considerations that go beyond the The objective of the operation was to scope of this article. gain control of North Africa from the At- Torch occurred in November 1942 and lantic to the Red Sea in coordination with was the first Anglo-American land, sea, and Allied units in Egypt. The critical initial air offensive of World War II. Conceived as a phase required simultaneously seizing ports means of opening a land front against Axis from southern Morocco to the middle of Al- forces in Europe, Torch had profound strate- geria. Close coordination among both Amer- gic and political implications. Politics were ican and British land, sea, and air forces especially important and influenced the would be necessary. campaign plan. The Allies wanted to storm Will Vichy Fight? ashore in Morocco and Algeria, hopefully As Allied preparation for Torch began, without Vichy French opposition, and planners had to consider possible French rapidly advance to the rear of resistance. After France fell in June 1940, Rommel’s Panzer army, thus end- her colonies had opted to either join the Torch was the first ing nearly three years of fighting Allies under de Gaulle and Free France or Anglo-American land, in North Africa.1 Under ideal cir- remain loyal to the pro-Axis regime at cumstances the Allies hoped that sea, and air offensive Vichy. Unfortunately, military governments the French would greet the Allies in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia were all of World War II with open arms. But if the French openly pro-Vichy. resisted, U.S. and British forces had The 1940 Axis armistice allowed Vichy to be prepared to defeat them—thereby risk- to maintain a force of roughly 55,000 in Mo- ing alienation from the local population as rocco which included 160 light tanks and 80 well as the military establishment of an ally. armored cars, plus anti-aircraft and field ar- Strategically, Torch would likely cause tillery. Many of the troops were French, the redeployment of Axis units from a hard- while others were drawn from the colonies. pressed Soviet army, meet Roosevelt’s de- French units were scattered about the coun- mand that U.S. ground forces enter the war try with the greatest concentrations near the in Europe by the end of 1942, and place capital of Rabat and the larger ports.5 Com- major Anglo-American forces on fascist plementing these ground units were French Italy’s doorstep.2 naval and air forces. Roughly 160 aircraft The Concept were available in Morocco, including Dewoi- Torch was conceived in the summer of tine 520 fighters, considered superior to 1942. The operation was a compromise solu- Grumman Wildcats on U.S. carriers.6 The tion to diverging American and British views great port of Casablanca sheltered one light of the war. General George C. Marshall, the cruiser, three large destroyers, seven other Army Chief of Staff, had pushed for a cross- destroyers, and a number of submarines. Channel attack. The British, on the other Also, the incomplete battleship Jean Bart lay hand, reasoned that Allied resources to take in the harbor and, though immobile, it had on the Germans in France were lacking and an operational turret with four 15-inch guns. Coastal artillery covered all the major ports. Casablanca was so well defended that a di- Lieutenant Colonel John Gordon IV, USA, is rect attempt to seize this key harbor was assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of judged impossible.7 Staff for Operations and Plans at Headquarters, The French were capable of serious resis- Department of the Army, as a member of the tance. Officially, French leaders in Morocco Concepts, Doctrine, and Force Policy Division.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 61 JFQ▼ FORUM were pledged to support Vichy and defend leaders and staffs of both services overcame Morocco against any attacker. The French this handicap. The major concern was com- navy in particular could be expected to resist mand and control. any British attack. Memories of the devastat- While it seems strange today—in an age ing British attack in 1940 on French ships at of JTFs—there was no unity of command Mers-el-Kebir still lingered.8 But covertly, prior to the departure of the Western Task many French military and civilian leaders in Force. The key operational Navy commander North Africa were conspiring against the was Rear Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, Com- Axis. These brave Frenchmen realized that mander Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, the only chance of liberating their country with headquarters in Norfolk. Hewitt, who was through an Allied victory. Cautiously, was to figure prominently in Mediterranean the British and Americans brought selected amphibious operations, was designated to French leaders into their plan in the hope command Western Naval Task Force on Oc- that at the critical moment in the invasion tober 10. His naval force would transport and the pro-Allied leaders would seize control of support the Army in assaulting Morocco.11 Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, thereby hold- The assault force would be led by Major Gen- ing resistance to a minimum.9 eral George S. Patton, Jr., who was designated In July 1940 the British, fearing that the Army Western Task Force commander. Hitler would force France to turn over its After receiving his mission on July 30, Patton fleet to the Axis, demanded that French immediately began to plan the seizure of the ships in Algeria and Senegal be scuttled or French colony, assuming that Casablanca sail out of port to join the Royal Navy. would be the key objective.12 When French commanders refused the Hewitt and Patton had separate com- British attacked and inflicted heavy losses on mands, with the former reporting to Com- the French navy. mander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, while the latter Another strategic consideration was pos- was directly subordinate to General Dwight D. sible action by Spain. Neutral since the start Eisenhower who was the Allied Expeditionary of the war, the Franco regime had earlier Force Commander (controlling the entire considered openly joining with the Torch operation, from Morocco to Algeria). In the Army had little Axis. But the Allies were of two conformity with late-1930s Marine Corps am- amphibious doctrine minds: Britain thought that Spain phibious doctrine, it was decided that once would remain quiescent while the the Task Force sailed all Army and Navy forces to guide its planning United States was unsure. America would come under naval command. Hewitt for the assault feared that Germany might renew would be in command until Patton could de- pressure on Spain, and noted that a ploy ashore and announce that he was ready division of Spanish volunteers was fighting to assume the lead role. Then Hewitt would on the Russian front. So unsure was America become, in today’s parlance, a supporting of Spain’s intentions that several U.S. divi- commander.13 Once the assault phase was sions were retained near the border between complete, it was planned that certain Navy French and Spanish Morocco following the ships would be released from the Western Task end of Vichy resistance.10 Force and revert to control of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet; other ships would remain off North Joint Planning Africa to support Army operations ashore. Torch was the largest joint amphibious The Army had little amphibious doc- operation undertaken up to that time. Thus trine to guide its planning for the assault. As it was in many ways a watershed event for a result, amphibious doctrine and tech- both the Army and the Navy. The number of niques pioneered by the Marines in the issues that had to be considered and re- 1930s and codified following several years of solved was enormous. The two services had exercises near Puerto Rico were adopted by never conducted an operation like this. Prior the Army. Even prior to the bombing of to World War II interaction between them Pearl Harbor, certain Army units had under- was infrequent. While lack of familiarity in gone some amphibious training. The 3d In- each other’s procedures did hinder prepara- fantry Division had developed a training tions for Torch, the professionalism of key program with the 2d Marine Division on the west coast, and the 1st Infantry Division had

62 JFQ / Spring 1994 Gordon conducted amphibious training on the east coast with 1st Marine Division. This was for- tuitous because by the time serious planning for Torch began in the summer of 1942, the Marines were almost fully committed in southwest Pacific. The amphibious assault phase of Torch was conducted exclusively by Army troops.14 There were a number of differences in how the Army and Marines approached amphibious assaults. Based on experience gained in the late 1930s, the Marines called for troops to go ashore with relatively light personal loads. The Army, on the other hand, Patton and Hewitt.

needed well equipped troops for the uncer- Naval Historical Center tain assault phase of an operation, and tended to load more equipment on the men. The Marines also had learned from exercises To Seize Morocco that personnel had to be dedicated to unload The success of Torch depended on the supplies and equipment from landing craft capture of a number of key ports, from Mo- once they reached shore. Marine divisions, rocco to Algeria. Planners had to assume therefore, included Pioneer Battalions whose that the French would fight, so a forcible primary job was to manage the beach and entry was required. The issues presented to prevent landing craft from stacking up while the Army-Navy planners included: waiting to unload. Army divisions lacked or- ▼ The need to simultaneously seize multiple ganic units for this task.15 beachheads: the sites were Safi in the south, The coordination and control of naval Fedala just north of Casablanca, and Port Lyautey gunfire and air support by Army troops was north of the capital of Rabat. Safi would serve pri- also in its infancy during Torch. There was marily as an unloading point for the 2d Armored relatively little training in this area, al- Division which would dash north to assist in the though since the main objectives and attack on Casablanca. Port Lyautey’s airfield was French defenses would be within sight of the envisioned as the initial location for Army fighters that would fly ashore from a Navy aircraft car- coast, it may have been assumed that ob- rier. Fedala would be the jumping off point for servers on ships would be able to direct fire the advance toward the main prize in Morocco— on the enemy. The Navy did provide spotter namely, Casablanca. teams that would go ashore, and battleships ▼ Air support during the first few critical and cruisers had seaplanes that could pro- days would have to come exclusively from the vide observation.16 carriers. The nearest Allied air base was the small Amphibious training for the force began field at Gibraltar. That base would, however, be in June 1942. Originally it was planned that fully committed to supporting the landings in Al- large scale landings would be rehearsed on geria. Once the airfield at Port Lyautey came into the North Carolina coast. But the summer of American hands, over 70 P–40 fighters embarked 1942 was a very dangerous time off the east on a small carrier would be flown by Army pilots to that site in order to relieve some of the burden coast—German U-boats were inflicting from the Navy. heavy losses on coastal shipping. Therefore ▼ It was hoped that a major attack would amphibious training was moved to safer wa- not be required against Casablanca or the capital ters in Chesapeake Bay. During the summer of Rabat. The plan called for Casablanca to be en- Army units boarded transports in Norfolk to circled by forces from Fedala and Safi. Once Port practice landings; assault training proceeded Lyautey was secured, Army units would push up to regimental level. As loading plans for south toward Rabat. Other Army units, plus car- the actual operation firmed up, efforts were rier air, would block any French forces from the made to embark Army units aboard the same inland cities of Fez and Marrakech that might at- transports on which they had trained.17 tempt to advance toward the coast. ▼ As previously mentioned, the Allied hope was that the French would not resist. For that reason the rules of engagement had to be written to

Spring 1994 / JFQ 63 JFQ▼ FORUM minimize the possibility of Allied forces firing on departed from Hampton Roads. Patton was the French until it was apparent that fighting was aboard the cruiser USS Augusta, the flagship. unavoidable. There would be no pre-assault To deceive Axis agents or U-boats outside the bombing or naval bombardment. A system was harbor the task force initially turned south- devised to allow any unit to announce it was in east, ostensibly to conduct exercises in the danger. A unit that was being fired on could an- Caribbean. Although the transports left from nounce “batter up,” which meant it was preparing to return fire in self defense. Only the task Norfolk, the carrier force and certain surface force or attack group commanders, however, units came from other east coast ports. could initiate the general engagement of French Linkups were performed in the mid- forces. That command was “play ball.”18 Atlantic.21 The task force route took it south of the Considerable forces were allocated. West- Azores. Fortunately, no Axis submarines ern Naval Task Force (or Task Force 34, At- spotted the convoy en route. This was at lantic Fleet) was divided into Northern, Cen- least partly due to the fact that north of the ter, and Southern Attack Groups which Western Task Force’s route a savage battle corresponded to the landing objec- was underway in the North Atlantic in the main American tives. Major naval units included which convoy SC 107 lost 15 of its 42 one fleet and four escort carriers. objective in Morocco ships.22 The U-boats were preoccupied. By Embarked were 103 Navy fighters, November 6 the task force approached the was the great port 36 dive bombers, and 26 torpedo Moroccan coast. At this point the weather of Casablanca bombers, plus 76 Army fighters. took a turn for the worse. Hewitt studied There were also three battleships, forecasts received from Washington, Lon- seven heavy and light cruisers, 38 don, and the task force itself. It was decided destroyers, four submarines, 30 troop trans- to go with the November 8 D-Day, despite ports, plus numerous support vessels such as risks of a heavy surf along the Moroccan tankers, tugs, and minesweepers.19 coast.23 On the morning of November 7 Task Army forces included Force X on the Force 34 split into three attack forces. That Southern Attack Group, with an immediate night Hewitt told Patton that the Navy objective of Safi and over 6,400 troops of the would be in position the following morning 47th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, to conduct the assault. All was now ready. and elements of the 2d Armored Division The biggest question was whether the plus support units; Force Y embarked on the French would fight. Center Attack Group, with an immediate objective of Fedala and some 19,300 troops of Landing the 3d Infantry Division, including elements In the early morning hours of Novem- of the 2d Armored Division and support ber 8 certain French military who were units; and Force Z loaded in the Northern At- aware of the Allied plan tried to assume con- tack Group, with an immediate objective of trol in Morocco. An unfortunate series of Port Lyautey and just over 9,000 troops of mishaps and errors led to the arrest of pro- the 9th Infantry Division, plus a battalion of Allied leaders. The result was that the tanks and supporting elements.20 French, led primarily by the navy, elected to Tanks were included in each landing. resist the landings. Thus began four days of Due to a lack of specialized tank landing fighting between American and Vichy forces. craft (which became common later in the The Southern Attack Group was the war), heavier medium tanks of the 2d Ar- most successful. Since the main objective mored Division would have to be landed on was to seize the port at Safi, the Army and piers, hence the desire to quickly seize the Navy had devised a scheme to take it in a port at Safi. General Patton planned to go coup de main. At 0445 hours two World War I ashore at Fedala to be close to the main destroyers, USS Bernadou and USS Cole, each drive on Casablanca. loaded with 200 soldiers, sailed directly into The Crossing the port and debarked troops, thereby preventing damage to the facilities.24 But Western Task Force embarked the Army French resistance began prior to the seizure forces in Norfolk, with several ships arriving at the last minute which complicated loading. On October 23 most of Task Force 34

64 JFQ / Spring 1994 Gordon

the port at Safi, the destroyer USS Dallas boldly sailed up the Wadi Sebou and debarked troops near the airfield. Naval gunfire and bombing drove off more French troops approaching from Rabat and Meknes, thus isolating the battlefield and allowing the Army to take the airfield. The battleship USS Texas, for example, dispersed a French column with long range 14-inch shell fire. By 1030 hours the first Army P–40s from USS Chenango landed at the airfield. The most severe fighting took place in the vicinity of the old Kasba. French troops within the fort re- pulsed several infantry assaults. Finally, Navy dive bombers attacked the fort, and shortly after the French surrendered. By the afternoon of November 10 the area around Port Naval Historical Center Lyautey was firmly in American hands.26 First Army P–40 taking off from USS Chenango The main American objective in Mo- for Morocco. of the harbor. At 0430 coast artillery began rocco was the great port of Casablanca. Un- firing on the ships offshore. The availability fortunately a direct assault on the city was of naval gunfire support was critical. At 0438 impossible—there were too many coastal de- hours Admiral Davidson, Southern Attack fense guns, including the 15-inch weapons Group Commander, signalled “play ball” of the battleship Jean Bart, in the immediate and Navy ships immediately engaged the vicinity of the harbor. Therefore, the assault French. In the first minutes of the exchange force had to come ashore north of the battleship USS New York placed a 1,600 Casablanca at the small port city of Fedala. lb. 14-inch projectile on the fire control Once a lodgement at Fedala was secured, an tower of the main coastal defense battery overland advance on Casablanca would near Safi, effectively silencing the site. More begin. A major threat was the French fleet at Army troops stormed ashore north of the Casablanca. Based less than 15 miles from harbor and began to fan out into Safi while the landing beaches were a light cruiser, simultaneously overrunning artillery posi- three large destroyer leaders, seven other de- tions. While French aircraft did not attack, stroyers, gunboats, and 11 submarines.27 If Navy fighters from an escort carrier were the French ships sortied, they would only be overhead. By mid-afternoon the city was se- minutes from the landing beaches. For that cured and the 2d Armored Division began to reason the Navy placed its most powerful land. The Southern Attack Group had ac- ships in the Center Attack Group. As op- complished its mission.25 posed to the pre-World War I battleships at French resistance in the north was more Safi and Port Lyautey, Center Force’s USS determined and effective than at Safi. Ini- Massachusetts was a new ship armed with tially, the assault went well. Army forces nine 16-inch guns. Heavy cruisers armed landed north and south of the Wadi Sebou with 8-inch guns, including USS Augusta River and advanced on Port Lyautey and the with Hewitt and Patton aboard, plus light nearby airfield. Casualties on both sides cruisers and destroyers were available to ei- mounted as the Army hit effective resistance ther provide gunfire support for the Army or during the drive toward the city and airfield. engage the French navy. Farther offshore USS French armored reinforcements from Rabat Ranger, the only American fleet carrier in were defeated by blocking Army units work- Torch, was ready. ing in conjunction with naval gunfire and air As at Safi and Port Lyautey, the French support from carriers. By the morning of in the Casablanca-Fedala area elected to re- November 10 French opposition began to sist the landing. Coastal defense guns fired collapse. In a manner similar to the taking of on U.S. ships near the Fedala beaches, prompting a vigorous reply from the fleet. Army units found surf conditions very poor

Spring 1994 / JFQ 65 JFQ▼ FORUM driven ashore. Additionally, Jean Bart’s main Operation Torch: Western Task Force (November 1942) battery was temporarily out of action following several hits from USS Massachusetts. Over- head there were numerous dogfights between French and U.S. Navy planes. Navy dive bombers sank three French submarines in the port and later completed disabling a battleship. The threat of enemy surface attack was eliminated. Throughout the battle Pat- ton was on the bridge of USS Augusta with Hewitt. The French naval attack had delayed the general’s plans to move ashore. By early afternoon Patton and his staff reached Fedala and the next day, November 9, he assumed overall command of the Moroccan portion of Torch from Hewitt—a smooth transition of command no doubt facilitated by the time the two officers had spent together over the previous several weeks.30 After the securing of the Fedala beachheads, the Army prepared to advance south toward Casablanca. Meanwhile, elements of Source: Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, the 2d Armored Division were pushing north vol. 2, Operations in North African Waters, October 1942–June 1943 (Boston: Little, to join in the encirclement and possible at- Brown, 1950), pp. 52–53. tack on Casablanca. With over 5,000 French troops in or near the city, and reinforcements on the way from farther inland, there in the Fedala area; many landing craft were was the potential for a stiff fight near the beached and wrecked, slowing down subse- heavily populated port. Fortunately, negotia- quent waves of troops and supplies. By mid- tions between the Americans and the French morning, despite the fact that French resis- resulted in a general cease fire in Morocco tance in the Fedala area had been largely on the morning of November 11. Temporary overcome, the landing was far behind sched- enemies would become our allies. The main ule. Meanwhile, a major naval battle was foe now became German U-boats. On the 28 taking place. evening of November 11 several enemy subs At first light Ranger had planes over slipped among the transports off Fedala and Casablanca awaiting a French response. Be- sank four—several of which were still loaded fore 0700 hours seaplanes were under attack with over 90 percent of their supplies.31 That by French fighters. Minutes later French so many ships were exposed to attack was a coastal batteries and Jean Bart opened fire on direct consequence of the delays in unload- American ships which initiated the naval ing imposed by the shortage of landing craft battle of Casablanca that lasted the balance and a lack of sufficient troops to unload 29 of the morning. French surface ships and boats—a valuable lesson the Army absorbed submarines sortied from Casablanca and prior to the Sicilian and Italian landings. headed toward the transport area off Fedala, Nevertheless, by that day it could be said all the while under fire from Center Attack that Morocco was secured. Group’s ships and Ranger’s aircraft. Several U.S. vessels were hit by fire from shore guns The Lessons and ships. But the French got by far the In that this was the first Army-Navy am- worst of the engagement. By early afternoon phibious operation since the Spanish-Ameri- two French destroyers had been sunk, others can War, the invasion of Morocco went were so severely damaged that they would amazingly well. Certainly the inexperienced sink later, and the cruiser Primauguet was Army and Navy forces that took part in Torch were fortunate that the French did not put up a protracted resistance. Nevertheless,

66 JFQ / Spring 1994 Gordon

extract forces from a collapsing lodgement area. Battle of Casablanca: Morning Engagement (Phase I) Strategically, it would have been an enormous setback if the first offensive in the European theater had ended in defeat. Future U.S. early entry operations could be placed in similar must win situations. In Morocco, Army forces had to come ashore in heavy seas, under fire, against an enemy who could mount effective opposition on land, at sea, and in the air. It required domina- tion of the sea, local air superiority, effective fire support, and overwhelming ground forces to ensure success at each of the three landing sites. ▼ Forcible entry required that overwhelming fire support be immediately available. At all three landing sites the French had powerful coast defense weapons and quickly engaged landing forces and ships offshore. It was due to the fact that massive firepower was immediately available in the form of naval gunfire and aircraft waiting on station that French weaponry was suppressed so Source: Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 2, Operations in North African Waters, October 1942–June 1943 (Boston: Little, quickly. Large caliber gunfire from battleships and Brown, 1950), p. 102. cruisers was particularly effective. Today’s precision weapons could replace the massive deluge of 14-, 8-, and 6-inch shells needed in 1942. ▼ There was a transition of air power from afloat to ashore. Due to Battle of Casablanca: Morning Engagement (Phase II) the great distance from friendly bases all aircraft were initially carrier based. Planes from Ranger and three smaller carriers were a decisive element in the success of the invasion of Morocco. Navy aircraft performed all the air superiority, close air support, and interdiction missions for the first two and a half days of the operation. And the planners had provided for a transition of air power. The 76 Army P–40s flown ashore from an escort carrier represented a well planned shift of the air effort. In modern terms, we could say the role of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) changed from Navy to the Army. This was an innovative decision for Source: Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 2, Operations in North African Waters, October 1942–June 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950), p. 103. 1942—but a technique we should be prepared to use in future joint force projection missions. ▼ Joint training contributed significantly to the success of Torch. it was a tribute to Hewitt, Patton, and their While there were gaps in the joint training of the staffs that such a complex operation was ex- Army-Navy force that deployed to Morocco, pre- ecuted so well. Looking back there are im- invasion rehearsals and exercises held in Virginia portant lessons to be drawn from Operation were invaluable in what was not an era of regular Torch. Army-Navy training. A few months of pre-deployment exercises went a long way to make Torch ▼ Winning the early entry battle is essen- successful. We should note that today Army-Navy tial. The riskiest part was the initial assault. The training is still an infrequent event. United States could not afford a defeat at that point. Tactically, it would have proved difficult to

Spring 1994 / JFQ 67 JFQ▼ FORUM ▼ The planners were restricted in selecting Advance from Safi (November 9–11, 1942) objectives—they had to go for ports right away. The lack of an adequate over-the-shore capability forced planners to target ports for quick seizure. Had the Vichy troops been more determined, had the Navy not been able to quickly suppress their defenses, or had the enemy been better alerted, the fights for Safi, Fedala, and Port Lyautey could have been much more costly. A shortage of landing craft (and many of which were destroyed in rough seas on November 8) led to delays in unloading transports—ships that then became U- boat targets. Being able to initially enter away from heavily defended points such as airfields or ports, rapidly disembark personnel and equipment, and then quickly disperse strategic lift, should be a goal for U.S. joint forces in a forcible entry, whether the troops are landing by air or sea. ▼ Forcible entry is perhaps the most intense kind of joint operation. The Army could not have entered Morocco without the Navy’s transport and firepower capabilities. Air superiority, initially all naval, was absolutely essential. The enemy had potent naval assets that had to be de- Source: George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West. The Mediter- feated—by the Navy. Yet in retrospect, it was the ranean Theater of Operations. United States Army in World War II (Washington: Office of Army that had to actually seize the objectives, the Chief of Military History, 1957), p. 112. provide for sustained air power ashore, and ultimately compel the French to accept an armistice. The capabilities The Capture of Casablanca of land, sea, and air forces had to be carefully orchestrated, especially since the enemy was, at least on paper, numerically equal

ll or in some areas superior. It was the overall capability of the joint force that resulted in the timely accomplishment of the mission— plus unwillingness on the part of the French to prolong the fight. In Morocco the pre-planned tran-

sition of command from Admiral Hewitt to General Patton was conducted very smoothly. ▼ Striking the enemy deep pays off. As the Army focused on defeating the French in close combat, Navy planes ranged far inland to interdict enemy reinforcements trying to move toward the coast. French troops moving north on the coastal road from Rabat to Port Lyautey were disrupted by naval gunfire well south of where Army troops were fighting to take the city’s critical airfield. Other airfields were attacked deep in-

Source: George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West. The Mediterranean Theater of Opera- land to prevent bombing of land- tions. United States Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957), map. 2 ing areas. Aircraft were the only means of striking deep. With the target location techniques and

68 JFQ / Spring 1994 Gordon

3 Blumenson, Command Decisions, pp. 186–88; Gelb, Desperate Venture, pp. 51–54. 4 George Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West. The Mediterranean Theater of Operations. United States Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957), pp. 13–14. 5 Ibid., p. 21. 6 Ibid. 7 Paul Auphan and Jacques Mordal, The French Navy in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press), p. 228. 8 In July 1940 the British, fearing that Germany would force France to turn over its fleet, demanded that French naval units in Algeria and Senegal scuttle or sail out of port to join the Royal Navy. When French commanders refused the British attacked and inflicted heavy losses. 9 Gelb, Desperate Venture, pp. 141–65. Howe, North- west Africa, pp. 77–84. 10 Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 26. 11 Samuel Eliot Morison, Operations in North African

Naval Historical Center Waters (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), pp. 21–26. 12 French battleship Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 33–40. 13 Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 44–46; Morison, Opera- Jean Bart in long range weapons available today, all compo- Casablanca showing tions, pp. 23–28. nents are able to effectively engage the enemy at 14 bomb damage. Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 164–67; also see Walter great depths. Karig, Battle Report: The Atlantic War (New York: Farrar Technology has changed a good deal and Rinehart, 1946), pp. 164–67. 15 since 1942. Precision strike technologies re- Morison, Operations, p. 27. 16 Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 61; Morison, Operations, place the massive, bludgeoning naval gun- p. 30. fire of World War II. Over the shore logistics 17 Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 60–67; Morison, Opera- is much improved. Sensor and reconnais- tions, pp. 23–33. sance assets would amaze the commanders 18 Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 45. 19 of 1942. In addition, the services have come Morison, Operations, pp. 34–40. 20 Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 101, 122, 151. a long way in codifying joint doctrine and 21 Morison, Operations, pp. 43–44. procedures, and they exercise together be- 22 John Costello and Terry Hughes, The Battle of the fore being thrown together in combat. Nev- Atlantic (New York: Dial Press, 1977). ertheless, Torch still offers many examples of 23 Morison, Operations, pp. 49–51. 24 the kinds of things that a joint By contrast the attempt to seize Oran, Algeria, was a disaster. Two British cutters with nearly 400 troops force must do to make an oper- st forcible entry is perhaps from the 1 Armored Division entered the harbor. The ation successful. French bitterly opposed the attack and both small ships the most intense kind Probably the most difficult were sunk. The Royal Navy lost 113 dead and the U.S. of joint operation mission that the Armed Forces Army 189; Allied survivors were held prisoner by the will be called upon to perform French until the cease fire. 25 Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 97–115; Karig, Battle in the future is a long distance, Report, pp. 191–200; Morison, Operations, pp. 135–56. forcible entry operation against a competent 26 Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 147–70; Karig, Battle opponent. That is exactly what happened in Report, pp. 191–200; Morison, Operations, pp. 115–34. Torch. Our predecessors of fifty years ago did 27 Auphan, The French Navy, p. 228. 28 an excellent job in planning and executing a Morison, Operations, pp. 55–87. 29 Auphan, The French Navy, pp. 230–37; Morison, very complex operation that worked. Study- Operations, pp. 88–114. ing Torch and similar operations can help us 30 Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 137. in looking to the future of joint and com- 31 Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 174–76; Morison, Oper- bined warfare. JFQ ations, pp. 167–74.

