“Look, Donald Trump’s got broad shoulders.”
Masculinity in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections.
Diplomarbeit
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
einer Magistra der Philosophie
an der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz
vorgelegt von
Hannah Maria WOLF
am Institut für Amerikanistik
Begutachter: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Brandt, MA
Graz, 2018
Eigenständigkeitserklärung
Ich erkläre ehrenwörtlich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbständig und ohne fremde Hilfe verfasst, andere als die angegebenen Quellen nicht benutzt und die den Quellen wörtlich oder inhaltlich entnommenen Stellen als solche kenntlich gemacht habe. Die Arbeit wurde bisher in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form keiner anderen inländischen oder ausländischen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt und auch noch nicht veröffentlicht. Die vorliegende Fassung entspricht der eingereichten elektronischen Version.
Graz am, ……………………………... ……………………………………… Unterschrift
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Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I want to thank my thesis supervisor Univ.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Brandt, MA for helping and advising me whenever needed, steering me in the right direction when I ran into trouble, and trusting me to work independently whenever possible. Without his assistance, this thesis would never have come to fruition. I greatly appreciated his unfettered support, trust, and understanding throughout the research and writing process.
I am also grateful for my professors, who over the years have continuously inspired and challenged me to work hard and give my best. I would not have come as far without their assistance and ability to motivate me at every turn.
A sincere thank you must be extended to Candice Kerestan for her diligent proofreading, constructive criticism, and wonderful wit.
Finally, more than academic support is needed to complete a thesis. Therefore, I want to express my profound gratitude towards my parents for providing unfailing support and understanding throughout my university education. I also want to thank my partner, Michael, for his firm belief in me, his encouragement and much appreciated humor in times of frustration, and his unwavering support.
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Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION 5
2. ON MASCULINITIES 9
2.1 A Brief History of American Manhood 11
2.2 The Origins of Masculinity 26 2.2.1 The Biological Essence of Masculinity 27 2.2.2 The Psychological Essence of Masculinity 32 2.2.3 The Male Sex Role and Social Learning Theories 36 2.2.4 Constructionism(s) 39 2.2.5 Gender and Power – Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Hegemony 43
3. MASCULINITIES, PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS, AND THE NATION 48
3.1 It’s a Man’s World – Masculinities and the Presidency 50
3.2 Fathers, Warriors, and Protectors – A Historical Perspective on Presidential Masculinities 58 3.2.1 The Rough Rider – Theodore Roosevelt 59 3.2.2 Hollywood Meets Washington, D.C. – Ronald Reagan 63 3.2.3 Masculinities Interrupted – George H. W. Bush, Michael Dukakis, and Bill Clinton 70 3.2.4 A Cowboy in the Oval Office – George W. Bush 77
4. THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 88
4.1 The Billionaire Everyman – Donald Trump 89 4.1.1 The Art of Rhetorical Muscle Flexing – Xenophobia, Terrorism, and Law and Order 91 4.1.2 The Art of Bullying – Anger, Violence, and the Politics of Degradation 104 4.1.3 The Art of the Sale – Entertainment, Promotion, and ‘Broad Shouldered’ Rhetoric 112 4.1.4 The Art of Machismo – Misogyny and Sexism 119
4.2 Who Has Got the Broadest Shoulders? – The Presidential Debates 133
5. CONCLUSION 142
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY 147
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1. Introduction The 2016 U.S. presidential election was peculiar and unexpected on several fronts. It was littered with controversial statements, derisive and divisive rhetoric, and even several outright scandals, resulting in one of the most unexpected political shake-ups in American history – the election of real estate mogul and former reality TV star Donald J. Trump as the 45th President of the United States. Scholars from a wide variety of academic fields will undoubtedly investigate the factors and mechanisms at play during this historic election for years to come. As this piece will argue, in order to understand the election and its results better, applying a gendered lens to the race between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton is not only beneficial but necessary. The importance of this is perhaps best exemplified by a controversial comment by Trump after securing the five crucial states of the so-called ‘Acela’ primaries for the Republican presidential nomination in April 2016. He stated that “[i]f Hillary Clinton were a man, I don’t think she’d get five per cent of the vote. The only thing she’s got going is the woman’s card” (Trump qtd. in Reilly 2016). In other words, he suggested that Hillary Clinton’s gender gave her an unfair advantage. Trump repeated this claim several times over the weeks leading up to the 2016 presidential election. Clinton reacted by embracing the term, replying “if fighting for women’s health care and paid family leave and equal pay is playing the women’s card, then deal me in” (Clinton qtd. in Reilly 2016).
Trump’s statement is interesting on multiple levels. It arguably exhibits sexist undertones by downplaying Clinton’s extensive political career and suggesting her appeal is not rooted in knowledge and experience but solely in her gender. Additionally, it simplifies the decision-making process of voters and relegates so-called ‘women’s issues’, such as paid family leave and the wage gap, to the background. However, his statement also highlights a long-standing trend which frequently becomes apparent when women enter traditionally male domains: as soon as women are involved, gender becomes a salient issue.
Gender, however, naturally has as much to do with men as it has with women. Although it is indisputable that Hillary Clinton’s nomination as the first female presidential contender of a major party1 cast spotlight on gender dynamics in presidential elections, this thesis argues that such dynamics have always been at play but simply less acknowledged. Every presidential election to date has pitted differing gender expressions against one another; the 2016 election just happened to be the first featuring a female and a male
1 American presidential elections have been dominated by men throughout history; however, apart from Hillary Clinton’s historic nomination as a major party nominee, there have been other notable women who previously ran for the highest political office. Victoria Woodhull was the first women in American history to join a presidential race for the Equal Rights Party, and Shirley Chisholm, the first African American women to be elected to Congress, was also the first African-American woman to vie for the Democratic Party nomination, albeit unsuccessfully.
5 candidate in direct opposition. Ignorance towards masculinities2 as active agents within the gendered spectrum largely derives from systems of hierarchy, such as patriarchy and the normative property affixed to masculinities, which ultimately render them invisible. However, simply because masculinities have rarely been acknowledged in gendered analyses of political processes does not mean that they are irrelevant. On the contrary, it will be argued that gender – one of the most pervasive and far-reaching social categories – has strongly influenced elections from the founding of the United States to present day.
This thesis will demonstrate that presidential politics have always been battlegrounds for not only differing views on policies and ideologies, but also competing models of American masculinity. It is no coincidence that Donald Trump’s running mate and current Vice President of the United States Mike Pence sought to reassure voters of Trump before the first presidential debate by stating: “Look, Donald Trump’s got broad shoulders. He’s able to make his case and make a point” (Pence qtd. in Griffiths 2016), lending this thesis its title. In total, Pence referred to Donald Trump’s ‘broad shoulders’ at least 17 times throughout the campaign and leading up to Trump’s inauguration in January 2017. Despite Pence’s denial, the masculine connotation of complimenting broad shoulders, thereby associating them with leadership skills and an assumed ability to protect and defend, could hardly be clearer, especially in the first race against a female presidential contender.
Employing this as a point of departure, this thesis seeks to investigate the relationship between masculinities and presidential politics more closely in order to ultimately argue that gender has been a significant, driving factor in American presidential politics. A core aim is to trace the intertwined relationship between masculinities and the political sphere in which the presidency is situated, highlighting that presidents of the past and present have used a gendered deck of cards to win elections, both consciously and unconsciously. A specific focus will be placed on the recent 2016 election and especially on Donald Trump’s highly masculinized presidential persona in order to illustrate how gender, particularly masculinity, becomes a valuable currency within political discourses. At the same time, this shall also shed light on how particular expressions of masculinity are used to systematically disqualify and mock femininities or divergent expressions of masculinity. Moreover, this paper seeks to compare Trump’s masculine gender expression with R.W. Connell’s framework of ‘hegemonic masculinity’.
2 The use of ‘masculinities’ as a plural form is deliberate and indicative because it allows for the recognition of a plurality and diversity of possible masculinities. As further explained throughout Chapter 2, a postmodern social constructionist approach has uncovered that a normative, single expression of masculinity fails to account for the diversity of gender expressions and experiences found in social realities, and thus necessitates a plural form.
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In order to explore the proposed arguments, this thesis is structured into three parts. The first part presents various theories surrounding masculinities and gender as well as a brief historical survey of American masculinities, thereby providing a solid theoretical background for later analysis. This framework will discuss formulaic and essentialist theories, which were ultimately discarded due to their inability to capture the complexity of masculinities; and trace social constructionist theories, which form the current academic consensus. Power dynamics and hierarchical structures will also be reviewed to highlight disparities between masculinities and femininities as well as differences among varying forms and expressions of masculinities. Despite outlining various theories on masculinities, it must be clarified that this thesis subscribes to a constructionist approach, which recognizes the plurality and variety of masculinities as constructed concepts at a culturally and historically specific moment in time. The discussion of essentialist, biological, and psychoanalytical theories simply serves to present differing viewpoints in the still highly contested field of masculinities studies.
The second part of this thesis attempts to showcase the nation, its political processes, and its leadership as a stage for and geared towards masculinities. It investigates how nation- states themselves as well as nation-building processes are situated within a larger gender framework, and how masculinities and nation-states have a reciprocal influence on each other. Moreover, the unique position the presidency occupies within a masculinized American political system will be discussed. Manners in which notions of masculinities and the office of the presidency are and always have been enmeshed with one another will then be exemplified in detail by evaluating five presidents as well as their election campaigns, leadership styles, and political opponents from a gender perspective.
The third and final part focuses on the 2016 election, particularly on how Donald Trump employed a specific pattern of aggressive, hegemonic masculinity to portray himself as the capable, successful, and strong solution to a supposed “American carnage” (cf. Trump 2017a). Trump’s masculinized persona will be investigated from four different angles in order to highlight the varying strategies he utilized as well as how those strategies drew on notions of hegemonic masculinity, fantasies of self-made success, systematic sexism, perceived ‘aggrieved entitlement’, and racialized anxieties. Trump’s masculine self-fashioning and how it becomes apparent in content, language and style of his political campaign will also be illustrated. Moreover, gendered subtexts and discourses demonstrated within the three presidential debates will be analyzed through a close reading of them.
The significance of an examination of masculinities and their role in shaping social relations, politics and policies, and economic and social realities cannot be understated.
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Masculinities are invisible and ubiquitous at the same time, as they are so deeply embedded in power structures which shape everyday interactions that they often go unnoticed until a closer look is taken. This makes an in-depth analysis demanding but crucial in the strife for eliminating gender inequality. In my view, gender and its far-reaching effects cannot be analyzed by focusing solely on women and femininities. Highlighting gendered processes and hierarchies within culture and society at large, helps to raise awareness of culturally, historically, and socially mediated perceptions of gender, which greatly influence our behavior as well as our belief and value systems. Manifestations of these gendered perceptions are embedded in all areas of our social, cultural, political and economic environment, thus shaping our societies significantly. As a feminist, I believe it is necessary to investigate, both, femininities and masculinities in their plurality and as fluid and constructed entities, in varying fields of research, in order to understand and ultimately question and reform the gendered power dynamics that governs our society.
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2. On Masculinities
When I teach courses on masculinity, I tell my students on the first day of class that if they do not have more questions about masculinity on the last day of class than they did on the first, then I have not taught them properly. (Reeser 2010: 7)
At first glance, masculinity does not seem hard to define. However, the closer one looks, the more evident it becomes that it might not be so simple after all. Todd Reeser does not exaggerate when he mentions the complexity and arguable impossibility of coherent and concrete definitions surrounding masculinities. Rather than coming closer to understanding them through his research, his more in-depth inquiries have only proven to prompt further questions. Reeser is not alone in this assessment, and R.W. Connell likewise argues that the failure to produce a coherent and universal science on masculinities is presupposed in its sheer impossibility (cf. 2005: 67).
If we accept, for a moment, that masculinities are undefinable, the aim of this chapter, perhaps even this whole thesis, may be called into question. How can something be studied if it defies definition? Finding an answer to this first requires acknowledging that studies of masculinities should not be dismissed because of a lacking coherent definition but rather embraced because of it. Masculinities are diverse, and the field of men’s studies is extensive and interdisciplinary; thus, it refuses a unified and generalized definition. However, this does not mean that there is no knowledge to be gained from inquiries into masculinities. On the contrary, the breadth of the topic itself has substantial significance to the subject and essence of men’s studies. The mere fact that men’s lives, behaviors, and social relations touch on many various fields of research as well as, entice and simultaneously aggravate an abundance of vastly different interest groups, is evidence of the reach and influence gender has on the world and one’s perception of it.
Over the course of Chapter 2, masculinities will be investigated closely. Beginning with an introduction of the basic principles and theories to which this thesis prescribes, this chapter will then provide a historical survey of American masculinities. Theories on masculinities originating in biology, psychology, the social sciences, and cultural studies will also be critically examined. While the historical survey and presented theories cannot claim completeness, their inclusion in this piece collectively aims to give comprehensive insight into the vast field of gender and masculinities studies.
Sociologist Arthur Brittan notes that masculinity is often believed to be measurable; thus, men are defined according to how much they have of it. This is best exemplified when looking at how homosexual men are treated in relation to masculinity. It is frequently suggested that they are deficiently masculine, for example on a hormonal basis, and
9 therefore excessively feminine. This then classifies them as lesser, or in other words, not as ‘real’ men (cf. Brittan 2001: 51). This thesis argues that this assertion is not only incorrect but wildly arbitrary and ignorant of the various realities of men’s lives and identities. Therefore, when examining masculinities, it is crucial to first discuss gender in general.
Gender does not exist in a vacuum; it is influenced and interpreted through history and culture, which means it is neither universal nor timeless. However, what gender and gender expectations mean at a certain point in time should not be considered merely arbitrary (cf. Brittan 2001: 51).
At any given moment, gender will reflect the material interests of those who have power and those who do not. Masculinity, therefore, does not exist in isolation of femininity – it will always be an expression of the current image that men have of themselves in relation to women. And these images are often contradictory and ambivalent. (Brittan 2001: 52)
Arguably one of the most crucial insights feminist theory and the women’s movement have provided is that gender is socially constructed rather than innate and biologically determined. The distinction between sex and gender, as the terms are now commonly used, became popular in the 1970s and lies at the heart of feminist theory. First introduced by Robert Stoller, seminal works such as Ann Oakley’s Sex, Gender and Society (1972) describe and eventually popularize the concept of gender as being separate from biological sex (cf. Segal 1990: 66). The distinction itself, however, can be traced back even further, predating second- wave feminism by roughly a decade. Simone de Beauvoir already observed in 1949 with the publication of The Second Sex that “[o]ne is not born, but rather becomes a woman” (de Beauvoir 1972: 295, qtd. in Pilcher and Whelehan 2004: 56). Sex refers to biological and physiological distinctions whereas gender refers to culturally negotiated sets of characteristics, behavioral patterns, and expectations ascribed to and associated with one or the other sex. In other words, gender is learned, validated, and maintained through a person’s cultural, historical, and political environment rather than genetically coded. This distinction remains quintessential to gender studies and thus provides a basis for men’s studies (cf. Craig 1992: 2-3, Pilcher and Whelehan 2004: 56-57).
Historically, men have been the dominant gender, and masculinities have therefore constituted the gender norm throughout most of the world, including Western cultures. With all but a few exceptions, it is hardly disputed that history was written by men, and largely for and about men. Masculinity has been assumed as natural, whereas femininity was long considered deviant and in need of definition3. Femininity became ‘the Other’ in contrast to
3 Edley and Wetherell exemplify this by referencing libraries. While most libraries have a section on women’s studies and women’s history, filled with works about women’s achievements, gender roles,
10 masculinity, or ‘the One’ (cf. Pilcher and Whelehan 2004: 90). This assumption leads to what Michael Kimmel calls “the invisibility of masculinity” (2000: 7). Even though scholars of men’s studies and gender studies locate masculinities within the framework of gender theories, popular perception and media ascribes gender mainly to women. Gender studies are frequently understood to be women’s studies only. Kimmel argues that while gender has become a focal point for women largely due to the women’s movement, it has stayed largely invisible to men4. Masculinities are considered unmarked while femininities are marked; women have a gender while men are often perceived genderless (cf. Kimmel 2006: 1-2). The fact that men do not seem to have a gender in popular Western perception is, however, what Roland Barthes calls “a significant absence” (Barthes 1976, qtd. in Reese 2010: 9), meaning the lack of recognition of male gender itself tells of masculinities and society’s level of awareness, or rather lack thereof. This ‘genderlessness’ of men is enabled largely by patriarchal structures because, as Edley and Wetherell illustrate, “[i]t is generally only the most powerful groups in society who can legislate normality; deciding what should be seen as natural, inevitable and unquestionable” (1995: 2). Therefore, in order to study masculinities, it is necessary to mark them, thus make them visible, and discard notions of an innate essence of masculinity, which is normative and unchangeable. Furthermore, the underlying power structures in which men (and women) operate, such as patriarchy and hierarchies relating to ethnicity, sexual orientation, and social class, need to be considered (cf. Reeser 2010: 8-10).
2.1 A Brief History of American Manhood Our beliefs about manhood have played a powerful role in determining the kind of life and the kind of society we have. These notions of manliness have left their imprint, for instance, on political language, with its profusion of sports metaphors and its preoccupation with toughness. They have framed our definition of the male homosexual as a man bereft of manhood. And they have nurtured our cultural romance with competition as a solution to all problems, from economic productivity to a fair divorce settlement. (Rotundo 1993: 6-7)
Feminism and the women’s movement were without a doubt a driving force behind the realization of academic research into masculinities as well as the mobilization of men into and within men’s movements. Nonetheless, masculinities were topical before the rise of
expectations, and grievances, a similar section about men is less frequent. There simply was, and perhaps still is, less of a recognized need to write about men in the same way because masculinities are considered the natural standard (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 2-3). 4 Thomas Lacquer writes that “[w]omen alone seem to have ‘gender’ since the category itself is defined as that aspect of social relations based on difference between the sexes in which the standard has always been man” (Lacquer 1990, qtd. in Kimmel 2006: 2).
11 feminism as a concrete discourse, albeit not necessarily deliberately or consciously. Our perception of manhood, as Anthony Rotundo describes above, is shaped and reshaped; in other words, it is a crucial part of history and has a history of its own (cf. Rotundo 1993: 1; 5- 7). Drawing upon this fundamental statement, Michael Kimmel then contextualizes this history within the United States: “American history cannot fully be understood without an understanding of American men’s ceaseless quest for manhood in the evolution of […] economic, political, social, and cultural experiences and events” (Kimmel 2005: 4).
While asserting that American manhood played a significant role in American history in his cultural and historical analysis Manhood in America (2006), Kimmel identifies three archetypes of masculinities5 within the historical-cultural landscape: the Genteel Patriarch, the Heroic Artisan, and the Self-Made Man, which at times coexisted and at others feuded with one another (cf. 2006: 12-13). The Genteel Patriarch can be most closely associated with an aristocratic, European manhood. He derives his power from property and land ownership and stands as the benevolent patriarch at the head of the family. He has refined tastes and is well-mannered, drawing heavily on the British code of honor and notions of chivalry. Similarly, the Heroic Artisan is influenced by European guild and craft traditions, with values such as a strong work ethic, honesty, virtue, and loyalty. The Americanized Heroic Artisan is, however, first and foremost independent and self-reliant, advocating liberty, manual labor, and democratic ideals. The Self-Made Man, the third archetype Kimmel mentions, eventually becomes the most influential ideal of American manhood throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. The Self-Made Man derives his manhood almost exclusively from the public sphere of the workplace and his success in it, measured by the degree of social and geographic mobility, wealth, and status. In contrast to the Genteel Patriarch’s land and property ownership and the Heroic Artisan’s independence as craftsman, farmer, or shopkeeper – which were pillars of stability in most men’s lives well into the 18th and 19th centuries – the Self-Made Man ventures into the fluctuating marketplace, which promises high rewards at the risk of great losses. While the Self-Made Man is not a purely American phenomenon, his development in the United States was faster as well as more extensive and intensive. According to Kimmel, this can be attributed to the young republic’s democratic ideals and lack of hereditary aristocracy, which provided a fertile ground for the ascent of the Self-Made Man (Kimmel 2006: 12-13).
5 Kimmel illustrates the three archetypes of masculinities he identifies by referencing Royall Tyler’s play The Contrast (1787). He associates each archetype with one of the main characters featured in the play. Billy Dimple as the Genteel Patriarch, Colonel Manly as the Heroic Artisan, and finally Mr. Van Rough as the Self-Made Man. Apart from fictionalized works being fruitful for analyses of cultural phenomena and expectations in general, this work in particular highlights that competing ideals of masculinities were part of a discourse before the gender discourse itself became visible, evidenced by the suggestive naming of the characters.
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In a different approach, historian E. Anthony Rotundo categorizes historical processes of masculinities into three phases, starting with communal manhood of New England Puritan societies. Life in Puritan New England was structured with great emphasis on religious doctrines, which identified a male God, who created men first and then women as their subordinates, and in which it was decidedly clear that women – not men – were responsible for the fall of grace. This led to a gender hierarchy in which men were superior to women and second only to God himself. However, while male power in church, family, and state affairs was unquestioned, men also owed a duty to the community and their inferiors. Duty was a key ideal around which gender and societal norms were structured, leaving little room for concepts of individuality, independence, and self-reliance. Communal identity, which required submission to superiors, duty and faith therefore preceded self-expression. While submission was required, self-assertion was, however, part of enacting communal masculinity in some cases. Settlements in New England were presented with seemingly endless opportunities for personal gain due to vast resources and space, as well as ignorance of Native American life and property – if one was only assertive enough to claim them. Therefore, a certain amount of individual ambition in financial wealth and warfare were permitted from early colonial efforts onwards6 (cf. Rotundo 1993: 11-15).
Over the course of the 18th century, society became even more lenient towards men asserting themselves and gaining personally in the process. Small merchant classes began developing, the Great Awakening furthered the belief in personal independence, and the continuous westward expansion relaxed strict societal norms. By the 1770s, ideals of self- assertion, self-control, and independence were far less restrained (cf. Rotundo 1993: 14-15). However, these new ideals of the late 18th century became increasingly difficult to reconcile with British ruling authority. According to Kimmel, the United States’ Declaration of Independence (1776) can also be read as a declaration of self-controlled, liberated, republican manhood. The American Revolution was not only a revolt against British authority, but also against British aristocratic masculinity and a peak of American self-assertion (cf. Kimmel 2006: 14). To truly embody self-reliant American manhood, one needed to be autonomous and exert control over liberty and property. The Revolution provided a coming- of-age for American men. Republican, industrious, and liberated American manhood provided a counterpart to European manhood, which quickly became denounced as effeminate, lacking virtue and determination. Aristocracy was equated with effeminacy and softness, largely due to its refined tastes and appreciation of luxury. In the late 18th century,
6 Tolerance of ambition and self-assertion, while sometimes extended to women, was primarily a male privilege. Male individual desire was far easier to negotiate within prevailing power structures, seen as adding to the common wealth and advancement, whereas female divergence from norms always posed a threat to patriarchy. It was thus far less accepted (cf. Rotundo 1993: 15).
13 luxury started to be associated with softness and thus, a lack of manliness, for the first time. This view of luxuries as soft and even feminine is still grounded in American society to the present day (cf. Kimmel 2006: 14-15).
The Revolution changed the gender paradigms of American society profoundly. The establishment of a free and independent republic presented American men with the opportunity to invent themselves anew as such. What Rotundo calls the “language of manliness” (1993: 16) became prevalent in political discourse and added a new layer to the definition of manhood. The Declaration of Independence itself proclaimed “he [George III] has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people [emphasis added].” During colonialism in the present- day United States, society was structured hierarchically for both genders; however, in the era of the new republic, these structures changed in favor of a more independent model of masculinity. Democratic power lay in the hands of individual citizens, meaning that firm individualism began to rank above communal submission in the political arena. These individual citizens participating in the political process, which excluded women, immigrants and slaves, began reaching positions of power and relished in the political self-control the new republic provided. Qualities such as firmness, individualism, and assertiveness became inherently linked to republican masculinity (cf. Rotundo 1993: 15-16).
Such changes in political structures also had far reaching effects on womanhood and femininity: women’s right to participate in the political process did not change after the American Revolution, as they could still neither hold an office nor vote, their position in society became cemented to the home and domestic realm. At the same time, men gained more influence in the political and thus public sphere in this new system of governance. Ruth Bloch demonstrates this division by analyzing the heavily gendered symbolism connected to virtue. In her assessment, public virtue was the most highly valued quality in men in the early days of the Revolution. However, the Revolution also gave rise to a more feminine, private, feminine kind of virtue. In the 1780s and 1790s, as active battle slowly gave away to nation- building processes, women’s virtuous duties changed to a role of instilling, nurturing, and promoting republican virtue in their sons (cf. Bloch 1987: 45-46). The home became the teaching ground for republicanism and morality, with the mother as the head teacher. Republican motherhood redefined femininity, womanhood, and motherhood. If it was a man’s duty to be politically and financially successful, it was a woman’s duty to guard communal virtue and morality (cf. Rotundo 1993: 17-18). After the Revolution, the separation of spheres, while not newly invented, became sharper than ever before. Men increasingly abandoned the position of moral authority within the family and assumed a stronger, more aggressive political role defined instead by commercial self-interest. The results of this were threefold: First, the
14 perception and assessment of women’s character was reversed radically. A woman was “no longer viewed primarily as the sinful daughter of Eve, she was now thought to exert an uplifting moral influence on men” (Rotundo 1993: 18). Second, women were no longer considered to be simply inferior to men, but the sexes were rather seen as being profoundly different. Women were nurturers, born to be pure, pious, and virtuous. They complemented men, and it was their obligation to balance out masculine self-interest, aggressiveness, and ambition. Third, the division of the world into two spheres became the consensus. Ideally, men were socially mobile and politically active within the public sphere while women were the custodians of the home, full of softness and warmth in the private sphere (cf. Rotundo 1993: 17-18; 24-26).
According to Kimmel, the three archetypes of manhood coexisted successfully throughout the late 18th and 19th centuries. While the Self-Made Man triumphed over the competing ideals of manhood throughout the 19th century, neither the Heroic Artisan nor the Genteel Patriarch disappeared immediately. However, the Genteel Patriarch was the first archetype to be uprooted and displaced. At the outset of the century, the Genteel Patriarch was wealthy, powerful, and owned vast estates; nevertheless, he was also increasingly dandified. While still influential during the first half of the 19th century, he virtually disappeared after the Civil War and the consecutive dissolution of slave plantations, his last large sphere of influence. The once ideal American man became gradually feminized and viewed as weak: American men now became dismissive of former codes of conduct and dress, which were largely inherited from European aristocracy. They began exchanging powdered wigs and ornamented cloth for simple and sturdy clothing, rejecting luxury, and rallying against inherited wealth, which was believed to make men idle and feminine. In this exact context at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Kimmel identifies the beginning of a rampant fear of femininity in American men7 (cf. Kimmel 2006: 20-21; 27).
In the young republic, Heroic Artisans, including craftsmen, shopkeepers, and small farmers, took on a highly valued model of masculinity. Despite struggling through economic hardship in the first half of the 19th century, they stood proud and valued their independence and liberty. The Heroic Artisan embodied ideals of Jeffersonian liberty, which promoted self- governance, democratic ideals, and republicanism. Although they were largely self-employed or worked in shops with fewer than ten or twenty employees, Heroic Artisans were not isolated. They instead cultivated communal bonds among each other and saw it as their duty to be politically involved and active – a drive that lead to early labor organizations such as
7 This fear of feminization became important to the perception and representation of masculinities throughout the centuries and is still prevalent within modern masculinity, as can be seen, for example, in homophobic rhetoric feminizing gay men and denying gay masculinities.
15 the Knights of Labor. However, the rise of industrialization, establishment of large factories, and consequent decline of small craft shops rendered older skills obsolete. Employment rates skyrocketed and the formerly highly valued bonds between masters and apprentices thus began to dissolve. In terms of produced goods, quality gave way to quantity which in turn led to a higher demand for wage laborers. This employment trend led to the formation of working men’s political parties, such as the Working Men’s Party (1828) and the Equal Rights Party (1833), which translated the working man’s hardships into a rhetoric “saturated with equations of autonomy and manhood. Loss of autonomy was equated with emasculation; economic dependence on wages paid by an employer was equivalent to social and sexual dependency” (Kimmel 2006: 22). The frustrations of the artisan class and their declining status led to policies aimed at completely excluding women from the workforce and erupted into riots against masculinities deemed unfit and un-American, especially those of immigrants (cf. Kimmel 2006: 22-23).
Kimmel summarizes antebellum working-class masculinity poignantly: “[T]he American working class that emerged in the decades before the Civil War was self- consciously white, native-born, and male, rooted as much in racism, sexism, and xenophobia as in craft pride and workplace autonomy” (2006: 23). Post-Civil War white working-class masculinities were increasingly measured against black masculinities, which were considered by the former to be overly uncivilized, sexual, and even predatory as well as (paradoxically) boyish, lazy, and unintelligent (cf. Kimmel 2006: 22-23).
Rotundo’s second phase of American manhood coincides with Michael Kimmel’s final archetype of manhood: the Self-Made Man. According to Kimmel, the Self-Made Man eventually succeeded against the other archetypes by mid-19th century, particularly after the Civil War, as he effectively feminized the Genteel Patriarch and proletarianized the Heroic Artisan. From this point on, the Self-Made Man has continued to be the prevalent, idealized version of masculinity in mainstream American culture (cf. Kimmel 2006: 28-29). Kimmel traces the victory of the Self-Made Man to the Civil War, in which the question of slavery, and consequently the conflict between a Southern slave-based, agrarian economy and Northern industrial capitalism, took center stage. The Civil War was also a gendered war8, in which different masculinities, femininities, and gender relations were contested (cf. Kimmel 2006: 49). As the Civil War drew near, stark contrasts between concepts of Southern man- and
8 Differences in gender relations, expectations, and realizations between the North and the South could already be observed before war broke out. Northern women, for example, had started to increasingly advocate for women’s rights, which was a grave disturbance in societal relations in the eyes of many Southerners. For numerous Southerners, feminism, abolitionism, and democratization in the North were indicative of a decline of societal values and an affront to natural gender and racial hierarchies (cf. Pinar 2001: 237-240).
16 womanhood were valorized; however, it quickly became clear that traditional performances of masculinity and femininity could not be supported during wartimes. While men fought as Confederate soldiers on the battlefield, women had to assume responsibilities such as supporting families and undertaking business affairs. Furthermore, the roles of the genteel lady and the Southern gentlemen were heavily dependent on slavery. It allowed white middle and upper-class Southerners to rely on black slaves for unpaid menial labor, gave Southern men intrinsic power, and cast them as the lady’s protector against the world’s supposed dangers, especially black men (cf. Pinar 2001: 237-240).
Apart from the restructuring of gender systems in the North and South during and after the Civil War, American culture was also drastically changed by the emerging and soon- to-be booming market economy. Antebellum America had already undergone a gradual shift from largely self-sufficient and low-scale production to large-scale, profit-oriented production; however, the burgeoning marketplace, influx of new workers, and industrialization transformed post-Civil War America into a heavily commercialized and increasingly capitalist nation. The vast possibilities the new market economy provided, and its belief in equal opportunity for (white) Americans, led to an adjustment in cultural conceptions of society, work, and masculinity (cf. Arehart, et al. 2016: Chapter VI). The American economy came to be perceived as a level playing field for industrious, determined, and economically quick- minded men to become wealthy and successful in this new competitive nation. Equal opportunity to succeed, however, also meant equal opportunity to fail. The shift from a communal masculinity in the colonial period to self-made manhood was stark. America was suddenly not filled with comrades but potential competitors (cf. Rotundo 1993: 19; Kimmel 2006: 30). With the abandonment of aristocratic lineage and the decrease in artisan patronages, a man’s social standing was no longer fixed. The notion that only those who worked hard enough would succeed quickly became ingrained in American society. Respectively, lack of commercially success was blamed on weakness of character or man’s faults, such as laziness or alcoholism. Each individual man was believed to entirely control his own social identity, and his worth as a man was determined by his success in the workforce (cf. Kimmel 2006: 30-31; Rotundo 1993: 168-169).
A man’s work and subsequent success or failure became the essence of his self- perception and social identity as a man. Fathers increasingly withdrew themselves from the home and their children’s education due to the division of spheres, extensive working hours, and long commutes. The establishment of schools also played a role, as middle and upper- class boys could now learn ‘manliness’ from peers and teachers rather than their fathers (cf. Rotundo 1993: 25-27). Adhering to the ideals of self-made manhood implied not only the successful making of the individual, but also one’s family (cf. Rotundo 1993: 167-169).
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Surviving in this new stressful and ascendancy-focused society meant that men needed to exercise self-control. 19th-century America was rapidly changing and thus experienced as being disorderly. Therefore, the need for control arose even more strongly than before. Men needed to moderate their supposedly ‘manly traits’, such as aggression and ambition; they needed to refuse or at least monitor temptations such as alcohol, laziness, and sexual urges9; and they needed to work hard to provide their families with a ‘breadwinning’ wage (cf. Rotundo 1993: 178-179; Kimmel 2006: 31-32).
The pressure of the free market economy and the fear of being domesticated by women in the home resulted in men seeking ways to escape. Akin with Huckleberry Finn, numerous men headed west to escape competition with other men in the market place, the domesticity of the home, and the mundane. When Henry David Thoreau wrote “[t]he mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation” (Thoreau 1854: 10), he captured the banality of day-to- day life and the fear of industrialization countless men felt. Westward expansion in the 1800s, particularly the California Gold Rush in 1849, provided opportunities for men to leave the realms of business and family behind, and experience new adventures, enjoy homosocial bonds, and free themselves from overt commercial pressure and the crowds of the increasingly urbanized east. Actual escape was not a viable option for every man who sought it, which led to fantasies of escape. Novels about adventures in the wilderness with strong homosocial relationships, honorable protagonists, and an absence of women boomed in 19th- century America. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, James Fenimore Cooper’s Leatherstocking Tales, which revolve around the frontier hero Natty Bumpoo, and Herman Melville’s narrative about the monomaniacal, revenge-seeking Captain Ahab and his ill-fated hunt of the white whale Moby Dick all provided fantasies of adventure and non-domesticity for men. They were tales of heroic feats in untamed environments without the confinement of the home and routine life in the workplace (cf. Kimmel 2006: 40-46).
The influx of immigrants in the early 20th century, particularly from Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the aftershock of the financial crisis in 1873, and the start of a vocal women’s movement increasingly displaced traditional masculinity, resulting in what is referred to as ‘a crisis of masculinity’10. Aiding these macrostructural external changes in
9 Manifestations of these beliefs were reflected in society through various channels. Rising alcohol consumption, for example, was paralleled by increased efforts by health reformers and organizations that promoted temperance to condemn drinking, the alleged vice of successful men (cf. Rotundo 1993: 180-182; Kimmel 2006: 31-34; 40). Sexuality was decried in the same vain, which is illustrated in American minister John Todd’s The Student’s Manual, a self-help book for young men in 1835 (cf. Kimmel 2003: 31-32). In the book, he warns adolescents and young men from the dangers of abusing their imagination, identifying it as a grave peril of manhood and stating that “a heavier curse can hardly hang upon a young man than that of possessing a polluted imagination”9 (Todd 1856: 147). 10 In historical research into masculinities “crises of masculinities” are frequently mentioned and explored. They are generally defined as periods in which anxieties about masculinities were
18 social paradigms, competing ideals of manhood increasingly destabilized normative masculinity. During times of relative peace and rapid transition from individual craftsmanship to industrialized factory work, it became unclear how men could prove their masculinity because normative ideals began to disappear steadily. If not a soldier or artisan, how was a man to express his usefulness to the community and thus prove his masculinity? This lack of clear guidance resulted in amplified aggression. Susan Faludi notes that “[being] a man increasingly meant being ever on the rise, and the only way to know for sure you were rising was to claim, control, and crush everyone and everything in your way” (Faludi 1999: 11). Hostilities against new groups entering the public arena and particularly the workforce led to a rise in racism and xenophobia as well as harsh backlash against early feminism (cf. Kimmel 1987: 262-46; Kimmel 2006: 59-62). Under the banner of muscular Christianity, the Ku Klux Klan, for example, experienced a revival in the first two decades of the 20th century, embarking on a self-claimed ‘holy crusade’ to reclaim Southern manhood by denying black masculinities, engaging in racial violence and opposing the women’s movement (cf. Kimmel 2006: 65-66; 129).
Furthermore, in the early 20th century, women’s presence appeared stronger, as they began entering traditionally masculine areas. They campaigned for the right to vote, joined the workforce in ever-growing numbers, and increasingly demanded sexual and marital liberty. This push by American women into the public arena redefined not only femininity, but also masculinity. Masculinity began to be defined more vigorously as the opposition to, or perhaps even the escape from, femininity. Instead of first and foremost detangling oneself from childish impulsivity and recklessness, men needed to distance themselves from femininity in order to be perceived as truly masculine. Around the same time, insults that directly referred to femininity and homosexuality (read: inferiority and weakness), by employing terms such as sissy, fairy, and milksop, experienced an increase in usage (cf. Rotundo 1993: 4-9; Kimmel 2006: 69).
Amy Greenberg argues that a profound shift of what constituted hegemonic masculinity took place throughout the 19th century, in which notions of masculinity, formerly connected to aptness of the mind, gradually came to rely on certain physical criteria (cf. Greenberg 2005: 8-9). After the Civil War, the male body shifted into focus, with strong
particularly high due to internal as well as external ‘threats’, with which masculinities were confronted. While overt reactions to situations which seemed to imperil masculinities and resulting changes in practice and performance in a given time period are categorized as ‘crises’, there is room for the argument that masculinities are perpetually unresolved and in constant need of demonstration and validation. Hence, in a ceaseless state of ‘crisis’. While, the idea of masculinity in crisis/es aids in historicizing masculinities, it is by no means uncontested because it frequently ignores processes of stasis and change inherent to gender norms (cf. Baron 2006: 144-146). Nonetheless the term will be used throughout this paper to illustrate cesuras within models of masculinities.
19 physicality being a key ingredient to healthy American manhood. Signing up for gym memberships, lifting weights, and sculpturing the male body to befit the new ideals of the male physique became common among American men (cf. Rotundo 1993: 223). Another pillar of a healthy and pure American male body was the strict regulation of marital sex and masturbation11 (cf. Kimmel 2006: 88). Even as the rampant fear of the damaging propensities of human sexuality decreased, sexual anxieties of a different kind remained prevalent. Instead of fearing the male sexual drive as polluting the mind, potential impotence due to sexual inactivity became the culprit. Women’s proposed unresponsiveness to male sexual advances and enthusiasm was said to hinder a healthy male sexuality, possibly leading to impotence (cf. Kimmel 2006: 89).
Given this background, sexual anxieties invigorated homophobia. American culture was perceived as increasingly feminine after the Civil War. Education and childrearing were almost exclusively feminine by the turn of the 20th century, and Freud’s precarious linkage of homosexuality to neurosis stemming from overbearing motherhood caused numerous parents to consult childrearing manuals and physician’s advice. Modern society, lasting peace, and the loss of the frontier were said to be the primary causes of the ‘wimpification’ of America, and solutions were provided accordingly. Men had supposedly become too soft and needed to rediscover their masculine roots by leaving the feminizing city and returning to the wilderness12. The most famous example of a city man rediscovering his inner cowboy, and thus his masculinity, is Theodore Roosevelt (cf. Kimmel 2006: 89-91). For centuries, men had been linked with culture, while women had been creatures of nature. This binary began to shift as men were increasingly seen as passionate, in touch with nature, untamed and wild. Masculine passions, including self-assertion as well as sexual desire, selfishness, greed, and lust, which were expected to be controlled throughout the 1800s, were accepted as intrinsically masculine and even valuable in the 1900s. Men started to embrace ‘the primitive’, almost animalistic nature they ascribed upon themselves (cf. Rotundo 1993: 227-228). A renaissance of outdoor leisure activities, such as hunting and fishing, were supposed to bring back innate masculinity to a pampered nation. In this context, gambling, horseracing, and baseball also reached great popularity. Fighting and military experiences of the Civil War were likewise glamorized and relived through aggressive sports like boxing and American
11 Similarly to John Todd in antebellum America, numerous self-help books written by doctors, self- proclaimed experts, and clerics were published to help men refute sexual temptations. J. H. Kellogg was among the most famous health reformers and strongest critics of masturbation, which he termed “self-abuse”, going as far as to suggest genital mutilation to prevent it (cf. Kellogg 1887: 295; Kimmel 2006: 88). 12 These notions of masculinity were, however, not just for grown men to internalize, but also young boys, best reflected in W.D. Boyce’s founding of the Boy Scouts of America in 1910, an organization that aimed to engage boys in nature and implicitly remove them from overwhelming motherly care and overcrowded cities (cf. Rotundo 1993: 258).
20 football. Escaping femininity also culminated in what is now known as the Gilded Age of fraternities. Numerous clubs, lodges and fraternities sprang up all over the United States, establishing enclaves where men could be men among men (cf. Kimmel 2006: 92-93, 112- 116; Rotundo 1993: 240).
The fear of feminization would later be mitigated as the United States joined the fight on the European continent in 1917. World War I provided a stage for a generation of men in crisis to exercise military masculinity, which had become heavily romanticized in the decades following the Civil War (cf. Rotundo 1993: 233). The greater the enthusiasm to prove military masculinity in the trenches was, the greater the disappointment in the subsequent interwar period. Veterans returned from Europe physically and emotionally scarred, becoming prime subjects of psychiatric literature. Military masculinity had once more been proven instable and elusive. Furthermore, the Great Depression destroyed the image of the workplace as a stable source of masculine identity. Unemployment rates soared, and wages fell, which in turn led to a renewed surge of nativism, racism, and exclusionary politics aimed at women and minorities (cf. Kimmel 2006: 127-129).
