ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2, pp 363± 376, 1997

Problemsof aid conditionality: TheNetherlands and Indonesia

PETER RBAEHR

Formany years, two policy objectives have held central position in the foreign policyof the Netherlands: the promotion and protection of human rights on the onehand, and the giving of ® nancialsupport to poor countries in the form of developmentassistance onthe other. The government of the Netherlands has alwaysconsidered these policy objectives to be in line with each other. This becomesclear from two major policy papers written by the Minister for DevelopmentCooperation, Mr Jan Pronk: AWorldof Difference (1990) and AWorldin Dispute (1993).Also in the general review of foreign policy (Herijkingsnota ),whichwas publishedby the government in 1995, it is tacitly assumed thatthere is nocon¯ ict between the two said policy aims. However,in foreign policy practice, situations may be facedin which the two policyobjectives are notalways in accordance with each other. A choicemay haveto bemadebetween alternatives, all of whichhave negative consequences. Sucha situationpresents itself when the government of anaid receiving country isfoundresponsible for the violation of humanrights. Should the donor country continueits support, diminish or suspend it or terminate it altogether? An argumentin favour of continuation is thatdevelopment aid is meantto give supportto the poor, who, in the case ofdiscontinuation, might become dual victims:once through the violation of human rights by their own government andsecondly by thesuspension of aidby thedonor government. Moreover, it is notat all certain that the offending government would be harmed by the suspensionor stoppage of aid. On the other hand, continuation of aid could be seen asa(tacit)form of supportto the offending regime, which would make the donorgovernment, as itwere, an accomplice in the violation of human rights. Diminishingor suspending aid can have at least a symbolicsigni® cance. The donorgovernment thereby distances itself explicitly from the violations of humanrights in the receiving country. Thistype of choice has presenteditself in the relations between the Nether- landsand its former colony Indonesia, since the coming to power of President Suhartoin 1965 until the ending of the aid relationship by Indonesia in 1992. Inthis paper an overview is presentedof Netherlands human rights and developmentaid policy. Next, its meaning for Dutch relations with Indonesia is dealtwith and it is shownthat this presented a dilemmafor Dutch policy makers. Finally,the question is raisedof suitable solutions to such a dilemma.

Peter RBaehris atJacobvan Ruisdaellaan 25, 2102 AM Heemstede, theNetherlands.

0143-6597/97/020363-14$7.00 Ó 1997Third World Quarterly 363 PETER RBAEHR

Humanrights anddevelopment cooperation as objectives ofDutch foreign policy In1979, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperationpublished a majorpolicy paper, HumanRights and Foreign Policy .1 Thepaper referred to the promotion of human rights as oneof the ` important aims’ offoreignpolicy, but ` itcannotbe itspredominating aim’ . 2 Sincethen, the Netherlandsgovernment has repeatedlystated that human rights are acentralor fundamentalaspect of its foreign policy. For example, Mr Hansvan den Broek, thenMinister of Foreign Affairs, said in 1988 that he considered human rights as an` assignmentto contribute within the possibilities of foreign policy to the respectof human dignity’ . 3 Someof the policy conclusions contained in the 1979 paper are ofdirect relevanceto the relationship between human rights and development cooper- ation.The government rejected the idea that aid should be used to reward countrieswhich respect human rights and conversely withheld to punish coun- trieswhich disregard those rights (policy conclusion no 35). That principle did, however,not alter the fact that, in the shaping of developmentcooperation, one mustconsider in what ways development aid can be made to serve thebest possiblerealisation of human rights. In that respect it was necessary totake accountof the human rights situation in recipientcountries, including the policy pursuedby the authorities. The aid-giving countries should, however, ` actwith acertainrestraint and without presumption in this delicate area’ (policy con- clusionno 36). Nevertheless, in cases whereabuses deriveddirectly from governmentpolicy, one should try to ensure that aid did not contribute directly tothe perpetuation of repression. Policy conclusion no 39 ended as follows: Wherethere is gross and persistent violation of fundamental human rights, non- allocationor suspension of aid can be considered, but other relevant policy considerationsmust be taken into account before such exceptional measures are taken.One of these considerations is of course the consequences which complete withholdingof development aid will have for sectionsof the population who live inpoverty and whose lot development co-operation primarily seeks to improve. 4 MrJan Pronk,who was Ministerfor Development Cooperation from 1973 until 1977and again from 1989 until the present, has beenone of themain architects ofpolicy making in this ® eld.Therefore, what he has tosay aboutthe subject isofprimeimportance. In his 1990 policy paper, AWorldOf Difference: ANew Frameworkfor DevelopmentCooperation in the 1990s ,5 humanrights received agreatdeal of attention. 6 Aclearchoice was madefor freedom and fundamental humanrights. Human rights were said to play an essential role as aguiding principleand moral foundation for democratisation processes. Classic human rightsare thebasis ofdemocracy and provide opportunities to the lower levels ofsocietyto presentand, if possiblelegalise, their justi® ed claims and interests. 7 Theargument that governments must be allowed to restrict civil and political rightsin order to make progress in the ® eldof social± economic rights, is explicitlyrejected: ` Thereis nofreedom without food, but freedom prevails’ . 8 Politicaland civil rights are seen as preliminaryconditions for achieving social andeconomic rights. Poverty must be fought by strengthening the autonomy of 364 PROBLEMS OF AID CONDITIONALITY marginalgroups. An explicit choice is madein favour of ` developmentof, for andby the people’ . 9 Atthe same time,the paper notes the weak position of the statein many developing countries, which makes itimpossiblefor governmental bodiesto prevent violations of human rights. Therefore, a pleais madefor strengtheninginstitutional frameworks. Training of judges, public prosecutors andsupport for human rights organisations should be given priority.’ 10 Thesethemes received renewed attention in the 1993 paper A World in Dispute.1 Againit is statedthat freedom and democracy are necessary toachieve manageablegrowth in the world. ` Goodgovernance’ must be stimulated,which means supportfor governmental services andprivate organisations in developing countrieswhich aim for a sustainablegrowth of legal security and of civil and politicalliberties. ` Furthermore’, Mr Pronkwrote, ` itis justi®ed on grounds of developmentpolicy, in case ofaseriousrelapse of democratizationor incase of sustainedexcessive military expenses, to cutor stopfully the giving of aidto the countryin question’ . 12 Thetwo policy papers clearly expose the importance of promoting human rightson the one hand, of emphasising aid to poor countries on the other, and theirmutual relationship. The Netherlands government directed its development aidpolicy in the 1980s to the promotion of human rights as well.It did not excludethe possibility that, in case ofserious violations of human rights, developmentaid might be decreased, suspended or even fully terminated. Whatdid those ideas mean in practice for relations with Indonesia?