NOTES

1 Martin Blumenson et al., Command Decisions (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960), pp. 173–86. 2 Norman Gelb, Desperate Venture (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1992), pp. 76–83.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 69 JFQ▼ FORUM Southern Italy: Strategic Confusion, Operational Frustration By PETER F. HERRLY and LILLIAN A. PFLUKE

Enemy shell landing amidst amphibious trucks at Anzio.

U.S. Navy

Our Mediterranean experiences had reaffirmed the truth that unity, coordination, and cooperation are the keys to successful operations. War is waged in three elements but there is no separate land, air, or naval war. Unless all assets in all elements are efficiently combined and coordinated against a properly selected, common objective, their maximum potential cannot be realized. Physical targets may be separated by the breadth of a continent or an ocean, but their destruction must contribute in maximum degree to the furtherance of the combined plan of operation. — Dwight D. Eisenhower 1

70 JFQ / Spring 1994 Herrly and Pfluke

ifty years ago, in one of the most con- confusion arose from diverging British and troversial campaigns of World War II, American views on operations in the the Allies swept out of Sicily into Mediterranean once the North African and southern Italy with high strategic Sicilian campaigns inflicted significant losses F on the Axis and cleared sea and air lines of hopes but vague operational objectives. After attaining a bitterly contested amphibious communication in the southern Mediter- lodgement at Salerno on September 9, 1943, ranean. The Allies resolved their differences and the subsequent capture of Naples, the over whether to attempt more in the campaign turned into a succession of diffi- Mediterranean by agreeing to knock Italy out cult and bloody battles that still resonate of the war and tie down German forces.6 with frustration: the Volturno and Rapido Thus further Mediterranean Rivers, San Pietro, Operation Strangle, and operations became a strategic campaigns supporting attack for efforts most anguishingly Monte Casino and Anzio. link battles Even the final battles that broke the German in northern France. But until Winter Line and liberated Rome on June 4, the last minute, the United to strategic 1944, remain controversial. Military histori- States and Britain could not objectives ans debate if capturing the retreating Ger- decide where and how to pur- mans—not Rome—should have been the sue these limited goals. Amer- overriding Allied objective of this conclud- ica was in favor of seizing Sardinia and Cor- ing phase of the campaign. sica and Britain wanted to operate in the During the campaign for southern Italy, Adriatic and Aegean Seas with the Balkans as Allied land, sea, and air forces fought as the objective point. They compromised on members of a joint and combined com- Italy. General Arnold, who headed Army Air mand, under first General Dwight Eisen- Forces, offered a key argument in the deci- hower and then General Sir Harold Alexan- sion: the seizure of the complex of excellent der. In retrospect these leaders prosecuted airfields around Foggia would greatly aid the the campaign based on what we today refer strategic air offensive against Germany.7 to as the foundations of the joint operational The decision split the difference be- art: air and maritime superiority, forcible tween opposing views, but unfortunately in- entry, transportation, direct attack of enemy cluded some of the worst aspects of both. strategic centers of gravity, and sustained ac- The Allies would land in southern Italy, al- tion on land.2 Eisenhower and Alexander though at U.S. insistence major assets— also relied on what Joint Pub 1 calls leverage seven divisions and large numbers of land- among forces for the joint combat power that ing craft and long-range fighters—would be ultimately yielded a hard-fought victory.3 stripped from the theater and sent to Britain. This analysis examines the southern Italian Despite this reduction in resources, Prime campaign in terms of current doctrine to re- Minister Churchill added the capture of veal how its lessons influenced the develop- Rome to the campaign’s objectives. Granted, ment of military operations. Rome was a glittering prize: liberating the Eternal City carried with it political and psy- Strategic Context chological benefits. But Churchill’s interven- Campaigns link battles to strategic pur- tion created a strategic and operational poses.4 Joint doctrine stresses that this pro- dilemma. Knocking Italy out of the war cess must define those strategic objectives to- meant the taking of Rome even though the ward which campaigns are directed.5 The best way of tying down large numbers of campaign for southern Italy illustrates this Germans with minimum forces was by fight- rule. The Allied failure to set clear and precise ing in southern Italy without reference to theater strategic goals resulted in campaign the capture of Rome. This dilemma was not difficulties and operational frustration. The fully recognized and never resolved. Thus, when Allied forces came ashore in Italy, their commanders had no clear idea of how the Colonel Peter F. Herrly, USA, holds the Chairman campaign should be prosecuted or toward of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair at the National what end.8 War College; Major Lillian A. Pfluke, USA, is an ordnance officer and currently attends the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 71 JFQ▼ FORUM were apparent to the Germans who rapidly re- Invasion of Italy (September 1943) acted to the landings.) The amphibious landing would not have been possible without American preparations that were prompted by the disastrous experience of the British at Gal- lipoli. During the interwar years the Marine Corps developed amphibious doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment, and improved interface with naval and air power. This effort paid off in World War II: though no marines participated in the Salerno landing, Marine doctrine did. In fact, the Marine Corps trained the Army divisions that spearheaded the North African and Sicilian landings. In turn, the lessons from these invasions were crucial to the Allies in conducting the Salerno assault on short notice.10 Then as now operating in littoral areas offered major challenges as well as opportunities for joint synergy. In this regard the Salerno invasion has important implications today for joint forces. For the first time air interdiction supported amphibious lodgement (demonstrating the operational tenets of si- multaneity and depth found in Joint Pub 3–0 11). Air attacks kept a skillful enemy off- balance and ill supplied. On the eve of the invasion, for instance, the Allies bombed Field Marshall Kesserling’s headquarters near Rome and almost killed him.12 In another il-

U.S. Army Center of Military History lustration of indirect and often hard-to-quan- tify effects of strategic air attack and air interdiction, the Allied bombing of Rome contributed to the Italian government’s decision to get out of the war. At the tactical level, one reason the German armored coun- Campaign Design: Salerno terattacks at Salerno were piecemeal and un- Eisenhower’s first planning assumption coordinated was a lack of fuel caused by air was that the synergy of available land, sea, and interdiction which hampered movement by air forces would prove decisive. (Joint Pub 1 armored and mechanized units to the battle- states that joint synergy results “when field and significantly limited mounted train- the elements of the joint force are so though no marines ing prior to the invasion.13 Allied air also effectively employed that their total participated, Marine helped protect Allied naval movements with military impact exceeds the sum of timely reconnaissance, counter air, and sup- doctrine did their individual contributions.” 9) De- pression of key enemy coastal radars. For spite shortcomings the Allied forcible their part Allied navies effectively neutralized entry at Salerno demonstrated the synergistic the U-boat threat and cleared sea approaches impact of land, sea, and air integration. of mines.14 Most importantly, naval and air Joint considerations, including the dis- firepower was indispensable in helping tance from Sicilian air bases and the character- ground forces hold off heavy counterattacks. istics of the available beaches, drove the German commanders reported that Allied choice of Salerno as a landing site. (Unfortu- naval fire and air bombardment made ex- nately, as will be seen later, the same factors ploitation of their tactical successes on land impossible.15 Lastly, by the end of the Salerno

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the beachhead led to heavy naval casualties and an anxious period for Allied forces. In terms of joint doctrine today, some of the difficulties can be attributed to ineffective command and control. Based on the North African experience with frag- mented command and control of theater air, General Eisenhower had a theater air commander, Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder, whose pursuit of strategic attack and air superiority was necessary and sound. Below that level, Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, USN, the amphibious force commander, was not the supported commander for the lodgement. If he been so designated—as envisioned under current joint doc-

U.S. Army trine—the theater air commander Loading LSTs at would have continued to orches- Italian port. trate the air effort. But Hewitt, and battles, the Allies achieved air superiority and later the ground commander of the landing retained it for the balance of the campaign. force, General Mark Clark, could have desig- Nevertheless, there were significant nated priorities and timing for air support of problems in getting the greatest possible the landing. The effect of command rela- synergy from Allied forces. The impact of tions on lodgement was demonstrated when naval gunfire suffered from a decision to Allied Tactical Air Forces Headquarters in seek tactical surprise and forego such sup- North Africa informed Hewitt that air cover port for U.S. forces (in contrast to the British was being reduced, indicating that it did not who used naval gunfire effectively in the share his urgent protests since he faced only same landings).16 Moreover, the Army Air a “light enemy air threat.” One hour earlier Force’s reluctance to divert P–51 fighters Allied naval forces had suffered catastrophic from “more important missions” to artillery hits on two cruisers and pulled the com- and naval gunfire support spotting reduced mand flagship out of the area.19 the accuracy of naval gunfire.17 Strategic Air Counterair efforts were not fully effec- The campaign achieved remarkable syn- tive early in the invasion while Luftwaffe at- ergy by interacting with the strategic air offen- tacks contributed to the distress of land and sive. As early as January 1942 Eisenhower had naval forces. The only available carrier air seen the potential effects of such interaction: was British, but their carriers generated sorties at low rates and were insufficiently We felt we were bringing a new concept, almost trained in ground support operations which a new faith, to strategic thinking, one which envi- revealed British naval aviation’s long period sioned the air coordinated with ground operations to the extent that a ground-air team would be developed, of neglect under the Royal Air Force.18 Allied tending to multiply the effectiveness of both. land-based air could only loiter over Salerno Many ground soldiers belittled the potentialities for short periods due to range and fuel limi- of the airplane against ground formation. Curiously tations as well as delays in establishing hasty enough, quite a number of Air Force officers were also airfields on shore. Unlike General Alexander antagonistic to the idea, thinking they saw an at- Vandegrift of the Marines on Guadalcanal, tempt to shackle the air to the ground and therefore a American and British commanders at failure to realize the full capabilities of air attack. It Salerno failed to fashion land tactical plans was patiently explained over and over again that, on to emphasize seizure and protection of air- the contrary, the results of coordination would con- fields ashore as a first order of business. The stantly advance the air bases and would articulate Luftwaffe advantage in shorter flight time to strategic bombing effects with ground strategy, so that

Spring 1994 / JFQ 73 JFQ▼ FORUM Crossing a rebuilt as a way to break the deadly stalemate on bridge over the the German Winter Line, the Anzio landing Serchio River. did achieve operational surprise. Naval and air power again worked well to secure a lodgement. But the Allied commanders lacked sufficient resources to expand and exploit the beachhead and exert leverage to move the Germans. General Lucas, commanding the landing force, has been criti- cized for lack of boldness. But Lucas had to deal with the conflicting intent of his commanders. The combined commander, Alexander, wanted him to push to the Alban Hills, but the ground commander, Clark, ordered him to orient on protecting his force. Due to constraints in amphibious lift, Lucas simply did not have the combat power for daring operational schemes. (As Joint Pub 1 states, “the operational concept may stretch but not break the logistic concept.”22)

U.S. Army Operational Art The Allied failure at Anzio was partially as the air constantly assisted the advance of the rooted in not adhering to another opera- ground forces its long-range work would contribute tional tenet, anticipation, which is taken up 20 more effectively and directly to Nazi defeat. in Joint Pub 3–0.23 The Allies, despite supe- This strategic doctrine was manifest in rior signal intelligence, failed to anticipate the seizure of Foggia’s airfields and the subse- German moves. Kesserling surprised Allied quent formation of 15th Air Force. American leaders with his stand at Salerno, the fighting heavy bombers operating from Italy withdrawal to the Winter Line, the defensive the Allies failed to gave a new dimension to the Com- design at Casino and elsewhere, and the reac- anticipate German bined Bomber Offensive, forcing the tion at Anzio. The failure to anticipate Ger- Luftwaffe to face in another direction man moves and countermoves stemmed in moves and diffuse its defensive efforts. The part from an Allied inability to set the proper new basing brought key production fa- timing and tempo24 for the campaign. Forced cilities in southeastern Germany within to husband their resources, the Allied key to reach. More importantly it increased the ef- victory should have been taking full advan- fectiveness of attacks on Rumanian oil fields tage of air and naval power and deception and German synthetic fuel plants (attacks and surprise to avoid enemy strength. But in which helped Allied land action in Russia, the repeated attacks along the Winter Line the Mediterranean, and northwestern France). Allies sent tired, shot-up units into action The drawback was an Allied failure to where failure to concentrate, poor combined understand that strategic air assets carried a arms and air-land integration, and inability logistical price tag, including sealift. For in- to train, plan, coordinate, rehearse, and exe- stance, bringing heavy bombers of Northwest cute were disastrous. African Strategic Air Force to Foggia involved Contributing to Allied operational prob- shipping assets that could have moved two lems was Allied failure to synchronize maneu- ground divisions to Italy; maintaining the ver and interdiction.25 The poor results of Op- bombers required shipping equal to the eration Strangle were partly due to an Allied needs of the entire British Eighth Army.21 failure to tie the interdiction effort to the ground maneuver scheme, and vice versa. Anzio Finally, after examining operational as- The reasonably effective operational pects of the campaign for southern Italy, the synergy obtained at Salerno contrasted with inability to achieve effective operational reach the failure to exploit similar advantages of naval and air power at Anzio. Conceived of

74 JFQ / Spring 1994 Herrly and Pfluke

appears as perhaps the most basic flaw. As 4 Ibid., p. 45. previously noted the pitfall in choosing 5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Salerno was that it was obvious to the Ger- Joint Pub 3–0 (Washington: Government Printing Of- mans. A better lodgement would have been fice, September 9, 1993), pp. III–2 and 3, and U.S. Ma- rine Corps, FMFM 1–1, Campaigning (Washington: Gov- north of Rome, something which the enemy ernment Printing Office, 1991), p. 34. feared since such a landing would have cut 6 Martin Blumenson, U.S. Army in World War II: The off substantial German forces. Also as noted Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Salerno to Cassino the major factor in picking Salerno was the (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 8. 7 range of Allied land-based air. But with the Blumenson, The Mediterranean Theater, p. 13. 8 Ibid., pp. 8–15. See also H.P. Willmott and Peter F. benefit of hindsight there was another op- Herrly, unpublished presentation to the National War tion, “a campaign not fought,” as suggested College and National War College Alumni Association by Joint Pub 3–0 in its treatment of basing as 50th Anniversary Commemoration of the Campaign for an indispensable foundation of joint opera- Southern Italy, November 1, 1993. 9 tional art in extending operational reach.26 Joint Pub 1, p. 48. 10 Allan Reed Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the The official Army history of the campaign United States Marine Corps (New York: Macmillan Publish- states that: “No one during the early months ing Company, 1980), pp. 350–51, and H. Kent Hewitt, of 1943 seems to have been thinking of Sar- “The Allied Navies at Salerno, Operation Avalanche— dinia and Corsica as stepping stones to September 1943,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 79, northern Italy, even though the islands no. 9 (September 1953), p. 961. 11 Joint Pub 3–0, p. III–14. would offer staging areas for amphibious op- 12 Blumenson, The Mediterranean Theater, p. 68. erations and airfields for short-range bom- 13 Ibid., p. 98. bardment and close support.” 27 Adding 14 Ibid., p. 92. Malta to this line of operation by construct- 15 Ibid., p. 133. 16 ing expeditionary airfields there would have Ibid., p. 56. 17 Ibid., p. 146. further increased aircraft range and sortie 18 Ibid., p. 45. rates. Further benefits would have accrued 19 Ibid., pp. 103–07. Hewitt wrote that: ’In justice to from pursuing multiple options (like southern all concerned, it seems certain that the [HQ NATAF mes- France) as advocated in the Marine Corps sage reducing air coverage because of the light enemy air manual, Campaigning.28 This operational ap- encountered] was sent before the news of the attacks on USS Philadelphia and USS Savannah had been received. proach was conceivable in 1943 since a simi- But the incident does illustrate the time lag in commu- lar approach—the interaction of land, sea, nications and the dangers of decisions being made in a and air to bypass enemy strength—was at rear area for a front line commander who is the one best the core of campaign design in the south- able to appreciate the immediate tactical situation. I real- west Pacific.29 ized fully that a 100 percent effective air defense was impracticable and that some successful enemy attacks must Although ultimately successful, the Al- be expected. But, given the overriding importance of lied campaign for southern Italy was flawed maintaining the naval gunfire upon which the Army in two ways. First, the failure to define strate- was then relying for the retention of its narrow foothold gic objectives trapped the campaign design- on the beach, I did think that this was certainly no time ers into pursuing ambitious goals with insuf- for the reduction of fighter cover over the ships. I am a strong believer in unity of command, particularly in tac- ficient resources. Second, Allied leadership tical operations. Tactical unity of command implies that compounded the problem by not prosecut- a tactical commander should have under his own con- ing the campaign as efficiently as possible. trol all the available instruments necessary to the suc- Italy was not the soft underbelly that Chur- cessful accomplishments of his mission.” 20 chill predicted, but rather a “tough old gut,” Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 47. 21 Blumenson, The Mediterranean Theater, p. 239. 30 as General Clark quipped. Nevertheless, 22 Joint Pub 1, p. 47. studying this campaign vis-á-vis current doc- 23 Ibid., p. III–16. trine illustrates some important lessons of 24 Ibid., p. III–19. See also FMFM 1–1, pp. 72, 75. military history for joint commanders. JFQ 25 Joint Pub 3–0, p. IV–19. 26 Ibid., p. III–21. 27 NOTES Blumenson, The Mediterranean Theater, p. 13. 28 FMFM 1–1, p. 39. 1 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden 29 Joint Pub 1, pp. 25–29. City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), p. 210. 30 “Tough Old Gut,” The World at War, videorecord- 2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed ing, vol. 13 (London: Thames Television in cooperation Forces, Joint Pub 1 (Washington: National Defense Uni- with the Imperial War Museum, 1980). versity Press, November 11, 1991), pp. 54–57. 3 Ibid., p. 51.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 75 JFQ▼ FORUM Interservice Rivalry in the Pacific By JASON B. BARLOW The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. — Sun Tzu 1

General MacArthur U.S. Navy inspecting beachhead on Leyte. t was over fifty years ago that General attack strategy against Japan? Unfortunately, Douglas MacArthur, on orders from Pres- the record shows that the division of Army ident Franklin Roosevelt to save himself and Navy forces in the Pacific was more a so- Ifrom certain Japanese capture, escaped lution to satisfy interservice rivalries and per- from Corregidor for Australia. MacArthur’s sonal egos than an example of sound mili- escape and newfound presence in the South tary practice. Pacific triggered a chain of events that led to But the war is long over and the United one of the more interesting and controversial States won. Why is this historical episode of decisions of the Pacific War: why did the any importance today? Because joint United States adopt a divided command and warfighting is the way of the future. Admiral

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Marine working on explore why some historians and partici- Vought F4U Corsair pants found the lack of a unified strategy aboard USS Block Island off Okinawa. costly, inefficient, and unsound militarily. Finally, I will suggest some lessons I think any future military commander can learn. The Pacific War At the outset of World War II the United States had four major commands in the Pa- cific, one each for the Army and Navy in the Philippines and in Hawaii. In both places the Army and the Navy commanders were independent and joint operations were a shaky 4 U.S. Marine Corps proposition at best. After Pearl Harbor was attacked it became obvious that centralized direction and control over the forces would William Crowe, a former Chairman of the be desirable. As historian Louis Morton ob- Joint Chiefs of Staff, put it this way: serves, unity of command was necessary as I am well aware of the difficulty of shedding ... “there was no single agency in the Pacific to individual service orientations and addressing the supply these forces, no plan to unify their ef- broader concerns of the joint arena. The fact is, how- forts, and no single commander to mold ever, that the need for joint operations, joint thinking, them into an effective force capable of offen- and joint leadership has never been greater as we meet 5 the global challenges and in order to get the most of sive as well as defensive operations.” The our finite resources.2 Pacific had traditionally been a “special pre- serve” of the Navy, and the Army might have Our war against Japan was costly in lives agreed to keep it that way if it had not been and resources. To think that it might have for the need to safeguard Australia against been made even a greater hardship by the the encroaching Japanese. Australia’s protec- inability of senior offi- tion became primarily the Army’s concern cers to share leadership the five weeks it took dividing when Roosevelt authorized 80,000 men to and resources is dis- the Pacific “had to be bought sail for the southwest Pacific in early 1942.6 turbing, even if an ef- back in blood later” With both the Army and Navy now in- fort on that scale had volved in the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs had the never been attempted. task of finding a Pacific theater commander. The five weeks it took the Joint Chiefs to ar- But who? Admiral Chester Nimitz, Comman- rive at an interservice agreement dividing der of the Pacific Fleet, or General MacArthur, the Pacific “had to be bought back in blood who was after his exploits in the Philippines a later, because the enemy used them to cap- “war hero of towering stature?” It was no se- ture and fortify the Admiralty Islands, Buka, cret that the President and many influential 3 Bougainville, Lae, and Salamaua.” members of Congress favored the appoint- To joint warfighters of the future the ac- ment of MacArthur as supreme commander.7 tion of these wartime leaders may sound in- But the Department of the Navy would have credible if not self-serving. The intention nothing to do with this suggestion. here is not to detract from the memories or Since the Pacific conflict was likely to accomplishments of these great men, but involve naval and amphibious operations it rather to ask why they made the choices seemed only proper to the Navy that the en- they did. First, we need to look at why there tire effort be directed by a naval officer. “Ad- was a need for unified command in the miral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Opera- Pacific and how interservice rivalry nega- tions, and his colleagues in the Navy tively affected that decision. Second, we will Department staunchly argued that the Navy did not have enough confidence in Lieutenant Colonel Jason B. Barlow, USAF, is a [MacArthur]—or any other Army officer—to member of the United Nations Division, Strategic entrust the Pacific to the Army’s com- Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5), on the Joint mand.” 8 The Navy thought that MacArthur Staff. He has served as a U–2/TR–1 flight comman- “would probably use his naval force...in der and instructor/evaluator.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 77 JFQ▼ FORUM U.S. Army Center for Military History

the wrong manner, since he MacArthur would receive his orders from the had shown clear unfamiliarity Army Chief of Staff, and Nimitz from the with proper naval and air Chief of Naval Operations.13 “In essence, the functions” in the past.9 This Joint Chiefs (now) acted as (their own) over- concern may have stemmed all Pacific Commander.” 14 Little did they from MacArthur’s defeat in know “the traditional elements of careerism the Philippines, where he lost and doctrinal differences within the Armed most of his naval and air as- Forces had combined to produce a monstros- 10 15 U.S. Navy sets. The problem of choos- ity.” Divided command may have been po- USS Idaho bombarding ing a naval commander was litically expedient but it was also to prove Okinawa. further complicated by MacArthur’s obvious costly and inefficient. seniority to any available admiral, his hav- “The command arrangements in the Pa- ing returned to active service after retiring as cific led to duplication of effort and keen Army Chief of Staff in 1935.11 Unable to find competition for the limited supplies of a satisfactory solution and to “prevent un- ships, landing craft, and airplanes.” 16 And as necessary discord,” the Joint Chiefs after five control over the entire theater was vested in weeks of deliberations divided the Pacific the Joint Chiefs, who in effect became the into two huge theaters. MacArthur was ap- directing headquarters for operations in the pointed commander in chief of the South- Pacific, “it placed on the Joint Chiefs the west Pacific Area which included Australia, heavy burden of decision in many matters the Philippines, Solomon islands, New that could well have been resolved by lesser Guinea, and Bismarck Archipelago. Admiral officials.” 17 For example in March 1944, Nimitz would command the remainder of after successes in Rabaul and Truk, it took the Pacific Ocean except for coastal waters the Joint Chiefs “months of deliberation” to off Central and South America.12 There settle what would have been a simple matter would be no unified command in the Pa- cific, but rather two separate commands.