As the Great Depression questioned the pillars of masculinity, the Second World War, euphemistically put, came to the rescue of men who felt as if they had lost their masculinity with the crash of the stock market. “Men had been able to prove on the battlefield what they had found difficult to prove at the workplace and in their homes – that they were dedicated providers and protectors” (Kimmel 2006: 147). However, once more, war was only a temporary reprise, and the return to day-to-day life proved increasingly difficult. War veterans struggled to adjust to the expectations of postwar masculinity and women alike, many of whom only reluctantly exchanged their civic duties for domestic ones in support of the wartime effort13 (cf. Kimmel 2006: 147-18).
Nonetheless, World War II changed how American men and the nation were perceived both at home and abroad.
The United States came out of World War II with a sense of itself as a masculine nation, our ‘boys’ ready to assume the mantle of national authority and international leadership. The nation claimed an ascendency over the world, men an ascendency over the nation, and a male persona of a certain type ascendency over men [emphasis in the original]. (Faludi 1999: 16)
13 Cynthia Enloe raises the question of whether wartime mobilization cements patriarchal authority or indeed weakens it. Women who had become socially mobile during wartime periods, did neither forget their learned skills nor their newly acquired public persona, even if they retreated from the public sphere. Enloe argues that these changes in self-perception and value, eventually furthered the feminist movement in the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Enloe 1993: 61-62).
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Invigorated military masculinity had established common denominators with which men could identify. There was a common enemy, a common strife, and a new frontier – all of which helped to create a seemingly unified wartime masculinity (cf. Faludi 1999: 20-22). Word War II had given men a sense of masculinity by using what Faludi calls “the national male paradigm” (1999: 26), which refers to recurring patterns that have historically proven to establish a sense of masculinity. In World War II, the Nazis were a common enemy to defeat, as were the British loyalists or the Native Americans centuries before. The fighting lines in Europe now promised a new frontier, as the American West once did. Families needed a masculine protector and men an enclave of fraternal bonding, as it was during the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and within the comforts of the popular lodges and men’s clubs of the early 1900s (cf. Faludi 1999: 26-27).
The 1950s saw a revival of fantasies of escape. What was once found in literature in the 19th century was now projected onto the big screen, mostly in the form of Western films14. Cowboys became revered cult figures; rodeos and dude ranches experienced a renaissance; and John Wayne became the ultimate embodiment of rugged, Western, cowboy masculinity (cf. Kimmel 2003: 166).
During the Cold War era, the national male paradigm first seemed to prove useful as well. Communism as an ideology as well as its concrete embodiment in the form of the Soviet Union were the new common enemy; space was dubbed the new frontier; the brotherhood of men was now a band of colleagues, engineers, and bureaucrats; and the families needing protection were now cared for by their steady incomes. Soon, however, it would turn out that while all aspects of the paradigm were fulfilled on the surface, they could not quite realize American men’s expectations. The first illusion to implode was the new frontier. After the Soviets sent Sputnik into space in 1957, a proper panic ensued. Winning the race to the moon became America’s main goal – a way to prove its superiority in the world. While the initial phase of the space program was met with burgeoning enthusiasm, the spatial frontier turned out to be a fraud15. The moon landing, while nonetheless a milestone in American
14 Westerns provided the desk job middle-class bureaucrat with a romanticized image of a lost frontier, saturated with depictions of manly duties and homosocial, frequently also interracial, bonds, as in The Lone Ranger. Such interracial, homosocial bonds were not uncommon in 19th century literature. Couples like Natty Bumpoo and Chingachgook in James Fenimore Cooper’s Leather Stocking Tales, Ishmael and Queequeg in Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick (1851), and Jim and Huck in Mark Twain’s The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1884/5) all offer a white leading hero and a man of color sidekick, who often acts as a spiritual guide to the protagonist. The celebration of male (interracial or interspecies) bonding continues until today in franchises such as Lethal Weapon and Star Trek, however, still largely neglecting or even celebrating unbalanced power dynamics (cf. Kimmel 2003: 44). 15 The American frontier’s appeal had always been a mixture of the thrill of adventure and the subsequent integration of new territory. The American West was discovered, conquered, and then
22 history, did not feel like an accomplishment of American men in general. It was the accomplishment of NASA engineers, scientists, and astronauts; and the awareness of American men’s lack of contribution slowly but steadily crept into society (cf. Faludi 1999: 27- 29). Furthermore, communists in general and Soviets in particular did not fulfill the criterion of the common enemy as clearly as, for example, the Nazis. For American men whose fathers had fought in Europe or the Pacific, the perception of patriotic and proud American masculinity was infused with images of brave soldiers liberating concentration camps and eliminating easily identifiable enemies. It was an aggressive and protective masculinity seemingly renouncing everything perceived as feminine and soft16. While the Cold War generation also participated in wars, including the Korean War and, most importantly, the Vietnam War, their fronts were not as clearly defined. The goals of battle were also ambiguous, which in turn led to waning public support for veterans and soldiers (cf. Faludi 1999: 28-29).
[It] was hardly the crucible of courage against a clear and visible enemy that his [the Vietnam veteran’s] father had faced. There was nothing clear about any of it, not the nature or identity of the enemy, not the mission, not where they should be shooting or who was shooting at them, and certainly not the meaning of victory. Nor was this a ‘masculine’ war in the World War II mode. There were no landings, no front lines, no ultimate objectives. It was essentially a war against a domestic population, against families, where huts were burned with Zippo lighters, cattle slaughtered, children machine-gunned […]. (Faludi 1999: 29)
Unlike their forefathers, Vietnam veterans were confronted with a changed society after returning from a highly-criticized war, and, in contrast to veterans of previous wars, their homecoming was not openly celebrated. Looking at gender dynamics specifically, it must also be noted that women were working during this time and not keen on leaving their jobs behind once more, further eroding the ideal of the male breadwinner (cf. Faludi 1999: 29; Kimmel 2003: 158).
civilized. Space did not fulfill these criteria; there was no colony to be founded on the moon and no territory to be gained (cf. Faludi 1999: 28-29). 16 Scholars have frequently identified military masculinity as simply renouncing everything considered un-masculine. Military masculinities are defined as hard, unemotional, aggressive and unfeminine. Aaron Belkin challenges this understanding of military masculinity by emphasizing its contradictory nature. The military has motivated service members to fight by forcing them to embody traits and identifications which have been framed as binary oppositions – masculine/feminine, strong/weak, dominate/subordinate, victor/victim, […] and to deny these embodiments at the same time.” (Belkin 2012: 4). In his opinion the definition of military masculinity is often shrouded by a glorification of soldiers, which leads to a simplification of identity dynamics at work within the military. He recognizes that the military has often been dubbed a prime example of a melting pot, in which men (and later women) of different backgrounds and social standings fight alongside each other for the American and democratic cause. This view, however, neglects that the military has often been an arena for exclusionary policies, fearmongering and scapegoating, which in turn has been smoothed over by imperial reactions to perceived foreign threats (cf. Belkin 2012: 4-5; 173).
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The civil rights movements of the 1960s can be viewed as marginalized groups’ fight to be liberated from societal expectations, unequal laws, and persecution. At the same time, it was an assault on traditional norms of (white) masculinities and the power relations in which they operated. By raising their voices against oppression, marginalized groups offered a stringent critique of white, heterosexual masculinities. Women gave a name to their problem without a name and vocalized their struggle for self-domination and equal opportunities. The African American Civil Rights Movement challenged white superiority and campaigned for full and equal citizenship. The Gay Liberation, also active during this time, asserted that gay masculinities were just as masculine as heterosexual ones. This inevitably led to backlash17 in the form of aggressive, sexist, homophobic, racist, and xenophobic language (cf. Kimmel 2006: 174-185).
With the onset of the Regan presidency, popular conservatism was shifted farther to the right while simultaneously villainizing liberal policies and politics – a trend that would likewise impact notions of gender in America. A strong man at the top was again in demand, and women’s rights suffered under such reverting tendencies18. Images of traditional masculinities, sometimes fused with military masculinities and a strong emphasis on physicality and virility, found their path into Hollywood movie productions. Leading actors such as Sylvester Stallone, Arnold Schwarzenegger, and Jean Claude Van Damme, donning aviator sunglasses, cowboy boots, bomber jackets, and muscle cars, would not only appease the men’s fashion and auto industries but rise to fame among American men through such films (cf. Kimmel 2003: 202-203; Babcock 2015). At first glance, the reappearance of the tough-guy masculinity may be perceived merely as backlash against women’s and minorities’ achievements during and after the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s; however, as Michael Kimmel argues, this response cannot be simplified down to a defense mechanism against gains made by the ‘others’, but must be viewed more generally as a reactionary, frustrated response to an ever more modern and global society and economy (cf. Kimmel 2013: 25).
17 At the same time, ideals of a “new sensitive man” of the civil rights and anti-war movements, proposed as a counterpart to hardened, distant and frequently militarized masculinities, would also materialize. In the case of the anti-war movement, however, this image quickly vanished, as it never gained much ground and the archetype of a pacifist, pro-feminist, and pro-sensitive man had to once more make room for the norm of the revived cowboy (cf. Kimmel 2006: 193). 18 The defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment in 1981 and the closure of the Office of Domestic Violence in the same year are two instances which illustrate the backlash on a policy-level. Furthermore, the belief that feminism and the women’s movement were harmful rather than helpful to women made headlines in magazines and newspapers ranging from The New York Times to Vanity Fair. Feminism was to be blamed for everything from female depression to the dissolution of family values to impotence (cf. Faludi 1993: 2-4; 14).
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Kimmel suggests these new angry and largely white heterosexual masculinities originate from “aggrieved entitlement” (Kimmel 2013: 21). As pointed out throughout this chapter, American men have always been given the impression that they will make it as men in America if they work hard enough and exercise (self-)control. The ideology of the American Dream suggests that diligence and perseverance will bear fruit in the end. However, for numerous men, both then and now, the American Dream has proven to be an illusion. A study by the Pew Research Center in 2012 showed that while 84% of Americans experienced higher absolute mobility than their parents, meaning their income exceeded the income of their parents, their rates of relative social mobility, meaning the ability to move between social classes, have remained stagnant (Pew Charitable Trusts 2012: 6). Their findings also revealed that only 4% of those born into the bottom quintile will reach the top quintile, which effectively disproves the ‘from rags to riches’ narrative (cf. Pew Charitable Trusts 2012: 4-6). Kimmel’s aggrieved entitlement thus stems from the failure to succeed in a world in which men have been led to believe, even promised, that they would eventually make it. This feeling of betrayal produces anger and resentment towards women, minorities, immigrants, and homosexuals, who are frequently perceived as taking their jobs, dictating the new norms through identity politics, or benefiting unfairly from affirmative action and government benefits (cf. Kimmel 2013: 8; 18). Kimmel, however, also argues that this anger not only stems from a feeling of entitlement, but also powerlessness. In an increasingly interconnected, global, and supposedly equal society, traditional notions of masculinity have begun to erode. Women’s advancement in the workplace, even in fields perceived as decidedly masculine, such as politics and the military, combined with deindustrialization, the conundrum of emotional constraint on the one side and being a loving partner and caregiver on the other, as well as the steady disappearance of the sole breadwinner providing for his family, have all contributed to what is often called the contemporary crisis of masculinity. The notion of being in a position of privilege while not feeling powerful seems to ring painfully true for middle and working-class men in 21st-century America (cf. Beynon 2002: 77-78; Kimmel 2013: 297-285).
Among scholars, the notion of a contemporary crisis of masculinity in the late 20th and early 21st centuries has become a common framework for analyzing contemporary masculinities. While there is not a universal consensus on these crises, they are frequently utilized to explain periods of change in the definition, representation, and production of masculinities. John Beynon, while critical of the crisis narrative in general, traces factors which contributed or even may have caused the so-called contemporary crisis. He cites changes in the workplace, the entrance of women into previously male fields, lower employment rates, early death, high rates of depression and suicide, gay liberation, male crime rates, and feminism among the most important and frequently discussed factors (cf.
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Beynon 2002: 77-78). Additionally, qualities formerly associated with a strong and healthy masculinity are nowadays often relegated, especially in comparison to traits traditionally perceived as female (cf. Beynon 2002: 84; MacInnes 1998: 46-48).
What were once claimed to be manly virtues (heroism, independence, courage, strength, rationality, will, backbone, virility) have become masculine vices (abuse, destructive aggression, coldness, emotional inarticulacy, detachment, isolation, an inability to be flexible to communicate, to emphasize, to be soft, supportive or life affirming). (MacInnes 1998: 47)
In conclusion, masculinities have always been subjected to trends, impacted by history, and were rarely static. As Whitehead and Barrett (cf. 2001: 7) argue, different time periods, with their respective cultural and political settings, demanded different masculinities. However, masculinities might never have been as prescribed and mandated as they are now. “[I]t can be argued that perceived notions of how males should perform their gender have never been more subject to media and popular interpretation than they are in this global, post-modern age” (Whitehead and Barrett 2001: 7).
2.2 The Origins of Masculinity In this chapter’s introduction, it was stated that masculinities are diverse, meaning that it is nowadays largely agreed upon that they are neither simply natural nor innate, and possibly defy definition. A variety of men’s movements formed following second-wave feminism to deal with issues and questions relating to the masculine gender and its role in society. Masculinities studies scholars propose vastly different positions on what masculinities are and what they perhaps should be. Additionally, the history of American manhood, full of ever- changing definitions and expectations, has been illustrated, presenting a framework which gives insight into the manifestations of different forms of masculinities in a temporal, regional, and cultural setting. Yet the question of the origin of masculinities stubbornly remains. Theories suggesting natural, biological, and innate sources of masculinity are continuously reiterated, republished, and exploited through a variety of avenues, including advertisements, political campaigns, popular culture, and the media. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine the following questions after all: Is masculinity something men learn? Is it something natural and innate to men’s bodies? Or is it something entirely different?
Generally, a rough distinction can be made between the various methods for determining masculinity’s source. On the one hand, there are essentialist approaches, which treat masculinity as something naturally occurring within men, found either in their bodies or constructed in their psyches. These strands of research, including psychoanalysis, evolutionary psychology, behavioral genetics, and sociobiology, seek what is often referred
26 to as an “essence of masculinity”. This also means that these approaches do not define masculinities as multiple or pluralistic. While some theories acknowledge that masculine behavior manifests itself in various patterns, essentialist approaches strive to locate the origin of masculinity19 within men’s bodies and minds. On the other hand, there are other methods that largely refer to cultural, social, and historical circumstances as influencing, informing, and shaping masculinities. These approaches reject the notion of a natural essence of masculinity and aim to define gender as being varied and constructed within social realities, languages, and cultures. In other words, they define concepts of masculinities.
Before addressing the different approaches, it should be noted that just as with scientific research in general, studies on gender and sex differences are by no means removed from ideologies and agendas. Science claims to be objective; however, especially in research on differences between the sexes, this objectivity is repeatedly stretched to its limits, as it is a field of study in which the separation of science and politics becomes increasingly difficult. Early biological and psychological sex differences research often heavily favored male superiority, and even nowadays biased test procedures and questions do occasionally resurface (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 10-12).
2.2.1 The Biological Essence of Masculinity
True masculinity is almost always thought to proceed from men’s bodies – to be inherent in a male body or to express something about a male body. Either the body drives and directs action (e.g., men are naturally more aggressive than women; rape results from uncontrollable lust or an innate urge to violence), or the body sets limit to action (e.g., men naturally do not take care of infants; homosexuality is unnatural and therefore confined to a perverse minority.) These beliefs are a strategic part of modern gender ideology, in the English-speaking world at least. (Connell 2005: 45)
As stated in this quote, men’s bodies frequently become the focal point of research on masculinity. Locating the origin of masculinity in men’s genes, hormones, and chromosomes as well as in their brain’s development and structure still is a popular approach (cf. Connell 2005: 45). Edley and Wetherell argue that every known cultural group, whether historic or modern, makes a distinction between men and women, and it is assumed that the two categories are fundamentally different from each other to some degree (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 9). Renowned sociologist R.W. Connell, however, argues that treating
19 The use of the singular form ‘masculinity’ is deliberate when considering essentialist approaches. In contrast to the modern consensus, which argues for a plurality and diversity of masculinities and male experiences, essentialist approaches largely define masculinity as singular and having a source in the male body or mind.
27 women and men as fundamentally different in body and mind is a more recent concept, as it actually began in the 18th century. She argues that rather than perceiving women as fundamentally different, they were considered incomplete and inferior versions of men. “Women and men were not seen as bearers of qualitatively different characters; this conception accompanied the bourgeoise ideology of ‘separate spheres’ in the nineteenth century” (Connell 2001: 31). Post-enlightenment societies have, however, employed a rigid distinction between the two sexes. This distinction is commonly made by observing physical differences between men and women, mainly their respective genitalia, or, in broader terms, their bodies20. In this process, men and women are not only described but defined. This means biological sex is equated with cultural associations of masculinities and femininities21 (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 9).
While broader interest in sex and gender has been growing in recent decades, biological sex difference research was already on the rise in the 19th century. In 1879, Gustave LeBon described women as naturally less intelligent and inferior to the majority of men, more akin to children or what he referred to as ‘savages’22. In line with the views of mainstream science in the 19th century, LeBon, a student of renowned physician Paul Broca, based his conclusion largely on the physical differences between male and female brains (cf. McCredie 2011: 75-76). This search for physical differences, which focused primarily on the brain and enjoyed widespread recognition in the 19th and early 20th centuries, is still periodically in vogue in modern science. The size and weight of the brain are no longer considered markers for superior or inferior intelligence in scientifically reliable sex difference research. However, this does not mean that inquiries into anatomical differences of the brain but also genes, chromosomes, and hormones pertaining to differences in intelligence are uncommon in the second half of the 20th century (cf. McCredie 2011: 79). Fausto-Sterling refers to neurological studies as late as the 1970s that attribute varying degrees of intelligence to sex differences, spanning from the influence of testosterone and estrogen to varying degrees of brain lateralization in males and females. While the most of studies she cites have been disproven, criticized, or regarded as insignificant to modern science, it is
20 This frequently also results in an omission, abasement or at least invisibility of individuals which do not fall into either category neatly, as is the case for intersex individuals among others (cf. McCredie 2011: 62). 21 A penis is not simply a part of the male body – it becomes the defining part, a signifier for maleness as well as masculinity. On the other hand, a vagina and breasts come to signify femaleness as well as femininity. 22 While he acknowledged some women as more intelligent than the average man, he qualified his statement by suggesting that those women were as rare as two-headed gorillas (cf. McCredie 2017: 75).
28 notable that all of them conclude that males have a greater capacity for intelligence (cf. Fausto-Sterling 1985: 37-41).
In popular culture and media, theories on intelligence differences based on sex resurface continuously. Tabloid newspapers, such as the Daily Mail as well as right wing media outlets like Breitbart, have both published articles about sex-based intelligence difference as late as 2006 and 2015, respectively. In 2005, the former president of Harvard University, Lawrence Summers, was criticized for suggesting that the reason for female underrepresentation in the natural sciences is that women have less aptitude in these fields than men (cf. Clerkin and Macrae 2006; Yiannopoulos 2015; Goldenberg 2005). While the mentioned theories may be based on flimsy scientific evidence or pseudo-science, their continuous republication illustrates the remaining interest in finding biological differences which deem men more intelligent, capable, and thus fitter for positions of power and leadership.
Apart from occasional pseudo-scientific articles, the topic of brain size and its relation to intelligence finds little place in current biological gender research. Instead of searching for differences in brain composition and structure, the focus has shifted to genes and hormones. Attributing sex differences to our genetic make-up is highly appealing for various reasons. Recognizing physical similarities in relatives can be a source of comfort and further our sense of belonging; blaming genes for our shortcomings such as weight problems, stubbornness, or shyness can lessen our guilt about those characteristics and be a tool of justification for our vices. Behavioral genetics aims to hold genes responsible for a broad spectrum of traits ranging from aggressive or shy behavior to criminal activity to intelligence and gendered labor divisions. In this sense, genes are considered an appropriate and equally warranted explanation for features of physical appearances as well as complex social structures and systems. It quickly becomes apparent that lumping these together is highly controversial because it is quite an intellectual leap from one to the other23 (cf. Fausto-Sterling 1985: 61- 62). Another problem with behavioral genetic theories is that they largely deny individual change. According to behavioral genetics acting or being a certain way is not an individual’s choice but depends on whether a certain gene is activated. This also means there is no possibility to reform one’s behavior (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 30).
The assumption that genes solely predispose human behavior and social systems has large blind spots. A common argument in this line of thought states that brain development is influenced by genes, which in turn influences human behavior. This behavior
23 Furthermore, the assumption that one gene is responsible for a certain characteristic such as aggression is highly unlikely considering even physical features such as eye or hair color are determined not by one, but rather by multiple genes (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 30).
29 then shapes our social, legal, and cultural systems, thus making genes responsible for phenomena such as divisions of labor and power dynamics within human societies. There is little evidence to support such a claim and much of what is known about human brain development frequently outright contradicts it. When looking at brain development, it has been proven that the organ’s formation begins in utero and that an individual’s amount of nerve cells is most likely fixed during pregnancy. Neuronal pathways, however, are continuously established after birth in interaction with the specific environment of an individual. This is important because it negates a purely genetic basis for human development. Depending on the specific environment an individual is born into, his/her brain may develop differently. Additionally, it challenges the reoccurring view that biology is primary, meaning it is often assumed that genes and hormones influence human behavior but not vice versa (cf. Fausto-Sterling 1985: 71-75; 100).
Additionally, sex hormones have often been the focus of sex difference research. Testosterone and estrogen and their influence on human bodies, minds, and culture take center stage. It is undisputed that sex hormones are crucial for the development of reproductive organs in utero and secondary sexual characteristics during adolescence. However, the effect of sex hormones on human brain development and psyches, which lead to sex differences in behavior between men and women, is far less affirmed by scientific evidence (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 31).
The belief that women are guided by their hormonal constitution is old but persistent. Hormonal cycles and levels are linked to cultural concepts of femininities and what is considered feminine behavior. From this perspective, women are more erratic, irrational, emotional, and hysterical solely due to their hormonal physiology, and therefore unfit to hold positions of power responsibly (cf. Fausto-Sterling 1985: 91). In the same vein, cultural aspects of masculinity are then ascribed to higher levels of the male sex hormone. Testosterone, the hormone perceived by the public as being responsible for aggressive behavior and related characteristics such as high drive, ambition, self-assertion as well as criminality and delinquency, thus becomes the counterpart of the supposedly femininity- inducing estrogen. There is a long history of men who stood out as violent or anti-social who were subjected to castration in an attempt to calm them and curb their aggressive tendencies24 (cf. Fausto-Sterling 1985: 126).
The idea that sex hormones precondition gendered behavior already begins to disintegrate due to ambiguous terminology. For example, when assuming that testosterone
24 There is no scientific proof that castration lowers aggression and aggressive behavior (cf. Fausto- Sterling 1985: 126).
30 is responsible for aggression, the first questions that arise are: How is aggression defined, or in other words, what constitutes aggressive behavior? How can aggression be measured, and is it valid to equate all aggressive behavior ranging from juvenile delinquency to riots and war? This becomes particularly problematic when war and aggression are conflated because while war certainly is an aggressive act, it is a social rather than individual phenomenon. Thus, this could lead to the assumption that all men refusing to go to war or evading the draft, even if the alternative is prison, have lower levels of testosterone and therefore are less aggressive, which is not scientifically proven (cf. Fausto-Sterling 1985: 126-129).
It quickly becomes frustrating that although research into biological sex difference has been conducted for over a century, there seem to be no conclusive answers. Edley and Wetherell point to two different reasons for this lack of results. First, they argue that there is a strong political agenda behind sex difference research, which makes it increasingly difficult to find proof for either theory. As soon as a scientific theory and its findings are published, another theory to discredit it follows suit. Second, the dichotomy between biological basis and environmental influences might hinder rather than help inquiries into the subject matter. This dichotomy is widely known as the so-called nature-nurture debate (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 35).
The nature-nurture debate is not necessarily an either-or question. It acknowledges the importance of culture, society, and family as important agents in human development; however, it assumes that biological and environmental factors, while both important, can be clearly distinguished from one another and therefore measured and compared separately. This leads to two core assumptions: The first postulates that there must be one factor more important in determining an individual’s behavior, and second asserts that biological and environmental influences can be viewed as separate entities. Lynne Segal summarizes the problems with biological sex difference research as oversimplified and ignorant of historical and cultural specifics:
Biology affects culture. But how it influences our lives is a historical and cultural variable. Biology does affect culture, but not in ways that can be specified independently of that culture; not […] through some fatality inscribed in our genes. […] Biological differences in intellectual and emotional capacities, if they exist, are most certainly not of such magnitude as to override human culture in explaining existing relationships between men and women [emphasis in the original]. (Segal 1990: 64)
Even after over a century of research into biological differences between men and women, there still are no conclusive answers as to what masculinity is, where it comes from, and what separates it from femininity. While some biological characteristics that distinguish the two
31 sexes cannot be discounted entirely, such as reproductive organs and facial hair, it quickly becomes clear that “a man is much more than just flesh and blood” (Edley and Wetherell 1995: 37).
2.2.2 The Psychological Essence of Masculinity
If masculinity does not originate within men’s bodies, can it be found in their psyches instead? Psychoanalytical approaches depart from the idea that genes, chromosomes, and hormones are ‘masculinity-producers’ and focus rather on “feelings, thoughts, fantasies and self- experiences” (Edley and Wetherell 1995: 38). Theories of evolution and sexual selection become relegated in favor of a man’s childhood and his early social experiences (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 38-39). Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, while not discussing gender overtly, established the foundation of inquiries into non-biological sex difference. While, as Connell states, “Freud opened more doors than he walked through” (2005: 10), his psychoanalytical framework provided a new perspective on human identity, gender, and sexuality. Perhaps most notably his approach to masculinity and femininity acknowledged that gender as well as sexuality are neither fixed nor located in an individual’s body, but rather established in the mind through conflicts and processes of identification (cf. Connell 2005: 8-9). Moreover, he considered masculinity as well as heterosexuality as fragile and complex concepts with innate ambiguities. He argued against masculinity as a pure phenomenon and focused instead on its emotional complexities and even contradictions (cf. Connell 2005: 10).
Psychoanalysis sees the foundation of human identity, and thus gender identity and behavior, in conflicts experienced in infancy and early childhood. Freud rejects the idea that infants have an innate gender programed somewhere in their bodies as is the case in biological approaches. In contrast, he argues that they have the same basic needs and desires, regardless of their sex. Childhood, for Freud, is conflict-ridden and violent, full of repressive experiences and censorship, as children need to cut back on their own desires when faced with power relations in the real world. He identifies certain instincts and drives in all infants, such as the need for security and nurturement as well as, more controversial, sexual and aggressive desires (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 40-41). Masculine or feminine behavior then develops “from the way these innate drives towards different forms of pleasure and varying forms of satisfaction are strategically handled by […] parents” (Edley and Wetherell 1995: 41).
Much of Freud’s research is linked to his theory of the ‘Oedipus complex’, which describes the emotional conflict in which a child simultaneously experiences desire for one
32 parent and hatred for the other. In relation to masculinity, according to Freud, the oedipal conflict manifests itself in a boy’s rivalry with his father and his fear of castration (cf. Connell 2005: 8-9). Freud argues that boys love their mothers, who, as the typical primary caregivers, satisfy most of their basic needs, and develop a type of attraction towards them, in which they compete with their father for their mother’s attention. As incestuous feelings are universally inacceptable and taboo in nearly every culture, the boy must repress his desires. He “must learn to direct his attention away from his mother to attain an appropriate genital heterosexuality […] which eventually will be directed at other women” (Edley and Wetherell 1995: 42). The father subsequently transforms from rival to role model, and the boy begins to leave the world of women to express and experience himself as a man. In terms of fear of castration, Freud sees its manifestation first and foremost in the anxiety men feel about impotence and the failure to perform sexually. In his view, the terror men feel about castration overpowers their sexual desire (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 42-43).
Some of Freud’s insights into the intricacies of the mind are certainly exceptional and were radical at the time; however, it should not be forgotten that he saw men as the superior sex nonetheless. While his focus on the ambiguous and fragile nature of masculinity as well as his theories on an innate bisexuality in all humans can certainly be considered progressive, there is an inherent sexism in his theories (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 43). Edley and Wetherell highlight that Freud assumes femininity to be “not only an inferior identity, a failed masculinity, but also a less secure and integrated psychological state” (1995: 43). This misogynistic view of femininity can be found in numerous psychoanalytical accounts succeeding Freud and remained largely unquestioned until the feminist turn in psychoanalysis (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 45). Connell notes that especially between the 1930s and 1960s psychoanalysis took a conservative stance and frequently became a tool used to reinforce a patriarchal gender order. In the same line, one’s ability to conform to gender norms was a measurement of one’s mental health, and any deviation, most prevalently homosexuality, was automatically rendered pathological (cf. Connell 2005: 11).
With few exceptions such as Simone de Beauvoir’s seminal work The Second Sex (1949) and Joan Riviere’s landmark article “Womanliness as a masquerade” (1929), which moved away from the idea of fixed gender patterns and towards a more flexible and inclusive view on gender development, feminism and psychoanalysis were hardly put in relation to one another until the 1960s (cf. Connell 2005: 18-19). At least in part due to the women’s movement of this time, modern psychoanalysts revised, and in some cases even reversed, hyper-positive accounts of masculinity and derogatory views of femininity. Men were no longer simply seen as the more capable, less emotional, and overall superior gender, but also as being more violent and prone to crime and abuse. Psychoanalysts also observed a
33 decidedly defensive quality of masculinity, which seems in constant need of being proved, strived towards, and mutually reassured as well as actively separated from effeminacy (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 46).
Feminist object relations theorists25 such as Nancy Chodorow provide an alternative position to Freudian views on gender development. She argues that while Freud’s theories are misogynistic, psychoanalysis still has merit for the analysis of gender development. “Object relations theorists contend that humans have an innate drive to form and maintain relationships, and that this is the fundamental human need that forms a context against which other drives, such as libidinal and aggressive drives, gain meaning” (Appelrouth and Edles 2011: 347-348). As most infants are still primarily raised by women, object relations theories closely investigate motherhood and the mother’s relationship with her infant. Greenson popularized the concept of dis-identification and counter-identification. He suggests that boys experience their first intimate relationship in their infancy with their mothers and thus identify with femininity rather than masculinity until the age of 24 months. They acquire a so-called ‘primary femininity’ (cf. Diamond 2004: 359-360). In order to achieve what is referred to as ‘normal’ heterosexual masculinity, boys need to dis-identify from their mothers and then counter-identify with their fathers. Girls, on the other hand, have to go through neither of these two identification processes. Drawing upon this foundational theory, it can be deduced that masculinity emerges as the more fragile and complex gender as result of this added identification burden. Similarly to Freud, Greenson also sees masculinity as emerging through and because of a struggle against femininity26. However, the reasons for the dissociation vary. While Freud considers the taboo sexual desire towards the mother as main reason, Greenson believes the identification with the mother as a person is the cause (Edley and Wetherell 1995: 47-48). For Chodorow, the process of disidentification from femininity poses implications for the perpetuation of misogyny. When distancing themselves from the mother and the femininity she represents, boys close themselves off from emotional intimacy and possibly develop resentment towards women in general (cf. Appelrouth and Edles 2011: 349).
25 Object relations theory accepts the basic Freudian premise of natural drives, which define human development; however, it locates these drives in interpersonal relationships, focusing on intimacy rather than sexuality (cf. Appelrouth and Edles 2011: 347). 26 Defining masculinity as ‘not femininity’, however, would be undesirable, as the concept is difficult to maintain and always allows for a “‘collapse’ into femininity” (Edley and Wetherell 1995: 53). Some psychoanalysts suggest that maintaining what is considered a ‘normal’ masculinity in our culture, which defines masculinity as the polar opposite of femininity, becomes practically impossible and hinders men from self-acceptance and an awareness of their needs as human beings (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 53).
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While psychoanalysis, both in its Freudian beginnings and more modern object relations theories, has produced fruitful insights, it is not without criticism. Psychoanalysis rests on Freud’s concept that unconscious processes inform daily realities and personalities. The problem with this view is that it can be neither proven nor disproven nor even tested properly, which naturally leads to any psychoanalytical claim being scientifically questionable (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 45). Furthermore, psychoanalysis largely neglects the outside world. Power structures in society as well as diversity in terms of class and race of individuals and realities of the gendered world such as the division of labor pose problems for psychoanalysis (Edley and Wetherell 1995: 67-70). Inequalities and power dynamics are frequently either neglected, or it at least remains “unclear […] whether psychoanalysts commenting on men […] are referring exclusively to white, middle-class, heterosexual, able- bodied men, or whether they assume that masculinity has a common genesis and shape” (Edley and Wetherell 1995: 67).
From a feminist perspective, it is also highly problematic that numerous psychoanalytical accounts essentially devalue femininity and motherhood (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 65). For example, Robert Stoller’s theory of a core gender identity27, which forms in the early years of childhood and can be disrupted through an incomplete or non- existing disidentification process from the mother, casts mothers in an unflattering light. Stoller developed his core gender identity theory while observing male to female gender dysphoria in a series of case studies (cf. Connell 2005: 14). He concluded that transsexualism in boys can be traced back to the mother’s inability to separate herself from her male infant (cf. Stoller 1974: 109). He additionally, and rather harshly, accuses mothers of transgender girls, who were assigned the male gender at birth, of being not only too permissive, but also actively encouraging feminization (cf. Stoller 1974: 120).
Object relations theory, too, has been accused of neglecting real life power relations and painting a picture of frail masculinities as opposed to stable and strong femininities. This ignores inequalities between men and women. Object relations theorists are thus criticized for suggesting that women are actually the more powerful sex and simply choose to give up their power to men – a claim which is objectively wrong when looking at power relations governing society (cf. Segal 1990: 76).
Connell (cf. 2005: 20-21) sums up the use of psychoanalysis and object relations theory as a crucial tool in the study of masculinity. This field, however, is vastly incomplete and fails to include the diversity of power structures as well as the complexities of human
27 As Connell (2005: 14) points out Stoller’s theory is also problematic in its narrowness, which departs from Freudian views of sexuality and gender as complex and contradictory structures. He believes gender identity to be fully formed as a core gender identity in the first years of an individual’s life.
35 experiences and desires. In conclusion, this suggests that while looking at men’s psyches may be more beneficial than focusing solely on their bodies, psychoanalysis does not suffice to explain masculinity or the complexities of men’s lives; for this, it is ultimately too essentialist, periodically misogynist, and homogenous. Grasping gender complexities and real-world power structures requires leaving behind theories of an essence of masculinity, and moving towards concepts of masculinities.
2.2.3 The Male Sex Role and Social Learning Theories
The lack of conclusive findings regarding sex difference in the psyche, emotional capacity, and temperament prompted some theorists to evaluate the sociological component of the so- called ‘sex role’ (cf. Segal 1990: 65). While the idea of the world as a stage, in which everyone plays a certain role, may be old, the accompanying theory of individuals enacting a certain role pertaining to their male or female sex is relatively new. It was not until the 1930s that this approach was accepted as a serious method in the social sciences for observing and surveying human behavior. The term ‘sex role’ is used to describe a set of cultural expectations generally attached to an individual’s sex, which when acted out means essentially being a man or woman. These sex roles are produced through socialization and are largely internalized, meaning they are not consciously performed most of the time (cf. Connell 2005: 21-22, Segal 1990: 65). Sex role theory quickly gained traction partly because it provided a model of gender development that was not only based on intrapersonal relations during infancy, but also gender socialization in society at large (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 71). In comparison to essentialist theories, such as the aforementioned psychoanalytical and biological approaches, sex roles are defined as products of society, meaning they are not fixed. If societal norms and expectations change, sex roles will inevitably change as well (cf. Connell 2005: 23). Another important implication of role theory for masculinities is that rather than seeing masculinity as an essence, it came to be viewed as the result of socialization processes (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 71).
Paper-and-pencil testing became the most popular tool to measure masculinity and femininity. Terman and Miles (1936) devised one of the first inventories to assess gender propensities in individuals. The underlying assumption was that masculinity and femininity were situated on opposing sides of a scale, meaning they are binary oppositions. They collected items that were expected to yield different results for women and men and divided them into different various categories such as word association and interests. There were obvious problems with this test and how its results were interpreted. First, anthropologists criticized that the items chosen were frequently arbitrary, thus not allowing for similar results
36 to be reproduced in culturally different settings (cf. Brown 1986: 319). Second, gender personalities were often conflated with gender stereotypes, indicating that the items tested what men and women should be rather than what they were. Lastly, the interpretation of results was far from objective, as they suggested feminine men and masculine women were deviant and inverted (cf. Edley and Wetehrell 1995: 75-77).
Talcott Parsons soon emerged as a key figure in sex role theory. Adhering to the functionalist school of thought, he interpreted society as an organism in which every individual or group in society has a certain function to work towards the fulfillment of societal needs. For Parsons, gender order established itself naturally so that society’s needs could be fulfilled in the most efficient and beneficial manner (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 77-78). Parsons, as most early sex role theorists, also believed that sex roles and their resulting divisions in the real world were harmonious, stable, and overall positive28 (cf. Connell 2005: 23). Men and women together, he argued, complemented each other in the nuclear family and thus made society as a whole work smoothly (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 78; Segal 1990: 65).
The issues with sex role theory already begin with its terminology. Role theorists generally assume that the male as well as the female role consist of certain key characteristics or norms. A norm, however, can describe something that is normative and/or ideal, as well as a rule that a significant number of individuals of a group follow. Put another way, from the very beginning, scholars could not fully agree on whether role theory describes how individuals act or how they are expected to act (cf. Segal 1990: 65, Edley and Wetherell 1995: 90). This had the problematic side effect of overemphasizing and exaggerating the degree of conformity to the male sex role most men experience. Most men do not exhibit all the core qualities that sex role theory identifies as masculine, which means either most men are not masculine, a fairly unlikely reasoning, or the core qualities defined distort the complexity and diversity of the masculine experience. As Connell (2001: 33) poignantly asks, “What is ‘normative’ about a norm hardly anyone meets?”
Another problem with role theory is the idea that masculinities and femininities are two opposite ends on a scale, which ultimately makes them mutually exclusive. This perspective essentially eradicates tensions, ambiguities, and conflicts from theories on gender identity. An individual can be either masculine or feminine; there is no in-between29
28 He ascribed different social functions to genders in a familial setting, defining men as “instrumental”, meaning they were inclined to actively ‘get things done’, and women, who he defined as more attuned to emotional and nurturing capacities, as their “expressive” counterparts (cf. Parsons and Bales 1956: 46). 29 This either-or paradigm was challenged by Sandra Bem, who situated masculinity and femininity not as polar opposites but rather as separate entities. To do so, she devised a test which allowed masculinity and femininity to be scored separately, thus allowing androgyny to be a possible result (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 76-77). Her research showed that not everyone conformed equally to
37
(cf. Edely and Wetherell 1995: 76-77). Furthermore, Parsons’ functionalist interpretation of role theory still relied heavily on Freudian ideas of castration anxiety and oedipal conflicts. Social learning theories move away from the classical psychoanalytical basis and perceive gender socialization as a conditioning phenomenon. The school argues that gender socialization happens through measures of positive and negative reinforcements, indoctrination, observation, and imitation. Individuals learn appropriate gender behavior by imitating the same-sex parent as well as through means of reward and punishment by society (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 78-80). Several studies have shown that parents, peer groups, and educational facilities indeed exhibit encouragement for gender appropriate behavior. A study by Rheingold and Cook (1975) examined children’s bedrooms and found that the selection of toys, furnishings, and color schemes and patterns were significantly gendered, and thus could possibly have a gender socializing effect30. Social learning theories point to such studies to prove gender socialization through conditioning but fail to answer as to why. Connell notes that role theory provide no explicable reason as to what agency second parties, in the form of parents and educators, have, on reproducing, reinforcing, and rewarding gendered behavior. By not supplying agency, role theory essentially suggests that second parties choose to reinforce gender roles, which would mean the entire system is based on voluntary action by individuals. This, as Connell points out, declassifies role theory as a social theory because while social theories should examine the relation between social structure and individual agency, role theory simply skirts around structure and replaces it with personal agency (cf. Connell 1987: 50).
It is understandable why role theory and social learning theories are appealing. They allow for change by “[offering] principles of political reform” (Connell 1987: 49), they are less deterministic than classic psychoanalytical and biological approaches, they regard social structures as not only important but influential for gender realities, and, last but not least, they seem believable in terms of one’s own personal experiences (cf. Connell 1987: 48-49; Edley and Wetherell 1995: 84-85). Critics have, however, pointed out that role theory oversimplifies gender dynamics by exaggerating the extent of prescription in human behavior and overemphasizing differences between men and women, primarily due the theory’s grounding in a male-female gender dichotomy derived from biological sex difference (cf. Connell 2005: 26-27). Most crucially, however, both theories fail to grasp the interrelation of gender and power. Neither role theory nor social learning theories realize the need to examine hierarchies
gender expectations. Bem herself later revised her findings by stating that they did not in fact measure masculinity or femininity in an individual but rather the “cognitive constructs derived from sex roles which we use to organize our perceptions and our social world” (Segal 1990: 67). 30 This was also proven in a more recent study conducted by Nash and Fraleigh in 1993, who found similar differences in boys’ and girls’ bedrooms (cf. Hughes 2010: 164; Nash and Fraleigh 1993: 5).
38 and systems of violence and oppression within gender. “To explain difference in the situation of men and women by appeal to role differentiation is to play down violence, and suppress the issue of coercion by making a broad assumption of consent” (Connell 2005: 27).
