73-1892 ) Stephen Charles Wiesenfeld, Etc
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LIBRARY c' SUPREME COURT, U. S. WASHINGTON, D. a 20543 In the Supreme Court of tfje Untteb States CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, SECRETARY ) OF HEALTH, EDUCATION and WELFARE, ) ) Appellant, ) ) vs. ) No. 73-1892 ) STEPHEN CHARLES WIESENFELD, ETC. ) a: Ic r'-o CXD '■n rri ;n ;r-tni - rr! o s -o m t—i co0 — 00 Xa ~n so ^ n ,7-1 cj w £><= Washington, D.C. on January 20, 1975 Pages 1 thru 37 Duplication or copying of this transcript by photographic, electrostatic or other facsimile means is prohibited under the order form agreement. HOOVER REPORTING COMPANY, INC. Official 'Reporters Washington, D. C. 5 46-6666 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES — — — — — — — — “-X CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION and WELFARE, : Appellant v. No. 73-1892 STEPHEN CHARLES WIESENFELD, ETC. x Washington, D. C. Monday, January 20, 1975 The above-entitled matter came on for argument at 1:13 oTclock p.m. BEFORE: WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice of the United States WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice POTTER STEWART, Associate 0‘ustlce BYRON F- T,IHITF A — iate Justice ^MARSHALL, Associate Justice HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Associate Justice LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., Associate Justice WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, Associate Justice APPEARANCES: KEITH A. JONES, ESQ., Office of the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. 20530 For Appellant MRS. RUTH BADER GINSBURG, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, 22 East 40th Street, New York, Nex* York 10016 For Appellee 2 CONTENTS ORAL ARGUMENT OF: PAGE: KEITH A. JONES, ESQ., For Appellant 3 MRS. RUTH BADER GINSBURG, For Appellee 19 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF: KEITH A. JONES, ESQ. 35 3 PROCEEDINGS HR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: We will hear arguments next in Wo. 73-1892, Weinberger against Wiesenfeld. Mr. Jones, you may proceed whenever you are ready. ORAL ARGUMENT OF KEITH A. JONES, ESQ. ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT HR. JONES: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This cases involves a claim of sex discrimination under the Social Security Act. Section 202(G) of that Act provides for the payments of benefits to certain widowed mothers. There is no comparable provision under the Act for payment of benefits under the Act to widowed fathers. The Appellee in this case is a widowed father who claims that he is constitutionally entitled to payment of benefits on the same basis as if he were a widowed mother. It is the Government’s position, as I will elaborate on at some length later, that this statute, like the property tax exemption in favor of widows in Kahn against Shevln, serves the permissible legislative objective of ameliorating the harsh economic consequences of economic job discrimination against women and that it should be sustained on that basis. A description of the operation of the Act is 4 essential to the understanding of this case. The benefits payable under Section 202(G) are paid out on account of the Social Security account of the deceased wage earner. The widowed mother receives equal to three-quarters of the primary insurance benefit that the deceased husband would have received had he lived and retired, reduced 50 cents for each dollar that the widow earns in excess of $2,400 per year. Payments are made to the widowed mother so long as she has a minor child in her care and remains unmarried. Similar benefits are provided under the Act for the child of a deceased wage earner. The child receives benefits on the basis of the Social Security account of his or her deceased parent whether or not the parent is the father or the mother. It makes no difference. But there is no provision under the Act for the payment of benefits to widowed fathers under the age of 60 on the basis of the account of their deceased wives. The Appellee in this case is a young, unemployed widower. After the death of his wife, his child began receiving benefits based upon her Social Security account. He, hox\rever was not entitled to benefits. By "he" I mean the Appellee was not entitled to benefits himself under the Act. In view of this, he brought present suit for declaratory and Injunctive relief, contending that he was constitutionally entitled to a distribution of benefits on the same basis as if he were a widow rather than a widower. A three-judge court was convened. The court determined that all sex-based classifications are inherently suspect under this Court's two-tiered Equal Protection analysis that it has applied in recent years. The court analyzed the statute, concluded that it did not serve a compelling governmental interest and, accordingly, the court held the statute unconstitutional and ordered the payment of benefits to the Appellee as if he were a widow. The court stayed its order pending this appeal and the case is now here on the