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Pacific Command Organization Chart (August 1945)

War Department Joint Chiefs of Staff Navy Department

U.S. Strategic Air Force CinC Armed Forces, CinC Navy Forces, (General Spaatz) Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas (General MacArthur) (Admiral Nimitz) Eighth Air Force (General Doolittle) Far East Air Force Fleet Forces (General Kenney) Third, Fifth, and Seventh Twentieth Air Force (General Twining) Armies Joint Task Forces Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth

Army Forces Fleet Marine Force Mid-Pacific (General Richardson) Area Commands Army Forces Western Pacific (General Styer) Type Commands Submarines, Amphibious, Land-based Air, etc. Naval Historical Center Troops assaulting New Guinea. for a single commander—how to reappor- carrying out an assigned task.21 Frederick the tion the force.18 Save for the President there Great espoused this idea when he stated: “It was no single authority. The process oper- is better to lose a province than split the ated as a committee rather than a staff, and forces with which one seeks victory.” 22 command was diffused and decentralized, MacArthur even showed his dismay in a let- making decisions on strategy and theater- ter written after the war about this very wide problems only available by time-con- issue: suming debates and compromises. In theater Of all the faulty decisions of the war perhaps the there was no one au- most unexplainable one was the failure to unify the in theater there was no one thority to choose be- command in the Pacific. The principle involved is per- authority to choose strategic tween strategic options haps the most fundamental one in the doctrine and or to resolve conflicts options or to resolve conflicts tradition of command...the failure to do so in the between MacArthur and Pacific cannot be defended in logic, in theory, or even Nimitz for manpower in common sense. Other motives must be ascribed. It and supplies, “no one to assign priorities, resulted in divided effort, the waste of diffusion and shift forces from one area to another, or con- duplication of force, and the consequent extension of centrate the resources of both areas against a the war with added casualties and cost.23 single objective.” 19 As MacArthur pointed out, the real dan- How could great leaders have forgotten ger of split command was that it pitted the fundamental of unity of command? One Army against Navy for scarce resources and of the country’s leading experts on war felt forced commanders into questionable posi- that the decision to split the command in tions of greater risk. Admiral Halsey’s daring the Pacific Theater was a direct result of “ser- raid on Bougainville in support of the vice interests and personality problems.” 20 Army’s advance was just such an example. Unity of command is key in war to “vesting appropriate authority and responsibility in a single commander to effect unity of effort in

Spring 1994 / JFQ 79 JFQ▼ FORUM The large island of Bougainville at the strategy of the Navy and his influence in the northern end of the Solomons was the final Pacific would be diminished.27 MacArthur, link in the “iron chain” that the Allies were on the other hand, had no trouble with the stretching around New Britain and Rabaul. approach to Rabaul suggested by the Navy The Japanese, having other plans, sent eight but demanded that, since the operations lay cruisers and four destroyers in his theater, he should command. The in an effort to wipe out the Joint Chiefs finally solved the argument by advancing American forces. moving Nimitz’s theater boundary one de- Halsey had only two carri- gree to include the island objective and then ers to support the Army split up the rest of the operation with since other major warships MacArthur.28 had been siphoned off to MacArthur referred often to what he saw prepare for a new Navy of- as a Navy cabal that plotted at every oppor- fensive in the central Pa- tunity to prevent him from taking overall cific. As Halsey later command of the Pacific War. The “Navy’s recorded, he fully “expected obstinacy was part of a long-time plot to both air groups to be cut to bring about the complete absorption of the pieces,” and they probably national defense function by the Navy, would have been had the (with) the Army being relegated to merely

U.S. Army Japanese been more skillful base, training, garrison, and supply pur- Army mortar firing and he less lucky. As it poses.” MacArthur even took his case to the at Japanese on turned out, he was successful thanks to favor- President in one instance, accusing the Navy Bougainville. able weather, Japanese mistakes, and the skill of failing “to understand the strategy of the and courage of his carrier pilots. It seems Pacific,” and charging that “these frontal at- Halsey “. . . would not have had to take des- tacks by the Navy, as at Tarawa, are tragic perate risks if the Americans had not been and unnecessary massacres of American trying to do two things at once. They had lives.” 29 Others joined in the fray. needlessly divided their forces in the Pacific Comments by General St. Clair Streett, so that the weaker half could be menaced by an air officer and a JCS staff member at the a relatively small enemy force.” 24 time, indicate he thought a single comman- The Pacific generated many examples of der should have been appointed by the Pres- interservice bickering, rivalry, one-upman- ident. He went on to say: “At the risk of ship, and downright nastiness. MacArthur being considered naive and just plain coun- and Nimitz were supposed to have cooper- try-boy dumb, the major obstacle to any ated but both man were strong-willed and ‘sane military solution’ of the problem was highly opinionated. One senior naval officer General MacArthur himself. Only with referred to “the complete lack of coordina- MacArthur out of the picture would it be tion between Army and Navy as one of the possible to establish a sound organization in worst managed affairs the area.” 30 Moreover, Streett thought that no commander is so priceless ever seen.” 25 This rivalry with MacArthur out of the way, the Supreme for overall command Commander’s job should go to an Army Air that he cannot be replaced continued throughout Corps or Navy commander, depending on the war even though who the President believed would have the both commanders had substantially the dominant role in the war. same goals.26 An example is the campaign Are there any conclusions we can draw for Rabaul. from these divisive moments? Certainly one MacArthur and Nimitz argued long and of the first things that comes to mind is the hard over the capture of Rabaul. They agreed importance of unity of command. As noted, it had to be taken, but apparently neither MacArthur even admitted after the war that trusted the other to command the joint the lack of a single commander in the Pacific force to do it. The Chief of Naval Operations “resulted in divided effort, the waste of dif- thought that if any of his carriers came fusion and duplication of force (and) undue under Army command the whole role and extension of the war with added casualties and cost.” 31 Secondly, we can appreciate that no commander is so priceless that he

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cannot be replaced. This should be especially Marine gunners with true when his popularity (such as 75mm pack howitzer MacArthur’s at the time) threatens his supe- on Bougainville. rior’s ability to make rational decisions about his service. Seemingly all decisions the Joint Chiefs made had to be weighed foremost against the consequences of offending either a personality or his “service.” Finally, we have to learn how to fight jointly. Congress had mandated it and Desert Storm validated it. As for the Pacific, it was only “because of our material superiority (that) the United States could afford such expensive and occasionally dangerous luxuries as a divided command...in its war with Japan.” 32 Given our finite resources, it seems unlikely that we could afford to fight a divided, multiservice war again. U.S. Navy Today’s often innocent banter of inter- 8 Clayton James, Command Crisis: MacArthur and the service competition can be healthy and pro- Korean War (Colorado Springs: U.S. Air Force Academy, 1982). Louis Morton agreed MacArthur was the “out- ductive up to a point. That point is reached standing commander” in the Pacific. See Morton, Lec- when lives or country are at risk. The mili- ture, p. 7. tary leaders of the future must learn to work 9 Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p. 141. and fight together or we will surely, at the 10 Manchester, American Caesar, pp. 212–16. 11 very least, risk losing the confidence of the Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p. 144. 12 John Costello, The Pacific War (New York: Rawson, American people. Sandwiched between de- Wade Publishers, 1981), p. 225. termined personalities and unable to shake 13 Morton, The War in the Pacific, p. 250. loose from their own service interests, the 14 John H. Bradley and Jack W. Dice, editors, The Sec- Joint Chiefs deliberately chose a divided ond World War: Asia and the Pacific (Wayne, N.J.: Avery strategy of dual command in the Pacific. Publishing Group, 1989), p. 102. 15 Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p. 145. America cannot afford waging war by service 16 Ibid., p. 145, and Morton, The War in the Pacific, for the sake of appeasing service pride or del- pp. 40–43. icate egos. Clayton James, in his authorita- 17 Morton, The War in the Pacific, p. 145. tive work on MacArthur, said it best: “There 18 Morton, “Pacific Command,” p. 23. 19 can be no substitute for the essential unity Morton, The War in the Pacific, p. 250. 20 Morton, “Pacific Command,” p. 26. of direction of centralized authority. The 19 Morton, The War in the Pacific, p. 250. hardships and hazards increasingly resulting 20 Ibid., p. 250. were unnecessary indeed.” 33 JFQ 21 U.S. Department of the Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Air Force Manual NOTES 1–1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 2–8. 1 Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War (New 22 Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 128. York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 35. 2 Air University Press, Conventional Warfare, vol. 8 23 James, Command Crisis, p. 123. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Command and Staff 24 Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, pp. 240–49. College, January 1991), p. 3. 25 Ibid., p. 179. 3 William Manchester, American Caesar (Boston: Lit- 26 Bradley, Asia and the Pacific, p. 122. tle, Brown, 1978), p. 282. 27 Ibid. 4 Louis Morton, “Pacific Command: A Study in In- 28 Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p. 185. terservice Relations,” Harmon Memorial Lectures in Mili- 29 Costello, The Pacific War, p. 449. tary History, no. 3 (Colorado Springs: U.S. Air Force 30 Morton, “Pacific Command,” p. 15. Academy, 1961), p. 3. 31 James, Command Crisis, p. 123. 5 Louis Morton, U.S. Army in World War II: The War 32 Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, p. 560. in the Pacific, vol. 10, Strategy and Command: The First 33 James, Command Crisis, p. 123. Two Years (Washington: Government Printing Office, 34 Morton, “Pacific Command,” p. 3. 1962), p. 240. 35 Morton, “Pacific Command,” appendix, chart 3. 6 Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The Amer- ican War with Japan (New York: Free Press, 1985), p. 143. 7 Ibid., p. 144.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 81 JFQ▼ FORUM Grave of a Dozen Schemes By H. P. WILLMOTT

The following article is divided into two parts: a definition of problems which beset the development of British policy and an examination of the main features of policy as it evolved. But to define such problems one must begin by noting that in the evolution of British policy there are two distinct phases, the watershed between

Naval Historical Center them being Septem- The British Chiefs in ber 1943. In the first January 1943 at the ver the last decade or so a number phase, between December 1941 and Septem- Casablanca conference ber 1943, the British were forced to respond (seated, from left): of impressive works have added Air Chief Marshall Sir to our knowledge of the forma- to events beyond their control and to fight Charles Portal, Chief of tion of Allied strategy and the where they were rather than where they Air Staff; Admiral of the O functioning of the anti-Axis alliance during would. This meant, in effect, the border be- Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, World War II. Callahan, Hayes, Homer, and tween India and Burma. In the next phase, First Sea Lord; the 1 during and after September 1943, the ele- Prime Minister; Field Thorne have rolled back the frontiers of Marshall Sir John Dill, knowledge, although the role of Britain in ment of choice entered into British calcula- Head of the British the war against Japan remains largely ne- tions because the surrender of the Italian Joint Staff Mission to glected and little understood. This lack of fleet and the crippling of Tirpitz freed British Washington; and Gen- appreciation is partly because of the way in naval forces from home waters and the eral Sir Alan Brooke, Mediterranean for service in Asia as Britain Chief of the Imperial which British policy evolved. The strands of General Staff (and continuity and clarity have been lost amid turned its attention to the questions of Chairman, Chiefs of the interminable intricacies of Combined when, in which theater, and with what Staff Committee). Chiefs of Staff meetings, the adagio rustle of forces she should expand efforts against forms in triplicate, and the baffling list of Japan. (In so doing, these questions revolved unpronounceable place names spread across around the issue of employing the fleet, the the Pacific. But one suspects with regard to element of choice in British policy proved Britain’s role in the Pacific that another fac- not as great as first appeared, partly as a re- tor is at work: the death of those involved sult of residual commitments made prior to and decrease in British power and influence September 1943.) in the Far East which have resulted in an accompanying contraction of interest.

82 JFQ / Spring 1994 Willmott

With respect to this first phase, from De- mainland and against Japan’s home islands. cember 1941 to September 1943, the basic To Washington, China was essential to the terms of reference for the British in settling Allied war effort, and it was therefore critical policy were determined by the events of the to restore overland communications with first six months. Between December 1941 Chungking. These communications could and May 1942, Britain suffered a series of de- only be through Burma, and thus Burma feats in Asia: specifically, in Borneo, Hong had to be reconquered for this very reason. Kong, the southwest Pacific, Malaya, and Leaving aside the obvious fact that Burma. The defeats carried home certain in- Britain did not agree with America’s view of escapable facts: that de- the value of China to the war effort, Ameri- despite a global presence spite a global presence can attitudes gave rise to three sets of related Britain lacked global problems. The two strands of U.S. policy— Britain lacked global power power, that her operational ground and air designs for China—were sup- timetable for the war posedly complementary, but they were in against Japan had to wait on events in the fact in rivalry. There were also problems in German war, that the Mediterranean theater ordering priorities and difficulties directly had second claim on resources and atten- associated with reestablishing overland com- tion, that the Indian Ocean and southeast munications. The second and third prob- Asia by extension held no more than a ter- lems had their basis in geography and condi- tiary position among priorities, and that the tions in northeast India and Burma. In terms Pacific in effect had no standing whatsoever. of priorities, northeast India lacked the ad- It is in this context that the negative British ministrative infrastructure for maintaining view of Burma took shape. For the high an invasion of Burma or an airlift to China. command in London, Burma had no politi- The needs of both an offensive into Burma cal, military, or economic value that made and an airlift to China were mutually exclu- reconquest mandatory. The British view, sive, but efforts to develop northeast India ironically, was a mirror image of that of the for either or both could not take precedence enemy. For Britain and Japan alike the over them since both initiatives had to be Chindwin River and Bay of Bengal formed a taken immediately and simultaneously. This line of mutual exhaustion, convenient to constituted, in brief, a clash between politi- both. Neither had the means to undertake cal imperatives and military necessity that offensive operations in these theaters, and was never to be properly resolved. both protagonists would have preferred—if The problems associated with the left to their own devices—to have accepted a reestablishment of overland communications stand-off there in order to devote resources with China crystallized at various levels. As and attentions to other, more important the- far as the British high command was con- aters. However, Burma had value for the Al- cerned there was not any prospect of signifi- lies that demanded the commitment which cant deliveries to China being possible before the British did not want. But Britain was one 1946 or 1947, by which time the impact of of the real losers at Pearl Harbor: the United China on events would be marginal. With States entered the war as the dominant in- only some 6 percent of Allied ground troops fluence in Asia and had the means to lead in southeast Asia in the engineers (compared with respect to prosecuting the war. The with 16 percent in the southwest Pacific), the United States, of course, entered the war service support needed for a Burma offensive with a two-fold agenda regarding China: to was unavailable. Aside from support to de- prepare the Chinese for a large-scale offen- velop resources for the airlift in northeast sive on the mainland, and to ready south- India, the engineers required for an advance west China as a base for air operations into Burma were the same needed to develop against territories occupied by Japan on the lines of communication that would support the advance itself. Moreover, as British staffs made their calculations, it transpired that if a H.P. Willmott is the author of June 1944; The road through Upper Burma was secured but Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied the enemy remained intact in Central Pacific Strategies, February to June 1942; and The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of Burma, then the logistical requirements of the Second World War. the forces guarding the road to China would

Spring 1994 / JFQ 83 JFQ▼ FORUM China-Burma-India Line of Communications (July 1945)

LEDO

The line stretched from dockside in Calcutta to unloading stands at Chinese airfields. Source: Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI. The China-Burma-India Theater. U.S. Army in World War II (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1985).

equal the carrying capacity of the road itself. But Britain noted that the success of this solu- Such considerations convinced the staffs that tion depended on the Chinese in Yunnan, the idea of pushing a road south from Ledo and they could only contribute effectively if to join the old Burma Road near Bhamo was first supplied by the very road their efforts nonsense,2 but that was as much a rational- were intended to open. This Catch-22 situa- ization as a reason since they had no real in- tion was just one case of the phenomenon terest in a campaign in Burma per se. For the whereby for each American solution there was high command Burma represented a haz- an unanswerable British objection,3 a conun- ardous and uncertain undertaking because it drum that was only one aspect of an insoluble would involve a long, exhausting approach Allied dilemma. If Britain moved into Upper through mountains and forests of the border Burma and went on the defensive, then the area against an enemy which could choose resultant commitment would be greater than where, when, and how to counterattack as their commitment in Assam and Manipur and well as make choices based on good and se- could not be sustained based on current or cure lines of communication. planned resources. Moreover, the alternative to a long-term defensive commitment in Operation Anakim Upper Burma was to attempt the reconquest To counter this Japanese advantage of po- of Burma overland from the north. Until Oc- sition, the U.S. high command argued that tober 1944 this was rejected by the Allied convoying attacks should be mounted to con- planners as unrealistic. Even if a road south vene along external lines of communication. from Ledo to Bhamo was opened, it would extend no further than 250 of the 750 miles to

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Anakim then she had every incentive not to do so. For Britain there were other, more pres- tigious and valuable targets than Rangoon to attack in southeast Asia, and if the Japanese held Burma in strength—as indeed they did— then there was every reason to bypass rather than to reconquer it. This was the gist of the Culverin alternative with landings in northern Sumatra and Malaya that were to end with the recapture of Singapore. But that idea, although sound, was never practical. The army I in India, at least prior to February 1944, was of uncertain quality and could not be reinforced from Europe.5 Neither amphibious nor naval forces were available on the necessary scale until Germany and Italy were defeated, and crucially the Americans would not accept any strategy that left the Burmese situation un- changed.6 Moreover, India could not maintain either the amphibious shipping or naval forces required for the operation; also, India was fully committed to the needs of the Chi- nese airlift and support operations from Assam and Manipur into Upper Burma. By any standard, however unexacting, when it came to policy, Britain found itself snookered. In the second phase of policymaking, after September 1943, the British high com- CODE WORDS mand was to find that its attitude toward ANAKIM Plan for recapture of Burma. America was thrown into confusion, and CULVERIN Plan for assault on Sumatra. strategic deliberations were all but wrecked, by a quickening of the war that presented DRACULA Plan for assault on Rangoon. Britain with mutually exclusive options. QUADRANT U.S.-British conference at Rangoon and Allied plan- Churchill feared the uses to which U.S. Quebec, August 1943. ners accepted that an ad- power could be put in the post-war world, OCTAGON U.S.-British conference at vance of 500 miles without and he clearly resented dependence on and Quebec, September 1944. an effective line of commu- loss of the power of decision to America. 4 OVERLORD Allied cross-Channel invasion nication was not feasible. Much of his behavior at this time conformed of northwest Europe, June 1944. Given this calculation, the to the de Gaulle syndrome, the penchant for SEXTANT International conference at British believed the only increasingly divisive activity as the power of Cairo, November–December 1943. way that Burma could be decision diminishes. Churchill believed that, retaken was by a campaign because the Americans could defeat Japan TRIDENT U.S.-British conference at involving holding opera- and could do it without the support of an Washington, May 1943. tions in Upper Burma, se- ally, and because American primacy in the curing the Arakan for its Pacific left Britain without a role in the the- airfields, and an assault ater, Britain had to turn to southeast Asia to landing at Rangoon followed by an advance expunge the shame of defeat. Britain had to through the Irrawaddy and Sitting valleys and recover her colonies and not by depending a battle of encirclement and annihilation in upon American largesse. The British Chiefs Central Burma (Operation Anakim). But the of Staff, on the other hand, saw in the conceptual problem here was that if Britain United States an ally to be supported rather indeed acquired the means to conduct than a power against which provisions had to be made. The chiefs believed that the priority had to be putting an end to the war against Japan quickly and that recovering

Spring 1994 / JFQ 85 JFQ▼ FORUM But as both sides considered options they British 14th Army Offensive were compelled to admit the imperial con- (December 1944–May 1945) nection. It was increasingly recognized that India was at the end of her tether and could not shoulder an increased commitment; that Canada had no interest in an imperial venture as she pursued her own bilateral arrangements in the Pacific with the United States; that New Zealand was unable to provide effective support for a British effort. In short, both Churchill and the chiefs knew that there was a reversal of the traditional relationship whereby Britain relied on imperial support: instead India and the dominions looked to Britain for forces to lighten their loads. But, while the high command was sympathetic to India,7 prepared to in- dulge Canada, and willing to support New Zealand, Australia was in a category by itself. The View from Down Under The exchanges between Britain and Aus- tralia were ambiguous, but the ambiguity was laced with suspicion and disdain. There can be little doubt that Churchill viewed all things Australian with disdain. This antipa- thy toward Australia extended to refusing to inform the dominion of the Sextant agreement, to enter into policy discussions with Australia, and even, at the dominion prime ministers’ conference in May 1944, to pass relevant discussion papers to the Australians until it was too late for them to be read before the meetings. Fueling this animosity was a British Treasury that insisted that Aus- tralia pay through the nose for everything

Source: Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI. The China- and denied terms that were available to Burma-India Theater. U.S. Army in World War II (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Canada and New Zealand. Military History, 1985). The Chiefs of Staff and Royal Navy were not beyond trying to treat Australia as a colony that would do what it was told. The most obvious example of this condescending colonies after the hostilities was as good as attitude was the attempt to send a mission to fighting for them. They also believed that an Australia to report on that country’s recep- effort in the main theater held the best tion facilities without any reference to the chance for ending the war, that a naval com- Australian government, an effort that was mitment in the Pacific would be cheaper in vigorously resisted by a dominion which re- manpower, and that an all-out effort in the sented the slur on its civil service and the re- Pacific would stand Britain well in securing ports it had already forwarded to London. post-war American aid. Moreover, the Royal Navy had little regard The views of Churchill and the chiefs for the Royal Australian Navy which it re- were mutually exclusive because there were garded as crippled by the Australian Treasury no bases from which their forces could oper- and plagued by an appalling staff. Only the ate in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. ordnance branch was regarded as competent, and the general view of Australia and its

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naval administration on the part of Royal consequences for the warships concerned. As Navy liaison teams was somewhat jaundiced, 1944 unfolded it became clear in London that amusingly so to anyone but an Australian. if British forces were to proceed to Australia In strategic policy, moreover, Anglo-Aus- then everything—from building materials tralian relations were somewhat schizophre- and prime movers to hospital equipment and nic. While Australia resented being excluded workers of every description—would have to from policymaking and ensured MacArthur’s be sent to Australia, and such resources were South West Pacific Command against any at- not available. At the same time the Royal tempted takeover by the British, some mem- Navy calculated that shortages of air groups bers of the Australian high command saw a meant that no more than three fleet carriers British return to the Pacific as a counter to could be maintained in the Pacific,11 and it being discarded by Amer- was forced to deal with the difficulties pre- the sheer scale of American ica as the battle moved sented by the lack of an oceanic fleet train. air power in the Pacific away from Australian But to pre-stock an Australian base in readi- shores.8 These Australians ness for the arrival of the fleet and have an meant that the RAF in effect believed their country had oceanic fleet train on hand, merchant vessels was discounted carried the imperial banner would have to be taken from service— for rein the Pacific since 1942 fitting and the run to Australia—when Britain and wanted a British and imperial effort to could not meet minimum import require- compensate for Australia’s progressive weak- ments. This was also a time when the de- ening as World War II entered its fifth year. mands on the merchant fleet would increase The British chiefs and even Churchill with the invasion of Europe, and when it was were aware of the immense effort that Aus- realized for the first time that paradoxically tralia had made and the manpower and fi- demands on British shipping would increase nancial problems which she faced in 1944.9 still further with the surrender of Germany.12 That year opened with the British staff plan- To compound matters, British plans in 1944 ning to send six divisions, lift for three divi- assumed that it would take between 11 and sions, a fleet with fifteen carriers and eight 18 months to prepare an Australian base; yet battleships,10 and 140 RAF squadrons to the in the course of 1944 Britain was caught be- Pacific, some 675,000 military personnel tween a lengthening of the war with Ger- plus labor and support workers pencilled in many into 1945 as plans to end the war with for movement to Australia. Inevitably, the Japan were moved forward at least into 1946. British saw such forces as the means to take Thus the shortage of Australian re- over South West Pacific Command, a view sources was only one aspect of the problems that revealed first a misunderstanding of that in 1944 resulted in a major change in MacArthur’s position within the American British policy. In the course of that year the high command and then a misunderstand- army commitment all but vanished: it ap- ing of the American willingness to discard peared MacArthur would not accept Indian this command with its problems in the final army divisions in the southwest Pacific and phase of the war. No less inevitably, but un- the British high command realized that fortunately, for much of 1944 London saw post-war occupation duties in Europe would Australia as a land of plenty, which it simply preclude any significant reinforcement of was not. It was true that Australia was so the Far East. The sheer scale of American air chaotically organized that she built her first power in the Pacific meant that the RAF in combat aircraft before her first motor car, effect was discounted from serious consider- but it was the shortages that finally so im- ation. A fleet train was improvised but only pressed London in the course of 1944. at the cost of abandoning amphibious ambi- Australia was, of course, hopelessly tions which was in part unavoidable: am- placed as a base for forces the British planned phibious shipping was largely shore-to- to send to the Pacific, and one notable ex- shore rather than ship-to-shore in the change was over a statement that Britain Pacific. Postponing Overlord, failing to se- could not supply 5,000 dockyard workers cure a working port until November, and needed to service and maintain British ships lacking 125,000 sailors for a corps-sized lift sent to the Pacific: Australia replied that failing to send workers would have unfortunate

Spring 1994 / JFQ 87 JFQ▼ FORUM conspired to kill the amphibious option.13 (Quadrant): in fact between the conferences During 1944, therefore, the navy changed London abandoned Culverin as impractica- from being the first of the services that were ble. But the conferences were critical in for- to arrive in the Far East to being the only mulating Allied policy for the war against one likely to arrive before the defeat of Japan, and the British held a weak hand. Japan was brought about, with all the politi- They had no proposals to make and only tra- cal and psychological overtones that en- ditional standbys to disguise their position: tailed. This fact, combined with the absence appearing to act (such as in creating South of a common basis for an Indian Ocean East Asia Command), observing the consent- strategy and a Pacific strategy, explains why and-evade principle, and putting on center the struggle within the high command was stage a light-weight irrelevance from the royal so difficult, bitter, and protracted.14 family to distract attention. In terms of unfolding events, the period The finesse failed. British histories point between May 1942 and May 1943 was out that Americans were favorably impressed marked by a frantic build-up in northeast by Mountbatten and Wingate, but that did India and start of the airlift, acceptance of not stop the United States from getting a the Anakim plan by both the United States higher priority for the war against Japan. and China as a basis of strategic policy in With regard to the Chindits the Americans February 1943, and the disaster of the first argued that if the British did so much with Arakan offensive. The latter is the dominant so little what might they not achieve if they event and it is often argued that it was the really tried, especially if a second Chindit failure of first Arakan that operation in the 1943–44 campaigning sea- the Americans offered the pushed Britain into Culverin. son had U.S. air support. The British ac- British a real part in the This was partly true, but in cepted the offer without realizing the conse- reality the Culverin proposal quences. From the time the offer was Pacific war was on the table in Septem- accepted America controlled the operational ber 1943 prior to the first timetable and Britain could not avoid an Arakan offensive. It had taken shape and Upper Burma commitment in 1943–44. commanded considerable support well be- There was, however, a twist or more ac- fore disaster overwhelmed the 14th Indian curately three twists. At Quadrant the United Division in the Arakan. Culverin gained sup- States proposed and Britain accepted—under port on a number of counts: a realization the consent-and-evade principle—that future that the Arakan offensive would fail; a desire Allied planning should be based on the to cut communications between Singapore premise of the defeat of Japan being achieved and Rangoon; a belief that Culverin would within twelve months of that of Germany, involve fewer resources; and least credibly, the latter set for October 1944. Thereafter an idea of the double envelopment of re- Churchill offered a fleet for immediate ser- sources. The landings in Sumatra and vice in the Pacific, trying to withdraw the Malaya were to be accompanied by landings offer when it became apparent that the fleet on Timor. could not be sent. Moreover, as the British considered the implications of the Twelve- Culverin and the Middle Strategy Month Plan it became clear that if the Ameri- With or without the Timor absurdity, the cans were to arrive in the western Pacific in Culverin concept was total nonsense. If early 1945, then China ceased to have any northern Sumatra had been occupied Britain relevance. If China could be discounted from would have had two open-ended commit- serious consideration so too could Burma. ments when she could not handle one. Secur- Thus within three months of discarding Cul- ing northern Sumatra as a base for air opera- verin as impracticable the high command re- tions made little sense if no heavy bombers discovered the operation as its only option in were available. The plan could not be effected southeast Asia—not that America agreed. before the war in Europe ended and did noth- Even more strangely, as British and American ing vis-á-vis Burma. Critically, the Culverin plans considered the little known WXYZ Op- plan left no proposal for 1943–44 campaign- tions, the U.S. Navy came to view that the ing in Burma which was patently obvious between May 1943 (Trident) and August 1943

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the western Pacific for a rendezvous with the Americans. To this writer’s knowledge only three histories or papers have ever given any consideration to the Middle Strategy, which has been portrayed as an attempt to split the difference between two views. It was no such thing. The Middle Strategy was a quite deliberate attempt by planners, specifically the Strategical Planning Section of the Joint Plan- ning Staff (JPS), to break Churchill’s opposition to a Pacific strategy by trapping him into a commitment to send forces to Aus- tralia thereby killing the Indian Ocean option. The rationale was the forthcoming imperial conference and the need for a policy to set before the dominion prime ministers. Churchill and the chiefs provisionally ac- Naval Historical Center cepted the Middle Strategy on this basis, and British inspection party visiting the set about selling it to Australia and New Solomons. Royal Navy was “considered necessary . . . to Zealand even as the JPS suppressed reports improve the prospects of destroying the confirming the Middle Strategy as a non- Japanese fleet, of capturing the Mandates... starter. With the Antipodes having endorsed and of taking the Marianas.” So it offered to the Middle Strategy, JPS then abandoned it support a British fleet with bases, aircraft, demanding a Modified Middle Strategy that, and common-user supplies and to maintain based in eastern Australia, could in turn be any British amphibious force sent to the Pa- dropped in favor of a full-fledged Pacific cific as long as a carrier force was on station commitment. The result was perhaps pre- in the central Pacific by mid-1944. In effect, dictable. Churchill violently repudiated the the Americans offered the British a real part Middle and Modified Middle Strategies and in the Pacific war as part of a coordinated Al- swung back to Culverin, despite the fact it lied strategy. Yet the British turned down or, had been abandoned as impracticable for a more accurately, did not respond to the offer. second time in the interim. To boost his posi- America kept the offer open until withdraw- tion Churchill recalled Mountbatten, but in a ing it on November 2, 1943, never to make it series of decisive meetings in August 1944 again. It would seem, however, that the Mountbatten refused to back Culverin and Chiefs of Staff, for whom matters in the Pa- said that the Burma commitment was un- cific were very much small change at this avoidable and that the fleet should go to the hectic time but who seem to have belatedly Pacific—exactly as the chiefs had demanded realized what happened, set about trying to for seven months. There was, however, a secure the role that they were offered. At Sex- catch. To clear Burma, Anakim was revived, tant they appear to have given an unofficial and this was wholly unrealistic because it undertaking to the United States that the called for a landing at Rangoon with seven fleet would be sent to the Pacific. divisions which was as large as Normandy, The period January–August 1944 saw the with all that implied. Moreover, India could British high command hopelessly divided on not despatch seven assault divisions, and if this and related issues. The chiefs sought the Mountbatten tried to counter this objection Upper Burma and Pacific commitments on by suggesting that the assault divisions could the basis that one was unavoidable and the be despatched directly from Liverpool, the other desirable; Churchill sought an am- idea of a Rangoon landing (Dracula) went phibious strategy in the Indian Ocean, specif- against the basic premise of British planning ically Culverin. By April, after four months of that simultaneous naval and amphibious deadlock, there emerged the Middle Strategy, commitments could not be met, and most which would use western Australia as a base certainly not in different oceans. for an offensive into the Lesser Sundas and then against Singapore from the east or to