Dutchdevelopment cooperation with Indonesia Tounderstandpresent-day Dutch± Indonesian relations, it is necessary tokeepin mindthat for over 300 years theEast Indies were a colonialpossession of the Netherlands. 13 Since1619, when Jan PieterszoonCoen founded the city of Batavia,having destroyed the original town of Jacatra, the Netherlands ruled overthe territory, while Dutch settlers helped to developit and pro® ted from its wealth.Up until the Japanese occupationin 1941, no serious efforts had been madeto meet the Indonesian nationalists’ wish for independence. It was only duringthe second world war, on 7December1942, that, in anoft quoted speech, QueenWilhelmina announced somewhat vaguely that after the war there would bejoint talks about the structure of the Kingdom and its parts, ` toadapt it to thechanged circumstances’ . However,the declaration of independence by Indonesiannationalists Sukarno and Hatta on 17 December 1945 came as an unwelcomesurprise to the Dutch. They reacted by sending an expeditionary forceof 120 000 men overseas. In two ` policeactions’ in 1947 and 1948 the Netherlandstried to subdue the nationalist movement, but in the end it had to bowto international pressure, exerted through the UN SecurityCouncil. On 27 December1949, the Netherlands transferred sovereignty to Indonesia. It only heldon to the territory of West New Guinea, which it eventually, in 1962, had togive up as well. 14 Tothis day, the events of the years 1945±49 have remained an issue of controversyin the Netherlands. Only very recently, proposals were launched 365 PETER RBAEHR

