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Hitler's Germany 1929-1939

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Hitler's Germany 1929-1939 Hitler’s Germany 1929-1939 How did Hitler change Germany from a democracy to a Nazi dictatorship, 1933-4? How did Hitler change Germany from a democracy to a Nazi dictatorship, 1933-4? Establishing the dictatorship a) The Reichstag Fire When he became chancellor Hitler set about seizing total power 27th February 1933, the Reichstag building was set on fire – inside the building was a Dutch communist, Marinus van der Lubbe (he was found with matches in his pocket). He confessed and was later executed This crime was of great convenience for the Nazis, however, anti-Nazis claim the whole thing was set up by the SA. (Lubbe was ‘intellectually challenged!). Hitler then claimed this fire was a communist plot and persuaded Hindenburg to sign an emergency decree, known as ‘The Law for the Protection of People and the State’. This ended all the freedoms granted by the constitution and gave the police total control. The police and SA arrested communist leaders, meetings were broken up and newspapers closed down. Other political opponents of the Nazis suffered. b) The 1933 election In correspondence with the Reichstag Fire the Nazi propaganda machine encouraged the Germans to vote for the Nazis through mass rallies, torchlight parades and radio broadcasts The March 1933 election the Nazis were victorious. More people voted for them than ever before (44%) and the party won more seats than ever before (288) With the support of the Nationalist Party (52 seats), this gave the Nazis a majority of the 647 deputies in the Reichstag. c) The Enabling Law Hitler now moved for complete power – 23rd March he introduced the Enabling Law – this allowed him to make laws without consulting the Reichstag and without the approval of the President, as this would change the Constitution of the Republic, it had to be approved by 2/3 of the Reichstag (not just a simple majority) Pressure was now put on other parties- Hitler banned the 81 communists from taking their seats using the emergency powers under The Law for the protection of People and the State. The next largest party was the Social Democrats, its members were threatened by the SA, other deputies gave into Nazi pressure or failed to turn up. The Enabling Law was passed by 444 votes to 94 This destroyed the Weimar Constitution and after March the Reichstag did not meet very often, only to hear speeches from Hitler In November 1933 new ‘elections’ were held for the Reichstag and the Nazis were the only party allowed to stand! d) The removal of opposition With the powers given to him by the Enabling Law, Hitler moved against his opponents- the communist had already been destroyed and in June 1933 the Social Democrat Party was banned Other parties soon followed- in July the Law against the Formation of New Parties ruled the Nazi Party was the only party allowed in Germany. Now Germany was a one party state TUs were also abolished and their offices were destroyed – leaders of opposition parties and TU were often arrested and imprisoned, some were to later die in labour camps Hitler put Nazis in important positions in state government, soon all ministers were Nazis, as were local officials, the majority of judges and civil servants were also Nazi sympathisers (those who weren’t would be removed from office). In this way Hitler took complete control of the German political, administrative and legal systems. e) The Night of the Long Knives Now that Hitler was in control he no longer needed to support of the SA, in fact they threatened his power and status The SA was an undisciplined body, many of its members were no more than thugs, many (including Ernst Roehm, leader) were homosexual, which conflicted with the new image of ‘respectability’ Hitler wanted to create Roehm’s views were more socialist than Hitler- he wanted the state to take over major industries. Hitler had won the support of leading industrialists and at this stage did not want to lose that support Above all he wanted the SA to control the German army – this alarmed Hitler as it would make Roehm more powerful than he was. Throughout 1933 Hitler had been trying to win over the support of army leaders for a Nazi takeover. Now he had to decide – Roehm and the SA, or the army. He chose the army! 30th June 1934 ‘the Night of the Long Knives’- Hitler claimed that the SA were plotting to seize power and ordered the SS to arrest its leaders. Over the next few days. 100s of SA leaders were shot, including Roehm At the same time Hitler also took the opportunity to remove other opponents, for example, von Schleicher, the former chancellor was murdered. In July Hitler explained his action to the Reichstag and it accepted his claim that he ‘had saved the nation’. f) The Death of Hindenburg Now Hindenburg was the only person with more authority than Hitler 2nd August 1934, he died at the age of 87 Hitler immediately declared himself as president, as well as chancellor, he took on the new title ‘ Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor’ On the same day the army swore and oath of loyalty to Hitler – the army was the only force with the power to oppose and remove Hitler...and they had promised to support him SUMMARY: How Hitler was able to create a Nazi dictatorship in Germany? 1. Reichstag Fire – Law for Protection of the State 2. General Election March 1933 gave Hitler a majority in the Reichstag 3. Enabling Act 23rd March 1933 gave Hitler the power to make his own laws 4. Law against the Formation of New Parties (July 1933) made Germany a one-party state 5. Banned TUs and filled civil service and courts with Nazis 6. The Night of the Long Knives (30th June 1934) destroyed the power of Roehm and the SA 7. When Hindenburg died. Hitler proclaimed himself Fuhrer; the army swore loyalty to him. Example 12 mark essay questions How important was the passing of the Enabling Law, amongst other factors, in making Hitler dictator after January 1933? (12 marks) Why was Adolf Hitler able to make himself dictator of Germany between January 1933 and August 1934? (12 marks) How important was the Reichstag Fire, amongst other factors, in making Hitler dictator after January 1933? (12 marks) .
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