Spring 1994 / JFQ 89 JFQ▼ FORUM The question is why the chiefs accepted in the high command really wanted, a land- this nonsense. The answer is obvious: with ing at Rangoon that was included in the plan the Octagon conference one month off Lon- because it would not be carried out, and a don had to have something and this plan central Pacific commitment that was beyond provided a Pacific commitment. The real rea- Britain’s means. son, however, became clear en route to Que- The postscript was full of irony. Between bec for the conference when the Directors of November 1944 and August 1945 Burma was Plans sent a memo to the Chiefs of Staff that reconquered by means of an overland ad- indicated that while Dracula had been pro- vance from northeast India. A British carrier posed to distract the Prime Minister from Is- fleet served off Okinawa and the Japanese tria and Vienna they had not anticipated home islands with credit. Dracula was car- that it would ever be authorized. Now that it ried out. All those things that could not had, how was it to be implemented? In fact have been attempted were accomplished, the directors already had made certain ar- but it was Dracula that provided final and rangements. A series of appropriate comment on British policy, and highly classified signals to for two reasons. The operation was executed Washington had instructed not with seven divisions but with seven bat- the Joint Staff Mission to talions, and it was directed not against the explain Dracula to the main Japanese base in Burma but a city Americans and to ask for abandoned by the enemy. Nothing better il- air support and assault lustrated the chasm between intentions and shipping but on no ac- capabilities, or between purpose and result, count to raise the issue of than Dracula. But perhaps more appropriate force requirements. Their is the fact that the operation was the last intention was to secure an British amphibious operation of World War American endorsement of II. And there can be little doubt that it was Dracula and ensure U.S. in- wholly right and fitting to carry out Dracula

U.S. Navy (Wayne Miller) volvement in the opera- against Rangoon—a city whose name is an Naval officers tion and then, with the anglicized corruption of the Burmese Yan questioning Japanese commitment firm, to request troops. If Amer- Gon meaning “end of strife.” JFQ prisoner of war. ica agreed Britain would be off the hook, and if they refused Dracula would duly fall by the NOTES wayside. In either case the British would be 1 The works include: Raymond Callahan, Burma, safe. It is clear that Dracula was never in- 1942–1945 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1979); tended to be implemented. Grace Person Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan (Annapolis: Naval Where the fleet would serve in the Pacific Institute Press, 1982); D.M. Horner, High Command: Aus- was the last aspect of policy to be decided. tralia and Allied Strategy, 1939–1945 (Sydney: Allen and The chiefs wanted the fleet to operate in the Urwin, 1982); and Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: central Pacific, but the Americans made it The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, clear they wished to see the British fleet em- 1941–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 2 American engineers confounded British calcula- ployed in the southwest Pacific. But the tions by pushing to Yunnan much faster than estimated, British would not be confined to what but given the quickened pace of U.S. advances across the amounted to a side show. Thus when the Pacific to little avail—not that Chungking had any in- Americans stated their position, the British tention of exerting itself against the Japanese when the had the advantage. As the minutes of meet- resumption of the civil war in China was at hand. 3 It should be noted that part of the problem was that ings conducted en route to the Octogon con- these emerged in succession: there was never an occasion ference record, once the American chiefs for- when all matters could be seen and settled, but policy mally stated their wish, the British chiefs were took the form of a series of encounter battles. Undoubt- prepared to pass the matter to Churchill to edly, this type of Anglo-American difficulty was serious in ensure that their views prevailed, but things that successive difficulties bred mutual exasperation. 4 In the author’s view the argument that air supply never came to that. British policy was settled: could and did square the circle falls on two counts: that a commitment to Upper Burma that no one the advance of 1945 was primarily the result of Japanese resistance being previously broken and not in the course of the advance on Rangoon, and that the advance is notable for its avoidance of major engagements other than

90 JFQ / Spring 1994 Willmott

at Mandalay and Meitkina. Air supply proved effective 11 These calculations, based on U.S. Navy reporting in the advance on Rangoon in large measure because the for 1942 and 1943, were erroneous, in part because set-piece battle was fought and won around Kohima and group losses were heavier—20 percent per month— Imphal in India, not within Burma. than those in 1945. But air losses by British carriers did 5 While the 4th Indian Division was perhaps the best meet the calculations: one carrier realized them on one British empire unit of World War II, the effectiveness of day alone. Indian army units largely depended upon local, village, 12 The extent of demands with the end of the Euro- and personal loyalties. Dilution of these loyalties given pean war were not realized until spring 1944 when the the tenfold expansion of the army between 1939 and needs of the British zone of Germany, liberated coun- 1942, plus disastrous defeats in 1941 and 1942 that tries, American forces moving to the homefront for re- were continued with the first Arakan debacle, cast deployment to the Pacific, and repatriation of British doubt on the Indian army which lasted until the imperial forces, as well as the normal demands of Japanese were defeated in early 1944. British forces in northwest Europe, the Mediterranean, 6 Preparing amphibious operations in the Indian and Asia were realized. Ocean could only proceed if specialist troops were di- 13 Illustrative of the problems is that postponing the verted from northeast India, and the Americans were al- Normandy invasion from May to June 1944 threatened ways wary of endorsing any amphibious proposal for to end all amphibious options in the Bay of Bengal in fear that a closing-down of Upper Burma options in January–April 1945, the only period outside the mon- order to provide for an amphibious operation would be soon for such operations. Lead-times for European am- followed by the latter being abandoned at some stage phibious forces were long indeed, and Overlord’s post- with the result that no offensive operation would be ponement, not to mention continuous supply over the staged in this theater. beach due to the failure to secure working ports, would 7 The severe industrial and economic exhaustion of have been enough to end the Indian Ocean options had India by early 1944 was compounded by the Bengal they not already been discounted. famine which claimed about 1,500,000 lives (as opposed 14 At a meeting on February 21, 1944, the chiefs de- to usual annual loss of about 400,000) and disastrous cided to resign en masse if Churchill insisted on a south- floods in eastern India. To make matters worse, Australia east Asia commitment for political reasons. In effect, suffered one of the worse droughts on record in 1943–44 they were claiming to be better judges of the national and could not make good India’s food shortages. interest than the head of government—an interesting 8 As for their American opposite numbers, most state of affairs given the long-standing tradition of civil- Australians admired the Navy and Army Air Force and ian control of the military. Two lessons can be drawn came to hold a quiet regard for the Army and Marine from this little-known episode: the danger of seeing Corps. But they had what can only be described as con- Churchill and the chiefs as one in the same, and more tempt and loathing for MacArthur, personally and pro- generally the confusion of political, military, and eco- fessionally, that was exceeded only by their feelings for nomic issues that blurs distinctions among these as- his staff. pects of governance so as to be meaningless at this level 9 By 1944 half of Australia’s male population of 18 of command. to 40 year-olds had volunteered and some 73 percent of all males over the age of 14 engaged directly in the war effort which exhausted the nation. Along with New Zealand, with more or less similar statistics, Australia made perhaps the greatest relative effort of the Allies in terms of manpower. Britain was only slightly behind her dominions, but involved a greater part of the female population than Australia and New Zealand. By 1944, however, and mainly due to faltering production, Aus- tralian forces were reduced as the demand in the southwest Pacific meant using three divisions to maintain one on the line. 10 Even including the Free French Richelieu in the planned British order of battle the totals of eight capital ships and fifteen carriers were never realistic though on September 2, 1945—as the British gathered forces in readiness for a now-canceled invasion of southern Kyushu—there were five fleet, four light fleet, and seven escort carriers on station. Ironically these plans were prepared in February 1944 just as the high command, in response to the Japanese fleet’s move to Singapore as a result of American carrier raids in the western Pacific, was obliged to ask America for carrier support and to re- lease Richelieu for service in the Indian Ocean. See the author’s “Reinforcing the Eastern Fleet: 1944” in War- ship, no. 39 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1986), pp. 191–98.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 91 JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE Defense Intelligence Agency (Joseph M. Juarez) National Military Joint Intelligence Center.

Challenging Joint Military Intelligence By JAMES R.CLAPPER,JR.

Summary

Military intelligence was shaped over four decades by the Soviet threat, emerging weapons systems, and increasing defense budgets. A sea change began with the demise of the old Soviet empire, the crisis in the Per- sian Gulf, and growing involvement in U.N. peace operations and humanitarian efforts. The Defense Intelli- gence Agency (DIA) is adjusting to successor threats, including regional instability, low-intensity conflict, terrorism, counter-narcotics, nuclear proliferation, and chemical and biological weapons—all within a joint environment. DIA must adapt its collection/production/dissemination cycle to a quickened operational pace and fewer resources. With technology now allowing intelligence to be treated as an integrated whole, the restructuring of DIA, and a focus on unified commands, the military intelligence community has gone back to basics while retaining the flexibility needed to underpin support of joint warfighting into the next century.

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ew questioned the roles of the mili- Intelligence Keeps Pace tary establishment in the early years Throughout this evolution, intelligence of our Nation: the Army dominated has pressed to keep pace. The imperative to the land while the Navy concen- do so was heightened by the lessons learned F from Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm trated on the sea. Some mix of missions occurred following World War I as the military and subsequent contingency operations. In potential of flight was seriously considered. fact, in the last few years the intelligence But during World War II, with the designa- community has concentrated on finding tion of theaters of operation, an interesting more innovative ways of supporting joint phenomenon arose—a commander in chief warfighting and providing this support more (CINC) from one service often led thousands rapidly and efficiently. Lately defense intelli- of personnel from others. gence has also begun to shift attention to The impetus for joint command stem- transforming peacetime organizations and ming from World War II extended to the cre- activities to more closely approximate how ation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The the intelligence community would fight dur- National Security Act of 1947 not only insti- ing wartime. tutionalized JCS but The fundamental elements of the mis- the fundamental elements hastened the formation sion of military intelligence—to provide unique insight to operating forces, reduce of the mission of military of a separate Air Force and, eventually, the uncertainty for decisionmakers, and project intelligence have not changed Department of De- future threat environments for the systems fense. At a 1948 meet- acquisition community—have not changed. ing in Key West, the chiefs carved out the What has changed very dramatically in sev- broad, individual functional areas that re- eral recent cases is the international military main intact to this day. Jointness came of age balance. By the late 1980s defense intelli- with the Goldwater-Nichols Act which re- gence had evolved over a period of nearly quires the Chairman to adjust service func- forty years in response to the threat posed tions as appropriate to “achieve maximum by the Soviet Union; the proliferation of effectiveness of the Armed Forces.” This pro- multiple, complex weapons systems and in- vided a fillip to joint task forces (JTFs)—a hy- telligence associated with their design and brid military element with components from employment; and a corresponding increase in the size of the defense budget. During DOD two or more services. JTFs were the compos- F–117 Stealth Fighter ite contingency force of choice. these four decades a dynamic Soviet threat attacking Iraqi facility. In the 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions, and U.S. response to it spawned large, capa- and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United ble service component and departmental in- States, the Chairman recommended extend- telligence organizations focused on intelli- ing JTFs to peacetime. Moreover, JTFs are the gence problems related to this threat. predominant means of executing military The intelligence community was primar- operations, relying upon service compo- ily concerned with adequate capabilities to nents for specific capabilities. Accordingly, support the mission of anticipating, moni- Army and Marine Corps elements comprise toring, deterring, and containing Soviet ag- joint ground components of JTFs, while Ma- gression or advantage. Significantly, system- rine and Navy elements make up joint mar- atic intelligence interest in other countries itime components. Each of the services logi- or regions, unless somehow tied to Soviet is- cally contributes to the joint air and special sues, was marginal at best. The former Soviet operations components of JTFs. Union was in many respects a very simple intelligence problem, but it was one that required remarkably sophisticated capabilities to manage. For example, during the height Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF, is Director of of the Cold War, Strategic Air Command the Defense Intelligence Agency. In addition to positions headquarters employed some 1,500 intelli- with the National Security Agency and the Air Force Security gence professionals, bolstered by unmatched Service, he has held key intelligence assignments with the civilian depth and expertise within the De- U.S. Combined Forces Command, Korea; Pacific Command; fense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to evaluate and Strategic Air Command.

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the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Similarly, the The intelligence community is still re- Navy needed a robust anti-submarine war- sponsible for providing the best possible in- fare program to monitor the design and op- telligence on regional force capabilities, eration of the Soviet submarines capable of plans, dispositions, and objectives. It also re- surprise attack. And the Army required thou- tains the requirement to understand the sands of intelligence personnel scattered conflict environment, whether the mission across Europe as a critical force multiplier to is containing aggression, keeping the peace, help NATO keep tabs on a numerically supe- or feeding the starving. In each case, mili- rior Soviet armored force. tary intelligence must provide information But then came the great collapse. In the on the means of access to an operational span of a few short years, the world witnessed: area, plus data on the terrain, climate, and ▼ the demise of communism in the Soviet the cultural context in which the Armed Union and Eastern Europe Forces will operate. ▼ the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact We should not be deluded, for even with ▼ the crumbling of the Soviet empire and these course adjustments for defense intelli- emergence of newly independent states gence the task of providing support for force ▼ the end of the Cold War with a dimin- application is neither easier nor simpler than ished military challenge to the West it was during the Cold War. In fact it is prob- ▼ war in the Middle East and subsequent ably more difficult. For example, the devel- heavy American involvement in U.N.-sponsored opment of precision-guided “smart” weapons peace operations and humanitarian assistance in has placed an untold strain on intelligence Iraq, Somalia, and the Balkans. resources. Operation Desert Storm offered Realigned and Refocused critical lessons regarding intelligence support Intelligence unquestionably helped win to sophisticated weapons. Among the most the Cold War by offsetting the imbalance be- critical was that such systems are voracious tween NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Yet by the consumers of intelligence. For instance, in time that paradigm no longer the past the identification of a specific tar- intelligence requirements applied, and before the West geted building sufficed. Today precision delivery capabilities require further identifica- to support battlefield even had a chance to cele- brate its victory, defense intel- tion—down to a particular room in that operations have become ligence moved on to more targeted building. This increase in the level simply mind-boggling pressing matters. Primary of targeting detail demands exacting geo-po- among them was modifying— sitional data, near-real time imagery, and in some cases creating from fused all-source intelligence. scratch—a structure that would enhance the Even more, intelligence requirements to ability of the military intelligence commu- support battlefield operations have become nity to address the challenges of a different, simply mind-boggling, from collecting and emerging, global military environment. correlating battlefield activities to developing There are some who claim intelligence target packages based on precision analysis, never met a threat it did not like. A truer dic- and from assessing battle damage to relaying tum is that intelligence only reluctantly assessments in near-real time to the opera- gives up threats it knows best. Today’s tional commander. As a result, intelligence threats are different from yesterday’s and in simply must situate itself within the opera- many respects considerably less predictable. tional cycle rather than outside it. In other These uncertain threats—regional, low-in- words, the intelligence collection, produc- tensity conflict, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and dissemination cycle must be com- tion, and chemical and biological weapons— pressed so that it fits within the operational have emerged as defense intelligence’s new cycle for targeting to support strike and re- priorities. Equally important is supporting strike operations. Also, as force moderniza- the expanding involvement of military tion and acquisition programs are focused on forces in efforts to alleviate global stress fewer systems, comprehensive assessments of points, whether they involve the use of force projected conflict environments become crit- or the provision of assistance. ically important. In developing these assessments intelligence must forecast both the nature and focus of military conflict in the next

94 JFQ / Spring 1994 Clapper

twenty years with sufficient precision to de- ways to align peacetime structures and activ- fine requirements for advanced weapons sys- ities to ease the transition to war. Defense in- tems and force structure. telligence is leveraging advances in automa- So defense intelligence faces a broad tion, communications, and interactive video spectrum of global geopolitical changes that not only to survive in this new world, but to requires supporting new and increasingly improve its ability to provide a high-quality complex missions. The military intelligence product to its customers. community is at the same time attempting In my ex-officio role as Director of Mili- to manage the transition from its Cold War tary Intelligence, I have engaged and em- posture to one ap- powered military intelligence leadership to propriate for the fight this battle better. These leaders are new world disor- working together more than ever before to der. This would solve the community’s most troublesome be a herculean problems and manage its activities coher- challenge in and ently and communally. They have devel- of itself. But in oped a planning approach that permits iden- addition defense tification of critical missions and supporting intelligence is em- intelligence functions required to meet barking on this them, and established a methodology to ra- transition in a pe- tionally restructure the community during riod marked by a this period of downsizing so that no essen-

DOD reduction in re- tial capabilities are sacrificed along the way. Loading Intelligence sources which far The Joint Environment equipment on aircraft. outstrips the annual increases required to DIA began this process by institutional- build capabilities in the first place. The fiscal izing the functions of the Pentagon-based, reality for intelligence is simple, yet stark— national-level Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) its budget levels will soon approximate those which proved so valuable during the Gulf for 1982. War. Established in the aftermath of that In the Defense Intelligence Agency conflict, the National Military Joint Intelli- (DIA), for instance, actions are already under gence Center (NMJIC) is a crisis-oriented, way that will eliminate nearly 1,000 billets multi-service, multi-agency intelligence by FY97. Throughout the General Defense clearinghouse and tasking center which Intelligence Program (GDIP), for which the forms the heart of timely intelligence sup- DIA Director serves as manager and which port to national-level contingency opera- funds most military intelligence resources tions. Assigned analysts and indications and supporting joint forces and defense acquisi- warning personnel monitor world trouble tion, projected cuts will approach 5,000 bil- spots and guide formation of intelligence lets by FY97. Along with these reductions working groups to monitor events more will go many of the capabilities developed in closely as situations intensify. These working another era to address another problem en- groups can be expanded into intelligence tirely. The magnitude of programmed cuts— task forces. DIA can also activate an Opera- and some advocate even larger reductions— tional Intelligence Crisis Center in the De- will leave intelligence with little flexibility to fense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) at devote resources to developing new capabili- Bolling Air Force Base, a move that allows ties to counter future threats. NMJIC personnel to have rapid access to With the dual challenge of more mis- DIA’s extensive analytic expertise. sions and fewer resources, the military intel- After the Gulf War the current intelli- ligence community views increased joint- gence functions of all service intelligence or- ness as a potential solution. Specifically, the ganizations were the first elements to be military intelligence leadership is focusing consolidated in NMJIC. Later agencies such on embedding joint culture in all operations as the National Security Agency and Central and is continually searching for innovative Intelligence Agency also provided full-time representatives to NMJIC. These elements can be augmented easily and rapidly in

Spring 1994 / JFQ 95 JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE Naval Historical Center (Jacobs) Building relief map of Rabaul, New Britain, circa 1943.

U–2R/TR–1 reconnaissance aircraft. DOD

large-scale crises that demand greater partici- and countries that have formed coalitions pation by community elements. Depending with the United States. upon the nature of the crisis, NMJIC can In addition to permanently establishing also accommodate intelligence support from NMJIC following the Gulf War, DIA spear- other national-level agencies headed an effort to consolidate theater intel- mechanisms have been and departments, such as the ligence assets into centers at major combat- established to share Federal Bureau of Investigation ant commands. These JICs have become and Department of State. primary nodes for intelligence support to intelligence with crisis With a staff arrayed both CINCs. Through them, the analytic commu- centers supporting functionally (for example, ter- nity provides detailed intelligence analysis the United Nations rorism or narcotics trafficking) against priority targets. Within them defense and regionally (on areas such as intelligence has established a capability for the Middle East or Africa), the daily monitoring of events throughout NMJIC hosts various intelligence working each CINC’s area of responsibility. JICs per- groups and task forces formed to address form similar functions for CINCs as NMJIC contingencies around the world. During ac- does for elements in Washington. In com- tual crises, NMJIC serves as a clearinghouse mands with worldwide missions JICs con- for all requests for national-level intelligence centrate on tailoring and applying intelli- information. Field elements forward intelligence for local use that is developed gence requirements to NMJIC where they primarily at national level. In commands are either satisfied immediately using exist- with specific regional responsibilities, JICs ing resources or farmed out to other agen- possess full-up production capabilities as cies, such as service intelligence organiza- well as collection assets to develop intelli- tions, for more detailed study. All responses gence concerning their areas of interest. This back to field elements are routed through information is frequently enhanced by intel- NMJIC. ligence provided from the national level. Interface mechanisms have also been es- Critical to the success of these JICs is the tablished that allow NMJIC to share appropri- ability to process fused intelligence from ately sanitized intelligence information with crisis centers supporting the United Nations

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JDISS, on the other hand, is a deployable system that, when tied into JWICS, becomes the interface between the military intelligence community’s national and theater intelligence centers and subordinate tactical commands. Essentially, it extends the national-level intelligence community’s reach down to the lowest tactical level on the battlefield. JDISS offers such applications as word processing, electronic mail, mapping, graphics, electronic publishing, bulk transfer of data, and a capability for direct analyst-to-analyst conversation. JDISS users also have the potential to access other important data bases and applications throughout the system. To illustrate how quickly advancing technology and operational requirements are pushing us let me cite a real-world JWICS example. Originally, JWICS was planned for

DOD introduction early in 1993. To validate the Effects of airstrikes concept, intelligence planners intended to shown in imagery wire the system’s components at DIA ini- multiple sources for theater battle manage- from U–2R/TR–1. tially and test them via experimental links to ment, and then transmit it further down the the Navy’s intelligence complex in Suitland, warfighting chain to tactical level. Accord- Maryland, and Atlantic Command com- ingly, the defense intelligence leadership is pound in Norfolk, Virginia. But a complica- promoting uniform standards for military tion emerged. While preparations were intelligence information and communica- being made to install JWICS at Suitland and tions systems which link the national, the- Norfolk, the United States launched Opera- ater, and tactical levels. The foundation of tion Southern Watch with the intention of this process is the Joint Worldwide Intelli- prohibiting offensive Iraqi air operations gence Communications System (JWICS) and against the Kurdish minority located south the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support of 32 degrees North latitude. Having com- System (JDISS). mitted to this operation without even a frac- JWICS is a sensitive compartmented in- tion of the massive infrastructure available formation (SCI)-secure, high-capacity, multi- during Desert Storm, the defense intelli- media communications system that offers gence community found itself confronting the military intelligence community a wide communications problems similar to those range of capabilities, including a secure identified repeatedly in lessons learned re- video and audio service for both video tele- ports following the Gulf War. Among them casting and teleconferencing. The system were how to disseminate imagery in near- also provides conventional network services real time, how to share data, and how to for collaborative electronic publishing, the communicate effectively with the JTF com- electronic distribution of finished intelli- mander in the region. gence, and tools to accommodate the trans- The community’s solution was to gam- fer of reference imagery, maps, and geodetic ble on technology and, instead of shipping materials, as well as other high-end graphics JWICS to Suitland and Norfolk, it was sent products. DIA is using JWICS to broadcast its to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where it worked ex- innovative, daily, national-level, classified actly as planned. JWICS facilitated the estab- intelligence updates. Officially designated lishment of a 24-hour electronic window the Defense Intelligence Network, the sys- through which NMJIC-based intelligence tem is commonly called “classified CNN.” watch officers could literally reach into the JTF Joint Intelligence Center in Southwest Asia, and vice versa. This JWICS link to U.S. forces during subsequent strike operations in

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Iraq provided exceptional base for coherently managing military intel- DIA is currently overseeing the most mission planning support ligence. In the new DIA, five of its previous significant restructuring of Human and the best battle damage nine directorate-size elements, plus other Resources Intelligence (HUMINT) in assessment up to that time. subordinate offices, merged into three major DOD history. Under this effort DIA is Since then JWICS has be- centers—namely, the National Military Intel- consolidating the HUMINT assets of come integral to all intelli- ligence Collection Center (NMICC), the Pro- all the services with its own to form Defense HUMINT Services (DHS), a gence support efforts, in- duction Center (NMIPC), and the Systems new joint field operating activity sub- cluding those for U.S. and Center (NMISC)—each of which performs ordinate to Director, DIA, in his ca- allied forces in places such critical functions. pacity as DOD HUMINT manager. The as the Balkans and Somalia. ▼ Collection Center. Manages all-source intel- activity was created last summer by This new architecture then Deputy Secretary of Defense ligence collection, both acquiring and applying William J. Perry. DHS is subordinate provides a revolutionary ca- collection resources to satisfy current and future to the National Military Intelligence pability for secure commu- DOD requirements. The center also manages the Collection Center. nications. For example, defense community’s entire spectrum of Human DHS was established to man- some time ago I had discus- Resource Intelligence (HUMINT) programs, and age HUMINT given the constraints of sions with intelligence per- the Measurement and Signature Intelligence pro- diminishing resources while more gram. Finally, NMICC controls the Defense At- rapidly and efficiently focusing as- sonnel on USS George Wash- ington operating at sea using taché System which has personnel posted in one sets on targets worldwide. The hundred countries. transfer of functions and resources the JWICS videolink in my ▼ Production Center. Produces or manages is being accomplished in phases and Pentagon office. The possi- production of military intelligence for DOD and is scheduled to be completed when bilities of analyst-to-analyst, the activity becomes fully opera- non-DOD agencies. For instance, the center pro- tional in FY97. All the services are national-to-tactical-level duces all-source, finished intelligence concerning represented on a transition team communications are only transnational military threats; regional defense; which is focusing on structural and beginning to be realized. combat support issues; the weaponry, doctrine, procedural changes in HUMINT dur- Technology is providing the and combat capabilities of foreign militaries; for- ing the formation of DHS. capability to treat intelli- eign military-related medical advances; and for- gence as an integrated eign nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons whole, another fundamental developments. Both the Missile and Space Intelli- lesson of Desert Storm. Defense intelligence gence Center at Huntsville, Alabama, and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center at Fort will soon be able to provide a variety of prod- Detrick, Maryland, are now part of this center ucts to support operating forces at virtually within DIA. any location for immediate application on ▼ Systems Center. Computer/automated data the battlefield. The early success of secure processing (ADP) nerve center which provides in- communications systems demonstrates the formation services and support to DIA and other validity of advanced computer technology to agencies in the national intelligence community. establish interactive intelligence connectivity These services include ADP support, communica- between National Command Authorities, tions, engineering and maintenance, information JICs at major warfighting commands, JTFs, systems security, imagery and photo processing, and ultimately tactical forces. and publication and dissemination of intelligence reference products. Restructuring DIA The community leadership has been Military Intelligence Board working hard to develop a structure and ac- Throughout this reorganization I have companying processes to meet its new mis- been aided immensely by the Military Intel- sion. Within DIA the restructuring efforts ligence Board (MIB) which is composed of went back to basics, and in what was the the service intelligence chiefs; Director for most profound reorganization in the Intelligence (J-2), Joint Staff; Deputy Assis- agency’s 32-year history, we conceived at the tant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Di- top but built from the bottom a new organi- rector of the Central Imagery Office; Associ- zation based on the traditional intelligence ate Deputy Director for Operations at NSA; constructs of collection, production, and in- and other senior DOD officials. I chair MIB frastructure. Importantly, the new structure in my capacity as the Director of Military In- was designed to serve as the institutional telligence (DMI), which is distinct from my role as the Director, DIA.

