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RADM Joseph Horn Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems June 12, 2014

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RADM Joseph Horn Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems June 12, 2014 State of IAMD 2014 “IAMD Achievements” RADM Joseph Horn Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems June 12, 2014 1 Program Executive Officer RADM J. Horn Executive Director W. Bray (SES) Chief of Staff Director, Director, PEO IWS Team Above Water Sensors Integrated Combat Systems Executive Assistant • 52 Military Vacant (SES) W. Williford (SES) • 403 Civilians Chief Financial Officer Chief Architect Executive Officer Acquisition Officer Chief Logistician Director, Corporate Operations Technical Authority SEA 05 Human Capital Resources Manager NSSPO Above Water Sensors AEGIS Fleet Readiness Director, Cruiser & Destroyer SCSC Wallops Island IWS 3D IWS 2.0 IWS 1.0F Combat Systems CJR Surface Ship Weapons SSDS Fleet Readiness AEGIS AEGIS TECHREP IWS 2I IWS 3.0 IWS 10.0F IWS 1.0 RAM Undersea Systems ZUMWALT IWS 3B IWS 5.0 IWS 9.0 Command & Control International & FMS IWS 6.0 IWS 4.0 Future Combat Systems LCS IWS 7.0 IWS 8.0 Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) IWS 10.0 Product Sustainment Integrated Combat Systems Major Program Managers Major Program Managers Major Program Managers Testing Main Thing: “To develop, deliver, and sustain operationally dominant combat systems to Sailors and Marines.” 2 PEO IWS Portfolio Aegis Combat Systems MK 34 GWS: • Radars: 1 Country • WSN-7/9: 4 Countries CEC: LCS 1 & LCS 2 BFTT DDG 1000 Integration into DDG 51 Countries • Ammunition: 17 Countries • NFCS: 1 Country 1 Country Combat Systems and CG 47 class ships Variant Integration Combat CPS SQQ-89: Systems (TSCE) 2 Countries BFTT: SM-1/SM-2: CIWS: Integration 1 Country 15 Countries 9 Countries AMIIP MK 41 VLS: LCS 2 Integration Aegis/ AWS: 8 Countries CDS CEC LINK 16 5 Countries AMDR LCS 1 Integration DDG DGG 1000 IWS 4.0 SSDS CG Combat Systems Integration in SFSE the following classes: NIFC-CA FTAMD Open Architecture CEC MIPS III CVN LSD IWS 10.0 ECIDIS-M LHA LHD LPD AMDR AN/SLQ-32 Sub Arctic ASW Advanced MK-32 Warfare Dev. Dev. LCS Mission Modules SPY-1A/B/D SEWIP AN/SPQ-9B SPY-3 SSQ-82 IWS 3.0 147 – Program CADRT USW DSS SPS-40 NULKA & Projects SPS-49 AUSPAR SQQ-89 SPS-67/73 3 – ACAT I AOEW DDE SDRW/SRD SM-2 CIWS SPS-64 5 – ACAT II CV-TSC /SCD Blk IIIB/ LRLAP SPS-55 WLR-1 BLK IV SM-6 ESSM SPQ-14/15 2 – ACAT III WQC-2A/6 RIM-7/ 3 – ACAT IV MK57 MK 38 SPA-25 Surface ASW Griffin RAM BLK 1/2 Integrated Combat 8 – R&D Systems Imp. NSSMS BPS-15 Systems Major SQS-56 SEARAM 40 – Inactive Program Manager 86 – Non ACAT MK 46 30mm Product Major UQN-4A MK 45 MK 75 76mm MK 57 AGS Program Managers VLS NFCS MMSP 3 Aegis Evolution to IAMD DDG New Construction Aegis Ashore Aegis Ashore DDG 113-121 Aegis Modernization CG 59-73 & DDG 51-90 AEGIS IAMD is now a Common Baseline 4 Testing Achievements BL 9 Events CECCEC CEC Missile Reliability Failure Horizon Horizon May 13 Re-conduct CG 60 CSSQT Aug 13 CHV SM2 vs. Sub High Alt ESSM vs. Sub Low Alt SM2 vs. Sub Low Alt SM6 vs. Sub Low Alt (EOR) NIFC-CA SM6 DT events conducted during PAU periods Sep 13 NOR First BL 9.A Ship