IHS Jane's Terrorism Country Briefing

IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing MALI

February 2013 ihs.com/janes

A product of IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – Mali February 2013

Executive Summary 3 Operational Tempo 3 Distribution of Attacks 3 Counter-terrorism Rating 4

1. Country Profile 5 Overview 5 Physical Terrain 6 Human Terrain 8 Sub-State Threats 9

2. Operational Profile 13 Tempo 13 Distribution of attacks 15 Tactics 16 Targeting 17

3. Qualitative Analysis 18 OSINT Summary: Prominent Malian Tuareg leader splits from Harakat Ansar al-Din 18 JTIC Brief: Mali mission – militant Islamist advance prompts French intervention 19 OSINT Summary: Senior AQIM commander in Sahel reportedly leaving group 24 JTIC Brief: Mali rebels’ recall to arms 27

4. Counter-Terrorism Environment 30 Security Environment 30 Political Environment 31 Physical Envrironment 31

6. Appendix: JTIC Country Briefing Methodology 32

Will Hartley [JTIC Editor] [email protected]

Charles Lister [JTIC Analyst] [email protected]

Executive Summary Operational Tempo

Non-militant casualty trend (1 February 2012 - 31 January 2013)

25 Attacks Fatalities 20

0 Feb Mar Apr May Jun July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan

Between 1 February 2012 and 31 January 2013, Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) recorded 64 damaging attacks in Mali, representing a major increase from the 14 attacks in the preceding 12 month period. The majority of this violence was accounted for by a militant offensive in the north-east of the country in February, March, and April 2012, and by events following the effective seizure of the region by Islamist militants in late June 2012.

The initiation of an ethnic Tuareg uprising in north-east Mali in January 2012 meant that the start of the reporting period saw a high level of sub-state violence. However, as Islamist militants joined the offensive in the region, insurgent violence peaked in March, with 10 attacks recorded as militants seized the towns of Gao, Kidal, and Tombouctou. Over the following months, there was a steady tempo of militant operations in the north-east, largely accounted for by attacks by Islamist militants on Sufi Muslim shrines. September and October saw the level of violence increase slightly but then decline in November and December. Nonetheless, the militant capture of Konna in Mopti region on 10 January 2013 sparked a French military intervention in north-east Mali the following day. Over the remainder of the month, French and Malian forces advanced and recaptured all towns held by militants in the region.

Distribution of Attacks

The highest level of violence was recorded in the north-east regions of Mali, which were seized by militants in March 2012, although recaptured by joint French-Malian forces in January 2013. Tombouctou saw the highest level of violence, and the 28 attacks recorded represented 44% of all attacks recorded nationwide.

The neighbouring regions of Gao (15 attacks) and Kidal (13 attacks) also saw significant militant activity.

Militant violence was also recorded in Mopti region (four attacks), while one attack was recorded in the capital Bamako and the regions of Kayes and Ségou.

Distribution of attacks by province (1 Feb 2012 - 31 Jan 2013)

0 0-5 5-15 16+

Counter-terrorism Rating

Security Environment 2.0 Police, Customs and Intelligence 2.0 Military and Paramilitary Forces 2.0 Judicial and Penal System 2.0 Political Environment 2.5 Government Legitimacy 2.0 Socioeconomic Conditions 1.5 International Co-operation 3.5 Physical Environment 2.0 Geography and Terrain 1.5 Natural Resource Control 3.0 Weapons Proliferation 2.0

The counter-terrorism environment in Mali is rated Very Lax (2.0) based on a weighted composite of the country’s ratings for Security Environment (military and law enforcement), Political Environment (government and society) and Physical Environ- ment (terrain and resources).

A Very Lax environment is defined as one which favours the sub-state actor. Terrorism campaigns may be sustainable indefinitely, and have a realistic prospect of achieving significant concessions. Insurgencies may be sustainable in the medium to long term, are likely to be able to maintain at least periodic control over some territory, and pose a significant threat to the state.

1. Country Profile Overview

The Republic of Mali is a large and sparsely populated country occupying the central part of the Niger River valley at the southern edge of the Sahara. Once home to successive empires that long dominated the West African interior, it is now one of the world’s least developed states and has a very marginal position in the international system.

Mali’s location in a poor and turbulent region was belied by its reputation for good governance and regional statesmanship. The country has been a pillar of pan-Africanism over the years, playing an important role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) regional integration endeavours and has forged strong relations with the United States, France, the European Union, South Africa, China, and the Arab world. These partners are vital in subsidising government operations.

While gold production has spurred reasonable headline growth since the mid-1990s, long-term development is likely to be constrained by the contrary demands of an unpredictable environment and booming population. In the medium term, the volatile political situations in neighbouring countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Niger, and Algeria also pose security and economic challenges to Mali’s development.

Mali has also had a history of instability and sub-state violence in its expansive north-east regions, with three separate uprisings by ethnic Tuareg militants in the 1990s and 2000s, each of which ended with negotiated settlements.

The beginning of a new Tuareg uprising in January 2012 had more serious political consequences, though, prompting a military coup in March. The subsequent abrogation of democratic principles put much of Mali’s international aid and assistance on hold.

Just as seriously, militants in the north-east, now including Islamist militants, took advantage of the post-coup chaos and seized control of the north-east regions of Gao, Kidal, and Tombouctou in late March and early April – an area more than three times the size of the United Kingdom.

By mid-2012, militant Islamist groups – including local Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) forces – had consolidated full control of the north-east and imposed sharia (Islamic law). While an uneasy status quo held for much of the remainder of the year, militants subsequently pushed south and captured further territory in mid-January 2013, prompting a French military intervention. Under the weight of French air strikes and ahead of a joint French-Malian ground offensive, militants withdrew from captured towns. Although government control was re-established over the north-east regions by the end of the month, there were indications that militants intended to transition to guerrilla operations.

A Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa patrol vehicle in Mali’s Gao region in late 2012. (IHS Global Ltd/JTIC)

Physical Terrain

Mali is comprised of 1,240,000 sq km of territory, making it slightly less than twice the size of the US state of Texas or slightly less than five times the size of the UK (244,820 sq km). Of this territory, 1,220,000 sq km is land and 20,000 sq km is water.

The country has no coastline and 3,650 km of land borders with Algeria (1,376 km), Niger (821 km), Burkina Faso (1,000 km), Cote d’Ivoire (532 km), Guinea (858 km), Senegal (419 km), and Mauritania (2,237 km).

The capital of Mali is Bamako, located in the south-west of the country, with a population estimated at 746,000 – making it the largest city in Mali. Population density across the country averages 11.08 people per sq km, and approximately 32% of the population live in urban areas.

Mali is a largely flat country with rolling northern plains – encompassing the regions of Tombouctou, Kidal, and Gao – covered by sand. The country’s south is dominated largely by a savana, while the north-east of the country is also home to an area of rugged hills and mountains, known as the Adrar des Ifoghas.

Mali’s climate is largely subtropical to arid, with a very hot and dry season spreading throughout February to June. The rainy season generally brings humid conditions and milder temperatures between June and November, with a short cool and dry season between November and February. The dominance of desert, arid plains, and hills and mountains in the northern half of the country means large parts of the north are uninhabited and the southern half of the country contains a larger proportion of the country’s population.

Topographical map of Mali.

Across Mali as a whole, forest covers around 125,720 sq km, or 10.3% of total land area.

Mali has approximately 18,709 km of roadway – compared to 394,428 km in the UK – of which 18%, or 3,368 km, is paved. The country’s transport infrastructure also includes an approximately 593 km long rail network – compared to 16,454 km in the UK. In addition, Mali has a total of 20 airports – compared to 505 in the UK – of which eight possess paved run- ways.

