Germany's Approach to Baltic Sea Security
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DIIS POLICY BRIEF NOVEMBER 2020 GERMANY’S APPROACH TO BALTIC SEA SECURITY Stepping up, but not enough? Although Germany is taking on more responsibility in the Baltic Sea region, the world KEY TAKEAWAYS is changing faster than Germany is changing its ■ Germany is increasingly taking more responsibility approach. The country’s policies accordingly for security in the Baltic Sea region. lack strategic direction and vision – and above ■ all, action. Its focus has been and remains on multilateral initiatives within a NATO and/or EU framework, which is very welcomed by the states in the region. If one wants to understand the German approach to security in the Baltic Sea, the context of Russo- ■ However, the changes Germany is making are being German relations is crucial. Making the headlines outpaced by the changing international context. once more with the poisoning of Russian opposition The country is doing more, but not yet enough: politician Alexei Navalny in August 2020, for a moment concrete action is needed with respect to the it seemed as if ‘a turning point’ in the relationship Bundeswehr, decision-making procedures and between the two countries had occurred. Even the strategic culture. future of the highly controversial Nord Stream II gas pipeline was hanging in the balance, as reflected in the election meddling, spreading disinformation, political German foreign minister, Heiko Maas, telling a German assassinations and Moscow’s uncompromising tabloid, ‘I hope the Russians don’t force us to change attitude in Syria, the Donbas and Belarus. This has led our position on Nord Stream 2’. But rather than a to a slow realization among Germany’s political elite turning point, it seems that Navalny’s poisoning is just that rapprochement on the basis of shared values and an additional step in the deterioration in relations reliance on a rules-based international order is between Germany and Russia. anything but possible. Nevertheless, Germany still does not perceive Russia as a direct threat, unlike its A special relationship that is not so special anymore eastern neighbors. After German reunification in the early 1990s, Germany attempted to balance Russia and western Germany’s challenged leadership in the Baltic Sea Europe. Advocating rapprochement with Russia while region pushing for the integration of its eastern neighbours This increasing frustration is reflected in Germany’s into Europe, under Merkel’s first two coalition approach to security in the Baltic Sea region (BSR), governments (2005-2013), Germany oscillated which has seen increasingly assertive posturing by between wanting to strengthen the partnership with Russia, a build-up of forces and increases in grey-zone Russia and supporting its EU neighbours to the east. conflicts in form of disinformation, cyber attacks and Since the Ukraine crisis of 2014, however, Berlin has other destabilization operations. As a consequence of paid much more attention to Russia’s actions and the Ukraine crisis in 2014 and in response to Russia’s threats to the Baltic and east European states, assertive posturing, NATO has stepped up its presence growing increasingly frustrated with Russia’s in eastern Europe to strengthen its deterrence and aggressive and assertive actions, such as hacking, defence posture on its eastern borders. Germany’s contributions to NATO deterrence and defence in the BSR FINLAND Baltic Air Policing NORWAY Ämari Air Base RUSSIA NATO Standing ESTONIA Naval Forces BALTIC SEA LATVIA SWEDEN LITHUANIA DENMARK BELARUS Rukla BMCC EFP Rostock Szczecin Combined Air Operations GERMANY MNC-NE Centre Berlin POLAND VJTF Uedem UKRAINE Nord Stream I and II pipelines NATO Countries Ulm Joint Support and Enabling Command Germany has taken a leading role in strengthening GERMAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO SECURITY IN THE BSR NATO’s eastern flank, clearly taking on more responsibility. Very much in line with the country’s Ground general approach to international politics and the ■ Leads NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) international order, the German approach to the Baltic multinational battlegroup in Lithuania. Sea clearly and explicitly focuses on multilateralism, in which it joins initiatives within a NATO or EU frame- ■ Enlarged presence at Multinational Corps North- work, or together with several other countries. The east (MNC-NE) Headquarters (the High-Readiness Force Headquarters) in Szczecin, Poland (set up by maritime domain is of particular interest to Germany, Germany, Denmark and Poland in 1999). as homeland defence and the defence of its allies closely overlap in the Baltic Sea. ■ Contributed to creation of NATO’s spearhead force (the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, VJTF). Yet, despite