Analytics on the Mind An Objectivist Survey of Analytic Philosophy of Mind Diana Mertz Hsieh (
[email protected]) 1 June 2003 Abstract: Although debates over the nature of the mind have raged in analytic philosophy of mind in recent decades, Objectivism largely lacks not only a theory of mind, but also an active discussion of the subject. The common strategy of adopting views from analytic philosophy of mind is perilous, given the significant differences between the principles and methods of Objectivism and those of analytic philosophy. Nonetheless, Objectivists can and ought to learn from the failures and successes of analytic theories of mind. This paper examines the commonalities and conflicts between analytic philosophy and Objectivism in order to sketch a plausible philosophy of mind consistent with Objectivism. Mind and Body In recent decades, debates have raged in analytic philosophy over the nature of the mind and its relationship to the body. In a quest for a viable account of the metaphysics of the mind— for an understanding of the existence, specific character, and causal efficacy of consciousness in a physical world—theories have cycled in and out of fashion with remarkable rapidity. In contrast, a philosophy of mind well-integrated with Ayn Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism has yet to be developed. A survey of the Objectivist literature reveals only scattered critiques of common analytic positions and some (occasionally conflicting) elements of a positive theory (Hsieh 2003). As such, the debate is only just beginning for Objectivism. The absence of a well-defined Objectivist ontology of mind is surprising not only in light of the vigorous debates in analytic philosophy, but also given the central role of mind-body integration in Rand’s philosophical system.