Human Terrain

The CIA estimated in 2008 that the population of Mali was 12,324,029. Mali has an estimated growth rate of 2.61%. High growth rates have resulted in a very large youth population, with 47.3% of the population under 14 years old and a median age of only 16.3 years. Infant mortality averages 111.35 deaths per 1,000 live births, while life expectancy at birth averages 52.61 years.

Mali is a predominantly Muslim society, with Muslims accounting for 90% of the overall population. The remainder of the country is composed of those belonging to indigenous beliefs (9%) and a small Christian community (1%).

Ethnically, 50% of the population are members of the Mandé ethnic group’s Bambara, Malinke, and Soninke sub-groups. Another 17% belong to the Peul ethnic group; 12% to the Voltaic; 10% to the Tuareg community; 6% to the Songhai; and the remaining 5% are classed as other.

The Malian labour force comprised approximately 5,400,000 in 2007, and of these approximately 80% of workers are engaged in the agriculatre and fishing industries, with the remaining 20% unclassified.

An estimated 36% of the Malian population was measured in 2005 to live below the poverty line and 41% of the national economy was calculated to be composed of informal economy areas.

Sub-State Threats

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Name: Tanzim al-Qaeda fi Bilad al-Maghreb al-Islamiyya, or Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Previously known as the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et la Combat (GSPC), or Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.

Scope: Transnational Orientation: Sunni Islamic Objective: Revolutionary.

Status: Active. The GSPC was founded in 1998 but pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda in September 2006 and renamed itself AQIM in January 2007.

Leader: Abdelmalek Droukdel alias Abu Musab Abdelwadud.

Summary: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a militant Islamist group founded in Algeria but operating throughout Algeria and the countries that comprise North Africa’s Sahel region, including Mali, Niger, and Mauritania. AQIM was originally founded as the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et la Combat (GSPC) in 1998 by Hassan Hattab as a splinter of the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), and waged a low-level guerrilla insurgency against Algerian security forces with the objective of overthrowing the government and forming an Islamic state under sharia (Islamic law). However, from 2001 onwards there were ideological divisions within the group between a cadre of nationalist Islamist militants and those who came to identify more with Al-Qaeda’s transnational militant Islamist ideology. In 2003, Hattab resigned as leader and the pro-Al-Qaeda Nabil Sahrawi became leader, although he was killed in June 2004 and replaced by Abelmalek Droukdel. Under Droukdel the GSPC continued to build relations with Al-Qaeda and in September 2006 Droukdel formally pledged loyalty to then Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. This was followed in January 2007 by the GSPC formally renaming itself as AQIM in recognition of Al- Qaeda’s acceptance of it becoming an affiliate organisation. Over the next two years AQIM supplemented its ongoing guerrilla insurgency with period mass-casualty attacks, typically either co-ordinated vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) or suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attacks. In addition, the group’s more transnational focus led to the group expanding its operations across the Sahel region. With this extended operational area, and under increasing security force pressure in Algeria, AQIM turned to the practice of kidnapping Western nationals, a practice for which it is now arguably most well-known. As the group’s operational tempo dropped through 2011 and into early 2012 such kidnapping operations have continued unabated, and unsubstantiated reports in July 2012 claimed that the activity has made AQIM the richest of Al- Qaeda’s affiliate organisations. Although diminished, low-level AQIM guerrilla operations continue periodically in north-east and east Algeria, however the group is typically more active across the Sahel region, particularly in north-east Mali from early 2012 onwards. Although AQIM elements established bases in militant-controlled areas of north-east Mali across 2012, a French military intervention in the region in January 2013 saw AQIM forces largely withdraw from Mali into neighbouring Sahel countries.

Former senior AQIM commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar (alias Khaled Abou el-Abbas or Laaouar) in a video released in December 2012. (IHS Global Ltd/JTIC)

Harakat Ansar al-Din

Name: Harakat Ansar al-Din, or Movement of the Partisans of the Religion.

Scope: Domestic Orientation: Sunni Islamic Objective: Revolutionary.

Status: Active since being founded on 15 December 2011.

Leader: Iyad ag Ghaly.

Summary: Harakat Ansar al-Din is an ethnic Tuareg militant Islamist group which was founded and operates in the north-east regions of Mali. The formation of the group was announced on 15 December 2011 by its leader Iyad ag Ghaly. Ghaly had previously led Tuareg fighters in an uprising against the Malian state in the early 1990s but after signing a truce with the government he served at the Malian consulate in Saudi Arabia between 2007 and June 2010. The formation of Harakat Ansar al-Din was precipitated by the fall of the Libyan regime of Muammar Ghadaffi in mid-2011, which resulted in large numbers of ethnic Tuaregs - many of whom had fled to Libya following a failed Tuareg uprising in Mali in 2007-09 and served in Ghadaffi’s military - returning to Mali. A secular Tuareg group, the Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA), was formed in October 2011 with the objective of securing independence for the north-east regions of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou. Harakat Ansar al-Din was founded by Ghaly two months later as a militant Islamist counter-point to the MNLA, seeking instead to create an Islamic state under sharia (Islamic law) throughout Mali. While the MNLA began its armed campaign in mid-January 2012, the first recorded armed actions by Harakat Ansar al-Din came in mid-to-late March, with the capturing of a series of towns in Kidal region. The group also carried out a series of significant joint attacks with the MNLA in late March and early April, capturing the towns of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou. However, Harakat Ansar al-Din fighters ejected MNLA forces from Tombouctou in early April, and then from Kidal and Gao in June in conjunction with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa militants respectively. However, control of Tombouctou was subsequently largely ceded to AQIM forces, and control of Gao to Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa. After participating in preliminary peace talks in Burkino Faso in November and December, Harakat Ansar al-Din militants – in conjunction with Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa – pushed further south and seized territory in Mopti region in early-January 2013. The move prompted a French military intervention in the north-east, and over the remainder of the month Harakat Ansar al-Din was forced to withdraw from all the territory it controlled.

Harakat Ansar al-Din militants in Mali’s Tombouctou in mid-April 2012. (PA)

Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA)

Name: Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), or National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad.

Scope: Local Orientation: Ethnocultural Objective: Separatist.

Status: Active since being founded on 16 October 2011.

Leader: Bilal Ag Cherif.

Summary: The Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) is an ethnic Tuareg separatist group operating in north-east Mali. The group’s principal objective is to establish an independent Azawad state, composed of the Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou regions of north-east Mali. Following the overthrow of the Libyan regime of Muammar Ghadaffi in October 2011, a large number of ethnic Tuaregs returned to Mali, many of whom had served in Ghadaffi’s military. On 16 October, the formation of the MNLA was announced with the merger of two Tuareg militant groups, the Mouvement National de l’Azawad (MNA) and the Mouvement Tuareg du Nord-Mali (MTNM), under the leadership of MTNM leader Bilal Ag Cherif. While the MNLA claimed to have attempted to engage in dialogue with Malian government over the following months, the group announced the beginning of its armed campaign on 17 January 2012. Over the remainder of January and into February, the group assaulted at least eight separate towns across Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou, briefly taking control of some towns before being expelled by Malian security forces. After a slight operational lull, the MNLA - in conjunction with militant Islamist Tuareg group Harakat Ansar al-Din - seized control of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou in a series of attacks in late March and early April, thereby achieving its objective of ‘liberating’ Azawad. In the following days the MNLA announced the end of its military campaign and declared the independence of Azawad. However, the group was subsequently ejected from Tombouctou by Harakat Ansar al-Din militants in early April, and then from Kidal and Gao in June. A failed attempt to retake Gao in November led to the MNLA losing its last remaining strongholds to militant Islamist forces. MNLA forces offered their assistance in the French military intervention in north-east Mali in January 2013, but it was unclear what role, if any, the group played in the recapture of the north-east regions from Islamist militants.