the many German initiatives and their Germany last had a leadership role in 2019, relative success, numerous issues continue to plague involving around 10,000 troops, and will do so the German approach to Baltic Sea security. again in 2023. Historically, Germany itself was perceived as a threat by other states in the BSR. However, given Germany’s ■ Set up new NATO headquarters, the Joint Support continued commitment to the security of the Baltic and Enabling Command, in Ulm, Germany, focused States, as well as its economic investments and on ensuring troop and equipment movements procurement projects designed to strengthen the across internal European borders. partnership between the Baltic States and Germany, Sea this perception of the latter is slowly changing. ■ In the process of creating a multinational ‘Baltic Germany’s insistence on multilateral approaches to Maritime Component Command’ (BMCC) at the security also contributes to the creation of a more German Maritime Forces Staff in Rostock, under positive view of Germany as one of the main security German leadership. Serves as a NATO command, providers in the region. but can also be used outside NATO. Nonetheless the highly controversial Nord Stream II ■ Contributes regularly to the NATO Standing Naval pipeline project mentioned earlier is causing major Forces of the North (Standing NATO Maritime problems for Germany with its eastern and northern Group One and Standing NATO Mine Counter Meas- neighbours, as well as with important allies within ures Group One). NATO, such as the US. These countries oppose the project because they fear increasing European ■ Created the annual Baltic Commanders Conference dependence on Russian gas, as well as the potential in 2015. exertion of Russian political and economic influence Air on traditional transit countries in eastern Europe, ■ Contributes regularly and extensively to Air Policing where Russia can threaten their gas supply without of the Baltic states, controlled from the NATO affecting the supply to western Europe through the Combined Air Operations Centre at Uedem, new pipeline. The US has even introduced sanctions Germany, which also coordinates recurring NATO on businesses involved in constructing the pipeline. exercises in the Baltic States (e.g. Baltic Operations Germany, however, has maintained the argument that (BALTOPS) and Ramstein Alloy). the pipeline is a purely economic project quite separate from security policy. While debate on the future of the pipeline was revived in the wake of the Big questions… Navalny poisoning, it quickly became clear that the Germany’s role in BSR security also highlights the big pipeline project, which is almost complete, will be questions: in order to take on more responsibility, finished regardless, and that the damage to Germany’s Germany has significantly increased its defence ties with its allies and neighbours will linger, as is spending since 2014, spending $49.3 billion in 2019, a visible, for example, in Germany’s relationship with 10 percent increase from 2018. Yet, Germany is still Poland, which has deteriorated substantially in falling short of the 2 percent of GDP threshold recent years. reaffirmed at the NATO Wales summit in 2014, DIIS POLICY BRIEF NOVEMBER 2020 spending only 1.36 percent in 2019 and 1.57 percent which the Chancellery and foreign, defence and in 2020 (this reflects a lower GDP in 2020 due to interior ministries participate, but giving a larger role COVID-19, which at least partially explains the rise in for the Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat) the percentage). While there is widespread agreement would also involve other important ministries, such as in Berlin that Germany and Europe need to do more on justice, finance and development, and thus enhance defence, with German political leaders stressing the coordination. Finally, the MSC report also calls for the importance of multilateralism and complementarity development of a national strategic culture if Germany with NATO, allies accuse Germany of not meeting its is to fulfil its international responsibilities, with regular ambitious rhetoric with proper action or concrete publication of a national strategy document, as well as steps: the failure to reach the 2% goal is often seen as awareness-raising public debates about German reflecting a lack of alliance solidarity on Germany’s security and defence policy, strategy and priorities. part, as is Germany’s preference for stabilization, training and support missions over combat operations. The German approach to security in the BSR thus very much reflects the broader global shifts to which Despite the increase in defence spending, the German Germany needs to adapt. Germany has been crucial in armed forces continue to be plagued by low levels maintaining dialogue with Russia because of its of readiness,