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Major Y/Harton G. Ingraa. Cavalry (P.O.L.) Noj 122

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Major Y/Harton G. Ingraa. Cavalry (P.O.L.) Noj 122 INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH USE OF CAVAXRY IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (WITH PRINCIPAL LESSONS) Major Y/harton G. Ingraa. Cavalry (P.O.L.) NoJ 122, Fort Icu.V9iworth, Korsas, 1 June, 1931. MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Second.Year class, ~" ; The Command and Goxtera). Staff School, Fort Leavenwfirth, Kansas* . : •SUBJECT: Cavalry in Russo-Japanese War. I • PAPERS ACCOMPANYING. > 1* Bibliography - for this study, 2. Map - Southern Manchuria. II. THE STUDY PRESENTKD. Discusc the use of oavaliy in the Russo-Japanese Vfar, i?oint out the principal lessons. III. HISTORICAL FA^TS RELATING TO THE STUgY. (1) • ..!• Cavalry organization and strength. •-.. * &' Ruaslan: The oavalry (in Manchuria), consisting •':' almost entirely of Cossacks, vas organized into separate divioions a»^ brigades. The offeotive strength of the oavalry division was about 3400. In some oases 12 horse artillery a were inoludod. Cavalry was not an organic part 3f the fantry division or army oorps, but was dot ailed from valry divisions as required for the purpose. (2) b. Japanese: In 1904 the Japanese Army oonsisted of 13 divisTons, 2 oavalry brigades, 2 artillery brigades* and certain "fortress troops". Each oavalry brigade was oonposed of 2 regiments of 4 squadrons each. The effeotiva strength of the oavalry brigade was about 1150 - with 6 HotoWciss machine guns* A oavalry regiment of 8 squadrons was an organic part of eaoh infantry division, (3) (1) - Author18 note: These facts relate primarily to oavalry operations; and limitations on length of thia study require a general familiarity (on the part of the reader) with the oampalgn in Manohuria and the important engagements thereof. - (A 27; M 10) * ill: (A 22-28; M 15 and 27) -1­ ?• Concentration and advanoe of Japanese Flrot Army. :" ; a. The Japanese Fixst'"Ai.'njy (Ku*oki), consulting of the 2d, T2th,vend Guard Divisions, inoluded divisiona + l cavalry only. Afteryxhe successful lpTi.Ung at Chemulpo, He divisional oavalry (reinforoed by infantry) covered th^coioeniration . along line of the Chechen River, (4) * ' , v > ' Jb« Due +-o Russian uripreparedness, Mie only forces . available t"> ov> iose * Japanese advance were 3 rogiL.ents of . Cobsaoks* On February 14tti, advanoe parties of ^iis oavalry orossed the Yalu at Yfiju end Cnyaiigsyong; and or Maroh 3d, . the Russian oavalry skirmished with the Japanese covering"•,';• force, (5) ••. , •; i v>~ 'V o# Kxiroki deoided to advanoe to the Yalu without awaiting""oompletion of his oonoentration; and on March 25th, a foroa of 7 squadrons of oavalry, 5 battalions of infantry, and 2 batteries of mountain artillery occupied FaJcasa and Kasan - to cover bridging of the Cheohen and Taing Rivers• Meanwhile, the oavalry of the Guard Division, supported by a small foroo of infantry, drove back some 600 Russian Cavalry, and on March 28th, occupied Teissu, The oavalry of the 12th Division arrived at Teissu on April 5th; and, preparatory to a general advaroe, a flank guard consisting of 1 squadron of oavalry, a regiment of infantry, and 2 mountain batteries was sent to Yongpyon to proteot the right of the army, (6) d. On April 4th, the cavalry of the Japanese covering foroe entered Wlju, Meanwhile, the Ruasian oavalry had fallen back aooroDS the Yalu and Joined the 3d Siberian Rifle Division. (7) 3. Battle of The Yalu. a. Tha Russian foroe opposing the Japanese First Army (exclusive of troops guarding the line of ooironujiloations) now numbered about 16,000 infantry, 2350 cavalry. 650 mounted scouts', 48 field guns, 8 mountain guns, and b horse artillery pieces. This foroe oocupied a defensive position in roar of the Ai River, with flank detaohments at Anton? and from Anplngho to Hslaopuhsiho, The right (south) flank detachment consisted of about 5 battalions of infantry, a machine gun oompany, some artillery, and a Z.'ew mounted t^outs. The left (north) flank detachment consisted of 11 squairons of cavalry, several companies of infantry, and a mountain battery. The .. remainder of tue oavalry (about 2 regiments of Cossacks), 3 battalions of Infantry, and some artillery was farther south, guarding the right flank from the mouth of the Yalu to Takus­ han. Of this last mentioned foroe, 2& equadrone of oavalry watched the ooast line from Takushan to Fitzuvro, and 1 bguadron was at Port Arthur. Thus, the Rursian foroe was extended ove.