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Japan :A History of the War Betwe (Cornell IntoerBttg Slibtarg CHARLES WILLIAM WASON COLLECTION CHINA AND THE CHINESE THE GIFT OF CHARLES WILLIAM WASON CLASS OF 1676 1918 The date shows when this volume was takein. To renew this book copy the call No. artfll^e to the librariao. ..._.. HOME USE RULES All BookB subject to recall All borrowers must regis- ter in the libraiy to borrow boolcB for home use. All books must be re- < turned at end of college year for inspection and repairs. Limited books must be returned within the four week limit and not renewed. '"" Students must return all books be^re leaving town. , OflTicers should arrange for I the return of books wanted during their absence from town. Volumes of periodicals and of pamphlets are held . in the library as much as possible. For special pur- poses they are given out for _ _ a limited time. 4 Borrowers should not use their library privileges for ' "" the benefit of other persons. Books of special value and gift books, when the giver wishes-' it, are not allowed to circulate. Readers are asked to re- port all cases of books marked or mutilated. Do not deface books by marks and writing. Cornell University Library DS 765.E13 1897 Heroic Japan :a history of the war betwe 3 1924 023 145 190 ApARiscHEzHAAR&STEINERTiEICHLER,Sr! LIBRAIRIE ETRANGERE 21 (ancien'^ 9 ) Rue Jac ob VZ6, --^ HIS IMPERIAL MAJEgTY, THE EMPEROR OF JiPiN, D^ (Published by permission of the Imperial Household Department). Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924023145190 -^ 2, I. M, HiRU-KO, Of JAPAN, 2!^ Page 22.-Line 8 from the top, for " 24tli " read " 29tli." Page 68. -Line 5 from the top, for " horses " read " hours." Page 85.-Line 3 from the top, (and throughout on this page), foi " Ting Yuen " read " Ping Yuen" also on Page 102, line 3 from the top. Page 209.- Lines 8 and 9 from the top, for "Yalu River" read " Hinglung-kaa." Page 232.-Line 6 from the bottom, for " Oshima " read " Osako." Page 282.-Line 3 from the top, for " Saka " read " Isaka." Page 305.-Line 16 from the top, for " Pashan-hao " read " Ku- slian-liao." Line 10 from the bottom, for " left " read " ri*vht." Page 311.-Line 17 from the bottom, the sentence begining " Some little," etc , should read "Before the Staff of the Second Army Corps entered Wei-hai-wei town, the gensdarmes belonging to this Corps at once began," etc. Page 325.-Line 2 from the top, for " Captain Ching " read " Admiral Ting." Page 388.-rirst line, for " Major General Nozn " read " Major Mozu." Page 422. -Line 12 from the top, supply " and wounded " after " " killed;" do. line 15 ; Also in line 15 for 4 p. m." read " 3 a. m." Page 494. -Line 8 from the top, for " Taka-o " read " Commander of the Takao." St. IDunstan's Ifiousc FETTER LANE, FLEET STREET, E.G. J897 iii'i V HEROIC JAPAN A HISTORY OF THE WAR BETWEEN CHINA & JAPAN BY F, WAEEINGTON EASTLAKE. Ph.D. YAMADA YOSHI-AKI, LL.B. Principal of the Chahtauquan Association of Japan LONDON SAMPSON LOW, MAESTON & COMPANY (.LIMITED St. Sunstaii's lljouse fetter lane, fleet street, e.g. LIi:kA:I;V V .1 J iH)!ti J fiiri: leiitissttiiaeflite PREFACE. The compilation of the present volume was begun shortly after the battle of Port Arthur, and the last word was written on September 2nd of the present year. The undertaking has been of great magnitude, and this for several reasons. In the first place, no precise, correct History of the War has as yet been published in any language. There are numerous Japanese compilations and one or two of foreign authorship. But all these were compiled when the actual facts were still, to a very great extent, unknown, and are therefore marred by serious errors in many particulars. But so far as the present work is concerned, it is absolutely authentic ; for not only have the Imperial Household, Foreign, War, and Navy Departments given the authors free access to all documents, but every word in the book has been thoroughly and repeatedly revised by the Authorities con- cerned, several chapters having thus been written and re-written six and even more times. More than this, the authors have had personal inter- views or communication with the Commanders of the various Regiments; with most of the officers and men whose deeds are enumerated ; with the highest officials of the Bank of Japan, Red Cross Society, Japan Mail Steamship Company, etc., etc., in fact, leaving no stone unturned to make the whole narrative thoroughly trustworthy and free from error even in minutiae. To do this Mr. Yamada has travelled literally thousands of miles