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IHS Jane's Terrorism Country Briefing IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing MALI February 2013 ihs.com/janes A product of IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – Mali February 2013 Executive Summary 3 Operational Tempo 3 Distribution of Attacks 3 Counter-terrorism Rating 4 1. Country Profile 5 Overview 5 Physical Terrain 6 Human Terrain 8 Sub-State Threats 9 2. Operational Profile 13 Tempo 13 Distribution of attacks 15 Tactics 16 Targeting 17 3. Qualitative Analysis 18 OSINT Summary: Prominent Malian Tuareg leader splits from Harakat Ansar al-Din 18 JTIC Brief: Mali mission – militant Islamist advance prompts French intervention 19 OSINT Summary: Senior AQIM commander in Sahel reportedly leaving group 24 JTIC Brief: Mali rebels’ recall to arms 27 4. Counter-Terrorism Environment 30 Security Environment 30 Political Environment 31 Physical Envrironment 31 6. Appendix: JTIC Country Briefing Methodology 32 Will Hartley [JTIC Editor] [email protected] Charles Lister [JTIC Analyst] [email protected] © 2013 IHS 2 ihs.com/janes IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – Mali February 2013 Executive Summary Operational Tempo Non-militant casualty trend (1 February 2012 - 31 January 2013) 25 Attacks Fatalities 20 15 10 5 0 Feb Mar Apr May Jun July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Between 1 February 2012 and 31 January 2013, Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) recorded 64 damaging attacks in Mali, representing a major increase from the 14 attacks in the preceding 12 month period. The majority of this violence was accounted for by a militant offensive in the north-east of the country in February, March, and April 2012, and by events following the effective seizure of the region by Islamist militants in late June 2012. The initiation of an ethnic Tuareg uprising in north-east Mali in January 2012 meant that the start of the reporting period saw a high level of sub-state violence. However, as Islamist militants joined the offensive in the region, insurgent violence peaked in March, with 10 attacks recorded as militants seized the towns of Gao, Kidal, and Tombouctou. Over the following months, there was a steady tempo of militant operations in the north-east, largely accounted for by attacks by Islamist militants on Sufi Muslim shrines. September and October saw the level of violence increase slightly but then decline in November and December. Nonetheless, the militant capture of Konna in Mopti region on 10 January 2013 sparked a French military intervention in north-east Mali the following day. Over the remainder of the month, French and Malian forces advanced and recaptured all towns held by militants in the region. Distribution of Attacks The highest level of violence was recorded in the north-east regions of Mali, which were seized by militants in March 2012, although recaptured by joint French-Malian forces in January 2013. Tombouctou saw the highest level of violence, and the 28 attacks recorded represented 44% of all attacks recorded nationwide. The neighbouring regions of Gao (15 attacks) and Kidal (13 attacks) also saw significant militant activity. Militant violence was also recorded in Mopti region (four attacks), while one attack was recorded in the capital Bamako and the regions of Kayes and Ségou. © 2013 IHS 3 ihs.com/janes IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – Mali February 2013 Distribution of attacks by province (1 Feb 2012 - 31 Jan 2013) 0 0-5 5-15 16+ Counter-terrorism Rating Security Environment 2.0 Police, Customs and Intelligence 2.0 Military and Paramilitary Forces 2.0 Judicial and Penal System 2.0 Political Environment 2.5 Government Legitimacy 2.0 Socioeconomic Conditions 1.5 International Co-operation 3.5 Physical Environment 2.0 Geography and Terrain 1.5 Natural Resource Control 3.0 Weapons Proliferation 2.0 The counter-terrorism environment in Mali is rated Very Lax (2.0) based on a weighted composite of the country’s ratings for Security Environment (military and law enforcement), Political Environment (government and society) and Physical Environ- ment (terrain and resources). A Very Lax environment is defined as one which favours the sub-state actor. Terrorism campaigns may be sustainable indefi- nitely, and have a realistic prospect of achieving significant concessions. Insurgencies may be sustainable in the medium to long term, are likely to be able to maintain at least periodic control over some territory, and pose a significant threat to the state. © 2013 IHS 4 ihs.com/janes IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – Mali February 2013 1. Country Profile Overview The Republic of Mali is a large and sparsely populated country occupying the central part of the Niger River valley at the southern edge of the Sahara. Once home to successive empires that long dominated the West African interior, it