DOCSLIB.ORG

Chapter Four T H E P L a C E O F T H E G O O D in Aristotle's Natural Teleology

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Chapter Four T H E P L a C E O F T H E G O O D in Aristotle's Natural Teleology Chapter Four The Place of the Good in Aristotle's Natural Teleology by Allan Gotthelf In previous writings I have offered an interpretation of Aristotle's conception of final causality in terms of his conception of an "irreducible potential for form."1 I have argued that final causality is operative in nature, and teleological explanation thus appropriate, only when there is being actualized a potential for a complex organic outcome which is not ontologically reducible to a sum of actualizations of potentials of the organ- ism's elemental constituents. At no place in this analysis do I refer to the goodness of that complex organic outcome.2 Some recent writers have suggested that the absence of any reference to goodness in the analysis of Aristotelian ends is a mistake. Thus, one of the most influential recent discussions of teleological explanation, John Cooper's 1982 Owen Festschrift paper, "Aristotle on Natural Teleology," begins as follows: Aristotle believed that many (not, of course, all) natural events and facts need to be explained by reference to natural goals. He understands by a goal (ov evexa) whether natural or not, something good (from some point of view) that something else causes or makes possible, where this other thing exists or hap- pens (at least in part) because of that good. Copyright © 1988 Allan Gotthelf. Revised from the paper read November 19, 1987, at Clark University, as part of the Tenth Annual Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. 1. Gotthelf 1976/77, reprinted with a long "Postscript 1986" as Gotthelf 1987a. Cf. Gotthelf 1980, 19876. 2. By the "goodness" of X here and throughout I mean merely X's being good (in whatever way, and for whatever subject, if any, it is). I do not mean to restrict the term to moral virtue. In a note at this point, after citing some passages, Cooper states: That the concept of a goal is the concept of something good is a view Aristotle inherited from Plato's Phaedo (cf. e.g. 97c6-d3, el-4, 98a6-b3, 99a7-c7); unless one bears the connection between goal and good clearly in mind one will fail to under- stand much that Aristotle says about natural teleology, and many applications he makes of it.... Andrew Woodfield (1976, pp. 205-206) correctly notes that according to Aristotle all tele- ological explanations are claims that something happened because it is good, and makes this theme central to his own uni- fying account of teleological description.3 In a paper published in the 1985 Balme Festschrift, Charles Kahn makes a similar claim, and he too cites Woodfield: The following schema is borrowed from Andrew Woodfield, whose analysis seems to me the most insightful. (The formu- lation here is limited to the simpler case of natural teleology, as distinct from the intentional finality of art and choice). A is (or occurs) for the sake o B may be analyzed as: (i) B is good (for the relevant subject) (ii) A contributes to, or is necessary for, B (iii) Therefore, A occurs (the relevant subject has or does A).4 As these commentators have noted, Aristotle himself fre- quently conjoins the terms 2e홢.os ("end") and oh evExa ("that for the sake of which") with aya66v ("good").5 And there are several passages where he appears to suggest that reference to the good is fundamental to our understanding of the end or final cause. For instance, in Metaphysics A 7 he characterizes his predecessors' limited grasp of the final cause as follows: That for the sake of which actions and changes and movements take place, they assert to be a cause in a way, but not in this way, i.e. not in the way in which it is its nature to be a cause. For those who speak of reason or friendship class these causes as goods; they do not speak, however, as if anything that either existed or came into being for the sake of these, but as if movements started from these.... Therefore it turns out that in a sense they both say and do not say the good is a cause; for they do not call it a cause qua good but only incidentally (988b6-15; tr. Ross). 3. Cooper 1982, p. 197 (1987, p. 245). 4. Kahn 1985, p. 197. 5. Or peanov ("better") or eo ("well"), etc. Cooper lists several of these passages in 1982, p. 197n1 (1987, p. 245n4). .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Teleology and the Concepts of Causation
    Philosophica, 46 (2), 17–43, 1990. 128 Teleology and the Concepts of Causation he term ‘teleology’ was coined by the philosopher Christian Wolff in his Latin T treatise of 1728 and he defined it as indicating the part of natural philosophy that explains the ends, or purposes, of things.1 It has been used to describe a prominent feature of the theological views of Thomas Aquinas and the metaphysics of Aristotle. Some forty years ago, it was adopted by the founder of cybernetics to characterize a mechanism designed, among other things, to steer missiles to their target. Since the instrumental purpose of artificial devices would seem to belong to a domain that is somewhat different from the metaphysical purposes of Nature and its components, it is reasonable to suspect that the term has shifted its meaning and become ambiguous. Where ambiguities remain hidden, all kinds of nonsense can be generated. In the present essay, I argue that the problem with ‘teleology’ goes back to one of the four ‘explanatory principles’ that resulted from Aristotle’s examination of what we now call causation. After a brief survey of the contemporary uneasiness about teleology I present an exposition of Aristotle’s classification of causes, suggesting that modern science has been somewhat cavalier in dismissing all but one of the four. I suggest that an adequate analysis of the concept of efficient cause opens a way to showing that the notion of final cause, usually condemned as ‘teleological’, is in fact twofold and that one of its components does not at all infringe the accepted rules of science.