(andsubsequently rejected) to holda `nationaldebate’ to come to terms withthe issue.The immediate cause ofthe controversy was thegranting of a visitor’s visato a formerDutch soldier who had defected to the Indonesian forces back in1948, subsequently adopted Indonesian nationality and become a wellknown humanrights activist in Indonesia. The discussions on this issue andthe emotionsit entailed demonstrated that for the Netherlands the relationship with Indonesiaremains a very` special’one. Thesuppression by theIndonesian army of a coup d’ Âetat ofleft-wingof® cers on30September1965 led to aperiodof massive violationsof humanrights. The one-timecommander of Indonesian intelligence, Admiral Sudomo, has stated thatbetween 1965 and 1968 more than half a millionpersons were killed. Accordingto other sources, the ® gurewas morethan a million. 15 Beginningin October1965, arrests tookplace on a massive scale.According to of® cial statistics,in the course of the years 750000 persons were arrested. These massive numbersof political prisoners were either not put on any kind of trial orwereonly tried after lengthy delays. Many were detained in camps. Especially duringthe ® rst years ofdetention, they were badly treated. Many were tortured, oftenleading to their deaths. Hygienic conditions and nutrition in the camps weregrossly de® cient. 16 Thesurvivors were only gradually released, often after manyyears ofdetention. After their release, these ` ex-Tapols’remained exposed toall sorts ofrestrictions. 17 Atthetime, the question was raisedin theNetherlands of whether and to what extentdevelopment aid should be used to put pressure onthe Indonesian authoritiesto getthe political prisoners released. The international position of the Netherlandswas strengthened,when, atthe request of Indonesia , it became chairmanof an international donor consortium for Indonesia, the Inter Govern- mentalGroup for Indonesia ( IGGI),establishedin 1967. Non-governmental humanrights organisations requested repeatedly that the human rights situation inIndonesiabe puton the IGGI agenda,but this was rejectedby the Netherlands andthe other IGGI members. Thehuman rights situation further deteriorated in theearly 1970s, when death squadsoperated, wantonly killing opponents of the Suharto regime. In 1975 Indonesiainvaded and incorporated the former Portuguese colony of EastTimor, suppressingthe East Timorese independence movement. The Indonesian army alsoacted mercilessly against separatist movements in Aceh and West Irian. Whatshould the Netherlands do under these circumstances? Economic and businessrelations with Indonesia had improved after 1966. Almost 10% of Dutchdevelopment aid went to Indonesia. Trade with Indonesia rose from450 millionguilders in 1966 to more than 1500 million guilders in 1984. Cultural relationsshowed a growingimprovement. Dutch and Indonesian universities cooperated,for instance in the training of judges, public prosecutors and other judicialof® cers as wellas inother ® elds.In 1970 President Suharto paid an of®cial visit to the Netherlands, which was returnedby Queen Juliana in 1971. Onthe other hand, non-governmental organisations urged the Dutch govern- mentto do something about the deteriorating human rights situation in Indonesia.Also, within the Dutch Labor Party and the smaller Radical Party, bothof which formed part of the governing coalition, voices were heard in 366 PROBLEMS OF AID CONDITIONALITY favourof cutting or suspending development aid to Indonesia to express Dutchconcern about the human rights situation. In 1975 Minister Pronk did indeedreduce development aid to Indonesia, claiming that Indonesia’ s needfor aidhad decreased. He announced that he would shortly review the entire developmentaid programme for Indonesia in a policyreview paper. The Labor Partydecided in its election programme, adopted in January 1977, that aid to Indonesiashould be discontinued.But Mr Pronk,himself a memberof theLabor Party,announced that he was notbound by the election programme, which dealtwith the subsequent, not with the current government period. 18 The governmentfell before Pronk’ s policyreview paper was issued,but its contents werewidely leaked. He concluded that he would not discontinue development aidto Indonesia, as theIndonesian government, under international pressure, had announcedthat it would do something about the problem of its political prisoners.He did argue in favour of the dissolution of IGGI andits replacement bya developmentconsortium of the World Bank, which would not be chaired bythe Netherlands, which ` consequentlycould spend all of its attention on its bilateraldevelopment cooperation with Indonesia’ . 19 Thelatter recommendation was nottaken up bythesuccessor government,in whichthe Labor Party was not represented.The development aid programme with Indonesia was continued withoutchanges, ` alsoin the light of the special relations between the Nether- landsand Indonesia’ , as thenew government declared.