MNLA militants in Mali’s Tombouctou on 11 April 2012. (PA)

Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa

Name: Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa, or Group of Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa. The group is more commonly known by its French acronym MUJAO, or Mouvement pour l’Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest.

Scope: Transnational Orientation: Sunni Islamic Objective: Revolutionary.

Status: Active since being founded in September 2011.

Leader: Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (alias Abu Ghoum-Ghoum).

Summary: Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa, more commonly known by its French acronym MUJAO, is a militant Islamist group that was based and operated in the Gao region of north-east Mali until a French military intervention in January 2013. MUJAO first emerged when the group released a statement in December 2011 claiming responsibility for the kidnapping of three foreign aid workers in Algeria’s Tindouf province in October 2011. The group identified itself as a splinter faction of Al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and was founded by senior Mauritanian AQIM militant Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou. After carrying out several attacks in Algeria and Mauritania, MUJAO sought to capitalise on the capture of large areas of north- east Mali by Harakat Ansar al-Din and Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA) militants in late March and early April 2012. In conjunction with Harakat Ansar al-Din, MUJAO militants ousted MNLA forces from Gao on 27 June and established a base camp there. The group implemented sharia (Islamic law) in Gao, began recruiting heavily from neighbouring West African countries, and expanded further, seizing control of Douentza in Mopti region on 1 September. MUJAO and Harakat Ansar al-Din militants captured the town of Konna in Mopti region in mid-January 2013, prompting a French military intervention in the region. Under French air strikes, MUJAO militants withdrew from Konna, Douentza, and Gao which were subsequently recaptured by joint French-Malian forces. Despite this territorial loss, MUJAO continues to pose a substantial local threat in north-east Mali and seems likely to engage in guerrilla operations targeting military forces.

A Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa patrol vehicle in Mali’s Gao in late 2012. (IHS Global Ltd/JTIC)

2. Operational Profile Tempo

Over the 12 months between 1 February 2012 and 31 January 2013, IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) recorded a total of 64 damaging attacks in Mali, with damaging attacks classed as operations by sub-state armed actors which directly resulted in loss of life, damage, or disruption. These attacks represented a major increase from the 14 attacks recorded in the preceding 12 month period, and equated to an average operational tempo of 5.3 attacks per month. The reporting period also witnessed a total of 59 confirmed non-militant fatalities and 35 non-militant wounded in Mali. Non- militant casualties include all security forces and civilians killed or wounded, whether by insurgents or as collateral damage in counter-insurgency actions. The deadliest single month was May 2012, with 22 non-militant fatalities and one non-militant injury.

Non-militant casualty trend (1 February 2012 - 31 January 2013)

25 Attacks Fatalities 20

0 Feb Mar Apr May Jun July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan

The initiation of an armed campaign by the ethnic Tuareg Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) in north-east Mali on 17 January 2012 saw the level of violence in the country rise considerably when compared to previous levels. As the first month of the reporting period, February saw a total of six attacks in north-east Mali, particularly in the regions of Gao and Kidal. Most notably, the town of Ménaka in Gao and Tinzaouaten in Kidal were seized by the group on 1 and 8 February, respectively. The remote nature of Mali’s north-east regions made verifiable reporting of militant attacks difficult, but the group appeared to struggle to maintain control of territory for more than several days at a time.

March witnessed the highest recorded level of sub-state violence in Mali, with a total of 10 attacks in the regions of Mopti, Kidal, and Gao. The MNLA continued its armed campaign through the month, which began to catalyse the formation of tribal-based pro-government militias, most of which failed to impact the group’s operations. However, the Ganda Iso militia notably clashed with the MNLA in the Saina area of Gao region on 24 March, but 10 militiamen were killed – including leader Amadou Diallo. The final four days of March saw Islamist militant group Harakat Ansar al-Din begin taking part in joint assaults with the MNLA, which resulted in the rapid seizure of most large municipalities in Gao, Kidal, and Tombouctou regions by 1 April.

Following the seizure of the historic town of Tombouctou by a joint MNLA-Harakat Ansar al-Din force on 1 April, the militant Islamists ejected MNLA personnel from the town the following day, leaving it under the control of Harakat Ansar al-Din. Thereafter, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) forces under Yahya Abu Amar Abid Hammadou (alias Abdelhamid Abou Zeid) established a significant presence in, and de facto control of, Tombouctou.

The increasing presence of militant Islamist groups in north-east Mali was underlined on 6 April when Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa militants kidnapped seven Algerian diplomats, including the consul, from Algeria’s consulate in Gao.

Between May and August there was a steady tempo of sub-state violence in north-east Mali, with a total of 18 attacks

recorded. An attack by suspected AQIM and Harakat Ansar al-Din militants on the Sufi Muslim tomb of Saint Sidi Amar in Tombouctou on 5 May served as a warning of further such attacks on perceived idolatrous targets by the militants across the remainder of the reporting period.

Following its leading role in the seizure of north-east Mali earlier in the year, the MNLA was subsequently ejected from the town of Kidal in early June by Harakat Ansar al-Din militants and then from Gao at the end of the month by a joint force of Harakat Ansar al-Din and Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa militants. This left Gao largely under the control of Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa, who quickly implemented harsh forms of sharia (Islamic law) and recruited a local Islamic police force.

Islamist attacks on perceived idolatrous buildings in Tombouctou continued through June, July, and August, with at least eight destroyed – all of which were UNESCO World Heritage sites. Popular resentment to Islamist rule occasionally arose, as illustrated by two incidents in which Harakat Ansar al-Din militants opened fire on civilian protesters in Kidal on 5 June and in Goundam in Tombouctou region on 13 July. However, casualty figures for both incidents could not be independently verified.

The level of violence increased slightly in September and October, with seven attacks recorded in each month. The period witnessed the continued consolidation of Islamist control in north-east Mali, as Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa seized Douentza in Mopti region on 1 September. The following day, it claimed to have executed Algeria’s vice-consul to Mali after Algiers had refused to accept the demands made by the group in late August. The two months also saw a further five perceived idolatrous sites destroyed in Tombouctou and various sharia punishments – such as ampuations and lashing – meted out to civilians deemed to have violated religious customs. Due to the difficulty in verifying casualty information, no fatalities were recorded in September but three people were killed by Islamist militants in October – two civilians travelling between Tombouctou and Mopti regions were killed on 4 October and a suspected MNLA militant was executed in Tom- bouctou on 2 October.

The increasing prevalence of Islamist militancy in north-east Mali led to intensified calls in the regional and international community – especially from France – for military intervention in the region, preferably led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In response, senior Islamist commander Oumar Ould Hamaha told Reuters on 13 October that militants would “open the doors of hell” for French citizens if their government continued to press for an intervention in Mali.

November and December saw the attack tempo decline somewhat in Mali, with five and three attacks recorded respectively, and no non-militant fatalities were recorded. Nonetheless, there was notable inter-factional fighting as Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa militants repulsed an MNLA attempt to retake Gao in November, which led to the MNLA losing control of the town of Menaka – its last remaining stronghold. Furthermore, Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa militants kidnapped a French national near the town of Kayes in Kayes region on 21 November.

