INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH
USE OF CAVAXRY IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
(WITH PRINCIPAL LESSONS)
Major Y/harton G. Ingraa. Cavalry (P.O.L.) NoJ 122,
Fort Icu.V9iworth, Korsas, 1 June, 1931.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Second.Year class, ~" ; The Command and Goxtera). Staff School, Fort Leavenwfirth, Kansas* . :
•SUBJECT: Cavalry in Russo-Japanese War.
I • PAPERS ACCOMPANYING. > 1* Bibliography - for this study, 2. Map - Southern Manchuria.
II. THE STUDY PRESENTKD. Discusc the use of oavaliy in the Russo-Japanese Vfar, i?oint out the principal lessons.
III. HISTORICAL FA^TS RELATING TO THE STUgY. (1) • ..!• Cavalry organization and strength. . •-.. * &' Ruaslan: The oavalry (in Manchuria), consisting •':' almost entirely of Cossacks, vas organized into separate divioions a»^ brigades. The offeotive strength of the oavalry division was about 3400. In some oases 12 horse artillery a were inoludod. Cavalry was not an organic part 3f the fantry division or army oorps, but was dot ailed from valry divisions as required for the purpose. (2) b. Japanese: In 1904 the Japanese Army oonsisted of 13 divisTons, 2 oavalry brigades, 2 artillery brigades* and certain "fortress troops". Each oavalry brigade was oonposed of 2 regiments of 4 squadrons each. The effeotiva strength of the oavalry brigade was about 1150 - with 6 HotoWciss machine guns* A oavalry regiment of 8 squadrons was an organic part of eaoh infantry division, (3)
(1) - Author18 note: These facts relate primarily to oavalry operations; and limitations on length of thia study require a general familiarity (on the part of the reader) with the oampalgn in Manohuria and the important engagements thereof. - (A 27; M 10) * ill: (A 22-28; M 15 and 27)
-1 ?• Concentration and advanoe of Japanese Flrot Army. :" ; a. The Japanese Fixst'"Ai.'njy (Ku*oki), consulting of the 2d, T2th,vend Guard Divisions, inoluded divisiona + l cavalry only. Afteryxhe successful lpTi.Ung at Chemulpo, He divisional oavalry (reinforoed by infantry) covered th^coioeniration . along line of the Chechen River, (4) * ' , v > ' Jb« Due +-o Russian uripreparedness, Mie only forces . available t"> ov> iose * Japanese advance were 3 rogiL.ents of . Cobsaoks* On February 14tti, advanoe parties of ^iis oavalry orossed the Yalu at Yfiju end Cnyaiigsyong; and or Maroh 3d, . the Russian oavalry skirmished with the Japanese covering"•,';• force, (5) ••. . , •; i v>~ 'V o# Kxiroki deoided to advanoe to the Yalu without awaiting""oompletion of his oonoentration; and on March 25th, a foroa of 7 squadrons of oavalry, 5 battalions of infantry, and 2 batteries of mountain artillery occupied FaJcasa and Kasan - to cover bridging of the Cheohen and Taing Rivers• Meanwhile, the oavalry of the Guard Division, supported by a small foroo of infantry, drove back some 600 Russian Cavalry, and on March 28th, occupied Teissu, The oavalry of the 12th Division arrived at Teissu on April 5th; and, preparatory to a general advaroe, a flank guard consisting of 1 squadron of oavalry, a regiment of infantry, and 2 mountain batteries was sent to Yongpyon to proteot the right of the army, (6) d. On April 4th, the cavalry of the Japanese covering foroe entered Wlju, Meanwhile, the Ruasian oavalry had fallen back aooroDS the Yalu and Joined the 3d Siberian Rifle Division. (7) 3. Battle of The Yalu. a. Tha Russian foroe opposing the Japanese First Army (exclusive of troops guarding the line of ooironujiloations) now numbered about 16,000 infantry, 2350 cavalry. 650 mounted scouts', 48 field guns, 8 mountain guns, and b horse artillery pieces. This foroe oocupied a defensive position in roar of the Ai River, with flank detaohments at Anton? and from Anplngho to Hslaopuhsiho, The right (south) flank detachment consisted of about 5 battalions of infantry, a machine gun oompany, some artillery, and a Z.'ew mounted t^outs. The left (north) flank detachment consisted of 11 squairons of cavalry, several companies of infantry, and a mountain battery. The .. remainder of tue oavalry (about 2 regiments of Cossacks), 3 battalions of Infantry, and some artillery was farther south, guarding the right flank from the mouth of the Yalu to Takus han. Of this last mentioned foroe, 2& equadrone of oavalry watched the ooast line from Takushan to Fitzuvro, and 1 bguadron was at Port Arthur. Thus, the Rursian foroe was extended ove.