The1980s and 1990s Thehuman rights situation in Indonesiareceived renewed international attention whenfour former bodyguards of President Sukarno, who had been detained for 20years becauseof theirinvolvement in the 1965 military coup, were executed. Manypeople felt that it was againstbasic humanitarian principles to execute themafter so manyyears ofdetention. Other aspects ofthe human rights situationin Indonesia caused international concern as well.Between 1982 and 1984a numberof ` mysteriousmurders’ took place; in his autobiography, publishedin 1989, President Suharto said that they had occurred under of® cial orders.There were reports about human rights violations by the security forces inIrian Jaya, Aceh and East Timor. On the latter island matters came toan explosionwhen the Indonesian military opened ® re ona funeralprocession in theEast Timorese capital of Dili, killing an estimated 100 people. 20 Since then bothintergovernmental and non-governmental organisations have reported on continuedhuman rights violations in East Timor. In 1994 the UN Commission onHumanRights reached agreement on aChairman’s Statementwhich ` ¼noted withconcern continuing allegations of human rights violations in East Timor, whilerecognizing the positive measures takenby the Government¼ to improve thesituation’ . 21 TheCommission expressed its concern over the incomplete informationconcerning the number of people killed and the persons still unaccountedfor since the events in Dili.It called on theIndonesian government tocontinue its investigation of still missing persons and of the circumstances underwhich they had disappeared. According to Amnesty International, the humanrights situation in Indonesia had strongly improved since the 1960s, but 367 PETER RBAEHR atthe end of 1994 there were still about 350 alleged opponents of the regime beingheld in detention in prisons all over Indonesia and East Timor. In1995 the Commission on Human Rights again adopted a Chairman’s Statementin which the Commission expressed its deep concern over the continuousreports of violations of human rights in East Timor, including recentlyreported increased tensions and a violentincident where six people were killed.A matterof preoccupation to the Commission was theincomplete informationconcerning the number of people killed and the persons still unaccountedfor. It called upon the Indonesian authorities to ensurethat all those incustody were treated humanely and their rights fully respected. It recognised thegreater access grantedby theIndonesian authorities to East Timor and called uponthem to continue this policy, including the granting of access tohuman- rightsand humanitarian organisations and international media. It welcomed the undertakingof thegovernment of Indonesiato invite the High Commissioner for HumanRights to visit East Timor in 1995. 22 Inthe beginning of 1996Amnesty Internationalagain expressed its concern over actions by theIndonesian security forces onEast Timor. 23 Inthe Netherlands, Mr Pronkhad returned as Ministerfor Development Cooperationin 1989. He reacted to the execution of another four former bodyguardsof President Sukarno by withdrawing 27 million guilders of addi- tionalaid for Indonesia. This announcement was oflittle ® nancialimportance, butit was generallyseen as acause forrenewed tension between the Netherlands andIndonesia. The announcement that Indonesia was planningto execute anothersix former bodyguardsÐ later denied by the Indonesian authoritiesÐ led to deÂmarches bythe President of the Council of Ministers of the European Communitiesas wellas thegovernments of theNetherlands and other European countries.Pronk discussed the matter during his visit to Indonesia, 6± 14 April 1990,and in the margin of the IGGI meetingof 12 and 13 June 1990. Schulte Nordholthas pointedout that Pronk was perhapsencouraged by his alleged `success’ whenthe bodyguards were in fact not executed. 24 Heexpressed his aversionto the human rights situation in Indonesia. During a press conference inJakarta in June 1991, he said that ` withoutpolitical deregulation measures, economicderegulation would be pointless’ . Healso indirectly criticised the Indonesianbirth control programme, which was seen as apersonalattack on PresidentSuharto. Theaftermath of the Dili affair has beenadequately described by Schulte Nordholt.25 Wecan therefore restrict ourselves here to the main lines of what happened.A ®rst preliminaryinvestigation by anationalIndonesian commission was widelyseen as inadequate.In the Dutch parliament and the press critical questionswere raised. The Netherlands government reacted by suspending another27 million guilders of aidfor 1992. In the beginning the Netherlands did notstand alone in this. Two other donor countries, Denmark and Canada, announcedthat they would stop their aid programme for Indonesia. However, no consultationsabout this took place among the three countries. Portugal, the formercolonial ruler over East Timor, led the efforts to arrive at an international condemnationof the Dili bloodbath. The European Community also suspended itsaid programme and in theEuropean Parliament the establishment of anarms 368 PROBLEMS OF AID CONDITIONALITY embargowas beingurged. 26 Asecondinvestigation took place, this time by the military,which by Indonesian standards was verycritical: the military reaction tothe demonstration in Dili was describedas excessiveand not in line with instructions.President Suharto reacted by ® ringtwo generals and by having a numberof lower-ranking of® cers prosecuted. Underthese circumstances, the Netherlands government announced its will- ingnessto resume itsaid programme for Indonesia in January1992. It stated that itassumed thatthe Indonesian± Portuguese negotiations about the future of East Timor,which were to takeplace under the supervision of theSecretary-General ofthe United Nations, were to lead to a satisfactorysolution. But it added that, shouldthese negotiations not lead to satisfactory results, itwould discuss possibleconsequences with its European partners .Thisthreat, which Schulte Nordholthas calledthe timebomb which shortly afterwards would end the Dutch±Indonesian development relationship, caused Indonesia to postponenego- tiationsabout the distribution of the new Dutch development money. In answer tothe Dutch threat, Indonesia started a diplomaticoffensive in order to prevent otherdonor countries from associating themselves with the Dutch approach. The IndonesianMinister of Foreign Affairs, Mr AliAlatas, visited a numberof foreigncapitals and succeeded in receiving the support he requested.Japan alone promisedUS$90 million by way of compensation for Dutch aid. 27 On 13 February1992 President Suharto, on theoccasion of acceptingthe credentials of thenew Dutch ambassador, spoke of Dutch ` colonial’behaviour, as hadbecome apparentfrom the continued Dutch interference in the domestic affairs of Indonesia.The establishment of alinkbetween human rights and economic aid, hetermed ` typicallyWestern’ . Atthe same time,Mr Pronkmade preparations forhis annual visit to Indonesia,which this timeÐ against the explicit advice of theDutch embassy inJakartaÐ was toinclude Aceh, where allegedly human rightsviolations by the Indonesian army were still taking place. He was clearly notat all prepared for the announcement by the Indonesian Government on 25 March1992 that henceforth it did not want to receive Dutch aid anymore and thatit had asked the Netherlands to discontinueits chairmanship of IGGI. By way ofexplanation, Indonesia referred to the ’ reckless use ofdevelopment aid as an instrumentof intimidation or as atoolto threaten Indonesia’ . 28

Colonialpast Thedilemma faced by theNetherlands was theresult of itstraditional emphasis onhumanrights in itsforeign policy on theone hand, and its desire to maintain friendlyrelations with IndonesiaÐ including the maintenance of a policyof developmentcooperationÐ on the other. The problems which arose wereun- doubtedlymade more acute by the circumstance that it involved a relationship betweena formercolonial power and its former colonial possession. As pointed outbefore, the Netherlands had great dif® culty in ending its colonial rule over Indonesia.Problems of tension between considerations of human rights and of developmentcooperation may also appear in relations between countries that haveno suchformer colonial ties. In a recentlypublished study a comparisonis madebetween the rupture of development aid relations between Indonesia and 369 PETER RBAEHR theNetherlands and a similarcase betweenKenya and Norway, because Norway hadexpressed itself too critically over the human rights situation in that African country.29 Inthe former case, thecolonial past served to aggravate the con¯ ict, astheIndonesians could rightly point to Dutchbehaviour in the past, which had beenfar fromspotless if seen froma perspectiveof respect for human rights.