    [Show full text]
  • English Authors
    Middlebury College Classics Department Library Catalog: English Titles - Sorted by Author Publish Title Subtitle Author TranslatorLanguage Binding Pages Date The Holy Bible Revised Standard Version English 1952 Hardcover 1,300 A New Aristotle J. L. Ackrill English 01/01/1988 Paperback 600 Reader The Paideia Proposal An Educational Manifesto Mortimer J. Adler English 09/01/1982 Paperback 96 Lucan An Introduction Frederick M. Ahl English 04/01/1976 Hardcover 379 Frederick Ahl & David To Read Greek... English 1969 Paperback 360 Armstrong Arab Political Thought and The Arab Predicament Fouad Ajami English 05/29/1981 Hardcover 240 Practice since 1967 Ekrem Akurgal & Max The Art Of The Hittites English 1962 Hardcover 315 Hirmer (Illustrator) The Archaeology Of W. F. Albright English 1961 Paperback 271 Palestine The Egyptians Cyril Aldred English 1963 Paperback 267 The Story Of The Famous Manuscript Discoveries And The Dead Sea Scrolls Their Momentous J. M. Allegro English 1961 Paperback 199 Significance For Students Of The Bible The First Year Of James Turney Allen English 1931 Hardcover 383 Greek Publish Title Subtitle Author TranslatorLanguage Binding Pages Date The Pronunciation of Vox Graeca W. Sidney Allen English 09/24/1987 Paperback 179 Classical Greek A Guide to the Pronunciation Vox Latina W. Sidney Allen English 08/17/1989 Paperback 152 of Classical Latin According To The Masoretic Text, A New Translation With The Aid Of Previous Versions Jewish Publication The Holy Scriptures English 1955 Hardcover 1,257 And With Constant Society Of America Consultation Of Jewish Authorities The Makers of Hebrew David Amram English 12/1988 Hardcover 418 Books in Italy Human Being and Essays on Virtue, Freedom, George Anastaplo English 04/01/1981 Paperback 0 Citizen and the Common Good Essays on Roman William S.
    [Show full text]
  • ARISTOTLE's TELEOLOGY and Uexk1tll's THEORY of LIVING NATURE
    ARISTOTLE'S TELEOLOGY AND UEXK1tLL'S THEORY OF LIVING NATURE THE purpose of this paper is to draw attention to a similarity between an ancient and a modern theory of living nature. There is no need to present the Aristotelian doctrine in full detail. I must rather apologize for repeating much that is well known. My endeavour is to offer it for comparison, and, incidentally, to clear it from misrepre- sentation. Uexkiill's theory, on the other hand, is little known, and what is given here is an insufficient outline of it. I do not maintain that either doctrine is right. I am fully aware that the problem of the essence of living nature by no means admits of an easy solution.' In offering for consideration the comparison contained in this paper I would go no farther than owning my belief that the two authors here discussed, both thinkers who combine an intensely philosophical outlook with a wide biological experience, are worth the attention not only of the historian of science and philosophy, but also of the student of philosophical biology. One of the various meanings which dv'at bears for Aristotle is that of a cause. In the second book of his Physics, as is well known, he investigates the philosophical character of that cause. The result is what we are accustomed to call his teleology. He maintains that not only rpoalpacr~sbut also dv'c is rTwvEIEKL r'tov alrlwv.2 This teaching has exercised a deep influence, especially throughout the Middle Ages. It has subsequently been discarded, especially since modern science established its mechanistic outlook on nature, which is strictly opposed to teleological explana- tions.