* a front of approximately 172 miles, with a smal.1. fnroe of oavalry oonoentrated on the left (north) flank - the bulk of the cavalry widely dispersed on the south. (8) b. Early on the morning of April 29th, the Japanese 12th Division bagan preparations to bridge the Yalu and oross near Chukyuri. At 11:00, AM, they moved forward to the riverj and by 2:00, PM, a battalion was on the right bank. A detaoh ment of .the Russian "'eft flank guard retired without opposition. The cavalry of the Japanese 12th Division or-ossed in rear of the leading brigade, and then formed part af a detaohment covering the Japanese right. (9) 4) - A 45-46; U 10; IT S-fl (7) - A 52; P 143 5) - A 48; F 119 8) - A 56-58: F 189-190; 6) - A 29-50; M 4A-46 9) - A 63 and 66; F 195-199 -2 •' ,'
(10) - (A 63 and 66; K 50 and 56) (18) - (B 13)' (11) - (B 9-10} M 61-62) (13) - (B 29; F 12) (14) - (B 31-32; G 5-7: M-83)
-3-. (Author's noto: ' This devalry ansagoment * .desoribed under d:\aDove -"xhoui'h unlnrpQi'tant, Is oited in thiB>.Btudy beoause Tt furnishes s the onlyy: instance during the. "entire war of a tiorntot d assaultl t . IIt t w^ll ll bo\ng.tebta a thathtt the Russians - probably through tJie^uocident »f circumstance rather than design - \.;\ employed "combined action", that 1$, a combination of fire "^T power and manoeuvering force, while the Japanese mounted / \ Vvv assault,was entirely/unsupported by Tire power.) >••-*„.'• \ v < - •;. \&'•"'• : \..^l'> £$?-. ••. - V ' '•< .'•'•-'•"; •• ••'•••• - : x '•• ^":- '-• •'•' ".'••• ' ''" s V > *" S# By May. 21et, the Russian- i'oroes operating against the Japanese Seoond Army had berfn reinforoel by 1 division .and a regiment of Infantryt Both sides nor conducted more ov Iocs continuous reoonnai • anoe. On June 4tht Spjnsonor, with 4^ squadrons of cavalry, R battalion of infantry', and a battery of horse artillery, undertook a reconnaissance in foroe* Zi squadrons advanoed down the right bank of the Fuohou Ho against the heighths west of Wuohiatun; while the infantry moved against Lungwangmiao pushing baok Japanese patrols and outgixards. The battery, with the remaining S squadrons as escort, remained in rear. At 2:00. Pl£, the next day (June 5th), the Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade began a withdrawal covered by patrols to maintain contact with the enemy. The Russian cavalry, however, failed to follow «5 this movement; and the operation produoed no worthwhile results. (15) f. A Russian force, under Stakelberg. was now advancing southward* - screened by a covering force (under Simonoy), On June 6th, this, covering for?e was at Wafangtien, with detuoh ments about 5 miles to the south - along the line: Hsiaoohia ohen - Chihohiatun (a front of about 30 miles) oovering all important roads leading to the south. On June ?th. 8 squadrons of Japanese cavalry drove in an advance detachment of this Russian soreen, and penetrated to within !& miles of Yfefan#tleYi Station, Similai* reconnaissances v»ero ffviooflssfully oarr5e4 out ox) the iOth and lli;h against the ee.3tern flank of the screen, (16) £, On June 12kh, the Ja?anf8« Second Arcy began a general advanoe to the nrrth in 3 ooltunna. This advance was discovered and reported by 2 squadrons of Cossiioks, whioh bad left Wafangtien with the object of breaking through the Japaiiese oovering force in front of Pulantien, and unexpectedly encountered the Japanese ad/anoe. KeanwhiXe, stakelberg had decided to abandon the offensive, take up a defensive position (Telissu), and await a Japanese attack* After some unimportant fighting on the 13th, Simonov's oovering force was withdrawn from the front, md ordered "to 'take up a position1 west of Tefangshea - to oover the ri^fct1 of the right corps (watoiling roads from Tafangshu to Huaugohiatun)", (17) 5« Battle of TeliPau (Wai'a2i«5ou)« a* The Japanese r.chemo of manoeuvre was to attaok the RusoTan left and left center with the 3d Division, while the 5th Division and a part of the 4th turned the Russian right. At the same time the Russians planned a counterattack against the Japanese right* The Japanese attaoked early on the morning of the 16th, By 7:00, AM, the right was pushing