DoubleStandards? Thenon-governmental critique of the Netherlands’ attitude towards Indonesia didnot diminish when in December 1982 the Netherlands government unilater- allysuspended its development aid towards Suriname, another former Dutch colony,where 15 known opponents of the military regime had been killed in coldblood. The Minister for Development Cooperation, Mrs Schoo,informed Parliamentthat the bilateral treaty 30 hadbeen suspended, because circumstances hadchanged so muchthat continued supply of development aid could not be demandedof the Netherlands. Fromthe beginning it has beenalleged by critics of the government that the suspensionof aid to Suriname, while this was initiallynot done in the case of Indonesia,was apolicyof double standards. The Netherlands government has, however,steadfastly denied that such was thecase. Itemphasised the unique, treaty-boundcharacter of the development relationship with Suriname. Aid to Surinamewas notonly very extensive, but also formed the lion’ s share oftotal internationalaid to that country. A furtherimportant consideration for suspend- ingaid was theseriousness ofthe human rights violations in a countrythat had alwayshad a traditionof absence of violence in politics. The December assassinationsdestroyed in one blow the core of the political opposition in Suriname. Nextto these factors cited by the government, there were undoubtedly other politicalconsiderations as well.Suriname is arelativelysmall, powerless country,while the Netherlands was andstill is oneof thefew foreign states that has shownsome realinterest in its fate. The case ofIndonesia is entirely different.That country is largeand potentially powerful, located in ageographi- callyimportant strategic position. For Dutch business interests Indonesia is vastlymore important than Suriname. 31 AnnualDutch aid to Indonesia was small incomparison to its size ofpopulation and represented only a smallproportion oftotal international aid given to Indonesia. Thedebate may never end over whether or not the Netherlands government has applieddouble standards with reference to Suriname and Indonesia. The governmentclaimed at the time that the assassinations in Suriname had so drasticallychanged the situation that continuation of the aid effort was impos- sible.It also pointed out that, according to its policy principles adopted earlier, developmentaid should never be usedto supportrepressive regimes nor lead to complicityin gross violationsof human rights. The government never said, however,that it hadsuspended the treaty with Suriname in order to improve the humanrights situation in that country. It mentioned other means whichit had usedfor that purpose, including the circulation of a memorandumat the 1983 session ofthe UN Commissionon Human Rights in Geneva. However, in 370 PROBLEMS OF AID CONDITIONALITY

Suriname,the suspension of aid was de®nitely seen as asanctionin reaction to theviolation of humanrights. But it did not contribute to thecredibility of Dutch humanrights policy as inboth cases thesame kindof violationsof human rights (summaryand arbitrary executions, disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests) wereat stake. TheDutch argument that the situation in Surinamehad changed so muchthat, accordingto the international legal principle rebus sic stantibus it was not obligedto continue its aid programme, has beenquestioned. 32 Forinstance, the AdvisoryCommittee on HumanRights in ForeignPolicy has pointedout that the pictureoffered by Suriname before the events of 8 December1982 was oneof continuingdeterioration in the human rights situation: ` TheDecember murders shouldthus not be seen as anisolated incident, but as aclimaxin a chainof events’ .33 Nodoubt the Netherlands government exposed itself to criticism by suspend- ingaid to Suriname, while at the time not doing so inthe case ofIndonesia. It `solved’this dilemma by denying the similarity of the two cases. This,of course, didnot silence its domestic critics. One may wonder, however, whether the Governmenthad any viable alternative. It could have avoided the accusation of applyingdouble standards either by suspending aid to Indonesia, which at that timeit did not want to do, or by continuing aid to Suriname, which was domesticallynot acceptable. 34 Theoretically,there was athirdpossibility: to admitthat it was indeedapplying double standards, which under the circum- stances was themost sensible thing to do.It is notlikely, however, that this third possibilitywas everseriously considered. Governments prefer to present their policiesas consistentand coherent. Applying double standards has noplace in sucha presentation. TheAdvisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy has called developmentaid to Suriname a `classic exampleof adilemma’, stemmingfrom the1979 policy paper HumanRights in Foreign Policy .Onthe one hand, the Netherlandsdid not want to use developmentaid or its suspension as areward orsanction for human rights performance (policy conclusion no 35). On the otherhand, it did not want its development aid to contribute to thecontinuation ofrepression (policy conclusion no 38). 35 Nevertheless,the Dutch measure was widelyinterpreted as aformof sanction. The dilemma received extra emphasis becauseof the obvious comparison with the situation in Indonesia.