2.2.4 Constructionism(s)
Connell (cf. 2005: 68-71) identifies four different strategies in academic research that have been used to categorize masculinity: essentialist, positivist, normative, and semiotic approaches. The strategies are not mutually exclusive, nor always self-contained, but frequently overlap. In the previous chapters, essentialist approaches have been assessed as being too narrow to explain the complexity of masculinity. Positivist approaches focusing on “what men actually are” (Connell 2005: 71), are frequently based on paper-pencil testing and commonly associated with sex role theory. While this strategy acknowledges that femininity and masculinity are flexible and fluid, it disregards power dynamics as well as the fact that mediums created to test masculinity and femininity are informed by presupposed assumptions about characteristics and behavioral patterns, which constitute masculinity or femininity respectively, in any given culture. Normative approaches investigate the idea that masculinity is what men should be according to cultural norms. This approach allows for closer investigation of the varying degrees of ‘normative masculinity’. It likewise enables scholars to recognize that not all men adhere to the normative standards issued by figures such as, for example, John Wayne. At the same time, the consideration of differing degrees of adherence constitutes the strategy’s main flaw. Thus, the question of how long it is appropriate to talk about a norm if only some men can fully comply, remains. Connell identifies the semiotic approach as the most beneficial strategy to analyze masculinity. Drawing largely on structural linguistics, it suggests that masculinity is defined through sets of signs which are masculine by being decidedly not-feminine. In this binary opposition, masculinity becomes an unmarked term that denotes its dominance over the marked opposition, namely femininity (cf. Connell 2005: 70-71). By recognizing the semiotic approach as crucial to the study of masculinity, Connell takes a constructionist stance and agrees with the general tendency of focusing on language and its capacities to construct realities as a foundation of gender studies.
Defining social constructionism can prove difficult because it is a multidisciplinary approach, influenced by fields such as sociology, linguistics, social psychology, and anthropology, and manifests itself in multiple social constructionisms, which sometimes overlap and sometimes oppose each other. Brickell argues that while the plurality of social constructionism can be confusing, convoluted, and occasionally vague, it simultaneously
39 enables relatively holistic research on gender and sexuality through its multiple theoretical viewpoints (cf. Brickell 2006: 87-88). Despite social constructionism’s imprecise nature, Vivien Burr identifies certain core assumptions that are shared by various social constructionist approaches and provides a tentative framework of the approach. In the broadest sense, social constructionism argues that there is no single underlying universal reality that can explain the world and be uncovered through means of empiricism and positivism. Instead, it suggests that realities are constructed through social interaction, by experiencing reality through a set of culturally and historically specific categories, which are also constructed through social processes (cf. Burr 2015: 3-5). One of the most important categories for the analysis of gender is identity. Sean Nixon argues that investigating identity categories is of utmost importance in gender studies. He describes masculinities, and identities in general, as “invented categories”, further explaining that “[t]hey are the product of cultural meanings attached to certain attributes, capacities, dispositions and forms of conduct at given historical moments” (Nixon 1997: 301). He warns against dismissing such categories as fictitious, because while they do not offer a definitive foundation akin to biological or divine explanations, identities are crucial for helping us “operate in the world, to locate ourselves in relation to others and to organize a sense of who we are” (Nixon 1997: 301).
To fully grasp social construction theories, language and other representational systems must first be examined, as they are undoubtedly at the heart of such theories. Language is understood as “performative and constructive” (Burr 2015: 202), which means that by using language people actively perform and construct their own world. This does not suggest that there is not a material world, but rather indicates that a material world itself has no meaning until its meaning is constructed (cf. Hall 1997: 25). Much of social constructionists’ understanding of language has been derived from structuralist Ferdinand de Saussure, who defined language as a system of signs. According to him, each sign consists of a signifier, which denotes the form of a sign, and a signified, the concept which is associated with the signifier. He also identified the relationship between the two components as arbitrary, which implies that to understand one sign, it must be differentiated from others (cf. Hall 1997: 31-32). Drawing on this conclusion, Nixon argues that if signs and concepts of masculinities are relational, meaning they are defined in contrast to femininities, one cannot understand masculinities at a given point in time without locating the prevailing discourses on femininities as well. Thus, they can only be defined in relation to each other (cf. Nixon 1997: 298). Saussure’s focus on the formal properties of language, however, leaves little room for notions of power. Additionally, while Saussure denoted the link between signifier and signified as arbitrary, he also saw language as a closed system. Building on his research,
40 cultural theorists and linguists later challenged this notion and proposed that language is not fixed, but rather full of variety in meaning and continuous change (cf. Hall 1997: 30-35). This assessment is significant because if language and its meanings are variable, they can be challenged, contested, and renegotiated continuously; in other words, they are capable of reform (cf. Burr 2015: 61-62).
Saussure’s theories as well as subsequent broader theories in the field of semiotics decisively shaped social constructionism. To counter the treatment of language as a static and closed system, research gradually began focusing on “representation as the source for the production of social knowledge [emphasis in the original]” (Hall 1997: 42). Michel Foucault departed from the rather narrow view concerning the production of meaning through language and focused instead on the production of knowledge through discourse, an approach that quickly gained traction (cf. Hall 1997: 36-37; 42-43). In fact, very few recent analyses of gender and sexuality omit Michel Foucault’s concepts of discourse and its relation to truth, power, and knowledge. Foucault removed the term ‘discourse’ from its former exclusively linguistic meaning and interpreted it as including language as well as practice. He saw ‘discourse’ as a system of thoughts and statements that enable one to convey one’s knowledge of a subject at a given moment. By talking about a certain subject, however, the discourse on the subject is actively constructed. “It [discourse] defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about […] It also influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others” (Hall 1997: 44). Foucault, while not denying that objects and ideas can exist materially, concludes that they cannot have meaning outside of discourse. Knowledge about objects (material items, actions, etc.) can only be obtained through discourse (cf. Hall 1997: 44-45). Foucault’s views are radically anti-essentialist; by claiming that nothing, not even the subject itself, has meaning outside of discourse, he challenges modernist methods of scientific and sociological research. Moreover, by denying the existence of a universal truth, feminist theorists have subsequently highlighted the instability and plurality of gendered identities and their relation to power structures. There is no natural essence which allows for a particular normative identity to be dominant, but certain identities can be “disciplined into dominant versions (white, middle-class and male) through discourses” (Rahmam and Jackson 2010: 43).
Discourse, knowledge, and truth31 cannot be viewed separately from power. Knowledge is intrinsically linked to power, as knowledge itself is a form of power. Possessing
31 Truth is used here in a Foucauldian sense. Foucault was skeptical of the notion of truth as it is commonly used. He rejected the idea of a universal, objective truth and deemed the concept meaningless unless connected to the power relations which produce it. This implies that truth as well
41 or lacking knowledge determines one’s ability to participate in a discourse and subsequently construct meaning. Moreover, questions concerning who can participate as well as whether and which knowledge is permissible in a particular instance directly implicate power. In recognizing this legislative effect of knowledge and power, it becomes evident that knowledge does “not only assume the authority of ‘the truth’ but has the power to make itself true” (Hall 1997: 49), rendering the notion of a universal, objective truth effectively futile (cf. Hall 1997: 48-49). Foucault’s model of power/knowledge has had a profound impact on feminist theory, prompting investigation into how power manifests itself “through specific binary and hierarchical identity categories such as homo/hetero, male/female, black/white” (Rahmam and Jackson 2010: 44). Foucault has been accused of being imperceptive of gender divisions. Particularly Marxist and socialist feminist theorists, whose views are deeply influenced by critiques of patriarchal and capitalist structures, see inequalities and power structures as being rooted to varying degrees in a material reality (cf. Burr 2015: 91-92).
As has been illustrated, neither Saussure’s nor Foucault’s theories are without challenge or criticism, and they are certainly not the only theories relevant to the study of masculinities and social constructs. However, both theorists offered groundbreaking insight into how one constructs reality, and thus into concepts and signs of masculinities, and led to the conclusion that gender is not inherent to one’s genes or psyche, but rather “a way of structuring social practice” (Connell 2005: 75). In the same line, it cannot be regarded as singular or timeless, as the knowledge discourse produces is culturally and historically relative, therefore enabling prevailing ‘truths’ to be challenged or even overthrown (cf. Burr 2015: 91-92).
Using an intersectional approach as a basis, masculinities must not only be seen in relation to femininities, but also to multiple masculinities (cf. Connell 2005: 74-75). The experiences and expectations of ‘black masculinities’, for example, are largely different from those of ‘white masculinities’ as are ‘working class masculinities’ in comparison to ‘upper class masculinities’. At the same time, white masculinities are constructed not only in relation to femininity, but also in relation to, for instance, ‘black masculinities’. Furthermore, it is insufficient to only differentiate between dichotomies of ‘black’ and ‘white’ masculinities, as the experiences within each specific category are diverse. “[E]asy generalizations […] are greatly misleading because within each of these broad categories there is considerable variation in both experience and presentation” (Beynon 2002: 2). Just as there is no single masculinity, there is no single ‘black masculinity’ but rather numerous different ‘black
is historically and culturally specific, and can be used to further the agenda of a particular group in the form of regimes of truth (cf. Walton 2012: 156-157).
42 masculinities’, defined and redefined continuously and experienced in manifold ways (cf. Beynon 2002: 2).
2.2.5 Gender and Power – Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Hegemony
Foucault’s theories on how power relations influence the construction of reality and truth have profoundly influenced the study of how masculinities have been and still are constructed. However, even though it is largely agreed upon that masculinities are constructed, Connell points out that “the social construction of masculinities is a systematic process” (2005: 38). This suggests that underlying social structures, such as patriarchal hierarchies and capitalist modes of economy, influence the constructive and productive processes of gender development and must therefore be highlighted. The social dimensions of masculinity have been uncovered by a range of theories – from sex role theory and social learning theories to social constructionism. However, while this social component has been acknowledged, power relations structuring society and gender have often not. This is a gaping weak spot because “an increasing number of social scientists appear to agree […] that any adequate theory of men and masculinity has to have the concept of power at its centre [emphasis in the original]” (Edley and Wetherell 1996: 97).
When analyzing gender through the lenses of power relations and patriarchal hierarchies, one question immediately arises: What exactly is patriarchy? Patriarchy is a term that initially appears easy to define; however, its intricacies and scope, as well as how and through which social mechanisms it operates, turn out to be unexpectedly obscure (cf. Rahman and Jackson 2010: 64-65). Originally, patriarchy had a significantly narrower meaning, denoting the role of the head of the family, the patriarch, over his subordinates, which included men as well as women. In feminist and masculinities research, this former meaning has largely disappeared, with the most common current definition instead referring to the power that men collectively obtain and exert over women, and the privileges they enjoy in comparison (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 121). However, feminist theorists are far from collectively agreeing on this definition32. Recent research has even gone as far as questioning
32 Pilcher and Whelehan comprehensibly summarize common critiques of theories that rely heavily on the concept of patriarchy. They state that such theories are in danger of being insensitive to change in gender relations over time, or, in other words, of being ahistorical. Moreover, some theories, including Marxist feminism, have been accused of reductionist tendencies since they identify only a single source, in this instance capitalism, as the basis and explanation for patriarchy and therefore fail to recognize the more intricate complexities of power relations. Additionally, focusing on patriarchy as a universal, one-fits-all concept ignores cultural variations in gender relations. It is often simply assumed that patriarchy operates everywhere identically without considering cultural and historical specifics. Lastly, while patriarchy can be a helpful tool in analyzing power relations between men and women, it
43 whether patriarchy, according to the aforementioned definition, might not be outdated altogether. MacInnes summarizes how patriarchy has been eroding continuously and cites evidence of “the material and ideological weakening and collapse of patriarchy” (2001: 322), such as a steadily increasing number of women in the workplace and changes in women’s legal positions and rights, which in turn have caused ideologies like the male breadwinner to lose traction in most industrialized societies (cf. MacInnes 2001: 316-321). Some scholars, however, are more reluctant to make such an assertion. Holter, for example, argues for a shift from analyses of power that rely solely on what he defines as direct gender hierarchies towards analyses of indirect structural inequalities, which relate to society and its inherent gendered structures of oppression, usually referred to as patriarchy (cf. Holter 2005: 16). While asserting that formal patriarchy has largely faded, he also suggests that patriarchal structures in society are still intact (cf. Holter 2005: 17-19). Nonetheless, scholars agree that the legacy of formal patriarchy cannot be discounted. As MacInnes states:
The material and ideological legacy of millennia of patriarchy remains in the dramatic material inequality between men and women, the continued dominance of men in the public sphere, especially in politics, in the systematic misogyny of all kinds of mental representations of the sexes and in the ubiquitous physical violence that characterizes sexual relations. (MacInnes 2001: 315)
The disappearance of formal or open patriarchal powers in industrialized nations has been definitively observed. While in most countries fathers no longer hand over their daughters to respective husbands and sexual abuse of a spouse is now illegal, discarding the concept of patriarchy as a whole would be neither beneficial nor accurate. Holter points out that although gender has in many senses become “supervisible or ‘hyperreal’” (Holter 2005: 19), patriarchy has remained overwhelmingly vague and invisible. Its effects are frequently tangible (for example, in the laws and regulations governing the labor market that frequently disenfranchise women), but its origins remain hard to trace. Holter emphasizes that it is crucial to recognize patriarchal structures as impacting all of society’s areas and functions, not only particular “gendered zones” (Holter 2005: 19).
Patriarchy has a long history, and structural inequalities between men and women are an important factor in analyzing how power relations influence gender practices. In addition to the topic of patriarchy, hardly any comprehensive analysis of masculinities and gender refrain from dealing with the capitalist form of economic production. Socialist and Marxist theorists have traditionally viewed the main source of men’s identities as being embedded in the capitalist structure of society, a competitive and profit-oriented system, overlooks how power dynamics unfold between men as well as between women. Thus, it provides only limited insight into gender related power dynamics (cf. Pilcher and Whelehan 2004: 94-95).
44 which, according to Marxist theory, alienates workers from the products of their labor as well as from each other33. “[I]f men are competitive, aggressive, emotionally inarticulate, detached, and oppressive in their dealings with others, then many of these characteristics can be explained as a consequence of our current mode of economic production” (Edley and Wetherell 1995: 99).
Marx himself, while offering an explanation of the exploitation of the middle and working classes, paid little attention to how the category of gender intersects with capitalist practices and how “the economic organization of society depended on the systematic exploitation of women to men’s advantage” (Edley and Wetehrell 1995: 122). While there are indications that the pattern is slightly shifting, domestic, unpaid work is still mainly performed by women. Such domestic work enables men to participate in economic production while locating women within the realms of reproduction. This split between men and women results in different material consequences, which in turn skew power relations, ultimately favoring men (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 122). When looking closely at capitalism, its seemingly natural link to patriarchy is so evident that it appears valid to question whether one can be analyzed without the other. Among feminist scholars, the belief that patriarchy and capitalism are “dual systems” (Edley and Wetherell 1995: 125), intersected by categories including race and class, has become increasingly impactful. Although capitalism in itself is not intrinsically gendered, its intersection with patriarchy enables it to become so. There is no overt reason why divisions of labor, wage gaps, and similar phenomena align themselves with the gender binary apart from the patriarchal structures that governed relations between men and women long before the advent of capitalism. Following this line of thought, the systematic disenfranchisement of the female workforce, which is reflected in multiple facets, such as a lack of affordable childcare, coupled with male reluctance to assume childcare responsibilities, and a consolidation of male economic power, can be attributed to the interaction between these two systems (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 126-127).
Critiques of patriarchy and capitalism certainly offer insight into how power operates between men and women, as well as how these power relations manifest themselves in material differences. At the same time, both perspectives are categorical in the sense that they see both men and women as separate, yet unified groups pitted against the other. Such categorical thinking can hardly be equated with social constructionist ideas, which at their core are anti-essentialist and advocate for multiple masculinities and male experiences. To some extent, categorical theories partially ignore how power regulates relations among
33 Victor Seidler, for example, argues that the stark division between public and private spheres, in the form of work and home, contributes to a split ‘sense of self’ in men, which furthers emotional detachment and depersonalization (Seidler 1991 qtd. in Edley and Wetherell 1995: 101).
45 masculinities and femininities (cf. Connell 1987: 54-55). The recognition of multiple masculinities has undoubtedly aided in grasping the complexities of gender; however, in order for them to not dissolve into a simple typology of masculinities, power dynamics between various masculinities and their intersection with class, race, sexual orientation, and other categories must be examined. As Connell states, “we have to unpack the milieux of class and race and scrutinize the gender relations operating within them. There are, after all, gay black men and effeminate factory hands, not to mention middle-class rapists and cross- dressing bourgeois” (Connell 2005: 76).
These power dynamics between masculinities are further developed in Connell’s influential model of hegemonic masculinity34, which quickly became revered and expanded as well as challenged35. In his influential work Masculinites, Connell conceptualizes hegemonic masculinity, drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s theories on hegemony as a means of control over social classes by a particular group through measures of consent and coercion. The process of establishing and maintaining hegemony usually, but not always, occurs without the use of physical force. Hegemony is neither fixed nor permanently attributed to the same group, but culturally and historically variable, meaning that hegemonies adapt when societal norms, expectations, and values change (cf. Hall 1997: 48). Connell applies this theory of cultural hegemony to offer insight into how power relations among men function, which patterns of masculinities are needed to maintain hegemony, and how masculinities and patriarchy influence each other. She (2005: 77) defines hegemonic masculinity as “the configuration of gender practices which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women.” Throughout history, particular ways of ‘being a man’ have been prized and praised above others, and set a standard of how masculinity should be interpreted, presented, and represented. This simultaneously leads to the marginalization and repression of other expressions of masculinities. Hegemonic masculinity does not necessarily need to be embodied by the most powerful men, and not
34 Connell traces similar patterns relating to femininities, which were originally referred to as ‘hegemonic femininities’; they were, however, renamed ‘emphasized femininities’ shortly after to highlight the asymmetrical power relations within a patriarchal system between femininities and masculinities. This thesis cannot comprehensively include emphasized femininities apart from mentioning them. Nonetheless, the concept of emphasized femininities must be acknowledged in order to account for the relational quality of gendered identities (cf. Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 848). 35 There is hardly any research on power relations and masculinity which does not use, criticize, or at least acknowledge Connell’s theory on hegemonic masculinity. It has become a highly polarizing conceptualization. Connell and Messerschmidt respond to some of the most frequently contested features of the concept and reformulate parts of the theory to comply with contemporary circumstances and research in their article “Hegemonic masculinity. Rethinking the concept” (2005). While not without problems, the theory does present a credible and important framework for this thesis, particularly in its more modern, adapted form.
46 every powerful man necessarily exhibits hegemonic masculinity. However, for hegemony to successfully be established, a certain “correspondence between cultural ideal and institutional power” (Connell 2005: 77) is likely. Moreover, hegemonic masculinity is not the norm but becomes normative. Most men do not – either because they cannot or do not want to – fully adhere to hegemonic ideals, which makes hegemonic masculinity inherently unstable and fragile (cf. Reeser 2010: 14). Nagel adds that “[h]egemonic masculinity is more than an ‘ideal’; it is assumptive, it is widely held, and it has the quality of appearing to be ‘natural’” (2005: 400).
If hegemony is not permanent and most men do not completely comply with it, why is it still prevalent throughout virtually all societies? Connell attributes this phenomenon mainly to men and their “relationship of complicity with the hegemonic project” (2005: 79). Essentially, this suggests that while the majority of men do not exhibit the normative ideal of hegemonic masculinity, they are frequently complicit in maintaining it. Hegemonic masculinity is used to legitimize patriarchal structures, and in the end, many men are equally responsible because they gain advantages through patriarchy and hierarchies among men. Lastly, it must be mentioned that hegemony operates in gender specific dominance-subordination patterns. Connell exemplifies this by referencing the dominance-subordination relationship between heterosexual and homosexual men, which is perhaps the most prominent, but certainly not the only, relationship of this sort. It is likewise noteworthy that in order to exercise domination and subordinate other patterns of masculinity, homophobic and effeminizing techniques are frequently utilized (cf. Connell 2005: 77-80).
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3. Masculinities, Presidential Politics, and the Nation
If nation states are gendered institutions, as much recent scholarship asserts […], then to limit the examination of gender in politics to an investigation of women only, as much contemporary research has tended to do, is to miss a major, perhaps the major, way in which gender shapes politics – through men and their interests, their notions of manliness, and the articulation of masculine micro (everyday) and macro (political) cultures [emphasis in the original]. (Nagel 2005: 397)
Nagel offers a reminder that nations, their institutions and organizations, as well as the political arena as a whole, are gendered spaces. She poignantly states that “[m]en organize, run, and ‘man’ the machinery of government” (Nagel 2005: 397). This, however, should not be interpreted as meaning that women do not have impact or agency within the government or the nation. Instead, it highlights that national and political structures and scripts were written by, for, and about men, while women have simply come to inhabit them (cf. Nagel 2005: 397). For this reason, a gender-oriented analysis of the nation and political systems must include an investigation into how masculinities affect, inform, and shape them. As previously established, masculinities and nations alike are socially constructed as well as maintained and challenged through discursive practices and representation. This does not imply that nations are imaginary, as they have physical effects such border checkpoints, but rather that certain elements of a nation and aspects shaping it are imagined (cf. Reeser 2010: 175).
Nation and gender are connected through analogies more often than typically realized and “[provide] the nation a gendered subjectivity that implies something about national characteristics” (Reeser 2010: 172). One may see Uncle Sam or even Superman as embodying America, thus ascribing Superman’s qualities, such as his strength, commitment to combat evil, and certainly masculinity – which is strong but humble, assertive but just and always ready to protect and preserve – to the United States. Applying Superman’s characteristics to the United States is one instance in which the nation is masculinized, meaning “gendered characteristics [are attributed] to it, especially power, hegemony, and sovereignty” (Reeser 2010: 188), which in turn reaffirms masculinity as embodying these qualities. Reeser also traces other crucial links between masculinity and the nation, such as the analogous nature between the male body and the nation (both are seen as impenetrable and hard), and the relationship between masculinity and imperial notions of conquest and colonization. In this comparative context, the avenues through which masculinity and the nation mutually reinforce and bolster each other, which unfortunately cannot be explored in detail here, grow increasingly apparent (cf. Reeser 2010: 176-177; 182-186).
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Historically, most nations have been mainly constructed by men and, arguably, to serve men’s interests. To better understand the relationship between masculinities and the nation, the interaction between masculinities and nationalism merits a closer look. First and foremost, it needs to be noted that their relationship “is an organizing and hegemonic one” (Nagel 2005: 404). The foundation of nationalism in most cases is conservatism, as nationalist beliefs emphasize the importance of tradition as a nation’s basis. In most societies, terms such as ‘traditional’ and ‘conservative’ are unequivocally related to ‘patriarchal’ and the notion of male privilege (cf. Nagel 2005: 404). Therefore, any analysis of masculinities and the nation must briefly mention how they relate to nationalism. One of the reasons why nationalism and masculinities frequently work in tandem, according to Nagel, is their similar historical origin. The modern Western hegemonic ideal of masculinity is largely seen to have developed starting in the early 19th century, roughly around the time nationalism and related practices such as imperialism and colonialism took hold in Europe and, albeit to a different degree, the United States. Another reason can be found when investigating how well cultural themes of nationalism resonate with those of particular, often traditional and conservative, masculinities. Qualities including honor, duty, bravery, and patriotism are difficult to attribute explicitly to either nationalism or masculinities because they are equally acceptable for both concepts, illustrating their strong, interlinking relationship (cf. Nagel 2005: 401-402).
Feminist research into nationalism pays close attention to how nationalist ideas affect women and men differently, and how they interact with masculinities and femininities. Cynthia Enloe points out that nationalism and its ensuing politics and policies have often been treated as gender neutral – understood as if they are experienced and manifest themselves in the same manner regardless of gender. The instability of these basic assumptions, however, is quickly uncovered by employing a feminist and gendered perspective onto nationalism and the nation. Enloe asserts, “nationalism typically has sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation, and masculinized hope” (Enloe 2014: 93). She argues that women have often either been relegated to national symbols in need of protection and reverence, effectively obscuring women’s active roles in the construction of the nation, or treated as objects of desire and conquest (cf. Enloe 2014: 86-91). At the same time, nationalism also demands a particular behavior of men. Nationalism is firmly affiliated with militarism and patriotism, which if rejected may make men fall prey to charges of cowardice and disloyalty. “Patriotism is a siren call few men can resist, particular in the midst of a political ‘crisis’; if they do, they risk the disdain or worse of their communities and families” (Nagel 2005: 402). Moreover, the identification process with a masculine-coded nation, which manifests itself in patriotic beliefs and behaviors, can help to assert an individual’s personal masculinity. In other words, men and women who wish to be perceived and identified as (more) masculine
49 might affiliate more strongly with a masculine-coded nation in order to be seen as masculine by association (cf. Reeser 2010: 187).
As illustrated above, masculinities and the nation cannot only be read as reinforcing each other for mutual benefit, but also interpreted in terms of the underlying anxieties, fears, and insecurities surrounding them. What if masculinities and the nation work so well together because the two concepts need to reaffirm rather than simply strengthen one another (cf. Reeser 2010: 188-189)? What if masculinity is “linked to the nation precisely because the nation needs to be buttressed by another incarnation of power or because masculinity needs to be helped by the representational power of the nation” (Reeser 2010: 189)? There have been instances in which nations fearing or in danger of military defeat employed masculinized (self-)images to rejuvenate themselves. Anxieties about the nation’s strength have frequently been projected onto the strength (or lack thereof) of the nation’s men. One example of this is the previously discussed founding of the Boy Scouts of America, which in part was an effort to combat a perceived feminization of American boys. Furthermore, there is a myriad of evidence in which the enemy, or ‘the other’, has been feminized, proven by stereotypes such as ‘the effeminate European aristocrat’ during the War of Independence, ‘the gay Jew’, and the incessant feminization of colonial subjects. This feminization of ‘the other’ is a means to emasculate and thus weaken ‘the other’, while at the same time bolstering the masculinity, and, by extension, strength of ‘the self or the one’ (cf. Reeser 2010: 188-189).
There is no doubt that masculinity, the nation, and nationalism are strongly, albeit not always securely, linked to one another. In the American context, this intertwinement is often reflected in the president, the face of the nation and sole unifying force in the federal system. If America is a masculine-coded nation – which this chapter aims to examine – it is unsurprising that the office of the presidency and the person considered the country’s leader would be enmeshed with notions of masculinity. If the masculine nation feels threatened by manifest adversaries, such as hostile nations or terror organizations, or the nation is perceived as vulnerable due to more abstract changes in global power structures, the desire to (re)masculinize the nation surfaces.
3.1 It’s a Man’s World – Masculinities and the Presidency Contests for the presidency have always been about gender. But until now this has not been recognized or acknowledged, because the overwhelming majority of candidates have represented the gender that occupies the dominant position, and hence largely escapes critical scrutiny. (Jackson Katz: 2016: XII)
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Masculinity has been embedded through the traditions that dominate the presidency, but inside those traditions lie more implicit assumptions that make presidential elections masculine space: the test of executive toughness, a preference for military heroes, the sports and war metaphors of debates, and more. Implicit in the gendering of presidential election space is the common belief that the election picks a single leader and commander in chief of ‘the greatest nation on earth’. (Duerst-Lahti 2014: 30)
The role of gender in relation to the presidency and the presidential election has become a broader political debate particularly since 2008, when two women, Hillary Clinton, a contender for the Democratic nomination, as well as Sarah Palin, the first female Republican running mate, vied for high profile positions in the White House. However, gender was always of importance in presidential performances and elections, albeit largely unnoticed. The invisibility of masculinities and the equation of the category of gender with women has aided to shroud the relationship between masculinities and the presidency. Gender dynamics, particularly notions of masculinity, have nonetheless regularly impacted presidential elections and the ensuing administrations. Competing expressions of masculinity were and still are a crucial category in an analysis of how and why the American electorate chooses a particular candidate as its political leader.
Before delving into the relationship between masculinities and the presidency, the latter itself must be considered briefly. The President of the United States (POTUS) is exceptional in his/her36 rights and duties as the highest executive authority. Irwin Morris points out the fact that in a system based on checks and balances, in which the three governmental branches have separate rights and duties, all of which are equally important to uphold the nation, the presidency inevitably stands out. While most Americans can name at least a handful of presidents, it seems plausible to assume that they cannot name an equal number of Supreme Court justices or speakers of the House. Furthermore, there is an almost insurmountable number of biographies, historical accounts, and analyses of various presidents and administrations found in libraries, book shops, and academic journals (cf. Morris 2010: 1-2). The unique space presidents occupy within the political system and society at large must be recognized in order to understand the enormous formal and symbolic relevance they have in crafting a particular American narrative – both of the nation itself as well as of a specific, exalted type of American masculinity.
The academic as well as popular interest in the presidency, and the men who occupied the office, is indisputable. Regardless of their aptitude or approval ratings,
36 I chose to refer to the president using gender-neutral pronouns when describing the office in general because while there has not been a female president to date, the obligations and rights tied to the presidency are not dependent on the gender of the respective officeholder.
51 presidents have, with only few exceptions, regularly topped the Gallup poll identifying the most admired man. The American public admires and glorifies its presidents to an extent that borders on idolization. Particularly presidents who are considered strong leaders in times of war are mythicized by historians as well as the public at large. Decisiveness, strength, and leadership, irrespective of whether beneficial or misguided, are continuously rated highly. Additionally, presidents garner more frontpage coverage than any other political figure of public interest due to their policy decisions as well as private lives and personalities. To put it simply, presidents are always the focus of attention (cf. DeConde 2000: 5-7). Harry S. Truman once stated, in terms of power, that leaders of large empires, such as Genghis Khan or Julius Caesar, would have paled in comparison to the American president. While historical changes and technical advancement need to be accounted for in such an evaluation, numerous political scientists and historians agree with Truman that there has never been an individual as powerful as the American president (cf. DeConde 2000: 3). With the exception of Theodore Roosevelt’s strong use of executive authority in foreign affairs up until the 1930s, a president’s power was hardly comparable to today’s standards. It was not until the Great Depression and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal that what is commonly referred to as ‘the modern presidency’ emerged. Before the 1930s, it was foremost Congress that engaged in the vast majority of policymaking; however, stimulated largely by the Great Depression and World War II, presidential authority grew immensely, giving these executive officeholders greater power and incentive to suggest policies to Congress as well as propose and enact certain policies themselves without having to go through the legislative branch. Additionally, the executive authority holds the authority to veto proposed legislation as well as the household budget and most prominently the power to declare war (cf. Greenstein 2000: 178- 179). Such an accumulation of power in one person naturally draws scholarly as well as popular interest.
Additionally, the presidency is rather unique in the space it occupies and the authority it wields within the American political system. As mentioned before, in the United States, a federalized nation, the president remains the sole unifying power elected by a national constituency. The president has substantial ability to influence which direction the United States will take over the course of an administration – meaning his/her personality, values, and beliefs as well as racial and gender identity are crucial to whatever the American narrative needs or wants to be at a given time (cf. McKay 2001: 170). Whoever occupies the office not only leads the nation but also represents it. The president gives the world’s most powerful nation a face, is the focus of around the clock media attention, comforts citizens after tragedy strikes, and projects what it means to be American both at home and abroad (cf. Katz 2016: 27-28). The president in a sense embodies America as a symbolic father of its people, as
52 well as fighter and protector of its rights and values. One instance of this merge between the body of the president and the body politic is illustrated by Ronald Reagan’s speech to Congress a few weeks after the failed assassination attempt on him in 1981 in which he stated “[t]hanks to some fine people, my health is much improved. I’d like to be able to say that with regard to the health of the economy” (Reagan 1981). Through this prominence and equation between the person and the nation, the president becomes more than a mere politician, and the presidential election depends on more than just policy. While character and personality of candidates always matter, regardless of for which office they run for, it seems exceptionally true for the presidency and even more so since the advent of radio and television. Presidents need to stage their personalities carefully and make themselves as attractive to prospective voters as their policies (cf. Spiegel 2012).
The masculine gendering of the nation and the fact that all presidents and vice presidents since the inception of the offices in 1787 and 1789, respectively, have been men has shaped the perception of the presidency as masculine by default. The characteristics expected of presidents are subject to historical change; however, they have always been closely associated with strongly admired and exalted forms of masculinity at a given time. “The presidency […] defines the masculine ideal, and thus serves to model for boys and men the most socially acceptable and validated qualities of manhood at a given cultural moment” (Katz 2016: 29). In Connell’s terms, the president demonstrates the particular form of hegemonic masculinity valued in American culture at a certain point in history, which is generally heterosexual, middle- or upper- class, Protestant, and, apart from Barack Obama, white (cf. Katz 2016: 1; 39-40). This means that every presidential election is not only a competition between differing viewpoints, parties, and ideologies, but also between different masculinities. It also means that whoever emerges victorious from the election represents both the nation and the ideal of American manhood. Presidents need to carefully groom and manage their image, which includes their masculine image (cf. Katz 2016: 29). As discussed in the previous chapter, masculinity is neither static nor fixed. Preferred concepts of hegemonic masculinity change, and unexpected, external circumstances arise, which means whoever embodies the ideal of American masculinity needs to reaffirm and prove it continuously. In the case of the president, who is at the heart of the political media spectacle, American masculinity needs to be performed perpetually on the national and international stage37.
37 The entrenchment of politics and masculinity, however, cannot only be traced through presidential history, but also in other political spheres and among various political offices. Arnold Schwarzenegger, who through his film and bodybuilding career had already acquired an image as virile, strong fighter and potent protector, famously denounced his opponents as “girlie men”, whom the voters should “terminate” (Schwarzenegger qtd. in Nicholas 2004) at the polls. Furthermore, Ted Cruz’s senatorial
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In addition to how presidents portray and stage themselves as men, it is crucial how presidents are represented in the media and other cultural channels. A closer look at the language used to cover presidential runs in popular media serves to illustrate how language highlights and simultaneously reinforces the presidential campaign as a masculine space. Coverage of presidential bids is enmeshed with references to other typically masculine domains such as war and sports. Candidates may be described as ‘throwing punches’, ‘entering the race’, ‘taking their gloves off’, or ‘scoring a victory’ – all references to boxing, football, baseball, or horseracing (cf. Carroll and Fox 2014: 6). However, not only serious media coverage plays a role. Late night comedy shows jump at the chance to question a president’s masculinity by feminizing or infantilizing them in sketches and caricatures. In the end, in humoristic portrayals as well as news coverage, the ceaseless talk of the president’s manly (or unmanly) character showcased on TV, radio, and the internet outlines the qualities of hegemonic masculinity worth admiring and striving for, while at the same time staking out its limits. In other words, cultural and media channels inform an ideal masculinity to be emulated but also single out, and thus determine, characteristics which are undesirable in a man. For example, conservative TV pundits and talk radio hosts have frequently ridiculed the manhood of Democratic presidents and presidential candidates for pondering complex issues and refraining from immediate decision making (cf. Katz 2016: 30). John Mihalic makes the loss of confidence in President Jimmy Carter, due to his insufficient hegemonic masculinity, abundantly clear in a Wall Street Journal article, when writing:
Jimmy Carter first presented himself to the nation as a masculine personality. Naval academy. Submariner. Nuclear Engineer. Farmer. Loner. Tough governor. But once in office, he lost no time revealing his true feminine spirit. He wouldn’t twist arms. He didn’t like to threaten or rebuke […] And we watched how far this approach got him in the jungles of Washington and the world. So in a sense, we’ve already had a ‘woman’ president: Jimmy Carter. (Mihalic 1984 qtd. in Jeffords 1994: 10)
Mihalic demonstrates which qualities he (and numerous Americans) value in a president, and they are all associated with a traditional, hegemonic ideal of masculinity and an acute devaluation of femininity, furthered by his equation of a female president with a president in whom he has no confidence. Moreover, he voices his opinion in a manner which suggests a feeling of betrayal at the apparent lack of presidential masculinity in Carter. Although Carter had an illustrious military career and owned a farm, his tendency to ponder complex issues, resort to diplomacy instead of flexing his muscles, and discuss policy issues with his wife nonetheless rendered him effeminate (cf. Jeffords 1994: 10). Reluctance to act hastily when campaign in 2018 bore the slogan ‘Tough as Texas’ (cf. Svitek 2018), which equates Texas and by extension Cruz with toughness of character as well as strength and the ability to protect and defend from harm – all qualities strongly associated with traditional, even cowboy-like, masculinity.
54 faced with difficult issues has often been identified as being indecisive, and a change of heart, even if caused by the emergence of valid new information, is denounced as flip-flopping. Indecisiveness and flip-flopping are typically associated with femininity and women who are, according to the stereotype, unable to ‘make up their mind’. Thus, calling presidents indecisive or labelling them as flip-floppers is a means to feminize them. This is especially damning when the issue of concern is one of foreign policy or the military, particularly masculine realms (cf. Fahey 2007: 140).
In the words of George H. W. Bush, “[p]residents define themselves through their exercise of Presidential power” (Bush 1991), and the area in which presidents have the greatest freedom to exercise presidential power is foreign policy. Foreign policy and the military are perhaps the domains of the presidency most definitively associated with masculinity. DeConde argues that while presidential power is checked and balanced thoroughly in terms of domestic policy, presidents are far less dependent on the judicial and legislative branches in their dealings with foreign nations and peoples. This power of decision in foreign relations has only grown as the nation and its military as well as economic might have expanded. DeConde observes increasingly tough and belligerent stances presidents have taken in foreign relations and links them to an act of masculine reaffirmation. In his analysis, he employs machismo as an essential presidential behavioral pattern, admired by large portions of the American population, and therefore to some extent required to be considered a successful president. Macho, while originally simply meaning male, has come to connote strong, aggressive masculine behavior, which values masculinity, toughness, and virility while demeaning femininity. It is also heavily linked to expressions of inflated masculine pride, an appreciation of physicality, aggression, and military violence as well as a strong sense of entitlement. Machismo and behavioral patterns akin to it run deep within numerous societies, including the United States; however, the manner in which it is valued in presidents is nonetheless peculiar (cf. DeConde 2000 3-5).
In absolute terms […] the American tradition of exalting toughness differs little from the approval of masculine behavior, and dominance, in other societies. The American practice varies notably in the unusual status it gives to a behavior in presidents that runs counter to aspects of democratic theory of governance. (De Conde 2000: 5)
Foreign policy as well as the military are innately linked to topics of national security and decisions of war and peace. Moreover, dealings with other possibly hostile nations and entities are perceived to require qualities such as assertiveness and strength. Presidents are frequently judged through their accomplishments in foreign policy or at least their propensities to use force should the need arise. The presidents most frequently named as the greatest are usually either war presidents or held the office during national or international crises.
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Leaders such as Theodore Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, George Washington, and John F. Kennedy normally top polls among Americans as well as historians and fit at least one of these categories. While reducing these administrations solely to their war efforts and crisis management paints only half a picture – and there certainly are war presidents, for example, George W. Bush, who do not fare well in popularity polls – exhibiting presidential dominance and toughness nonetheless seems to relate to how well a president is perceived (cf. Katz 2016: 35-36). This has noticeable effects on the gendered nature of the American presidency and helps explain why no woman has yet managed to crack the so-called highest of glass ceilings.
On April 17, 1969, Richard Nixon gave a speech at the ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary of the League of Women Voters, in which he prophesized that it was only a matter of time until a woman would hold the esteemed office of the presidency.
[C]ertainly in the next 50 years we shall see a woman President - maybe sooner than you think. Whatever the case might be, whether that happens or not […] what is even more important is not to think in terms of whether a woman could or should be President, but I think we should all say that by reason of the role women have played in politics in America a woman can and should be able to do any political job that a man could do. (Nixon 1969)
In April 2019, the foretold 50-year mark will be met, and a woman has yet to be elected to the highest office in the country. Polls throughout the years repeatedly suggest that adversity towards a female president are waning and ‘Mrs. President’ is considered more of a when than an if. Polls conducted as late as eight months before the 2016 presidential election showed that 80% of Americans considered the country ready for a female president, which is a significant increase from the 60% who thought so only ten years earlier (cf. Agiesta 2016). Moreover, recent research suggests that considering gender stereotypes as the main culprits of the political gender gap does not suffice. In fact, studies have illustrated that even though Americans often resort to gendered stereotyping when evaluating women candidates, the gender bias against women has been fading over the last decades, and female underrepresentation in politics has at least partly been explained by the smaller number of women running for office. Furthermore, studies suggest that women are as likely as men to do well in terms of fundraising and vote totals (cf. Dolan 2014: 97). It seems gender bias does not have an impact on election outcomes; however, when looking more closely at the issue, significant factors, which make it more difficult for women to hold high-political offices, do ultimately surface. Three aspects relating to gender bias in electoral processes worth considering include the manner and setting in which studies on gender bias are conducted, how social desirability possibly factors into such studies, and where gender bias is still visible and how it interacts with the political atmosphere at a given point in time.
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Firstly, most studies on gender stereotypes in politics ask participants whether they would vote for a qualified female candidate, should their party nominate one, and which traits and levels of expertise they generally associate with male or female candidates. These studies give valuable insight into general gender bias; however, they neglect actual, real-life candidates as well as the political atmosphere in which they run for office (cf. Lawless 2004: 487-488). Secondly, while polls continuously show that the acceptance for a potential ‘Mrs. President’ has been growing, researchers at Northern Illinois University point out that polls on socially sensitive issues like gender and race must be viewed critically. Their research concluded that in response to questions such as whether they would vote for a qualified female candidate, or whether the country was ready for woman president, respondents tended to give the more socially desirable, acceptable, or appropriate answer rather than their own, possibly controversial opinion. This suggests that while approval for female candidates has been growing, its degree might very well be exaggerated (cf. Streb et al. 2008: 76-77). Thirdly, the findings of studies on gender bias can largely be summarized as follows: While the political and electoral processes have become less hostile towards female candidates and offer more equal opportunities, voting constituencies still tend to attribute different traits, characteristics, and areas of expertise to men and women. The gender-based distinctions found echo the formerly stark separation of spheres. The idea that women are better suited to deal with domestic issues of the metaphorical ‘home’, while men can better handle issues on ‘the outside’, which require strength and a certain callousness, still resonates in America. Men are perceived as strong, tough, and decisive and apt in foreign relations, the military, crime, and the economy; in contrast, women are believed to be more compassionate, tender, and open to compromise, thus more suitable to issues of education, healthcare, poverty, and family. If these findings are viewed in the context of the current political climate, which post-9/11 has been dominated by issues of national security, and the wars on terror and crime, it becomes apparent that gender bias is indeed influencing elections. If women are ultimately perceived as less reliable than men on the issues most salient to voters, they logically face a significant gender-based disadvantage (cf. Lawless 2004: 479-480; 487).