(15) - (B 32-33; M 7) (16) - (B 33-35) (17) - (B 36 and 38; F 22 and 27-28)
-4 , *an3.. the 5th Divicion hid oroased the Fuohou River, ^'babk BOB© Russian dismounted o&yalry, and occupied the liV»» Vfangohiatun - YsiifiOhifeMinv The 1st Cavalry Brigade, whicii '"
(18) - (B41-44; 0 33) ' (20) - (B 48-49; 0 48-60) (19) - (B 44 and 48: G 28) (21) - (B 50-52; G 54-70) (22) - (B 61; G 71-82; M 135-137) -5 7:00, PM, onvt 10.20th, a squadron of Cossacks reconnoitpririfc -.s towards Taknsft-tii was surprised near Y/angohiatun by advance Japanese intarsry elementc, and suffered a loss of CO offloors and oent (23) ' ••;•';' x , ^«
, . • • •'.•• : . , • : ) • ' ' • • • • ' • '/'•.' b. On June 3d, Mioohenfco sent a foroe of 2 uguadrons of oavalry and a cuns on reconnaissance towards. Koullrnho. This foroe engaged the covering forces of the Japanese Fourth Army; "but the latter successfully oonoealed their strength leading the Russians to believe that the main body of the army was still at Takushan, (24) $» Further advance of Japanese First Army, ' ; . /About May 1st, Rennemkampf, with a oavalry brigade and a battery of horse artillery, had been diBpatohed from Liaoyang to Saimaohi "to 'olear up the situation1 in the east and at the same time fproteot the threatened flank' of the retiring Russians (in front of the Japanese First Army)", Until about the middle of June, this foroe c-eplayed consid erable fruitless activity. Meanwhile, the divisional cavalry of the Japanese First Army wan being "used up" in maintaining oontaot between ihe advancing colunnB. (25) 9» Battle of Liaoyang,• , a. In late August, the 3 Japanese armies (First, Fourth, and Second - in that order from right to loft) wore converging on Liaoyang. The Russian lories, now somewhat more concentrated, oooupied a defensive ZOTIO of great strength some distance south of the city. Initially, the Russian strength (including foroes tit Mukden end oltjewhere in the vicinity) totaled 193 "battalions of infantry, 152 squadrons of cavalry, and 559 mobile guns of all calibres (inoluding horse pud mountain artillery) - in all an effective strength of betffoen 140,000 and 150,000, considerably superior in ull ermn to that of the combined Japanese armies. The Russian foroe was disposed in 2 wings - with a gap between. (26) b. The initial Russian cavalry dispositions were as follows (27): On the right (as part of west wing) « 17 squadrons (reinforced by 3 battalions of infantry and 12 guns) On the left (as part of east wing) - a detaohment (under Yanjil) oonslsting of 6 squadrons, 11 battalions of infantry, and 44 guns At Sanohiatzu and vicinity (about 15 miles to the east of the left, flank of the army) - 12 squadrons (Liubavin) Southwest of H8ingohing (about 15 miles still father to the east) - 10 sauadrons (Vndritov) At Liaoyang (e.o p\rt of general reserve and the garrison) - 15 squadrons Remainder of the cavalry (as part of army corps and other subordinate oorjnanfts) - was disposed in front of the most advanoed position o* During the battle, whioh opened with a Japanese attack on the morning of August 26th and oulminated in a Russian general retreat on September 7th, the Russian oavalry dispositions changed continuously. Thus, by August 29th, Miaohenko's Cosoaok Brigade was in frontj the strength of the detaohment on the rightfc^dbee n increased to 21 squadrons with 14 squadrons (under Grekov) nearby guarding against any wide turnjng movement; and Samsonov's Siberian Cossaok Division (19 squadrons) was in reserve. (28) 83) - (B 66-68; M 75-76) (26) - (D 7-18; M 167-1 24) - (IB 70; M 76) (27) - (D 8-11: H 1-13) 25) - (B 91-99; M 77) (28) - (D 52«58; H 14-1 •»6** ' d. Summarized briefly - the Russian oavalry. though muoh dispersed, mixed with infantry, and lacking unity of oomn.and, saooesofully protected the flanks, filled gaps in -the line, and oovereA withdrawals (inoluding those to suooessive positions and thb final withdrawal north from Liaoyang). On the other hand, the J- oanese permitted the Russian east wir><< to withdraw northwest of the Toeing River on the night of 26oh/ 27th unmolested "by any pursuit; while on the v/est, the 1st ••> Cavalry B?igade, which wso on the extreme left (as part of the Seooad ArtnyJ roported at 6:00.LAV, on thaflQth, p. long column ' of the enemy, orossing /the Tait25U, but failed to interfere ' with the c Tor sing < Again, at 4:00, PJ.