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MIB proved its worth during the Gulf War when it played a critical role in foster- ing greater cooperation within the military intelligence community. Since that time MIB has met virtually every week and provided a forum for senior community leaders to over- see program development, review integrated programs and budgets, resolve program- matic issues of mutual concern, and deal with substantive intelligence matters. As this modus operandi matures, we envision em- intelligence data no longer powering the service intelli- bypasses CINCs as it flows gence chiefs as Deputy from national level to Directors of Military Intelli- gence. In this way, they will service elements acquire recognized responsibility and authority to assist DOD SR–71. in the management of military intelligence as an integrated community for their respective warfare areas. making it reality by applying appropriate These reorganization efforts, coupled high-technology and providing a solid orga- with a rethinking of the way defense intelli- nizational underpinning—has also presented gence does business, meshes well with the a challenge. As we learned in restructuring new combat construct for regional contin- DIA, the concept was simple, but the devil gencies that has emerged recently. At the top was in the details. But this was clearly a con- of what Pacific Command calls the theater cept whose time had come. The challenges “two-tiered warfighting model” is the uni- to joint military intelligence today are much fied command which monitors the regional different from those of the Cold War years. military situation and provides direction as The community’s responses have also been well as strategic and operational focus for different. In short, we have returned to the forces in the theater. It also maintains com- basics of intelligence, and in doing so I be- batant command over associated JTFs. Be- lieve we have fundamentally changed our neath the unified command are service com- ways for the better. Most importantly the or- ponents that provide forces and sustain ganizational structures are sufficiently flexi- logistics for the theater, and JTFs which co- ble to sustain military intelligence into the ordinate activities of the combat forces and next century. To harken back to Baron provide direction to tactical forces. Rutherford, we in defense intelligence have To reiterate, intelligence data no longer not only begun to think, we have begun to bypass CINCs as it flows from national level act as well. JFQ to service elements in the field. National- level intelligence activities are centralized in NMJIC where service and intelligence community representatives are consolidated. Data funneled via NMJIC flows in turn through unified command JICs and on to JTFs, which significantly have subordinate to them not individual Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force components, but land, sea, air, and special operations forces. Achieving this level of jointness in peacetime has not been without its share of confusion. Likewise, overlaying this structure with a corresponding, complementary template for intelligence support—and then

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Is U.N. Peacekeeping a Growth Industry? By EUGENE V. ROSTOW

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The Treaty of Vienna called upon the leading powers to take three kinds of action: first, to hold regular meetings of the sovereigns or their ministers; second, to con- sult at those meetings about their common interests; and third, to agree “on measures most salutary for the repose and prosperity of the nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe.” This program recognized the special importance of the Great Powers because they have military strength but was meticulously based on the political fact that each state was deemed to be sovereign. Until 1914 the main European powers, sustained in their resolve by the fear of a new Napoleon, followed these prescriptions with remarkable success: they met in Congress from time to time, consulted about threats to the peace, and sometimes agreed on diplomatic or military measures to prevent war or to smother it in negotiations. Save in two instances—the Crimean War and the Franco- United Nations Prussian War—the new habits of the Concert everal recent articles in JFQ and of Europe prevailed, and even then concerted other military journals assume that Great Power diplomacy helped to keep those the sudden increase in the number wars brief and limited. and complexity of U.N. peacekeep- For most Americans the Concert of Eu- S rope is a dim and unattractive memory. The ing operations will continue indefinitely. Straight line projections are notoriously un- names of Castlereagh, Metternich, Talley- reliable as a basis for prediction, however. In rand, and Czar Alexander I, the chief dele- this instance, they are particularly unreli- gates to the Congress of Vienna, are hardly able, because the present trend raises serious household words. At most, those men are re- and difficult problems of law and policy, es- called as reactionary enemies of all the pecially for the permanent members of the causes most dear to the romantic liberalism U.N. Security Council. of the early 19th century. Their effort to out- The reasons for this judgment emerge law the slave trade is perhaps the only ex- sharply from even a brief review of the evo- ception to that grim verdict. lution of U.N. peacekeeping in the perspec- Yet the achievement of the Congress of tive of the policies supposed to govern such Vienna has turned out to be as creative and The U.N. Security far-sighted as that of the 55 men who met in Council in session. activities. The U.N. peacekeeping efforts in which we have lately been involved in So- Philadelphia in 1787 to write a new consti- malia, Bosnia, and Haiti are a sub-set of a tution for the United States. Between the much larger class of political and military ac- Congress of Vienna and 1914, the Concert tions, all of which are in fact intended to of Europe gave the world a century of gen- keep (or restore) peace. eral peace which proved hospitable to social As a matter of practical politics, the no- progress as it should be defined: the emer- tion that the major powers of the state sys- gence of democracy, end of slavery, accelera- tem at any given period have a special re- tion in vindicating the equality of women, sponsibility for keeping the peace was first development of trade unions and the wel- proclaimed in the Treaty of Vienna which fare state, and the flowering of science, brought the Napoleonic Wars to an end in learning, and the arts. 1815. The conception of peacekeeping The successors to the 19th century Euro- adopted by the Congress of Vienna was sim- pean statesmen, a group which now includes ple and clear cut. It remains the essence of the idea of peacekeeping today.

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American, Japanese, and Chinese members after disaster was brought on by the inepti- among others, can claim no such record. tude of governments, the forces of evil After violent exertions in two appalling wars emerged from their caves, and Russia, Italy, and a prolonged Cold War, they can claim Germany, and then Japan were taken over only that they barely managed to prevent by regimes of barbarism and aggression the death of world civilization. It remains to which threatened a return to the Dark Ages. be seen whether they can restore the health Gradually Western countries and the Soviet of the weakened polity which has survived. Union rallied and barely won World War II. In 1914, of course, the Concert of Eu- In 1919 the peacemakers had made the rope failed to prevent war. One of the reform of the Concert of Europe their first strongest considerations in President Wil- order of business at Versailles; in 1945, in son’s decision to lead the United States into San Francisco, they dealt similarly with what the war in 1917 was the conviction that the they perceived as the structural weaknesses Concert of Europe had to be institutional- of the League of Nations. This time, the ized and strengthened in order to make it an peacemakers were led by a Wilsonian Ameri- effective League to Keep the Peace. Wilson can government, which had worked with came to realize that, unless the United States Great Britain throughout the war to prepare commentary joined the Western Allies in the war, it the draft Charter of the United Nations. The would have no voice in the peace, and could Charter was in fact adopted even before the not therefore expect to help the Concert of war against Japan was quite finished. Europe develop into an effective interna- The U.N. Charter, going beyond the tional body capable of keeping the peace. Covenant of the League of Nations, flatly For Wilson, this was America’s most vital prohibits the use of force against the territo- stake in the outcome of the war. rial integrity or political independence of The League of Nations was created in any state. The Security Council is vested 1919 as a new Concert of Europe, this time with “primary responsibility” for keeping on a world scale. It was in continuous ses- the peace and endowed with two kinds of sion, had an independent secretariat, and power for achieving that goal: the peaceful embodied the idealism of the Peace Move- methods of conciliation, mediation, adjudi- ment; but its only instruments for action cation, and diplomacy listed in chapter VI of were those of the Concert of Europe—con- the Charter, and, when diplomacy fails, the sultation, persuasion, and recommending novel authority to use military and eco- peacekeeping measures to member states. nomic pressure provided for in chapter VII. The United States was not a member of the So far as the use of armed force is con- League, and the Soviet Union was not ad- cerned, chapter VII provides two equally legal mitted until 1934. And most important of methods for using military force to carry out all, neither the United States nor its West Eu- the Charter rule against aggression. The Secu- ropean allies were ready to accept the bur- rity Council, through the Military Committee dens of peacekeeping in the world of trou- and Secretary General, can conduct enforce- bles which emerged from the wreckage of ment actions which could range in severity World War I. from breaking diplomatic relations to full The history of the two decades between scale war. The Charter provides detailed pro- the wars is a chronicle of almost unrelieved cedures for serious military operations. Under human folly. There was a widespread loss of article 43, member states can make special confidence, nerve, and will among the gov- agreements with the Security Council to pro- erning classes of all the countries. As disaster vide the necessary force. Those troops could be called on by the Security Council when needed and would operate under U.N. com- Eugene V. Rostow is Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs Emeri- mand. While the founders of the United Na- tus at Yale University and Research Professor of Law and Diplomacy tions assumed that enforcement actions by at the National Defense University. His latest book was published the Security Council would be the normal simultaneously by Yale University Press as Toward Managed Peace: The and perhaps nearly the exclusive way to keep National Security Interests of the United States, 1759 to the Present, the peace, the elaborate procedures of chapter and by National Defense University Press as A Breakfast for Bonaparte: U.S. National Security Interests from the Heights of Abraham to the Nuclear Age.

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VII have never in fact been used. Despite the law and the Charter to defend themselves passionate hopes attached to the Wilsonian against breaches of the peace until the Secu- idea, those articles are and will almost surely rity Council has acted effectively to restore remain a dead letter. They have been tried in the peace. Thus the states would not be pow- the crucible of experience and found want- erless to resist aggression if the Security ing. The great power veto, indispensable to Council could not for any reason undertake the existence of the organization, makes it to enforce the peace itself. impossible for a state to rely with confidence Neither the Security Council nor Inter- on the United Nations as the guarantor of its national Court of Justice has as yet clearly security. And quite apart from the veto, the indicated how long a period the Security tenacious force of nationalism makes any- Council has under article 51 before the right thing like consistent unanimity in the Secu- of self-defense may be required to yield to a rity Council nearly inconceivable. Security Council enforcement action. A few The Charter rule against aggression has people have contended that the right of self- been enforced since 1945, when enforced at defense is suspended in effect when a com- all, by actions of individual or collective self- plaint is put on the Security Council’s defense conducted by victims of aggression docket. This is an absurdly narrow reading of and their friends without permission of the the language and policy of article 51.1 Cer- Security Council. In Korea (1950–54) and tainly state practice gives no support for the Gulf War (1991– ) such campaigns such a view. In the long cycle of Arab wars of self-defense have been against Israel, for example, it has never been peacekeeping forces are blessed by the Security Council, suggested that Israel lost its right of self-de- lightly armed troops a move which was welcome to fense when the Security Council took cog- the victims of aggression and nizance of the conflict and put it on the for police actions in aid their friends but legally unnec- docket. As the ultimate buckler of sov- of diplomacy essary. Nonetheless, those votes ereignty, the right of self-defense cannot be of approval by the Security impaired so lightly, especially if the Security Council have been of enormous emotional Council is relying on inadequate or ineffec- and political significance in invoking U.N. tual measures to restore the peace. symbolism, however mythical. The point is The only way the state’s inherent right of capital importance, because one fre- of self-defense can be forced to yield to a quently comes across the statement that the Security Council enforcement action is by a Security Council is the sole source of legiti- Security Council resolution “deciding” that macy for all peacekeeping operations. the action of self-defense has itself become a Article 51 provides that nothing in the breach of the peace. Such a resolution would Charter “shall impair the inherent right of of course be subject to a great power veto. individual or collective self-defense...until There is a third category of uses of force the Security Council has taken measures nec- considered legal under the Charter, peacekeep- essary to maintain international peace and ing actions recommended by the Security security.” The reason for this provision of the Council or indeed by the General Charter is obvious. The document’s drafters Assembly. In the U.N. vocabulary, peacekeep- were acutely aware that the enforcement pro- ing forces are lightly armed troops for cedures of the League of Nations had failed. demonstrations or police actions in aid of The enforcement articles of chapter VII were diplomacy—the deployment of U.N. forces designed to remedy the perceived weaknesses between belligerents to help monitor a cease- of the League Covenant. The San Francisco fire agreement or demilitarized zone, for ex- Conference which produced the Charter in ample. One U.N. official calls it a “non-coer- 1945 realized, however, that its bold and in- cive instrument of conflict control,” 2 a novative enforcement procedures might in definition which accurately characterizes the turn fail. They therefore underscored the im- policy Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold portance of what is called the inherent right and the Security Council of his day thought of states both under customary international they were applying when they invented it shortly after the Suez Crisis of 1956, and then tried to use it again in the Congo crisis of the early 1960s. Hammerskjold called

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these operations chapter six-and-a-half proce- The final days before the Six-Day War of dures, a way of moving from the entirely June 1967 reveal how dangerous and unreal- peaceful methods of chapter VI to the far dif- istic Hammarskjold’s second rule can be. The ferent measures of chapter VII. U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) had been es- In Hammerskjold’s view, U.N. peace- tablished after the Suez War of 1956 to pa- keeping operations could be conducted only trol an area between Israeli and Egyptian with the consent of states where they were forces along the Eastern border of the Sinai to take place. The force was to be scrupu- Desert. As worldwide anxiety focused on the lously neutral between the parties and use Arab forces being deployed in Sinai positions deadly force only to defend itself or perhaps to attack Israel, Egyptian President Nasser its U.N. mandate. asked U.N. Secretary General U Thant to re- The Charter makes no express provision move the UNEF troops from parts of the de for U.N. peacekeeping activities of this kind. facto Israeli-Egyptian border. In all probabil- But the International Court of Justice has de- ity, Nasser expected to be restrained by the cided that the General Assembly or the Secu- strong pressure of the Western powers not to rity Council have broad implied authority to start a war. The Secretary General took the organize and use such forces as they may position that if Nasser wanted part of the commentary deem “necessary and proper” in order to UNEF forces removed, he would have to re- carry out diplomatic efforts to promote the move them all. This was done over the furi- peaceful settlement of disputes. The Interna- ous protest of President Johnson, and the tional Court of Justice has said with empha- Six-Day War became inevitable. sis that such uses of force are not enforcement The recent crop of peacekeeping opera- actions, but are legitimate activities of the or- tions has blurred the distinction between ganization, part of its armory of diplomatic chapter VI and VII in U.N. practice. If peace- methods for resolving disputes under chap- keepers are authorized by the Security Coun- ter VI by peaceful means.3 cil to use force on a considerable scale, it is The first two large-scale U.N. peacekeep- no longer possible to pretend that they are ing exercises took place in the Middle East present in host states only with their permis- after the Suez Crisis and in the Congo dur- sion and only as neutrals. The Congo ing the 1960s. Both ended in recrimination episode of 1960–64 dramatizes this dilemma. and controversy. Immediately after Belgium liberated the The Secretary General at the time, Dag Belgian Congo in 1960 to become the Repub- Hammarskjold, instructed peacekeepers to lic of the Congo, the rich province of Katanga take no sides in the Congo civil war, save to formally seceded with the help of some Bel- make sure that Belgian or other non-Con- gian officers and European mercenaries golese forces did not participate. Not unnat- claiming recognition as an independent re- urally, it proved difficult to reconcile these public. The Security Council, taking jurisdic- goals, and in the end some U.N. peacekeep- tion at the request of the Secretary General, ers used a considerable amount of force to undertook to help maintain the territorial in- defeat white mercenaries and others who tegrity and political independence of the Re- were helping the secessionist government of public of the Congo within its original Katanga province. The Congolese govern- boundaries, assist in maintaining order, se- ment prevailed, and the civil war ended. But cure the withdrawal of foreign troops and it took an opinion of the International mercenaries, and prevent civil war. Clearly Se- Court of Justice to persuade the French and curity Council policy in the Congo, Somalia, Soviets to pay their assessed share of the Haiti, and Bosnia went beyond the neutral costs for the operation. They had refused to posture for peacekeeping forces which had pay because they thought the peacekeeping been deemed mandatory at an earlier point. effort was illegal under the Charter. There is It is hardly self-evident that U.N. forces still an active controversy about who or- should be or can be neutral between aggres- dered the final attack but no controversy sor and victim. Will the legal advisors of for- about the outcome. eign offices acquiesce in so radical a change in the legal distinction between chapter VI and VII? Can the Security Council authorize peace enforcement actions not through the

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special procedures foreseen by article 43, but directed by NATO arrangements for com- through procedures which have emerged in mand and control, not those of the United recent peacekeeping episodes? Is the proce- Nations. That being the case, why should dure prescribed by article 43 mandatory? NATO go through the slow, difficult, and Does it embody a fundamental principle of uncertain process required for a Security policy? As a matter of usage, will peacekeeping Council resolution of prior approval? operations of this kind become the equiva- What bearing does the U.N. experience lent of what have always been regarded as en- with peacekeeping operations of this kind forcement actions? have on the universal aspiration for an effec- The issue will arise shortly if the Security tive system of collective security against ag- Council utilizes the precedent of its practice gression? For large-scale military operations in dealing with the crises in Somalia and like those in Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, or the Per- what once was Yugoslavia as a way of dealing sian Gulf, arrangements of collective self-de- with the urgent problem of failing states, that fense offer the only practicable way toward ef- is, states which the Council finds are inca- fectiveness in enforcing the Charter rule pable of meeting their international responsi- against aggression. Since the procedures of ar- bilities. This is the most striking procedural ticle 43 are not available for reasons men- development and potentially most important tioned earlier it behooves the states to give up substantive development in the recent peace- the quest for a new mechanism, a new bu- keeping practice of the United Nations. reaucracy, which might prevail where the The loose and flexible procedures which League of Nations, Security Council, and the Security Council has pursued in estab- other institutional devices have failed. In this lishing and managing peacekeeping opera- realm, wisdom comes with the realization that tions since the Congo in- while Woodrow Wilson’s insight was correct why should NATO go through cident thirty years ago in viewing the failure of the Concert of Eu- raise the question with rope to find a diplomatic solution for the crisis the process required for a which we began: the which followed the archduke’s murder in Security Council resolution equal legality and legiti- 1914 as the proximate cause of World War I, macy under the Charter his remedy for reforming the Concert was of enforcement actions and actions of collec- misconceived. Neither the shortcomings of tive self-defense in carrying out the Charter the Concert of Europe nor the United Nations rule against aggression. The point is under- can be cured by a new institution and a new scored by the willingness of the Council to bureaucracy, or by reinforcing the Security delegate to NATO the military responsibility Council’s power to pass legally binding deci- for carrying out a peace agreement for sions. In its nature, the state system is still a Bosnia, if one is made. congeries of sovereign states, which can be led Under the Charter, members of NATO only by the achievement of consensus among have the right to use force in the former ter- its leaders. Its basic procedures are still the ritories of Yugoslavia to defeat and reverse meetings, consultations, and recommenda- the consequences there of aggressive acts tions of the Concert of Europe, not the com- and other violations of the laws of war commands of a non-existent sovereign. For peace- mitted during the last two years by Serbia keeping, the model of the Concert of Europe and Croatia. The consent of the Security is far more realistic and relevant than all the Council would not be required for such an well intentioned experiments in building the action on the part of NATO. international machinery of a superstate. JFQ The permanent members of the Security Council would have to resist any attempt by NOTES the Secretary General to establish a rule re- 1 Eugene V. Rostow, “Until What? Enforcement Ac- quiring Security Council authority before tion or Collective Self Defense?,” American Journal of In- NATO undertakes an action of collective self- ternational Law, vol. 85 (1991), p. 505. 2 Shashi Tharoor, “Peace-Keeping Principles, Prob- defense which raises a fundamental ques- lems, Prospect,” Naval War College Review, vol. 47, no. 2 tion. Such a rule would violate the basic (Spring 1994), pp. 9, 10. principle of article 51 of the Charter. As Sec- 3 “Certain Expenses of the United Nations,” Interna- retary of Defense William Perry has recently tional Court of Justice, July 20, 1962, pp. 151, 165–66. made clear, NATO forces in Bosnia would be

Spring 1994 / JFQ 105 ARTICLE TITLE OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

General Nathan Farragut Twining, USAF (1897–1982) Chief of Staff of the Air Force Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

VITA

Born in Monroe, Wisconsin. Graduated from U.S. Military Academy (1918). Attended Infantry School and served as company commander, 29th Infantry (1919–22). Instructor, Air Corps Primary Flying School (1924–30). Pilot and squadron commander (1930–35). Attended Air Corps Tactical School and Command and General Staff School (1935–37). Air Corps technical supervisor (1937–40). Technical Inspection Section, Office Chief of Air Corps, and assistant executive officer to Chief of Staff of the Army Air Force (1940–42). Chief of Staff, Army Air Forces, South Pacific. Commanded 13th Air Force; 15th Air Force, Mediterranean Theater; and 20th Air Force (1942–45). Commanding General, Air Materiel Command (1945–47). Commander in Chief, Alaskan Command (1947–50). Vice Chief of Staff (1950–53) and Chief of Staff of the Air Force (1953–57). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1957–60). Worked for development of aircraft, missiles, and weapons. Advocated Eisenhower’s policy of extensive but not exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons. Term as Chairman marked by crises in Lebanon and on Quemoy and Matsu. Played leading role in DOD Reorganization Act of 1958. Died at Lackland Air Force Base.

In 1948 the Nation’s first Secretary of Defense, James D.

Forrestal, ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a sabbatical at Courtesy of USAF Art Collection Key West, Florida, for an intellectual reassessment of roles and Portrait of General missions of the Armed Forces. He hoped for a solution to the increasingly ugly internal strug- Nathan F. Twining by gle for resources. Unfortunately, no such solution came from the meeting. When reduced to Robert Brackman. the actual meaning of the many words of the document, the mission of the Army was only re- stated to be the defeat of enemy ground forces; the Navy’s was to be control of the seas; and the Air Force was charged with securing and controlling the air. These missions and their service assignments were, of course, precisely the same prior to Key West. This redefinition of the roles and missions apparently failed to consider, or to strike at, the real core of interservice rivalry. It would seem, from agreements reached, that some fears had been expressed that one service might cannibalize another. But I don’t believe that any responsible military chief of service ever actually entertained such an intention except, perhaps, as a “paper exercise.” The complexities of modern war would absolutely prohibit a one-service or two-service system.

— From Neither Liberty Nor Safety: A Hard Look at U.S. Military Policy and Strategy by Nathan F. Twining

106106 JFQJFQ/ Spring/ Spring 1994 1994 FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

force mix that replicates proven capabilities for- provided vast logistical support to the Marines merly provided by carriers and amphibious as well as the other services (the amount of am- forces alone. munition alone would stagger the average Letters... The value of AJFP is in cost-saving synergism reader of JFQ ). Members of every service put and the expanded range of capabilities put at a aside parochial views and did what was best for CINC’s disposal. Fragmenting capabilities by re- the Nation and the coalition—and their deeds quiring joint forces to compete for scarce space speak louder than words. aboard sea-based assets or substituting less ca- The Goldwater-Nichols Act is not a panacea, Rewrapping Joint pable assets does not provide the appropriate but it provided for much better coordination Packages force or take advantage of the true capabilities among the services in the Gulf War than in pre- To the Editor—The British once thought of naval forces. vious conflicts. No member of the Armed Forces that an adequate presence in the Falkland Is- One need only remember the dilemma faced should have to pay with his or her blood for the lands could be provided by residual marine de- by the Royal Marines in the Falklands to grasp ego of their leaders. I hope and pray that we fix tachments, the occasional visit of a nuclear sub- the real importance of forces and equipment de- the problems identified in the numerous after- marine or surface combatant, and long-range signed to operate in consonance. When they action reports on Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In military overflights. Argentina’s invasion caused wanted to use amphibious assault capabilities my opinion true jointness will not occur until Whitehall to regret its decision to reduce forward on HMS Hermes, the British marines found that leaders put parochialism aside and do what is based assets. Some recent articles on the Adap- the decks, normally crowded with helicopters, best for our soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, tive Joint Force Package (AJFP) concept ignore had been commandeered for a fleet air-to-air and ultimately the Nation. the lessons of the Falklands. The article by Ad- defense mission instead of amphibious assault. —LTG C.A.H. Waller, USA (Ret.) miral P.D. Miller in the inaugural issue of JFQ The Royal Marines were not properly utilized and The writer served as Deputy CINCCENT during (Summer 93), for instance, minimized the nega- the Sea Harriers launched from HMS Hermes Desert Shield/Desert Storm. tive implications of this concept without indicat- were not overly effective in stopping the Argen- ing what the terms presence and deterrence ac- tinean air force. To the Editor—Bernard Trainor’s essay tually mean. AJFP remains a good idea. Once we deter- entitled “Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf AJFP is not a panacea for doing the same mine what levels of joint force replicate carriers War” (JFQ, Winter 93–94) offers a good analysis with less. Forward presence means deploying and amphibious forces, it will be a great idea. It of jointness in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. How- credible assets where they can be best used in a is dangerous to experiment with the require- ever, he makes two assumptions that are incor- crisis. They serve simply through their existence ments of warfighting CINCs prior to reaching a rect and detract from his thesis. to deter would-be aggressors. No one has yet consensus on what sort of AJFP is an adequate The first is his discussion of the Joint Forces determined the point at which credibility is substitute for traditional forces. While AJFPs are Air Component Commander (JFACC). Here he stretched to incredulity. Some aggressors are a consequence of fiscal constraints, we must attributes to Air Force biases the centralized only deterred by what they can see. To claim avoid being lulled into a false sense of security. control of air power and attacks against only tar- that bombers in Louisiana provide the same It is better to model and simulate AJFP ideals gets that planners believed critical to the overall level of deterrence as forward deployed carriers before going to sea. We do not want to find our- campaign, citing the unhappiness of both the and amphibious ready groups with embarked selves in a situation similar to that which the Army and Marines with targeting. The CINC de- Marines looming on the horizon tests the imagi- British confronted off the Falkland Islands when termined targets for the strategic air campaign nation. Yet the proponents of the AJFP concept they needed a carrier and had to make do with from JFACC input and reviewed JFACC planning, continue to argue that this is possible. something else. particularly where no agreement existed among Fiscal austerity obviously requires warfighting —Maj C.P. Neimeyer, USMC component commanders. For example, he allo- CINCs to take advantage of all the forces at Plans Division cated sorties to soften up the Iraqi Republican hand. However, cobbling together disparate Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Guard against the advice of his Air Component companies, squadrons, and detachments as the Commander. It is important not to interpret dis- tip of the American spear is a recipe for disaster. Joint Acculturation satisfaction with the decisions of a CINC as a It is worth recalling the problems encountered by I read Bernard Trainor’s ar- lack of jointness when the issue really reflects joint forces at Koh Tang Island in 1975 and To the Editor— ticle on service culture and the Gulf War (see joint control of air assets. Desert One in 1980. Out of Joint, JFQ, Winter 93–94), and while it is Second, Trainor compares the NATO heritage Other AJFP advocates insist that single-ser- an excellent piece, I’m compelled to offer a few of VII Corps with the greater flexibility of the vice force packages can be adapted by selecting further details on things which he neglected to Marines. He incorrectly attributes the delay of VII capabilities to meet specific requirements. One mention. CINC may require a carrier while another needs While most participants will admit that, as a tailored amphibious group supported by mis- Trainor indicated, not everything associated with sile-firing ships and submarines. But it is a rare jointness went perfectly in Desert Shield/Desert JFQ welcomes your CINC who would accept a less capable deterrent Storm, some things were a cause for pride. The force. The problem is one of definition. What letters and comments. Write or Marines did a splendid job in reaching Kuwait AJFP can replicate the capabilities of carriers FAX your correspondence to City, assisted by the magnificent performance of and amphibious forces? Can Atlantic Command the Army’s Tiger Brigade. Moreover, the Army (202) 475–1012/ convince a CINC that AJFP capabilities meet his requirements? Despite similar past experiments DSN 335–1012. we have yet to determine the appropriate joint