The period also saw a split develop within AQIM’s senior Mali-based commanders, with Oumar Ould Hamaha claiming to confirm on 3 December that senior AQIM commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar (alias Khaled Abou El Abbas alias Laaouar) had decided to leave the group and form his own armed force that would operate “throughout the entire Sahara”. Later that month, Belmokhtar confirmed the split in a video statement in which he identified his new group as Katibat al-Muqaoon bil-Dumaa, or the Battalion of Those Who Sign With Blood. The group was subsequently responsible for a four-day siege of the Tigantourine gas facility near In Amenas in Algeria’s Illizi province between 16 and 19 January 2013, which left 50 people dead, including 37 foreign nationals.

While January 2013 only witnessed four attacks in Mali, the month was significant as the seizure of the town of Konna in Mopti region on 10 January by Harakat Ansar al-Din and Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa militants prompted a French military intervention across the north-east on 11 January. While ensuing air strikes saw Islamist militants flee Konna and Douentza and rear bases in Gao, AQIM militants led by Abou Zeid advanced west and took control of the town of Diably in Ségou region on 14 January. Nonetheless, French military forces backed by the Malian army took back Diablay several days later, followed by the critical towns of Gao, Tombouctou and later Kidal by the end of the month.

Despite this significant loss of territory, a mine attack that killed four Malian soldiers in the town of Gossi in Tombouctou region on 30 January indicated that Islamist militants may have reverted to fighting a guerrilla war in the north-east of the country.

Distribution of attacks

Distribution of attacks by province (1 Feb 2012 - 31 Jan 2013)

1 Number Province Attacks 3 1 Tombouctou 28 2 Gao 15 2 3 Kidal 13 4 4 Mopti 4 6 7 5 Bamako 2

5 6 Kayes 1 7 Ségou 1 0 0-5 5-15 16+

The highest level of violence occurred in Mali’s Tombouctou region – predominantly in the city of Tombouctou – where the total of 28 attacks recorded equated to 43.8% of all attacks nationwide in the reporting period. The figure also represented a major increase from the preceding 12-months, when only two attacks were recorded.

Tombouctou’s primacy was indicative of its prominent role as a heartland of Islamist militants – including both local Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) forces and Harakat Ansar al-Din – following their seizure of the north-east of the country along with the ethnic Tuareg Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) fighters in late March and early April 2012.

The regions of Gao (15 attacks) and Kidal (13 attacks) also witnessed significant increases in violence from the previous reporting period. While this overall significant increase in violence was primarily attributable to the armed campaign waged by the MNLA and Islamist militants in the first quarter of the reporting period, it was also attributable to the violent imposition of sharia (Islamic law) in areas under militant Islamist control. By late June 2012, all major municipalities in Mali’s Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal regions were under such control, whether by AQIM, Harakat Ansar al-Din, or Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa.

Four attacks were also recorded in Mopti region, which was largely related to the militant Islamist capture of the towns of Douentza and Konna in the region in September 2012 and January 2013 respectively.

Meanwhile, the capital Bamako and the regions of Kayes and Ségou all witnessed one attack throughout the reporting period.

Tactics

Principal Tactics Feb 12 - Jan 13 Ambush

The most commonly utilised insurgent tactic in Mali between 1 February 2012 and 31 January 2013 was ambush, with the tactic used on 23 separate occasions, accounting for 35.4% of all tactics employed by insurgents. This represented a notable overall increase from the five instances of the tactic’s use in the preceding 12 months, and also a slight proportional increase in the tactic’s use, indicating that the change was a consequence of an increased preference for the use of ambush tactics in militant operations.

The prominence of ambush tactics underlined the overwhelming use of mobile guerrilla tactics by militants in the first half of the reporting period and the sporadic incidence of attacks on security forces and civilian protesters – who opposed the militant control of towns – in the second six months, in the regions of Tombouctou, Ambush 23 36% Kidal, and Gao. Assault 17 26% Sabotage 9 14% Assault Hostage 7 11% Threat 5 9% Assassination 1 1% The second most commonly employed tactic by insurgents was assault, with the Hijack 1 1% 17 instances of the tactic’s use in the reporting period accounting for 26.2% of Explosive device 1 1% all tactics employed by insurgents. The tactic had not been employed at all in the Other 1 1% previous reporting period, thereby representing a significant shift in terms of militant activity and an increased preference for the use of assault tactics in operations.

Operations involving the use of assault tactics were almost entirely accounted for by attacks on villages and towns in the north-east regions of Tombouctou, Kidal, and Gao in the first four months of the reporting period, and in the regions of Mopti and Segou in the final two months of the reporting period. Such operations were initially carried out as joint operations between the MNLA and Harakat Ansar al-Din, but subsequent such attacks were carried out mostly by Harakat Ansar al-Din and Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa militants. A key example of the tactic’s use came on in late March and early April, when joint MNLA-Harakat Ansar al-Din forces captured the towns of Gao, Kidal, and Tombouctou in a three-day period.

Targeting

Principal Targets Feb 12 - Jan 13 Other and Residential

The most common target of insurgent operations during the reporting period was “other and residential”, a classification used by JTIC to denote seemingly indis- criminate attacks where the nature of the target was either not apparent – typically involving attacks on apparently random civilians – or attacks in which the civilian population was deliberately targeted. There were 40 such attacks recorded in the reporting period, accounting for 59.7% of all sectors targeted. These attacks represented a notable increase from the six such attacks recorded in the preceding 12 months.

The reporting period witnessed frequent instances of low-level violence in which civilians were targeted by Islamist militants, mostly in punishment for their perceived failure to adhere to the militants’ strict enforcement of sharia (Islamic law). The peri- Other and Residential 40 60% od also saw a sustained bout of militant assaults on villages and towns in February, Religious 12 18% March, and April 2012, which saw militants establish direct control over north-east Military 10 15% Mali. Government and Diplomatic 3 5% Law enforcement 1 2% Media 1 2% Religious

The second most common target of insurgent operations during the reporting period was religious buildings and people, with the total of 12 attacks on the sector accounting for 17.9% of all sectors targeted by insurgents. Religious buildings and people had not been targeted in the previous 12-month reporting period, thereby representing a significant shift in terms of militant activity.

The vast majority of attacks on religious targets were accounted for by attempts, mostly successful, by Islamist militants to destroy Sufi Muslim tombs and other historically-valued monuments and buildings, due to their perceived un-Islamic nature. While these attacks themselves inflicted no non-militant fatalities, their impact was considerable, especially in garnering international attention to the conflict in north-east Mali. Many of the targeted tombs were in the town of Tombouctou, and thereby part of a UNESCO World Heritage site.

3. Qualitative Analysis

The following is a selection of recent IHS Jane’s analysis covering sub-state violence in Mali:

OSINT Summary: Prominent Malian Tuareg leader splits from Harakat Ansar al-Din

25 January 2013

Senior Harakat Ansar al-Din commander Alghabass Ag Intallah confirmed on 24 January that he had split from the group and formed Harakat Azawad al-Islamiyya, or the Islamic Azawad Movement, adding: “We are ready to negotiate.”

Intallah’s split from Harakat Ansar al-Din followed a French-led military intervention against Islamist militants in north-east Mali that began on 11 January. Intallah’s announcement saw him frame his armed actions in the militant-held region - collectively referred to by ethnic Tuaregs as Azawad - as being motivated by “a set of grievances that date back at least 50 years”.

