One Bow (or Stirrup) Is Not Equal to Another: A Comparative Look at Hun and Mongol Military Technologies Samuel Rumschlag University of Wisconsin-Madison n his landmark study of the rapid rise and de - ber of mounts which made such mobility possible cline of the Huns in the fifth century CE, E.A. (Sinor 1972: 171). Other such factors often include TIhompson observed that “history is no longer sat - nomadic battle tactics, such as the art of luring en - isfied to ascribe so striking a movement as the rise emies into vulnerable positions before attacking of the Hun empire to the genius of a single man … them (May 2018: 1), along with specific political de - it is only in terms of the development of their soci - velopments, in both nomadic polities and those of ety that we can explain … how they came to build their adversaries, that altered the nomadic balance up so vast an empire of their own, and yet proved of power vis-à-vis their opponents. While worthy unable to hold it for more than a few years” (1996: foci of scholarly attention, all these factors offer 46). By making this claim, Thompson did not in - only a partial explanation of nomadic successes. tend to diminish the role that gifted Hun leaders Scholars should also look for additional factors played in guiding their society to international that contributed to nomadic successes and can prominence—only to point out that monocausal help explain historical realities that are only par - explanations cannot adequately capture historical tially explained by appeals to leadership, mobility, reality in all its completeness. Leadership is obvi - politics, and tactics. ously important, but even the most talented leader For example, it is significant that the Huns even at is limited by his or her circumstances. their peak under Attila never won a victory against Even so, much nomadic scholarship has tended to a full-strength Roman field army, mostly chalking privilege charismatic leadership as one of the most up victories against disorganized opponents when important factors, if not the single most important the Roman legions were engaged elsewhere. Every factor, that contributed to successful nomadic mil - time the Huns did meet the Roman military for itary organization (see, for example, Di Cosmo open battle proper, they either lost miserably or 1999: 19-21; Drompp 2005: 108). This tendency won Pyrrhic victories—Attila’s bloody victory over comes to a head in studies of the Mongol expan - the Byzantine army in 447 CE is a good example sion, where scholars note that Chinggis Khan suc - (Thompson 1996: 227). The Mongols, on the other cessfully set up a ruling system based on loyalty to hand, routinely and ably trounced the best soldiers the “holy charisma” of the ruling house (Golden and armies the most powerful sedentary states 2000: 36), redirecting old tribal loyalties from (real could throw at them. I contend that gifted leader - or fictive) kinship-based structures to a new and ship or better use of mobile armies in the “exposed exclusive focus on duty to the Mongol royal house zones” where many nomadic victories were won (Morgan 1986: 90). While these points and the and where nomadic political and cultural influence scholarship that supports them are certainly valid, was most heavily felt (Lieberman 2008: 693) are there is sometimes a tendency toward too great a not enough to explain these differential successes. focus on the importance of leadership at the ex - Likewise, overly simplistic explanations that attrib - pense of other important contributing factors to ute nomadic victories to superior numbers of com - nomadic military successes. batants (Smith 1975: 272) or the incompetence of Of course, leadership is not the only explanation the nomad’s enemies (Smith 1984: 345) are the re - offered for nomadic military prowess. The mobility sult of putting too much trust in flawed and frag - of nomadic troops is also an oft-cited factor used mentary primary sources. Close analysis reveals to explain their military successes (Morgan 1986: that many of the innate advantages we assume no - 86; Thompson 1996: 55), as is the quality and num - madic societies to have enjoyed over their seden - The Silk Road 16 (2018): 78–90 Copyright © 2018 Samuel Rumschlag 78 Copyright © 2018 The Silkroad Foundation tary foes are in fact illusory. May (2006) has noted nomadic military technologies over time allowed that although scholarship has tended to character - successive nomadic groups to be increasingly suc - ize nomadic armies as mainly achieving victory by cessful vis-a-vis their sedentary enemies until the “overwhelm[ing] their opponents through sheer eventual invention of firearms leveled the playing ferocity or superior numbers” (517) or has simply field. Far from being a peripheral consideration, brushed off their prowess by claiming that nomads uniquely nomadic military technology operated si - were “natural warriors inured since birth to riding multaneously