Spring 1994 / JFQ 107 Corps to meticulous planning and deliberate Joint Professional Military Educa- Education synchronization required by NATO procedures. tion is focused on the integrated em- The rapid advance into Kuwait took advantage ployment of land, sea, air, space, and of the Marines’ superior offensive capability. THE ABCs OF JPME special operations forces. It refers to Further out on the arc, VII Corps had to travel a There is a lot of misunderstand- PME taught in a joint environment, greater distance and wait for support units to ing about joint education. Part of it by a joint faculty, to a joint student catch up. The logistical problems are docu- involves confusion over five interre- body, and from a joint perspective. mented, including the limited ability of support lated terms, namely, joint matters, Normally when the term joint is used units to operate at night. In retrospect any Joint Professional Military Education with PME it refers to equal represen- operation can be improved, but in this instance (JPME), the Program of Joint Education tation from all services. The three it is incorrect to fault the inflexibility of NATO (PJE), the Process for Accreditation of JPME institutions are constituent procedures or lack of jointness. Joint Education (PAJE), and Profes- colleges of the National Defense —Gen James P. McCarthy, USAF (Ret.) sional Military Education (PME). An- University (NDU): the National War Olin Professor of National Security other area of misunderstanding con- College (NWC), the Industrial Col- Department of Political Science cerns educational requirements for lege of the Armed Forces (ICAF), and U.S. Air Force Academy promotion or designation as a Joint the Armed Forces Staff College Specialty Officer (JSO). A third area (AFSC). These colleges are supervised To the Editor—Both “Jointness, Service centers on the responsibilities of the by CJCS through the President, Culture, and the Gulf War” by Bernard Trainor Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff NDU, and are fully joint in mission and “The Single Manager for Air in Vietnam” by (CJCS) for education as opposed to and orientation. A joint college, Willard Webb (JFQ, Winter 93–94) highlight those of the service chiefs. The fol- school, or course is used by two or lessons learned—and relearned—on managing lowing is an attempt to clarify these more services and has a joint faculty. air assets, from World War II to Vietnam and the areas of misunderstanding. Both the Joint Military Intelligence Gulf War. While acting as Battle Group O–5 College and the Defense Systems JFACC representative in Dhahran during the final The Terminology Management College are examples days of Desert Storm, I helped establish the first The terms mentioned above— of joint colleges, but they are not JFACC structure on USS Lincoln and participated namely, joint matters, JPME, PJE, JPME institutions. JPME colleges in the JFACC doctrine working group. The per- PAJE, and PME—are defined in teach joint matters as part of their spectives provided by both Trainor and Webb Chairman’s Memorandum (CM) overall curricula and approach PME would have been valuable in my daily interaction 1618–93, “Military Education Policy from a joint as opposed to a service with the other services. I applaud JFQ for mak- Document” (MEPD), which was is- perspective. Only JPME institutions ing this information and analysis on joint opera- sued on March 23, 1993. Together offer phase II of the Program for tions available. with the services, defense agencies, Joint Education (PJE) because of the —CAPT C.R. Rondestvedt, USN and CINC’s, CJCS used the law and congressionally mandated require- Commanding Officer the intent of Congress to define ment regarding the mix of students Service Schools Command these terms. and faculty and the joint focus of Joint matters relate to the inte- their curricula which develops the To the Editor—I’m not surprised that grated employment of active and Re- joint attitudes and values required in some readers have quibbled over my essay on serve component land, sea, air, phase II. jointness and service culture (JFQ, Winter space, and special operations forces, The Program for Joint Education 93–94). It is a complex issue that defies di- national security strategy, national prescribes the joint curricula, stu- gested treatment. The thrust of my piece was military strategy, strategic and con- dent-faculty mixes and ratios, semi- not that jointness failed in the Gulf, but rather tingency planning, command of nar service mixes, standards, and that service culture was a driving influence. The combat operations under unified learning objectives for all PME at lesson is that culture should not be suppressed commands, and joint force develop- both intermediate and senior levels or jointness abandoned, rather that jointness ment. The term joint matters is fun- designed to qualify officers for JSO must harness the vitality of service culture. damental because of the emphasis designation. The NWC and ICAF I would suggest that critics suspend final put on it by the Goldwater-Nichols curricula encompass both phases of judgment until they read my forthcoming book, DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. PJE. Other institutions as approved The Generals’ War, when it is published later this Title 10, chapter 38, of the act by CJCS conduct PJE phase I and year. The points contained in my essay are fully (“Joint Officer Management”) makes AFSC conducts PJE phase II. Officers addressed there and evidence supporting my several specific references to joint must complete both phases of PJE to thesis will, I trust, convince objective readers. matters. It is important because an meet the educational requirements for JSO qualification. Phase I is in- —LtGen Bernard Trainor, USMC (Ret.) individual must be educationally corporated into curricula both at in- Director, National Security Program qualified in joint matters to become termediate and senior service col- John F. Kennedy School of a Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). leges and in other appropriate Government educational programs which meet Harvard University PJE criteria and are accredited by CJCS. Phase II complements phase I,

108 JFQ / Spring 1994 is taught at AFSC at the intermediate It considers the military, political, Joint Staff as well as those who are and senior levels, and is integrated, economic, social, and psychological JSOs must be promoted at a rate no along with phase I, into both the dimensions of strategy with an em- less than that for officers who NWC and ICAF curricula. In actual- phasis on the planning and conduct presently or previously were on ser- ity PJE can be thought of as that part of war, service organization, joint and vice staffs. Officers who are not JSOs of the overall curriculum which cov- combined operations, force employ- but who either are serving now or ers the specific joint matters men- ment and deployment concepts, and have served in joint duty assign- tioned above. military leadership. ments other than the Joint Staff The Program for Accreditation of For simplicity, PME can be must be promoted at a rate no less Joint Education is a CJCS-approved thought of as having two compo- than service averages. Thus, with the process to assess the conduct of PJE. nents: joint PME (JPME) and service exception of needing joint educa- Though the Military Education Divi- PME. JPME, as previously discussed, tion to become a JSO, joint educa- sion (J-7), Joint Staff, is thoroughly has a joint focus in a joint environ- tion does little to determine promo- involved in administering PAJE, it is ment while service PME has a service tion. Additionally, nearly half of all not a J-7 process. PAJE teams gather focus and is taught in a service envi- joint duty assignments do not have data and make recommendations to ronment. JPME and service PME to be filled by officers with a joint CJCS who appoints PAJE team mem- must each include a component in education or who intend being bers based on nominations received their curriculum called the PJE. As nominated for JSO designation. Fur- from the services and the Office of part of that PJE there are specific thermore, over 80 percent of the re- the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In goals for the composition of faculty maining joint duty assignments can addition, OSD plays a visible and and students and, most importantly, be filled by JSO nominees. In sum, continuous role in PAJE, from partic- teaching joint matters (as defined less than 11 percent of joint duty as- ipating in visits to reviewing recom- above and verified by the PAJE). signments must be filled by fully mendations to CJCS. PAJE is de- qualified JSOs. If one concludes that signed to approximate the civilian Joint Education and there is a better chance of getting education accreditation process. It Promotion promoted due to jointness, it is joint begins with an extensive self-study The second area of misunder- duty assignments (especially those by the institution under evaluation standing is the joint education re- on the Joint Staff) and not joint edu- and then involves an on-site review quirement for promotion or designa- cational programs which are at by PAJE team members which is fol- tion as a JSO. These are personnel cause. Having phases I and II can lowed by a recurring cycle of contin- issues, not educational issues. Again, help get a joint duty assignment, but uous improvement. The process in- Goldwater-Nichols directed estab- without JSO designation or assign- cludes an independent advisor from lishment of the joint officer spe- ment to the Joint Staff promotion the civilian sector who is included to cialty and specific requirements for rates are the same as service aver- ensure that a non-DOD opinion is JSOs. One requirement, mentioned ages. Many select, competitive ser- considered in the overall recommen- earlier, is completion of PJE. Meeting vice positions (such as command) dation. Additionally, all PAJE team the educational requirement, com- have higher promotion rates than members are given specific accredi- bined with a joint duty assignment those for joint positions. tation training prior to participation. and being nominated, leads to board Recommendations to CJCS either for selection for JSO designation. There The Role of CJCS or against accreditation as a phase I are other paths to JSO designation, The third area of misunder- or phase II program come from a yet this is the most common and is standing concerns the educational group including the independent preferred by Congress. While com- responsibilities of CJCS as opposed to advisor, Director of the Joint Staff, pleting PJE phases I and II are key those of the services. Here again the Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for steps in the process of becoming a key sources are the Goldwater- Military Education, and a senior JSO, both the joint duty assignment Nichols Act, the Skelton House panel OSD official. and the nomination procedure are report, and MEPD. Title 10, National Professional Military Education is of equal importance. But simply Defense Authorization Act (“Doc- related to all of the above. PME pro- completing both phases of the PJE trine, Training, and Education”), lists vides individuals with skills, knowl- does not make one qualified for a the responsibilities of CJCS as devel- edge, understanding, and apprecia- joint duty assignment or JSO nomi- oping doctrine for the joint employ- tion that enable them to make sound nation. ment of the Armed Forces, formulat- decisions in progressively more de- Specific rules established in the ing policies and the joint training of manding command and staff posi- Goldwater Nichols Act govern as- the Armed Forces, and formulating tions within the national security en- signment and promotion of officers policies for coordinating the military vironment. PME has as its primary with a joint specialty. The rules re- education and training of members theme the employment of combat quire that officers who either of the Armed Forces. forces, with strategy being increas- presently or previously served on the Publishing MEPD fulfills these ingly emphasized at the intermediate, responsibilities under Title 10 with senior, and general/flag officer levels.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 109 respect to formulating policies. One of Perhaps discussing JPME terminology the most important elements of will open the way. Further informa- POSTGRADUATE MEPD is the military framework tion may be found in the Goldwater- chart outlining education from pre- Nichols Act, House panel report, or INTELLIGENCE commissioning through general/flag MEPD. Questions on JPME should be PROGRAM officer. The Skelton panel report directed to military personnel offices. Starting this autumn the Joint tasked CJCS to review and revise cur- —Contributed by Military Intelligence College (JMIC) ricula at NDU colleges and joint Lt Col David E. Muhleman, USAF will offer a Postgraduate Intelligence matters (PJE) at service colleges. Military Education Division (J-7) Program and Master of Science of Also, CJCS was tasked to establish Joint Staff JFQ Strategic Intelligence Program on a criteria and standards for PJE phases structured part-time basis. JMIC is an I and II and to determine through accredited institution located on PAJE which programs were accred- INSTITUTE FOR Bolling Air Force Base in Washington. ited for PJE credit (that is, education- The curriculum will include ally qualifying for JSO designation). JOINT WARFARE courses in intelligence and national The Chairman’s responsibilities ANALYSIS security policy, intelligence and do not overlap with service responsi- strategy, intelligence analysis, intelli- bilities. The Chairman is not respon- The Naval Postgraduate School gence organization and resource sible for developing or accrediting (NPS) in Monterey, California, is de- management, intelligence collec- the service portion of PME. Service- veloping a program in Joint Warfare tion, the international environment, unique PME continues to be a re- Analysis. Its main thrust is to intro- and electives. Students can complete sponsibility of the service secretaries duce joint warfare into academic the Master’s degree in two years. and chiefs, and extends to issues courses in order to graduate military Classes include two three-hour ses- ranging from curricular design to se- and civilian students who are famil- sions each Saturday for ten weeks lection and tenure of commandants. iar with joint matters. In support of per academic term, four terms each This distinction is important when this effort NPS has established the year. Course work can be completed discussing PJE, PAJE, and MEPD. The Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis in seven consecutive quarters with Chairman is only one user of the to serve as a focal point for faculty an eighth quarter dedicated to com- graduates from the PME institutions and student research. Each student pleting the thesis. administered by the services. is required to complete a research Admissions are competitive; the Additionally, there are several thesis to receive the Master’s Degree tentative deadline for application types of military education other at NPS, and the institute will direct packages is July 1, 1994. For more in- than intermediate (command and research in the area of joint and formation, please contact the Admis- staff) and senior (war) colleges, in- combined warfare. sions Officer, LT Thomas Van Wagner, cluding other educational and tech- To facilitate research certain USN, at (202) 373–3299. JFQ nical institutions, enlisted PME focus issues are being developed. courses, branch and specialty schools, These issues cross not only service and service academies, ROTC, and lines, but also the boundaries of aca- OCS programs. Technically, CJCS has demic disciplines. For instance, a MILITARY HISTORY responsibility for coordinating the campus-wide group has been study- SYMPOSIUM policies affecting these educational ing theater ballistic missile defense areas, but past chairmen and the cur- which fostered theses in the fields of The U.S. Air Force Academy will th rent CJCS have left close oversight to operations research, combat systems, hold the 16 Military History Sym- 4 the parent services. However, MEPD joint C I, and space operations. Pro- posium, “Tooling for War: Military addresses these areas, and contact be- posed focus issues for future study Transformation in the Industrial tween the Joint Staff and these insti- include information warfare, joint Age,” on September 21–23, 1994. For tutions is ongoing. logistics, offensive operations, and more details contact Major John T. In attempting to clarify the expeditionary warfare. Farquhar, USAF, at HQ USAFA/DFH, common misunderstanding about In addition to research, the in- 2354 Fairchild Drive (Suite 6F37), joint education it has not been possi- stitute will assist in course develop- U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado ble to offer an exhaustive treatment ment and the publication of joint 80840–6246; or call: (719) 472–3230/ of the subject. Many other issues, material as well as serve as a center FAX (719) 472–2970. JFQ such as the Joint Duty Assignment for visiting scholars working in the List (JDAL), joint credit for service in joint arena. For more information Operations Desert Shield/Desert concerning this program, contact the Storm, waivers, and Critical Occupa- Dean of Instruction, Richard Elster, tional Specialties, also affect officers. at (408) 656–2391, or the Director of the Institute, CAPT George Conner, USN, at (408) 656–3306. JFQ

110 JFQ / Spring 1994 Documentation JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT The following tables were included in the DOD Joint Officer Management Annual Report for FY93 which was published as appendix E (“Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Report”) to the Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress (January 1994).

Summary of Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) and Joint Specialty Officer Nominee Designations for FY93 Category Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps Total Number of officers designated as JSOs* 234 33 * 0 0 267 Number of officers designated as JSO nominees 388 207 703 0 1,298 Number of JSO nominees designated under Critical Occupational Specialty provisions 309 138 387 0 834

* A total of 108 Navy officers designated as JSOs on October 21, 1993 will be reported in FY94.

Critical Occupational Specialties (COS) Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps Infantry Surface Pilot Infantry Armor Submariner Navigator Tanks/Amphibious Armored Vehicle Artillery Aviation Air Weapons Director* Artillery* Air Defense Artillery SEALS Missile Operations Air Control/Air Support/Antiair* Aviation Special Operations Space Operations Aviation Special Operations Operations Management Engineers Combat Engineers

* Specialties with a severe shortage of officers.

Summary of Officers on Active Duty with a Critical Occupational Specialty (COS) as of September 30, 1993 Category Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps Total COS officers who have completed the Program for Joint Education (PJE) 1,542 1,196 1,626 490 4,854 COS officers designated as JSOs 1,537 1,220 1,269 574 4,600 COS officers designated as JSO nominees 1,481 1,337 2,122 344 5,284 COS officers designated as JSO nominees who have not completed PJE 1,071 1,042 1,427 199 3,739 COS JSO nominees currently serving in a Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) 686 645 925 135 2,391 COS JSO nominees who completed a JDA and are currently attending PJE 3 1 10 1 15

Average Length of Tours of Duty in Joint Duty Assignments (JDAs) for FY93 (in months) Joint Staff Other Joint Joint Total General/Flag Officers Army 26.7 27.6 27.3 Navy 20.3 27.1 26.0 Air Force 24.1 29.6 28.5 Marine Corps 24.9 20.2 22.2 All services 24.5 27.7 26.9 Field Grade Officers Army 36.3 38.4 38.1 Navy 34.6 38.9 38.3 Air Force 37.1 40.0 39.7 Marine Corps 37.8 38.7 38.6 All services 36.3 39.2 38.9

Spring 1994 / JFQ 111 Documentation—continued

Joint Duty Position Distribution by Service as of September 30, 1993 Joint Staff Other Joint Duty Total Joint Duty Total JDAs % Total Officers % * Army 274 2,866 3,140 34.5 % 30.3 % Navy 221 1,723 1,944 21.4 % 26.0 % Air Force 282 3,204 3,486 38.3 % 37.8 % Marine Corps 64 461 525 5.8 % 5.9 % All services 841 8,254 9,095 100. % 100. %

* Total officers O3 through O10.

Critical Positions Summary as of September 30, 1993 Category Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps All services Total critical positions 387. 188. 364. 61. 1,000 Number of vacant positions 63. 19. 85. 7. 174 Number of critical positions filled by JSOs (percent filled) 277.(87 %) 138.(82 %) 239.(86 %) 38.(75 %) 692.(84 %) Number of critical positions not filled by JSOs 43. 30. 38. 16. 127 Percent critical positions filled by JSOs (since January 1, 1989) .85 % .82 % .86 % .70 % .84 %

Program for Joint Education (PJE) Phase II Summary (FY93) Category Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps All services Total critical positions 387. 188. 364. 61. 1,000 Students graduating from Armed Forces Staff College in FY93 292. 169. 333. 47. 841. Students who had not completed resident PME (percent of total) 0.(0 %) 10.(5.9 %) 54.(16.2 %) 15.(32 %) 79.(9 %)* Students who had completed nonresident PME (percent of total) 0.(0 %) 9.(5.4 %) 54.(16.2 %) 14.(29.8 %) 77.(9.2 %) Students who had not completed nonresident PME (percent of total) 0.(0 %) 1.(0.6 %) 0.(0 %) 1.(2.1 %) 2.(0.1 %) * Reasons for not completing resident Professional Military Education (PME) prior to attending phase II (with number of officers): completed phase I by correspondence/seminar (60), completed phase I equivalent program (17), and career path did not allow attendance at a resident PME program (2). JFQ

The Joint Force Quarterly ESSAY CONTEST ON Revolutions in Military Affairs

JFQ announces an annual essay contest cosponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Net Assess- ment) and the National Defense University Foundation to encourage innovative thinking on Revolutions in Military Affairs and how the Armed Forces can best prepare to remain dominant as the nature of warfare changes. All essays will be considered for publication in JFQ. The contest will be open to both military officers and civilians from this country as well as abroad. Cash prizes of $2,000, $1,000, and $500 will be awarded to the three top entrants. In addition, a prize of $500 will be awarded for the best essay submitted by either an officer or officer candidate in the rank of major/lieutenant commander or below (and equivalent grades). All winners will also receive a selection of books dealing with innovation. Look for entry rules and other details in the next issue of JFQ (Summer 94).

112 JFQ / Spring 1994 ARTICLES Richard B.H. Lewis, “JFACC Prob- JFQuarterly Survey James H. Baker, “Policy Challenges lems Associated with Battlefield of Joint Literature of U.N. Peace Operations,” Param- Preparation in Desert Storm,” Air- eters, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1994), power Journal, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring pp. 13–26. 1994), pp. 4–21. BOOKS Eliot A. Cohen, “The Mystique of Allan L. Mink, “JTF Planning Cell: Initial Response to the Yugoslavia Douglas Menarchik. Powerlift— U.S. Air Power,” Foreign Affairs, Crisis,” Military Review, vol. 74, Getting to Desert Storm: Strategic vol. 73, no. 1 (January/February no. 3 (March 1994), pp. 68–70. Transportation and Strategy in the 1994), pp. 109–24. Justin B. Orabona, “Is There Equality New World Order. Westport, Conn.: Karl Farris, “U.N. Peacekeeping in in Jointness?,” Marine Corps Praeger Publishers, 1993. 291 pp. Cambodia: On Balance, A Suc- Gazette, vol. 78, no. 2 (February $49.95. [ISBN 0–275–94642–8] cess,” Parameters, vol. 24, no. 1 1994), p. 28. Bruce Porter. War and the Rise of the (Spring 1994), pp. 38–50. Leonard P. Picotte, “Fighting Joint,” State: The Military Foundation of Charles Horner, “Offensive Air Oper- U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Modern Politics. New York: Free ations: Lessons for the Future,” vol. 120, no. 1 (January 1994), Press, 1994. 380 pp. $24.95. The RUSI Journal, vol. 138, no. 6 pp. 41–43. [ISBN 0–02–925095–1] (December 1993), pp. 19–24. Michael C. Pugh, “Multinational Donald M. Snow and Dennis M. George A. Joulwan, “Operations Naval Cooperation,” U.S. Naval Drew. From Lexington to Desert Other Than War: A CINC’s Per- Institute Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 3 Storm: War and Politics in the spective,” Military Review, vol. 74, (March 1994), pp. 72–74. American Experience. Modern war no. 2 (February 1994), pp. 5–10. C.R. Rondestvedt, “Putting the studies. Armonk, New York: M.E. Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control: JFAAC to the Test,” U.S. Naval Sharpe, 1994. 384 pp. $50.00. The Crisis in Military–Civilian Institute Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 1 [ISBN 1–56324–251–6] Relations,” The National Interest, (January 1994), pp. 60–62. JFQ David F. Trask. The AEF and Coalition no. 35 (Spring 1994), pp. 3–17. Warmaking, 1917–1918. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993. 235 pp. $29.95. The National Defense University (NDU) will sponsor the [ISBN 0–7006–0619–X] following events over the coming year: MONOGRAPHS Frank J. Cook III et al. The Defense JOINT OPERATIONS SYMPOSIUM Department’s Role in Humanitarian “Standing Up a Joint Task Force” and Disaster Relief. National will be held in Washington, D.C., on July 12 and 13, 1994 Security Program policy analysis paper 93–02. Cambridge: John F. Kennedy School of Government, TOPICAL SYMPOSIUM Harvard University, 1993. 31 pp. “Counterproliferation” Patrick M. Cronin and S.J. Flores, ed- will be held in Washington, D.C., on November 16 and 17, 1994 itors. Standing Up Coalitions. Con- ference proceedings. Washington: PACIFIC SYMPOSIUM Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense Univer- will be held in Honolulu, Hawaii, on February 22 and 23, 1995 sity, 1994. 23 pp. with the cosponsorship of the U.S. Pacific Command William A. Stofft and Gary L. Guertner. Ethnic Conflict: Implica- NATO SYMPOSIUM tions for the Army of the Future. will be held in Washington, D.C., on April 24 and 25, 1995 Strategic Studies Institute report. with the cosponsorship of the NATO Defense College Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1994. 19 pp. To obtain registration information for any of the above symposia—or to be placed on the mailing list for announcements of future NDU symposia—please write or call: JFQ lists recent selected titles on joint and combined operations, coalition warfare, National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies (Symposia) military history, and related topics of inter- Fort Lesley J. McNair est to its readers. Publishers are asked to Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 forward books and publications directly to (202) 287–9230/9231 or DSN 667–9230/9231 the attention of the Managing Editor at the FAX: (202) 287–9239 or DSN 667–9239 address shown in the masthead on page 3.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 113 though the two translations were, CHINA’S MILITARY Three Kingdoms: they did not provide enough. CLASSICS A Historical Novel That situation has now changed attributed to Luo Guanzhong. dramatically. The last few years have A Review Essay by Translated and with notes by Moss Roberts seen a flood of good books on Chi- Berkeley: University of California Press; nese warfare. Within months of each ARTHUR WALDRON Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1991. 1,096 pp. $100.00. other three excellent translations of [ISBN 0–520–06821–1] Sun Tzu have appeared, and over the he difference between Western last several years new versions of and Chinese ways of war, if The Book of Stratagems: other key texts on war have been Tthere is one, will probably be Tactics for Triumph published as well as a magnificent found in differing emphases on the and Survival translation of Three Kingdoms, China’s material as opposed to the mental by Harro Von Senger greatest epic on politics and conflict. Edited and translated by Myron B. Gubitz At last the rich tradition of Chinese aspects of conflict. Western military New York: Viking, 1991. history is an account of ever larger 397 pp. $24.95. thought about warfare is becoming armies and technological break- [ISBN 0–670–83962–0] accessible to the nonspecialist. throughs. The Chinese tradition, by The best point of departure for contrast, with technology often The Seven Military Classics examining why the Chinese under- changing very little over long peri- of Ancient China standing of war differs in some fun- ods of time, stresses strategy and Translation and commentary by damental respects to that of the West psychological advantage as keys to Ralph D. Sawyer with Mei-Chün Sawyer is probably the San-Kuo yen-i, an Boulder: Westview Press, 1993. episodic novel of great length and success. Hence the verdicts of their 568 pp. $29.95. theorists: for Clausewitz war is an [ISBN 0–8133–1228–0] complexity that is available under the act of force; for Sun Tzu—as will be title Three Kingdoms in a fine transla- seen in some of the translations— Sun Tzu: The New Translation tion by Moss Roberts of New York war is above all the art of deception. by J.H. Huang University. Composed in the 14th This difference has more than New York: William Morrow, 1993. century, yet based upon texts and tra- 288 pp. $10.00. ditions a millennium older, it is the academic importance. The Chinese [ISBN 0–688–12400–3] approach to warfare has a certain at- story of a dividing China at the end rd tractiveness today as Western war- Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare of the 3 century A.D. as the Han dy- fare seems to be reaching its limits, Translated and with an introduction nasty neared its end and war raged chiefly since key technology (that is, and commentary by T. Roger Ames over whether to save or replace it. nuclear weaponry) makes the sort of New York: Ballantine Books, 1993. Generations of Chinese have come to total war which Clausewitz contem- 321 pp. $25.00. know the characters in the Three [ISBN 0–345–36239–X] plated increasingly unthinkable. Kingdoms just as well as Westerners once knew biblical stories or some Those nations that could theoreti- Sun Tzu: Art of War know today’s sitcoms. There is Ts’ao cally destroy the world realize that Translated by Ralph D. Sawyer even, or perhaps particularly, such in collaboration with Ts’ao, the clever and amoral courtier massive force is of little practical use Mei-chün Lee Sawyer scheming against his own sovereign, in achieving the ends of policy. So Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. Liu Pei, the loyalist who perishes in 375 pp. $9.95. what he knows is a futile struggle, strategic and psychological acumen, [ISBN 0–8133–1951–X] traditionally a Chinese forte, look and most importantly, Chu-ko Liang, more and more relevant. the brilliant strategist who gives up a These are not novel ideas: in- reclusive life of study and contempla- deed some version of them has been tion of nature to serve the dynasty. part of Western military discourse Portions of Roberts’s translation since at least the period following and other Chinese strategists. But it appeared in his 1976 publication of World War I when the search for a was impossible until recently for an abridged version of the novel way around the Western Front led anyone but a China specialist to go (which is still a manageable intro- thinkers like Liddell Hart to recog- much further. The reason was that duction though it lacks the sweep nize the affinity between the revived for even the most serious and moti- and extensive notes of the 1991 edi- Western interest in the indirect ap- vated specialist the necessary sources tion). While the story is absorbing proach and the concepts of Sun Tzu simply did not exist. English-lan- and full of social and military guage studies of Chinese warfare drama, the conflict described differs were sketchy and highly technical. in many ways from the sort of war The major text, Sun Tzu’s Art of War, Arthur Waldron teaches strategy at the familiar in the West. There are war- was available in the 1910 translation Naval War College and is also an adjunct riors to be sure, but less time is spent by Lionel Giles or the 1963 version professor of east Asian studies at Brown on their clashes than in comparable by Samuel B. Griffith. And good University. He is the author of The Great western works such the Iliad. We re- Wall of China: From History to Myth. member the chief characters not so

