Chemin Des Dames Battlefield

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Chemin Des Dames Battlefield BATTLEFIELD Chemin and Matt Leonard. © WIPL images des Dames Photos: Matt Leonard reports on a unique subterranean museum that reconstructs the war below ground on the Western Front of the First World War. t 6 o’clock, on the morning Above Inside the Dragon’s of 16 April 1917, as dawn Cave – part of the underground broke across the Chemin world which became part of the des Dames, the French battlefield in 1917. Inset First World War trenches hurled themselves at as they survive today on the theA Germans dug in on the imposing Chemin des Dames battlefield. ridgeline. By 7 o’clock, only an hour later, the Second Battle of the Aisne was as good as lost. It was one of the costliest battles pass’), inspiring his men to triumph replaced by Douglas Haig at the head of of the war and would lead to General in one of the most horrendous battles the British armies, and old Marshal Joffre Nivelle’s removal from office and mutiny in modern history. By the time Verdun was replaced by Robert Nivelle at the head within the French army. was safe, Nivelle had been appointed of the French. Nivelle, like so many of his Commander-in-Chief of the French Army. predecessors, claimed to have a grand ‘Victory is certain’ Europe was weary of war. The 1914 war plan that would end the stalemate. Robert Georges Nivelle was born in 1856 of movement had turned into the 1915 After months of preparation, he to a French father and an English mother. war of trench stalemate. To break the had gathered together a formidable By 1914 he was an accomplished artillery impasse, in 1916, having massed men, force: 1,200,000 men, 5,000 guns, up officer, and after gaining fame during guns, and munitions on the Western to 200 tanks, 47 squadrons of photo- the First Battle of the Marne and the Front, the Germans at Verdun and the reconnaissance and artillery-spotting First Battle of the Aisne, he was soon Allies on the Somme had mounted the aircraft, 39 observation balloons, and 8 promoted to general. most murderous offensives in military squadrons of fighter planes, all crammed He served with distinction at the Battle history. These two monstrous battles had into an 80km front. General Micheler of Verdun, pioneering the use of creeping each claimed a million casualties. The oversaw command of General Mazel’s barrages, which protected the infantry search for breakthrough, for a way out of Fifth Army and General Mangin’s Sixth and won him the respect of the poilu. the deadlock, a path to victory became Army, while General Duchene and his His patriotism and defiant attitude increasingly desperate. Tenth Army waited in reserve. were expressed in his famous phrase, Governments fell and generals were Nivelle confidently proclaimed: ‘We ‘Ils ne passeront pas’ (‘They shall not sacked. Old Field-Marshal French was have the formula… victory is certain.’ 64 MILITARYHISTORYMONTHLY March 2012 Left French poilus (ordinary infantrymen) in the First World War. After two and a half years of trench crossfire from the ravines on the south warfare, Nivelle’s offensive on the Chemin des Dames was the straw that finally broke the camel’s back. slope caused appalling losses. Tens of thousands mutinied in the spring of 1917. Ironically, uncoordinated use of Above General Robert Nivelle (1856-1924), the man who had ‘the formula’ that made ‘victory certain’. Nivelle’s creeping barrages meant that many of the French shells fell But his plan was flawed from the on their own men, or behind the beginning. He was so convinced of his attacking infantry, leaving them exposed. own brilliance that secrecy had taken a Like so many of Nevertheless, the attack continued, and back seat to self-promotion. He often in a heroic effort the 69th Battalion of spoke too freely of the upcoming his predecessors, Senegalese infantry reached Hurtebise offensive, resulting in elements of his farm, at which point the staunch German strategy being in open circulation. This, Nivelle claimed to resistance virtually wiped it out. The coupled with the German capture of his have a grand plan bravery of these colonial troops is battle plans two weeks before the attack, memorialised in the form of imposing meant there would be no breakthrough, that would end black statues erected near Hurtebise farm. only a grotesque massacre. By the evening of the first day, the the stalemate. attack had descended into bloody farce Over the top and the French had suffered some 40,000 Bad weather ensured that the battlefield ‘‘ casualties. Nivelle had promised to call became sodden and impassable and his men weary, which resulted in several postponements. The inclement conditions also hampered reconnaissance: out of 392 German artillery batteries, only 53 were identified. The Germans, forewarned, had not been idle in their preparations. They avoided the