Not only executive offices such as the presidency are strongly associated with notions of masculinity, but also political parties, especially the Republican Party as a whole. According to research from scholars such as Nicholas Winter, parties have come to be seen in increasingly gendered terms. There are several reasons for this phenomenon. Particularly since the 1970s, Democrats and Republicans alike have defined their general stance towards polarizing issues such as the Equal Rights Amendment and abortion, with Republicans tending to identify with more traditionalist and Democrats with more liberal views. Additionally,
57 party alliances with different interest groups, including feminist groups for the Democrats and socially conservative groups for the Republicans, have helped to corroborate these alignments further. Perceived expertise of the respective parties has similarly aided their increasingly gendered nature. Democrats are generally thought to be more competent in domestic policy issues, particularly pertaining to social welfare, while Republicans are seen as more adept at dealing with foreign policy, terrorism, crime, and economic matters. Therefore, Republicans, in the eyes of many voters, have become the more masculine party. Lastly, the fact that more Democratic than Republican women have been elected to represent political offices reinforces this gendered binary (cf. Winter 2010: 591-592). Such findings can provide more insight into how gender concepts interact and possibly coincide with party alignment and voting behavior in complex ways, consciously as well as unconsciously. What is more important for this thesis, however, is that findings suggest that it has become easier for Republican candidates to appear more masculine, as evidenced by candidates such as Ronald Regan and George W. Bush, who successfully presented themselves as all-American cowboys ready to stand up for themselves and their country (cf. Winter 2010: 593). While it would be a significant oversimplification to assume Republican candidates have an advantage in contemporary presidential elections for this reason, there is room to assume that they potentially have to invest less to appear manly to the broad public and are less likely to be feminized or perceived as weak than their Democratic competitors.
3.2 Fathers, Warriors, and Protectors – A Historical Perspective on Presidential Masculinities There's a long history of presidential races becoming contests over masculinity and virility. When Thomas Jefferson was running against John Adams, for example, Jefferson accused Adams of having ‘neither the force and firmness of a man, nor the gentleness and sensibility of a woman.’ Stephen Douglas accused Abraham Lincoln of having a ‘hatchet face,’ while Lincoln called Douglas a diminutive mama's boy. (Anderson 2016)
[A]fter one term in office, Van Buren was outmasculinized in the campaign of 1840 […]. The rhetoric of that campaign, which pitted William Henry Harrison, the hero of Tippecanoe, against Van Buren, was a political masterpiece of gendered language. […] In a sense, the presidential campaign of 1840 was the first – but certainly not the last – national presidential campaign characterized by dirty tricks, race-baiting, and the promotion of form over substance, and it continued the great American tradition of using manhood as political currency. (Kimmel 2006: 25-26)
These two quotes, while coming from two very different sources, essentially assert the same claim. Electoral campaigns have always incorporated beliefs about masculinity as “political
58 currency” (Kimmel 2006: 26). If the argument is that gender, particularly masculinities, has always been firmly linked to the presidency and the presidential electoral process, this claim must be investigated by taking former presidents, campaigns, and elections into account. While there is a case to be made for every past president, some stand out in their meticulous orchestration of a certain hegemonic masculinity and their use of particular masculine tropes. Additionally, some electoral campaigns stand out in their effective use of methods, narratives, and rhetorical devices to masculinize a candidate, while often simultaneously feminizing the opponent. Throughout this chapter, aspects of five presidencies, four of which are relatively recent, will be analyzed through a gendered lens. In particular, the focus will rest on how masculinities were used in each respective presidential campaign to strengthen the candidates as well as to defame their opponents and silence their critics.
3.2.1 The Rough Rider – Theodore Roosevelt
A president who immediately comes to mind when talking about presidential masculinity is undoubtedly Theodore Roosevelt. Frequently hailed as one of the greatest American presidents of all time, Roosevelt has emerged as an embodiment of the virile, strong, masculine spirit associated with the highest executive authority. However, he was not always the rugged yet intelligent and civilized outdoor-man he came to be known as. In fact, his fusion of ‘civilized’, and ‘primitive’ notions of masculinity was largely a feat of self- (re)creation. Theodore Roosevelt was in numerous ways the epitome of the Self-Made Man (cf. Ducat 2004: 78-79). In his early life, Teddy Roosevelt was a far cry from what he wanted or expected a man to be. He described himself as a shy, weak boy of ill health who suffered from asthma, which required him to leave the city behind at times to, quite literally, breathe (cf. Roosevelt 1946: 13). He exhibited few of the typically masculine qualities that he would later be known for and encourage in other men and boys. Roosevelt became the target of crude jokes and bullying by other boys who humiliated him for his perceived weakness. It is reasonable to suggest that this humiliation haunted him and eventually became a driving force in his ceaseless quest for physical and authoritative masculinity (cf. Testi 1995: 1516- 1517). At a young age, Roosevelt already expressed deep admiration for men unlike him. His childhood heroes were largely men of the military and frontier who fearlessly fought for the country, conquered the wilderness in the West, and stood their ground as they faced their foes (cf. Roosevelt 1946: 27).
Having been a sickly boy, with no natural bodily prowess, and having lived much at home, I was at first quite unable to hold my own when thrown into contact with other boys of rougher antecedents. I was nervous and timid. Yet from reading of the people I admired—ranging from
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the soldiers of Valley Forge, and Morgan's riflemen, to the heroes of my favorite stories—and from hearing of the feats performed by my Southern forefathers and kinsfolk, and from knowing my father, I felt a great admiration for men who were fearless and who could hold their own in the world, and I had a great desire to be like them. (Roosevelt 1946: 27)
Roosevelt, who came from an upper-class New York family, began to strengthen his body by rigorously exercising and participating in rowing and boxing events upon entering Harvard College in 1876 (cf. Fehn 2005: 53). Roosevelt used virtually every sport at his disposal to intensify his manly character (cf. Testi 1995: 1517). However, when he first entered the political arena in 1882 as part of the New York State Assembly, he was still frequently the target of attacks on his masculinity and assumptions about his sexual orientation. He was referred to as “Jane Dandy”, “Young Squirt”, “our own Oscar Wilde”, and as someone who was “given to sucking the knob of an ivory cane” (Bederman 1995: 170; Kimmel 2006: 120). The profoundly gendered (and frequently sexualized) nature of these attacks is undeniable. They highlight how large of a threat homosexuality was (and still is) considered to masculinity, as well as how closely physical prowess and masculinity were connected. His lack thereof automatically made him unmanly and effeminate, and thus a potential target (cf. Ducat 2004: 78; Kimmel 2006: 120-121; Bederman 1995: 170-171). He embodied what Americans at the time feared the country, particularly its male population, was becoming – educated, civilized, urban, and incapable of enduring hardships or staying firm in the face of danger.
As discussed previously, the turn of the century provided a watershed of new masculine ideals and ways to achieve them. The fear of feminization and the shift from the masculine mind to the masculine body profoundly influenced what it meant to be a man in this era. Roosevelt understood that while a threat to his masculinity could break his political career, reforming it to conform to hegemonic standards could make it. He “was the first president to articulate the shared anxieties of his generation, and he provided its first seemingly coherent response to the cultural dislocation of modern society” (Watts 2003: 2): He escaped the city and headed westward, a path which was becoming increasingly popular among men to invigorate their masculinity. In 1883, he bought a property in South Dakota where he reinvented himself as a Western cowboy who enjoyed shooting, hunting, and farm work, and distanced himself from the pampered lives of the Eastern elites to which he originally belonged (cf. Ducat 2004: 78-79). His experiences of struggle and adventure in the untamed West served as a basis for his “moral and political philosophy” (Kimmel 2006: 121). He employed a rigorous exercise regime to become fit, which aligned with the contemporary trend of utilizing sports to strengthen a man’s body and thus his character and competitiveness (cf. Nye 2007: 427).
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Upon his return to New York, he wore his new cowboy identity proudly and used it to rebuff some of the criticism he had previously had to endure. He wrote: “It would electrify some of my friends who have accused me of representing the kid-glove element in politics if they could see me galloping over the plains day in day out, clad in a buckskin shirt and leather chaparajos, with a big sombrero on my head” (Roosevelt 1884 qtd. in Bederman 1995: 175). His Dakota-made cowboy identity helped him gain more respect, and hence more foothold in American politics. However, what cemented his status as a national hero and symbol of American manhood was his participation in the Spanish-American War. As conflict pertaining to the Spanish colonies in the West Indies loomed, Roosevelt was reportedly overly enthusiastic about going to war. After acquiring permission to form a volunteer cavalry regiment, he did just this, and the troops would come to be known as the Rough Riders, one of the most mythicized and revered symbols of rugged American martial masculinity. Roosevelt himself picked the members of his regiment, choosing mainly farmers, miners, cowboys, hunters, and former football players – all of whom had, in his eyes, experienced the strenuous life he admired and for which he strived (cf. Watts 2003: 161). It seems, however, that not only Roosevelt was enchanted by the idea of a ragtag group of hardened, virile, adventurous men who bravely rode to war against the Spanish imperial power. When he published The Rough Riders, his account of how the regiment faced its Spanish foe, in 1899, it became an instant bestseller (cf. Fehn 2005: 54). The Rough Riders in many ways embodied Roosevelt’s ideal masculinity as well as his glorified view of the West as a “sphere of self-sufficient, muscular, male camaraderie” (Testi 1995: 1518) as opposed to the increasingly feminine-coded East.
Theodore Roosevelt is often remembered as a reforming force in a progressive era. There is certainly truth to this statement, particularly when studying his domestic policy efforts. He also began to embody an American imperialist and cosmopolitan spirit in his foreign policy, which would shape the conception of American power on a global scale throughout the following century. This spirit was not solely Roosevelt’s making, although he did come to represent it in several ways. Nagel’s and Reeser’s theories of gendering the nation are reflected in Roosevelt’s approach to foreign policy and war-making. He frequently connected a nation’s strength to the strength of its men, particularly its military, which is why he continuously advocated for increasing military prowess. In “The Strenuous Life”, one of his most well-known speeches which was held prior to his presidency in 1899, Roosevelt encouraged the expansion of the military by utilizing notions of honor, duty, and civilization, and expressed his adoration for war and its masculine virtues. Moreover, his belief that civilization progressed along a continuum led him to encourage American involvement on a global scale, frequently through military intervention, global policing, and coercion through
61 his big stick policy approach38. The speech illustrates this bellicose and macho attitude through his assessment of the Civil War as a necessity to overcome weakness and build American greatness and character; endorsement of military intervention in Cuba, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines; and praise of English imperialism as “of great benefit for England” and “even greater benefit to India and Egypt” (Roosevelt 1899). Additionally, he deems the Filipino people as “utterly unfit for self-government” and unlikely to ever acquire this ability, therefore justifying the need for “self-government under wise supervision” (Roosevelt 1899). Roosevelt believed it was necessary for a great man to find a balance between being chivalrous and good-hearted, on the one hand, and tough, aggressive, and violent, on the other. He also viewed righteous war as not only unavoidable, but ultimately positive. In his eyes, a great country needed to be made up of great, strong, virile men, who help civilization using all means, frequently including force.
The rigid discipline Roosevelt exhibits in his continuous pursuit of strong masculinity and its accompanying self-discipline, self-control, and work ethic are often heralded as his most virtuous and impressive qualities. However, it is important to acknowledge that his actions, motivations, and overall perspective on American masculinity were not only driven by strong will and pride, but his deep concerns about his, and by extension the nation’s, masculinity, his contempt for physical weakness and feminization, and “his anxieties about future sexual and racial degeneracy” (Watts 2003: 5). While he valued the fine arts, literature, and the mind throughout his life, he carefully staged his public persona as primarily tough and masculine, and he took great care to distance himself from the features of cultivated, upper-class Eastern men, who were met with mistrust from the American public.
Part of Roosevelt’s self-definition was in terms of negative reference groups. Roosevelt made plain his aversion to aristocrats, idlers, clubmen, snobs, and ‘special apostles to culture’ of the Mugwump variety. ‘Bitter, sour, ineffective men,’ Roosevelt called the Mugwamps, ‘who possess much refinement, culture, knowledge of a highly unproductive type.’ Evolving identity from dissociation, Roosevelt made it plain that he was not one of these (Saveth 1991: 46).
He feared being associated with the effeminate qualities frequently associated with highbrow, urban elites who were believed to be weak and feminine. These deep-seated fears were crucial driving forces for his embodiment of masculinity, conceptualization of change, and view of the world. Roosevelt perceived modern American society to be at a junction, with one route leading to success, domination, and civilization and the other to degeneracy, savagery, and failure. He feared the decay of civilization through submission. Bluntly stated, from his
38 This refers to his ideology “of speaking softly, while carrying a big stick” (Roosevelt 1916 qtd. in Ducat 2004: 90), meaning maintaining peaceful negotiations while simultaneously threatening with strong military might.
62 perspective, it was of paramount importance to get white heterosexual American men back on the ‘right’ track, and thus away from prostitution, homosexuality, as well as ‘dandi- and wimpification’. This alone was the only measure that could save America from what he believed to be a looming catastrophe (cf. Watts 2003: 4-6). Watts argues that Roosevelt, along with most of his contemporaries, saw the world through a social Darwinist lens, which suggested that nations progressed from savagery to civilization, with only the strongest and fittest surviving while the weakest perished39. He also believed every civilization was on the verge of descending into savagery and barbarism. In other words, he saw modernity as “civilizing and emasculating, entirely capable of limiting the nation’s ability as a manly presence among nations” (Watts 2003: 23). This is also illustrated in Roosevelt and the nation’s anxieties over what Edward A. Ross termed a ‘race suicide’, which decried the “reproductive peril posed by the contradictions of American manliness” (Ducat 2004: 79), meaning self-control and civility. On the one hand, these qualities were considered requirements for successful American masculinity; on the other, however, they were believed to hamper white American reproduction in comparison to people who were seen as racially inferior, less civilized, and thus less inhibited (cf. Ducat 2004: 79-80).
Modernity brought a myriad of changes and contradictions to the ideal of American manhood. It was important to climb the social ladder and become the top-dog in the business world, all while staying a hunting, fishing, physically fit cowboy at heart. As Watts points out, Roosevelt’s embodiment of these contradictions was part of what made him so successful in his political endeavors. He combined the previously contradictory elements of the intellectual, civilized modernity of the eastern coast with the rugged, savagery of the American frontier, largely circumventing their ambiguities by embracing them. “He was the man who identified with the past, yet embodied modernity, the patrician with an affinity for workers, the conservationist who proudly killed animals, the bodybuilder who loved poetry, and the civilized Easterner who made it in the West” (Watts 2003: 4).
3.2.2 Hollywood Meets Washington, D.C. – Ronald Reagan
In times of crisis, the public frequently seeks a protector, warrior, and strong male leader who bolsters national confidence, exudes a can-do attitude, and ultimately vows to shield his people from the evils of the world, regardless of what they may be. Throughout American history, no president may have utilized his bold masculinity in times of fear and
39 This worldview also had a strong racialized component, inferring that the strongest nations of Anglo- Saxon and Germanic descent were not only fit, but meant to conquer other territories. As a result, it was their task to civilize darker-skinned populations, which Roosevelt frequently considered unfit for self-governance (Watts 2003: 21-22).
63 crisis better than Ronald Reagan. The 1980s were characterized by a return to the rugged tough-guy, cowboy masculinity, which had been rigorously criticized by the women’s and civil rights movements as well as humbled by the defeat in Vietnam. The political, economic, and social circumstances provided a fertile ground for Reagan’s all-American, optimistic, yet tough type of masculinity. Jimmy Carter’s previous administration appeared to be in perpetual peril, internationally as well as domestically. Foreign policy in post-World War II America was characterized by the Cold War, a standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, which, through its accompanying nuclear arms race, instilled deep fear in the American public. The conflict permeated presidential administrations since its inception and would continue to do so until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Until this point, every presidential election revolved around which potential leader could successfully stand up to the communist threat in the East. In most cases, the candidate who could most effectively demonstrate his masculine vigor, toughness, and assertive qualities emerged victorious. Apart from the race between Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater in 196440, which ended in a landslide victory for Johnson, hyper-masculine, aggressive behavior was largely rewarded by the American electorate (cf. Katz 2016: 70-71). As previously discussed, the general perception that Republicans were more masculine than their Democratic counterparts may have additionally helped in their Cold War era presidential efforts. They were therefore by extension perceived as having a greater ability to defy the USSR, a regime that also basked in hyper-masculine displays of their leaders and military.
Ronald Reagan, a moderately successful actor turned Governor of California, has without question become one of the most iconic presidents in recent American history. Especially among Republicans, Reagan is admired to the extent of mythification. His popularity soared both during and after his administration, especially when compared to his predecessors. When he left office after serving two terms in 1989, his final approval ratings were higher than those of the previous seven presidents (cf. Peters 2018). Americans viewed Reagan a success, particularly after the debacles that had rocked previous administrations – Kennedy’s assassination, the Vietnam War under Johnson, Watergate, and Carter’s general unpopularity, aided by the Iran hostage crisis, cumulatively prompted a loss of trust and belief in the presidency and a feeling that America, both as a nation and economic as well as cultural powerhouse, was in decline and crisis. Reagan managed to reignite the fuse
40 Lyndon B. Johnson’s campaign successfully framed Republican opponent Barry Goldwater as a radical, impulsive, and ultimately dangerous man who could not be trusted with the (nuclear) power of the presidency. Although only broadcasted once, Johnson’s famous TV campaign ad “Daisy,” which portrayed nuclear annihilation as inevitable should Goldwater be elected, is one of the few instances in which hyper-masculine behavior worked against a presidential candidate and steered voters towards a candidate who portrayed himself as more level-headed and thus more trustworthy (cf. Katz 2016: 70-71; The Democratic National Committee 1964/2012).
64 of American exceptionalism and boost American morale, a feat he greatly prided himself in, as is illustrated by his farewell speech held on January 11, 1989 (cf. Jeffords 1994: 1-3).
It's been quite a journey this decade, and we held together through some stormy seas. And at the end, together, we are reaching our destination. […] The way I see it, there were two great triumphs, two things that I'm proudest of. One is the economic recovery, in which the people of America created—and filled—19 million new jobs. The other is the recovery of our morale. America is respected again in the world and looked to for leadership. (Reagan 1989)
The narrative that America’s power had been diminished and its reputation tarnished presented ample opportunity for Reagan – a former movie star who knew how to project confidence, craft stories, and play the part of the hero – to assume a savior-like role. He managed to exude what is often referred to as ‘sunny optimism’, and insinuated that better days were ahead. As Ducat argues, Reagan managed “to embody the image of Übermensch and Everyman simultaneously […] seem[ing] both omnipotent and ordinary at the same time [emphasis in original]” (2004: 88). Succeeding Jimmy Carter, Reagan represented the epitome of resurfacing American greatness, optimism, all-American values, and masculine strength, at home and abroad.
When analyzing Reagan’s presidency, it is crucial to investigate how his success and popularity compare to that of his predecessor, James ‘Jimmy’ Carter, who embodied the ideals of the ‘New Sensitive Man’ of the 1970s. Deeply religious, intelligent, soft spoken, and adherent to pacifist ideals, he was what the nation needed following the Watergate scandal. Four years later, however, his presidency was overshadowed by economic strains and the Iranian hostage crisis, which, spanning over 444 days, made numerous Americans, particularly men, lose confidence in the president. His attempts and negotiations to free the Americans held hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran were deemed too weak, too forthcoming, and ultimately not manly and tough enough (cf. Katz 2016: 74-76). Even though Carter did negotiate the release of the Americans held in Iran, they were not freed until minutes after Ronald Reagan was sworn into office on January 20, 1981. Ronald Reagan, who had repeatedly presented himself as hard-hitting on hostile nations such as Iran on the campaign trail, was thus perceived as having restored America’s masculine toughness by simply being president, and, as a result, achieved the hostage release (cf. Katz 2016: 77). Although it has been proven that the timing of the release was meant as an act of humiliation towards Carter rather than an act of fearful respect towards Reagan, the image of Reagan ending the Iranian hostage crisis took a firm hold, especially among Republicans. It is an image so persuasive that it is still perpetuated to underline masculine strength. Even as recently as the 2016 election, this event remained relevant, with Marco Rubio stating that under his presidency “our adversaries around the world will know that America is no longer
65 under the command of someone weak like Barack Obama and it will be like Ronald Reagan, where as soon as he took office the hostages were released from Iran [emphasis added by the author]” (Rubio 2016 qtd. in Robertson 2016), a sentiment seconded by Republican candidate Ted Cruz.
Ronald Reagan was used to having cameras on him, and his staffers knew how to capitalize on this talent. While he repeatedly stated that the presidency was not simply a role he was playing – maintaining he had “never thought of it [the presidency] that way [as a role]” (cf. Reagan in BBC Newsnight 2017) – a closer look at the president’s life, politics, and rhetoric supports the contrary. While the president is revered as a person, many Americans admire the constructed, ultimately staged image of the president even more so. When Richard Nixon created the White House Office of Communications, with its media- and PR- trained personnel, he “institutionalized television as a principle technology for governance” (Raphael 2009: 117). The creation of this office, a reaction to the rise of television, enabled presidents to both construct themselves and be constructed through an audiovisual media lens. In a sense, this can be read as an extension of America’s long tradition of political oratory and rhetoric. Robert Denton highlights this, citing rhetorical expertise in presidents such as Washington, Lincoln, and Kennedy, ultimately refraining from mentioning Reagan in the same vein. However, he underlines how Reagan’s rhetoric was exceptionally well-suited to the burgeoning television society, making him the first to successfully master this new medium which had revolutionized the way politics were produced and consumed (cf. Denton 1988: 3-5).
When investigating Ronald Reagan’s masculinity, Jackson Katz argues that it is impossible to ignore the distinction between reality and image – in other words, between the man and the image of the actor turned president (cf. Katz 2016: 81-82). Referring to Reagan, an unnamed former aid at the White House is quoted saying “[h]e's an actor. He's used to being directed and produced. He stands where he is supposed to and delivers his lines, he reads beautifully, he knows how to wait for the applause line” (N.N. qtd. in Raphael 2009: 118). “The Great Communicator”, as he came to be known, enjoyed and excelled at telling stories and jokes, frequently using anecdotes from his life before politics and referencing movies in speeches. In a society which sees entertainment, particularly Hollywood, as an expression of national character, he could always rely on his experience as an entertainer. In the opening essay of his book Ronald Reagan, the Movie (1987), Michael Rogin makes the case that Reagan partially defined himself through the roles he played in Hollywood, ultimately merging his on- and off-screen self into a transfixing image that achieved legendary status during his presidency (cf. Rogin 1987: 1-3). This mesh of fact and fiction was evident, for example, when Reagan allegedly told Israeli Prime Minister Shamir that he understood
66 the Jewish plight and was moved when he filmed the liberation of Nazi concentration camps in one of his films (cf. Katz 2016: 86).
As illustrated by Reagan, television ultimately changed political campaigning, as it increased the need for an entertainment factor. Presidential candidates must entertain their constituency as much as necessary to convince them of their policies. Reagan recognized this and understood that presidential narratives are largely invented. Similar to Theodore Roosevelt, who presented himself as a Rough Rider, Reagan crafted the narrative of the benevolent yet stern, tough yet just cowboy “who could restore order to a world gone mad” (Katz 2016:83). The slogan “This is Reagan Country”, spotted all over America during his 1984 campaign, is deliberately reminiscent of the Marlboro Cowboy (cf. Katz 2016: 91). It is thus not a coincidence that Reagan, widely regarded as an average movie actor who interestingly rarely played cowboys himself, sought opportunities to strengthen this image. In addition to being called “Rawhide” by the Secret Service, he deliberately juxtaposed himself with perhaps the most iconic American cowboys, John Wayne and Clint Eastwood, to enhance this narrative.
As an actor John Wayne personified in dangerously attractive images the romantic myth that masculine style and substance are indivisible; that to express openly and unashamedly one’s emotions of doubt, fear, love, and even (unless goaded unendurably) anger is womanish; that the dominant male must control himself, his environment, and indeed all of life, through action, often violent action in chivalric defense of women, children, and country, action forced upon the good man by evil others; that by will power, strength, skill, superior technology, and firepower he can prevail over circumstance and chance, over enemies, personal and national, in a world of black-and-white moral choices. (Curtis 1989)
This juxtaposition climaxed at the 1984 Republican National Convention (RNC) when the Reagan campaign introduced a short film about the incumbent president’s achievements with John Wayne clips. Neither of the three men were really cowboys at any point in their lives; however, the appeal remained because it was the myth of the cowboy that attracted admiration, not men actually tending cattle. The cowboy as a cultural myth is infused with images of a romanticized frontier, rugged independence, nostalgic patriotism, and the fight between good and evil, which is rarely presented as complex or nuanced. This figure is also, perhaps above all, saturated with images of white hyper-masculinity. Ronald Reagan brought the cultural cowboy myth, with its connotations, back to life in his presidential persona (cf. Slotkin 1998: 643-645). In cinema, particularly in Westerns, the battle between right and wrong is frequently portrayed as black and white. Complexity and nuance typically take a backseat while tropes of strong men fighting evil with iron will and loaded guns, who later ride off into the sunset having made the world a little safer, are dominant.
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Large portions of Americans who voted in the 1980 and 1984 elections grew up watching John Wayne and Gary Cooper movies with such storylines, including Bonanza and The Lone Ranger. Westerns began reaching their peak popularity in the 1950s, and out of the entire fictional production in that decade, ten percent were Westerns. In fact, all but two out of the top ten television shows were Western-themed (cf. Kimmel 2006: 165). Reagan’s image as the resurfacing cowboy thus “tap[ped] into a deep wellspring and link to our [American] mythical past as an archetype of (white) American masculinity” (Katz 2016: 94). The Cold War provided Reagan with the perfect backdrop to play the “sheriff, who would bring the bad guys – the Soviet Evil Empire – to justice” (Boris 2007: 611). It is of little significance to the Republican consciousness that he did not bring the Soviet Union to their knees by use of masculine force but rather through negotiation and diplomacy, which entailed nuclear reductions on both sides (cf. Katz 2016: 74).
When looking back to Reagan’s first presidential campaign in 1980, however, it was feared that his simplistic view of complex issues and lack of intellectual capacity would hinder his ability to even reach the White House. On the contrary, these turned out to be some of his greatest political assets. Nowadays, political scholars agree that the institution of the American presidency is one which frequently wins over large portions of the population by embracing anti-intellectual sentiments. Anti-intellectualism describes the acquisition of knowledge through instincts, morals, and ideologies rather than through reason and analytical thinking. It does not refer to an individual’s intelligence, but instead conveys anti- elitist feelings and general suspicion towards intellectualism, which is frequently associated with a smug sense of superiority. Shogan argues that anti-intellectual sentiments of presidents have been observable since the New Deal Era and are particularly pronounced among Republican presidents. According to her, some reasons for this trend include “changing electoral constituencies, the political transformation of the South, the rise of the religious right, and the post-World War II liberalization of academics and intellectuals” (Shogan 2007: 296). The tendency to view politics as a spectacle to watch, rather than a process in which one participates, has aided anti-intellectualism, as deconstructing complex issues analytically simply is not as sensational (cf. Shogan 2007: 295-296).
Ronald Reagan’s anti-intellectual attitude already manifested itself during his gubernatorial campaign in California when he not only viciously attacked protesting students at the University of Berkley, referring to them as “self-indulgent snobs […] contemptuous of middle-class values” (Shogan 2007: 298), but also decried the moral decline of the University of Berkley in general41. This condemnation captured the rage that numerous white, middle
41 “There has been a leadership gap and a morality and decency gap at the University of California at Berkeley where a small minority of beatniks, radicals, and filthy speech advocates have brought such
68 class Americans felt, many of whom believed that the civil unrest of the 1960s was a temper tantrum of a generation of ungrateful and unpatriotic youth42 (cf. Katz 2016: 109). Reagan was a staunch ideologue who, as his former campaign and media advisor Roger Ailes poignantly stated, was elected on “themes” not “details” (Ailes qtd. in Katz 2016: 101). His prioritization of instinct and ideology over preparation and intellectual engagement is illustrated particularly well by his actions before the only economic summit held in the United States during his presidency: His advisors had allegedly prepared a briefing book on the issues at hand, urging him to study it. On the morning of the summit, he told them that he had not reviewed the briefing but instead stayed up late to watch The Sound of Music, one of his favorite films. Interestingly, despite his lack of preparation, Regan was a success at the summit. This instance highlights that “Reagan's ideology was firmly in place; he felt he did not have to do his ‘homework’ to perform adequately. The antiseptic rationales behind the policies were unimportant; what really mattered was an unwavering belief in the script” (Shogan 2007: 298). His anti-intellectualism was undoubtedly beneficial to him, making him ‘one of the guys’ and seemingly eliminating distance between himself and the electorate, particularly among white male voters (cf. Katz 2016: 97). However, his thinly veiled racism and aura of the strong, benevolent patriarch, which appealed to the same demographic, must not be ignored.
To conclude, Ronald Reagan successfully “embodied one of the enduring masculine myths of the United States: the strong, unwavering, moral cowboy riding in from the West to save the day” (Katz 2016: 79). His successful display of hegemonic masculinity was in part possible due to Jimmy Carter’s lack thereof; the fact that the Soviet Union provided him with an evil antagonist whom he could defeat heroically; emerging distrust in intellectualism and the Washington elite; and masculine backlash towards gains made by feminism and the civil rights movement, which were perceived as emasculating the nation in the 1980s. His cowboy bravado and clever campaigning strategies have overflown into subsequent Republican presidential campaigns and personas, as evidenced by George W. Bush’s cowboy-inspired photo-ops and Donald Trump’s campaign slogans that promise a better, even victorious, future. Presidential candidates in the 2012 and 201643 campaigns – from Newt Gingrich to shame to and such loss of confidence in a great University that applications for enrollment are down 21% and are expected to decline even further” (Reagan 1966 qtd. in Shogan 2007: 298). 42 His staunch, right-wing conservatism became particularly pronounced during the unrest at universities in the 1960s and 1970s. He saw the protests as a disgrace incepted by young people, who in his view upset the country simply for the sake of upsetting it. Asked about the violent intervention by police at protests at the University of California, he famously stated “[i]f it takes a bloodbath, let’s get it over with” (Reagan 1970 qtd. in Elving 2004). 43 For Ted Cruz’s and Marco Rubio’s statements see Robertson: 2016. For Newt Gingrich’s see Presidential Candidates Debates (2012) "Republican Candidates Debate in Des Moines, Iowa," December 10, 2011. Moderated by Diane Sawyer and George Stephanopoulos, ABC News. In: Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley (eds.), The American Presidency Project.
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Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz – repeatedly referenced Reagan’s toughness in order to be masculinized by extension. Ronald Reagan’s success, popularity, and ensuing enshrinement clearly illustrate how masculine myths, macho behavior, entertainment, and nationalized masculinity inform presidential politics.
3.2.3 Masculinities Interrupted – George H. W. Bush, Michael Dukakis, and Bill Clinton
Following Ronald Reagan in terms of masculine appearance in character, policy, and stature proved to be a difficult feat for candidates of both major political parties. The 1988 presidential race between George H. W. Bush and Michael Dukakis was, in Ducat’s words, “an electoral battle characterized by its comical but earnest performances of masculinity” (Ducat 2004: 95). As will be highlighted in the following chapter, electoral campaigns provide ample evidence of how sufficient or insufficient masculine qualities may bolster or hinder (even unlikely) candidates. Similarly, they are also indicative of how campaign staff turn manhood and its connotations, as well as related white male anxieties, into an indirect campaign issue, which is particularly noticeable in Republican George H. W. Bush’s campaign efforts.
In regard to masculinity, George H. W. Bush certainly struggled to fill Ronald Reagan’s shoes as the Republican presidential candidate. Although, or perhaps because, he had served as Reagan’s vice president, he was considered less manly, and politicians on both sides of the aisle saw him as merely a lap dog to America’s favorite Republican cowboy. A source close to Bush once stated that “[y]ou could make a case that the worst possible training for the presidency is seven years as Vice President. Seven years of perfecting the habit of never making decisions or speaking up” (n.n qtd. in Ducat 2004: 85). The Bush campaign realized this possible pitfall and throughout the campaign began to associate his time as vice president with loyal male camaraderie instead of passive obedience, thus transforming it into something akin to a strength (cf. Ducat 2004: 85-86). Bush’s aristocratic mannerism and Ivy League education was also seen as a hindrance rather than an asset in the electoral masculinity contest. Following Nixon’s silent majority and Ronald Reagan leadership, the Republican base, which had once been dominated by Northeastern elites, increasingly relied on the votes of blue-collar Americans from the South and Midwest. Bush’s rhetoric, particularly his “gracelessly flamboyant gesticulations [and] his infamously fractured syntax” (Ducat 2004: 85), raised skepticism among potential voters as well as his campaign staff. Instances of this – such when he bragged “we tried to kick a little ass tonight” (Russakoff
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/?pid=97703, accessed on 03.04.2018.
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1984) after his 1984 vice-presidential debate with Geraldine A. Ferraro, the first female candidate to ever be on a major party ticket, or ordered a “splash of coffee” (Dowd 1988a) at a New Hampshire truck stop in 1988 – stuck and alienated him from potential voters. The Republican consultant Edward Rollins admitted that Bush was already “a Washington insider for too long” (Dowd 1988a) and perhaps needed to undertake a cross-country trip in order to reacquaint himself with everyday Americans and their use of language (cf. Dowd 1988a). As mentioned before, implications of aristocracy have been in danger of being considered effeminate since as early as 1766, and charges of elitism are still frequently employed to discredit political opponents44.
From the beginning of his campaign, assumptions about Bush’s feminine, aristocratic, and ultimately weak persona as well as its possible implications for the presidency already garnered media attention. In the same week he announced his candidacy in 1987, Newsweek published an issue which donned a picture of Bush with the now famous headline “Fighting the ‘Wimp Factor’”, plainly emphasizing the ostensible fear of a president considered insufficiently masculine to lead the country. Even Jimmy Carter, whose masculinity was endlessly pitted against Ronald Reagan’s during his race for reelection, described George H. W. Bush as effeminate – an act which blatantly reveals how everyone, even those who have suffered due to it, are part of the national conversation about a presidential candidate’s masculinity (cf. Curtis 1989). However, Bush and his campaign had two aces up their sleeves. On the one hand, Bush boasted a decorated military career. As a fighter pilot in World War II at the young age of 18, he had masculine as well as patriotic credentials which could be exploited for political gain. On the other hand, Republicans were facing Democratic frontrunner Michael Dukakis who, similarly to Jimmy Carter eight years before, provided the Bush campaign with ceaseless opportunities to call into question his masculinity as well as his patriotism, and thus masculinize Bush through comparison (cf. Katz 2016: 103-105). While both candidates had to fight charges of what were deemed ‘wimpish’ behavior and attitudes, Bush prevailed due to, among other factors, his and his staff’s success at painting Dukakis as a failed protector, weak patriot, henpecked husband, and ultimately effeminate man.
As was the case when analyzing Reagan’s masculinity, the opponent, in this case Michael Dukakis, must likewise be investigated more closely in order to identify which forms
44 Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney faced similar problems in his 2012 run against Barack Obama. His old money, country club flair distanced him from large portions of the blue-collar voters. Moreover, Newsweek published an article reminiscent of the Bush campaign (see below) with the headline “The Wimp Factor. Is He Just Too Insecure To Be President?”, caricaturing Romney as an out-of-touch, insecure elitist who does not even drive the jet ski himself, but lets his wife take the wheel (cf. Tomasky 2012; Katz 2016: 104-105).
71 of masculinities were employed and resonated with voters, particularly white men, during the 1988 presidential bid. Several instances typify the downfall of the Democratic nominee, all of which pertain to his masculinity, patriotism, and executive authority. Reminiscent of the much more vicious and blatantly racist ‘birtherism’ crusade against Barack Obama 20 years later, Dukakis, a son of Greek immigrants and follower of the Greek Orthodox faith (at least on paper), came under scrutiny in terms of his patriotism and American values. This was largely due to him vetoing a bill that would have made it compulsory for teachers to lead students in the Pledge of Allegiance and allow cases of non-compliance to be fined. Dukakis’ argument that such a bill would impede teacher’s freedom of speech was dismissed and ultimately twisted by his Republican opponents to suggest a lack of patriotism and a disloyalty to the nation. It is hardly a coincidence that George H. W. Bush chose a flag manufacturer as one of his campaign stops, therefore proudly declaring loyalty to the nation by cherishing its insignia overtly (cf. Katz 2016: 106-107). Objectively, Dukakis was a patriot; however, in his view, it was the Constitution, separation of powers, democratic process, and their collective long-standing history that he admired and aimed to protect (cf. Katz 2016: 107). This more intellectual, process-oriented kind of national pride has hindered the Democratic Party from having a stronger patriotic image more than once – especially in comparison to Republican politicians, such as Donald Trump, who frequently relish in jingoistic fervor, which inevitably includes the touting and vocal admiration of the practically sacrosanct symbols of America.
In a further effort to strip Michael Dukakis of any patriotic character, the Bush campaign ruthlessly exploited the Willie Horton case to portray Dukakis as being soft on crime. Bush, in contrast, was painted as a protector who would shield America from every foreign and domestic threat. Willie Horton, an African-American man convicted of murder in Massachusetts, fled to Maryland during a prison furlough in 1986 and tortured a couple, stabbing a man and raping his wife. As Dukakis had been in favor of the furlough program and advocated its expansion to those convicted of first-degree murder, the Bush campaign soon realized that the Horton case provided them with the perfect opportunity to not only stoke fear, but also label Dukakis as being weak on crime. Bush could insinuate that he was naïve and soft, unable to protect innocent, law-abiding victims from predatory and vicious criminals. Bush denied the accusation that political ads juxtaposing the Horton case with Dukakis were supposed to characterize him as a failed masculine protector and pander to racial fears. He decried the Democrats’ anger over the racist subtext (cf. Dowd 1988b). However, disputing this subtext is close to impossible. The image of a strong, evil, and sexually predatory black man who brutalizes a white woman while her husband helplessly watches resonates with one of America’s most deep-seated racial fears (cf. Katz 2016: 113- 114). Two famous political ads were broadcast following the crime, and while one was not
72 produced by the Bush campaign directly, Bush asserted that he stood “fully behind those ads” (Bush qtd. in Dowd 1988b). The first ad, produced by the National Security PAC, showed a mugshot of Willie Horton, repeated his crimes, and specifically blamed Dukakis’ policy positions for the violent crime45, ignoring the fact that the program had been running for over a decade and was initiated by Republican Governor Frank Sargent. The second ad was directly produced by the Bush campaign and is widely known as “The Revolving Door Ad”46. It depicted convicts marching through a revolving gate while a voice-over narration recounts how Dukakis supported prison furloughs as well as vetoed the death penalty and mandatory prison sentences for drug dealers. Moreover, a text stating “268 Escaped” appears on the screen. Collectively, these ads created the image of Dukakis being responsible for 268 violent criminals, especially murderers and rapists, going free (cf. Katz 2016: 113-114; Ducat 2004: 91-92). The Bush campaign strongly pushed the message of Dukakis as being ‘soft on crime’, a frequent charge against (mostly) Democratic candidates. As discussed above, toughness is perceived as an essential quality of traditional, hegemonic masculinity, and by emphasizing a candidate’s disfavor of capital punishment and his ‘soft’ approach to law and order, a perceived lack of traditional masculinity is highlighted.
At the second presidential debate in Los Angeles, Dukakis’ categorical denial of capital punishment also cost him points with voters, especially when asked whether he would be in favor of the death penalty if it were his wife, Kitty Dukakis, who was the victim of rape and murder. Dukakis answered calmly that he would not and continued to give a lengthy answer, citing that capital punishment was not a deterrent and that his state had proven that other ways of punishment were more effective (cf. Presidential Debate 1988). His answer is widely regarded as one of the biggest failures in the history of American presidential debates. Dukakis’ opposition to the death penalty was widely known, and what the question, which undoubtedly alluded to the Willie Horton case, actually referred to were his qualities as a protector, his martial passion, and ultimately his masculine strength. To put it bluntly, the moderator Bernard Shaw could just as well have asked “whether Dukakis had enough testicular integrity to seek the ultimate vengeance and thereby […] protect other vulnerable females” (Ducat 2004: 95). While the candidate’s answer provided correct information on effectiveness of capital punishment, it failed to elicit the aggressive, masculine response that would have reassured voters he was not the weak, naïve man the Bush campaign had defined him as. In the end, he seemed like a “stolid bureaucrat whose pulse was quickened
45 National Security PAC (1988) “Willie Horton 1988 Attack Ad.” Youtube, uploaded by llehman84, 03.11.2008, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Io9KMSSEZ0Y&list=PLx6hZvy- 6qcXGrLXNRMGT1GljJoV9uR7I, accessed on 10.04.2018. 46 Frankenberry, Dennis and Ailes, Roger (1988) “Revolving Door.” Youtube, uploaded by Museum of the Moving Image, 10.06.2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TKXx8GnOgA4, accessed on 10.04.2018.