114 JFQ / Spring 1994 much for feats of arms as for their no such operational derivation: they be conquered by coercion alone, moral and intellectual qualities. refer directly to plans, a fact which then or now. So from the beginning Chu-ko Liang is perhaps the underlines the stress, even very early Chinese military thinkers had to best example, for of his character in China, on thought over action. ponder problems on a scale that there is no doubt. Although he has Several recent publications make Westerners have confronted only turned away from the world to seek this point explicitly, among them quite recently. China was and is too peace as a simple farmer, he remains Carl-Alrecht Seyschab’s “The Thirty- big to conquer militarily or rule by thoroughly loyal to the legitimate six Stratagems: Orthodoxy against direct coercion. The technique of Han ruling house, and when asked Heterodoxy” in East Asian Civiliza- controlling it had to involve ele- reemerges to serve it. Of what does tions and Harro Von Senger’s The ments other than the purely mili- his service consist? Above all, his Book of Stratagems: Tactics for Tri- tary. The belief that operational skill analysis of strategy. Liu Pei, a loyalist umph and Survival. These works could substitute for sound strategy— leader, goes repeatedly to Chu-ko’s translate and explicate a recent Chi- just plausible in Europe, and which hermitage. When finally admitted nese text on a traditional subject, undid Napoleon and doomed Ger- he finds that Chu-ko Liang is totally the “Thirty-six Stratagems,” a collec- many twice in this century—never familiar with the dynasty’s situation tion of phrases which add up to only was credible in China. Those Chi- and pulls out a map to sketch an op- 138 characters encapsulating various nese who were charged with military timum counter-strategy. Joining the approaches to conflict—such as “be- operations instinctively considered loyalists Chu-ko serves with great siege Wei to rescue Zhao” or “lure them within a complex cultural, po- personal bravery, dying on cam- the tiger down from the moun- litical, and moral context. paign. But it was his ability to get at tain”—that fascinate some Western- Therefore ancient Chinese mili- the heart of strategic questions that ers while others dismiss them as tary works might appear rather mod- brought the Han loyalists to him “strategy by fortune cookie.” Von ern to the Western mind. Since at and that has kept his fame bright Senger supplies either the story from least the beginning of revolutions in among Chinese ever since. which each phrase originated or a military affairs in the early 19th cen- Is there a Western equivalent to story which embodies the sense of tury there has been a tendency in Chu-ko Liang? To Clausewitz, Napo- each in a volume which is both in- the West to assume that increased leon was the “god of war,” but Napo- teresting and culturally informative. power would make military solu- leon never offered a systematic ap- The making of strategy has been tions to problems easier. So time and praisal of the strategic situation as esteemed since ancient times in again we have looked to weapons for comprehensive as Chu-ko Liang did China above other military virtues, decisiveness—be it rapid-firing guns, for the tottering Han dynasty. Before including ability to fight or develop tanks, airpower, or current high recommending an action Chu-ko new or improved weapons. Western tech. But with the advent of nuclear Liang carefully analyzed its potential history is full of warriors renowned weapons and the expansion of po- impact on relations among contend- for bravery and technologies noted tential battlefields to a global scale, ing states, and it was this insight for innovation, from Greek fire to we may reach a point where decisive above all that led to his success. By precision guided munitions. But force is increasingly difficult to contrast Napoleon won through a how many stratagems are remem- achieve. This situation, however, is combination of numerical superiority bered and celebrated? There are ex- familiar to Chinese whose funda- and tactical brilliance, levying one amples such as Cannae or Inchon, mental approach to warfare stresses army after another while gradually but they are exceptions. In the West the limits and hazards of relying too beggaring France, and moving with battles have been won by the side heavily on force alone. speed and cleverness to hit hard, but that pushed harder. In China, by For guidance on operating in nevertheless with remarkably little at- contrast, one finds fewer pitched such conditions, the Chinese regu- tention to a comprehensive strat- battles and much more staked on larly turned to specialists in ping fa, egy—a weakness he shared with a the working of strategy. or the way of warfare, a number of host of Western military heroes. The reason for this contrast is whom have ancient texts attributed This stress on stratagems in one not an arbitrary cultural difference; to them and who are not by any culture and on material and opera- the most distinct factor in the tradi- means adherents to a single ap- tional strengths in the other is ar- tional Chinese way of thinking proach. Five ancient works and one guably a basic difference between about war was the sheer scale of the of later origin were collected about Chinese and Western warfare. The battlefield. More than two thousand 1073 in the Sung dynasty as China very term strategy is derived from the years ago the Chinese were not con- faced a severe military threat; this Greek strategia meaning generalship, tending for local power (which may collection became a standard work and thus conveys the notion of have implied control of a state the and has been influential ever since. command. Equivalent words in Chi- size of France), but for control of “all Now it has been translated and in- nese—chi, ts’e, mou, and others com- under heaven”—t’ien-hsia, which troduced with great skill and clarity monly rendered as stratagem—have even in those days was probably more than a million square miles of territory. This area was too large to

Spring 1994 / JFQ 115 by Ralph Sawyer, a businessman and translates it “Warfare is the way (tao) rubric under which firepower or scholar, in a tome that should be on of deception.” Huang, though, takes throw-weight might be found—ac- the shelf of every officer with an in- the phrase very differently: “Military quires a rather abstract thrust. One is terest in traditional Asian military operations entail unconventional not looking simply for power, but thought. means.” From Huang’s comments it rather for circumstances—whether By far the most influential Chi- emerges that the root meaning of qui terrain, correlation of forces, or psy- nese military thinker is Sun Tzu, and (which others make deception) is to go chological advantage or disadvan- three translations of the text bearing against. The art of war is “to go tage—that are conducive to victory. his name have just been published against [what is usually done]” which In English we would use at least by J.H. Huang (a Chinese philologist is to say employ unconventional means. two different terms to express these now based in California), Roger T. Huang buttresses this reading by refer- two aspects of meaning: the one ma- Ames (a specialist in Chinese philos- ring to a Sung dynasty commentator terial, the other intellectual and psy- ophy at the University of Hawaii), who maintains that qui in this pas- chological. The Chinese use only and Ralph D. Sawyer (the translation sage meant skill in using forces and one, not because they are confused, can be found in his Seven Military did not connote deception. but simply because they slice reality Classics, but a more extensive intro- The same is true of another cele- differently. They see the strategic as- duction and notes appear in a sepa- brated passage that Griffith translates pect of shih (choosing terrain or a rate volume also listed above). “What is of supreme importance is to situation that is advantageous) as in- Each translation has a particular attack the enemy’s strategy.” Here separable from the physical aspect strength: Huang presents the text in Ames is pretty much in agreement: (combat power). So shih is not some- two parallel columns, one unfolding “The best military policy is to attack thing measurable although it has an the topic and the other giving Sun strategies.” Sawyer, however, is less objective component. Above all it is Tzu’s particular insights, that makes abstract: “The highest realization of psychological, part of the Sun Tzu- the structure of text clear where it warfare is to attack the enemy’s nian understanding of conflict can be obscured when published as plans” and Huang more so: “So the which implies that victory and de- one short paragraph after another. best strategy is to crush their plans.” feat are ultimately mental states. Ames’s edition is the most attractive, Perhaps the most interesting exam- Behind this lies a philosophical offering Chinese as well as English ple of such a word is shih, which is background—the distinctions be- texts, and an introduction which found in the title of the fifth book. tween the ancient Chinese view of a will have particular import for those Griffith translates this as energy; single universe and Greek dualism, interested in Sun Tzu as a text of Huang makes it combat power; Sawyer between the temporal and the abso- philosophy as well as strategy. renders it strategic military power; lute—which Ames illuminates in his Sawyer, however, is the only transla- Ames translates it strategic advantage. fine introduction. Before dismissing tor of the three to present, in addi- Each has its warrant, but again the all this as too abstract, it is worth tion to a very fine English version of differences are revealing. noting that today, perhaps more the text, a comprehensive introduc- Huang’s combat power (like his than in the past, the American mili- tion that provides the necessary unconventional means) is the transla- tary is being used in environments background on Chinese warfare of tion that sounds most like Western that it cannot dominate by sheer the period. This fills half the vol- military language (though it is sup- force. Military strategists today must ume—pages which are well used— ported by references to ancient us- take the context in which they use and is illustrated with helpful battle ages in the Shuo-wen, I-ching, and force as seriously as Sun Tzu, and maps and charts. other classics). It contains little hint recognize that the shih of our mili- The differences among the three of Chinese philosophy, but rather tary, however we measure it, is the volumes illustrate different ap- suggests something quite familiar in product of a successful combination proaches that can be taken to Sun the West: force or power (either la- of inherent strength with an advan- Tzu. Thus there are certain key words tent as in a set crossbow or un- tageous situation. in Sun Tzu which are not easy to put leashed as in a flood able to move Similar patterns of difference run into English but are central to his boulders). Sawyer’s translation is through all three volumes. Oversim- whole approach. Dozens of examples similar, but Ames, who has written plified they show that scholars do could be given but a few will have to extensively on the term’s meaning, not agree on whether Sun Tzu essen- suffice. takes a suggestion from the contem- tially is a realist—whose fundamental One is the word kuei, found in porary scholar Hsü Fu-Kuan that the concern is the use of force and who is the passage that Griffith translates word was first used to discuss con- thus largely understandable through “All warfare is based on deception.” tention over advantageous terrain. Western analytical categories—or That sounds like a strong claim, and That is, as Ames reads the text, even whether the text expounds an ap- many war college lecturers invoke it a word which might sound intellec- proach to war that in its fundamental to argue that Sun Tzu meant some- tually congenial to a Westerner—the definitions and assumptions differs thing very different than Clausewitz. profoundly from the mainstream of Ames renders the passage “Warfare is Western military thought. the art (tao) of deceit” while Sawyer

116 JFQ / Spring 1994 This, of course, is a specific in- sands of the Arabian peninsula and stance of a general question: is there FALAISE, down the alleys of Mogadishu. a specifically Western way of war? Or, Blumenson is one of the last of a if there have been non-Western ways THE HIGHWAY OF breed. His career began as an official in the past, do they continue to exist DEATH, AND Army historian serving in the Euro- today? Or is everyone adopting the MOGADISHU pean theater during World War II. He Western model as manifested most wrote two “green books”,1 authored recently in Operation Desert Storm? A Book Review by over a dozen other works, and edited Even Sun Tzu’s homeland, the evi- STEVE E. DIETRICH The Patton Papers.2 Hunched over an dence would suggest, has adopted antiquated typewriter, carefully craft- the Western way. How else are we to ing each sentence, Blumenson writes explain the emphasis on weapons The Battle of the Generals: in a delightful style. With flowing but and technology (whether in Peking The Untold Story of the Falaise succinct prose he packs more infor- or Taipei) on which vast sums of Pocket—The Campaign That mation into a single brief paragraph money are being spent? Should Have Won World War II than many authors cram into a To make that assessment, how- by Martin Blumenson thirty-page chapter—and he chal- ever, is perhaps to fall into the trap New York: William Morrow, 1993. lenges the reader to think. Conceived of looking most closely at that with 288 pp. $25.00. for a wide audience, The Battle of the which we are most familiar. The [ISBN 0–688–11837–2] Generals is jargon-free and requires no concepts of war that underlie the use special knowledge of World War II. of new weapons which the Chinese hat history repeats itself is de- Documentation is sparse, and serious are acquiring would be familiar to batable; that history offers readers will want to refer to better Chu-ko Liang and Sun Tzu. Why? Tglimpses of recurring problems maps than those found in the book. Because they are appropriate to ob- is undeniable. The parallels between The Falaise pocket is not really jective conditions, both physical Normandy and recent operations are an untold story. Blumenson himself 3 and psychological, of Chinese war- haunting illustrations of recurring told it in Breakout and Pursuit. But fare. Nor is their relevance limited. problems. Martin Blumenson’s The “green book” authors were instructed As mentioned earlier, the very quan- Battle of the Generals is a provocative to detail what happened. It seems tity of firepower now available to assessment of the final operation of Blumenson has written this latest the military has rendered obsolete a the Normandy campaign in 1944. book to appease that old veteran lot of Western thinking about war, He argues that had Allied comman- who said “We don’t need you histori- in particular the notion of winning ders not faltered, it would have been ans to tell us what we did, only we by a preponderance of force alone. It the final operation of the war. know that. We need you to tell us may be that the Chinese emphasis Blumenson highlights demands why we did it.” Here he succeeds. on stratagem—or to put it another on senior leaders in the tactical, op- The first third of the book pro- way, on the autonomy and impor- erational, and strategic arenas. He de- vides one of the best overviews avail- tance of properly understanding and scribes difficulties of command, con- able of World War II Allied opera- conceiving of war—offers an intel- trol, and communications in a lectual context for modern wea- multilateral force dominated by bi- ponry that the Western tradition has lateral agreements. Normandy offers Bradley and Patton. difficulty providing. That is a ques- compelling examples of what occurs tion for military professionals to de- when national objectives are at odds termine. Now, at least, thanks to the with coalition planning. And he re- works reviewed here, nonspecialists counts disagreement over air support in Asian questions will at last have a for ground operations which reveal foundation on which to base that flawed joint operations. Though the determination. JFQ Armed Forces have made great strides in joint and combined warfare, the images recalled suggest similar recent challenges to commanders across the

Lieutenant Colonel Steve E. Dietrich, USA, is Chief of the Military Studies Branch at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He has published a number of articles on Patton and is currently writing a monograph on the M1A1 roll-over program for

Desert Storm. U.S. Army

Spring 1994 / JFQ 117 gap bringing “a much earlier end of General Schwarzkopf and friends. the war in Europe.” Instead, Allied discord caused the war to last ten additional months. For the first three months after D-Day, Eisenhower had remained with his headquarters in England. He left Montgomery in command on the ground. Bradley rarely met with his temporary superior, a man whose arrogance he despised. Mont- gomery, failing to take his objective of Caen until the end of July, had his hands full with the multilateral 21st Army Group and exercised little

U.S. Air Force (H.H. Deffner) operational control over Bradley. Eisenhower found that he was unable to motivate Montgomery to tions in the Mediterranean and west- der who grasped what needed to be move aggressively enough, and ern-European theaters prior to the D- done and how to do it,” except he Montgomery’s insolence nearly Day landings. The middle chapters was “unable to make his genius felt” pushed him to relieve Britain’s most deal with the first two frustrating and was consequently “lured astray” famous soldier. Lacking coordina- months of the Normandy campaign. by his bungling superiors. As a result tion, Bradley and Montgomery In the final third, Blumenson ana- of command problems, Blumenson failed to close the gap at Falaise in lyzes what happened at the Falaise contends, thousands of Germans time. But Bradley halted Patton’s ad- pocket and critiques the generals. His who should have been captured or vance before it crossed into Mont- assessment is fresh, almost shocking. killed in the Falaise gap—created gomery’s sector where it may have Blumenson portrays a “dis- after an enemy counterattack at Mor- resulted in a friendly fire incident jointed” alliance headed by inept tain drove a forty by fourteen-mile with distant Canadians. Simple coor- commanders who were unable to bulge in Allied lines in August dination between Bradley and Mont- properly control air forces or each 1944—escaped with much of their gomery or closer involvement by other. Eisenhower was the overall equipment through a gap that was Eisenhower could have resolved the commander; Montgomery was the closed too late. Surviving German problem and allowed them to knock ground component commander and troops later haunted the Allies at two German armies out of the war. also led 21st Army Group; and, Arnhem, Huertgen Forest, the Ar- Earlier, a lack of proper coordi- under Montgomery, Bradley was the dennes, and elsewhere.4 nation between the Army and the commander of First Army until tak- Blumenson states that Patton Army Air Forces resulted in costly ing over the newly activated 12th should have had Bradley’s job before friendly fire incidents. Bradley Army Group. Eisenhower assumed D-Day. Eisenhower’s classmate and planned Operation Cobra to break ground command from Mont- six years Patton’s junior at West through the hedgerows of Nor- gomery on September 1, making Point, Bradley had been subordinate mandy, which had reduced fighting Montgomery and Bradley equals just to Patton in North Africa and Sicily. to a slug-fest reminiscent of the six days after the Normandy cam- Eisenhower elevated Bradley over trenches of World War I. In an un- paign ended. Patton as senior ground commander usual operation, Allied bombers To Blumenson the three generals for the invasion of France only be- would dump a carpet of bombs on a “fumbled badly,” especially Mont- cause Patton was in disgrace for slap- long, narrow strip into the enemy gomery. Eisenhower did not inter- ping two soldiers in Sicily.5 Inexperi- lines in front of American troops vene when he should, Bradley inter- enced, Bradley was uncomfortable in near St. Lo. Two infantry divisions fered where he should not, and his relationship with two old war- would rush into the gap created by Montgomery’s involvement was riors, Patton and Montgomery. He the bombing and hold open the unwelcome to the Americans. The knew that he had not earned their shoulders while two armored divi- generals erroneously focused their respect as a commander. Patton, sions charged through. Bradley efforts on taking terrain, not defeat- however, could have met Mont- wanted the bombers to approach the ing the enemy. Patton, who assumed gomery as an equal. “The thrust of target parallel to his front lines to command of the Third Army under Patton and the balance of Mont- avoid the possibility of stray bombs Bradley’s 12th Army Group on gomery would have produced a per- landing on friendly troops. The August 1, “was the single comman- fectly matched team.” He concludes bombers struck twice in two days, that the Eisenhower-Montgomery- both times attacking perpendicular Patton relationship could have en- to the front lines and directly over trapped the Germans in the Falaise the troops, both times dropping

118 JFQ / Spring 1994 bombs short and killing or wound- ing hundreds, primarily members of the 30th Division. The controversy over whether Bradley approved the perpendicular approach or the Air Forces simply ignored his instructions still rages today.6 Controlling combined operations in Normandy was even more precarious. In the British sector, under Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, a Canadian army controlled a British corps with both British and Canadian divisions. Montgomery also controlled a British army with a Canadian corps consisting of Polish and Canadian divisions. The Ameri- Marines raiding can sector was homogenous except Bakara Market, nd for Leclerc’s 2 French Armored Di- Mogadishu. vision under XV Corps. Operations of these units offer examples of challenges to combined command. Dif- U.S. Navy (Terry Mitchell) ferences in experience, equipment, logistical requirements, organiza- strike Iraqi Republican Guard divi- forces during the 38-day air cam- tion, doctrine, training, perceptions sions with B–52 bombers in the first paign as Schwarzkopf directed. of other nations’ soldiers, and fur- hour of the war on January 17, 1991. A chilling similarity between ther thorny issues reveal themselves Schwarzkopf was enraged to discover Desert Storm and the Falaise pocket for analysis. For example, Blumen- on January 15 that air planners had was the failure of both Allied opera- son accuses Leclerc of disobeying the decided not to strike the Republican tions to encircle completely and de- attack orders of a U.S. commander Guard formations until 18 hours stroy or capture the enemy’s main by keeping his forces available for into the war after enemy air defense force. Bradley accused the British of the liberation of Paris, a national po- systems had been destroyed.8 In a pushing the Germans out of the litical objective which was at odds situation eerily similar to the acri- open end of the Argentan-Falaise with coalition operational needs. In monious exchanges between Bradley pocket like “squeezing a tube of the ensuing confusion, Leclerc’s for- and his airmen Schwarzkopf accused toothpaste.” Referring to Bradley’s mations impeded an advancing U.S. the chief air planner and comman- comment as dishonest, Blumenson unit, possibly preventing a timely der of all Air Force wings in south- points out that it was Bradley who closing of the Falaise gap. west Asia of having lied to him.9 As failed to close the pocket and later Blumenson concludes that for in Bradley’s case, Schwarzkopf’s defended his actions by arguing that British, Canadian, and American problem stemmed mainly from a he preferred to have a “solid shoul- armies in Normandy “No coherent misunderstanding between air and der at Argentan to a broken neck at leadership bound all the parts to- ground commanders. Falaise.” Whether the gap could gether to form a unified whole.” For To improve coordination of air have been successfully closed earlier, the often impromptu multinational and ground operations and to ensure however, is also arguable.12 forces of today—organizing rapidly ground commanders received appro- James G. Burton, a retired Air in response to global crises—coopera- priate air support, Schwarzkopf had Force colonel, sparked a debate in tion among allies is vital to success. his deputy meet daily with the Allied the Proceedings over the past year The recent disastrous Ranger opera- Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) with an article accusing VII Corps of tion in Somalia highlights one aspect commander.10 Still, in early February failing at the end of Desert Storm to of the problem7 and Bosnia might the Army corps commanders “bit- destroy the Republican Guard as or- provide parallels to flawed multilat- terly complained” to Schwarzkopf dered, instead “pushing them out eral operations in Normandy. “that the Air Force was not hitting the back door.” 13 In a subsequent Bradley’s squabbles with the air- the targets they had chosen.” 11 piece inspired by Burton’s charge, a men during Cobra foreshadowed Again, a lack of agreement between retired Army general insisted that Schwarzkopf’s problems with his air the Army and Air Force on how best Republican Guard soldiers and commanders in Saudi Arabia. Ac- to employ available airpower was to equipment survived to harass the cording to one account, Schwarz- blame. The debate continues over kopf had ordered the Air Force to why the Air Force did not destroy at least 50 percent of Iraqi ground

Spring 1994 / JFQ 119 Kurds because Schwarzkopf failed to mandy,” the keynote address at the Robert R. plan to entrap them.14 Whether McCormick Tribune Foundation and U.S. MUCH MORE THAN coalition forces could and should Naval Institute Normandy Conference. 6 have completely captured or de- In Battle of the Generals (pp. 129–41), “FROM THE SEA” stroyed the Republican Guard is con- Blumenson insinuates that the Army Air Forces ignored Bradley’s instructions for A Book Review by troversial. But the fact is that bombers to strike parallel to friendly lines and JOHN N. PETRIE Schwarzkopf ordered the destruction later lied about it. In Breakout and Pursuit (pp. of Saddam Hussein’s elite units and 231–33), Blumenson highlighted the “unsat- many escaped. isfactory . . . absence of firm understanding Blumenson completed this book and mutual agreement” between Bradley and How Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy before the Persian Gulf War. It is in- the airmen. But Geoffrey Perret in Winged and Its Allies teresting to ponder whether its publi- Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II by Frank Uhlig, Jr. cation at that time may have influ- (New York: Random House, 1993) claims that Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994. air commanders convinced Bradley to ap- 455 pp. $34.95. enced the planning or outcome of [ISBN 1–55750–853–4] Desert Storm. Perhaps a historically- prove the perpendicular approach and that he later lied in blaming the Army Air Forces minded planner might have provided for disobeying his instructions and falsified a for the entrapment of the Republican document to help prove the case. At the Nor- More wealth than most nations com- Guard to prevent an escape compara- mandy Conference in Wheaton, Illinois, on mand and more foresight than men ble to Falaise. Perhaps Schwarzkopf March 2–3, 1994, Bradley biographer Clay normally possess are needed to produce might have been more careful to en- Blair pointedly stated that Bradley, as a man a fleet suitable for all occasions. sure the Iraqi escape route was cut of honor, was incapable of such dishonestly. before agreeing to end the fighting. There can be no doubt, however, that Bradley Blumenson’s contentious book agreed that the second bombing run would rank Uhlig brings a lifetime of should stimulate a lively debate in overfly his front lines. The Army Air Forces in experience to this book. His re- this regard. The Eisenhowers, Mont- World War II, vol. 3, Europe: Argument to V-E search started when, at the age Day: January 1944 to May 1945, edited by F gomerys, Bradleys, Pattons, and of seventeen, he joined the Navy as Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate (Chicago: the Nation was engaged in the great- Schwarzkopfs of tomorrow will be University of Chicago Press, 1951), an official better joint and combined comman- history, is silent on this subject. est maritime struggle the world has ders because of their awareness of re- 7 Rick Atkinson, The Washington Post, known. Since then he has been curring operational problems. JFQ January 30–31, 1994. deeply involved in recording and 8 Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold analyzing the way navies fight. If NOTES Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York: one were to advertise for an author- Houghton Mifflin, 1993), pp. 105–06. 1 ity to write a book such as How Volumes in the U.S. Army in World 9 Atkinson, Crusade, pp. 105–06; see War II series published by the U.S. Army Navies Fight the qualifications would also Robert H. Scales, Jr., et al., Certain Vic- describe Uhlig. Consequently, this Center of Military History (ex-Office of the tory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Wash- Chief of Military History) are known as work is a superb piece of history and ington: Government Printing Office, 1993), analysis presented in elegant but “green books” due to the color of their pp. 176–78. buckram bindings. Blumenson’s “green 10 Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Sur- simple prose. It examines what books” include Breakout and Pursuit: U.S. vey, vol. 1, part II (Washington: Govern- navies do and provides a history of Army in World War II, The European Theater ment Printing Office, 1993), pp. 57–58. the U.S. Navy at war. The account of Operations (Washington: Office of the 11 Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, spans three centuries of naval com- Chief of Military History, 1961) and Salerno editors, The Whirlwind War: The United States bat in every ocean and on the lakes to Cassino: U.S. Army in World War II, The Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert and rivers of three continents. Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Wash- Storm (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Mil- ington: Office of the Chief of Military His- Beginning with American and itary History, forthcoming), p. 289. French navies and privateers operat- tory, 1969). 12 In a forthcoming article to appear in 2 The Patton Papers, vol. 1, 1885–1940, ing against the British in 1775 and Military History Quarterly, Carlo D’Este sup- culminating with Desert Storm, How and vol. 2, 1940–1945 (Boston: Houghton ports Bradley’s decision that, without major Mifflin, 1972 and 1974). reinforcements, his forces were spread so Navies Fight offers readers an unvar- 3 Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit. thinly that if the gap had been closed they nished account of what the Navy has 4 Blumenson, “Cantigny Discussion,” a would have been vulnerable to attack by es- done, how it has done it, why it has paper presented at the conference on Nor- caping German units. done it, and whether it was done mandy sponsored by the Robert R. Mc- 13 James G. Burton, “Pushing Them Out well. Along the way we learn things Cormick Tribune Foundation and U.S. the Back Door,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed- about allies, enemies, and in a couple Naval Institute at Cantigny in Wheaton, ings, vol. 119, no. 6 (June 1993), pp. 37–42. Illinois, on March 2–4, 1994. See responses under the same title in the 5 Eisenhower’s biographer recently ensuing issues. claimed that Bradley was selected over Patton 14 John H. Cushman, U.S. Naval Institute Captain John N. Petrie, USN, is director of because he had more confidence in Bradley’s Proceedings, vol. 119, no. 10 (October 1993), research and professor of national security abilities; Stephen Ambrose, “Dwight Eisen- pp. 76–80. policy at the National War College. His hower: Command, Coalition, and Nor- article, “Dealing with Anarchy,” appears in this issue of JFQ.