French military forces seen arriving outside the strategic town of Sévaré in Mali’s Mopti region on 23 January 2013. (PA)

As Amenokal, or traditional leader of the prominent Ifoghas tribe - based largely in Kidal region - Intallah’s split is likely to affect militant dynamics in Kidal. Indeed, his statement expressly called for “Malian authorities and France to cease hostilities in the zones that we are occupying in…Kidal and Ménaka [in Gao region] to create a climate of peace”.

Harakat Ansar al-Din leader Iyad Ag Ghaly is also a member of the Ifoghas tribe and unsuccessfully stood against Intallah for leadership of the tribe in late 2011. Intallah’s declaration that Harakat Azawad al-Islamiyya is “neither AQIM or MUJAO” - a reference to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa respectively - but still Islamic in both name and nature, seemingly identified him as an actor both willing to compromise and retain previously gained influ- ence.

Such pragmatism is not new for Intallah. He initially joined the secular Tuareg Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) in late January 2012, following the group’s launching of its armed campaign for Tuareg separatism on 16 January. Roughly one month later, he joined Harakat Ansar al-Din, just as it began its armed campaign alongside the MNLA. In late 2012, he was Harakat Ansar al-Din’s lead negotiator in talks with Mali in Burkina Faso.

Intallah’s more moderate stance in terms of Islam was also crucial in moderating Harakat Ansar al-Din’s imposition of harsh forms of sharia (Islamic law) in Kidal in mid-2012, after a series of protests by residents in June.

JTIC Brief: Mali mission – militant Islamist advance prompts French intervention

24 January 2013

Key Points:

• Islamist militants seized the town of Konna in Mali’s central Mopti region on 10 January, prompting a French military intervention the following day.

• Under French air strikes, militants have withdrawn from captured towns ahead of advancing joint French-Malian forces.

• Although territory is being recaptured, the militant retreat is largely tactical and a transition to guerrilla operations appears forthcoming.

A southward advance by Islamist militants in north-east Mali has prompted a French military intervention to counteract the militants. Matthew Henman reports.

At approximately 0900 local time on 21 January, a column of French armoured vehicles, carrying around 200 French and Malian soldiers, entered and secured the town of Diabaly in Mali’s Ségou region. The town of Douentza, in Mopti region, was also recaptured by joint forces later that day. Three days earlier, on 18 January, joint forces had retaken the town of Konna in Mopti.

The operations were part of a French military intervention in north-east Mali that began on 11 January, prompted by the capture of the strategically-placed Konna the day before on 10 January. Following several days of air strikes on Konna, militants counter-attacked and seized Diabaly on 14 January. Air strikes continued on both towns, though, forcing militants to withdraw ahead of advancing joint French-Malian ground forces.

The aftermath of French air strikes on a militant Islamist camp in the town of Diably in Mali’s Ségou region in January 2013. (PA)

Uprisings

Mali has faced substantial instability in the north-east regions of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou, a cumulative area more than three times the size of the United Kingdom. The three regions are home to a large population of ethnic Tuaregs, and experi-

enced significant Tuareg uprisings in 1990-96, 2006-08, and 2008-09.

The security situation stabilised over the following years, with substantial numbers of Malian Tuareg fighters travelling to Libya and joining Colonel Muammar Ghadaffi’s military. However, the Libyan conflict during early-to-mid 2011 led to large number of Tuareg fighters fleeing Libya and returning to Mali. In October 2011, two Tuareg militant groups merged to form the Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA), which sought an independent Tuareg state in north-east Mali. A separate militant Islamist Tuareg group, Harakat Ansar al-Din, was then formed in December with the objective of forming an Islamic state under sharia (Islamic law) throughout Mali.

The MNLA launched its armed campaign in January 2012, attacking a series of key towns throughout the three regions over the following two months, typically briefly seizing control of a town before being ousted in military counter-operations.

Although the MNLA was failing to hold territory, the perceived poor handling of the uprising by the government led a group of army officers to overthrow President Amadou Toumani Touré on 22 March. In the aftermath of the coup, the MNLA and Harakat Ansar al-Din launched a number of joint operations, seizing control of the key towns of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou between 30 March and 1 April.

The towns largely fell without a fight as military forces simply withdrew. The military subsequently established a line of control north of the town of Mopti, along the neck of territory dividing north-east Mali from the remainder of the country, effectively ceding control of two thirds of the country to the militants.

Islamist supremacy

While the MNLA had led the uprising, it rapidly found itself outmanoeuvred by Harakat Ansar al-Din. The militant Islamists ejected MNLA forces and took full control of Tombouctou on 2 April 2012 and then Kidal in early June. Harakat Ansar al-Din also began building firm links with regional militant Islamist groups that had a longstanding presence in north-east Mali, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and AQIM splinter Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa - more commonly known by its French acronym MUJAO.

Such links were demonstrated when a joint force of Harakat Ansar al-Din and MUJAO militants attacked and ousted MNLA forces from Gao - the group’s last key stronghold - on 27 June. Furthermore, control of Tombouctou was effectively ceded by Harakat Ansar al-Din to senior local AQIM commanders Jemal Oukacha (alias Yahya Abu al-Hammam) and Yahya Abu Amar Abid Hammadou (alias Abdelhamid Abou Zeid).

Over the following months, MUJAO, in particular, became particularly assertive, seizing the town of Douentza in Mopti region on 1 September; confirming on 22 October unverified reports that it was heavily recruiting from Algeria, Senegal, and Cote d’Ivoire; and decisively defeating an MNLA attempt to retake Gao in mid-November.

Thereby, in late 2012 north-east Mali was firmly under militant Islamist control. Harakat Ansar al-Din controlled Kidal; Harakat Ansar al-Din and the Abou Zeid’s AQIM forces controlled Tombouctou; and MUJAO controlled Gao. Furthermore, an AQIM splinter faction led by former senior commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar (alias Khaled Abou El Abbas or Laaouar) - a rival to Abou Zeid - had also established a presence in Gao, alongside MUJAO.

Key developments in Mali, 10-21 January 2013.

Southward advance

Under Islamist rule, sharia was imposed in north-east Mali, and numerous videos emerged of militants carrying out amputa- tions, whippings, and other punishments for contraventions. Meanwhile, although there was growing regional talk of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-led military intervention in north-east Mali, efforts to resolve the situation diplomatically continued. In early November, Harakat Ansar al-Din agreed to participate in talks with Bamako in Burkino Faso and called a ceasefire. Initial talks with Burkinabé mediators were then held in Ouagadougou on 4 December.

Any progress was seemingly undone, though, on 20 December when the UN Security Council approved a French resolution authorising a full military intervention in Mali. Six days later, Harakat Ansar al-Din ended its ceasefire.

Subsequently, in early January 2013 the group pushed south towards the military line of control. Twelve soldiers were captured by militants outside Konna on 7 January, before militants attacked and captured the town on 10 January. In three separate statements, the attack was claimed by both Harakat Ansar al-Din and MUJAO, although it seems more likely a joint force took the town.

Southward advance

French intervention

The fall of Konna put militants only 50 km from the town of Mopti and, more significantly, the town of Sévaré, which housed Mopti airport. This was the main airport for north-east Mali and had been identified as a key facility for the UN-approved military intervention. As such, reports early on 11 January claimed that French soldiers and equipment had been airlifted to the airport late on 10 January.

The reports were confirmed later that day when, at Bamako’s request, France launched a military intervention in north-east Mali, beginning with a series of air strikes on Konna. French forces met unexpected resistance, though, with militants killing a pilot in the downing of a French helicopter in the town.

French Minister of Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius stated on 13 January that the military operation was aimed at “stopping the terrorists”, adding that air strikes were being extended to target “the terrorists’ rear bases”. Indeed, across 12 and 13 January French aircraft had struck militant positions in Afhabo, Lére, Douentza, Nampala, and Gao.