is now one of the world’s least developed states and has a very marginal position in the international system. Mali’s location in a poor and turbulent region was belied by its reputation for good governance and regional statesmanship. The country has been a pillar of pan-Africanism over the years, playing an important role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) regional integration endeavours and has forged strong relations with the United States, France, the European Union, South Africa, China, and the Arab world. These partners are vital in subsidising government operations. While gold production has spurred reasonable headline growth since the mid-1990s, long-term development is likely to be constrained by the contrary demands of an unpredictable environment and booming population. In the medium term, the volatile political situations in neighbouring countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Niger, and Algeria also pose security and economic challenges to Mali’s development. Mali has also had a history of instability and sub-state violence in its expansive north-east regions, with three separate upris- ings by ethnic Tuareg militants in the 1990s and 2000s, each of which ended with negotiated settlements. The beginning of a new Tuareg uprising in January 2012 had more serious political consequences, though, prompting a military coup in March. The subsequent abrogation of democratic principles put much of Mali’s international aid and assistance on hold. Just as seriously, militants in the north-east, now including Islamist militants, took advantage of the post-coup chaos and seized control of the north-east regions of Gao, Kidal, and Tombouctou in late March and early April – an area more than three times the size of the United Kingdom. By mid-2012, militant Islamist groups – including local Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) forces – had consolidated full control of the north-east and imposed sharia (Islamic law). While an uneasy status quo held for much of the remainder of the year, militants subsequently pushed south and captured further territory in mid-January 2013, prompting a French military intervention. Under the weight of French air strikes and ahead of a joint French-Malian ground offensive, militants withdrew from captured towns. Although government control was re-established over the north-east regions by the end of the month, there were indications that militants intended to transition to guerrilla operations. A Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa patrol vehicle in Mali’s Gao region in late 2012. (IHS Global Ltd/JTIC) © 2013 IHS 5 ihs.com/janes IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – Mali February 2013 Physical Terrain Mali is comprised of 1,240,000 sq km of territory, making it slightly less than twice the size of the US state of Texas or slightly less than five times the size of the UK (244,820 sq km). Of this territory, 1,220,000 sq km is land and 20,000 sq km is water. The country has no coastline and 3,650 km of land borders with Algeria (1,376 km), Niger (821 km), Burkina Faso (1,000 km), Cote d’Ivoire (532 km), Guinea (858 km), Senegal (419 km), and Mauritania (2,237 km). The capital of Mali is Bamako, located in the south-west of the country, with a population estimated at 746,000 – making it the largest city in Mali. Population density across the country averages 11.08 people per sq km, and approximately 32% of the population live in urban areas. Mali is a largely flat country with rolling northern plains – encompassing the regions of Tombouctou, Kidal, and Gao – covered by sand. The country’s south is dominated largely by a savana, while the north-east of the country is also home to an area of rugged hills and mountains, known as the Adrar des Ifoghas. Mali’s climate is largely subtropical to arid, with a very hot and dry season spreading throughout February to June. The rainy season generally brings humid conditions and milder temperatures between June and November, with a short cool and dry season between November and February. The dominance of desert, arid plains, and hills and mountains in the northern half of the country means large parts of the north are uninhabited and the southern half of the country contains a larger proportion of the country’s population. © 2013 IHS 6 ihs.com/janes IHS Jane’s Terrorism Country Briefing – Mali February 2013 Topographical map of Mali. Across Mali as a whole, forest covers around 125,720 sq km, or 10.3% of total land area. Mali has approximately 18,709 km of roadway – compared to 394,428 km in the UK – of which 18%, or 3,368 km, is paved. The country’s transport infrastructure also includes an approximately 593 km long rail network – compared to 16,454 km in the UK. In addition, Mali has a total of 20 airports – compared to 505 in the UK – of which eight possess paved run- ways.
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