    [Show full text]
  • TELEOLOGY and DIALECTIC Introduction
    CHAPTER FIVE TELEOLOGY AND DIALECTIC Introduction: Teleology and Natural Science We have seen how Marx addresses several issues in the philosophy of science on his way to constructing his research principles which, in turn, lead him to theoretical conclusions. Several issues he addresses are shared with natural science, including conceptualizing variables, looking for their interrelations, and accounting for causal dynamics. Teleological explanation is one philosophy of science category that directs attention toward the temporal relationship between variables and their causal properties. In this chapter, I inquire into the logic of teleological explanation in natural and social science and how Marx’s approach addresses this issue as well as its political implications. Teleological reasoning comes up in the works of classical philoso- phers, Christian theologians, and modern philosophers of science. As expressed by Aristotle and Kant, teleological arguments depict things as existing or coming to exist because of the purpose or role they play in the world.1 It is a seductive way of thinking. Th ings are here because of what they do for us and/or for other things. Teleological reason, however, at its traditional rudimentary level at least, does not go beyond speculative reason as it simply rests on argument, not on test- able empirical demonstration. As these sorts of explanations are sub- ject to misleading us, we need to clarify teleology’s logic and root out 1 “Philosophers as divergent in their perspectives as Aristotle and Kant have
    [Show full text]
  • Cognitive Biases Explain Religious Belief, Paranormal Belief, and Belief in Life’S Purpose ⇑ Aiyana K
    Cognition 129 (2013) 379–391 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Cognition journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/COGNIT Cognitive biases explain religious belief, paranormal belief, and belief in life’s purpose ⇑ Aiyana K. Willard , Ara Norenzayan 1 Department of Psychology, The University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada article info abstract Article history: Cognitive theories of religion have postulated several cognitive biases that predispose Received 4 March 2013 human minds towards religious belief. However, to date, these hypotheses have not been Revised 25 July 2013 tested simultaneously and in relation to each other, using an individual difference Accepted 27 July 2013 approach. We used a path model to assess the extent to which several interacting cognitive tendencies, namely mentalizing, mind body dualism, teleological thinking, and anthropo- morphism, as well as cultural exposure to religion, predict belief in God, paranormal beliefs Keywords: and belief in life’s purpose. Our model, based on two independent samples (N = 492 and Religion N = 920) found that the previously known relationship between mentalizing and belief is Cognitive biases Paranormal belief mediated by individual differences in dualism, and to a lesser extent by teleological think- Purpose ing. Anthropomorphism was unrelated to religious belief, but was related to paranormal belief. Cultural exposure to religion (mostly Christianity) was negatively related to anthro- pomorphism, and was unrelated to any of the other cognitive tendencies. These patterns were robust for both men and women, and across at least two ethnic identifications. The data were most consistent with a path model suggesting that mentalizing comes first, which leads to dualism and teleology, which in turn lead to religious, paranormal, and life’s-purpose beliefs.
    [Show full text]
  • A Systematic Framework for Exploring Worldviews and Its Generalization As a Multi-Purpose Inquiry Framework
    systems Article A Systematic Framework for Exploring Worldviews and Its Generalization as a Multi-Purpose Inquiry Framework David Rousseau 1,2,3,4,* and Julie Billingham 5,6 1 Centre for Systems Philosophy, Surrey KTI5 1EL, UK 2 Centre for Systems Studies, University of Hull, Kingston-on-Hull HU6 7RX, UK 3 Alister Hardy Research Centre, University of Wales TSD, Lampeter SA48 7ED, UK 4 Bertalanffy Center for the Study of Systems Science, 1040 Vienna, Austria 5 Centre for Systems Philosophy, Surrey KTI5 1EL, UK; [email protected] 6 Salesforce, Inc., San Francisco, CA 94105, USA * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +44-(0)-7714-677-687 Received: 31 March 2018; Accepted: 5 July 2018; Published: 10 July 2018 Abstract: Systems science methodologies do not have a consistent way of working with worldviews, even though determining stakeholder perspectives is central to systems thinking. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive “Worldview Inquiry Framework” that can be used across methodologies to govern the process of eliciting, documenting, and comparing the worldviews of stakeholders. We discuss the systemicity of worldviews and explain how this can help practitioners to find the roots of stakeholders’ disagreements about value judgements. We then generalize the structure of the Worldview Inquiry Framework to produce a “General Inquiry Framework” that can be used to govern an inquiry process in other contexts. We show that the presented Worldview Inquiry Framework is a special case of this General Inquiry Framework and show how the General Inquiry Framework can be tailored for other contexts such as problem solving, product design, and fundamental research.