{, on the 31st, thja fcV brigade reportod a strong force of Russians moving south from" leitaijand based upon this report, the Japanese 4th Division, although badly noeded cvnd aotually ordered into the attack, ^ was held out to meet a hostile envelopment* Subsequently, however, the information proved to have been Incorrect. On September 1st, when the Russian forces in front of the Japanese Fourth Army fell baok to the seoondary (main) position, the Japanese failed to pursue; but the divisional oavalry with this army did carry out a successful reconnaissance of the fortifioations about the oity, and determined that the enemy had no Intention of abandoning the entire position at that time. (29) 10. The Shah Il£. a. The Japanese having failed to pursue when the Russians-withdrew north from Liaoyang, Kuropatkin deoided to discontinue the retroat and oonoentrate at Kukden. On 3eptenb»i? 7th, the oavalry, under Vl3ohenko, Samsonov, and Grekov', was oov6rtng the front along a line about half-way between L'ukden and Liaoyang - with orders to push reconnaissance to the south. This rooonnaisoanoe yielded no information of value. (30) b. The Russians now began a new advanoe to the south again in"£ wings with a gap between. The oavalry wus assigned as follows: <* Ri«ht (west) wing - 2 Cossaok brigades Left (east) wing - 1 Cossaok division (Samsoiiov). Later Rennenkampf!s oommand - now consisting of 16 squadrons, 13 battalions of indentry, and 30 guns - was also assigned to this wing. General reserve - 1 independent Cossaok Thus, thsj Russian cavalry (except that with the general reserve) wae split up along the entire front* 50 squadrons operated with the east wing advancing through the mountains, while with the west wing advanoing in the Ho Hun plain where the terrain was particularly suitable for cavalry operations! the cavalry was split up on minor duties in olose contact with the main bodies; and no dlstantvreoonnalssanoe was performed. (?1) o. The Japanese Sd Cavalry Brigade had now arrived on the rTght, and was reconnoitring toward Sohuantaltsy. The 1st Cavalry Brigade (as part of the Second Array) was still operating on the extreme left. On Soptember 9th, the Japanese d'»oided to attack; and the 2d Cavalry Brigade was withdrawn to Sihoyan (right rear) to cover the line of oommunications reaching that place on the 11th. on which date the battle beKan with an attaok by both sides. (32) (29) -(D 69-82; 0 20-120) (31) - (E 17-28; H 30-31) (30) -(E 9-10; H 16) (32) - (E 9 anrt 60; H 62. 77, and 106) -7 d. On September ISfeh, the Russians were enveloping the Japanese right, and Samaonov's Siberia Cossaok Division was attacking a Japanese flank detachment on the heighths of Riuwobio, when the Japanese 2d Cavc.liy Brigade (vmioh ha* loft Sihoyan at six o'clock, that morning) arrived on +&*•• -neane* This brigade heel been reinforced with about 120C ?ien hastily gathered froi.i the line of oommunioetions, Apf>ar*ntly ^unobserved, the main body succeeded in .'gottiug almost in rear *„ of the^rtuseian left .-•. then sudil it - (E 103-104J H 158-159) (34) - (C vol) (35) - (J vol) -8 with identioal instructions - viz,, to m £, on February 17th. another R\^ssian oavalry foroe (4 squadrons) was dispatcher, to destroy important railroad bridges in rear of the Japar (Author's note: Limitations on the leuf;th of this study preoruj'e' carrying the historical narrative beyo-id this point. 3o far an concerns tha oavalry, subsequent opar-tions, lnoludin,.v a r c t«ilion of previous faii.urcs, niiJL aerely confirm ooa-::'i^x«jns which may already be drawn) IV. OPINION UF THE AUTHOR. 