International anddomestic dimensions TheNetherlands government had to face strongdomestic political pressure at times.Human rights organisations have a relativelystrong position in the Netherlands. 36 Theyhave repeatedly pointed to the de® ciencies in the human rightssituation in Indonesia. This criticism was ledby the non-governmental IndonesiaCommittee, which has exertedpermanent pressure onthe Dutch Government.Also within the Dutch Labor PartyÐ which at times formed part of thegoverning coalitionÐ and the smaller political parties of the left, continued referencewas madeto Dutch commitments to human rights and the conse- quencesthereof for its relations with Indonesia. On the other hand, there were 371 PETER RBAEHR clearDutch economic interests which demanded extension of traderelations with Indonesiaand an improved climate for investments. These interests were not servedby explicit criticism of Indonesian government policies, in the realm of humanrights or elsewhere. Thevarious Dutch governmental agencies did not always see eyeto eye. The Ministryof Foreign Affairs was traditionallystrongly engaged in thepromotion ofhumanrights, while at the same timepursuing a policyof combattingpoverty as amainaim of development. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was mainly interestedin restoring mutual trade relations. The Ministry of Education and Sciencesemphasised cultural relations, while the Ministry of Justice wanted to beinvolved in the elaboration and extension of the Indonesian legal system, whichis mainlybased on the old Dutch system.

Attitude ofIndonesia Developmentsin Indonesia itself did not really contribute to a normalisationof relations.The Netherlands government had stated in apaperissued in September 1990that Indonesia in the ® eldof civil and political rights had ` amixed record’ .37 Theactions by themilitary in Diliin September1991 did not improve matters.Reports of improvementsin thehuman rights situation were followed by newsof the execution of political prisoners, which met with international condemnation,if onlyon humanitariangrounds. Indonesia has notbeen much in ahurryto ratify the major human rights instruments. So far ithas rati®ed only twoof these treaties. 38 TheIndonesian Foreign Minister, Mr AliAlatas, in a speechat the World Conferenceon Human Rights, recognised the universal character of human rights,but strongly rejected the establishment of a linkbetween human rights anddevelopment cooperation: Humanrights are vital and important by and for themselves.So are efforts at acceleratednational development, especially of the developing countries. Both shouldbe vigorously pursued and promoted. Indonesiatherefore cannot accept linkingquestions of human rights to economic and development cooperation, by attachinghuman rights to economic and development cooperation as political conditionalitiesto suchcooperation .Sucha linkagewill only detract from thevalue of both.39 Hethus distanced himself clearly from the policy principles expressed by Mr Pronk.Moreover, in the Final Declaration adopted in Vienna it is statedthat `¼thepromotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms atthe national and international levels should be universal and conducted withoutconditions attached ’ .40 AttheAsian preparatory conference in Bangkok, Indonesiatogether with such countries as China,Malaysia and Singapore, has distanceditself from supposedly ` Western’views of human rights. 41

Policystyle Thepolicy style, especially of Minister Pronk, undoubtedly served to complicate matters.As mentionedbefore, the Indonesians repeatedly indicated that they 372 PROBLEMS OF AID CONDITIONALITY tookoffence at the direct way in which Mr Pronktends to express hisviews. Thiswas entirelyagainst the Indonesian cultural pattern, where one tends to express oneselfin a far moreindirect, less confrontationalway. Mr Alatas referredindirectly to this in his Vienna speech:

But this is acallfor greaterrecognition of the immense complexity of theissue of humanrights due to the wide diversity in history, culture, value systems, geography andphases of development among the nations of the world. And therefore this is alsoa calladdressed to all of us to develop a greatersensitivity toward this complexityÐand greater humility and less self-righteousness in addressing human rightsissues. 42

Moreover,we shouldnot forget the oft-mentioned Indonesian cultural character- istic,in common with other cultures in Asia, of doing one’ s utmostto avoid losingface. It would, for example, be a clearloss offace toadmit that an improvementin the human rights situation was theresult of pressure exertedby theDutch. Mr Pronkhas shownlittle understanding for such subtleties.

