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Teleological Mortality in Plato's Timaeus

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Teleological Mortality in Plato's Timaeus Teleological mortality in Plato’s Timaeus Xi Ji Submitted to University College London for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Classics Supervised By: Doctor Jenny Bryan I, Xi Ji, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other source, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. Signature: Abstract This thesis aims to show how Plato attempts to bridge the gap between immortal and mortal nature in the Timaeus. It explores the similarities and dissimilarities between the constitution of the immortal existents, i.e. the cosmic soul and human immortal souls, and the mortal existents, i.e. the cosmic body and the human bodies. In the knowledge of the similarities, that is, the soul and body are fashioned using the Forms and Receptacle as common components, the distinction between the immortal souls and mortal bodies seems not to be an absolute one. The dissimilarities lie in that the two kinds of existents are created in different ways, which entail that they differ in structures and modes of motion. The similarities and dissimilarities altogether explains why the immortal souls and mortal bodies appear to be utterly different existents but can be connected to and communicate with each other. The embodiment of the cosmic soul in the cosmic body yields an everlasting creature such as the cosmos itself. Whereas the embodiment of the human immortal soul in the physical body results in the former’s being disrupted and the generation of two kinds of mortal souls, i.e. spirited and appetitive parts of souls. The spirited part of soul is designed as an intermediary between the immortal soul and the body as well as between the immortal soul and the appetitive part of soul. The tripartite soul and its interaction with the mortal body reveal Demiurgic concerns for humans. Humans are endowed with mortality intentionally for the sake of cosmic completion and perfection. The Demiurgic compensatory arrangement, i.e. the structural affinity between the cosmos and humans and purposefully designed bodily parts and organs, allows humans, as mortal creatures, to bridge their own gap with the everlasting cosmos by imitating the latter. 1 Acknowledgements I would like to extend thanks to people who have so generously contributed to the work presented in this thesis. My greatest debt in writing the thesis is to my doctoral supervisor, Dr. Jenny Bryan. I thank her not only for her tremendous academic support but also for her patience and encouragement. During my time as a Ph.D. student at the Department of Greek and Latin at UCL, I have been so fortunate to be part of a dynamic community of classical researchers. I am very grateful to my secondary supervisor, Dr. Peter Agocs, who has helped to examine the first thesis chapter for me. I also want to thank Dr. Stephen Colvin, who first introduced me to my doctoral supervisor and has been helpful ever since. I would also like to acknowledge Prof. Xuefu Zhang of the Department of Philosophy at Zhejiang University, who introduced me to ancient philosophy when I was an undergraduate and has been supportive ever since. Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my parents for providing me with not only financial support but also continuous encouragement throughout my years of researching and writing this thesis. I could not have been pursuing my Ph.D. degree without them. 2 Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................................ 1 Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................ 2 Contents ............................................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 4 Chapter 1 Cosmology and teleology ............................................................................................... 7 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... 7 1.1 Timaeus’ cosmology and the Timaeus ............................................................................................... 8 1.2 Αἰτία and intentional teleology ......................................................................................................... 11 1.3 The conception of divine craftsmanship ........................................................................................ 17 1.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 23 Chapter 2 The physical account of mortality in the Timaeus .................................................... 25 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 25 2.1 Mortality in the Phaedo and the Timaeus ..................................................................................... 26 2.2 The constitution of the human body ................................................................................................ 28 2.3 The physical process of death ............................................................................................................. 36 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................................... 43 Chapter 3 The immortal soul .......................................................................................................... 44 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 44 3.1 The construction of cosmic souls ....................................................................................................... 45 3.2 The creation of individual human immortal souls .................................................................... 57 3.3 The allotment of the individual immortal souls and the cause of evils ............................ 59 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................................... 62 Chapter 4 The mortal souls ............................................................................................................. 64 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 64 4.1Πάθημα and αἴσθησις ............................................................................................................................. 65 4.2 Emotions and the mortal parts of soul ........................................................................................... 72 4.2.1 Anger and the spirited part of soul ........................................................................................ 74 4.2.2 The appetitive part of soul ........................................................................................................ 79 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................................... 86 Chapter 5 The teleological mortality ............................................................................................. 88 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 88 5.1 The inevitability and necessity of mortality ................................................................................. 90 5.2 The combination of immortal soul and body ............................................................................... 94 5.3 The Demiurgic concerns for humans .............................................................................................. 98 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................ 102 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 104 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 107 3 Introduction This thesis studies how, according to Timaeus’ cosmology, Plato bridges, or attempts to bridge the gap between immortality and mortality. The subject might strike one as odd. Indeed, it might seem rather plain, first, that Plato holds a dualistic stand on the relationship between soul and body;1 second, that even if he did intend to reconcile the apparently incompatible nature of immortal soul and mortal body, a prima facie reading of the Timaeus would not disprove a dualistic interpretation, let alone speak in favor of the bridge-the-gap theory. Since the late 19th century, there has in fact a revival of interest in the Timaeus, and Plato’s views on cosmology and psychology have drawn more and more attention of classical
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