1, Dlsousflion. a. Russian oavalry; (1). Cavalry being primarily an oftensive arm. the defeneivo attitude which characterized the Russian operations . throughout was not conducive to any brilliant employment of that arm, (&)• Initially, we find some oavalry south of the Yalu endeavoring to cover the Russian concentration, offering llttlft or no resistanoe to the advance of the covering foroe of tae Japanese First Army, ma!.xng no effort to penetrate the hostile soreen, and finally retiring north of the Yn without maintaining even small reconnaissance groups south o: the river. Subsequently, we find the cavalry (as part of a detach ment detailed to protect the Russian left) watohlng the Japanese 12th Division bridge and cross the Yalu in broad day light with no attempt ot Interference - then withdrawing, losing oontaot, anl pprioitting the Russian x'osition to be turned (36) - (K 1-33: R 519) (37) - (K 34-37) -9 (55). JnfrdnJ t pf the Jnvroiogv o 3eoojujL Armyy/ we find the Ritutjiau'cavalrutjiau'cavalry with no organized achachewe e of reoonn- ,, aieanoo. At Telissu, the cr.vrliy ia ordered ()# fi'Jie proportion of op.valry {other than cavalry) with tho Joprnese forces v/as so eruall as to preclude extensive operations bj that arm. In this connection, it might be observed that wrier a tHf'ferent organization, the divisional cavalry of t-ho 11 Japanese divisions in the theater (2>Z scuad rons) together v/ith the 2 cavalry brigades would have provided 1 redolent for each army (approximately equivalent to our type corps) and more than a cavalry corps of 2 divisions for employ ment by the supremo commander,, (2). Initially, we find the Japanene cavalry properly and successfully employed to cover concentration/! and advances. Thus, with the Second Army operating offensively towards ITan Shan, the 1st Cavalry Brigade (together with the 5th Divl3ia•,) covers the north flank - a highly appropriate mission* At Telissu, however, this brigade is on the Japanese right instead of in mobile reserve, or. on the left where it ooula support the main effort. Having become engaged dismounted (on the . right) even though to good purpose, it was not readily available when the Russian withdrawal began - for the better purpose of pursuit and exploitation of ^the sucoess. During the advance of the .''apnneso First Army after the "Xulu, we '".nd the divisional oe.valry being exoendjl in mointalnin-; liaison between the several columns. (4). Ti e opportune arrival of the 2d Cavalry during the oporKtions on the Shah Ho is an outstanding exwrple of proper employment of cavalry by the Japanese. On the other hand, the laok of vigorous pursuit after victory was character istic of the Japanese operations throughout; and the employment of cavalry as an enoiroling force (accompanied by direot pressure) seems not to have been considered* -10 (1). The attachment of infantry to cavalry forces on missions of every kind was habitual on "both sitiep. Since automatic and so called "infantry" weapons were not then a major factor, the cavalry and infantry wore approximately equal (nan for man) in fire power - and motor transport being ;, unknownr , it if r'"1ous that this prooeedure operated to Ueprive the ca alry of u u i«c»^fc valuable characteristic - Mobility, "I TW " '••'••> A particulariy disadvantageous in the ca&e of the .:.pi"je, sinoe they were continuously on the ofieneire. *2)# Shock action - another charr.otexlsti* peculiar to cavalry - was employed in but n single instance, w^th , n*gativ<; and inconsequental results* >•/ . • < ' • • ' ' . « / (3). It is our doctrine that raids ere r-.rely nroduotive of important resnlts, and that employment: of cp.'/olry on such missions in. therefore, aoldom JUBfci;*iablr. Ii'owever, with a single rail line serving Japanese comcrmicotions, scarcity "f jfoads, slow moving ar»J~;u. trancport. the Japanese Third Array Jiif.t released by the fall of P^rt Arthur and evail able to move north pjid reinforoe the Jar^.n* se mo.\n forces, and the xiaiinitoi oondp.n.