Media reports subsequently claimed that at least 60 MUJAO militants had been killed in Gao alone, and local residents reported militants withdrawing from Gao, Douentza, and Tombouctou. A Harakat Ansar al-Din statement on 14 January, claiming that militants had only retreated “with the goal of limiting damage… [to the] civilian populations”, followed reports of 11 civilians being killed in strikes over the previous two days.

Although militants were pulling back in the east, a counter-attack in the west resulted in AQIM militants under Abou Zeid attacking and capturing Diabaly on 14 January. Over the following days there were continuous air strikes on alleged militant targets in Diabaly and Konna, before a joint French-Malian ground offensive began to move north on separate axes towards the two towns. Under pressure from air strikes, though, militants withdrew north ahead of the advance and Konna and Diabaly were retaken by the joint force on 18 and 21 January respectively.

French and Malian forces on patrol in the town of Sévaré in Mali’s Mopti region on 21 January 2013. (PA)

French intervention

While the initial objective of the French intervention appeared to be a return to the status quo, pushing militants back from the military line of control north of Mopti, and holding them in check until an ECOWAS-led full military intervention could begin, French Minister of Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian stated on 20 January: “The goal is the total re-conquest of Mali. We will not leave any pockets [of resistance].”

Malian officials have claimed that militants are retreating north towards strongholds in Kidal in the far north-east ahead of the joint military advance. However, if true, this remains likely a tactical manoeuvre rather an indication of defeat, and the militants can be expected to transition from the positional conflict of the past 12 months to guerrilla operations against military forces. Indeed, a MUJAO commander told Associated Press on 15 January: “I would advise France not to sing their victory song too quickly. They managed to leave Afghanistan. They will never leave Mali.”

Beyond the short-to-medium term impact in Mali, regional support for the French intervention has also generated security issues in neighbouring countries. The Algerian government on 13 January gave approval for French aircraft to use Algerian airspace for Mali operations. Three days later, on 16 January, militants from a group led by the Gao-based Belmokhtar attacked a gas facility in eastern Algeria and killed 37 foreign nationals over the following three days. The militants explicitly cited Algeria’s support for France’s intervention as the motive for the operation.

Furthermore, alleged Boko Haram splinter group Jamaatu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan killed two soldiers in Kogi State on 19 January in what it claimed was a response to the Nigerian government’s decision two days earlier to deploy 1,200 soldiers to Mali.

OSINT Summary: Senior AQIM commander in Sahel reportedly leaving group

5 December 2012

The deputy mayor of an unspecified town in Mali’s Tombouctou region claimed on 3 December that senior local Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar (alias ‘Khaled Abou El Abass’ or ‘Laaouar’) had decided to leave the group to form a “movement spanning the entire Sahara desert”.

An alleged associate of Belmokhtar in Mali, Oumar Ould Hamaha - who has been widely reported as a senior Harakat Ansar al-Din militant - purportedly confirmed the claim, stating in a telephone interview: “It is so that we can better operate in the field that we have left this group which is tied to the ‘Maghreb’ appellation. We want to enlarge our zone of operation throughout the entire Sahara, going from Niger through to Chad and Burkina Faso.” Hamaha added, though, that he and Belmokhtar would remain under the command of Al-Qaeda’s central leadership.

Belmokhtar’s position within AQIM became strained in January 2007 following a reported power struggle with group leader Adbelmalek Droukdel (alias ‘Abu Musab Abdelwadud’), and in October 2012 unconfirmed reports claimed Belmokhtar had been removed from his command position in northern Mali.

Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether the split has taken place, and as of early on 4 December, no clarifying statement on Belmokhtar’s position had been released by AQIM. If Belmokhtar was to form a new group it remains to be seen how many of his former fighters would leave with him, and it is also unclear what the nature of such a group’s relations with AQIM would be.

A still image of Mokhtar Belmokhtar (alias Khaled Abou el-Abbas or Laaouar) taken from the December 2012 video in which he announced his split from AQIM and the formation of Katibat al-Muqaoon bil-Dumaa. (PA)

Mali rebels deny Al-Qaeda ties

10 February 2012

• The MNLA claims to be a worthier ally in the battle against AQIM than the government of Mali.

• It says it damaged two helicopters flown by Ukrainian mercenaries, but they have since been repaired.

The Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA) has denied the Malian government’s claim that the Tuareg rebel group is allied with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Mali’s Ministry of Defence released a statement in late January saying that a joint force of MNLA fighters and “jihadists from AQIM” had attacked Aguelhok: one of several northern towns that have been raided since the rebellion was launched earlier that month.

Hama Ag Sid’Hamed, the head of the MNLA’s external relations, refuted the claim. “The Tuareg who attacked the garrison at Aguelhok included no AQIM elements,” he toldIHS Jane’s in a 9 February email.

Originally an Algerian group, AQIM has long used desolate northern Mali as a base for kidnapping Westerners and is often said to collaborate with Tuareg smugglers.

However, Hama Ag Sid’Hamed claimed that the foreign jihadists were not hosted by the Tuareg, but by drug traffickers from the northern Arab tribes who have close ties to the government. “AQIM was installed in the region on the initiative of the drug barons with the tacit agreement of Bamako,” he said.

He explained that this was a mutually beneficial arrangement whereby the government used the jihadist presence as an excuse for not investing in northern Mali, in the process leaving the region at the mercy of Arab traffickers and AQIM, who profit from smuggling drugs and ransoming Western hostages.

Hama Ag Sid’Hamed also refuted reports that Iyad Ag Ghali, an influential Tuareg leader who formerly served as a Malian diplomat in Saudi Arabia, has established an AQIM-allied militant Islamist group called Ansar al-Din. “Iyad didn’t pronounce the creation of an Islamic movement. He stayed in his encampment outside Abeïbara [in north-east Mali]. There is no group that speaks of sharia [Islamic law] on the ground,” he said.

The MNLA spokesman admitted that some Tuareg had joined AQIM and drug smuggling gangs, but only out of poverty. “The few Tuareg involved are exploited by the Arab drug barons to work as security escorts or drivers,” he said. “Young Tuareg have joined AQIM, not out of ideology but to live from day to day.”

“The MNLA wants to be totally rid of AQIM, since it brings nothing but fear and desolation,” he added.

Ag Sid’Hamed also clarified earlier claims that the MNLA has shot down several Malian aircraft, including a MiG-21 jet. “The MNLA has not destroyed any planes [but has] badly damaged two helicopters in confrontations in the town of Ménaka. They have been repaired by Ukrainian mercenaries at Gao and have been operational for two days. They are piloted by Ukrainian and Bulgarian mercenaries who are paid USD6,000 a day,” he said.

Asked whether the MNLA has Libyan weapons that could threaten military aircraft, Ag Sid’Hamed said the group had “two anti-aircraft cars” with an adequate supply of ammunition.

Airpower could prove crucial in the desert war if the military can use it to effectively support its ground forces and break up rebel attacks on far-flung garrisons.

A video filmed by an MNLA rebel showed that the group has at least five BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. Footage of rebel fighters has shown that they have 14.5 mm ZPU-1 and ZPU-2 light anti-aircraft guns and 12.7 mm heavy machine guns, but so far there have been no signs of larger-calibre auto-cannons or shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.

However, an MNLA video posted on the internet shows that the group does have at least five 122 mm BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launcher systems that were probably taken from Libya during the country’s 2011 conflict.