Government's direct appeal. At the outset, I think it can be said that the District Court clearly erred in applying the compelling; governmental interest standard of review. It has become clear in this Court's decision in Kahn against Sheyin and, last week, in Schlesinger against Ballard, that sex-based classifications are not inherently suspect. They are not subject to justification only on the basis of a so-called "governmental interest." They are not invalid per se. This is not to suggest that the traditional permissive rational basis standard of review is fully 6 appropriate in all sex discrimination cases. Sex-based classifications, we believe, do merit close judicial scrutiny and they have received it by this Court in the past. In Frontiero against Richardson and Reed against Reed, this Court struck down sex classifications that merely served the purpose of administrative convenience. Thus the Court has applied a standard of review which involves close scrutiny, but scrutiny which is not so strict as to be inevitably fatal. The rule that the Court seems to be applying is simply that sex-based classifications must rest on some substantial reasonable basis or, as Chief Justice Burger said in the Reed opinion, upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. As I will now show, the statute here in question easily meets that test. Appellee’s principal attack on this statute is, curiously enough, not from the point of View of the widower who has been denied benefits, but rather from the point of view of the female wage earner who, it is alleged, is denied Social Security coverage for her spouse that would have been granted to a male wage earner. The Appellee’s argument proceeds syllogistically. 7 First, the Appellee analogizes the payment of Social Security taxes to the purchase of private insurance coverage. Then the Appellee contends that female wage earners are not granted the right to purchase the same insurance coverage that a male wage earner purchases for his spouse under the system and, Appellee concludes, that is discrepancy in treatment, is a discrepancy in insurance coverage, it is impermissible. We believe there are two fatal flaws to this chain of reasoning. First, the analogy to private insurance schemes is itself fundamentally erroneous. As this Court noted in Flemming against Nestor, the Social Security Act comprehends a scheme, not of private but of social insurance under which benefits are distributed and coverage provided, in large part, under the basis of probable need rather than on the basis of strict — rather than strictly on the basis of the contributions that the insured wage earner has paid. Even accepting, for the moment, the private insurer paradigm on which Appellee relies, we think it is nevertheless clear that the female wage earner is not entitled to any additional insurance coverage under the Act, that the female wage earner has not been disadvantaged in any way. As we pointed out on pages 21 and 22 of our brief, 8 female wage earners, under the Social Security system, pay in only 28 percent of all Social Security taxes whereas 3^ percent of the benefits paid out of the system are paid out on the basis of the Social Security account of female wage- earners . Now, I am not tslicing about the benefits that are paid to women. I am talking about the benefits that are paid out solely on the basis of the women's accounts as workers. Now, this means that the Social Security system is already out of actuarial balance in favor of the female wage earner as against the male wage earner. If my rough arithmetical calculations are correct, right now, the female wage earner receives 33 percent greater coverage under the Act in terms of dollars than does the male wage earner. To grant the additional insurance coverage for which Appellee contends here would simply further tilt the scales in favor of the female wage earner as against her male counterpart. QUESTION: How do you account for the existing disparity? MR. JONES: I think, in large part, the disparity flows from the fact that women have longer life expectancies and that their retirement benefits are spread out over a 9 longer period of time. It may also be attributal in part to the fact that lower wage earners are entitled to somewhat greater return under the Act than are higher wage earners and women, statistically, are lower wage earners. I think for those two reasons, and I’m not sure which is more important, women do receive, on the basis of their accounts, far greater return than do men. And our position with respect to this argument, this insurance coverage argument by the Appellee, is that to grant further coverage, to further tilt the scales in favor of women, obviously would not serve the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause and it therefore seems to us that Appellee's insurance coverage argument simply reduces to the complaint that Appellee’s individual wife, as a wage earner, unlike the average female wage earner, has been somehow disadvantaged, that the payments made on the basis of her account are in some sense constitutionally insuffi cient .