73 more by statistical graphs than by a sexual assault on his own wife” (Ducat 2004: 95). Dukakis’ ‘gender-inappropriate’ answer was only reinforced by his depiction as a henpecked, “Kitty-whipped” (Kimmel 2006: 195) husband. This charge was illustrated in Dick Hafer’s GOP-endorsed smear comic that portrayed Kitty Dukakis as a “take-charge woman” (Hafer 1988: 23). Moreover, the comic shows Dukakis as the “Sheriff Pansy” (Hafer 1988: 2) whose election would cripple national defense, supported by slogans such as “The Best Baby Is A Dead Baby” (Hafer 1988: 9), which alludes to Dukakis’ pro-choice views and alleges that he backed bestiality and witchcraft.
Paradoxically, the perhaps most notable instance ridiculing Michael Dukakis’ manhood was not orchestrated by the Bush side but the Dukakis campaign itself. As the Bush campaign had successfully managed to raise skepticism about Dukakis’ abilities to be a credible, tough, decisive commander-in-chief, the Democratic candidate decided to visit a General Dynamics tank factory. This, however, backfired with the release of an embarrassing recording of Dukakis wearing full headgear and riding a tank. Ducat perhaps best summarized the clip when writing “[i]nstead of the formidable battle-hardened leatherneck he wished to present himself as, Dukakis looked more like a frightened four-year-old boy on his first bumper car ride” (Ducat 2004: 89). The video seemed to underline the narrative of the weak Democrat that Republicans had been pushing since the early 1970s (cf. Katz 2016: 115). It also cemented the idea that Dukakis, especially in comparison to World War II fighter pilot George H. W. Bush, was a nuisance, perhaps even a threat to national security.
The Republicans’ combined efforts to bolster Bush’s tough, macho image while simultaneously ridiculing Dukakis’ insufficient liberal masculinity proved extremely successful when George H. W. Bush won the 1988 election in a landslide. Various commentators and news outlets wrote of Bush’s transformation from a ‘wimpish’ aristocrat to a mighty commander-in-chief. Journalist Tom Wicker wrote that Bush “established by September a satisfactory identification as Ronald Reagan’s surrogate, who was not a wimp after all” (Wicker qtd. in Curtis 1989), and Newsweek, the magazine first publicly raising questions about Bush’s masculinity, published an article stating:
The new George Bush looks rugged, even macho […] Something startling has happened to the man who was once mocked as Ronald Reagan’s lap dog [...] It could be argued, George Bush walked into the polling booth as Clark Kent and emerged as the Beltway equivalent of Superman. (N.N. qtd. in Curtis 1989)
Years later, Michael Dukakis explained that the most damning mistake his campaign had made was to let Bush define him as a person and as a politician (cf. King 2013). It seems appropriate to add that the Republicans had defined him as a man as well.
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George H. W. Bush, while not nearly as popular or traditionally masculine as Ronald Reagan, nonetheless occupied the role of the benevolent protector, patriarch, and war hero who presided over the nation. The idea of the fatherly protector is common and has frequently proven to be successful when gauging the viability of potential presidential candidates; it is even therefore more interesting that the American electorate neglected the president embodying this trope during his campaign for reelection in favor of none other than Bill Clinton, who conveyed neither of the mentioned criteria. 46 years old on Election Day, Clinton was one of the youngest presidents ever to be elected, and therefore closer to the American population’s median age than Bush or Reagan. Instead of fighting in war, he actively protested the involvement in Vietnam. His relationship with his vice president Al Gore “gave friendship a political valence” (Kimmel 2006: 196), and his wife Hillary proved to be unlike most former first ladies in American history. Bill Clinton did not fit the typical presidential requirements in numerous ways upon his inauguration. Interestingly, he is considered to be the Democrat who successfully ‘remasculinized’ the Democratic Party after Jimmy Carter, Walter Mondale, and Michael Dukakis. This remasculinization is largely credited to his centrist, even center-right, politics, especially in terms of crime and punishment, which appeased voters who saw Democrats as too lenient on crime and national security. This applies particularly to white men who left the Democratic Party in favor of the increasingly right-wing Republicans beginning in the 1960s and 1970s. Clinton’s aptitude to connect to average Americans through his rhetoric and his “ability to ‘feel people’s pain’ […] to feel their anger” (Katz 2016: 119) also played into his presidential narrative. Additionally, he did not fit the trope of the ‘liberal wimp’. As the former Governor of Arkansas, Clinton could also connect well with Southern voters; and in comparison to Michael Dukakis’ nickname ‘The Duke’, which elicited uncomplimentary comparisons to John Wayne, Clinton was dubbed ‘Bubba’, far from a snobbish, elitist nickname (cf. Katz 2016: 119). In short, although he was initially an unlikely candidate to re-masculinize the Democrats, he ultimately showed off masculine credentials through unexpected means.
In order to analyze the candidates’ masculinities, they have thus far been pitted against their opponents. However, when discussing Bill Clinton, his wife Hillary merits a closer look, not only because of her 2016 presidential run. Hillary Rodham Clinton was a different first lady in nearly every way; she transgressed the boundaries of what it meant to be ‘First-Lady-like’. She is highly educated, successful, ambitious, and opinionated. Hillary and Bill were frequently described as the ‘First Couple’, rather than the President and the First Lady. Initially, her strong-mindedness was perceived as an asset and helped her husband. However, Clinton’s presidency coincides with the rise of right-wing media, especially talk radio, which quickly declared misogynistic war on the First Lady, Rush
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Limbaugh at its forefront. General disapproval, especially among white Republican men, however, did not surface until later into Bill Clinton’s first term. After his first year in office, Hillary even received higher approval ratings than her husband by a 14 percent margin (cf. Ducat 2004: 134). Nonetheless, the tide on Hillary Clinton quickly turned, and caricatures, which depicted her as manlier than her husband or, crudely phrased, as a “ball-busting bitch” (Kimmel 2006: 196), became more frequent. The egalitarianism the Clintons proudly sported at the beginning of the Clinton presidency waned, at least in the public light.
The antifeminist backlash that later crystallized around the persona of Hillary Clinton had become pervasive among the self-anointed political kingmakers of the media, especially in talk radio, that the Clintons themselves felt compelled to play down the egalitarian nature of their relationship […] they realized that the American people weren’t ready for that [an egalitarian, power-sharing relationship], and so they [tried] to do it without telling people. (Ducat 2004: 137)
Hillary attempted multiple times to present herself to her numerous critics in a more traditional feminine manner, however largely to no avail. The criticism, whether about the way she dressed or spoke or her involvement in her husband’s politics, always boiled down to her lack of feminine submission. This undoubtedly reflected on Bill Clinton’s masculinity. If he could not manage to subdue his wife, how was he supposed to be manly enough to lead the country? In an effort to highlight his masculinity, it became important to underline Hillary’s femininity. After Bill Clinton’s defeat in his run for reelection as Governor of Arkansas, she undertook what was the first of a number of feminine make-overs: she stopped wearing her glasses, which might have made her look too intellectual, and more importantly took her husband’s last name. In the White House advisers and experts were hired to ‘feminize’ and ‘soften’ Hillary. During Bill’s run for reelection as president in 1996, Hillary presented herself more subdued. She talked less, refrained from mentioning ‘her plans’, and constantly repeated the phrase ‘my husband’. If she concerned herself with projects, as it is common for first ladies, they were far less political and no longer focused on issues like healthcare reform, which had garnered large amounts of criticism, but rather topics such as education and anti-drug campaigns, which had a more maternal flavor (cf. Ducat 2004: 145-147).
Hillary’s ‘traditionalization’ certainly helped bolster her husband’s masculine image; however, what really feminized her and masculinized him at the same time were allegations surrounding President Clinton’s sexual misconduct and allegations of infidelity. The image of a skirt-chasing, macho man in the Oval Office not only elevated Clinton’s masculinity, but also the public’s belief in him as a strong president, and he soon reached astounding popularity among (particularly but not exclusively) men. Simultaneously, this likewise pushed Hillary into the corner of the betrayed wife, thus ultimately feminizing her (cf. Ducat 2004:
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147). The macho husband and the subsequent betrayed wife were tropes much easier to relate to. They began to question whether Bill really was the henpecked husband Americans believed him to be. Prior to the scandal, Bill Clinton was usually attacked for his perceived lack of masculinity.
An examination of the linguistic and visual imagery through which Clinton has been portrayed shows that after the 1992 election, the president’s critics relied largely on feminine attributions to attack him. In most instances, this was in relation to his more phallically constructed wife, Hillary. […] he was variously represented as infantilized, dominated, and castrated by her. (Ducat 2004: 153)
When the scandal about sexual misconduct between Bill Clinton and White House intern Monica Lewinsky broke, the president’s genitalia and by extension his masculinity became a national topic of conversation and hardly anyone doubted whether the president was ‘a real man’ any longer. Bill’s extramarital affairs invigorated his masculine image, and interestingly, his popularity soared after the affair (cf. Ducat 2004: 160-161).
Although Bill Clinton remasculinized the Democratic Party to some extent, the Republicans still claim the space of traditional, hegemonic masculinity with far more ease. Clinton’s pandering to the conservative right wing through tough posturing and legislation in terms of crime and punishment, the ‘Don’t Ask Don’t Tell’ policy concerning homosexuality in the military, as well as, paradoxically, his lack of fidelity and loss of control around women helped him gain ground with white male voters. Nonetheless, the 2000 election would return power to the Republicans once more, with George W. Bush at its forefront, in what Ducat calls “the perhaps most phallic [administration] in U.S. history” (Ducat 2004: 166).
3.2.4 A Cowboy in the Oval Office – George W. Bush
George W. Bush was elected the 43rd President in the infamous 2000 election, which still elicits strong reactions on both sides of the aisle. His presidency is largely marked by objectively dramatic events, mainly the largest terrorist attack on American soil on September 11, 2001, perpetrated by Al-Qaida, the bloody wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the catastrophic aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. As mentioned before, times of national crisis typically unify nations, strengthen nationalistic and patriotic sentiments, and increase the want for tough and decisive, and in some cases punitive, executive action. All of these trends can be traced throughout George W. Bush’s presidency, and all have ties to stereotypically masculine behavior and traits. In this sense, George W. Bush’s presidency incorporates and utilizes signs of strong, hegemonic masculinity in an abundance of ways. Patterns and ideologies, such as the cowboy myth, anti-intellectualism, sports as a representational means
77 for masculinity, and tough executive action towards battle enemies, which have all been discussed previously, are apparent and in some instances even extraordinarily visible in the Bush presidency. Moreover, his race for reelection in 2004 against John Kerry serves as a recent example of masculinized campaigning and hyper-masculine bravado.
George W. Bush had realized how important the staging of his political persona, and particularly the staging of his masculine persona, was in electoral battles from his father’s political obstacles. George H. W. Bush, branded a wimp and a blue-blooded elitist even before officially announcing his candidacy, had to repeatedly fight emasculating labels throughout his political career. While raised in Texas, Bush Jr., like his father, was born into an affluent and politically active family in the Northeast, specifically in Connecticut. He attended Yale University, and when he was invited to join the illustrious secret society Skull and Bones, he was the fifth of his family to do so (cf. Lemann 2004). He had widespread name recognition and connections to important donors, particularly in the oil industry, and influential Republican figures. By all appearances, George W. Bush was a typical elitist, wealthy, and well-connected Republican with patrician roots. However, throughout his political career, he did everything in his might to erase any evidence of his privileged upbringing and present himself as an ordinary All-American man, even openly declaring his hostility towards intellectual elites (cf. Katz 2016: 170; Lemann 2004).
As previously discussed, exhibiting anti-intellectualism has frequently helped politicians, particularly those of the GOP, to connect to their constituencies. In many respects, Bush Jr. became a master of conveying anti-elitist sentiments while objectively being part of the elite himself, perhaps like no other before Donald Trump. He also made no secret of his disdain for intellectual activities and those who valued them highly. His preference for loyalty instead of erudition is observable in his staff appointments and the degree of respect he demanded of them (cf. Lemann 2004). Through his father’s struggles and his personal loss in the 1978 congressional election to Democrat Kent Hance, who in Bush’s own words “gave [him] a lesson in country-boy politics” and made him vow “to never get out-countried again” (Isaacson 2000), Bush realized that his background could not only help but also harm his political ambitions. According to Shogan, “Bush’s anti-intellectualism help[ed] him recast any political descriptions that [had] been ascribed to him. [He] used his anti-intellectualism to surpass expectations, develop a ‘conservative’ populism, showcase his moralism, and declare political independence” (Shogan 2007: 299). In other words, it gave him the opportunity to actively craft his own narrative in the manner he preferred rather than letting him be described passively. Bush could present himself as an underdog or as the folksy, tough, and grounded cowboy, although his familial connections did not support such an assessment. It enabled him to counter complex issues with masculine bravado and swagger
78 without having to answer for it, since he had staged himself as a man of action and sly quips rather than of sophisticated rhetoric (cf. Shogan 2007: 299-300). More than once, he stated that he “does not do nuance” (Bush qtd. in Hoffman 2011: 337), a line which showcases decisiveness (even if possibly misguided), allows for unilateralism and brash executive authority, distances himself from career politicians who approach complex issues with nuance, and fits the cowboy narrative of acting rather than speaking.
In some instances, his anti-intellectual attitude, neatly packaged within a humorous speech, even charmed an intellectual crowd. For instance, during a commencement address held at Yale University in 2001, he jested “congratulations to the class of 2001. To those of you who received honors, awards, and distinctions, I say, well done. And to the C students I say, you, too, can be President of the United States” (Bush 2001a). He went on to recount a deal he had made with a former classmate while studying in the library, saying that “Dick wouldn't read aloud, and I wouldn't snore” (Bush 2001a). In the same vein, Bush referred to his academic choices as “a diversified course of study” and an “academic road less traveled” (Bush 2001a). Through this slightly self-deprecating humor, his anti-intellectual attitude charmed a crowd of Yale alumni, who had mainly voted for the Green Party candidate Nader in the 2000 presidential election (cf. Associated Press 2001). This is an example of Bush’s strategy which repeatedly proved useful throughout his first presidential campaign and early presidency.
Hand in hand with his anti-intellectual self-depiction, Bush relied heavily on mythic cowboy imagery, which had previously enhanced Reagan’s masculine credentials. Arguably, visual representations of the mythic cowboy played an even larger role in Bush’s presidency than in Reagan’s. While Reagan frequently relied on juxtapositions forged during his campaign appearances and through his acting career, Bush exhibited cowboy credentials more frequently and more visually in his official appointments as well as instances of staged privacy. In an increasingly mediated political space situated in an increasingly visual culture, looking like a cowboy rather than primarily being associated with one amounted to a more successful selling strategy.
Bush repeatedly stated that he was Texan through and through, and his relationship to the Lone Star State associated him with notions of independence, faith, and morale as well as mythic frontiers and cowboy conceptions. It is hardly coincidental that George W. Bush and his wife Laura bought a Texan ranch in 1999, only a year before his presidential election race. This can ultimately be read as a means of validating Bush’s cowboy masculinity. It is likewise fair to suggest that he would have had a more difficult time selling himself as an authentic cowboy from Connecticut than from rural Texas. The ranch was later dubbed the
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‘Western White House’, and he conducted a large amount of presidential business from there, primarily clad in cowboy style clothing as opposed to his tie and suit attire worn in the White House47. Theodore Roosevelt as well as Ronald Reagan owned ranches themselves; however, in both cases, they spent considerably less time working from them. Nonetheless, the effect of simply being at the ranch was similar – suggesting that they enjoyed getting away from Washington, D.C., and living the more rural and rugged life reminiscent of the frontier. Bush’s dialect and simplistic language only underscored the visual presentation of a Southern cowboy occupying the White House. Images of Bush clearing brush from his ranch, driving around in his pick-up truck, and dressing in hunting gear surfaced in abundance (cf. Hoffman 2011: 326-327). These photo-ops were meant to depict him as a tough guy, a man who does not shy away from work and is down-to-earth and grounded. In short, they showed him as the opposite of Washington politicians in expensively furnished offices who wore tailored suits and debated complex issues using complicated legal terms.
As discussed above, the mythic cowboy Bush aimed to present himself as has little to do with actual cattle drivers. The mythic cowboy encompasses a romanticized idea of the frontier as well as notions of freedom, independence, and a heroic white male identity. Another feature of the cowboy is his distinctly and uniquely American quality. Therefore, by presenting himself as one, Bush unequivocally showed his allegiance to the country and its hard-working citizens. In white American culture, the cowboy additionally represents a shared mythical past, shared values, and American exceptionalism. As Hoffman describes, “the mythic cowboy is associated with the very identity of the country, [and therefore] virtually all Americans can participate in references to the myth” (Hoffman 2011: 325). This is certainly true for the white American population; however, it should be noted that participation in the myth is far more ambiguous for people of color. Arguably, this is a deliberate rather than simply ignorant act. Pandering to the white (male) vote using frontier imagery and the traditional values of the Wild West has been a key strategy in numerous campaigns, particularly by the GOP in political terms and in the South in geographical terms.
Bush, just as the majority of Republican nominees and politicians after 1988, has been compared as well as compared himself to Ronald Reagan. One point of comparison arises regarding the use of the mythic cowboy. While this was certainly part of Reagan’s image strategy, at least one significant difference can be pointed out in the presidents’ use
47 Anti-elitist sentiments were also underlined by the fact that Bush only wore a suit and tie when in the Oval Office but never on the campaign trail. There is a liberating quality to this image of donning casual cowboy wear instead of stuffy formal attire when outside Washington, D.C. He once even opened a campaign rally in Oregon with the words: “It’s great to be in a place with more boots than suits” (Bush 2004 qtd. in Katz 2016: 170). This insinuates that he is more at ease and more himself when dressed casually and far away from the rigorous politics and etiquette of Capitol Hill.
80 of cowboy imagery. Whereas Reagan embodied the optimistic male patriarch who rode in to save America from the Soviet Union during his election in 1980, George W. Bush appeared as the cowboy comrade throughout his first election and early presidency. When Reagan was elected, the country was perceived to be weak and emasculated, largely due to the aftermath of Vietnam and its reshaping of American self-confidence as well as its perception in the world, economic hardships, and hyper-masculine Soviet posturing (cf. Katz 2016: 172). On the contrary, Bush, inherited the country in much better economic position and without a significant villainous counterpart. Therefore, his cowboy bravado was initially intended to present him as ‘one of the guys’ and ‘someone you would like to have a beer with’ rather than a heroic savior. This, however, changed with the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, which shook Americans to their core. Bush’s cowboy image nonetheless fit the new narrative well, even if it had not been intended this way. The outdoorsy comrade quickly became the vengeful sheriff and masculine protector.
After Bush had won the 2000 election in the perhaps most controversial manner, his critics rallied and questioned whether he was intelligent enough to lead the country and whether he had a political persona of his own (cf. Katz 2016: 183). This changed quickly after the 9/11 attacks when his leadership proved successful in unifying and rallying the country against a common threat. American hyper-patriotism and nationalism, a common and expected reaction to crisis, concurred with his Texan cowboy persona and eventually elevated him to the nation’s first sheriff. Bush’s initial reaction, staying calmly seated for roughly ten minutes while listening to elementary students reading, was criticized (cf. Padgett 2011); however, his actions and speeches throughout the days following the attacks propelled him to the forefront of a (superficially) unified nation.
While the tragedy of 9/11 is undisputed, in retrospect it gave Bush and his fellow conservatives numerous opportunities to roll back civil liberties, engage in imperial politics, and “revalorize heroic (white) masculinity after decades of decline” (Katz 2016: 171). The attacks bolstered Bush’s masculinity and simultaneously re-masculinized the nation in unrivaled ways.
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 […] the relation of the leaders of the United States to its citizens is well illuminated by interpreting it under the logic of masculinist protection. The Bush administration has mobilized the language of fear and threat to gain support for constricting liberty and dissent in the United States and waging war outside. The stronger U.S. security state offers a bargain to its citizens: obey our commands and support our security actions, and we will ensure your protection. (Young 2003: 3)
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In the days following the attacks, Bush presented himself as masculine protector and avenger – as the Cowboy-in-Chief who would not yield until the perpetrators were brought to justice and the international community reminded of America’s decisiveness and strength. 9/11 thus became “a transformative period during which issues of gender were especially salient” (Coe et al. 2007: 33). Coe et al. observe that President Bush exhibited a particularly masculinized persona after the attacks, predominantly in his interactions with the press. He repeatedly used language aimed at asserting that he was bold, clear, certain, and unwilling to compromise or negotiate (cf. Coe et al. 2007: 34-35). In connection with the content of his messages, which was suffused with themes of violence, domination, and strength, his masculine credentials were reinforced. The intrinsic link between masculinity and the presidency enables just this.
[W]hen the nation–and, by extension, the presidency– is challenged, performing familiar varieties of masculine identity is one way a president might seek to assert control […] Indeed, a special emphasis on dominance masculinity would enable Bush – and by extension the nation – to assert a masculine leadership norm stifled by the divisive 2000 election outcome and severely challenged by September 11. (Coe et all 2007: 35)
The attack on the nation as a whole, which invigorated patriotic fervor, also licensed Bush to use violent language to an extent that would have otherwise been unacceptable or at least heavily criticized (cf. Coe 2007: 36). In the weeks following the attacks, the president repeatedly emphasized the cowardice of terrorists and proposed heavy-handed retaliation. The threat of terrorism fits neatly into the cowboy narrative. As was the case during the Cold War, it provided an opportunity to define the world as a dichotomy – good versus evil, civilized versus savage, us versus them (cf. Hoffman 2011: 333). This was made abundantly clear when Bush addressed Congress in a joint session on September 20, 2001, famously stating “[e]very nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush 2001b). This comment illustrates Bush’s binary world view, a consistent trope in the Western and cowboy narrative as well as a thinly veiled and highly masculinized threat to every nation in the world. The cowboy narrative also allowed for the continuously recycled portrayal of “the United States besieged by an enemy”, who is “pos[ing] a threat to American exceptionalism” (Hoffman 2011: 333). Such a portrayal had been used against immigrants, communists, dissidents, and protestors in the past. Moreover, while not completely ignoring America’s allies, his uncompromising, unilateral reaction to 9/11 mirrors the equally unrelenting, strong-minded, and decisive cowboy, who acts without first asking for permission. Lastly, the cowboy narrative also gave permission to neglect norms and even laws. The use of torture, black site prisons, unlawful detainment, and large-scale surveillance of the general population all contradicted moral or legal norms; however, the gravity of the
82 attacks coupled with Bush’s persona and policy approach ultimately justified these actions. “Cowboys were justified in breaking rules because they did so in order to defeat evil” (Hoffman 2011: 334).
There is perhaps no better instance juxtaposing the Wild West narrative of Bush’s persona with the proposed ‘War on Terror’ than his statements on September 19, 2001, when asked about Al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden.
This is a different type of enemy than we’re used to. It’s an enemy that likes to hide and burrow in, and their network is extensive. There are no rules. It’s barbaric behavior. They slit throats of women on airplanes to achieve an objective that is beyond comprehension. And they like to hit and then they like to hide out, but we’re gonna smoke them out. […] I want justice. There is an old poster out west I recall that said ‘wanted, dead or alive’ [transcript by the author]. (Bush 2001c)
His remarks to the press illustrate the creation of the barbaric, savage ‘other’ and the strong, decisive, and uncompromising retaliatory military action planned to oppose it. Additionally, the use of one of the most iconic Western idioms echoes his Western-style persona in an almost cartoonish manner.
The ‘War on Terror’, undeniably masculine in its connotation, unified Americans against a common enemy; however, by exploiting the population’s fears and insecurities, it also furthered the Bush administration’s, as Ducat (2004: 236) defines it, “phallic agenda of unilateralism and unaccountable exercise of power”, which is characterized by “[t]ax breaks for the wealthy, harsher disciplines for the poor, untrammeled military expenditures, cold-war style surveillance of citizens […], erosions of civil liberties, and invitations to corporate predators to feast on wilderness areas” (Ducat 2004: 236). The fear of the feminization of the state through affirmative action programs and social welfare measures were effectively combated in the early 21st century. Crudely summarized, the perceived ‘nanny state’ became the realm of daddy once more (cf. Ducat 2004: 235-237).
The subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and later Iraq, although retrospectively disastrous in terms of American as well as global politics, at first constituted the hyper- masculine climax of the Bush administration. 9/11 and its aftermath are now examples of how hyper-masculine, macho behavior and policies are perceived among the American electorate. After Osama bin Laden was identified as organizing the attacks on the World Trade Center, Afghan authorities demanded proof before extraditing him to the U.S. It was then that “Bush […] morphed into a warrior-chieftain” (DeConde 2002), dismissed the demand of proof as a tactic of delay, and launched an attack against one of the poorest war- ravaged nations. This crusade against the Taliban, and most saliently Osama bin Laden,
83 which eventually overthrew the Taliban regime, enhanced George W. Bush’s popularity excessively. At times, his popularity rose higher than that of any other president before him. Media outlets “hail[ed] Bush as a conqueror” (DeConde 2002), even though the operation to obtain bin Laden had failed. The subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003 was perhaps even more symbolic. Saddam Hussain’s regime, already an enemy of George H. W. Bush during his presidential tenure, was accused of, among other things, harboring terrorists as well as having weapons of mass destruction, which was deemed a threat to American national security. Evidence for such claims was flimsy and ultimately disproven; however, Bush argued for a preemptive strike to topple the regime, a move largely endorsed by the American public. In March 2003, the war was supported by the majority of Americans (72%), and Bush’s approval rating soared to 71% (cf. Newport 2003). At its outset, Bush used the Iraq war to bolster his masculine credentials and tote an aggressive masculinity towards Iraq. This is perhaps best illustrated by Bush’s speech declaring the end of the war on May 1, 2003, and the martial photo-op that accompanied it as well as his belligerent “bring em’ on”48 (Bush qtd. in Loughlin 2003) comment directed at Iraqi militants targeting American soldiers. The former merits closer examination due to its hyper-masculine war-like display of presidential machismo and the contemporary perception of the photo-op as a political blunder. On May 1, 2003, Bush, dressed in military garb, landed a fighter jet on the USS Abraham Lincoln, greeting and saluting military personnel aboard the ship, and declaring the mission accomplished and the war victorious. Rarely has a photo-op been as highly masculinized or as blatantly staged. No president in the 20th or 21st century has ever shown himself in military uniform, a universal symbol of masculine strength. Regardless of the lack of Bush’s own military credentials, the narrative the administration wanted to tell was compelling, although it was ridiculed by real service members even at the time (cf. Kimmel 2006: 250). It only mattered to few that the event was “a staged pseudo-event, taking place a mile off the San Diego coast with the boat positioned to obscure the view of the coastline” (Kimmel 2006: 250). Bush had successfully crafted himself as a cowboy, even though he neither rode horses nor had any experience in ranching, and in the same vein, he succeeded in presenting himself as a tough commander-in-chief who fought at the front line with his soldiers, without ever having been deployed.
The ‘War on Terror’, its ensuing wars, and national security were the most salient issues in the subsequent 2004 election. George W. Bush ran for reelection against
48 A comment which was readily criticized by Democratic presidential candidate Dick Gephardt as “phony, macho rhetoric” (Gephardt qtd. in Loughlin 2003). Moreover, in retrospect critics have bemoaned Bush’s masculine posturing in such instances, which jeopardized American military personnel abroad due to its threatening and almost challenging nature. Even Bush himself later admitted that he regretted his “kind of tough talk” because it “sent the wrong signal to people” (Bush qtd. in Coe et al. 2007: 49).
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Democratic nominee John F. Kerry. The 2004 election campaign was highly saturated with masculine imagery and identities (see Kimmel 2006, Katz 2016, Fahey 2007).
[I]n the campaign of 2004 an aristocratic blueblood – prep school, Ivy League, summers in Kennebunkport – cast himself as a virtual log-cabin-born Everyman who raised himself by his bootstraps. And he cast his opponent, a sage and sober bureaucrat, as soft and sensitive, under the thumb of an emasculating wife. (Kimmel 2006: 251)
John Kerry, a Vietnam veteran and war hero, posed a problem for the Bush campaign in terms of masculine competition. He had fought in a war (which Bush had evaded), was athletic, and repeatedly posed for photos together with fellow veterans and the firefighters’ union, therefore reaffirming his masculinity as well as his connections to blue-collar Americans (cf. Katz 2016: 174-175). John Kerry demonstrated traditional masculine credentials Al Gore had lacked in 2000. The Bush administration and groups associated with the GOP therefore aimed to discredit Kerry as ‘real and tough man’, and thus as a viable presidential candidate, by first casting shadows on his illustrious military record and then depicting him as an effeminate, luxury-loving elitist.
Kerry, who had been awarded three Purple Hearts as well as a Silver and a Bronze Star Medal for his service in Vietnam, became the target of a group associated with Republican donors called the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, who launched a series of attack ads questioning Kerry’s military record. Although almost all military members who served with Kerry rejected such claims and strongly supported Kerry, the damage had been done. These ads, coupled with Kerry’s delayed reaction, had cast a shadow on his fighter and protector image, which he would never fully regain. The Swift Boat smear campaign, together with the Willie Horton ads, ranks among the most successful attack ads in American political history (cf. Katz 2016: 175-176). The second strategy the Bush campaign employed was to ‘Frenchify’ John Kerry. Since the open disapproval of military intervention in Iraq by the French government, anti-French sentiments had increased in the United States. France quickly became a “scapegoat for anti-American, anti-war sentiment wherever it arose” (Fahey 2007: 137). Fahey traced anti-French rhetoric and attitudes and found that while they are often disguised as humor, they are situated within an American xenophobic tradition. ‘Being French’ becomes heavily connoted with notions of femininity, weakness, pretentiousness, elitism, immorality, and even promiscuity (cf. Fahey 2007: 137). By depicting Kerry as French, he thus automatically becomes all of the above as well as essentially un-American. Kerry, who has French citizens in his family and speaks French fluently, was quickly targeted by the Republican Party as being too continental and as ‘looking too French’, a label which swiftly gained momentum in popular media. Various media outlets such as the Washington Post, the Boston Herald, and The New York Times began to use French exclamations and words
85 in their articles about Kerry, continuously reinforcing his ‘French image’49. Kerry’s association with France, a nation frequently considered eccentric, luxury-loving, and weak, was therefore coded feminine from an American perspective, provided the GOP and associated organizations with an opportunity to characterize Kerry as soft and effeminate as well. In a far-reaching campaign, the National Rifle Association (NRA) ran an ad which depicted Kerry as a poodle with a pink bow called Fifi and printed the slogan “that dog don’t hunt” underneath, which alluded to Kerry’s backing of gun control legislation (cf. N.N. 2004). When he stated that he wanted to fight “a more effective, more thoughtful, more strategic, more proactive, more sensitive war on terror that reaches out to other nations and brings them to our side” (Kerry 2004 qtd. in Katz 2016: 184), Dick Cheney seized the chance to ridicule Kerry’s soft and sensitive approach to terror prevention. While Kerry had a detailed plan for how to engage in counterterrorism and cooperation with other nations, his word choice was what stuck, and Cheney utilized the feminine-coded word ‘sensitive’ as his basis for portraying Kerry as feminine and Bush as his masculine counterpart (cf. Katz 2016: 184). Unilateralism and strong executive authority bravado were key hallmarks of Bush’s first term, and they had generally boosted his popularity among the American people. Kerry, with his more diplomatic and consensus-oriented style, was therefore easily ridiculed as going out of his way to please America’s allies and asking for a metaphorical permission slip to protect America. Additionally, Kerry changed his mind on the Iraq War, eventually opposing it, which aided his portrayal as a weak flip-flopper. Indecisiveness, as mentioned above, is considered a typically feminine trait, and as Kimmel writes, “[Kerry] did the unthinkable for a man: He changed his mind” (Kimmel 2006: 251). This would ultimately cost him. No amount of military posturing and hunting photo-ops could establish an image different than the one the GOP had enforced: Kerry as an effeminate flip-flopper who was French rather than American, had cheated his way to military glory, and was destined to fail miserably at protecting the country from terrorist attacks due to his sensitive War on Terror should he be elected. Bush eventually won the 2004 presidential election by a narrow margin, and while it might be an overstatement to reduce his victory to his cowboy and protector swagger, traditional masculine boasting once more proved to be a successful campaign strategy. Bush’s approval ratings, however, plummeted after domestic failures such as his dealings with Hurricane Katrina, the rising national debt, and the increasing public perception of the Iraq War as futile and misguided.
49 The Boston Herald stated that “Republicans have sniped that Sen. John F. Kerry ‘looks French’, but his relatives on the other side of the Atlantic say there’s nothing Gallic about the Democratic presidential candidate”; the Washington Post wrote “Mon Dieu! The Republicans are trying to turn John Kerry into a frog”; and the New York Times published an article condemning the tactics of criticizing Kerry as ‘too French’, while simultaneously titling it “J’accuse” and ultimately reinforcing the French connotation (all qtd. in Fahey 2007: 139).
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Nonetheless, his heavy-handed approach to foreign affairs as well as his cowboy bravado and anti-intellectual charisma had succeeded in 2000 as well as in 2004.
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4. The 2016 Presidential Election
From the start, Trump has positioned himself as the embodiment of tough-guy masculinity, a throwback to the days when men were men and America was great because of it. Cultural ideas about gender have always hovered beneath the surface of American presidential politics. But this time around the combination of Hillary, a woman, facing Trump, the angry face of aggrieved and aggressive white manhood, has made gender — especially masculinity — visible in unprecedented ways. (Katz qtd. in Earp 2016)
Donald Trump’s election as 45th president of the United States came as a shock to nearly everyone. Pollsters and media outlets had predicted a historic victory for then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who would have become the first woman to hold the highest office in the United States. Instead, despite losing the popular vote by a two percent margin, Donald Trump won critical swing states such as Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin, which resulted in an Electoral College victory. Media personalities, politicians, and scholars of a variety of fields – from political science and history to sociology and cultural studies – have tried to find the causes and implications of this political upset and will continue to do so for years to come. While it is difficult to pinpoint one exact reason for this outcome, several factors, most frequently cited as explanations, have been presented. These include the clash between urban and rural voters; populist rebellion against Wall Street and the political establishment, which was perceived to be embodied by Hillary Clinton; former F.B.I. director James Comey’s renewed comments on Hillary Clinton’s emails shortly before the election; racially motivated backlash against the two-term Obama presidency; and reluctance to vote for a female president (cf. Cohn 2017).
An argument is to be made for each of these considerations, albeit to varying degrees. So far in this thesis, the prevalence of masculine performances in American presidential politics, the history of American manhood, and the interlinking relationship between the nation and constructs of masculinities have been discussed and examined. The 2016 election is no exception and also subject to such review. In fact, in some ways, it constitutes a watershed moment for masculine self-fashioning and notions of, to use Kimmel’s term, ‘aggrieved entitlement’. Therefore, in addition to all possible explanations above, there is an argument to be made for gender – gender in general as well as (white) masculinities in particular.
Campaigns for the presidency reflect the struggle to define national identity, particularly in regard to its racial, gender, sexual, class, and religious contours. As the national representative, the president of the United States is thought to embody the national identity and its collective values and given that the nation-state is coded masculine, (he) personifies ‘not only ‘America,’ but American manhood’ [emphasis in original]. (Smirnova 2018: 1)
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This is not to say that Donald Trump’s gender and masculine performance were the sole reasons for his success. There are undeniably multiple factors at play and reducing the broad movement that eventually elected Trump to an admiration for tough-guy masculinity and its performance would oversimplify cultural and social systems, values, and trends. However, as Smirnova argues, “[t]he politics of masculinity in the 2016 presidential election reveals as much about the matrimony between hegemonic masculinity and state power as it does the mechanisms by which patriarchal power subjugates or excludes women, the LGTBQ community, people of color, and other marginalized populations” (Smirnova 2018: 1). Furthermore, Dittmar states that “[i]n multiple ways, his [Trump’s] victory signaled the re- entrenchment of presidential masculinity, whether through his strategy and behavior or in the public’s acceptance of the misogyny evident in his campaign and his past” (Dittmar 2018: 5). Therefore, while Trump’s masculine self-modeling was not the only cause of his success among voters, it undisputedly contributed to his popular support, and his victory reaffirmed the masculine connotations and requirements for the highest political office. In the following chapter, Donald Trump’s ‘broad-shouldered’ exhibition of hegemonic masculinity will be examined in order to shed light onto how the admiration of a particular brand of aggressive masculinity may have affected the outcome of the 2016 election. Furthermore, the three presidential debates will be analyzed in detail to investigate Trump’s as well as Clinton’s gendered performances.
4.1 The Billionaire Everyman – Donald Trump Throughout the 2016 election, Trump, born into a privileged New York family and heir to a real estate empire, became the mouthpiece for large segments of middle- and working- class white America. Although far from a typical American in reality, he successfully blurred the line between being an all-American Everyman; self-made billionaire; and flamboyant, at times even cartoonish, entertainer. He managed to connect to middle- and lower-class white Americans, who supported him in larger margins than almost every poll had predicted. His campaign message resonated particularly well with the segment of the population which deemed a political shake-up as necessary and felt cheated out of the American Dream by various outgroup threats, such as corrupt and incompetent politicians, foreign powers, immigrants, and beneficiaries of welfare and affirmative action programs. The “blue-collar billionaire” (Colvin 2016a), as he was paradoxically dubbed by supporters, has been in the media spotlight for most of his life. His real estate dealings; marriages and tabloid-filling divorces; provocative statements, frequently saturated with elitism, arrogance, misogyny, and thinly veiled racism; largely self-aggrandizing books, most notably Trump: The Art of the Deal (1987); and reality TV projects The Apprentice and the Miss USA beauty pageant afford him
89 enormous name recognition. Nonetheless, neither media pundits and pollsters nor established politicians from either major political party considered him a serious contender for the presidency until Super Tuesday. Even then, the myriad of scandals surrounding Trump were believed to effectively disqualify him from the race. However, he persisted and won the presidency, despite losing the popular vote by the largest margin in American electoral history.
Donald Trump’s common man narrative is reminiscent of former President Andrew Jackson, whose self-fashioning as an antagonist to the Washington elites and president of the people, partially mirrors Donald Trump’s. Jackson, a wealthy man, positioned himself as a voice of the working class and as strong, decisive and populist leader. His approach to executive power was marked by its boldness, even resulting in political caricatures representing him as a monarch (cf. Johnson and Tumulty 2017). The historian H. W. Brands states that “Trump seems to like the tough-guy persona of Andrew Jackson […] There is no question that Jackson was decisive, and that he cared nothing for political propriety” (Brands qtd. in Jacobson and Waychoff 2017). This tough guy persona echoes the platform of the Trump campaign, flouting political incorrectness as well as Trump himself, a politically inexperienced billionaire as presidential contender. Trump stated his admiration for Jackson as a strong, manly leader, who in his eyes, singlehandedly could have prevented the Civil War50, an assessment immediately criticized for its historical inaccuracy. Trump admires Jackson’s strong, masculine persona and relishes comparisons with the former president, despite criticism of Jackson’s darker side having surfaced among scholars over the past years51. Comparisons between the two men are certainly appropriate, however, historians caution against exaggerating their similarities. While Jackson and Trump both come from privileged, wealthy backgrounds; campaigned on populist platforms; are known for their pugnacity; and favor strong, decisive, even unilateral action; Jackson had a decorated military as well as political career before assuming office and won the popular vote by a large margin (cf. Jacobson and Waychoff 2017, Johnson and Tumulty 2017). Furthermore, the historian H. Lee Cheek, Jr. argues that Trump’s understanding of Andrew Jackson’s political legacy might be based on favorable specifics, rather than a complete picture of the former president’s political persona. “The Trump endorsement of Jackson follows from his very limited understanding of Jackson as a man of action […] He has no knowledge of the misdeeds of Jackson that are central to a complete understanding of his political career” (Cheek qtd. in Jacobson and Waychoff 2017). Nonetheless, the similarities as well as
50 “He was a very tough person, but he had a big heart. He was really angry that he saw what was happening with regard to the Civil War, he said ‘There’s no reason for this'” (Trump 2017b). 51 Most notably the focus has shifted towards Jackson’s status as a slave holder as well as his exclusionary and ‘removal’ policies concerning Native Americans, which resulted in the Trail of Tears.
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Trump’s open admiration for Jackson, which is demonstrated by the act of displaying President Jackson’s portrait in the Oval Office, give insight into which masculine qualities Trump favors and aims to represent himself (cf. Jacobson and Waychoff 2017).
Trump’s success in the 2016 election can be attributed to numerous different factors, one being his exceptional self-marketing, which established him as the manliest, strongest, and most unapologetic man and the only solution to America’s problems. Robert Brannon’s influential characterization of the male sex role defines four key characteristics of the traditional male sex role: the ‘big wheel’, the ‘sturdy oak’, ‘give ‘em hell’, and ‘no sissy stuff’. Being the ‘big wheel’ refers to achieving and maintaining (financial) success and a high social status. The ‘sturdy oak’ means acting independently, self-reliantly, and confidently. ‘Give ‘em hell’ denotes an aura of masculine aggression, strength, daringness, and even violence; and ‘no sissy stuff’ signifies the stigmatization of traditionally feminine qualities and manifests itself in misogyny, sexism, and emasculation through feminization (cf. Kahn 2009: 56-57). While sex role theory fails to provide a holistic and inclusive explanation for gendered realities Brannon’s characterization echoes aspects of Trump’s masculinity in numerous ways and will thus serve as a means to structure the following analysis.