The MNLA has also been bolstered by Tuareg who served in the Libyan armed forces, including its overall military commander, Colonel Mohamed Ag Najim.

In an attempt to dispel claims that the Tuareg fought for Moammar Ghadaffi and were forced to flee after he was toppled, the MNLA released a statement saying that Col Ag Najim joined the Libyan rebellion in its early stages. “The combatants who returned from Libya fought with the [rebel] National Transitional Council forces more than they did with Ghadaffi’s forces,” it said.

JTIC Brief: Mali rebels’ recall to arms

• In January, the recently formed MNLA launched a series of attacks in north-eastern Mali, the first major Tuareg militant offensive in the country for three years.

• In the initial phase of its campaign, the MNLA demonstrated significant capabilities, operating over a wide area, and taking control of at least two towns.

• Government allegations that the MNLA is allied with local Al-Qaeda forces have not been substantiated, and are unlikely given the MNLA’s known opposition to AQIM.

Separatist Tuareg militants, the recently formed MNLA, have launched a new rebellion in north-eastern Mali. Charles Lister examines the new threat to stability.

On 17 January 2012, the Mouvement National pour la Liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA) launched an assault on the town of Ménaka in Mali’s north-eastern Gao region. The following day, MNLA militants assaulted the towns of Aguelhok and Tessalit, both located in neighbouring Kidal region. Subsequently, on 26 January, the MNLA announced it had taken full control of Lere in Tombouctou region, and claimed to have taken partial control of Amderamboukane in Gao. Finally, on 1 February the group announced it had taken full control of Ménaka.

The attacks represented the first significant Tuareg militant offensive in the country for three years, and marked the beginning of armed operations by the MNLA, a coalition of Tuareg militant groups which had announced its existence in late 2011. Notably, Tuareg fighters recently returned from serving in the Libyan army of former President Moammar Ghadaffi were reported to have participated in the assaults, appearing to confirm fears that their return might presage a period of renewed Tuareg militancy in the Sahel.

A new rebellion

The MNLA was established on 16 October 2011 following the merger of two existing Tuareg separatist groups, the Mouve- ment Touareg du Nord-Mali (MTNM) and the Mouvement National de l’Azawad (MNA). MNLA spokesman Hama Ag Sid Ahmed stated that the group’s objective was an independent state of Azawad, encompassing Tuareg areas of Mali’s north- eastern Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal regions.

This stance was reiterated in an online statement posted following the 17 January assault on Ménaka, which stated: “Military operations… will continue so long as [the government in] Bamako does not recognise this [Azawad] territory as a separate entity.”

A graphic published on the website mnlamov.net announcing the start of the MNLA’s armed separatist campaign in Mali on 17 January 2012. (IHS Global Ltd/ JTIC)

The January statement also claimed that the renewed rebellion had in part been motivated by the government’s recent decision to deploy security forces to areas of north-eastern Mali claimed by the Tuareg: “While there was an ongoing attempt at dialogue with the government… it sent massive military equipment, with tanks and helicopters, to our lands under the pretext of combating insecurity in the region. This is an occupation [and] we reject it. For this reason, we decided to take up armed struggle for our independence.”

In addition to such military “occupation”, the group has previously been angered by government attempts to use economic development of the Tuareg-dominated north-eastern regions as a means to divert popular support from the separatists to the government. The launch of the government’s so-called Special Programme for Peace, Security and Development in Northern Mali (PSPSDN) in August 2011 is likely to have also been considered a provocation by Tuareg activists.

MNLA capabilities

The opening of the MNLA’s campaign featured at least nine assaults on six towns in Mali’s Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal regions over the course of two weeks. Although details of the attacks remain difficult to verify, the group is confirmed to have seized full control of at least two of the towns – Lere in Tombouctou and Ménaka in Gao.

While the geographical distribution of the attacks is focused primarily along the country’s eastern borders with Algeria and Niger, Lere and Niafunke are located around 500 miles from the other towns attacked, demonstrating a surprisingly expansive area of operations for so early in the MNLA’s campaign.

MNLA operations, January 2012. (IHS Global Ltd/JTIC)

The MNLA benefits from the presence of experienced personnel within its ranks, including some who served with the Libyan army. While some media reports have claimed that as many as 4,000 Tuareg soldiers have returned to Mali from Libya, the actual number cannot be verified. However, MNLA leader Bidal Ag Cherif stated on 9 January that the group is composed of 1,000 Tuareg fighters, many of whom he claimed had received military training in Libya.

Among them is the MNLA’s military chief, Mohamed Ag Najim, who reportedly served as a Libyan army colonel in the town of Bani Walid in Misratah district. Najim is the cousin of former MTNM leader, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga – the most prominent Tuareg militant commander to have consistently refused to make peace with the Malian government, who died in an unexplained car crash on 26 August 2011.

In addition to Najim, three former Libyan officers – a Lieutenant Colonel and two Colonels, identified as Mbarek Akly Ag, Iba Moussa, and Ag Assalat Habbi respectively – have allegedly assumed positions of leadership within the MNLA. Meanwhile, a further three senior MNLA commanders held local commands in the Malian military in Gao until they defected to the group following its formation.

The MNLA also appears to be relatively well-armed, possibly as a result of access to looted Libyan army equipment. Accord- ing to an anonymous Malian official cited byThe Guardian in September 2011, Bahanga’s death the previous month had occurred while he was transporting Libyan arms along the Algeria-Niger border.

Meanwhile, in addition to showing at least eight Urab-4320 truck chassis each carrying 40-round 120mm BM-21 Grad launchers, recent video footage of an MNLA convoy in the Malian desert reveals several militants carrying what appear to be FN-FAL rifles, which were used extensively by pro-Ghadaffi forces but are not known to be used by the Malian military. While this would appear to confirm that some Libyan weapons have found use inside Mali, there is as yet no evidence of the surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that have been the focus of international concerns.

Al-Qaeda allegations

On 26 January, the Malian Ministry of Defence issued a statement repeating allegations made in the media that the MNLA was supported by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and claimed that the attack on Aguelhok earlier that day had been carried out by a joint MNLA-AQIM force. The claim could not be independently verified, but appears unlikely, especially given chief MNLA spokesman Hama Ag Sid Ahmed’s pledge on 20 December 2011 to combat AQIM in Mali and the wider Sahel region.

In an earlier interview, Ahmed also claimed that “some young Tuareg had allowed themselves to be manipulated by AQIM”, and stated: “For two months, we [the MNLA] have intensified our efforts to recover them. Twenty-five of them have already returned to our ranks.”

In comments made to the Mauritanian Alakhbar newspaper on 22 January, MNLA leader Bidal Ag Cherif had also denied earlier allegations of MNLA links to AQIM, and claimed that such comments were an attempt by the Malian government to use “extremism and trafficking as an excuse to promote the development [of] the north” of the country.

In the same interview, however, Cherif did confirm that “there had been efforts to establish relations with” Tuareg militant Is- lamist group Harakat Ansar al-Din, which is led by Iyad Ag Aghaly and was formerly known as Le Mouvement Islamique pour la Liberation de l’Azawad (MILA). In defence of this policy, Cherif stated: “This is a national Azawad movement… we have the same enemy. The MNLA affirms the need to unite and mobilise all efforts of the [Tuareg] people to serve the noble cause.”

Outlook

In the previous two decades, Mali has experienced several periods of sustained Tuareg militancy interspersed with peace accords of varying tenability. The return of former Tuareg soldiers from Libya, with professional levels of military training and purported access to looted Libyan arms and munitions, therefore represented a notable threat to the Malian government, particularly given the increased threat it was already facing from AQIM factions also operating in the north.