* a front of approximately 172 miles, with a smal.1. fnroe of oavalry oonoentrated on the left (north) flank - the bulk of the cavalry widely dispersed on the south. (8) b. Early on the morning of April 29th, the Japanese 12th Division bagan preparations to bridge the Yalu and oross near Chukyuri. At 11:00, AM, they moved forward to the riverj and by 2:00, PM, a battalion was on the right bank. A detaoh­ ment of .the Russian "'eft flank guard retired without opposition. The cavalry of the Japanese 12th Division or-ossed in rear of the leading brigade, and then formed part af a detaohment covering the Japanese right. (9) 4) - A 45-46; U 10; IT S-fl (7) - A 52; P 143 5) - A 48; F 119 8) - A 56-58: F 189-190; 6) - A 29-50; M 4A-46 9) - A 63 and 66; F 195-199 -2­ •' ,' <j, The Japanese soheico of manoeuvre wc.3 to envelop a ' '••' tho, .uueaTart. left. Kartsev (commnndlnt? the rtussian detaohiaent'*'•*. on, the north) had been posted on the upper Yalu iov the "* ' express purpore of prote^+in;j the Russian left, Regardless', \ he not only fill baok from the river on the 30th Without /attempting to prevent, or even hp.rrass, the onen^'s crossing*, but lost contact and railed to inform his ' apertor of his action. The Russian commander, regarding the oro.>sing at Chukyuri as a mere feint, oiling to his belief that th<i Japanese would land a large foroa on his right, and continued unaware of the real danger - to his left. The attaok was smooessful; and by noon. Hay 1st, tho Russian*; were falling 'back on liensu. Beyond oiutlne off a part of the RuuoJ«in rear guara, thn Japanese failed to purtme. (10) 4« Operationg in front of the Japanese Second Army, a. The Japfin.-ee Second Army (Oku), oonsidting of the let . 3d,""*4th, and dtli Divisions and 1st Cavalry Brigade, began landing May nth, at i.outuahih and Sanohiatan. (11) b. At this oi»i<\ Russian forces were disposed as follows :"~Zasulioh falling back from Fenghuangcieng to Liflnchan­ kuan. to whicli nlaoe reinforoemente were en rou'e (from fiac­ yang); Rennenkampf, with portions r>f his Trpn?-"1 \kal Coaqaai: Division (17 sguadrc^?), 3 oattaliona of inr.^ntry, and 14 gune, was operating in th? .ioinity of Saunaohi to secure the loft; on the right, Kisohenko, with 11 squadrons of cavalry and a horse tattery, watched the area between Fenghuangoheng and J jiuen t,3 welJ as tho ooas« line from Antung to ?itzuwoc ( o* Luring operations to the westward, the Japanese 6th Division and lot Cavalry Brigade covered the north flank ­ along the line: Pulantien - Pitzuwo, (1C) d. After the fall of Nan Shan,, a Russian cavalry brigade was ma/ohing south to reoocupy a section of the Uukden - Por* Arth\of railway line (previously abandoned). Rumors of this movement having reached Oku, he sent forward the 1st Cavalry Brigade, supported by some infantry of the 5th Division, to reoonnoiter to th« north of Y/afongtien. On May 30thi thene hostile cavalry forces were approaching Tellssu (Wafangou), Upon reaohing Chuohlatlen, the advanoe guard of the Japanese 14th Cavalry regiment reported Wuchiatun (a viHt^e about Zh miles south of Telia mi) oooupied by the enemy. Orders were at once sent to deploy dismounted on the heighths commanding the valley of the Fuohou River, The Russian foroe, which proved to be about l i squadrons of cavalry and a half oompany of frontier guards, withdrew - pursued by the 2d Squadron, 13th Cavalry (Japanese), followed at some distance by the remainder of the regiment. Upon receiving fire from some Russian reserves south of Lungwangmiao, the leading (8d) squadron continued at the charge with drawn swords. The Russians kept up their fire until the Japanese squadron was about 50 yards distant ­ then charged in extended order, During the melee1 2 squadrons of the 8th Siberian Cossacks oaao up, and promptly charged the left of the Japanese squadvon. The main body of the Japanese oavalry having now arrUid, the Russians withdrew oovered by the fire of their dismounted squadron, (14) (See "Author's note" on next page) (10) - (A 63 and 66; K 50 and 56) (18) - (B 13)' (11) - (B 9-10} M 61-62) (13) - (B 29; F 12) (14) - (B 31-32; G 5-7: M-83) -3-. (Author's noto: ' This devalry ansagoment * .desoribed under ­ d:\aDove -"xhoui'h unlnrpQi'tant, Is oited in thiB>.Btudy beoause Tt furnishes s the onlyy: instance during the. "entire war of a tiorntot d assaultl t . IIt t w^ll ll bo\ng.tebta a thathtt the Russians - probably through tJie^uocident »f circumstance rather than design - \.;\ employed "combined action", that 1$, a combination of fire "^T power and manoeuvering force, while the Japanese mounted / \ Vvv assault,was entirely/unsupported by Tire power.) >••-*„.'• \ v < - •;. \& '•"'• : \..^l'> £$?-. ••. - V ' '•< .'•'•-'•"; •• ••'•••• - : x '•• ^":- '-• •'•' ".'••• ' ''" s V > *" S# By May. 21et, the Russian- i'oroes operating against the Japanese Seoond Army had berfn reinforoel by 1 division .and a regiment of Infantryt Both sides nor conducted more ov Iocs continuous reoonnai • anoe. On June 4tht Spjnsonor, with 4^ squadrons of cavalry, R battalion of infantry', and a battery of horse artillery, undertook a reconnaissance in foroe* Zi squadrons advanoed down the right bank of the Fuohou Ho against the heighths west of Wuohiatun; while the infantry moved against Lungwangmiao pushing baok Japanese patrols and outgixards.
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