massive artillery bombardment – consisting of some 5,000,000 shells – by pulling back from their forward positions and sheltering deep underground in the many caves, quarries, and dugouts that lay under the ridge. When the French attacked, the defenders emerged and strafed them from the rear. The Germans had positioned 100 machine guns for every kilometre of frontline, and the Right The detritus of battle, preserved in situ in the underground battlefield. www.military-history.org MILITARYHISTORYMONTHLY 65 BATTLEFIELD Above Vauclair Abbey – a Medieval ruin became increasingly common, soldiers the French ranks. Partially, this was created by modern industrialised warfare. refused to go back up the lines, because the British kept the Germans demonstrations were held, and large occupied at Passchendaele, and this off the battle if it foundered during the groups would sing revolutionary songs, served to distract their high command first 24 hours, but this probably had more such as the Internationale. from what was happening on the Aisne. to do with his confidence in victory than Despite the uprisings, the men Nevertheless, the uprising was no minor any concern about losses – such was the resolutely defended their lines. They event: between April 1917 and January nature of attritional warfare. Instead, he objected to attacking and wanted peace, 1918, as many as 40,000 men were pursued his plan relentlessly, until, on involved in collective insubordination, 4 and 5 May, the assault on the Californie mainly in the Chemin des Dames sector. Plateau and Laffaux Mill finally brought 554 soldiers were condemned to death the French to the crest of the Chemin Something had for their behaviour, although only 49 des Dames. were actually executed. The offensive was called off on snapped in the 9 May, by which time French casualties French ranks, The Chemin des Dames today numbered 187,000. The Germans Today, a visit to the Chemin des Dames suffered an estimated 168,000. It was a and on 5 May sector of the old frontline clearly humiliating defeat for Nivelle and he was shows why the 1917 offensive failed relieved of his duties on 15 May 1917. 1917 mutiny so dismally. In the rain and snow of April 1917, the high ridgeline must Mutiny broke out in the have seemed a suicidal challenge. The However, the damage went far deeper ‘‘21st Division. Germans had also taken advantage of than just Nivelle’s fall from grace, or the underground caves, quarries, and indeed the catastrophic losses of the tunnels (approximately 370 in all) that battle – something not uncommon in riddled the area. the massed infantry assaults of the war. A The destroyed Vauclair Abbey, the farm deeper consequence was that the famous but were certainly not prepared to at Hurtebise (where the 69th Battalion ‘élan’ (‘spirit’) of the French army was give any more of their land away to of Senegalese were wiped out), and the broken: something had snapped in the the Germans. remains of the trench lines on the Plateau ranks, and on 5 May 1917 mutiny broke It was General Pétain, ‘the saviour of de Californie all display the wanton out in the 21st Division. France’, who finally ended the unrest. destruction and ambiguous realities Life on the frontlines had become He improved billets, food, home leave, of industrialised warfare. But perhaps unbearable. Home leave was regularly and, most importantly, adopted a new the two places that best communicate cancelled and troops were not rested form of warfare. He focused attacks the insidious character of the war in properly before returning to the front. on limited objectives and ensured the region are the destroyed village of The mutinies spread through the that artillery-fire, tanks, and aircraft Craonne and the Caverne du Dragon. ranks like wildfire. Mutinous acts were spearheaded the assault. By the outbreak of the war, Craonne recorded in 68 divisions, 136 regiments, Amazingly, the Germans never caught was a small town of about 800 people. and 23 battalions of infantry. Desertions wind of the revolution blowing through From 13 September onwards, the town 66 MILITARYHISTORYMONTHLY March 2012 was captured and recaptured, before the Germans took final possession of it and then held it until May 1917. By the war’s end, the village had ceased to exist. The ground was destroyed to such an extent that it was impossible to either grow or build anything on the site. Craonne was rebuilt further down the valley and the original village was left as it was; it is now an arboretum and a protected historic monument. The old streets and buildings are mapped out on the forest floor, a presence of absence that is hard to ignore. It shares similarities with the destroyed villages around Verdun, particularly the village of Fleury- devant-Douamont, and is a powerful reminder of how modern warfare can sweep away everything before it.
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