Wittgenstein and Folk Psychology
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Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy Wittgenstein and Folk Psychology Volume 9, Number 4 Yi Jiang Editor in Chief Audrey Yap, University of Victoria Various writings by the later Wittgenstein on the philosophy of Editorial Board psychology, published posthumously, express his basic critical Annalisa Coliva, UC Irvine attitude toward certain concepts and issues in the philosophy Henry Jackman, York University of psychology. His attitude towards folk psychology is negative Frederique Janssen-Lauret, University of Manchester in principle, leaving him opposed to the foundation of current Kevin C. Klement, University of Massachusetts psychological research. This critique of folk psychology and of Consuelo Preti, The College of New Jersey the philosophy of psychology in general is in accord with the Marcus Rossberg, University of Connecticut general method of his later philosophy, that is, dealing with Anthony Skelton, Western University philosophical problems by dissolving them. However, his crit- Mark Textor, King’s College London ical attitude towards folk psychology has been less influential Richard Zach, University of Calgary in the development of contemporary philosophy, and is in op- position to the philosophy of psychology and folk psychology Editors for Special Issues as practiced today. In this paper I will analyze Wittgenstein’s Sandra Lapointe, McMaster University understanding of the concept of psychology, offering a different Alexander Klein, McMaster University interpretation from that of other scholars, and explain why and Review Editors how contemporary philosophers of psychology misunderstand Sean Morris, Metropolitan State University of Denver Wittgenstein. Sanford Shieh, Wesleyan University Design and Layout Daniel Harris, Hunter College Kevin C. Klement, University of Massachusetts ISSN: 2159-0303 Special Issue: Concepts of the Psyche: Wittgenstein on Mental jhaponline.org Phenomena © 2021 Yi Jiang Edited by Stefan Majetschak and Yi Jiang Wittgenstein and Folk Psychology 1. The Concept of Psychology in Wittgenstein Yi Jiang Joachim Schulte pointed out in Experience and Expression that Wittgenstein tried to figure out the map of psychological terms but failed because his understanding of these terms, and of psy- chological phenomena, are sharply distinct from ours (Schulte Wittgenstein left behind various notebooks on the philosophy of 1995, 24–28). In fact, Wittgenstein explains his research plan in psychology at the time of his death, which his students compiled Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, where he tries to sort out into volumes entitled Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology and psychological terms and phenomena in his own distinct way, es- Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. In these notebooks, pecially for such terms as “sensation”, “imagination”, and “emo- Wittgenstein expresses his basic ideas concerning certain fun- tion” (Wittgenstein [1947]/1980a, §63; §148; hereinafter cited as damental concepts and issues in the philosophy of psychology, RPP I). However, it seems that his understandings of these terms very severely criticizing ordinary psychological terms. However, are not so much distinct from ours as understood in his own par- in present research on the philosophy of psychology and mind, ticular way, for his own particular purpose. Some scholars have Wittgenstein receives few mentions, and his ideas make no real suggested that the reason there is no unified criterion for sorting contribution at all. Peter Hacker has claimed that philosophy af- psychological concepts in Wittgenstein’s ideas, is that his focus ter Wittgenstein has betrayed his way of thinking (Hacker 1996, is on the specific analysis of every concept with an eye toward 2–3). John Benjafield also observed that Wittgenstein’s criticism clarifying similarities and differences among them, rather than of psychological terms has been overlooked in recent develop- on identifying their types (Hacker 1996, 192; Tu 2005, 125; Racine ments of psychology (Benjafield 2008, 111). This could explain, and Müller 2009, 113). But, according to Wittgenstein’s writings, in part I think, why Wittgenstein’s ideas have few resonances in he did not identify the types or carefully analyze them. In con- contemporary philosophy. But it does not explain why Wittgen- trast, he attempted to show our misunderstanding of psychology, stein criticized psychological terms, the Gestalt psychology for and the misguidedness of our ordinary language in psychology instance, in his comparison of psychology with physics on their and philosophy. Others have argued that the difference between first stages of developments. In this paper, I will argue that Wittgenstein’s understanding of psychological terms and ours, Wittgenstein was not concerned with any specific approach in is that he coined a new, non-scientific way to describe language psychology, but with the general conception of psychology, and usage (Bennett and Hacker 2003, 74–81; Wang and Guo 2004, especially that which relates to psychological understanding. 