4.1.1 The Art of Rhetorical Muscle Flexing – Xenophobia, Terrorism, and Law and Order
Trump had announced possible candidacies in various election cycles before 2016 but never followed through until his official announcement on June 16, 2015, at Trump Tower in New York City (cf. DelReal 2015). His announcement speech already illustrated numerous features of his style and content, which was ceaselessly employed throughout his campaign. From the beginning, Trump exhibited an aggressive, even punitive, tone; deliberate ignorance of political correctness; overt racism and xenophobia; the idea of a leader taking back what has been lost and squandered by incompetent previous administrations; and significant disregard for accuracy and truth. His remarks also showcased a worldview which is largely binary, transactional, and best summarized as a zero-sum-game. In his speech, he divides the world into winners and losers and locates America firmly on the latter side. To do so, he employs a rhetoric of domination and aggression, which eventually became a masculinized and domineering staple of his campaign.
When was the last time anyone saw us beating, let’s say, China in a trade deal? They kill us. I beat China all the time. All the time. When did we last beat Japan at anything? […] When do we beat Mexico at the border? They’re laughing at us, at our stupidity. And now they are beating us economically. They are not our friend, believe me. But they’re killing us economically [emphasis added by author]. (Trump 2015a)
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His entire announcement speech, which lasted for roughly 45 minutes, was garnished with grammatical variations of the words ‘kill’ five times and ‘beat’ six times52, all used in connection to other nations and trade negotiations. He repeatedly claimed that other nations, such as Japan, China, and Mexico, were destroying America through unfair trade deals and were aided by mismanagement by previous U.S. administrations (cf. Trump 2015a). In the case of Mexico, he even suggested that they were doing so purposefully and even gloatingly. Additionally, to what Trump perceives as economic mismanagement in dealings with other nations, he also raged against border security or the lack thereof, by using highly xenophobic and fearmongering imagery.
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us [sic]. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. […] They’re sending us not the right people. It’s coming from more than Mexico. It’s coming from all over South and Latin America, and it’s coming probably – probably – from the Middle East [emphasis by author]. (Trump 2015a)
This infamous statement by then primary candidate Trump paints a gruesome picture of other countries supposedly deliberately sending immigrants to destabilize the American economy and society. The claim is highly xenophobic and succumbs to deeply ingrained racialized fears of white American identity. This statement becomes particularly potent in its fear- mongering by juxtaposing rape and crime with immigrants from non-white majority countries. Pandering to racialized fears of the white American population about people of color being potential rapists and criminals already proved useful with the notorious Willie Horton ads in the race between George H. W. Bush and Michael Dukakis. Moreover, Trump distinguished acutely between ‘us’ and ‘them’, repeatedly stating that immigrants crossing the border are not good people, especially in comparison to the hard-working Americans to whom he addressed his speech. This was further underlined by the shift from the pronoun ‘they’ to ‘it’ when referring to immigrants, which leads to the perception of immigrants as a homogenous group and facilitates dehumanization. It has been discussed that rejection of and aggression towards the other, while not exclusively a masculine trait, frequently goes hand in hand with concepts of white hegemonic masculinity.
Concepts of traditional white heterosexual masculinities have been scrutinized repeatedly by the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, LGBTQIA+ movements, and feminist and gender theories throughout the past decades. Such challenges have begun to change long-standing power dynamics, patriarchy, and white male supremacy as well as
52 He used ‘killer’ one more time referring to terrorists and ‘beat’ one more time referring to ISIS (cf. Trump 2015a).
92 initiated a slow but steady erosion of ideals and notions of traditional and hegemonic masculinity. This unmasking of hegemonic masculinity reveals insecurities within the construct of masculinities, which can in turn elicit reaffirming reactions and backlash such as masculine overcompensation. A 2013 study by Willer et al. claims that when traditional forms of masculinity are threatened, men tend to overcompensate by espousing more homophobic beliefs as well as more pronouncedly advocating for the military, war, and similar dominance hierarchies (cf. Willer et al. 2013: 1004-1005). Looking back to Chapter 2.1, it is known that rejection, aggression, and exclusion of ‘the other’ have repeatedly been used against immigrants, African Americans, members of the LGBTQIA+ community, and women to buttress threatened masculine ideals. Johnson recognizes this as a key to understanding patterns of demagoguery in Trump’s divisive worldview. “Demagogues grind liberal democracy to a halt by encouraging subjects to focus on the felt precarity of their existence rather than their shared connections with others” (Johnson 2017: 230). Trump taps into sentiments of aggrieved entitlement and the anxieties of numerous white men who feel threatened by contemporary social changes. He overcompensates his and by extension their masculinity by using bellicose, jingoistic rhetoric and providing a dehumanized but essentially inferior scapegoat in the form of the immigrant and racialized ‘other’. He encourages his supporters to identify themselves as victims on the basis of “felt precarity [emphasis in original]” (Johnson 2017: 230).
Anti-immigrant rhetoric is closely tied to masculinity and anxieties surrounding them. Historically, whenever native-born white men have felt threatened by immigrant communities, regardless of whether they were Irish or Latinx, exclusionary practices, hate speech, violence, infantilization, sexualization, and denigration swiftly followed (cf. Kimmel 2006: 23). By collectively defining Mexicans as rapists, Trump sexualizes the ‘other’ and at the same time associates them with uncivilized, predatory behavior. When Kimmel writes that “Irish immigrants were especially stamped with problematic masculinity” and continues by saying they were “[i]magined as rough and primitive, uncivilized and uncivilizable, […] ridiculed as a subhuman species, born to inferiority and incapable of being true American men” (Kimmel 2006: 23), it echoes Trump’s generalizing claims about Mexicans as predators and criminals who are inherently irreformable and a threat to the American nation. His proposition to build a border wall, and therefore physically separate the American people from the ‘other’, heightens the differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Moreover, by claiming he will make Mexico pay for the border wall53 – a measure which he considers necessary to ensure
53 Trump, Donald J. (realdonaldtrump). “With Mexico being one of the highest crime Nations in the world, we must have THE WALL. Mexico will pay for it through reimbursement/other.” 27.08.2017, 8:44 am. Tweet.
93 national security – the proposal becomes punitive and highly domineering in its meaning. According to Trump, because Mexico allegedly sends its delinquents, whom he characterizes as incapable of integrating, they must pay their dues in form of the border wall. Furthermore, when countering Mexican politicians’ rejection of such a proposal by (at least verbally) threatening to enlarge the wall54, he clearly demonstrates an approach of dominance and humiliation rather than one of cooperation and diplomacy. In other words, disagreement will be punished and met with threats. Ignorance of diplomacy and the embrace of unilateralism and dominance are highly indicative of masculinized executive toughness, as is Trump’s frequently racialized rhetoric. Domineering and targeting non-white nations that are to a degree, both economically and militarily, inferior is not unusual in the framework of American presidential masculinity, and highlights DeConde’s theory of the macho presidency.
Trump’s announcement speech was by far not the only demonstration of xenophobic and racist sentiments, but rather the beginning of a steady stream of anti-immigrant speech. History has repeatedly shown that threats to white heterosexual masculinity tend to manifest themselves in forms of racially motivated aggression, exclusion, and violence. Media analyses of Trump’s voter base have frequently concluded that racist sentiments are particularly common among men of lower economic and social standing, or, as Tillner puts it, “underprivileged ‘victims of modernization’” (Tillner 2000: 55) who see immigrants, and particularly people of color, as threats to their own economic and social status. However, recent research has challenged this conclusion. It has come to light that middle-class or even privileged young men seem just as, if not more, likely to hold racist beliefs and violently act upon them. Tillner explains this by referencing racism as “a consequence of […] ‘demands for dominance’” (Tillner 2000: 55). He argues that numerous young men perceive a desirable masculine identity as defined through strength, power, money, success, and competition. As previously discussed, many men do not or cannot conform to this hegemonic ideal of masculinity; however, by exerting dominance and, as a result, subordinating and even delegitimizing other forms of masculinity – for example, the racialized ‘other’ – hierarchies which can be empowering and remasculinizing are established (cf. Tillner 2000: 55). In turn, a narrative emerges in which people of color and/or immigrants are perceived as threats not only to aspects of the material world, but also to the entitlement to power many white Americans feel, consciously or unconsciously. While a sense of racial entitlement does not automatically relate to gender, the prevailing importance of dominance and power in the construction of masculinity facilitates racist and xenophobic sentiments that rely on similar hierarchical structures.
54 “The wall just got ten feet higher” (Trump 2016a).
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Throughout his primary campaign to acquire the GOP nomination, Trump frequently pandered to racist, anti-immigrant, and white supremacist beliefs. There is an abundance of evidence for his bigoted racial views both before and during his presidential campaign. Although Trump describes himself as “not a racist, in fact, I am the least racist person that you’ve ever encountered” (Trump qtd. in Fisher 2016), there is a long list of instances which suggests the contrary. For example, he failed to immediately repudiate the endorsement of former KKK Grand Wizard David Duke, which is widely interpreted as a nod to white power and white supremacy groups; proposed a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” (Trump 2015b); and demanded the recusal of a judge presiding over a lawsuit against him due to the judge’s Mexican heritage (cf. Fisher 2016). Trump’s racist actions and beliefs before his candidacy are also well documented. As early as the 1970s, he faced a lawsuit accusing him of racially discriminating against African Americans who sought housing in his apartment buildings. He also crusaded against the Central Park Five, a group of five African American and Latino teenagers who were wrongfully convicted of raping a jogger in Central Park. He ran ad campaigns in newspapers demanding the reintroduction of the death penalty and refused to accept their innocence as late as 2016, even after the men had been exonerated by DNA evidence. Moreover, he was among the most prominent supporters of the so-called ‘birtherism’55 conspiracy theory, which casts doubt on Barack Obama’s Hawaiian birthplace (cf. Lopez 2018). Trump’s thinly veiled and racially motivated backlash against the first African-American president perhaps reached its peak when he blamed Obama for stoking racial divisions in the country during his speech at the Republican National Convention (RNC). “The irresponsible rhetoric of our President, who has used the pulpit of the presidency to divide us by race and color, has made America a more dangerous environment for everyone than frankly I have ever seen and anybody in this room has ever watched or seen” (Trump 2016b). He insinuated that Obama, by acknowledging racial injustice in America, not only created it, but heightened it. This statement, coming from a presidential nominee who generalized Mexicans as criminals and rapists, can be easily identified as pandering to racist views rather than concern for the African-American population and racial equality in the United States. It must be noted, however, that while Trump expressed racist and xenophobic beliefs in an exceptionally direct manner, the Republican Party had been cultivating fertile ground for such sentiments for decades. From a gender perspective, this concurs with theories of the interlinking relationship between conservatism and hegemonic masculinity, and underscores research deeming
55 Research has shown strong correlations between adherents to birtherist beliefs and levels of racial resentment. For more information, see Philip Klinkner (2014). “The Causes and Consequences of ‘Birtherism’”. Paper presented at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, https://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/papers/docs/Birthers.pdf.
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Republicans the more strongly masculinized party. As sociology professor Doug McAdams writes:
During the 2016 GOP primaries, when Donald Trump characterized Mexican immigrants as ‘rapists,’ hesitated to repudiate endorsements from David Duke and other white supremacists, and proposed to bar Muslims from entering the country, he merely gave open and flamboyant expression to racial attitudes widespread among GOP base voters. Trump is pushing the racially polarized politics that has characterized the Republican Party for the past half century, but he did not create it. (McAdams 2016)
Two of Trump’s most touted talking points throughout his campaign were illegal immigration and terrorism. By ranting against the threats of illegal immigration and terrorism, Trump crafted a narrative that portrayed himself as competent and masculine savior while depicting his opponents as ignorant, incompetent, and even complicit in the ultimate American demise he conjured. To accomplish this, he used offensive, often vulgar, language to defame a racialized ‘other’, which he painted, often by using derogatory terms, as dangerous, illegitimate and inferior. By openly espousing feelings of racial resentment and Islamophobia, in addition to asserting white male dominance, he also echoed a form of nostalgia for what is often perceived as ‘the good old times’ before social change and political correctness supposedly wracked havoc on American society. This idea of bringing back the ‘good old times’ – when the economy was growing, terrorism seemed inexistent, and gender as well as racial roles were clear cut – is perhaps best encapsulated by Trump’s campaign slogan ‘Make America Great Again’.
Trump never specifies when America was ‘great’, why it stopped ‘being great’, or who exactly falls under his idea of ‘America’. It is perhaps this ambiguity that explains the slogan’s success. While implicitly alluding to a utopian past of a productive white, male economy in a socially conservative nation, Trump never specified when America was great and at what point it changed from ‘a winning to a losing’ nation. By doing so, he not only evaded criticism, but also ensured that every voter could individually construct and nostalgically imagine a past time which should be restored. According to Michael Kimmel, the period Trump and his supporters most likely refer to is the 1950s, a decade frequently valorized, particularly by the conservative movement, as a time “when everyone knew their place” (Kimmel qtd. in Giese 2017), men earned breadwinning wages, and America was perceived stronger and safer. While the post-World War II economy did indeed grow, this view is nonetheless highly selective and ignores, among other things, factors which enabled this exalted white male American success story, such as segregation and Jim Crow laws as well as female oppression and discrimination (cf. Giese 2017). Trump’s campaign essentially alludes to a largely fictional, highly racialized and gendered utopian past and vows to make it the future.
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Furthermore, the slogan is strongly reminiscent of Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential campaign during which he used the slogan ‘Let’s Make America Great Again’ (cf. Engel 2017). Invoking Reagan, a highly masculinized president and Republican hero, through a campaign slogan might very well have additionally bolstered Trump’s masculine and conservative credentials.
Trump’s crude language and aggressive rhetoric merits a closer examination. Two questions arise when examining his manner of communication. First, the way Trump utilizes language is not only highly emotionalizing but also emotional. He frequently appears emotional, highly defensive, and at times, even hysterical – traits considered typically feminine. How does this aspect of language use relate to his hyper-masculine content and behavior as well as to the masculine expectation of level-headedness? Second, how could Trump not only remain part of the race but even eventually emerge as its winner by using crude, offensive, and frequently factually incorrect language, which likely would have disqualified other candidates?
To answer the first question, a closer investigation of so-called ‘male hysteria’, a phenomenon that first breached scientific literature in the late 1900s. At the time, hysteria and its various symptoms, was closely, even exclusively, associated with women and femininity. However, cases of men suffering from similar symptoms began to surface throughout the 1800s and eventually reached “near-epidemic proportions” (Rotundo 1993: 186). The possibility of men suffering from hysteria posed a difficult situation for physicians at the time, due to the condition’s feminine connotations. Diagnosing men with hysteria would ultimately feminize them, at a time, in which the fear that America’s men were too pampered and effete, ran rampant. However, it quickly became apparent that the condition did not necessarily affect men lacking traditional masculine qualities in high quantities. In contrast, it seemed as if the condition was particularly common among men, who exhibited traditionally masculine qualities, worked masculine jobs and were robust and strong. Thus, the condition, which came to be known as neurasthenia, did not seem to stem from a pathological flight from femininity but rather from an inability to conform to strict masculine gender norms (cf. Brandt 2007: 74-75). This suggests that masculine overcompensation and anxieties about male gender roles manifested themselves in hypermasculine, ‘hysterical’ behavior. This may explain Trump’s highly emotional and often defensive behavior and rhetoric.
The second question, references the numerous instances throughout the race, which were cited as evidence for Trump’s eventual downfall due to unrefined, offensive, and fear- mongering speech patterns and blatant falsehoods. Still, however, he persisted, which raises questions of how and why. It is certainly true that to some extent his supporters were willing
97 to overlook his rhetoric in order to prevent another Democratic president in the form of Hillary Clinton. To others, however, his rhetoric was appealing precisely because of its aggressive and offensive nature.
Donald Trump expresses out loud everything they feel — with force, aggression, anger, and no shame. All they have to do is support and vote for Trump and they don’t even have to express their ‘politically incorrect’ views, since he does it for them and his victories make those views respectable. He is their champion. He gives them a sense of self-respect, authority, and the possibility of power. (Lakoff 2016)
Republicans have continuously decried the demand for and use of political correctness as an act of masking uncomfortable truths. At the same time, hardly any candidate has gone as far as Trump, certainly not when seeking the nation’s highest political office. His pronounced and open assault on political correctness and the almost mythical narrative of ‘telling it like it is’ even shocked seasoned GOP politicians. Trump’s political incorrectness nonetheless proved to be an asset in the 2016 campaign, and it is an important tool in his rhetorical repertoire. Trump frequently suggests that being politically correct is a waste of time and, in essence, useless56. According to Gantt Shafer, his supposed truth-telling must be read through a white racial frame, which means through a “neoliberal worldview that ‘interprets and defends white privilege and advantaged conditions as meritorious’ and accents white virtue in opposition to the inferiority and deficiencies of racially oppressed people of color” (Gantt Shafer 2017: 1). While harshly criticized for his comments concerning race and gender by the Democratic Party, the media, and even some Republican politicians, Trump established himself within the conservative movement as a one-man army fighting against a politically correct Washington. He succeeded in cultivating an image as truth-teller, straight-shooter, and go- getter who was not afraid to bluntly discuss often unfounded or grossly decontextualized, yet highly polarizing issues, such as illegal immigration and its relation to criminal activity. He even went as far as to compare cities to war zones due to African American crime or terrorism. When making such statements, however, he never felt compelled to give sources for his claims, nor did he need to: he had established himself as truthful and simultaneously decried everyone disagreeing with him as fake. Through his inherently pro-white ‘truth-telling’, he normalized practices of racial oppression and marginalization by essentially claiming that there is little benefit in using language sensitive to other people’s grievances or denying those grievances altogether. Trump portrayed politically correct language as a “bureaucratic
56 Trump, Donald (realdonaldtrump). “Being politically correct takes too much time. We have too much to get done! #Trump2016.” 28.01.2016, 10:44 A.M. Tweet. Trump, Donald (realdonaldtrump). “So many ‘politically correct’ fools in our country. We have to all get back to work and stop wasting time and energy on nonsense!” 08.08.2015, 7:29 A.M. Tweet. Trump, Donald (realdonaldtrump). “People have got to stop working to be so politically correct and focus all of their energy on finding solutions to very complex problems!” 13.12.2015, 7:33 A.M. Tweet.
98 sugarcoating of inherent truths” (Gantt Shafer 2017: 2) that hinders politicians from tackling problems facing the nation (cf. Gantt Shafer 2017: 2-4).
In addition to utilizing Gantt Shafer’s racial frame, I argue that it is even more worthwhile to analyze Trump’s rhetoric through both white-racial and gendered frames, respectively. The masculine connotation of being a so-called straight-shooter is already obvious in the word itself. It is reminiscent of the Wild West, cowboys, and soldiers – all of which are masculinized images. As seen with past American presidents, Trump, too, attempts to masculinize himself by identifying with such cultural symbols. Furthermore, he feminizes political correctness by redefining it as inherently untrustworthy and weak. Expressing oneself in a politically correct manner, in the Trumpian sense, amounts to the coddling of a particular group, which results in the group becoming privileged over the ‘average American’. It is depicted as going out of one’s way to accommodate someone else’s feelings, an act seen as feeble and feminine. Throughout the campaign, he repeatedly conflated political correctness with weakness and unwillingness to act. This is particularly well illustrated through his tweets concerning the Obama presidency’s policies on (counter)terrorism and immigration57.
Illegal immigration provides a suitable framework for Trump to display traditional masculine strength by neglecting the complexity of migration patterns, laws, and realities as well as punitively retaliating against a racialized ‘other’ who remains largely homogenous and faceless. He employs a similar strategy when talking about Muslims and the collective threat they allegedly imply. Since 9/11, Islamophobia has been a motivator for rhetoric and policies targeting Muslims, increased military spending, and the curtailment of civil liberties. Trump thus capitalized on already established fears when repeatedly proclaiming that ‘radical Islamic terrorism’ was the defining threat of the 21st century. Due to this pre-established fear and hostility towards Islam58, restricting the rights of the Muslim population proved to be a particularly appropriate topic for bolstering macho strength and vengefulness. This suggests
57 Trump, Donald (realdonaldtrump). “With Hillary and Obama, the terrorist attacks will only get worse. Politically correct fools, won't even call it what it is - RADICAL ISLAM!” 04.07.2016, 10:34 A.M. Tweet. Trump, Donald (realdonaldtrump). “Captain Khan, killed 12 years ago, was a hero, but this is about RADICAL ISLAMIC TERROR and the weakness of our ‘leaders’ to eradicate it!” 31.07.2016, 7:57 A.M. Tweet. Trump, Donald (realdonaldtrump). “When will President Obama issue the words RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM? He can't say it, and unless he will, the problem will not be solved!” 15.11.2015, 9:18 A.M. Tweet. Trump, Donald (realdonaldtrump). “We better get tough with RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISTS, and get tough now, or the life and safety of our wonderful country will be in jeopardy!” 22.11.2015, 10:59 A.M. Tweet. 58 A poll conducted by YouGov in March 2015 showed that 55% of Americans had an unfavorable view of Islam to at least some degree (cf. Moore 2015).
99 that Trump’s aggressive rhetoric fell on fertile ground, furthering fear and open hostility towards the Muslim ‘other’ that has been increasingly noticeable since the 9/11 attacks.
Rhetorical muscle flexing and tough-talk is not uncommon in presidential politics and campaigns. Advocacy for a strong military as well as explicit and implicit threats of military action against foreign adversaries are frequently used to showcase strong masculine leadership qualities and underline a candidate’s competence as commander-in-chief and warrior-protector of the American people. Trump lauded the military on numerous occasions, for example in his campaign announcement (cf. Trump 2015a), and promoted expanding the military budget, for example during the primary debate between Republican candidates in Milwaukee, saying: “We have to make our military bigger, better, stronger than ever before so that nobody messes with us, and a long run [sic], it's going to save us” (Presidential Candidates Debate 2015a). Apart from such common and relatively calm calls for increased military strength, Trump also laid out more aggressive and punitive plans on the campaign trail. At a rally in Fort Dodge, Iowa, Trump assured that he “would bomb the shit out of them [ISIS]” and advocated carpet bombing the region, stating that he “would blow up every single inch” until “there would be nothing left” and then seize the region’s oil (cf. Trump 2015c) – ignoring that such acts would amount to breaches of the laws of war (cf. Wright 2017). Furthermore, he proposed targeting terrorists’ families, which similarly constitutes a war crime, before conflating criticism of this idea with political correctness. “We’re fighting a very politically correct war. And the other thing is with the terrorists, you have to take out their families. When you get these terrorists, you have to take out their families. They – they care about their lives don’t kid yourself” (Trump 2015d). Moreover, when confronted with a letter signed by high ranking foreign policy experts that stated they would not support some of Trump’s campaign promises concerning, for example, torture, Trump doubled down on his campaign promises.
They then came to me, what do you think of waterboarding? I said it's fine. And if we want to go stronger, I'd go stronger, too, because, frankly that's the way I feel. Can you imagine — can you imagine these people, these animals over in the Middle East, that chop off heads, sitting around talking and seeing that we're having a hard problem with waterboarding? We should go for waterboarding and we should go tougher than waterboarding. (Trump, Presidential Candidates Debate 2016a)
His rhetoric of muscle flexing when confronted with foreign adversaries is not unusual, especially for Republican presidential candidates. However, his suggestions of effectively looting oil of a sovereign nation, committing war crimes by targeting the families of terrorists, agreeing with the use of waterboarding as an interrogation practice, and suggesting even more brutal means of torture are hyper-masculine policy proposals. Through aggressive and
100 domineering language and continuous self-aggrandizement, Trump emphasizes that his masculine qualities qualify him as the only viable protector and warrior of the nation59. Furthermore, regardless of whether his criticism is aimed at political correctness, lax foreign policy deals, border and national security, or trade agreements, he continually conveys his disapproval with a sense of urgency. The effect of this is threefold: First, it mobilizes supporters effectively. If voters believe that the country is teetering on the edge and will decline if they refrain from acting promptly, a motivation to vote becomes immediate. Secondly, it reaffirms masculinity by drawing upon what Marion Young refers to as “the logic of masculinist protection” (Young 2003: 2), which applies the framework of patriarchy and the role of the masculine protector to the politics of the security state. Akin to formal patriarchy, in which women and children are subordinate to a patriarchal protector, masculinist protection suggests that by allowing a political leader to occupy the role of a tough and vigilant protector, citizens, similarly to women and children in the patriarchal household, become subordinate. This subordination becomes accepted by (over)emphasizing or creating an outgroup threat or developing a feeling of social and economic precarity, and it justifies paternalism, authoritarian leadership, and aggressive foreign policies (cf. Young 2003: 2-3). Thirdly, Trump’s urgent tone highlights other candidates’ and politicians’ inability or unwillingness to act while showing his own supposed eagerness (cf. Gantt Shafer 2017: 5). This is reminiscent of earlier presidential campaigns in which candidates, such as John Kerry or Jimmy Carter, were depicted as weak and effeminate because they either failed to act decisively and aggressively enough or resorted to bilateral negotiations and diplomacy rather than unilateral decision-making. Trump portrays himself as a doer in comparison to other politicians who “[a]re all talk, they're no action, nothing gets done” (Trump, Presidential Candidates Debate 2016b).
Issues of national security, immigration, and crime were among Trump’s most prominent campaign topics, yet his rallies, speeches, ad campaigns, and debates were wrought with a lack of explicit policy details. While vagueness is not uncommon during presidential elections, Trump’s imprecision stands out. Smith argues that by veiling the mechanisms he would use to counter the American carnage he had conjured, he achieved three things: First, he retained flexibility in terms of how and when he would ‘fix’ America’s problems. Second, he sidestepped possible policy attacks and simplified politics by avoiding convoluted policy debates. Third, he used the lack of detail to personalize his campaign.
59 Trump, Donald (realdonaldtrump). “Another radical Islamic attack, this time in Pakistan, targeting Christian women & children. At least 67 dead, 400 injured. I alone can solve.” 27.03.2016, 3:37 P.M. Tweet. Trump, Donald (realdonaldtrump). “Just announced that as many as 5000 ISIS fighters have infiltrated Europe. Also, many in U.S. I TOLD YOU SO! I alone can fix this problem!” 24.03.2016, 10:52 A.M. Tweet.
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Smith maintains that Trump sees America’s problems as faults of particular politicians, first and foremost Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. This means “his struggle is not about agency but agents. Because Obama and the Clintons were to blame for the dystopia Americans should reject their false leadership to which ‘I alone’ am the alternative” (Smith 2017: 973). Furthermore, this presented thesis argues that Trump’s lack of policy details is necessary for the particular type of ‘broad-shouldered’, masculine performance he enacts. He casts himself as the only option for those who long for law and order, as well as strength and honesty. In his acceptance speech at the 2016 Republican Party Convention, he memorably stated “I have joined the political arena so that the powerful can no longer beat up on people that cannot defend themselves. Nobody knows the system better than me, which is why I alone can fix it” (Trump 2016b). The statement is reminiscent of both the father-protector as well as the typical political strongman, who proposes remedies for a variety of problems in the form of himself, largely without providing details. The strongman ideology, unsurprisingly, is over- saturated with images of strong, authoritative masculinity and macho braggadocio. In some ways, Trump portrays himself as
a strongman in the ancient tradition of tribal chieftains whose very presence is a guarantor of safety and prosperity. Whatever the problem is, he’ll ‘fix it,’ and that’s particularly true of challenges where ‘strength’ is, in theory, of inherent value, such as maintaining a credible deterrent to foreign aggression, negotiating trade agreements, or in general threatening law breakers with violence. (Kilgore 2016)
Akin to other political leaders60, Donald Trump has cultivated traits that allow his political style to be interpreted within the framework of the strongman ideology. He depicts the world as dangerous and even hostile, celebrates nationalism, embraces conspiracy theories, promises to control the establishment and political elites, and strongly rejects political as well as media opponents. Throughout the campaign, he vowed to finally put ‘America First’; adhered to the birther movement against then President Barack Obama; touted numerous conspiracy theories concerning Hillary Clinton as well as her involvement with the Clinton Foundation and the Benghazi affair; neglected and repeatedly discredited media outlets and politicians critical of him; and promised to ‘drain the swamp’. By painting America as decaying and the world as relishing its downfall, Trump created an environment of fear. The apocalyptic images of crumbling airports in America, which he describes as being in “Third World
60 There are roughly two types of emerging strongman leaders on the international stage. On the one hand, there are strongly authoritarian and autocratic leaders who (to varying degrees) neglect or corrupt democratic systems of governance. Examples include Vladimir Putin, Victor Orban, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Nicolás Maduro, and Rodrigo Duerte. On the other hand, there are leaders who operate within democratic systems but conform to strongly nationalistic rhetoric and campaign on the platform of decisive leadership, such as Narendra Modi, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Shinzo Abe, (cf. Rachman 2016).
102 condition”, the country’s suffering “through one international humiliation after the other”, and the recalling of Hillary Clinton’s legacy as one of “death, destruction, terrorism and weakness” stokes rampant fears of a prosperous future lost (Trump 2016b). This environment of fear enables strongman leaders to emerge. By creating a reality in which America is mocked, ‘losing’ continuously, and inhabited by patriots who cannot defend themselves against the corrupt elites, Trump could successfully position himself as the strongman opposition, angry voice of the economically displaced, and defender of the weak.
Strongman leaders typically prefer to negotiate face-to-face and tend to ignore traditional forms of conduct, institutions, and international law (cf. Rachman 2016). In other words, they see themselves as the most important, and in some cases, only decision-making body. This is illustrated in Trump’s speech at the Republican National Convention. Normally, conventions are intended as an opportunity for the party to rally behind its candidate and unify after a decisive primary race. They are commonly used to invoke the party’s creeds, traditions, and former presidents. The Republican Party in particular tends to invoke the past glory of revered presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln, and Ronald Reagan. Trump, who was only reluctantly endorsed by a handful of officials in the GOP and had fought a harsh primary campaign, chose to break with convention traditions. He omitted former presidents, his primary opponents, other GOP politicians, and Congress from his speech. Apart from mentioning himself, he only named Mike Pence, praised Bernie Sanders, and thanked a total of eleven family members (cf. Smith 2017: 969; Trump 2016b).
Trump’s strongman tendencies are also tangible in the way he tweets. In a Politico article, historian Frederico Finchelstein points to similarities between Trump’s tweeting habits and populist strongman leaders in Latin America who use the social media platform in a similar manner. He argues that Trump is reminiscent of, what he refers to as, “‘post-fascist’ populist leaders” (Brassil 2016) who employ social media as an unmediated channel of communication between themselves and the electorate. This allows them to “emphasize their ‘outsider’ status and downplay the importance of traditional institutions (a free press, other branches of government)” (Brassil 2016). Through his use of the social media platform Twitter, his muscle-flexing rhetoric, and his bellicose personality, Trump has established himself as a strongman, decisive leader, and source of unmediated truth. He alone knows the system; he alone can protect the nation’s citizens; he alone can and will face foreign adversaries; he alone has the ‘guts’ and knowledge to fix America’s problems; and thus he alone is the solution to halt the nation’s certain decline. To phrase it in Brannon’s terms: he presents himself as a ‘sturdy oak’ who will give everyone he disagrees with or deems a threat hell.
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4.1.2 The Art of Bullying – Anger, Violence, and the Politics of Degradation
Anger can fuel malice, but it can also motivate social dominance, stoking a desire to win the adoration of others. Combined with a considerable gift for humor (which may also be aggressive), anger lies at the heart of Trump’s charisma. And anger permeates his political rhetoric. (McAdams, Dan 2016)
Traditional white masculinity views itself under threat due to social, economic, and lifestyle changes. Scholars have traced a spike in spiteful, hateful, and emotionally as well as physically harmful forms of aggression by white men towards the racialized, sexualized, or feminized ‘other’ since the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Racial resentment has always been a part of American history; however, historians and social scientists see its implementation as a key feature of the Republican Party, particularly in its Southern Strategy which aimed to convince Southern voters holding anti-African American sentiments to align themselves within the belief and value system of the GOP. The Civil Rights Act, signed into law by Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson, solidified the restructuring of partisan values (cf. Logan 2016: 28).
Particularly since the 1990s, the narrative of white, Christian, patriarchal, and heterosexual America being endangered has flourished in conservative media such as Fox News and right-wing talk radio. Talk radio hosts such as Rush Limbaugh, Mike Savage, and Sean Hannity draw large crowds61 of mostly men who listen to their lamentation of America as a ‘paradise lost’. Their shows are filled with racism, sexism, bigotry, and white male entitlement – all thinly veiled in the least. Kimmel describes conservative talk radio hosts as “the choirmasters of the Angry White Male chorus” who “direct and redirect […] rage” (Kimmel 2013: 37). Features of right-wing talk radio include divisive and often inflammatory speech as well as disparaging and derogatory comments about women and minorities. White masculinity being cast as the victim of these two groups, the liberal media, and establishment politics is likewise characteristic of such shows (cf. Kimmel 2013: 36-40). This type of broadcasting has fueled the anger of particular segments of white conservative men for roughly two decades, not only by providing right-wing political commentary, but also by “speak[ing] with an old-school masculine authority that recalls an idealized past, when (white) men were in control in the public and private spheres, and no one was in a position to actively challenge their power” (Katz 2016: 124).
61 While there are widely varying accounts of how many people tune into conservative talk radio, Limbaugh’s weekly audience is estimated to be over 20 million listeners. This makes him the most- listened talk radio host in the United States, closely followed by other conservative household names such as Sean Hannity, Mike Savage, Glenn Beck, and Laura Ingraham (cf. Farhi 2009).
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While he is not de facto a creator of conservative media, Trump nonetheless uses similar strategies that Limbaugh, Hannity, and Savage frequently employ. Referring to conservative radio talk shows, Michael Kimmel quotes Sarah Sobieraj and Jeffrey Berry as follows: “[Outrage media aims] to provoke a visceral response from the audience, usually in the form of anger, fear, or moral righteousness, through the use of overgeneralizations, sensationalism, misleading or patently inaccurate information, ad hominem attacks, and partial truths about opponents” (Sobieraj and Berry qtd. in Kimmel 2013: 33). Trump’s rallies and other campaign appearances provide evidence for all the criteria above. Similar to talk radio figures, Trump uses bellicose, highly masculinized, and aggressive language to attack and ridicule his opponents and critics. He exploits his supporters’ anxieties and anger, channeling them into attacks against his opponents, the Obama administration, governmental institutions, and foreign nations. There is no shortage of misconstrued information, partial truths, or even blatant false statements, which are used to make his highly sensationalized points. Additionally, akin to talk show hosts, he weaponizes traditional masculinity, either by threateningly displaying it himself through combativeness and aggression, or belittling or even denying other candidates their masculinity through bullying tactics such as name-calling and feminization. In Brannon’s terms, he “gives ‘em hell” (cf. Kahn 2009: 57). In their claim above, Sobieraj and Berry could have been describing a Trump rally just as well as conservative talk radio.
Trump’s rhetorical form functions through a toxic, paradoxically abject masculine style whose incoherence is opaque to his critics but meaningful to his adherents, for it helps them imagine themselves as victims of a political tragedy centered around the displacement of ‘real America’ from the political center by a feminized political establishment. (Johnson 2017: 230)
Trump builds on anger already activated through conservative media, economic strains, and the perceived loss of privilege, and positions himself as the one and only avenger of ‘the powerless’. He, however, not only incites anger, but performs it on campaign stages around the United States. Research has shown that anger – not fear – is a stronger motivator for risk-taking voting behavior and a substantial mobilization tool (cf. Valentino, Wayne and Oceno 2018: 216). Therefore, his performance of visceral, masculinized fury transforms fears and anxieties about the economy, terrorism, immigration, and the loss of status into politically explosive anger, and thus results in the active political participation of his supporters. He is unrepentant in his insults and assertions; belittling towards his opponents, whom he deems effete and feminized; supportive of violence against those who disagree with him; and yearnful for the partly anachronistic ‘good old times’ in which white men were undisputedly at the top of the social hierarchy.
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He figures in the election as a populist superhero, a crusader and champion of the cause of a rightwing white masculinity that perceives itself to be profoundly imperiled and deeply aggrieved. Brash, braggadocious and unapologetic, Trump’s racialised, patriarchal rhetoric articulates a rage that is rooted in a deeply felt loss of racial and gendered entitlement. For an angry, dying brand of white American masculinity, he stands as validation, spokesman and belligerent defender. (Logan 2016: 28)
As evidenced throughout this paper, threatening or even questioning a political candidate’s masculinity can prove disastrous for their political aspirations, especially if not immediately and adequately refuted. Whether Jimmy Carter, George H. W. Bush, Michael Dukakis, or Mitt Romney, even a hint of weakness or effeminacy results in the need for a masculine image makeover. Throughout the election year, Trump exploited every chance to caricaturize his opponents as weak and not masculine enough for office, while at the same time posing as a highly masculinized alternative.
Famous for his degrading nicknames, Trump repeatedly referred to Republican candidate Jeb Bush as lethargic. At a rally in Mobile, Alabama, he called Bush a “very, very low-energy person”62. Just a few days later, he repeated the claim in a call-in to Fox News’s O’Reilly Factor, stating “[h]e doesn’t have the energy or the capacity to make our country great again. That I can tell you 100%” (Trump qtd. in Campbell 2015). He relentlessly portrayed Jeb Bush as unenthusiastic at his rallies, in tweets, and during interviews with media outlets and cable news shows such as the The New York Times and Good Morning America until the dull image stuck (cf. Campbell 2015). By suggesting that Bush was low- energy, Trump accomplished several things: First and foremost, he attacked Bush’s virility and by extension his masculine prowess. The accusation of a man being low-energy carries connotations of indecisiveness and even questions his stamina, going as far as eliciting ideas about low testosterone levels and therefore a lack of masculine strength and vigor to be president. Additionally, by continuously reiterating Bush’s lack of energy, and simultaneously mentioning his lag in the polls, Trump presented himself as the high-energy, virile, and successful alternative to Bush. Furthermore, characterizing Jeb Bush as lacking masculine vigor and strength implicitly associates him with his father, who himself had been branded as a ‘wimp’, rather than with his brother, who had succeeded in cultivated a highly masculine persona (cf. Yglesias 2015). After successfully associating Jeb Bush with low-energy levels, he began to use the same attack on Ben Carson, calling him “super low energy” at a rally in
62 The full statement from the rally doubled down on the low-energy trope by suggesting Americans would be extremely bored if a ‘low energy’ person, such as Jeb Bush, became president. “Let’s assume that somebody else becomes president. Wouldn’t that be horrible? Wouldn’t that be horrible? So let’s assume that somebody else becomes president. Let’s assume a very low-energy – very, very low energy, so low energy that every time you watch him, you fall asleep – Let’s say Jeb becomes president. Not good. Not good” (Trump qtd. in Campbell 2015).
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Miami. In an identical manner, he followed up by stating “[but] we need tremendous energy” (Trump 2015f), and once more presented himself as the invigorated solution.
Apart from ‘low-energy Jeb’ and ‘super-low energy Ben’, Trump also affixed Republican presidential contenders Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio with nicknames, with the former coming to be known as ‘Lyin’ Ted’ by Trump supporters63. Trump first mentioned the nickname during a primary debate in Detroit in which Rubio and Cruz himself accused Trump of proposing outrageous immigration reform to gain votes without the intent to follow through. Trump responded by deflecting the accusation on Cruz, retorting “[y]ou’re the liar. You’re the lying guy up here. […] I’ve given my answer, Lyin’ Ted. I’ve given my answer” (Presidential Candidates Debate 2016a). Deflecting accusations made against himself onto someone else is a favored tactic of Trump. Dawn Marlan defines this tactic of projection and reduction as part of a broad-shouldered rhetoric, which reduces language to its “pseudo-masculine essence” (Marlan 2017: 37). By projecting and reducing, “Trump expels his own worst character traits, purifying himself as he attaches them to enemies, attacking them for his own flaws” (Marlan 2017: 37)64. Moreover, projection might also be a means to mask masculine anxieties and insecurities. This line of argument suggests that Trump is aware of and anxious about his flaws and overcompensates by attaching them to his opponents. Furthermore, by attaching a memorable nickname to his opponents, he reduces them to cartoonish one- dimensional caricatures.
Apart from Jeb Bush and Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio became Trump’s preferred target for ridicule. At the same primary debate in Detroit, Trump referred to Rubio as ‘Little Marco’65, a nickname which not only reduced his opponent to one physical feature, but at the same time infantilized him. Dittmar points out that Trump repeatedly referred to Rubio as a ‘lightweight’. The use of boxing references, a sport which relies on traditional masculine characteristics such as strength, aggression, and violence, immediately invoked masculinized images. Although Trump never explicitly says it, inferring that Rubio is a ‘lightweight’ creates a contrast in which he himself is a ‘heavyweight’ (cf. Dittmar 2016a). Furthermore, by referring to Rubio as ‘little’, Trump insinuated that Rubio, due to his youth, was merely a child and thus unfit to be president, and at the same time emasculated him by using a diminutive to describe his physical appearance. Trump, who himself is tall, literally
63 A fairly ironic nickname given by Trump given that he is well known for false statements himself and went as far as to imply Cruz’s father was involved in the assassination of former President John F. Kennedy (cf. Jacobson and Qiu 2016). 64 He used a similar strategy when he branded Hillary Clinton as ‘Crooked Hillary’, insinuating dishonesty and untrustworthiness. 65 “You defraud the people of Florida, little Marco” (Presidential Candidates Debate 2016a).
107 towered over Rubio and exploited possible anxieties Rubio (and prospective voters) might have about his height, a marker of the male body and thus of masculinity.