    [Show full text]
  • Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle's Science of Nature
    This page intentionally left blank EXPLANATION AND TELEOLOGY IN ARISTOTLE’S SCIENCE OF NATURE In Aristotle’s teleological view of the world, natural things come to be and are present for the sake of some function or end (for example, wings are present in birds for the sake of flying). Whereas much recent scholarship has focused on uncovering the (meta-)physical underpin- nings of Aristotle’s teleology and its contrasts with his notions of chance and necessity, this book examines Aristotle’s use of the theory of natural teleology in producing explanations of natural phenomena. Close analyses of Aristotle’s natural treatises and his Posterior Analytics show what methods are used for the discovery of functions or ends that figure in teleological explanations, how these explanations are structured, and how well they work in making sense of phenomena. The book will be valuable for all those who are interested in Aristotle’s natural science, his philosophy of science, and his biology. mariska leunissen is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. EXPLANATION AND TELEOLOGY IN ARISTOTLE’S SCIENCE OF NATURE MARISKA LEUNISSEN Washington University in St. Louis CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521197748 © Mariska Leunissen 2010 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
    [Show full text]
  • Curriculum Vitae Tara Smith September 2016 6008 Aurora Drive Department of Philosophy Austin TX 78757 University Of
    Curriculum Vitae Tara Smith September 2016 6008 Aurora Drive Department of Philosophy Austin TX 78757 University of Texas at Austin Cell: (512)-507-3392 2210 Speedway, Stop C3500 [email protected] Austin, TX 78712-1737 (512) 471-6777 Department Fax: (512) 471-4806 Areas of Specialization Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law Education Ph.D. and MA, Philosophy, The Johns Hopkins University, 1989, 1985 Dissertation: "The Inflation of Rights" (Advisors: Susan Wolf, Richard Flathman) B.A., Philosophy and Government, University of Virginia, 1983 magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa London School of Economics and Political Science, Spring 1982 Professional Appointments Fall 2005-present, Professor, University of Texas at Austin Fall 1996-2005, Associate Professor, University of Texas at Austin Fall 1989-1996, Assistant Professor, University of Texas at Austin Spring 1989, St. Mary's College of Maryland, Visiting Instructor Summer 1987-Spring 1988, Towson State University, Lecturer 1985-1988, The Johns Hopkins University, Teaching Assistant Publications Books: Judicial Review in an Objective Legal System, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 301 pages. Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics – The Virtuous Egoist, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 318 pages. Chinese edition, 2010; second Chinese translation, July 2015. Viable Values: A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, 205 pages. Moral Rights and Political Freedom, Rowman & Littlefield, 1995, 224 pages. Japanese edition, 1997. Articles: Forthcoming: "What Good is Religious Freedom? Locke, Rand, and the Non-Religious Case for Respecting It," Arkansas Law Review vol. 69: 4, February 2017. “Religious Liberty or Religious License? Legal Schizophrenia and the Case Against Exemptions,” Virginia Journal of Law and Politics, vol.
    [Show full text]
  • Plato's Tales of Teleology
    Cambridge University Press 0521790670 - Plato’s Natural Philosophy: A Study of the Timaeus-Critias - Thomas Kjeller Johansen Excerpt More information Introduction: Plato’s tales of teleology The ancient covenant is in pieces; man knows at last that he is alone in the universe’s unfeeling immensity, out of which he emerged only by chance. His destiny is nowhere spelled out, nor is his duty. The kingdom above or the darkness below; it is for him to choose.1 Does the universe support our moral endeavours? Does the world, as we know it, give us reason to think that we will be better off, happier, more thriving, if we pursue a course of moral probity than if we do not? Does the universe make us feel at home as moral agents? Does goodness or beauty figure in the world independently of us? Can we learn something about how to live our lives from observing the universe? Many today would agree with Jacques Monod in answering ‘no’ to all of these questions. We live in an ‘unfeeling’ universe. The world is insensitive to our moral concerns. Values are mere human ‘constructs’, which the universe at best is indifferent to and at worst undermines. Reading Plato we are brought back to a world in which the ‘ancient covenant’, the moral agreement between man and the universe, still holds. It is a tenet of Plato’s thought that man is not alone in the universe with his moral concerns. Goodness is represented in the universe. We can there- fore learn something about goodness by studying the cosmos.