120 JFQ / Spring 1994 of cases about friends who fought one another. The analysis is clear and con- cise which is rare in such literature. But How Navies Fight offers more than it claims. A careful reading will reveal how navies operate with their sister services. Naval missions necessarily rely upon and routinely support other services simply because navies rarely fight alone. In this respect Uhlig has produced a clandes- tine primer on joint operations. What comes across is that the critical business of navies is not widely heralded operations. Fighting on, over, and under the oceans involves more than projecting power ashore “From the Sea,” though such operations are undoubtedly an important part of it. How Navies Fight captures the unglamorous but absolutely critical dimensions of naval warfare in the broadest sense. It deals with ensuring national security and successfully conducting operations both in and from a maritime theater if deterrence fails. Uhlig’s U.S. Navy (Ron Wimmer) conclusions come down to basic, yet often unrecognized facts. Since two that it may replace; but it can only airlift. But we must remember America gained its independence the only be in one location at a time. that neither airlift nor sealift are use- Navy has regularly performed five Today the loss of one amphibious ful in an assault on hostile shores. wartime missions: strategically mov- ship could remove enough capability That brings up the question of ing troops, acquiring advanced to make a planned operation inexe- naval gunfire support. Modern five- bases, landing forces on hostile cutable or at least ill-advised. inch gun batteries are exceptionally shores, mounting blockades, and Some relief is gained by the in- well suited to this mission; but there mastering the seas. creased and improved use of near- are not as many of them as we A rightsized force and the mixed term prepositioned ships carrying a would like. Previous conflicts have blessing of a peace dividend means generic unit’s equipment. These repeatedly proven that even larger not expecting to have anything in ships allow forces to be airlifted into calibre guns were essential to diffi- excess. Without knowing the theater and fall in on identical gear cult fire support missions. Those specifics of the next war, the lessons to that on which they have trained. guns are gone. Hardened targets and of history found in this book can A consistent dilemma made bridges are tough to engage with serve as a guide for balancing mar- clear by chronicles of combat opera- five-inch ammunition. The Oliver itime forces. After spending my ca- tions is that airlifting moves the first Hazard Perry class ships have a su- reer in frigates and destroyers it was part of a force faster, but by the time perb 76 mm gun. But it is not the no surprise to learn that the Navy the whole unit is airlifted it could optimum gun for fire support mis- has never had enough small combat- have all been moved faster, cheaper, sions and raises the question of how ant ships when war broke out. I also and with greater integrity by sea. So to kick the door open for opposed knew that we have always lacked decisions on lift turn on how quickly amphibious landings. Precision mu- sealift vessels—which we are now ac- forces need to arrive, adequate air- nitions delivered by attack planes quiring faster than any other type of fields with sufficient ramp space and can pick up some slack—but that is ship. But now I have also come to re- maintenance, the character of the more expensive and less flexible alize that we may be short of am- transportation infrastructure, and than fire support afloat. And these phibious ships as well. That potential the availability of port facilities and missions will have to compete for shortage is especially worrisome con- sealift. Most situations can be ex- priority with a complex target list sidering the average age of our am- pected to require both airlift and which can only be carried out by phibious force. Many ships are near- sealift, and few if any will require precision munitions. ing or are at the end of their effective In World War II pre-assault period of service. Fortunately, a new bombardment grew longer as the vessel is far more capable than any

Spring 1994 / JFQ 121 conflict went on, with some fire mis- forces in Desert Storm. But U-boat capitulate but circumstances in the sions lasting days. In the Pacific campaigns in the Atlantic, U.S. sub- future might not allow us so much Japanese defenders pulled out of marine operations in the Pacific, the flexibility. range of naval gunfire thus surren- Cuban missile crisis quarantine, Op- This was better than the situa- dering the advantage to engaging eration Market Time in Vietnam, the tion in Vietnam where America and forces when they were most vulnera- current embargo on the states of for- the South Vietnamese only appeared ble, crossing the beach. This was a mer Yugoslavia, and the Haitian em- to control the local waters for differ- great tribute to the effectiveness of bargo all represent the mission of ent reasons. Political intimidation— bombardment. This and more is re- blockade in naval warfare. It is a Khrushchev had warned that a vealed in Uhlig’s analysis of the war function unlikely to fade into his- blockade would have grave conse- in the Pacific. In the near future we tory during our lifetimes. quences—paralyzed our will. It pre- will have a smaller force which ne- Progressive changes in technol- vented us from interdicting war ma- cessitates minimizing casualties. ogy have caused many aspects of terial delivered by sea to North Both shore bombardment and fire naval combat to adapt over the Vietnam. As a consequence the Navy support need closer looks. years. For example, mastery of the and Coast Guard undertook a block- Though we can expect that al- local sea once meant a small area at- ade of South Vietnam (Operation lies will make the facilities for ad- tendant to an ongoing operation. Market Time) which, though effec- ministrative off-load of ships and The area involved has been ex- tive, largely intercepted and ha- aircraft available it is not a given. An panded to cover the operating radius rassed vessels of the nation we were enemy may try to either seize key of new weaponry and sensors, and supposed to be assisting. But when transportation nodes or make them includes air superiority and access to Market Time forced Hanoi to divert untenable. Not every potential ally hostile shores. In Desert Storm coali- supplies to the Cambodian port of has airfields which can receive C–5s tion forces needed maritime superi- Sihanoukville for overland infiltra- or ports which can accommodate ority throughout the Red Sea, Per- tion to their forces in South Viet- roll-on/roll-off ships. A smaller, sian Gulf, and maritime approaches nam, political concern over widen- more sophisticated force as adver- to both. Six carrier battle groups, ing an already unpopular war tised in the Bottom-Up Review needs two battleships, several cruisers, an prevented effective interdiction. It to remember that the theater of war amphibious ready group, scores of was not until the 1970 coup in Cam- will define the options for entry. frigates and destroyers, many mine bodia that Sihanoukville was closed. Sometimes the only way in will be warfare ships, logistics support ships, By then the Ho Chi Minh Trail was across a defended shore. and several submarines were com- operating every night and air inter- Finally, in crossing hostile mitted to the fight. While it was as- diction efforts had only marginal shores we should anticipate that sea sumed that they enjoyed total com- success. So an enemy with no real denial forces will attempt to inflict a mand of the sea, Uhlig makes the naval or air power was able to heavy toll. If an enemy can make case that they did not. achieve—as a result of our political the likely cost of an operation ap- Remarkably, the Navy did not caution—what it could never have pear unacceptable, domestic politi- do a good job in mastery of the seas done tactically. In Vietnam we never cal considerations could allow him in combat—a primary mission. U.S. tried to attain mastery of the local to win without firing a shot. Today’s and coalition forces swept the Iraqi sea even though essentially unchal- force has been designed to minimize navy into the dustbin of history, and lenged after early August 1964. the effectiveness of most sea denial allied air superiority was unchal- Other naval warfare functions forces—but mines will continue to lenged after the first few days of which arise are less essential to vic- be a significant threat. combat. But mines sowed in the tory at sea but are typical of naval Conducting a blockade is te- shallows off Kuwait and hardened activity. Among them are commerce dious and frequently finds too few batteries along its coast—emplaced raiding, naval raids ashore, fleets in ships attempting to cover too much during Iraq’s six-month occupation being, cutting lines of communica- sea room. It is a naval operation in anticipation of an assault—consti- tions, cruises against enemy raiders, characterized by days of boredom in- tuted formidable sea denial forces. protection of shipping, bombard- terrupted by a few minutes of in- There were numerous, though ap- ment, fire support of troops ashore, tense danger which then quickly re- parently insufficient, mine counter- movement of forces, scouting, com- turns to boredom. Over the years a measures ships in theater, and clear- munications intelligence, naval wide variety of applications and in- ing mines along a heavily defended demonstrations, evacuation of en- novations have been made to fulfill shore could have been difficult. dangered troops, operations in aid of the blockade mission. The classic op- While a successful assault on the friendly governments, rescue of eration used by Union forces to close Kuwaiti coast was possible, a naval civilians, and troop support and air Confederate ports in the Civil War demonstration proved to be the best warfare functions where airfields are varied little from the maritime inter- use of amphibious forces. It drew off insufficient or unavailable. In a diction as conducted by coalition Iraqi attention as the ’left hook” maneuver out-flanked them in the desert. This plan forced Saddam to

122 JFQ / Spring 1994 world where no major adversary has and strategic factors of the conflict yet emerged, we should anticipate AUSTRALIA AND and their effect on minorities, the the Navy being called upon to per- media, and long-term strategic inter- form a number of small but danger- THE GULF WAR ests. Such a comprehensive book re- ous missions. They will undoubtedly A Book Review by mains to be written. include operations similar to those ALAN L. GROPMAN A few years before the Gulf War, identified above. It will be surprising Australia revised its defense policy if a year passes without the Navy ex- during what was still a bipolar, Cold ecuting a rescue mission in support The Gulf Commitment: War world. After serious study under of an American embassy or provid- The Australian Defence Force’s the ruling Labor Party, Australia ing relief to victims of a natural dis- First War adopted a course which called for aster. The Navy’s role in non-com- by David Horner self reliance within an alliance batant evacuation operations has Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University framework with much greater em- now sadly become an art form. Press, 1992. phasis on regional associations. Mili- These extremely dangerous opera- 238 pp. $ 24.95. tarily, the policy demanded defense tions have been consistently exe- [ISBN 0 522 84511 8] in depth of the homeland, replacing cuted without fanfare and without Australia’s Gulf War a forward defense strategy. Aus- friendly casualties. edited by Murray Goot and Rodney Tiffen tralia’s response to Iraq’s invasion of How Navies Fight is nearly flaw- Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Kuwait would seem to have violated less but it could benefit from the in- Press, 1992. this new policy, given the end of the clusion of additional maps. In par- 304 pp. $ 24.95. Cold War and the swift dispatch of ticular, maps should accompany the [ISBN 0 522 84463 4] Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ships discussions of operations in the to the Gulf in 1990 (along with dis- Philippines after the Battle of Leyte cussions about sending additional Gulf as well as in the region from f the many books that have naval or possibly air assets to the the Bay of Bengal to the Gulf of appeared in the aftermath of area). But apparently the Gulf War Thailand. OOperation Desert Storm, the and participating in it did not Overall this book is readable two reviewed here look at opera- change Australian policy as not long and thought-provoking. If Potter tional and geostrategic aspects of after the conflict a strategic planning had not written Sea Power, then this Australia’s experience in the conflict. document iterating it was issued work by Uhlig would likely be the The Gulf Commitment by David with a statement that “there is no standard text for naval science Horner is largely a campaign history reason to rush into a major overhaul courses of the future. But its value is while Australia’s Gulf War, an anthol- of our defence policy.” more than academic. It informs the ogy edited by Murray Goot and Rod- Australia’s Gulf War questions uninformed and moves knowledge- ney Tiffen, is an analysis of Aus- the relevance of defense policy in able readers to question assumptions tralia’s overall role in the war. The the face of that experience while about naval combat and the Navy’s latter is a more valuable contribution David Horner’s The Gulf Commitment contribution to warfare. In danger- to the literature on the war since does not. Horner provides an intro- ous and uncertain times it is useful Australia’s part was limited to the ac- ductory chapter in which the shift to question assumptions. tivity of the three naval vessels in policy is discussed and an attempt This book should be read by which participated in the U.N. em- is made to place the Australian role newly promoted general officers of bargo of Iraq, while the geopolitical in the Gulf in context but he fails to the Army and Air Force who want to impact of the war had far greater make a case. Leaders go to war for understand the relationship between consequences for Australia. complex purposes and Australia, like their service’s capabilities and those Australia’s Gulf War is also im- the other members of the coalition, of the Navy. JFQ portant in understanding the domes- went into the Gulf for various rea- tic political and foreign demands sons although that region fell out- which coalition warfare places on a side the scope of the new defense country like Australia today. It could policy. Prime Minister Robert Hawke also serve as the model for a similar told parliament that the Gulf com- book about America in the Persian mitment was “proportionate to the Gulf—one that treats such diverse is- interests we have at stake and to our sues as the moral, political, ethical, national interests. It is also a practical commitment.” But the political dimension of Australia’s Gulf War Alan L. Gropman teaches military history at commitment is better treated in Aus- the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. tralia’s Gulf War and includes consid- He recently lectured at Australian service eration of that nation’s association colleges on the role of U.S. airpower in the Persian Gulf War.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 123 with and belief in the U.N. approach participated in the blockade. Yet their that Australia followed the lead of to collective security, relations with symbolic value far exceeded the mili- the United States in the Gulf, but the United States, and a need for tary capability provided by these rather claims that it was acting only precedent-setting action to defeat ships. Australia, a nation that sold Iraq in its own interests. Next the case Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait. wheat and other commodities, helped against Australian participation is After examining the strategic to enforce Saddam Hussein’s diplo- made by two members of the left backdrop Horner details the efforts of matic, political, military, and eco- who make too much of the blunders the Australian military in the Gulf. nomic isolation, and also made a po- by the American government in suc- Following internal discussion and a litical statement at great cost in terms coring Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq war conversation between Prime Minister of trade which counted for much and failing during the Reagan and Hawke and President George Bush, more than its military contribution. Bush administrations to rein in Sad- the Australian cabinet authorized the Other Australian military ele- dam Hussein’s tyranny. The reality of dispatch of two sophisticated guided ments did become involved. Eventu- the August 2, 1990 invasion and Sad- missile frigates and a slower but tech- ally the first three vessels were re- dam’s unignorable threat to Saudi nologically advanced supply ship to placed, one frigate by a guided Arabia were facts that had to be dealt the Gulf. They deployed with a com- missile destroyer, and mine-clearing with, and prior mistakes were no jus- bined complement of six hundred detachments were sent to the area. tification for inaction in the face of a men on August 13, 1990. In addition, some ground and sea great menace. The authors, more- Because Iraq had a large air force personnel who had been previ- over, argue that continued economic force and surface-to-surface missiles, ously seconded to American and sanctions and diplomacy versus the the Royal Australian Air Force British units served in the Gulf. After use of force would have worked to (RAAF) assisted in training the RAN Desert Storm, 75 Australian service- eject Iraq from Kuwait, surely a naive crews in air and missile defense by men served in northern Iraq to aid sentiment given Saddam’s past and running hundreds of simulated at- Kurdish refugees. However, any present actions. But this is not to say tacks on the ships. RAAF F–111s, F/A thought the Hawke government that this chapter does not score de- 18s, P–3Cs, helicopters, and trainers might have had of sending RAAF bating points on the effects of the (the last simulating Exocet missiles) combat units (with F–111s, RF–111s, Gulf deployment on Australia’s flew more than 400 hours in prac- or F/A–18s) was checked in part be- democracy, and on its relationship tice attacks. Lear jets flown by con- cause of constrained resources, but with its neighbors, none of whom re- tractors towed targets to sharpen the mainly because of strident opposi- sponded similarly. These two leftists skill of RAN gunners. Since the navy tion from the left wing of the ruling also provide an example of the edi- determined that the supply ship’s air party. The “convener of the centre- tors’ approach to viewing issues from defenses were inadequate for the re- left faction . . . told the Prime Minis- all sides. gion, the Royal Australian Army dis- ter that he would face a party room As a tie breaker, the collection patched a detachment from an air revolt if the government tried to in- includes a chapter on the politics of defense regiment to ensure the crease Australian forces in the Gulf.” Australian involvement by a neutral safety of ship and crew. The ships on duty in the Gulf journalist who makes the point that The mission was to “prevent the from September 1990 to March 1991 Australia’s long commitment to the import or export of all commodities acquitted themselves with a great United Nations weighed heaviest on and products to or from Iraq or deal of skill and pride. Horner con- the minds of the Hawke government, Kuwait,” but the initial rules of en- cludes that in the Gulf War Australia and not George Bush’s requests. gagement issued by the government “demonstrated...support for the The next five chapters focus on were too tame to permit the ships to role of the United Nations in protect- the home front. One treats experi- effectively carry out this role. After a ing small countries, and in general ences of Arab-Australians (the major- good deal of message traffic back and showed that Australia would pull its ity of whom are Lebanese and Chris- forth the ships were permitted to act weight internationally. However, the tian) and their trial at the hands of aggressively, first firing warning and commitment also contributed to native Australians. Another deals then disabling shots at vessels which Australia’s security by improving the with the experience of Jews in the failed to yield and also boarding efficiency and battle-worthiness of face of increasing anti-semitism also ships which might be carrying for- the ADF [the Australian Defense at the hands of native Australians. bidden materials. Australian frigates Force].” The Gulf Commitment is a Both articles point out that attacks did fire warning shots at suspected graphic account of value to military on Arab and Jewish institutions ships and also boarded several. professionals. While its purpose is brought Arabs and Jews closer as The Australian contingent was in- limited, it fulfills that goal admirably. both communities condemned at- deed small—three ships as opposed to In Australia’s Gulf War Goot and tacks on any ethnic group or facility. about 180 from the United States (in- Tiffen present a broader canvas. The Another chapter covers the cluding six aircraft carriers)—and only book opens with a brief explanation largely impotent peace movement one of 17 national naval forces which by Minister for Foreign Affairs Gareth Evans on the strategic reasons for entering the war. Evans denies

124 JFQ / Spring 1994 Puma helicopter hovering over HMAS Darwin.

U.S. Navy (John Bouvia) that tried unsuccessfully to use the Three chapters then deal with The final two chapters assert that Gulf War to drive a wedge between the impact of the war on Australian Australia’s participation in the Gulf Australia and the United States. The foreign policy. The first details Aus- demonstrated that the force structure author argues that despite a nation- tralia’s historical involvement in the developed for a self-reliant defense wide effort by peace groups the war Middle East, including its ties to Is- policy was ill-suited for distant force “left the Australian people more in fa- rael, pro-Israeli Prime Minister, ex- projection. A force structure more vour of the United States, the ANZUS tensive trade ties with many Arab suited to the old forward defense alliance and joint [U.S./Australian] fa- countries, and the effects of its mid- force structure was needed. But Aus- cilities than they were before.” dle eastern policy on Jewish votes tralia has not questioned its force Probably the most useful chap- and campaign contributions. structure, at least not publicly. Enter- ter in Australia’s Gulf War treats the The second chapter delineates ing the Gulf War, moreover, also vio- news coverage. Every type of media Australia’s (especially the Labor lated that part of Australia’s defense is richly considered, and the author, Party’s) close connection to the policy that called for greater atten- one of the book’s editors, knows this United Nations. It was through this tion to regional concerns. Its neigh- territory well. He is most critical of attachment, argues the author, that bors were much more anti-American the anti-war and anti-American bi- Prime Minister Hawke was able to than Australia, much less pro-United ases in the state-funded Australian overcome anti-American sentiment Nations, and resolutely uninvolved Broadcast Company. He is even in his party. In 1945 Australia’s then in the Gulf War. Therefore, Australia more disparaging of the extremely Minister for Foreign Affairs H.V. may have wounded itself regionally heavy use made by Australian televi- Evatt, a Laborite, was present at the as it tried to promote the idea that it sion of American network coverage. creation of the United Nations and is an Asian country not completely The last chapter in this section is also played a major role in drafting tied to America and its aims. on polls. The author, book co-editor the Charter and later served as presi- Australia’s Gulf War is a thought- Murray Goot, is an expert on polling, dent of the General Assembly. Nor- ful book with a serious end, and it and he writes an exceptionally de- man Makin, also a Laborite, was the deserves attention by readers on tailed chapter on the successes and first president of the U.N. Security both sides of the Pacific. JFQ failures of polling during the build- Council. The chapter concludes with up and war phases. He found that a this judgment: “The importance of lack of money hampered both the the U.N. factor in selling the Gov- frequency and detail of polls. Never- ernment’s Gulf policy to the Party theless, support for the war went up cannot be exaggerated.” after the fighting began, with 75 percent of Australians eventually favor- ing involvement.

Spring 1994 / JFQ 125 FitzSimonds, James R. Revolutions in Military Affairs Cumulative Index (1993–1994) no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 24–31 ISSUES 1–4: CONTRIBUTORS Fogleman, Ronald R. Reengineering Defense Transportation no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 75–79 Builder, Carl H. Gordon, John, IV Roles and Missions: Back to the Joint Power Projection: Operation Future [Out of Joint] Torch no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 32–37 no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 60–69 Chiarelli, Peter W. Gropman, Alan L. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Australia and the Gulf War no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 71–81 [Off the Shelf/Review] Chilcoat, Richard A. no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 123–25 Army Prepositioning Afloat Gropman, Alan L. no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 51–57 The Military Cost of Clapper, James R., Jr. Discrimination Challenging Joint Military [Off the Shelf/Review] Intelligence no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 123–25 no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 92–99 Hammond, Grant T. Coglianese, Christopher Paradoxes of War Operation Weserübung and the no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 7–16 Origins of Joint Warfare Hazlett, James A. no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 100–11 Do We Need An Information Cole, Ronald H. Corps? Managing the Schwarzkopf no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 88–97 Account: Atkinson as Crusader Henderson, David S. [Off the Shelf/Review] Army Prepositioning Afloat no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 123–27 no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 51–57 Collins, John M. Herrly, Peter F. Where Are Special Operations Southern Italy: Strategic Forces? Confusion, Operational no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 7–16 Frustration Crigler, T. Frank no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 70–75 The Peace-Enforcement Dilemma Hoar, Joseph P. no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 64–70 A CINC’s Perspective Cronin, Patrick M. no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 56–63 Rethinking Asian Alliances Hooker, Richard D., Jr. [Off the Shelf/Review Essay] Operation Weserübung and the no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 119–23 Origins of Joint Warfare Cropsey, Seth no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 100–11 The Limits of Jointness Huntington, Samuel P. [Out of Joint] New Contingencies, Old Roles no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 72–79 no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 38–43 Dietrich, Steve E. Jeremiah, David E. Falaise, The Highway of Death, What’s Ahead for the Armed and Mogadishu Forces? [Off the Shelf/Review] no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 25–35 no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 117–20 Johnson, Dana J. Dixon, Anne M. Unity of Control: Joint Air The Whats and Whys of Operations in the Gulf Andre, David J. Coalitions no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 88–99 no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 26–28 A Reflection on We Were Soldiers Keaney, Thomas A. Doughty, Robert A. Surveying Gulf War Airpower Once...And Young [Off the Shelf] Reforming Joint Doctrine no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 25–36 no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 40–47 no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 119–22 Kelso, Frank B., II Barlow, Jason B. The Wave of the Future Interservice Rivalry in the Pacific no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 13–16 no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 76–81

126 JFQ / Spring 1994 Kim, Ted Owens, William A. Sullivan, Brian R. Logistics: The Way Ahead Living Jointness Russia’s Military Past [Off the no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 38–44 no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 7–14 Shelf/Review] Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. Petrie, John N. no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 125–27 Assessing the Bottom-Up Review Dealing with Anarchy Sullivan, Gordon R. [Commentary] no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 17–23 Projecting Strategic Land Combat no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 22–24 Petrie, John N. Power Kupiszewski, Robert B. Much More Than “From the Sea” no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 8–12 Joint Education: Where Do We Go [Off the Shelf/Review] Summers, Harry G., Jr. From Here? no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 120–123 Revisiting the Gulf War no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 63–70 Pfluke, Lillian A. [Off the Shelf/Review Essay] Larson, Charles R. Southern Italy: Strategic no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 118–22 Cooperative Engagement Confusion, Operational Trainor, Bernard E. no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 82–87 Frustration Jointness, Service Culture, and the Lewis, William H. no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 70–75 Gulf War [Out of Joint] United Nations Peacekeeping: Poole, Walter S. no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 71–74 Ends versus Means Chiefs from Across the Estuary van Tol, Jan M. no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 48–57 [Off the Shelf/Review] Revolutions in Military Affairs Libicki, Martin C. no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 123–25 no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 24–31 Do We Need An Information Pudas, Terry J. Vlahos, Michael Corps? Preparing Future Coalition By Our Orthodoxies Shall Ye no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 88–97 Commanders Know Us [Out of Joint] Linn, Thomas C. no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 40–46 no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 108–10 The Cutting Edge of Unified RisCassi, Robert W. Waldron, Arthur Actions Principles for Coalition Warfare China’s Military Classics no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 34–39 no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 58–71 [Off the Shelf/Review Essay] Mariner, Rosemary B. Rosen, Stephen Peter no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 114–17 A Soldier is a Soldier Service Redundancy: Waste or Webb, Willard J. no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 54–62 Hidden Capability? The Single Manager for Air in McDowell, Dennis no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 36–39 Vietnam Theater Missile Defense: A Joint Rostow, Eugene V. no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 88–98 Enterprise Is U.N. Peacekeeping a Growth Wettering, Frederick L. no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 80–87 Industry? [Commentary] Dealing with Anarchy McPeak, Merrill A. no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 100–105 no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 17–23 Ideas Count Sewall, John O.B. Willmott, H.P. no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 22–24 Implications for U.N. Grave of a Dozen Schemes Mears, Gary H. Peacekeeping no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 82–91 Logistics: The Way Ahead no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 29–33 Willmott, H.P. no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 38–44 Sewall, John O.B. Guadalcanal: The Naval Miller, Paul David United Nations Peacekeeping: Campaign A New Mission for Atlantic Ends versus Means no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 98–106 Command no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 48–57 Winnefeld, James A. no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 80–87 Skelton, Ike Unity of Control: Joint Air Mundy, Carl E., Jr. Taking Stock of the New Joint Era Operations in the Gulf Complementary Capabilities from no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 15–21 no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 88–99 the Sea Stanton, James P. Wolfowitz, Paul D. no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 17–21 Europe, Forward Presence, and the Managing the Schwarzkopf Mundy, Carl E., Jr. Future Account: Atkinson as Crusader Thunder and Lightning: Joint no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 47–53 [Off the Shelf/Review] Littoral Warfare Steele, William M. no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 123–24 no. 4 (Spring 94), pp. 45–50 Joint Education: Where Do We Go JFQ Oakley, Robert B. From Here? An Envoy’s Perspective no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 63–70 no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 44–55 Strain, Frederick R. Articles published in Joint Force Owens, Mackubin Thomas The New Joint Warfare no. 2 (Autumn 93), pp. 17–24 Quarterly are listed in the Air University Vietnam as Military History Index to Military Periodicals. In addition, [Off the Shelf/Review Essay] Sullivan, Brian R. brief abstracts of selected articles no. 3 (Winter 93–94), pp. 112–18 On the Other Side of the Interwar appear in Current World Affairs: Years [Off the Shelf/Review] A Quarterly Bibliography. no. 1 (Summer 93), pp. 125–27

Spring 1994 / JFQ 127 POSTSCRIPT

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