Conclusions TheDutch± Indonesian colonial past helps to explain why the expression ` pater- nalism’often crops up whenever the Dutch criticise the human rights situation inIndonesia. That expression can be interpreted in two ways. The ® rstÐand mostcommonÐ refers tothealleged inappropriateness of aformercolonial ruler, itselfguilty of humanrights violations in the past, now criticising human rights violationsin the former colony. On the other hand, it may also be a re¯ection ofpaternalism not toexpress suchcriticism, as ifhuman rights were only applicableto the former colonial ruler itself and not to the present-day situation inthe former colony. Mutualaccusations of paternalism have dominated debates in theNetherlands aboutDutch± Indonesian relations. Human rights organisations have referred to `doublestandards’ when the Netherlands government reacted much more sharply tohuman rights violations in SurinameÐ another former colonyÐ than in In- donesia.It may be safely assumed thatthese debates, which may imply a potentialthreat, are beingcarefully monitored by Indonesia. Thegovernment of Indonesia has alwaysskilfully handled the notion of sensitivityto foreign criticism. On manyoccasions Indonesian representatives let itbe known that they felt offended by the Dutch lack of sensitivity to their concerns.They would subtly imply that the Dutch way of handlingthings lacked ®nesse andwas atypicallyWestern way of overriding Asian sensitivities. The pointis notwhether that reaction was realor mainly show-business (most probablyit was abitof both); it was certainlya highlyeffective method of dealingwith Dutch criticism. Theepitome of Dutch lack of sensitivity was, in the eyes ofIndonesian governmentof® cials, the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, Jan Pronk.It should be said that, even by Westernstandards, Mr Pronkis unusually bluntand direct. He maynot have been the ideal person to handlesuch delicate 373 PETER RBAEHR mattersas relationswith Indonesia. On the other hand, it has repeatedlybeen emphasisedthat he acted on the basis ofCabinet decisions and that, in the aftermathof the Dili affair, he had the support of other Western governments, as wellas ofthe Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van den Broek. The Indonesiangovernment, for its part, tended to focus its attention on the person ofMr Pronk,whom it saw as thesymbol of Dutch intransigence and paternalism. Havingthe right person to conduct one’ s policyis ofcourse extremely important.In the Netherlands the Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsiblefor humanrights policy, but his colleague for Development Co-operation happens to beinchargeof the® nancialmeans thatare availablefor development assistance. Thismeans thatthese two of® cials will have to agree with each other when the matterof aid conditionality is tobefaced.Lack of agreementbetween these two of®cials with regard to the means tobe employed may not necessarily be a problem,but they should agree on the objectives of foreign policy. Baneke has shownthat the ministers Van der Stoel and Pronk used a differentapproach to theproblem of political prisoners in Indonesia, but agreed on the objective of tryingto free theseprisoners. Van den Broek and Pronk seem tohave agreed on thedetermination of policy, but they differed so much in their approaches that theIndonesian government could use thisdifference to its advantage. Themajor weakness in the Dutch position, as wellas asourceof strengthfor theIndonesians, was thelack of international support for the Netherlands. The Indonesianscould easily afford to do withoutDutch aid, which was onlya small percentageof the total aid it was receiving.Other countries such as Japanwere willingto replace the Netherlands. The Dutch government failed to obtain suf® cientsupport for its position from its European partners as well.Thus the `threat’expressed in the memorandum of January 1992 announcing the con- ditionalresumption of aid, remained an empty one. Thecase suggeststhat the linking of aidto theobservance of humanrights is unlikelyto be effective,unless the amount of aidinvolved is quitesubstantial or thereis suf® cientinternational support. Both were singularly lacking in the Dutchposition towards Indonesia. Onepolicy conclusion from the case studyhere presented must be that a governmentshould try to avoid formulating policy objectives which may come intocon¯ ict with each other. However, it is alsotrue that a governmentmust sometimesact under pressures generatedby anactualsituation, which may limit itschoice among policy options. An explicit choice might be one of the following: · tocontinue extending development assistance, even if thatmeans `complicity’ withviolations of human rights or even contributing to such violations. This wouldmean that the objectives pursued by the giving of development assistance are ratedhigher than the struggle for human rights; · tostate explicit conditions in the ® eldof human rights, even if this means violatingthe sovereignty of the receiving country. It would be wise to reach agreementbeforehand with other donor-countries, in orderto avoid the danger ofbeingput in apositionof politicalisolation, as happenedto theNetherlands inthe case ofIndonesia. 374 PROBLEMS OF AID CONDITIONALITY

Thetermination of the Dutch± Indonesian development cooperation relationship has sincethen been welcomed by Dutch political leaders, as wellas byPresident Suharto.It has supposedlyre-established relations between the two countries on ahealthier,` moremature’ basis. At times,it has almostsounded as ifitwas the Netherlandsthat had broken off the relationship! This may, however, be amatter ofcognitive dissonance or faire bonnemine a Ámauvaisjeu .