throughout the length and breadth of Japan. And just here it would be well to state the manner of collaboration. Dr. Eastlake, the American author, who had, from the inception of the War, been rendering into English and compiling, for local publication, from Japanese periodicals of various kinds, narratives of the heroic deeds and exploits PREFACE. performed by the Army and Navy of Japan, conferred with Mr. Yamada, President of the Japan Chautauqnan Association, as to the advisability of bringing out these storiettes in book form. Mr. Yamada, who was greatly desirous that the Occident should learn the truth about the War and that the labours of his countrymen should be represented with fidelity and exactitude, at once proposed to publish a book on the War, working as co-author with Dr. Eastlake. But upon questioning the Naval and Military Authorities in the early part of 1895, it was found that the larger portion of the narratives taken from Japanese newspapers and magazines was either incorrect or else quite unfounded ; and, what was still more to the purpose, a vast quantity of fine material had never been published, some of the most touching or heroic stories being quite unknown even in Japan. And so it comes that most of the " Brave Deeds " published in the present volume are now made public for the first time. Immediately on learning the real situation, the test of rigid and impartial criticism was applied to what had already been laboriously com- piled —with the result that one-half had to be expunged and the other entirely re-written. The authors have often groaned in spirit on learning that what they considered their best " bits" were untrue or not borne out by the facts. And we must give the utmost honour to the Army and Navy Departments for their excellent conduct in this context. Time and again have they had the authors ruthlessly strike out stories that had found ready credence the Empire over and been quoted and requoted in the columns of the foreign press at home and abroad. Nothing has thus been published but actual fact : fact abundantly proved and amply sup- ported by many witnesses. It was soon found that the mere compilation of heroic anecdotes was insufficient. There must be some outline sketch of each battle, or else the narratives would be unintelligible. And so the next step was the concluding to compile a short History of the War as a whole, the " Brave Deeds" to come at the end of each chapter. In May, 1895, it was con- fidently expected that the work would be completed in September of the same year. And yet nearly every vi'ord written up to that time has since had to be re-written, while a very large portion has had to be struck out. Moreover, the troops were then returning from the seat of war, and each Regiment as it came back was put to the interrogatory, entailing further and vast changes. In March of the present year, 1896, it was positively expected to publish in May, and announcements publicly made in that sense ; yet from the various Departments, Societies, etc., manuscript kept pouring in : so that instead of being 400 pages long—as announced PREFACE. ili in April—our book numbers 526 pages, and even then we have been compelled to add five appendices. We have, however, kept to the main idea of showing the heroic side of this great conflict : and just here an ex- planatory word is necessar)'. We do not—let us state it emphatically—we " do not for a moment contend that the many score of " Brave Deeds narrated prove the superiority of Japan to any other land. We have written these simply to show that the qualities of martial heroism, implicit soldierly obedience, unflinching sense of duty, noble unselfishness and deathless courage are to be found in this Empire of Japan. Withal there is one phase of bravery which seemes peculiar to this country. It is this and this alone which we have tried to emphasize and thus bring to the notice of the world. Many of the anecdotes are simple and unassuming, nor do we claim for them great merit ; they are recorded to let the world see and know that the Japanese are, as a military people, the compeers of the most renowned nations of the Occident. The authors are, at the same time, fully aware of the defects in a work of this kind. The present volume is the outcome of two full years of unceasing, painstaking labour; yet it is compiled underpressure, and this may often be traced in the pages. Were we to begin to thank those who have been instrumental in assisting the compilation of this work, our list would be a long one.
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