    [Show full text]
  • Teleology, First Principles, and Scientific Method In
    Teleology, First Principles, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Biology by Allan Gotthelf Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. .ISBN 978– 0–19–928795–6. Cloth $99.00 xviii + 440 Reviewed by Tiberiu Popa Butler University [email protected] Students of Aristotle may take it nearly for granted today that a rigorous study of his biological writings is worthwhile not just because of the intrinsic merits of those works but also because they can help us to acquire a deeper and more nuanced understanding of other parts and aspects of Aristotle’s oeuvre—especially his metaphysics and natural philosophy, and his philos- ophy of science.This view, however, was considerably less popular just a few decades ago. David Balme, and subsequently Allan Gotthelf, James Lennox, and other influential scholars, contributed significantly to this par- adigm shift in the field of Aristotelian studies. Besides his work devoted to Ayn Rand’s philosophy, Gotthelf is well known as the author of many seminal articles and chapters on ancient philosophy, and as the editor or co-editor of several important books on Aristotle’s biological treatises and their philosophical implications. His prominent place in the recent history of Aristotelian scholarship has been acknowledged, among other things, by the publication of Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle: Essays in Honor of Allan Gotthelf [2010]. Teleology, First Principles, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Biology gathers 16 articles (some based on conference presentations), of which four—chapters 4, 12,
    [Show full text]
  • Aestimatio 10 (2013) 355–365 356 Aestimatio
    In memoriam Allan Gotthelf (30 December 1942–30 August 2013) ⋆ James G. Lennox University of Pittsburgh [email protected] Allan Gotthelf passed away on August 30, 2013 in his apartment in Philadel- phia under the care of close friends, finally succumbing to the cancer that he had battled successfully for many years. He has left behind a lasting legacy of distinguished scholarship on Aristotle’s philosophy and science; but more than that, Allan was able, through his infectious enthusiasm, spirit of coopera- tion, and formidable organizational skills, to reshape the field of Aristotelian studies fundamentally. Not only through his scholarly publications but through his prodigious organization of workshops, conferences, summer insti- tutes, and a truly astounding network of correspondence, which only became more astounding with the advent of the Internet, Allan was able to involve an ever expanding number of scholars in a systematic study of Aristotle’s biological writings, encouraging us to consider the Generation of Animals, Parts of Animals and History of Animals as much a part of our scholarly diet as the Organon, Metaphysics, or Nicomachean Ethics.Indeed, he en- couraged us to think of these investigations as sources of insight into these philosophical works and not merely as documents in the history of biology. Born in Brooklyn on December 30, 1942, Allan Gotthelf came of age during the heyday of the Brooklyn Dodgers, attending games at Ebbets Field as a young boy shortly after Jackie Robinson had joined the team, an event that left
    [Show full text]
  • Leibniz's Two Realms
    Leibniz’s Two Realms Jonathan Bennett [From D. Rutherford and J. A. Cover (eds), Leibniz: Nature and Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 135–55. 1. Leibniz’s commitment to mechanism Leibniz’s support for ‘mechanism’ may be encouraged Leibniz insists that any bodily event can be explained purely also by his denial that any material event can be explained in terms of ‘mechanism’, meaning impact mechanics. The through a mental one. The Galilean revolution may en- latter’s laws are all quasi-causal (Sleigh’s label) rather than courage that denial, but not to the extent of requiring it. causal; they describe patterns among events that are em- Descartes was a prime revolutionary who firmly rejected the bedded in the universal harmony, and do not imply that any Aristotelian paradigm, yet he held that human behavior body acts on any other. When declaring how things must go requires some input from an immaterial mind. Leibniz in physics, Leibniz does not often remind us that his topic dissents: ‘I attribute to mechanism everything which takes is quasi-causation, not real transeunt causation; but that place in the bodies of plants and animals except their initial is always his view. Similarly, in those contexts he seldom formation’, he writes at NE 139. ‘I do not approve of bringing reminds us that bodies are phenomenal rather than basically in the soul when plant and animal phenomena have to be real; but in the mature years that is always his view too. explained in detail’ (NE 220). This holds for humans too. In his claim for the power of mechanism, Leibniz is refus- Leibniz’s faith in mechanism’s extent draws strength from ing to explain any particular events in terms of Aristotelian his conviction that the value of this world consists partly ‘forms’, e.g.
    [Show full text]