The presidential body plays a crucial role in how a leader is perceived. Historically, leaders have been considered as representing two bodies, the body natural and the body politic. Their body natural, meaning their personal constitution and health, is perceived as a reflection of the health of the nation’s body politic. It is no coincidence that the presidential body, which in the United States has always been a male body, is heavily scrutinized. Because of this, former presidents have gone to great lengths to present their bodies in the best, healthiest, and most masculine light. Theodore Roosevelt was known for his martial arts training and cowboy riding. Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush were frequently photographed in ranch-like settings, clearing brush and riding horses. Bill Clinton and Al Gore used their morning jogs as photo opportunities66, and Barack Obama was photographed shirtless in swimming trunks and playing basketball on various occasions. Showcasing masculine strength and health is crucial to presidential success. At the same time, covering up health issues and evading situations which display physical weakness are equally important, as the physical impairment of the president is perceived as the impairment of the political and economic health of the nation. Franklin D. Roosevelt avoided being photographed in a wheelchair. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s first heart attack was initially reported as digestive problems, and John F. Kennedy hid his chronic illnesses and the resulting pain in order to retain his youthful and virile reputation (cf. Achenbach and Cunningham 2016; Soni 2015). Moreover, physical well-being and health are often conflated with leadership qualities. Therefore, the health and appearance of presidents or presidential contenders subconsciously influences voter’s perceptions of them as fit for leadership. It is thus no coincidence that Donald Trump appeared on The Dr. Oz Show, a popular talk show about health and medicine, in September 2016, sharing his medical records with the host Mehmet Oz. It is not difficult to discern the agenda behind Trump revealing his medical records on a popular day-time television show and particularly Oz’s admiring facial expression when he highlighted Trump’s high testosterone levels to an audience of millions of viewers (cf. Belluz 2016). Oz’s confirmation of Trump’s good health as well as a controversial letter67 from Trump’s personal physician Dr. Harold N. Bornstein support the image of Trump being above average in terms of health. The letter by Bornstein uses hyperbole to describe Trump’s blood
66 Bill Clinton, whose chubby appearance in jogging shorts might not seem like a demonstration of masculine strength and vigor, nonetheless used his body as means to appeal to voters. While it did not project masculine ideals, it fit well with his presidential persona, which relied heavily on relatability. His morning jogs with Vice President Al Gore were seen as a project of self-reform, and the sport itself proved relatable and unpretentious. 67 In 2018, Bornstein claimed that the letter was dictated by Trump rather than his own professional assessment (cf. McCarthy 2018).
108 pressure and laboratory results as “astonishingly excellent”, depicting “his physical strength and stamina [as] extraordinary” and even proclaiming that if elected “Mr. Trump […] will be the healthiest individual ever elected to the presidency” (Bornstein qtd. in Taylor 2015). Trump, as other presidents and presidential contenders before him, has a vested interest in appearing healthy, strong, and masculine.
Traditionally exalted markers of the male body, such as body height and muscularity, as well as masculinized body language68 send subconscious messages about leadership qualities to American voters. Michael Dukakis’ appearance in a tank was perceived as childish and fake rather than strong-minded and masculine. Richard Nixon’s sweaty and bloated appearance during the televised presidential debate with John F. Kennedy made voters question his health and, by extension, his ability as commander-in-chief. Trump, whether purposefully or coincidentally, drew on the latter anecdote by repeatedly talking about Rubio’s sweating. On the campaign trail, multiple remarks were made that sowed doubt about Rubio’s health and youthful virility such as “[Rubio] is the one that sweats the most... He’s the youngest but I have never seen any human being sweat like that”, “[h]e sweats more than any young person I’ve ever seen in my life. [...] I’ve never seen a guy down water like he downs water. [...] They bring it in buckets for this guy”, and “Rubio, I’ve never seen a young guy sweat that much. He’s drinking water, water, water [...] I never saw anything like this with him, with the water” (Trump qtd. in Lippman 2015). He then juxtaposed Rubio’s perspiration with a lack of formidable appearance and leadership qualities. At campaign rallies in Georgia and Iowa, Trump said the following:
[H]ere’s the problem with Rubio: when you sweat that much ... now think of it. So you have Putin – he’s sitting over here. And he’s waiting to kill the stupid Americans because he’s been just destroying us so badly. So he figures, and a guy walks in, and he’s soaking wet and sweating. ‘Hello, hello, can I have some water?’ (Trump qtd. in Lippman 2015)
I always say, I have never seen a young person sweat like Marco Rubio ... He drinks more water – he's like a machine. Water, water, water. Sweats, gives a speech. Think of Putin. Pretty tough cookie, right? I think [of] Rubio and I'm saying, you have to be cool. You have to be really cool. And Rubio's going to meet him and walk in, and he's sweating – sweat is pouring down. And Putin's going to look at him and say, ‘What the hell is wrong with this guy?’ (Trump qtd. in Lippman 2015)
68 Trump’s masculinized body language is best illustrated by examining his handshake. Whenever he shakes someone’s hand, regardless of gender and status, his grip is strong, and he pulls the other person towards him. His handshake is part of his body language, which aims at physically demonstrating domination over the other, thus establishing himself as the more masculine person (cf. Pascoe 2017: 131). Moustafa Bayoumi, an English professor at the City University of New York, writes “his handshakes are small, hyper-masculine demonstrations of strength, as if he’s afraid even of the decorum of equality that a handshake brings” (Bayoumi 2017).
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When Trump commented on Rubio’s perspiration, he ultimately questioned the Floridian’s health and leadership qualities; and by placing emphasis on Rubio being both the youngest and ‘sweatiest’, he aimed to discredit Rubio’s youth as an asset. Trump essentially declared Rubio an inconsequential political candidate who was not to be taken seriously because of his insufficient body height, youth, and perhaps questionable health.
Marco Rubio, in contrast to Jeb Bush, who largely refrained from attacking his opponents personally, retaliated against Trump in an equally hyper-masculine manner. Before the Republican primary debate in Detroit on March 3, 2016, Rubio, who had previously stated he would not attack any candidate personally, fired numerous shots, saying that Trump “never punched anyone in the face” and was “the first guy who begged for Secret Service protection” (Rubio qtd. in Dittmar 2016a). On the same evening, Rubio also poked fun at the size of Trump’s hands, covertly implying that it correlates to the size of his genitals. Rubio tried to undercut Trump’s claim as strong and aggressive by suggesting that Trump lacks penis size as well as the ability to protect himself, essentially claiming ‘real tough guys’ do not need anyone to protect them because they do it themselves (cf. Dittmar 2016a). Bret Baier of Fox News, one of the debate moderators, asked Rubio about these attacks. Rubio replied that he would rather speak about policies but because of Trump’s ceaseless attacks against every other candidate, he felt obligated to retaliate. Heightening the masculine connotations of the feud, Trump, in his response, neither defended himself against Rubio’s other various attacks, such as on his spelling or similarity to a con artist, but only defended the size of his hands and its implication.
And as far as – and I have to say this, I have to say this. He hit my hands. Nobody has ever hit my hands. I have never heard of this. Look at those hands. Are they small hands? And he referred to my hands, if they are small, something else must be small. I guarantee you there is no problem. I guarantee. (Presidential Debate 2016a)
It has been made abundantly clear that presidential elections are always masculinity contests; however, the level of hyper-masculine posturing which culminates in a presidential contender assuring the electorate that the size of his penis is sufficient is perhaps unsurpassed in American political history. ‘Adequate’ penis size is perhaps one of the most common male anxieties, and when Rubio attacked Trump’s hands, he indirectly attacked Trump’s masculinity by association. Trump did not refute Rubio as strongly when mocked for his spelling, lack of knowledge, or image as a con man. However, he went to great lengths to assure the American people that his sexual prowess and genital size, and by extension his masculinity, are nothing to worry about69. Perhaps no other instance illustrates how closely
69 Ted Cruz also attacked Trump by describing him as “a yawning cavern of insecurity” and stating that “[t]here’s a reason [why] Donald builds giant buildings and puts his name on them everywhere he goes”
110 masculinity and presidential leadership are intertwined: the sexualized male body becomes a marker for electability.
Trump’s political opponents were not the only targets of bullying and domineering rhetoric during the 2016 election season. News outlets, such as The New York Times, which he nicknamed ‘The Failing New York Times’, and CNN, which he frequently referred to as the ‘Clinton News Network’ or ‘Very Fake News’, and news personalities and anchors, such as Jim Acosta (‘Crazy Jim’), Megyn Kelly (‘Crazy Megyn’), and Joe Scarborough (‘Psycho Joe’), were also subject to his verbal attacks. Moreover, he mocked Serge F. Kovaleski, a disabled New York Times reporter, by jerking and flailing his hands around (cf. Trump 2015h). By caricaturizing and bullying the news media and journalists, he delegitimized them, which fits well into his fake news narrative. In contrast to his political opponents, the news media did not retaliate in the same (or often in any) manner. Furthermore, he directed his bullying and threats to activists and protestors at his rallies, defining protestors at his rallies as not mature or masculine enough. In one instance, he even mocked a young protestor by shouting “[h]ow old is this kid? He’s still wearing diapers” and “go home to mommy” as well as saying that another protestor was at his rally because he “can’t get a date” (Trump qtd. in Dittmar 2016b). Throughout the 2016 campaign, there were several moments when Trump supporters and protestors clashed, most notably in March 2016 when a Chicago rally had to be cancelled due to violent clashes between supporters and detractors. At a question and answer event in Hickory, North Carolina, Trump refuted claims of violence at his rallies.
The press is now calling, they’re saying, ‘Oh but there’s such violence.’ There’s no violence. You know how many people have been hurt at our rallies? I think like, basically none, other than I guess maybe somebody got hit once or something. But there’s no violence. […] The people that are supporters of Donald Trump want to see America be great again. That’s what it is. There’s no violence. There’s love-fests [sic]. These are love-fests. (Trump qtd. in Berenson 2016)
Assaults on protestors at his rallies are, however, well documented. Furthermore, despite Trump’s insistence that his rallies compare to “love-fests”, there are numerous examples of him not only excusing violence but even inciting it. On February 1, 2016, Trump instructed attendees at a rally that if they “see someone getting ready to throw a tomato” to “knock the crap out of them” (Trump qtd. in Mashable Daily 2016). On another occasion, he stated that he “would like to punch him [a protestor] in the face”; and after a protestor tried to rush the
(Cruz 2016). While Cruz aimed to discredit Trump’s ego, his remarks are also emasculating. Insecurity and weakness are seen as feminine and therefore incompatible with ideals of assertive, strong, hegemonic masculinity. Furthermore, intentional or not, Cruz suggests that Trump overcompensates for his insecurities by building skyscrapers, which are inherently phallic structures.
111 stage at a different rally, he described his preferred course of action against the man as follows: “I don’t know if I would have done well, but I would have been out there fighting, folks. I don’t know if I would have done well, but I would have been boom boom boom boom” (Trump qtd. in Mashable Daily 2016). In addition to repeatedly endorsing violence against protestors70 and downplaying the more frequent and methodical attacks on them71, Trump actively offered legal support72 for supporters who assaulted activists. One of the most outrageous instances was his suggestion that the “Second Amendment People” (Trump 2016c) could perhaps stop Hillary Clinton from changing gun legislation, which was interpreted as an appeal to resort to violence against Clinton in order to stop gun control measures.
Endorsing, inciting, and engaging in violence concurs with theories of hegemonic masculinity which “emphasises practices toward authority, control, competitive individualism, independence, aggressiveness, and the capacity for violence” (Messerschmidt 1993: 82). Not every man is violent, and violence is not exclusively masculine; however, violence is a means of defending privilege as well as establishing hierarchies, thus frequently aiding in the construction of a homogenous, traditional concept of masculinity. Moreover, Trump frames the violence at his rallies as a valiant and righteous act against the protestors’ dissent, which originally made them the target of physical aggression. The idea of violence as a tool of redemption, revenge, and righteousness is omnipresent and rarely questioned in political as well as popular culture73. Furthermore, engaging in or advocating for violence reaffirms the traditional, hegemonic masculine credentials of aggression and domination exemplified by Donald Trump.
4.1.3 The Art of the Sale – Entertainment, Promotion, and ‘Broad Shouldered’ Rhetoric
“I don’t do it for the money. I’ve got enough, much more than I’ll ever need. I do it to do it. Deals are my art form. Other people paint beautifully on canvas or write wonderful poetry. I like making deals, preferably big deals. That’s how I get my kicks” (Trump and
70 “Maybe he [a protestor] should have been roughed up because it was absolutely disgusting what he was doing”; “The audience hit back, and that’s what we need a little bit more of” (Trump qtd. in Mashable Daily 2016). 71 “In the good old days this doesn’t happen because they used to treat them very, very rough [sic]. And when they protested once, they would not do it again so easily”; “Part of the problem and part of the reason it takes so long is nobody wants to hurt each other anymore, right?” (Trump qtd. in Mashable Daily 2016). 72 “Try not to hurt him. If you do I’ll defend you in court, don’t worry about it” (Trump qtd. in Mashable Daily 2016). 73 Avenging violence as righteous or redemptive power can be traced in numerous popular movies such as for example, Taken (2008), The Godfather (1972), and Gladiator (2000).
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Schwartz 1987: 1), Trump writes at the beginning of his book Trump: The Art of the Deal. From the earliest stages of the presidential race, Trump started his campaign in the same vein, routinely touting his business savvy and deal-making abilities. Depicting himself as the best deal-maker for the American people became his strongest and, due to his lack of previous political experience, perhaps only tangible qualification for office. Although critics point to Trump’s multiple bankruptcies and lawsuits to discredit this claim, Trump himself and his supporters frequently cite his competence as a business man and his ability to make deals as the main reasons he gained their support (cf. Swanson 2016; Fishwick 2016).
There is a strong connection between business success, wealth, and hegemonic masculinity. Kimmel defines the Self-Made Man as one of the most prominent and exalted archetypes of masculinity in American history (cf. Kimmel 2006: 13-14; 29). Trump invokes an alpha male status by repeatedly referring to how he ‘wins’ at business and makes unrivaled deals to solidly establish his companies. Throughout the campaign, he promised to replicate his success in office to make America great again. Commercial success likewise constitutes a pillar of hegemonic masculinity, and Trump flaunts it as well as the wealth he has acquired through it ceaselessly. In doing so, he is able to present himself as the prototype of the male breadwinner, who leads both his companies and his family as a strong patriarch. Flaunting wealth and commercial success alludes to conservative values, which view wealth and success as inherently masculine due to its conformity with traditional gender roles. Moreover, it concurs with the conservative idea that wealth is meritorious. According to Kimmel, “success in the market, individual achievement, mobility [and], wealth” are the defining characteristics of the Self-Made Man (Kimmel 2006: 17). ‘Having made it’ in the business world amounts to proving one’s masculinity; thus, Trump’s wealth and business deals are used as proof that he is “the big wheel” (Kahn 2009: 56).
Candidates frequently employ their family history as a means to situate themselves within the scope of the American Dream and the narrative of the Self-Made Man. Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz both emphasized their Cuban roots and told of their families’ escapes from the Castro regime, which firmly locates them in opposition to Communism as well as within the exalted narrative of ‘making it in America’ (cf. Jordan 2016; Flegenheimer 2016). Donald Trump also perpetually reinforced the narrative when discussing himself as a self-made successful and wealthy businessman. To suit this narrative, however, Trump had to downplay his father’s success74, which was not only the foundation of his own fortune, but also largely
74 In his book Crippled America, as well as on the campaign trail, Trump emphasized that the money he received from his father was not a grant but rather a loan, meaning he had to pay it back with interest. Additionally, he minimized its size. “He loaned me a small amount of money — loaned, not gave — around $1 million — money that I probably could have gotten from a bank — and the biggest
113 reliant on government grants, which Trump opposes (Lapham and Miller 2012: 28-29). In order to be perceived as the hardworking, honest, and successful embodiment of American middle- and working-class values and traditional masculinity, he espoused a narrative which established him as a shrewd business man who had built an empire out of practically nothing but a small loan and by virtue of his business savvy. However, flaunting personal wealth and affluency has not always helped candidates. George W. Bush cultivated an image of a rough- and-tumble cowboy masculinity, partially to veil his patrician roots, and Mitt Romney was repeatedly accused of being out of touch due to his privileged background. Tony Libri, a Republican county committee chair, stated that “[Romney] probably spends more on a shirt or haircut than most Americans make in a week. I want a guy who can roll up his sleeves and talk about being on the front lines in Afghanistan or being a welder on a factory floor” (Libri qtd. in Katz 2016: 105). If wealth and a privileged upbringing have been obstacles to candidates in the past, how is it possible that they only buttressed Trump’s masculinity and popularity among middle- and working-class voters in 2016?
Amanda Friesen offers a possible explanation for this paradox. She argues that Trump’s appeal as an affluent business mogul can be seen in his ‘Las Vegas style wealth’, in contrast to the Romney’s, Bush’s, or Clinton’s more obscure wealth. She poses the question whether his popularity derives from the way he invests his money and which kind of business ventures he undertakes.
I wonder if Trump supporters at a certain economic level and from a certain cultural background would make exactly his choices, if they had the money. They do not aspire to hob- knobbing over foie gras and a ‘78 Margaux before the Met Gala; they want ringside seats at Mayweather-Pacquiao with the penthouse suite at MGM Grand. (Friesen 2016)
Rather than earning money through complex stock market exchanges and oil empires, Trump deals in concepts of entertainment and pleasure. He is known for luxurious buildings bearing his name, casinos, golf courses, airlines and private jets, reality TV shows, beauty pageants, and multiple marriages to beautiful young women (cf. Friesen 2016). Trump’s luxury is reminiscent of Hugh Hefner, a figurehead of wealth, hedonism, and white male superiority over women as well as marginalized and subordinate groups of men (cf. Wolcott 2017). Trump, first and foremost, sells himself as the ultimate product of an American Dream75 and a particular masculine fantasy.
part of my journey began. I paid my father back a few years later, with full interest, after my Manhattan deals started to come in — and very successfully” (Trump 2015i: 99). 75 The use of an indefinite article is deliberate because it highlights its white, heterosexual, and masculine connotations.
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His appeal as a ‘blue-collar billionaire’ is strengthened by his unconventional use of language. The simplicity of Trump’s language, his offensive choice of words and content, and his ceaseless, cartoonish self-aggrandizement have baffled establishment politicians on both sides. Investigating the appeal of Trump’s use of language gives insight into how masculinity, entertainment, and self-marketing work hand in hand to create slogan-like soundbites and constant media attention. Although Trump is undoubtedly part of the New York elite, he does not conform to popular elitist stereotypes. When Obama tried to make conversation with farmers in rural Iowa about the price of arugula at Whole Foods, it was taken to prove what numerous rural voters had believed nonetheless – he was an elitist (cf. Romano 2007). Trump, on the other hand, embraces fast food chains. Similar to George W. Bush, Trump’s use of language also underscores anti-intellectual sentiments, a hallmark of candidates who aim at presenting themselves as ‘one of the guys’ in order to connect to voters. He does not go to great lengths to hide his less than humble beginnings. However, the language he uses to discuss his upbringing shows that despite his private and Ivy League education he is not part of their inner-circle. When he says “I went to an Ivy League school, I’m very highly educated. I know words, I have the best words. I have — but there’s no better word than stupid” (Trump 2015e), he effectively negates being part of an elite network through this layman’s choice of words while at the same time touting his academic achievements.
Being a mouthpiece for those who feel neglected and aggrieved, while simultaneously bragging about personal wealth, achievements, and ability, seems an unlikely combination. However, it has become possible partially due to a larger shift in political and media culture. At least since the 1980s, celebrity politicians have become more and more common. Former actor Ronald Reagan secured the governorship in California before serving as president for two terms. Arnold Schwarzenegger, a Hollywood star, bodybuilder, and icon of physical masculinity, also became Governor of California; Jesse Ventura, a former professional wrestler, secured the governorship in Minnesota; and numerous celebrities such as Oprah Winfrey, Cynthia Nixon, and Kid Rock have been flirting with the idea of running for office (cf. Mudde 2018). Kayam states that this trend of celebrities venturing into politics “has seen the displacement of traditional political skills (e.g. bargaining, compromise) and their replacement by those of media management and fundraising” (Kayam 2018: 74). Politics has become a spectacle; politicians have morphed into entertainers; and the American population has become the national spectatorship. Neil Postman relates how “entertainment is the supra- ideology of all discourse on television” and that neither content nor point of view matter as much as “the overarching presumption […] that it [discourse on television] is there for our amusement and pleasure” (Postman 2005: 87). The Trump campaign realized the entertainment potential of politics and used it to its advantage, turning every campaign stop
115 into a part improvised comedy show, part inflammatory speech, and part reality TV program. This strategy has proven successful as highlighted in his book Trump: The Art of the Deal: Trump writes that “if you are a little different, or a little outrageous, or if you do things that are bold or controversial, the press is going to write about you” (Trump and Schwartz 1987: 56). His candor and tendency to speak unscripted are entertaining and unconventional and thus lend him the appearance of authenticity. This in turn leads supporters to view him as strong, honest, and trustworthy because ‘he tells it like it is’ and does not back down for anyone. Through the unscripted use of callous and often inflammatory speech, his supporters perceive him less as divisive but rather as a strong leader.
I argue that Trump’s success in TV, business, and politics can at least in part be attributed to his talent of selling ideas and fantasies. In the Art of The Deal, Trump writes “I play to people’s fantasies. People may not always think big themselves, but they can still get very excited by those who do” (Trump and Schwartz 1987: 58). In a speech at Lawrence University’s annual Honors Convocation, Paul Cohn traced the important interlinking relationship between media and masculinity for American presidents. His discussion of the importance of masculine image politics and the presidency portrayed Trump as the result of decades of mediated masculine performances, which frequently had little to do with reality. While George W. Bush and Ronald Reagan acted like cowboys, they never actually tended cattle; Bill Clinton likewise knew that emphasizing his Southern ‘Bubba’ persona was important to enhance his credibility as a ‘man’s man’ and connect with Southern voters. It is the masculine image that matters most, even if it cannot be fully equated with reality. Trump, Cohn argued, is what “Jean Baudrillard would call ‘hyperreal’” and “no more than a fictional character constructed entirely by the man and his media enablers” (Cohn 2017). In his address, he also suggested that numerous voters rejected Hillary Clinton as a viable presidential candidate due to her perception as unlikeable and inauthentic. One reason for this can certainly be traced to underlying anxieties about a woman seeking the highest political office in America, which would violate century-old gender norms and expectations. However, as Cohn pointed out, Clinton’s inauthenticity needs to be contrasted with Trump’s appearance of authenticity. While voters viewed Clinton as holding something back and having an inconsistent personality, Trump’s brashness and self-aggrandizement, which can be traced throughout his entire life, were entirely believable (cf. Cohn 2017).
The reason […] that many of us find Hillary Clinton ‘inauthentic’ is that we detect a substantial gap between the ‘Hillary Clinton’ we see in the media and the real person we don’t see but sense is there; and since her media performance of herself is less than convincing, we think that she’s always hiding something. But do we ask, as we do of most politicians, if there’s a difference between what Trump says and what he really thinks? Do we imagine a real Donald
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Trump beyond his media performance? No, Donald Trump is his media performance [emphasis by author]. (Cohn 2017)
Trump masterfully sells feelings and fantasies. Many of his business ventures, including casinos, beauty pageants, and reality TV shows, sell hyperreal images of beauty, fame, and power. Trump has, at various stages in his life, expertly conflated himself with fantasies and the fulfillment of a particular narrative of the American Dream, which have lent him credibility and trust from his supporters. His fame has provided him with public authority, and because he seems trustworthy and honest (or at least more trustworthy than established politicians), his statements are accepted as no less true, even though most are riddled with untruths76. Through his continuous repetition of lies people are increasingly unable to differentiate between founded fact and unfounded lie. Trump is a prime example of the idea that if a majority of voters feels something to be true, it acquires a truth-like status while actual facts are rendered redundant (cf. Konnikova 2017). Trump is successful at selling a white, heterosexual, masculinized prototype of the American Dream because it is synonymous with his flamboyant media persona. By establishing himself as a larger-than-life and ultimately entertaining reality TV character, he has evaded losing supporters even in situations that would have likely cost any other candidate votes.
Trump’s use of language might also help illustrate how he came to be seen as an honest, charismatic, and funny ‘guys’-guy’. His rallies and speeches are characterized by the use of simplistic language, repetition, self-aggrandizement, and exaggeration. The tendency to speak in layman’s terms in order to appeal to voters has been observable since 1789. Analyses of presidential speeches have shown that while most presidents in the 18th and 19th centuries spoke at a college graduate level, the trend has continuously moved downwards. In the 20th century, the average language level of presidential speeches was comparable to that of an eighth grader. Nowadays, the average American reads at a seventh-grade level, which could be an explanation for the fourth-grade average Trump uses. Through his use of short sentences, rejection of complex vocabulary, and frequent repetition, he ensures that he is understood by the majority of Americans, while at the same time espousing anti- intellectualism and creating memorable political slogans, akin to advertisements in their style, such as the chants ‘lock her up’ and ‘build that wall’ (cf. Kayam 2018:74-75). Marlan defines the appeal of Trump’s language as follows:
76 Politifact checked both candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, 394 times from their announcement speeches until September 21, 2016. While both candidates have told untruths, 70% of Trump’s checked statements were false to some degree. In comparison, 28% of Hillary Clinton’s checked statements proved to be false to some degree (cf. Politifact 2016).
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Trump’s reduced linguistic arsenal makes him appear trustworthy to those who mistrust the educated elite, trafficking in anti-intellectualism. He speaks their language, enabling identification. […] [H]e lubricates their imagination by talking like they talk, by putting a Big Mac on a china plate, allowing for the identificatory logic of porn. For a moment, they imagine that they are sharing in his experience, jet-setting around the country, sleeping on featherbeds, and grabbing all the women they like. He is their onscreen actor, their proxy, and though they know they don’t have a six pack or the stamina of a twenty year old, for a moment they imagine that that perfect ten actress is accessible to them. (Marlan 2017: 38)
A myriad of studies has shown that although the valorization of anti-intellectualism is found throughout American culture, it appears to resonate particularly well with men. Kimmel argues that boys in schools “regard academic disengagement as a sign of their masculinity. How little they care about school is a badge of honor among their male friends” (Kimmel 2016). Former President Obama, for example, was frequently ridiculed for his professorial speech patterns, which were considered weak and epicene, particularly in conservative and working- class circles. ‘Real men’ supposedly use violent, brutish, and vitriolic language, which is neither nerdy and elitist professor-speak nor weak, indecisive, and overly-accommodating feminine-speak. If this is taken to be true, embracing anti-intellectualism and using brutish language in the political arena is only a natural continuation of this trend.
Linguist George Lakoff identifies another salesmanship feature of Trump’s language: repetition. Through his use of repetition, he continuously activates cues within his supporters, and even within his opposition. If, for example, the word ‘winning’ is used in contexts ranging from the economy to the military, it becomes associated with Trump (cf. Lakoff 2016). Moreover, politicians tend to speak in qualifiers and abstractions. They talk about ‘the government’ and the ‘international community’, rather than naming actual people or objects, and they employ qualifying phrases. The purpose behind this use of language is to prevent their statements from being used against them by their opponents and the media. While in contrast vague and qualifying statements are more difficult to use in attacks, they tend to make politicians seem untrustworthy or cowardly (cf. Swaim 2015). Donald Trump, however, has chosen a different style: He uses name-calling and ad hominem attacks against his opponents (see Chapter 4.1.2), speaks directly and in absolute statements, and utilizes what he refers to as “truthful hyperbole”, described by him as “an innocent form of exaggeration” and a “very effective form of promotion” (Trump and Schwartz 1987: 58).
My whole theme is make America great again. We don't win anymore as a country. We don't win with trade, we don't win with the military. ISIS, we can't even knock out ISIS, and we will, believe me. We will. We don't win in any capacity with healthcare. We have terrible healthcare, Obamacare is going to be repealed and replaced. We just don't win. You look at our borders, they're like swiss cheese, everybody pours in. We're going to make a great country again.
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We're going to start winning again. We're going to win a lot, it's going to be a big difference, believe me. It's going to be a big difference. (Presidential Candidates Debate 2016b)
Direct statements saturated with absolutisms convey strength. Trump sells himself as someone who not only knows what is wrong with America, but also who is to blame and how the country can best be fixed – he projects himself as the ‘father who knows best’ and must not be questioned. Lakoff argues that the idea of a strict father is linked to conservative values and moral frameworks. According to Lakoff, the strict father “knows right from wrong and has the ultimate authority” (2016), and he harshly punishes those who disobey in order to discipline them and prevent them from disobeying again. In doing so, deviants thus submit to the strict father’s authority, which is considered right and moral. Punishing the disobedient is perceived as necessary to reform them into moral, strong, and prosperous individuals; however, if they fail to be prosperous, they are then deemed immoral. Lakoff suggests that this is a root of the conservative belief that the poor deserve their poverty due to laziness and immorality (cf. Lakoff 2016).
Trump is an efficient salesman of ideas. He uses masculinized fantasies and sensationalist anger as strategies to sell himself to the American public as a strong leader who will promote economic growth and ensure national security, while punishing those disobedient, hostile, and, disagreeing. His masculine performance is larger than life, flamboyant, and entertaining and concurs with a media-saturated, hyperreal political discourse. Trump knows that being talked about, regardless of reason, is what counts, and his obsession with ratings underscores his identity as a showman. Between his announcement speech for his candidacy on June 16, 2016, and Election Day, he tweeted about ratings at least 61 times, either bragging about his own or belittling those of his adversaries in politics and the media77. Trump and his team realized that in show business being likeable and professional is second to being interesting, unconventional, and outrageous.
4.1.4 The Art of Machismo – Misogyny and Sexism
So far, I have established that masculinities operate as one side of a binary in the gendered context; thus, femininities must be acknowledged in order to locate and define masculinities. Furthermore, the construction of hegemonic masculinity is dependent on
77 For more information, see Brendan Brown’s Trump Twitter Archive, http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/, a comprehensive, however incomplete, archive of Donald Trump’s tweets.
119 notions of fight and flight from femininities78 as well as homosexuality. In Brennon’s terms, “no sissy stuff” (Kahn 2009: 57) is allowed. Hegemonic masculinity can only function in a system of hierarchical oppression, which subjugates women as well as marginalized groups of men who embody non-traditional, non-hegemonic, and/or non-heteronormative masculinities, and is upheld by complicity and consent. Connell’s theory of hegemonic masculinity also acknowledges relations of power and violence within the construction of gender and defines the construction itself as social struggle. Patterns of violence against the gendered and/or racialized ‘other’ are employed to uphold hierarchical structures and the privilege of one group. Inequalities and their relation to violence may be traced literally as well as symbolically: Statistically, men are both involved in violent crime (against men and women) to higher degrees and more often armed. Furthermore, patriarchy simultaneously functions as a form of “cultural disarmament” (Connell 2005: 83), preserving (white, heterosexual) male privilege. Violence and power imbalances therefore frequently manifest themselves in non-physical ways, for example through misogyny, sexism, and structural inequalities. Defining demeaning attitudes towards women as a characteristic of hegemonic masculinity is not to say that all men discriminate against women or act violently towards them; however, doing so acknowledges that those who exhibit sexist, misogynist, and harassing behavior are unlikely to perceive themselves as deviant from the norm (cf. Connell 2005: 82-83). Furthermore, DeConde sees the devaluation and sexualization of femininity, coupled with exaggerated masculine pride, as bedrock of macho behavior, which fits into the pattern of hegemonic masculinity (cf. DeConde 2000: 4). For this reason, a discussion of Donald Trump’s masculinity must include an analysis of his sexist, disparaging, and occasionally openly hostile behavior towards women.
Trump’s tendency to objectify women as agency-less recipients of sexualized desire in order to bolster his masculinity is hardly unknown. Prior to his candidacy, a multitude of instances already showcased his exaltation of normative female outer beauty; his belief in traditional gender roles, which confine women to the domestic, familial sphere; and his devaluation and disparagement of non-traditional femininity. In addition, his approval of female bodies he finds attractive is complemented by his disgust for women he considers undesirable due to, for example, age, non-conformity to Western beauty standards, or female
78 Trump’s and Rubio’s attempts to present the other in a feminine light, as ‘girly man’, are exemplary for this. For instance, Trump tweeted a picture of a make-up artist blotting Rubio’s sweat with the words “Never let them see you sweat”, and Rubio said to an audience that “Trump had this little makeup thing, applying makeup around his mustache, because he had one of those sweat mustaches.” In both cases, the candidates imply the other is vain, a stereotypically feminine quality, and insinuate that this makes them less masculine and by extension weak. Make-up is largely considered a feminine product, although men, especially on television, use it as well. Presenting the use of make-up as ‘girly’, vain, and effete – despite its necessity on a television set – illustrates a negative view of and even an escape from stereotypically feminine products and supposedly female characteristics in men.
120 bodily functions such as menstruation. His objectification of women is particularly salient when he compares women and their beauty to buildings. In his book Trump 101: The Way to Success, it states that “beauty and elegance, whether in a woman, a building, or a work of art, is not just superficial or something pretty to see” (Trump and McIver 2007: 55); and in an ABC interview in 1994, he explained that he enjoyed the fact that his first and second wife had become celebrities because of his fame, describing the process as similar to “creating stars” and “almost like creating a building” (ABC News 1994). By comparing women to buildings and their construction, he quite literally compares them to inanimate objects of his creation; they come into being because he creates them.
In 1999, during Trump’s brief flirtation with a presidential bid for the 2000 election, he stated that “the only difference between me and the other candidates is that I’m more honest and my women are more beautiful” (Trump qtd. in Dowd 1999). Although made almost a decade ago, the statement is as valid now as it was then for characterizing Trump’s view of women and their worth. Numerous examples from both before and during Trump’s candidacy can be found which highlight that, in his view, a woman’s worth largely derives from her physical appearance. Instances of this include when he told a female reporter that she “wouldn’t have a job if she weren’t beautiful” (cf. Trump qtd. Last Week Tonight 2014), wrote “[i]t’s certainly not groundbreaking news that the early victories by the women on The Apprentice were, to a very large extent, dependent on their sex appeal” (Trump and McIver 2004: 94), and noted that “it doesn’t really matter what [the media] write as long as you’ve got a young and beautiful piece of ass” (Trump qtd. in Bahadur 2015) in an Esquire magazine interview in 1991. The statement made during the 2000 campaign also exemplifies the idea of ‘beautiful women’ as objects to be owned and used as political assets and boosters of masculine pride. By stating that his women are more beautiful than those of his opposing candidates, he dominates not only women, by reducing them to their appearance, but also his opposition, by noting their apparent lack of ‘beautiful women’. Trump values female attractiveness and beauty, and he especially heeds how they make him look by extension. In his book Trump: How to Get Rich, he boasts that “all the women on The Apprentice flirted with me [him] — consciously or unconsciously. That’s to be expected. A sexual dynamic is always present between people, unless you are asexual” (Trump and McIver 2004: 223). This underscores his highly sexualized view of femininity and femaleness; women are first and foremost seen as objects of desire and sexual gratification for men. Such a statement also reaffirms Trump’s masculinity because, as Kimmel argues, successful masculinity is often measured by a man’s ability to “score with a woman”, which “indicates both his desirability and his virility and proves that he’s succeeding in the often complicated task of attaining manhood” (Kimmel 2008: 170). Furthermore, Pascoe, who studied masculinities of high
121 school boys with working-class backgrounds, observes what he calls “compulsive heterosexuality” (Pascoe 2017: 126). This entails the objectification of the female body as a means to bolster masculinity, the exertion of (symbolic as well as physical) dominance over women and female bodies through sexualized language, and the reaffirmation of heterosexuality through the touting of sexual prowess, activity, and desirability among peers (read: so-called ‘locker room talk’).
Glimpses into Trump’s marriages offer further insight into his beliefs concerning a woman’s role. Although he affirmed that his first wife Ivana’s intelligence set her apart from other women with whom he had relations, he later lamented her business success. In The Art of the Comeback, Trump writes that “taking her out of the role of wife and allowing her to run one of my casinos in Atlantic City, then the Plaza Hotel [emphasis by author]” was his “big mistake” in their marriage79 (Trump qtd. in Crockett 2016). According to Trump, Ivana’s success in business made her unattractive as a woman and wife. He described how she had become an executive rather than remaining his wife and he spoke negatively of her assertiveness in business (cf. ABC News 1994). Essentially, Trump explained that his marriage failed because he mistakenly allowed his wife to leave the domestic sphere and enter the public sphere. In a paternalistic and patronizing tone, he maintained a rigid distinction between the two spheres, even painting them as mutually exclusive, and established himself as the patriarchal authority by stating she could only venture into the public sphere with his permission. Furthermore, her success and interest in business, in Trump’s eyes, made her neglect her role as a wife and robbed her of her femininity. In the same interview, he acknowledged that on some days when he “come[s] home and dinner is not ready [he] go[es] through the roof” (ABC News 1994) and that he has mixed feelings about his second wife Marla Maples working, both sentiments which can be explained by a clash of traditional norms of femininity and wifely duties with realities of the working woman, wife, and mother (cf. ABC News 1994).
Because Trump defines women and femininity primarily in physical terms, he also aims his hostility, ignorance, and even disgust towards female bodies. From Trump’s perspective, a women’s worth diminishes as soon as she does not fit his beauty standards or holds opposing viewpoints. In the past, he attacked journalist Megyn Kelly, who had criticized him (see below), by suggesting she was aggressive due to her hormonal cycle;
79 It is interesting that he considers employing his wife as reason for the demise of his first marriage – and not his illicit affair with Marla Maples, who became his second wife after Ivana.
122 rejected criticism by Cher80 and Bette Midler81 because of their appearance; and targeted Arianna Huffington, whose lack of beauty he deemed responsible for her failed marriage82. He frequently fuses outer appearance with skills, honesty, and character traits. This means he voices his distrust of people, particularly women, whom he does not find attractive.
Trump’s degradation and verbal abuse of women is well documented. When he commented on Republican candidate Carly Fiorina’s appearance by saying “Look at that face! Would anyone vote for that? Can you imagine that, the face of our next president? I mean, she’s a woman, and I’m not supposed to say bad things, but really, folks, come on. Are we serious?” (Trump qtd. in Lawler 2015), he both ridiculed her appearance and insinuated she lacked a certain ‘look’ to be president. In May 2016, he asked a California audience “Do you think Hillary looks presidential?” and continued by stating “I don’t think so. And I’m not going to say it, because I’m not allowed to say it, because I want to be politically correct. So I refuse to say that I cannot stand her screaming into the microphone all the time” (Trump qtd. in Dittmar 2018: 8). Apart from his expert use of apophasis, Trump vocalizes the gendered circumstance that American presidents have to appear male in order to be perceived as presidential. For 228 years, presidents have been and looked ‘male’, and as neither Hillary Clinton nor Carly Fiorina are male, they did not ‘look presidential’. At a 2016 rally in New Hampshire, he repeated that Clinton lacked the ‘presidential look’ and added that he, in contrast, did ‘look presidential’ (cf. Colvin 2016b). There is a decidedly gendered undertone to the idea of a ‘presidential look’. In Donald Trump’s eyes, Clinton and Fiorina’s lack of perceivable, outer masculinity makes them unfit for national leadership. While Clinton and Fiorina look insufficiently masculine, they are, however, at the same time attacked for their apparent lack of femininity, which is connoted with soft-spoken and conciliatory language and attractiveness.
Similar to the comment on Carly Fiorina’s appearance, Trump disapproved of Clinton’s looks at a rally in October 2016 by saying “[t]he other day I’m standing at my podium and she walks in front of me, right? She walks in front of me and when she walked in front of me, believe me, I wasn’t impressed” (Trump qtd. in Dittmar 2018: 8). By criticizing his female opponents’ attractiveness, something Trump values in women above all, he diminishes their
80 Trump, Donald J. (realdonaldtrump). “@Cher should stop with the bad plastic surgery and nasty statements about good people running for office. I (cont) http://tl.gd/hchk8l.” 11.05.2012, 3:20 P.M. Tweet. 81 Trump, Donald J. (realdonaldtrump). “@BetteMidler talks about my hair but I’m not allowed to talk about her ugly face or body --- so I won’t. Is this a double standard?” 28.10.2012, 10:57 A.M. Tweet.; Trump, Donald J. (realdonaldtrump). “While @BetteMidler is an extremely unattractive woman, I refuse to say that because I always insist on being politically correct.” 28.10.2012, 10:59 A.M. Tweet. 82 Trump, Donald J. (realdonaldtrump). “@ariannahuff is unattractive both inside and out. I fully understand why her former husband left her for a man- he made a good decision.” 28.08.2012, 9:54 A.M. Tweet.
123 worth as women, candidates, and potential leaders of the country. This illustrates the double standard regarding physical appearance which women face when running for political office – the need to be conventionally feminine but not so much as to lose a serious image. Furthermore, by commenting on Clinton’s voice and speech patterns, referring to them as ‘screaming’, he highlights how female language use, particularly when assertive or angry, frequently negatively contributes to their likability, as it violates traditional gender norms that prescribe women to be diplomatic, compassionate, quiet, and soft. Hillary Clinton was repeatedly denounced as ‘lecturing’, ‘screaming’, and being ‘shrill’ by the media as well as candidates including Marco Rubio, Donald Trump, and Jeb Bush. Trump was not alone in commenting on female candidates’ looks, speech, and wardrobe. Other candidates, and even media personalities such as Joe Scarborough and Michael Smerconish83, scrutinized Clinton and Fiorina’s lack of smiling during campaign events and debates. While, as Dittmar points out, criticism of facial expressions is not inherently sexist, the lack of comment on men’s smiles is indicative of a gender bias (cf. Dittmar 2018: 9-10).