Notes Theauthor thanks Ineke Boere® jn,Herman Burgers,Monique Castermans, Marlies Glasius,Hans Goder- bauer,Maarten Kuitenbrouwerand Nico Schulte Nordholt for their critical comments. 1 Ministryof Foreign Affairs ofthe Kingdom of the Netherlands, HumanRights and Foreign Policy , Memorandumpresented to the Lower House of the States General ofthe Kingdom of the Netherlands on 3May1979 by theMinister for Foreign Affairs andthe Minister for Development Co-operation. References are tothe of® cial Englishversion. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has recentlydeclared thatthe paper still re¯ects of®cial Dutchthinking about the place ofhuman rights in foreign policy. 2 Ibid., p 131. 3 Speechby Mr H vanden Broek, 10 December 1988,on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the UniversalDeclaration ofHuman Rights, Utrecht, p 5(mytranslation). 4 HumanRights and Foreign Policy , p 139. 5 SecondChamber, 1990± 91 session, 21 813, nos 1± 2; hereafter quotedas AWorldof Difference . 6 Thefollowing paragraph is partlybased on astudyby Oda vanCranenburgh, ’ Developmentcooperation and humanrights: linkage politics in the Netherlands’ , inPeter RBaehr,Hilde Hey, Jacqueline Smith & Theresa Swinehart(eds), HumanRights in Developing Countries: Yearbook 1995 ,TheHague: Kluwer Law International,1995, pp 29± 55. 7 AWorldof Difference , p 61. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid, p 171. 10 Ibid, p 211. 11 AWorldin Dispute ,TheHague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993. 12 Ibid, p 26. 13 Thisparagraph also forms partof Peter Baehr,Hilde Selbervik & Arne Tostensen,` Responsesto human rightscriticism: Kenya±Norway and Indonesia± the Netherlands’ , inBaehr et al, HumanRights in Develop- ingCountries , pp 80±81. 14 See ArendLijphart, TheTrauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea ,New Haven:Yale UniversityPress, 1966. 15 Peer Baneke, Nederlanden de Indonesische Gevangenen (TheNetherlands and the Indonesian Prisoners), Amsterdam: WiardiBeckman Stichting,1983, p 9. 16 Ibid, p 11. 17 As late as August1995, on the occasion of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of Indonesian independence,three prominentpolitical prisoners were released, includingformer vice-prime minister Subandrio,who had been under arrest for30 years. Anestimated 27are stillbeing detained for political reasons.Amnesty International, Indonesia:The 1965 Prisoners: A Brie® ng ,AIIndex:ASA 21/36/95, 31July 1995. 18 Baneke, Nederlanden de Indonesische Gevangenen , p 83. 19 Draft policyreview paperon Indonesia, as quotedby Mr Pronk himself in ibid, p 100. 20 See Hans Goderbauer,` Indonesiaand East Timor’, inB ÊrdAnders Andreassen &Theresa Swinehart(eds), HumanRights in Developing Countries Yearbook 1993 ,Oslo:Nordic Human Rights Publications, 1993, p 137. 21 UNDoc.E/ 1994/24;and UN Doc.E/ CN.4/1994/132,par. 482, p 381. 22 UNDoc.E/ 1995/23,E/ CN.4/1995/176,par. 590, pp 420± 421. The High Commissioner did indeed pay a visitto East Timorin December 1995. 23 AmnestyInternational, EastTimor: The September and October 1995 Riots: Arbitrary Detention and Torture,London,15 January 1996, AI Index:21/ 03/96. 24 NicoG SchulteNordholt, ` Aidand conditionality: the case ofDutch± Indonesian Relationships’ , inOlav Stokke(ed), Aidand Political Conditionality ,London:Frank Cass, 1995,p 141. 25 Ibid. 375 PETER RBAEHR

26 Katarina Tomasevski, DevelopmentAid and Human Rights Revisited ,London:Pinter, 1993, p 113.The USA stoppedits aid programme to Indonesia in June 1992. But Tomasevski comments: `Indonesiadid not lose muchaidÐ at thedonor meeting in July1992 USD 4.94billion was approved,more thanthe previous year, andeven slightly more thanthe World Bank had recommended’ .See alsoAndrew MacIntyre, ` Indonesia in1992: coming to terms withthe outside world’ , AsianSurvey ,No2, 1993, pp 204± 211. 27 SchulteNordholt, ` Aidand conditionality’ , p153. 28 Press statement bythe Indonesian government, 25 March 1992. 29 Baehr et al,`Responsesto human rights criticism’ ,pp64± 94. 30 Developmentcooperation between Surinameand the Netherlands formed part of a bilateral treatyconcluded in1975, according to which the Netherlands was obligatedto provide DFL3500 million over a periodof 10to 15 years toSuriname to carry outa longtime developmentprogramme. 31 Thatwas made evidentwhen in August1995 no less than50 highranking representatives ofDutchbusiness ®rmsÐthe largest delegationof its kindÐ visited Indonesia in the wake ofQueen Beatrix’ sof®cial visit. 32 See DionneBosma, `TheDutch± Surinam Treaty on Development Assistance: acorrect appealto fundamen- tal changeof circumstances?’ , LeidenJournal of International Law ,Vol3, No 2, 1990, pp 201± 220. 33 AdvisoryCommittee onHuman Rights and Foreign Policy, Aidfor Human Rights: Suriname and Human Rights,TheHague, 1984, p 13(translation from the original Dutch). 34 TheAdvisory Committee onHuman Rights and Foreign Policy has called thesuspension of aid to Suriname `politicallyunavoidable’ , ibid, p 22. 35 Ibid, p 20. 36 TheDutch section of Amnesty International has almost 150000 members whichmakes it,after theFaroe islands,the largest nationalsection per capita. AIMembershipStatistics 1995 ,AIIndexORG 40/04/95. 37 `Mensenrechtenin Indonesie È’(Humanrights in Indonesia), Second Chamber, 1989± 90, 21 662, no 1, p 2. 38 TheConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the International Conventionon the Rights of theChild ( NetherlandsQuarterly of Human Rights ,Vol13, No. 4, 1995). This means thatit has forexample not rati® edthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenanton Economic,Social and Cultural Rights. It has signed,but not yet rati® edthe Convention against Torture. 39 Statement byHE MrAli Alatas, Ministerfor Foreign Affairs andHead ofthe Delegation of the Republic ofIndonesia, before the Second World Conference on HumanRights, Vienna, 14 June1993, p 8(emphasis added). 40 ViennaDeclaration and Programme of Action ,I,par8 (emphasis added). 41 See: GJH. vanHoof, ` Asian challengesto the concept of universality: afterthoughts on the Vienna conference onhuman rights’ , inJacqueline Smith et al (eds), HumanRights: Chinese and Dutch Perspectives ,Dordrecht:Kluwer Law International,1996, pp 1± 15. 42 Alatas’ speech tothe Vienna conference, p7(emphasis added).

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