3–4). But, in fact, there is no such way defined by Wittgenstein. First, I will clarify Wittgenstein’s ideas by examining his attitude If there were, he would signal it as the mark of his philosophy towards folk psychology and his criticism of ordinary psycho- of psychology. Wittgenstein attempted to describe the everyday logical terms. Then I will argue that Wittgenstein rejects folk usage of psychological terms in our ordinary life in order to show psychology as a confusion of two language games. Finally, I will that the psychological and philosophical usages of these terms analyze the reason why and how Wittgenstein’s ideas about psy- misguide us in all sorts of ways. chology remain under-appreciated in both contemporary psy- These are, to my knowledge, the main misunderstandings of chology and philosophy. Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology that have arisen to date. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 9 no. 4 [38] How then can we look at his philosophy of psychology in prac- study on psychological research (Margolis 1984, 1), or an anal- tice? Or, what real situations arising in his philosophy can be ysis of psychological concepts through the observation of their explained as we go? Before solving this problem, we need to similarities and differences (Tu2005, 118). It is evident that, in his ask whether there is indeed such a philosophy of psychology later notebooks, the term “philosophy of psychology” refers to in Wittgenstein’s notebooks. In other words, do the problems his philosophical criticism of psychology, and his critical exami- Wittgenstein discusses in his notebooks belong to the realm of nation of then-current psychological theories and methods, such philosophy of psychology? The further question is how Wittgen- as Gestalt psychology and experimental psychology (Wittgen- stein deals with psychology, namely what is his basic attitude to- stein [1948]/1980b, §350–51; hereinafter cited as RPP II). ward psychology in his later thought. These are the first steps for According to his notebooks, Wittgenstein’s criticisms include us to clarify Wittgenstein’s ideas regarding psychological terms the following: first, he criticizes then-current psychological the- and phenomena. ories and methods by complaining that they are not presenta- To begin, let us look at what the philosophy of psychology tions (or manifestations in Wittgenstein’s word) of our mental consists of. In Wittgenstein’s later notebooks he did not use this states. But rather, these theories misguide us and inhibit our term, but he did discuss psychological terms and phenomena. understanding of those mental states. To describe mental states, In his early Logical Notebooks and the Tractatus he said that episte- Wittgenstein explains depression, excitement and pain as psy- mology is a kind of philosophy of psychology, but his claims ev- chological states. He does not attribute these states to be invis- idently denied the significance of the philosophy of psychology, ible or ineffable, but to be expressible in language. As he says which accords with his negative attitude towards epistemology. in Remarks, understanding a word is not a mental state in one’s For him, psychology has no closer relation to philosophy than head but a sentence that one expresses in one’s language (RPP II, it has to other natural sciences. If epistemology is just a part of §149–50). Based on this conception of mental states, he describes the philosophy of psychology, it is not part of the foundation of presentations or manifestations of mental states as a grammar philosophy at all. It is well-known, however, that Wittgenstein of language which expresses ordinary uses of language explic- did not discuss the concept of the philosophy of psychology in itly and correctly. For instance, if we use the word “know” in a his later philosophy, instead discussing psychology itself and sentence like “I know you were absent last time”, the sentence psychological terms and phenomena. does not express one of my mental states when I use the word His later writings on psychology have been termed philoso- “know’;, but expresses my knowledge of what happened to you phy of psychology, but the editors of those writings compiled last time. It means that there was no mental state that I had when them for the purpose of presenting Wittgenstein’s discussions I said the sentence “I know you were absent last time”, but only of psychology, rather than as a Wittgensteinian philosophy of the sentence in