Deployment Capable – Jan 15 SM2 vs. Sub High Alt Sim LRS&T Feb 14 First BL 9.C Ship Deployment Capable – Sep 15 JPJ SM2 vs. Sup High Alt (AAW) SM2 vs. Sup High Alt (IAMD) 25-29 Mar BL 9A M-Assessment LF01 May 14 NOR 1-7 May HVU SM2 vs. Sub Low Alt (Area Def.) SM6 | NIFC-CA D1A CEC D1F CEC CEC May 14 Horizon HorizonHorizon May 14 JPJ TRACKEX DTT DTT SM6 vs. Low Alt Sub (EOR) SM6 vs. Long Range Crossing Sub (EOR) NIFC-CA 2A TX01 LF08 Sim LRS&T TEMP 1669 ARAV-A Jun 14 HVU DDG 53 CSSQT JPJ IAMD TRACKEX 2xSM2 vs. ½ Raid A4 (Jun 14 ) D1C CEC CEC CEC SM6 | NIFC-CA Horizon Horizon Horizon Jun 14 SM6 vs. High Alt. Sup NIFC-CA 2A NIFC-CA 2B NIFC-CA 2C CG 60 LF02 BL 9A IT HVU (TBD) NOR 2xSM2 vs. ½ PRA A4 5 20140603 Testing Achievements BL 9 Events LF07 LF06 LF08 LF09 CEC CG 62 SM2 vs. Sup High Diver 2x SM2 vs. Sup Low Alt (EOR) 2x SM2 – 1 ESSM vs. Raid S1 4xSM2 vs. Raid S3 BL 9A IT CHV (Aug – Sep 14) D1F CEC D1E CEC D1A CEC D1E CEC D1F CEC Horizon HVU Horizon HVU Horizon DTT SM6 vs. Low Alt Sub (EOR) SM6 vs. Low Alt. Sup (EOR) SM6 vs. Max Downrange (EOR) SM6 vs. Low Alt. Sup (EOR) SM6 vs. Low Alt Sub (EOR) FTM-25 ARAV-B DDG 53 FTM-25 JPJ (Oct 14) 2xSM-3 vs. 2x ARAV-B 2x SM-2 vs. 2x BQM-74E Sim LRS&T LF02 LF04 Sim LRS&T LF09 LF08 Sim LRS&T DDG 65 SM2 vs. Sub Low Alt (AAW) SM2 vs. Sub Low Alt (IAMD) 4xSM2 vs. Raid S3 (IAMD) 2xSM2 – 1 ESSM vs. Raid S1 (IAMD) CSSQT BEN (Dec 14) D1H D1G D1I D1H SM6 vs. Sub S-Band (EA) SM6 vs. Sub X-Band (EA) SM6 vs. Sub X-Band (EA) SM6 vs. Sub S-Band (EA) CG 62 Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 HVU BL 9A OT (TBD) CHV 7xSM2 vs. Sub & 2D Sup Raid (AAW) 7 Missiles vs. Raid S3 7 Missiles vs. Raid S1 GWS vs. UAV SUW Raid - SM2 vs. Sub Low Alt New Event DOT&E Directed D1A CEC D1B CEC D1D DDG 53 Horizon Horizon SM-6 JPJ (Feb 15) SM6 vs. Max Downrange (EOR) SM6 vs. Max Crossrange (EOR) 2xSM6 vs. 4x BQM-74E 6 20140603 Detection Achievements Major Accomplishments: • Significant improvements in SPY-1 operational availability from 85% to 98% • Enhanced SPY operational readiness, capability and proficiency, reduced Lost Operational Days from 25.2 days so 2.8 days per six month deployment • SEWIP Block II has passed Milestone C and • The Air Missile Defense approved for Low Rate Radar finalized the Initial Production. Capability Development System will bring Document (CDD) and enhanced EW capability development contract to Surface Navy was awarded to Raytheon • Deployers routinely meet SPY Effective Transmit Power above +.5db required for BMD 7 Command and Control Achievements Major Accomplishments: • Certified Accelerated Mid-term Interoperability Improvement Project (AMIIP) for AEGIS, SSDS and the E2C • Fire Control Loop Improvement Project (FCLIP) implemented on SSDS, ESSM, RAM, CEC and SPQ-9B to enhance ASCM defense on SSDS ships • Successfully conducted a series of tracking and firing exercises of AEGIS Baseline 9 in a NIFC-CA environment. 8 Engagement Achievements • By the Numbers • “First of” events – Procurement – AEGIS Baseline 9C: NIFC- • 200 SM-2s (Recertified for Fleet use) CA, and SM-6 Surface-to- • Air Active Missile with 89 SM-6s OTH Targeting and • 700 RAM Integrated BMD • Over 80 Block 1B Phalanx CIWS • Installed on installations JOHN PAUL JONES (DDG 53) • Installation underway on – Flight Tests BENFOLD (DDG 65) and • 29 RAM BLK IA Missiles firings BARRY (DDG 52) with a 94% success rate • 8 RAM BLK 2 missiles – AEGIS Baseline 9A: NIFC-CA and SM-6 • 50 ESSM • Installed on • 113 SM-2 firings CHANCELLORSVILLE (CG 62) and NORMANDY (CG 60) • 25 SM-6 firings Installation underway on • 31 Long Range land PRINCETON (CG 59) Attack Projectile (LRLAP) 9 QUESTIONS? 