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\\server05\productn\H\HLP\4-1\HLP104.txt unknown Seq: 1 11-FEB-10 17:29 Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge- Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions Judge Mark W. Bennett* INTRODUCTION At a 1993 meeting of his organization Operation PUSH, on the topic of street crime, the Reverend Jesse Jackson told the audience, “‘There is noth- ing more painful to me at this stage in my life than to walk down the street and hear footsteps and start thinking about robbery . Then look around and see somebody white and feel relieved.’”1 Jackson’s observation reflects an unfortunate but often held belief, one that even a famous and deeply committed national civil rights leader cannot escape: a white stranger is probably less threatening than a black stranger. Such a reaction is an example of implicit bias. Implicit biases are the plethora of fears, feelings, perceptions, and stereotypes that lie deep within our subconscious, without our conscious permission or acknowledgement. Indeed, social scientists are convinced that we are, for the most part, una- ware of them. As a result, we unconsciously act on such biases even though we may consciously abhor them. My own introduction to implicit bias was deeply unnerving. Associate Dean Russ Lovell of the Drake University Law School, with whom I have co-taught Advanced Employment Discrimination Litigation for many years, suggested that I visit a Harvard University website about Project Implicit. The site, www.implicit.harvard.edu, includes an online test on different types of biases called the Implicit Association Test (IAT). At that time, I * Mark W. Bennett is in his fifteenth year as a U.S. District Court Judge in the Northern District of Iowa, a district that led the nation in trials per judge last year and over the last decade. He was Chief Judge of the district from 2000 to 2007, a U.S. Magistrate Judge in the Southern District of Iowa from 1991 to 1994, and in private practice in Des Moines, Iowa from 1975 to 1991 where he specialized in constitutional, civil rights, and employment discrimina- tion litigation. Judge Bennett has taught at four midwestern law schools and has frequently been a visiting jurist in residence. He has lectured at more than 290 CLE programs across North America. Judge Bennett has developed a reputation as a national trial court innovator. See e.g., Kirk W. Schuler, In the Vanguard of the American Jury: A Case Study of Jury Innova- tions in the Northern District of Iowa, 28 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 453 (2008). I wish to thank the Federal Judicial Center and U.S. District Court Judges Bernice Donald and Elaine Bucklo for their encouragement and assistance in my exploration of implicit bias in the legal system; and my law clerk Nicholas Herbold, invaluable “career” law clerk Roger W. Mastalir, and the editorial staff of the Harvard Law & Policy Review for their assistance with the preparation of this Article. 1 Mary A. Johnson, Crime: New Frontier; Jesse Jackson Calls It Top Civil-Rights Issue, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 29, 1993, at 4. \\server05\productn\H\HLP\4-1\HLP104.txt unknown Seq: 2 11-FEB-10 17:29 150 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 4 knew nothing about the IAT, but as a former civil rights lawyer and sea- soned federal district court judge—one with a lifelong commitment to egali- tarian and anti-discrimination values—I was eager to take the test. I knew I would “pass” with flying colors. I didn’t. Strongly sensing that my test performance must be due to the quackery of this obviously invalid test, I set out to learn as much as I could about both the IAT and what it purported to measure: implicit bias. After much re- search, I ultimately realized that the problem of implicit bias is a little recog- nized and even less addressed flaw in our legal system, particularly in our jury system. I have discovered that we unconsciously act on implicit biases even though we abhor them when they come to our attention. Implicit bi- ases cause subtle actions, like Jackson’s reaction to footsteps behind him in the night. But they are also powerful and pervasive enough to affect deci- sions about whom we employ, whom we leave on juries, and whom we believe. Jurors, lawyers, and judges do not leave behind their implicit biases when they walk through the courthouse doors. I have come to the conclusion that present methods of addressing bias in the legal system—particularly in jury selection—which are directed pri- marily at explicit bias, may only worsen implicit bias. Specifically, judge- dominated voir dire and the Batson challenge process2 are well-intentioned methods of attempting to eradicate bias from the judicial process, but they actually perpetuate legal fictions that allow implicit bias to flourish. At the beginning of the jury selection process, judge-dominated voir dire, with little or no attorney involvement, prevents attorneys from using informed strikes to eliminate biased jurors. For a variety of reasons, judges are in a weaker position than lawyers to anticipate implicit biases in jurors and determine how those biases might affect the case. Thus, permitting judges to dominate the initial jury selection causes more biased jurors to remain on a case and exacerbates the role of implicit bias in jury trials. Additionally, the Batson process, which permits defendants to challenge a prosecutor’s peremptory strikes of jurors if the strikes seem to have been racially motivated, is thor- oughly inadequate. It both allows the implicit and explicit biases of attor- neys to impact jury composition and may provide a false veneer of racial neutrality to jury trials. This Article begins with a brief examination of the existence and preva- lence of implicit bias, including the history of implicit bias testing and other social science research into the phenomenon. Next, this Article turns to a more detailed examination of the two problematic aspects of jury selection mentioned above—judge-dominated voir dire and the Batson challenges— 2 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994), the Supreme Court expressly extended Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges, holding that the Equal Protection Clause forbids peremptory challenges on the basis of gender as well as on the basis of race. In this Article, I intend references to “the Batson challenge process” to include the process for challenging gender-based peremptory strikes as well as the process for challenging race-based peremptory strikes. Likewise, my arguments in this Article apply with equal force to both types of strikes. \\server05\productn\H\HLP\4-1\HLP104.txt unknown Seq: 3 11-FEB-10 17:29 2010] Implicit Bias in Jury Selection 151 and the way in which those processes may exacerbate rather than alleviate the problems of implicit bias in jury selection and jury determinations. Fi- nally, this Article considers what lawyers and judges can and should do about implicit bias in the legal system. I propose twin solutions to the problems of judge-dominated voir dire and the flawed Batson challenge pro- cess. The first solution is to increase lawyer participation in voir dire, thereby placing the primary onus to detect and address the implicit bias of jurors in the hands of the trial participants best equipped to do so. The sec- ond solution is the total elimination of peremptory challenges, a solution to the failed Batson process perhaps as brutally elegant and effective as Alex- ander the Great’s solution to the Gordian Knot.3 True, there is some tension between increasing lawyer participation in voir dire while stripping lawyers of peremptory challenges. But it is my contention that the two proposed solutions work best in tandem. The implicit bias of jurors can be better addressed by increased lawyer participation in voir dire, while the implicit bias of lawyers can then be curbed by eliminating peremptory strikes and only allowing strikes for cause. I. THE EXISTENCE AND PREVALENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS A. Explicit Bias Versus Implicit Bias Society in general and courts in particular have been aware of explicit bias for years. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins4 presents an excellent example of explicit bias. In Price Waterhouse, when a highly successful woman was denied partnership, her supervisor expressly advised her to “walk more fem- ininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”5 The bias on which the supervisor’s com- ments were based was open and obvious. There are also myriad cases in- volving actions based on conscious bias that is not explicitly stated, so- called circumstantial evidence cases. For example, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,6 the plaintiff could not offer a “smoking gun” comment revealing racial bias. He was nevertheless given the opportunity to prove his claim of race discrimination by establishing a prima facie case,7 and then overcoming the employer’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons 3 Gordius, King of Phrygia, tied his chariot to a hitching post before the temple of an oracle with an intricate knot, which, it was prophesied, none but the future ruler of all Asia could untie. In the course of his conquests, Alexander the Great came to Phrygia and, frus- trated with his inability to untangle the knot, simply sliced through it with his sword. His subsequent success in his Asian campaign has been taken to mean that his solution to the “Gordian knot” fulfilled the prophesy.

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