>r with a ouypriority In etrenir'th of 80,000 about to launch ".n offennive - tlie Jiupateh of fcischenko10 cavalry corjis fco cut the rail line north of Port Arthur wa« strategically and tactical".:' sound; and tho strength of the force vat* adeouate. That tho operation failed was duo only to the cavalry comoander's lack of vi/?;or in executing his mission and the ever present Russian solicitation for a oafs line of retreat. Cn the other hand, the Japanese cavalry raids, wlth small forces wholly inadequate for the purpose, could hardly be expected to succeed, despite Japanese disregard for Chinese sovereignty - yet due to incompetency of tho Russian reconnaiss ance and intelligence oervice, actually produced important and far reaching results. , (A), The fnlluro of either the Rttcsian or cavplry to operate in naes WKB nnrfcefts this was r*?j*ticuiarly inexcusable in the case of the forcer, whose strength and cavalry organization made such operation readily possible. 2, Conclusions, Si f cpyalry : Thye cr.valr y roeonnaifiennce lacked intelligent oi-gooiizntion andd control t l ; th«thtt the V*.B continuously in the dark regarding Japnneue dispositions ft/id movcnients followed as a nfltursl result. The Russian cavalry was aeemingly xinpi'e.iare^ for. and unadaptable to, the changed ^oi'ditions of warfare encountored, 3ren during such periodi as the Ruasian A^orcofl as a whole were acting offensively, the cavalry was enplryed defensively, 3»'iR«ions were frequently tither va£Twely fit&ted or fitted entirely. Despite a prepond erance of strength, the Russian cavalry failed to operate in mass, was poorly led failed to defeat the vex? ouch weaker JnpcnoBe cavaliy, seidon attempted distent reoonneissence, and in screening anfl flank protection its failure was roarked. It should be remembered, hovraver, that faJlure of Russian leodor- Bhip and of the field forces as a whole was general and conplete • pp-8e cavclry: Che cavalry reconneiusance, while nore effective then that ox the fiubc^ons, lacked a^rressiveneas and without tho ertenslvj flysten of ceplonage eaployed by the Japanese, information of the enemy would hart b^en meager. aeno**ol3y ppeaking,. tho Japanese cavalry m&e utilized a» "mounted infantry" and was not o»ploy«d to beot advantaee. -11 3. Legqena to be lep.med. a. That cavalry reoonnaissanee and counter reoonnai'isBfjioc, If it ie to be efficient and productive of results> roust be intelligently organized, directed, end con troll t'± throughout. b. That cavalry is essentially an offensive weapon an corn oT opportunity - for enployuent by the comoander, during combat to influence the result, and after victory to reap ihe fruits thereof, ct That the principle of nass in particularly applic&bTe to cavalry if -the full value of this ana is to bo realized. ' &0 That a high degree of fire power (machine # a artiTiery in higier echelons) is essential in cavalry orgaiii station. £, £hat nobility cruet be carefully preserved. t. That cavalry should, not bo included as an o^/jaaic part of r *e in?aJitr7 divisioii K* TJ ;t r.C'jn the situation warrants a cavelry raid \ The hoovilo cooounlcations, the ctren^rth of the j /orce mist be a4ec;uite« a»d the operation amst be carried out r: fh boldness end vigor. i, 7'aally. that all cavftlry *nl higher (and ntp^'K) -met o<» ttorou^ly lndootrinuted with the c li*li*tlon*t vat. appropriate ec&ployaent of cavalry tinder ell conditions - so as to injure proper »iffslonnp definitely stated and well executed* fcajor. -12 •9 Ceralrjr in J&isso-Jsp&nef e War - . • Bo, 122, BJBLIOOBAPHY ( A 44-46) • Text A (below), pages 44 to 43.. A * Brltljh Official History of The {fosse*-Javanese v?ar; Prepared >y Historical geeticn of The Conelttee of Isperlal Peftroe; Harrison and 8ons, London (Part I, Second aj.ition - 1909) > B - 3fcJie as A (Part IX - 1900) C - Seme as A (Part III - 19O3) • D - 8*»e *H A (lart IV - 190*) 2 - Sax? a* A (Pert Y - 1909) 7 - Geraan Official Account, Th« Jtaseo-Japaiieec Vr>?; Pr«pA?«A in Historical Section'of the 0«r«an Ijtxericil Staff; Hu^h R^es. Ltd,, T^cmAon (1906)« Axithoriz^d Yranslatlos ty Karl ron Pon^it, Jato Llwteeatrt, 934. (Kaatt Pro««inn) Fusili«r fie^inttfot, Oernan Any (TOE YALC) 0 - S All sorrees obtained fros Library, CoMtend an4 General Staff Sebool, Port te«Tctarortb# Ksnsos*