As such, the outbreak of an open Tuareg rebellion is a significant development. In conducting a number of apparently successful operations over a wide area in a short period of time, the MNLA has demonstrated it has the capability to critically undermine security in Mali’s northern regions. Meanwhile, the seizure of Lere and Ménaka and the alleged capture of parts of Amderamboukane represent an apparent attempt to move immediately towards the establishment of a territorially-based separatist insurgency. While it is yet to prove capable of holding territory in the face of an anticipated Malian counter-offensive, it provides Bamako with a security challenge of a different order from that already presented by AQIM.

Meanwhile, it is unclear whether the local population supports the MNLA’s armed campaign. However, pro-Tuareg websites have published photographs of demonstrations purportedly held in support of the MNLA, and it is likely the group can count on at least passive support for its separatist objectives among significant elements of the population in the northern regions. Furthermore, the MNLA stands to benefit from reports of widespread arrests of Tuareg citizens suspected of separatist links, with such counter-insurgency measures likely to undermine the government’s attempts – embodied in the PSPSDN development programme – to win the support of the Tuareg population.

4. Counter-Terrorism Environment

From 1 February 2012 until 31 January 2013, JTIC recorded a total of 42 successful counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations in Mali, with successful operations classed as those leading to the arrest or death of suspected militants, or the capture of weaponry and logistics. This figure represented a significant increase from the six counter-terrorism operations -re corded in the preceding 12 months and was almost entirely accounted for by operations targeting militants in the north-east.

Counter-Terrorism Environment Rating

1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0

Highly Extremely Very Moderately Very Extremely Highly Lax Restrictive Insecure Lax Lax Restrictive Restrictive Restrictive Secure

The national counter-terrorism environment rating assesses the vulnerability of the state to campaigns waged by armed sub-state groups active in the country. The lower the rating, the more likely it is that groups active in the country will be able to sustain themselves and achieve their objectives.

The counter-terrorism environment in Mali is rated Very Lax (2.0) based on a weighted composite of the country’s ratings for Security Environment, Political Environment and Physical Environment. A Very Lax environment is defined as one which favours the sub-state actor. Terrorism campaigns may be sustainable indefinitely, and have a realistic prospect of achieving significant concessions. Insurgencies may be sustainable in the medium to long term, are likely to be able to maintain at least periodic control over some territory, and pose a significant threat to the state.

Security Environment

Assesses the capacity, capability and loyalty of state security forces – as well as the effectiveness of the judicial system – and the extent to which they are adapted to the threat posed by militant groups.

Security Environment 2.0 – Very Lax Police, Customs and Intelligence 2.0 Military and Paramilitary Forces 2.0 Judicial and Penal System 2.0

Having run the country for half of its independent history, the 7,500-strong Malian armed forces had generally adapted well to the civilian order since 1992 and, up until the military coup in March 2012, were no longer a major force in Malian society. Now however there is a major question regarding whether the army is willing to completely subject themselves to civilian rule again.

The armed forces see themselves as guardians of a process of political reform symbolised by the coup and may at some point decide that this reform is not being carried through to their liking. There is now consensus both within government and in the Malian army that the armed forces are disorganised, corrupt, and demotivated, and in need of major reform. This was underlined in the poor performance of of the military in the north-east in early 2012, with many towns captured by militants without any opposition from military forces in the region. While the military subsequently re-established government control in the north-east in January 2013, this was heavily dependent on French assistance and participation in joint missions.

The civilian national police force has a complement of a few thousand and is confined to urban areas, with the paramilitary Gendarmerie and National Guard fulfilling internal security functions in rural areas. The extent to which these bodies are able to project force and maintain security, stability, and government rule in the militant-inhabited north-east remains highly questionable however.

Political Environment

Assesses the extent to which the political environment, and the attitudes of the population, affect the state’s ability to counter the activities of militant groups operating in the country.

Political Environment 2.5 – Very Lax Government Legitimacy 2.0 Socioeconomic Conditions 1.5 International Co-operation 3.5

The Tuareg population of Mali has a long history of disenfranchisement and disengagement with the government, perceiving that the north-east is unfairly kept under-developed by the government. Such issues have been the primary motivators of several uprisings since the early 1990s.

Until the military coup in March 2012, Mali was seen as a model for developing democracies in Africa. However, while the coup reversed more than two decades of democratic tradition, it was widely accepted by the southern Malian population, primarily because the government of President Amadou Toumani Touré was also seen as having done little to meet the needs of ordinary people while at the same time being massively corrupt. Following the coup, a transitional government was put in place until elections scheduled for May 2013. Any delay in democratic transition, though, may see the military-led government decline in popularity.

Mali’s population is in a desperate situation across all sectors. Half the population live on less than a dollar a day, 25% of children under five are underweight, and only a quarter of the adult population is literate. Women have on average more than six children each while life expectancy is just 52 years.

Mali participates extensively in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and has a strong bilateral rela- tionship with France. This was underlined when French forces launched a military intervention in north-east Mali in January 2013 at Bamako’s request. Joint French-Malian forces subsequently re-captured all territory previously held by militants in the region.

Physical Envrironment

Assesses the extent to which characteristics of the local theatre affect the state’s ability to successfully constrain the activities of militant groups operating in the country.

Physical Environment 2.0 – Very Lax Geography and Terrain 1.5 Natural Resource Control 3.0 Weapons Proliferation 2.0

Border security is a near-impossible task for Mali, given the number of neighbouring states – Mali shares a border with seven states, most of which experienced internal conflict in the past decade – and the vast length of frontier in inaccessible areas. The ability of sub-state actors to capture and hold territory was demonstrated throughout 2012 when militants assumed direct control of almost two thirds of the country.

Mali has quite significant mineral deposits – including iron ore, tin, zinc, copper, silver, bauxite uranium, and manganese – but has been unable to exploit more than a small percentage of them.

The already significant proliferation of small-arms and other weaponry in Mali has been exacerbated by spillover from regional conflicts, such as the 2011 anti-government uprising in Libya.

6. Appendix: JTIC Country Briefing Methodology

JTIC Country Briefings are consolidated reports designed to pull together all existing and new IHS Jane’s qualitative and quantitative intelligence in an effort to provide our clients with the most complete view of terrorism threats on a country-to- country basis.

The JTIC dataset, used to generate the incident and trend analysis in these reports, is compiled using reliable open-source intelligence (OSINT) collated from a comprehensive range of national and international sources, including: local, national, and international news sources; government and inter-governmental reports; and analytical articles. Every effort is made by JTIC analysts to verify the accuracy of reported events through detailed examining and cross-referencing of all available sources.

The dataset is updated with new information twice daily and event records are written and meta-tagged in accordance with the facts of an event as known at the time. JTIC regional analysts consistently review event records entered into the database, and records are amended and updated as additional information becomes available.

JTIC’s editorial and analytical procedures are designed to ensure that the maximum number of terrorism and insurgency events is recorded on the day those events occur. However, to ensure that all events are recorded, JTIC analysts periodically review the dataset on a country and group basis in an effort to capture any additional events that may not previously have been available in open-source. These events are backfilled into the dataset to allow for the most accurate statistical trend analysis.

As the JTIC dataset is compiled solely from available open-source intelligence, it is crucial to note that analysis of that data cannot be expected, in isolation, to provide a complete assessment of terrorism/insurgency trends. To achieve this, findings from the database should always be viewed in conjunction with qualitative intelligence provided by JTIC analysts in these reports, and gleaned from a multitude of sources in addition to available open-source.