Employing Lethal Autonomous Robots Within Jus in Bello and the Requirement for Command Responsibility
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KILLER ROBOTS: EMPLOYING LETHAL AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS WITHIN JUS IN BELLO AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY Lieutenant-Commander P.D. Smithers JCSP 38 PCEMI 38 Master of Defence Studies Maîtrise en études de la défense Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et not represent Department of National Defence or ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce without written permission. papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le Minister of National Defence, 2012, 2014. ministre de la Défense nationale, 2012, 2014. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 38 – PCEMI 38 2011 – 2012 MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE KILLER ROBOTS: EMPLOYING LETHAL AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS WITHIN JUS IN BELLO AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY By Lieutenant-Commander P.D. Smithers “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par attending the Canadian Forces College un stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is exigences du cours. L'étude est un a scholastic document, and thus document qui se rapporte au cours et contains facts and opinions, which the contient donc des faits et des opinions author alone considered appropriate que seul l'auteur considère appropriés and correct for the subject. It does not et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète necessarily reflect the policy or the pas nécessairement la politique ou opinion of any agency, including the l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y Government of Canada and the compris le gouvernement du Canada et Canadian Department of National le ministère de la Défense nationale du Defence. This paper may not be Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de released, quoted or copied, except with citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans the express permission of the Canadian la permission expresse du ministère de Department of National Defence.” la Défense nationale.” Word Count: 16 697 Compte de mots : 16 697 i ABSTRACT Robotic systems have become commonplace in military operations in recent years, receiving frequent media exposure. Consequently, military plans to develop lethal autonomous robots (LARs) have created considerable debate among governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and other interested parties about the potential use of these killer robots in combat. This paper briefly examines the historical background behind robotic weapons, distinguishes LARs from other robots and weapons, and then discusses the impact of popular culture on the public’s perception of them. It explores LAR’s potential impact on just war theory’s jus in bello principles of discrimination, proportionality and military necessity, as well as the legal requirement for command responsibility. Examples of relevant modern military doctrine and contemporary accidents and mishaps involving military robotics are presented. Arguments for and against LARs are considered, and the foregoing discussion is applied to develop courses of action to mitigate problems posed by lethal autonomous robot employment. A warning zone or battlespace management model is described for low-risk situations, while a human on the loop model incorporating operator override is provided for more complex scenarios. The paper concludes that lethal robots should not be autonomous, but should have a human on the loop in a supervisory or veto capacity, until such time as they may be reliably operated within the jus in bello principles of just war theory and the legal requirement for command responsibility. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i Table of Contents ii Chapter 1. Killer Robots – an Introduction 1 2. The Robots Are Coming! 9 3. A LAR by Any Other Name … 20 4. You Say Robot, I Say Terminator 29 5. Just War Theory Meets Machinis Autonome 37 6. The Shape of Things Today 50 7. No LARs in Our Time? 64 8. No Man’s Land, or Man on the Loop? 79 9. Conclusion 90 Bibliography 97 1 CHAPTER ONE KILLER ROBOTS – AN INTRODUCTION The robotics revolution has been described as the next major revolution in military affairs, on par with the introduction of gunpowder and nuclear bombs. – Christof Heyns, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. report A/HRC/23/47, 9 April, 2013, paraphrasing P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotic Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, 2009. Yesterday’s popular science fiction may not necessarily be today’s science fact, but it may conjure disturbing images of dystopian futures and militarized technology gone wrong. Technology has been exploited by states throughout the ages to prepare for or fight wars, contributing to various revolutions in military affairs (RMAs).1 One modern military technological development which has received considerable contemporary scrutiny is military forces’ use of robotic systems in combat. If a robot is broadly defined as “a machine capable of carrying out a complex series of actions automatically,”2 then robotic systems may be said to include a wide range of modern military equipment that operates with varying degrees of independence from human supervision.3 Modern naval examples of robotic systems within the range of 1 A discussion of revolutions in military affairs is found in Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, “Thinking about revolutions in warfare,” in The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300 – 2050, ed. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Kindle edition, locations 109–175, 292–361. 2 Katherine Barber et al., Oxford Canadian Dictionary of Current English, 722. 3 See Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, “Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots,” November, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload 0 0.pdf, 2, for a description of human interaction with robotic systems. Examples of modern military robotics applications are found in Patrick Lin, “Introduction,” chap. 1 in Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics, ed. Patrick Lin, Keith Abney and George A. Bekey (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012), 4–5. 2 that definition include any number of above-water fire control systems, smart sea mines like the American CAPTOR mine, weapon mounts such as the Mk 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), and combat management systems like the American Aegis and Canadian SHINPADS systems.4 The field of robotics also includes a subset of autonomous or semi-autonomous unmanned vehicles, commonly called drones.5 The robotic capabilities of one representative aerial drone, the Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk, are described by its manufacturer as follows: Once mission parameters are programmed into Global Hawk, the air vehicle can autonomously taxi, take off, fly, remain on station capturing imagery, return, and land. Ground-based operators monitor the system’s health and status, and can re-task the air system’s navigation and sensor plans during flight as necessary.6 4 The examples are described in Federation of American Scientists, “MK 60 Encapsulated Torpedo (CAPTOR),” last modified 13 December, 1998, http://www fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/dumb/mk60.htm; US Navy Fact File, “Mk 15 – Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS),” last updated 15 November, 2013, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact display.asp?cid=2100&tid=487&ct=2; David Ewing et al., IHS Jane’s C4ISR & Mission Systems 2013–2014: Maritime 2nd ed. (Coulsdon: IHS Jane’s, 2013), 110–111; and Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, 5th ed. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 59–60. 5 Barber et al., Oxford Canadian Dictionary of Current English, 242; and, Paul J. Springer, Military Robots and Drones: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 2013), 2-5. Chapter 3 of this paper will discuss the definition of robot in more detail. While examples and discussion points in this paper may refer to drones, they should be taken to refer to the larger field of military robots in general, unless otherwise stated. 6 Northop Grumman, Facts, “RQ-4 Global Hawk High-Altitude, Long-Endurance Unmanned Aerial Reconnaissance System,” last modified May, 2008. http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/RQ4Block10GlobalHawk/Documents/HALE Factsheet.pd f, 1. 3 Naval drones, generally referred to as maritime unmanned systems, comprise a considerably smaller and lesser-known segment of contemporary military robotics.7 The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) primarily operates maritime unmanned systems in surface target practice as well as underwater/seabed intervention roles.8 Military forces have been interested in robotics to varying degrees—and with mixed results—since World War One, and Global Hawk’s progenitor was a radio- controlled hobby plane purchased for use as a military target drone in 1940.9 However, it is only in recent years that robots such as MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper drones have become seemingly ubiquitous in the battlefield. In his book, Wired for War: the Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, P.W. Singer describes United States (U.S.) drone usage during its invasion of Iraq as involving over five thousand drones of twenty- two different types, outnumbering the American military manned aircraft inventory by almost two to one in numbers of airframes.10 The International Federation of Robotics, an international organization that promotes the robotics industry, estimated that approximately sixty-two hundred military robots were sold worldwide in 2012.11 Singer 7 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence, Guidance for developing Maritime Unmanned Systems (MUS) capability (Norfolk: NATO, 9 July 2012), http://cjoscoe.org/docs/MUS Final 9July2012.pdf, 1.