10 DDG / CG Modernization IAMD Features Ballistic Missile Defense AEGIS ACB CEC ESSM Multi-Mission SIGPRO SEWIP NIFC-CA SM-6 BMD CIWS BLK1B SM-6 ESSM ACB First Install First Install USS Chancellorsville (CG62) USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) April 2012 September 2012 11 Baseline 9 Capabilities Cooperative Engagement Capability NIFC-CA • Increases AD capabilities by integrating sensors and • Distributes the AEGIS Shipboard fire control loop, via a weapons into a single real-time network network of remote sensors achieving independent • Expands battle space; enhances SA; improves depth of engagement consummation Over The Horizon (OTH) fire; longer intercept ranges; and reaction times • Kill Chain: active missile, elevated sensor, sensor • Data distribution for composite tracking network, and a weapons control system E-2D JLENS CEC AEGIS SM-6 SM-6 Multi-Mission Signal • Self-defense, area defense and theater Processor defense • Improved Performance in Littoral Environments • Supersonic missile launched from AMOD ships • Improved Performance Against Sea Skimmers • Dual Seeker (Active and Semi-Active) • Dual-Beam Operation • Uses the MK72 booster of the SM-2 Blk IV and the SM-3 • Improved BMD Search • Supports Joint Integrated Fire Control • Enhanced BMD LRS&T Performance • OTH engagement Capability • Aegis BSP Enhanced Range Resolution, Discrimination & Characterization 12 IAMD Planning and Training Maritime IAMD Planning System IAMD Weapons Tactics Instructor Course (WTI) (MIPS) • 19 Week NAMDC course that covers capabilities, • Navy operational level planning training strategies and threats system for IAMD, NIFC-CA Planner • Train individuals to improve unit and strike group • Provides planning function & near- proficiency real time plan monitoring function Advanced Warfare Training (AWT) • Supports tracking and engagement • CSCS and ATG course covering watchstander and of difficult targets in a complex team scenarios environment • Located at Maritime Operations NIFC-CA Training Centers of numbered Fleet • Update of curriculum and NTSP in progress commands and onboard some afloat units • Network Communication pillar for NIFC-CA 13 AMDR / DDG-51 FLT III / ACB Next Fills Critical Gaps in Maritime IAMD Capability 14 Air & Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) Next Generation Radar • AMDR-S employs a Digital Beam Forming (DBF) architecture – FLT III version more than doubles the range over SPY-1 or VSR – Provides advanced robust BMD detection & discrimination – Efficient, precise search & track using multi-beam operation • AMDR-X based on proven phased-array technology – Robust AAW horizon detection – Advanced illumination & link support for missiles • Suite coordination compensates for challenging multi-mission environments • Open systems approach allows AMDR to scale & adapt to future platforms 15 .
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