with good leadership and high mo - and archery in the harsh climate of the steppe” bility in successful nomadic armies, and each (517), nomadic armies were in fact often quite factor complemented the advantages conferred by small when compared to those of their opponents the others. The loss of even one of these advan - (623) and required every bit as much training to tages would have seriously impoverished the abil - become battle-ready as the professional soldiers ity of a nomadic society to mount successful they fought. Indeed, the martial lifestyle came no campaigns against well-equipped sedentary foes. more “naturally” to them than to anyone else. In - An added benefit of incorporating technological deed, to many observers in the ancient world it improvements into our explanatory frameworks is must have seemed that the armies of stable seden - the potential for such a perspective to explain not tary states enjoyed innumerable advantages over only nomadic victories over powerful sedentary their mobile counterparts: funding, equipment, foes, but also differential successes between differ - supplies, professional leadership—the list goes on. ent nomadic groups over time. Using two compar - Why then do we see powerful armies in the service ative case studies, I will argue that the mediocre of sedentary states so often trounced by nomadic successes of the Huns in the 5th century and the foes? Were nomadic victories really as “inevitable” dazzling successes of the Mongols in the 13th cen - as some incautious authors have claimed (Bartlett tury are due to differences in archery and 2010), or is some other overlooked factor at play? saddle/stirrup technology in addition to other fac - To help explain nomadic successes, I will highlight tors such as quality of military leadership. Despite one aspect of nomadic society that is not fre - the tendency of posterity to assume that one quently discussed. I argue that superior military mounted archer is equal to another, from a techno - technology was as crucial to nomadic military vic - logical perspective, this is simply not the case. tories as were other factors such as gifted leader - Although the Huns and Mongols are hardly the ship and extreme mobility. Improvements made to only two nomadic groups to practice mounted archery successfully, sev - eral factors make them ideal for comparison. First, their origins trace to the same geographic area of the world (Kim 2016: 6; May 2006: 630). They were likewise both inheri - tors of similar nomadic military traditions derived from their common ances - tral group, the Xiongnu (circa 300 BCE-200 CE) (Golden 2011: 33; Vaissere 2005). The Xiongnu were Fig. 1. Mongol riders escorting prisoners, from an early 14th-century illustration of Rashid important technological ad-Din’s “Universal History” ( Gami at-tawarih ). The riders and mounts pictured on either side of the prisoners offer a glimpse of Mongol stirrups and quivers, while the mount on the innovators, introducing to left is also equipped with a saddle. Bibliothèque national de France, Département des Manu - mounted archery several scrits, Division orientale, Supplement Persan 1113, folio 231v. important new develop - 79 be attributed to the Xiongnu. Both groups were inheritors of a long nomadic tradition of mounted archery, and the arse - nal and practices of both groups reflect the contributions of many others. Still, though, at a foundational level Hun and Mongol military practices are marked more by similarity than by difference, and this makes the subtle differences that do exist between them especially illuminating. The Huns and Mongols are also comparatively well-studied archaeologically, with enough surviving exam - ples of their bows and eques - trian accoutrement to permit a Fig. 2. Diagram of a composite bow. (After: Hank Iken, in Grayson et al. 2007 , Tradi - thorough discussion that is tional Archery from Six Continents) well-grounded in empirical data. ments, including paired stirrups in the fifth cen - tury CE and stiffening bone plates on the limb The Technology of Mounted Archery ends of their composite bows. The Huns of Europe The primary weapon of every nomadic mounted had the stiffening bone plates that were first devel - archer was the composite bow, defined as a bow oped by the Xiongnu but lacked the technological composed of at least three layers of varying mate - innovations that the Xiongnu remaining in Inner rials (Reisinger 2010: 44). Sometimes, these bows Eurasia developed in the fifth century and subse - are also termed “Scythian bows” after their sup - quent periods, such as the paired stirrup. But by the time of the Mongols, these inven - tions had been widely adopted and mastered in Inner Eurasia. An understanding of Mongol technology, such as their use of paired stirrups and an im - proved composite bow design, is important in explaining the technological supremacy and, by extension, the enhanced military capabilities of the Mongols.