When Trump mocked Marco Rubio for his perspiration, he implicitly questioned his health and fitness for office. Similarly, Trump had already started to attack Clinton’s stamina early in the campaign. For example, when he said “I think that my words represent toughness and strength. Hillary’s not strong, Hillary’s weak, frankly. She’s got no stamina, she’s got nothing” and added “[w]e need a president with tremendous intelligence, smarts, cunning, strength and stamina. And Hillary doesn’t have that” (Trump 2015g). Therefore, when Clinton abruptly left a 9/11 memorial service and video footage showed her almost collapsing and needing assistance by Secret Service agents to enter a van, media outlets began to question Clinton’s health, which provided a further opportunity for the Trump campaign to question Clinton’s health and stamina. Using the video footage of the incident, Donald Trump seized the chance to depict Clinton as weak, ill, and unfit for the presidency. This was illustrated most prominently in a campaign TV ad titled “Dangerous”, which juxtaposes images of militant groups, North Korean tanks, and terrorists in Iran with images of Hillary Clinton coughing, being helped into a van and up the stairs, facing questions about her involvement in Benghazi, and looking at her cellphone wearing sunglasses (cf. Donald J. Trump for President Inc. 2016). A voice-over narrator states:
Our next president faces daunting challenges in a dangerous world. Iran promoting terrorism, North Korea threatening, ISIS on the rise, Libya and North Africa in chaos. Hillary Clinton failed
83 Smerconish commented on Fiorina’s facial expression after the first debate, stating “[t]here are times to be serious, but you’ve got to loosen it up a little bit” (Smerconish qtd. in Dittmar 2018: 9), and Joe Scarborough tweeted “Smile. You just had a big night #PrimaryDay” at Hillary Clinton (Scarborough, Joe [JoeNBC]. 15.03.2016, 9:10 P.M. Tweet).
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every single time as Secretary of State, now she wants to be president. Hillary Clinton doesn’t have the fortitude, strength or stamina to lead in our world. She failed as Secretary of State, don’t let her fail us again. (Donald J. Trump for President Inc. 2016)
At the end of the ad, when Trump states his approval of its message, the text “Donald Trump will protect you. He is the only one who can” (Donald J. Trump for President Inc. 2016) appears on the screen. As the narrator claims, Clinton is neither physically, nor mentally, nor morally fit to be president of the United States. Accompanied by daunting music, the clips of Clinton in a physically weak state due to illness and in a morally questionable situation during the Benghazi investigation, combined with video of her looking at her phone, alluding to the email and cell phone scandal while wearing sunglasses, which insinuate shadiness (read: dishonesty and crookedness), culminate in a final image of the White House on a stormy, frightening day. The primary aim of this ad was to cast doubt on Clinton’s ability to lead the nation. Physical strength and health are equaled with strength to protect the American people from foreign adversaries and negotiate with potentially hostile nations. The ad concludes that Clinton cannot fulfill either requirement. By presenting Clinton as weak, Donald Trump, in contrast, automatically becomes the stronger option. The final message, declaring Trump the only viable protector, also functions in the framework of paternalism. He presents himself as the fatherly male protector. Although the ad never explicitly mentioned gender or attributed Clinton’s lack of stamina to femininity, it did pander to an audience which already questioned the viability of a female president and thus has a gendered subtext.
Questioning Clinton’s strength, stamina, and mental stability not only played into Trump’s attempts to prove himself as the strongest and toughest candidate, but also capitalized on gender stereotypes of feminine instability and weakness — whether physical or emotional. For those who may still question whether women are tough enough to be commander-in-chief, Trump’s attacks stoked those flames without ever explicitly invoking gender. (Dittmar 2018: 15)
As mentioned above, Trump values normative female beauty as a measure for female worth and capability84. At the same time, he conveys ignorance, displeasure, and even disgust for functions of the female body such as menstruation, and expresses unfamiliarity with and disinterest in policies regarding women’s issues such as abortion and women’s health providers. When asked about abortion and whether it should be punishable for women during a MSNBC townhall interview with Chris Matthews, Trump advocated for “some form of
84 Donald Trump’s exaltation of female beauty and his tendency to objectify and sexualize the female body also permeate his family circle. When he, for example, stated that “if Ivanka were not [his] daughter, perhaps [he]’d be dating her” (Feyerick 2016), he suggested that the aspect of life in which he and his daughter had the most in common was sex. He also repeatedly focused on her appearance as well as encouraging others, such as Howard Sterne, to do the same (cf. Feyerick 2016).
125 punishment” (Matthews 2016) for the woman, albeit rather reluctantly and without giving details. His proposal elicited an outcry, which led him to later retract it (cf. Glenza 2016). However, the most notorious remarks about female bodily functions were aimed at former Fox News reporter Megyn Kelly, who questioned him about his derogatory comments towards women and their bodies. At the first Republican presidential candidates’ debate in Cleveland, Ohio, the following exchange took place:
Kelly: Mr. Trump, one of the things people love about you is you speak your mind and you don't use a politician’s filter. However, that is not without its downsides, in particular, when it comes to women. You’ve called women you don’t like ‘fat pigs’, ‘dogs’, ‘slobs’ and ‘disgusting animals’. [laughter] Your Twitter account...
Trump: Only Rosie O’Donnell. [laughter]
Kelly: No, it wasn’t. [applause] Your Twitter account... [applause]
Trump: Thank you.
Kelly: For the record, it was well beyond Rosie O’Donnell.
Trump: Yes, I’m sure it was.
Kelly: Your Twitter account has several disparaging comments about women’s looks. You once told a contestant on Celebrity Apprentice it would be a pretty picture to see her on her knees. Does that sound to you like the temperament of a man we should elect as president, and how will you answer the charge from Hillary Clinton, who was [sic] likely to be the Democratic nominee, that you are part of the war on women? (Presidential Candidates Debate 2015b).
In response, Trump lamented the prevalence and danger of political correctness and emphasized that the nation faces other more urgent problems such as trade and national security. Furthermore, he said “[a]nd frankly, what I say, and oftentimes it’s fun, it’s kidding” before adding “[a]nd honestly Megyn, if you don’t like it, I’m sorry. I’ve been very nice to you, although I could probably maybe not be, based on the way you have treated me” (Presidential Candidates Debate 2015b). This exchange between Kelly and Trump gives insight into multiple aforementioned aspects of Trump’s treatment and view of women. First, although initially denying he had used derogatory language to refer to women (according to Trump apart from Rosie O’Donnell), all instances are well documented, as Megyn Kelly points out. Trump swiftly indicates that he does not take her charges against him seriously by turning the moment into an opportunity for comic relief and condescendingly saying “I’m sure it was”. His tone in the latter instance suggests a nonchalant attitude as well as a dismissal of both the issue and Kelly for bringing it up. Furthermore, his response to the charges is neither an apology nor a denial but rather a means of distraction and deflection. He ultimately dodges
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Kelly’s question but once more refers to political correctness as a crux of the modern world, stressing that the instances Kelly mentioned are to be understood in jest and failing to see any harm in his comments. He then proceeds to patronize Kelly by half-heartedly apologizing for her taking offense to his language and rebutting her by saying that he had been “very nice” to her although, in Trump’s view, her behavior did not warrant such treatment. His apology functions to align her with those who value political correctness and are therefore, according to Trump’s narrative, thin-skinned and reluctant to talk about ‘real’ issues. When he then suggests that she does not deserve his civility, ostensibly due to her tough and critical questioning on women’s issues, he, on the one hand, projects himself as benevolent for still being nice and, on the other hand, formulates it as a reprimand and perhaps even threat towards her. Shortly after the debate, he attacked Kelly in various tweets and retweets, calling her a “bimbo”85 as well as asserting that she “really bombed” it86, was “not very good or professional”87, and seemed “angry”88. Furthermore, in a CNN interview with Don Lemon after the debate, he explained his attacks on Kelly.
I don’t have a lot of respect for Megyn Kelly. She’s a lightweight and you know, she came out there, reading her little script and trying to, you know, be tough and be sharp […] I have no respect for her. I don’t think she is very good. I think she is highly overrated […] She gets out and she starts asking me all sorts of ridiculous questions and you know, you could see there was blood coming out of her eyes, blood coming out of her wherever. (Trump 2015j)
In his explanation, he describes Kelly as “a lightweight” and not “tough” and “sharp” before suggesting that her questions were “ridiculous” and that she was aggressive due to “blood coming out of her wherever” (Trump 2015j). It does not seem far-fetched to interpret his comment as a reference to menstrual blood. In this case, Trump insinuates that Kelly asked him certain questions and treated him hostilely due to her hormonal levels. Beliefs about female unfitness for positions of power due to their hormonal cycle and its assumed negative effect on their personality and judgement are still prevalent. Due to backlash against his comment, he later stated he had referred to her nose and that he meant to say ‘whatever’
85 Trump, Donald J. (realdonaldtrump). “@timjcam: @megynkelly @FrankLuntz @realDonaldTrump Fox viewers give low marks to bimbo @MegynKelly will consider other programs!” 07.08.2015, 9:24 A.M. Tweet. 86 Trump, Donald J. (realdonaldtrump). “Wow, @megynkelly really bombed tonight. People are going wild on twitter! Funny to watch.” 07.08.2015, 9:40 A.M.. Tweet. 87 Trump, Donald J. (realdonaldtrump). “I really enjoyed the debate tonight even though the @FoxNews trio, especially @megynkelly, was not very good or professional!” 07.08.2015, 2:53 A.M. Tweet. 88 Trump, Donald J. (realdonaldtrump). “@ElvisFever: @megynkelly @FoxNews Out to get you with baited questions. She was angry at you. Very hostile and unprofessional.” 07.08.2015, 4:19 A.M. Tweet.
127 rather than ‘wherever’. Nonetheless, numerous politicians, including members of the GOP, condemned his comments as unacceptable (cf. Arana 2015).
Besides his objectifying views and derogatory comments about women, more serious allegations about sexual assault and harassment of various women surfaced throughout his campaign. Research on masculinities and how it relates to violence against women has been growing in recent years. The connection between cultural norms of hegemonic, patriarchal masculinity and violent acts towards women has been increasingly highlighted by feminist, sociological, and cultural theories concerning gender, power relations, and what is frequently referred to as ‘rape culture’. The UN’s “Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women” (1993) defines violence against women as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life” (UN General Assembly 1993). The document also acknowledges that
violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared with men. (UN General Assembly 1993)
Within masculinities and gender studies, violence against women is broadly recognized as a crucial feature in the construction of hegemonic and patriarchal masculinities. Certain male gender identities are socialized through paradigms of aggression and violence aimed at women and other (marginalized and/or subordinate) men and perpetuated through common everyday wisdoms and cultural practices such as ‘boys will be boys’, the dismissal of offensive language and objectification as so-called ‘locker room talk’, and the implicit as well as explicit dismissal of rape culture. The climate rape culture creates normalizes and thus allows or even emboldens the sexualization and objectification of women and their bodies as well as (sexualized) violence, harassment, coercion, and abuse against mainly women, primarily perpetrated by men. In such a climate, charges of harassment and abuse are often mischaracterized as the victim’s fault or dismissed as false or inconsequential altogether. As mentioned before, in order to understand and combat violence against women, the construction of male gender identities, particularly hegemonic and patriarchal gender identities, and the performance of such gender identities must be discussed. According to Greig et al., beliefs of men’s natural superiority over women as well as the normalization of violence as a means to assert gender authority and tool to aid the construction of a particular
128 normative form of ‘real’ masculinity (read: hegemonic and patriarchal masculinity) are at the root of the problem (cf. Greig et al 2016: 49).
Donald Trump’s misogynistic and sexist behavior before and throughout his campaign had repeatedly been criticized; however, no incident proved as much of a threat to his campaign as the release of an audiotape in which Trump not only uses lewd and vulgar language to talk about women, but also appears to brag about sexually predatory behavior and how his fame allows him to act in such a way because “they [women] let you do it” (Bush and Trump 2016). The taped conversation took place in 2005 between Donald Trump and Billy Bush, who were on a bus on their way to film an episode of Access Hollywood at the set of the popular daytime soap opera Days of Our Lives.
Trump: I did try and fuck her. She was married.
Unknown: That’s huge news.
Trump: No, no, Nancy. No, this was [unintelligible] — and I moved on her very heavily. In fact, I took her out furniture shopping.
She wanted to get some furniture. I said, “I’ll show you where they have some nice furniture.” I took her out furniture —
I moved on her like a bitch. But I couldn’t get there. And she was married. Then all of a sudden I see her, she’s now got the big phony tits and everything. She’s totally changed her look.
Billy Bush: Sheesh, your girl’s hot as shit. In the purple.
Trump: Whoa! Whoa!
Bush: Yes! The Donald has scored. Whoa, my man!
[Crosstalk]
Trump: Look at you, you are a pussy.
[…]
Trump: Yeah, that’s her. With the gold. I better use some Tic Tacs just in case I start kissing her. You know, I’m automatically attracted to beautiful — I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t even wait. And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything.
Bush: Whatever you want.
Trump: Grab ‘em by the pussy. You can do anything. (Bush and Trump 2016)
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The conversation above is illustrative of numerous aspects related to theories on hegemonic masculinity, compulsive heterosexuality, as well as sentiments of male sexual entitlement and homosociality and its influence on heterosexual relations. According to Hammarén and Johansson, homosocial environments are defined by the conflict between homosocial desire and homosexual panic, which results in homosociality becoming a fertile ground for homophobic and misogynist language. “Homosocial desire refers to men turning their attention to other men, and homosexual panic refers to the fear of this attention gliding over into homosexual desire. In an attempt to emphasize heterosexuality, fear or hatred of homosexuals and misogynist language are developed” (Hammarén and Johansson 2014: 2). In his study about homosocial bonds among young Australian military men, Michael Flood investigates how sharing, discussing, and fantasizing about heterosexual activities in addition to sexualizing, objectifying, and fetishizing the female body become means to (re)affirm masculinities and facilitate homosocial bonding. Furthermore, Flood’s research highlights that “male bonding feeds sexual violence against women and sexual violence against women feeds male bonding” (Flood 2008: 350). During the exchange, which takes place in a homosocial environment, Trump and Bush focus on the outer appearance of the women in question and reduce them to objects of sexual desire, using the words “hot” and “pussy” in reference to Arianne Zucker and boasting about Trump’s sexual pursuit of Nancy O’Dell despite her marital status. The manner in which the two men talk about the two women signifies no interest in them apart from their physical appearance, and the female bodies are sexualized through the use of lewd language in this context. Theories of hegemonic masculinity are concerned with power over other groups, such as women and other non- hegemonic groups of men, and power imbalances can result in (physical or other) violent behavior. Moreover, theories of compulsive heterosexuality and male sexual entitlement suggest that objectifying and even degrading the female body through language as well as action can function to bolster masculinity and stake a claim for a hegemonic variant of masculinity (cf. Pascoe 2017: 125-6; Kimmel 2008: 170).
However, it is important to note that just as there is not one unified masculinity, there is neither one universal male sexuality. Although male sexuality is frequently depicted as being driven, uncontrollable, and ultimately natural, men and their expressions of sexuality are not homogenous. Connell’s theories on multiple masculinities highlight this and, rather than generalizing all male sexual behavior, investigate how a particular form of hegemonic masculinity defines and polices sexual behavior and meaning through the repression of other forms of sexual expression (cf. Edley and Wetherell 1995: 193). Although male sexuality is not intrinsically or naturally linked to aggression, domination, and violence, the exchange in the Access Hollywood tape, illustrates predatory behavior as well as power’s role in sexual
130 relations. Donald Trump states that he cannot control his sexual desire when he sees beautiful women and that he may inevitably start kissing them without their consent. Neither he, nor any of the listeners present, disagree, question, or condemn such actions, even though they constitute sexual assault. It cannot be determined whether Trump was not contradicted due to agreement, complicity, ignorance, or fear of being labeled not masculine enough. Nonetheless, the tape concurs with Flood’s as well as Hammarén and Johansson’s research on homosocial environments as fertile grounds for misogynist and even sexually predatory behavior and language. It also echoes Kimmel’s assessment that recounting heterosexual activities bolsters masculine credentials. Although Trump recounts his failed attempts to court Nancy O’Dell, his claim that women “let him do it” due to his fame suggests a ‘successful’ occurrence of a similar manner in the past. Furthermore, it reaffirms his hegemonic masculinity by referencing his fame and wealth as reasons for his ability to ‘score with’ women. “Trump states that his power as a business executive and reality television-star affords him the luxury to freely gain compliance over women, and in claiming to do so he also indexes his status as a physically powerful man” (Rodgers 2017: 72).
The tape was released only days before the second presidential debate, and Trump was attacked for his behavior instantaneously. Swift condemnation came not only from the Democratic Party, but also from numerous members of his own party, which even uninvited Trump from GOP events (cf. Benoit 2017: 244). Trump was already married to Melania at the time of the recording, which earned him additional criticism because the tape indicates his willingness to commit adultery. Trump’s initial response to the tape and its content was not particularly apologetic or understanding of the offense the tape revealed. “This was locker room banter, a private conversation that took place many years ago. Bill Clinton has said far worse to me on the golf course — not even close. I apologize if anyone was offended” (Trump qtd. in Farley 2017). Trump minimized his statements when he said that they “took place many years ago” and that they constitute mere “locker room banter”, suggesting that the firestorm of criticism he received was exaggerated and that the statements were not reflective of him today. Furthermore, he deflected blame onto Bill Clinton, who according to Trump “had said far worse […] on the golf course”, a statement which functions to attack Bill Clinton, and by extension his wife Hillary Clinton, as well as deflect and normalize the situation. He is not the only man talking like this – he is not even the only president or presidential contender speaking this way. While the last sentence of the statement does contain an apology, the use of “if” as a qualifier shows it is nonetheless demonstrative of his lack of understanding and/or regret concerning his words (cf. Benoit 2017: 249). His second response89 to the tape again
89 “I’ve never said I’m a perfect person, nor pretended to be someone that I’m not. I’ve said and done things I regret, and the words released today on this more than a decade-old video are one of them.
131 referred to it as “decade-old” but did include an unqualified apology. Nonetheless, he ended the statement by criticizing both Bill and Hillary Clinton90 for having done worse, thus ending the statement by attacking and deflecting once again. Trump himself has been accused of sexual misconduct by over twenty women since at least the 1980s and denies all allegations, accusing the women of seeking fame or being paid by the Clinton campaign (cf. Jamieson, Jeffrey and Puglise 2016). He also denounced one woman’s allegation, which asserts Trump had groped her and kissed her without consent, by demeaning her appearance. At a Florida rally in West Palm Beach, he insinuated that the accusations are false because he does not find his accuser attractive, saying “[t]ake a look. Look at her. Look at her words. And you tell me what you think. I don’t think so” (Trump qtd. in Jacobs 2016).
Trump’s behavior towards women concurs with Connell’s assertion that power relations within the construct of hegemonic masculinity may manifest themselves in misogynistic, sexist, and oppressive behavior. He frequently doubted female candidate’s looks and presidential appearance, objectified and demeaned women, overemphasized or devalued female bodies, and was accused of sexually harassing and assaulting women for, among other reasons, making lewd comments, touching and kissing them without consent, and walking into beauty pageant dressing rooms unannounced while the contestants were undressed. These instances can be interpreted as a sense of entitlement towards the female body as a sexual commodity for Trump to see and touch. At the same time, his disgust of the female hormonal cycle, his dislike for women he does not find attractive, and his outrage over a Miss USA winner gaining weight (cf. Barbaro and Twohey 2016) after the competition, demonstrate contempt towards the non-sexualized female body. In other words, he uses women he deems attractive and desirable as a means to bolster his masculinity and sexual prowess, while at the same time demeaning women who do not fit this standard. Lastly, the statements made on the Access Hollywood bus and the subsequent deflective and minimal apologies underline that he sees political correctness towards women as a nuisance that only serves to divert attention from the great challenges facing America. This is unsurprising due to his overall insensitive use of language. Furthermore, he does not recognize issues of sexual misconduct and objectification as a larger problem within society and qualifies and
Anyone who knows me, know these words don’t reflect who I am. I said it, I was wrong, and I apologize. … I’ve said some foolish things, but there is a big difference between the words and actions of other people. Bill Clinton has actually abused women and Hillary has bullied, attacked, shamed and intimidated his victims. We will discuss this more in the coming days. See you at the debate on Sunday” (Trump qtd. in Farley 2017). 90 Trump presents the sexual misconduct allegations against former President Bill Clinton as a means to attack and deflect blame, which therefore is how they are presented in this thesis. The limited discussion of the allegations is not intended to minimize the allegations against either man.
132 normalizes his statements on the infamous tape as locker room talk, which is ultimately not important or serious.
4.2 Who Has Got the Broadest Shoulders? – The Presidential Debates Presidential debates have become a prominent fixture of presidential elections. Scholars widely agree that the 1960 televised debates between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon defined new visually mediated paradigms for the presidency. When Nixon lost his lead to Kennedy after the first debate, it was partially attributed to his refusal to wear stage make-up and subsequent sweaty face and five-o’clock-shadow. According to Katz, mediated, particularly televised, images of the president have become the most important factor for constructing a presidential narrative and appearance, and, with that, presidential masculinity (cf. Katz 2016: 69).
Constructed and mediated images of presidential masculinity had long been important in presidential races, even before the mass media technologies of the twentieth century. But since the invention of television, and particularly since 1960, the way a candidate for president performs his manhood in the media spectacle of presidential campaigns has not merely been an important part of his ‘electability’; it has arguably been the most important part. (Katz 2016: 69)
In his book Amusing Ourselves to Death, Neil Postman argues that this fixation on ‘look’, appearance, narrative, and style has taken its toll on the debates’ quality of content. He argues that modern, televised debates have little in common with, for example, the Lincoln- Douglas debates preceding the Civil War, and that the way modern debates are conducted limits or even impedes logical argumentation, structure, and occasionally even syntax. It focuses on impressions rather than policies and the feelings these impressions elicit within the American electorate (cf. Postman 2005: 97).
The men were less concerned with arguments than with ‘giving off’ impressions, which is what television does best. […] [T]he debates were conceived as boxing matches, the relevant question being, Who KO’d whom? The answer was determined by the ‘style’ of the men – how they looked, fixed their gaze, smiled, and delivered one-liners. (Postman 2005: 97)
The presidential debates are thus arguably the climax of the media spectacle that is the American presidential election. After each debate, the policies and performances of the candidates competing for the presidency are dissected by the media as well as scholars in fields ranging from history and political science to communication and cultural studies. Throughout this paper, it has been illustrated that all presidential performances are also
133 gendered performances, which means presidential debates provide a wealth of information for gender and masculinities studies. Therefore, the three presidential debates during the 2016 election unsurprisingly further illustrate aspects of Trump’s approach to gender and his performance of masculinity. The manner in which Trump and Clinton’s gendered performances functioned in direct interaction can likewise be identified in their formal broadcasted exchanges. In the following pages, gendered behavior and contexts as well as expressions of Donald Trump’s masculinity found within the three debates, which took place in Hempstead, St. Louis, and Las Vegas in September and October 2016, will be investigated. In doing so, this will further highlight how they shaped his presidential campaign and how the interaction of the presidential contenders’ gendered performances can be interpreted. The debates provide insight into previously discussed notions of Trump’s masculinity, such as his dominating and aggressive rhetoric, his behavior towards women, and his self- aggrandizement, all of which serve as means to project strength and success, two highly valued and sought-after markers of (hegemonic) masculinity. The debates also showcase how both Trump and Clinton attempted to use explicit as well as implicit gender discourses to influence voters’ perceptions of them as viable and competent candidates for the presidency.
There were numerous instances throughout the three debates in which gendered notions, language, and contexts were invoked in order to either establish a connection with the electorate or denounce the other candidate as ineffective and less viable. On the outset of the first debate, Hillary Clinton mentioned it was her granddaughter’s second birthday, which prompted her to think about which direction the country should pursue and what the American future ought to represent. She then went on to outline the topics her campaign was concerned with, prominently featuring issues such as equal pay for women, paid family leave, and affordable child care (cf. Presidential Debate 2016a). By first establishing a connection with the audience through her role as grandmother and then referencing issues which are particularly important to female voters – and which have frequently been neglected in previous male-dominated presidential debates – Clinton emphasized her gender. In his stump speech, Donald Trump, on the other hand, painted a characteristically gloomy picture of the present in which America is losing in comparison to countries such as Mexico and China. He vowed to decrease taxes for businesses, which he promised would be “a job creator like we haven’t seen since Ronald Reagan” (Presidential Debate 2016a); stop companies from producing overseas; and renegotiate trade deals (cf. Presidential Debate 2016a). Although tax reform and the economy are traditionally seen as typically male topics, they are also among the most crucial issues in elections in general. Therefore, while emphasizing his economic policies may buttress his masculinity, his reference to such issues
134 is likely less deliberate and more so linked to the general interests of the electorate. Furthermore, while men are largely perceived to be more apt at dealing with the economy and tax reform, Clinton’s political career, juxtaposed with Trump’s lack thereof, possibly negated such preconceived gender stereotypes in the 2016 race.
Other instances, however, do highlight a gendered subtext in Trump’s behavior. When watching the first presidential debate, the number of interruptions and interjections between the two candidates skewed substantially into Donald Trump’s direction. According to The New York Times, Trump interrupted Clinton 39 times (cf. McDonald and Cuba 2016); Time magazine counted 28 (cf. Wilson 2016); and Vox even found a total of 51 interjections, half of which occurred within the first 25 minutes of the debate (cf. Crockett and Frostenson 2016). The reason for the divergent interruption counts between sources is largely due to the fact that there is no universal consensus on what counts as an interruption, whether an unsuccessful interruption ought to be counted, and whether interjections function similarly to interruptions and should therefore be acknowledged in such statistics (cf. Koerth-Baker 2016). However, all interruption totals find higher rates of interruptions by Donald Trump as well as more interruptions by moderator Lester Holt while Hillary Clinton was speaking. Research has shown that women are interrupted by men and other women at a higher frequency than men by men or men by women. This may partially be explained by theories concerning women’s subordination through language use; however, the fact that women interrupt women may also illustrate a change in the trend and suggest that they may feel less inclined to adhere to gendered language patterns (cf. Hancock and Rubin 2014: 56). While gendered language appears to be shifting towards more egalitarian language use, Donald Trump’s continuous interruptions of Clinton, as well as of his Republican primary opponents, highlight his domineering approach to conversation and debating, which concurs with his hyper-masculine, aggressive, and brash rhetorical and gender performance.
He also declared that Clinton was “not nice” (Presidential Debate 2016a) during the debate and implicitly mocked her for preparing for it. Whether deliberately chosen or simply part of Trump’s speech, both attacks have a gendered subtext. Aiming to disqualify a candidate because he or she is not ‘nice’ is unusual. Niceness is far less a requirement of political decorum than, for example, civility and respect, particularly in the context of a presidential debate. Nonetheless, Trump chose to attack Clinton on her apparent lack of niceness. Niceness and kindness are arguably connoted in emotive and even nurturing terms, especially when applied to women. A recent study on how ‘self-confidence appearance’, defined as “others’ perception of whether an individual is confident about being able to meet his/her performance standards” (Guillén, Mayo and Karelaia 2017: 840), in the workplace is affected by gender revealed that while self-confident behavior is generally seen
135 as beneficial in the workplace for men, women must also be prosocially oriented, or, in other words, nice. The findings suggest that “women low in prosocial orientation are penalized at work, as compared to men and also to women high in prosocial orientation” (Guillén, Mayo and Karelaia 2017: 840). While the study focuses on women and men in private businesses, research on the double standard (being strong and assertive without being too strong and assertive) female politicians must navigate indicates similar trends. Furthermore, according to Brenda Weber, Trump’s insinuation of Clinton overpreparing for the debate also speaks to a gendered subtext. Weber sees similarities to data about female lecturers and teachers in classrooms; “[s]tudents will say a smart and competent female professor sounds ‘overbearing’ or ‘overly intellectual,’ whereas they expect a male professor to be authoritative or actually know what he’s talking about” (Weber qtd. in Paquette 2016a).
The context in which gender perhaps becomes most visible during the first debate occurred when moderator Lester Holt asked Donald Trump about what he meant when saying that Clinton lacked a ‘presidential look’. It has previously been mentioned that the concept of a ‘presidential look’ is part of a gendered narrative about whose appearance meets preconceived expectations based on how former presidents looked, which substantially favors white men over women and men of color, particularly because of the complete or nearly complete lack of precedent. Trump evaded answering the question by changing the subject to stamina, saying: “She doesn’t have the look. She doesn’t have the stamina. I said she doesn’t have the stamina. And I don’t believe she does have the stamina. To be president of this country, you need tremendous stamina” (Presidential Debate 2016a). When Lester Holt pressed the issue by repeating that it was not stamina but her look that Trump had criticized, Trump evaded again and stated that “[y]ou have to be able to negotiate our trade deals. You have to be able to negotiate, that’s right, with Japan, with Saudi Arabia. […] All you have to do is speak to them. […] You have so many different things you have to be able to do, and I don’t believe that Hillary has the stamina” (Presidential Debate 2016a). As discussed before, criticizing Clinton’s stamina also adds to a gendered narrative of women being weaker, and thus less able to negotiate beneficial trade deals. Moreover, it enables Trump to establish himself as both the physically and mentally stronger candidate. Clinton, however, seized the chance to call Trump out on his record of hostile and sexist comments towards women.
Clinton: You know, he tried to switch from looks to stamina. But this is a man who has called women pigs, slobs and dogs, and someone who has said pregnancy is an inconvenience to employers, who has said…
Trump: I never said that.
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Clinton: …women don't deserve equal pay unless they do as good a job as men
Trump: I didn’t say that.
Clinton: And one of the worst things he said was about a woman in a beauty contest. He loves beauty contests, supporting them and hanging around them. And he called this woman ‘Miss Piggy.’ Then he called her ‘Miss Housekeeping,’ because she was Latina. Donald, she has a name. (Presidential Debate 2016a)
Trump barely defended himself, merely interjecting that he never said such things and later asking where Clinton had received this information. Subsequently, he even launched an attack against Rosie O’Donnell91, stating “I said very tough things to her, and I think everybody would agree that she deserves it and nobody feels sorry for her” (Presidential Debate 2016a). Rather than disproving Clinton’s accusations about his mistreatment of women, his mentioning of Rosie O’Donnell curiously underlined and perhaps even confirmed them. Trump then stated “I was going to say something extremely rough to Hillary, to her family, and I said to myself, ‘I can’t do it. I just can’t do it. It’s inappropriate. It’s not nice’” (Presidential Debate 2016a), which might have been an insinuation about Bill Clinton’s infidelity. This is reinforced by the fact that he told a reporter after the debate that he was glad he “was able to hold back on the indiscretions with respect to Bill Clinton […] Because I have a lot of respect for Chelsea Clinton and I just didn’t want to say what I was going to say” (Trump qtd. in Severns 2016). When asked to clarify what exactly he meant, he simply jumped to discussing the next debate. Throughout the presidential campaign, Republican candidates and supporters frequently insinuated that Bill Clinton’s sexual misconduct and infidelity was proof of Hillary Clinton’s unfitness for office. These attacks were particularly pronounced on apparel and other merchandise which were sold at Republican, particularly Trump, rallies (cf. Sanghani 2016). This narrative suggests that women whose partners are unfaithful are at least partially to blame for not satisfying their husbands’ needs or being unable to command or hold their attention.
The second presidential debate between Trump and Clinton was more tangibly concerned with gender than any other debate in the 2016, and perhaps even any previous, election cycle. At the same time, it was a highly hostile clash between the two presidential contenders who even refrained from shaking hands at the outset of the debate. The release of the Access Hollywood tape, in which Trump uses crude language and appears to brag
91 Donald Trump had previously referred to Rosie O’Donnell as “disgusting” and as having a “fat, ugly face” as well as a “slob”, “fatass”, “loser”, and “degenerate” (cf. Trump 2006). These remarks, among other instances, prompted Megyn Kelly to ask him about his derogatory language towards women during the first Republican primary debate. As mentioned above, this resulted in a feud with the reporter, whom he also attacked in retaliation, frequently resorting to gendered language to do so.
137 about impunity when committing sexual assault, preceded the debate and thus became a focal point of discussion. Already in the first question solely directed at Donald Trump, moderator Anderson Cooper asked the Republican candidate to clarify whether he understood the gravity of his words and highlighted the impact the tape had had on political discussion surrounding the election. While Trump repeated that he “wasn’t proud of it” (Presidential Debate 2016b) and apologized to his family and the American people, his response was also largely evasive. He denied accusations of sexual assault, emphasized that it was only locker room talk, and implied that the outrage over his words was exaggerated. While downplaying his remarks in the recording, he also regularly redirected attention to atrocities committed by ISIS, ending his answer with “we should get on to much more important things and much bigger things”, arguably aiming to lessen the tape’s implications (Presidential Debate 2016b). Furthermore, only after Anderson Cooper repeatedly pressed the issue of whether Trump had ever committed the acts he spoke about on the tape, Trump denied them before immediately beginning to talk about national and border security (cf. Presidential Debate 2016b).
Cooper: Just for the record, though, are you saying that what you said on that bus 11 years ago that you did not actually kiss women without consent or grope women without consent?
Trump: I have great respect for women. Nobody has more respect for women than I do.
Cooper: So, for the record, you’re saying you never did that?
Trump: I’ve said things that, frankly, you hear these things I said. And I was embarrassed by it. But I have tremendous respect for women.
Cooper: Have you ever done those things?
Trump: And women have respect for me. And I will tell you: No, I have not. And I will tell you that I’m going to make our country safe. We’re going to have borders in our country, which we don’t have now. (Presidential Debate 2016b)
The reason for Donald Trump’s reluctance to give a clear response is difficult to explain with certainty; however, his manner of continuously evading and changing the subject to “more important things” serves to minimize his behavior and demonstrates an ignorance towards the issue. Both minimization and ignorance as well as projection are illustrated in his response to Hillary Clinton’s criticism of his behavior and Martha Raddatz’s further questioning concerning the tape. After Clinton stated that “he [Trump] has said that the video doesn’t represent who he is. But I think it’s clear to anyone who heard it that it represents exactly who he is” (Presidential Debate 2016b) and cited multiple instances of Trump’s sexist and defaming behavior towards women and women’s bodies, Trump repeated that the tape is “words, it’s just words” (Presidential Debate 2016b), further displaying disregard of the
138 issue. In response to Raddatz’s question of whether he had changed since 2005, Trump repeated his defense of the tape being “just locker room talk” (Presidential Debate 2016b) before referencing Bill Clinton as the most abusive man in history and attacking Hillary Clinton as being an enabler and defender of her husband’s abuse (cf. Presidential Debate 2016b). While Bill Clinton’s history of sexual abuse and misconduct should not be ignored, Trump uses it to deflect blame from his own actions and thereby attack his political opponent, which raises doubts about his motives. His respect and concern for women became particularly questionable when he described Hillary Clinton as having “tremendous hate in her heart” (Presidential Debate 2016b) and referred to her as “such a nasty woman” (Presidential Debate 2016c) in the third and final debate.
The latter comment resulted in backlash particularly on social media, where it was coopted by women who solidarized with Clinton and promoted hashtags such as #nastywomen and #IAmANastyWoman to reclaim the term. It is unclear where the term ‘nasty’ originated; however, according to Caroline Light, Professor of Gender Studies at Harvard University, its application to demean women in particular has a long-standing history. Light states that “[i]t dates back to colonial times. A ‘nasty’ woman is one who refuses to remain in her proper place, as defined by men. One who challenges male authority” (Light qtd. in Paquette 2016b). Although Trump might not have deliberately chosen a historically gendered term to insult Clinton, “[t]he tendency to call women ‘nasty,’ is baked into our [American] culture” (Paquette 2016b). Research on which terms students applied to professors shows that while both men and women are frequently described as ‘tough’ or ‘assertive’, the term ‘nasty’ is applied to women at a higher frequency (cf. Paquette 2016b). Furthermore, apart from its connotations of uncleanliness, ‘nasty’ has been used as a derogatory term to describe immorality and sexual promiscuity in women (cf. Garber 2016)
Trump was insulting her [Clinton] as both a physical and a moral entity: He was denigrating her looks, her personality, and her moral character. He was suggesting ugliness, and ickiness, and lasciviousness. He was replicating, essentially, the regressive assumptions that are rampant in a culture that still demands that women be, above all, pleasing. (Garber 2016)
Apart from the content of the debates, Donald Trump’s body language, particularly during the second debate, merits a closer look. Electability of a candidate is dependent not only on verbal but also nonverbal communication. Voters tend to trust nonverbal cues more than verbal articulations, particularly if verbal and nonverbal behavior contradict one another. Previous presidents and presidential candidates varied greatly in their ability to nonverbally highlight their leadership qualities. John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan are considered two highly apt presidents concerning the use of their body to convey youth and virility or strength and security, for example. In contrast, when Michael Dukakis soberly uttered he would still
139 reject the death penalty even if his wife was the victim of a crime, Bush successfully branded him as the ‘iceman’. Bush himself also blundered by simply looking at his watch during the debate with Bill Clinton in 1992, which was interpreted as conveying uneasiness, impatience, and ignorance (cf. Gentry and Duke 2009: 37-39).
The second debate, which was held in a town hall setting without podiums and interspersed with direct questions from the audience, allowed the candidates to move on the stage freely, thus changing the nonverbal communication dynamics. With Donald Trump inviting women who had accused Bill Clinton of sexual abuse and the Access Hollywood tape being released just days prior, the debate featured a charged atmosphere which quickly became visible through the lack of an opening handshake between the candidates. A handshake at the beginning of a debate is part of debate decorum. It is a sign of respect and civility that emphasizes an equal standing between the two debating parties before they present their opposing arguments (cf. Uhrmacher and Gamio 2016). Body language experts argue that the possibility of free movement on the debate stage facilitates an analysis of Trump and Clinton’s nonverbal communication strategies. Hillary Clinton repeatedly crossed the stage and approached the audience directly when answering questions, aiming to highlight openness, empathy, and relatability. She remained seated and on her side of the stage during the GOP nominee’s allotted speaking time. In contrast, Donald Trump used his body language to convey power and strength, frequently following Clinton and looming over her, circling the stage during his as well as her speaking time. His constant movement can be analyzed on various levels: First, his perpetual motion highlights activity rather than passivity. Regardless of whether it was a deliberate decision or merely unconscious, his constant movement underlines his self-fashioning as a ‘doer’, who recognizes the urgent need to act quickly and decisively, in contrast to establishment politicians, who he mocks as mere ‘talkers’. Masculinities are frequently defined as active in comparison to more passively connoted femininities. Trump’s anger and highly energized speech performances are among his greatest assets. He repeatedly decried other politician’s inability and passivity in comparison to his eagerness, therefore allowing his ceaseless movement to be read as a manifestation of his restless ambition. Secondly, Trump’s physique is commanding, particularly in comparison to Clinton’s smaller frame. Thus, following Clinton and remaining in close proximity to her diverts attention away from her, even during her turns. According to David Givens, the director of a nonprofit research center on nonverbal communication, “Trump’s constant pacing and restless movements around the stage attracted attention from Hillary’s words, and visually disrespected her physical presence on the stage, as in ‘I am big, you are small’” (Givens qtd. in Uhrmacher and Gamio 2016). Thirdly, his movements on stage, which were described as “like a lion” (Uhrmacher and Gamio 2016) “prowling” (Collett
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2016) and “threatening” (Rappenport 2016), exerted dominance and perhaps aimed to unsettle Clinton. This assessment becomes more probable due to his overall aggressive body language. He not only repeatedly pointed his finger at Clinton, a gesture which Givens refers to as “aggressive in all cultures” (Givens qtd. in Uhrmacher and Gamio 2016), but also snorted, rolled his eyes, and jutted his chin while the Democratic nominee was speaking. Trump’s gestures and facial expressions illustrate aggression, ignorance, and even hostility towards Clinton (cf. Collett 2016).
The third and final debate held in Las Vegas stands out due to its relative lack of personal attacks and insults in contrast to the two previous debates. Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton both focused on policy discussions about issues such as gun control, tax laws, and abortion rather than resorting to ad hominem attacks. In comparison to the first and second debates, Trump’s hyper-masculine and dominating gender performance was uncharacteristically subdued. Apart from insulting Clinton as a “nasty woman” (Presidential Debate 2016c), as discussed above, and demonstrating a lack of knowledge concerning female reproductive rights, particularly when he mischaracterized late-term abortions in brutal and factually incorrect terms, Trump remained more focused and less aggressive in the final debate (cf. Presidential Debate 2016c). Nonetheless, the three debates provide clear insight into how Trump’s masculinity manifests itself in his rhetoric, body language, and choice of insults. Throughout the debates, Trump’s masculine performance seems heightened due to the juxtaposition with Clinton, who emphasized her femininity far more in the 2016 than in the 2008 presidential campaign by foregrounding issues that (disproportionately) affect women as well as denouncing Donald Trump’s misogynistic behavior. Additionally, Trump’s evasiveness when questioned about his misogynistic behavior and sexist remarks seems particularly noteworthy. His petulant and deviant behavior certainly showcases a degree of disregard for women, femininities and unequal power relations between the genders in the macho tradition. However, his emotional and defensive behavior not only suggests nonchalance but also demonstrates insecurities, masculine anxieties and the need to aggressively deflect from his shortcomings.
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5. Conclusion Inquiries of a gender-related nature rarely provide easy, straightforward, or definitive answers. Gender and its surrounding discourses are multi-faceted, intersectional, and subject to change by their very nature. Therefore, suggesting that Donald Trump’s presidential victory is solely due to his broad shoulders or, in other words, his masculinity would be a gross mischaracterization of a myriad of cultural and political processes involved in his election. Assuming that his expression and performance of masculinity had no effect, however, would prove just as problematic.
Throughout this work, the pervasive nature of gender, its expressions, perceptions, and representations, has been illustrated in detail. Questions about gender and sex have been shaping various cultures and academic communities for decades, and interest in this topic is growing rather than waning. This recognition of gender as an important and influential social category has allowed scholars to survey cultural, political, historical, and social processes and power systems through an additional lens, giving deeper insight into how gender, as a category, structures societies. While gender studies has received increasing attention, masculinities, in particular, seem to retain an elusive quality. Thus, inquiries into masculinities, the power systems in which they operate, and their forms of reproduction are necessary to comprehensively explore gendered realities. By initially examining the basic premises of gender studies, this piece could then ultimately examine the role masculinities play in American presidency – an office that is not only pivotal in shaping and reflecting the country’s attitudes on gender, but also in upholding male power structures that enable strong masculine figures such as Donald Trump to thrive within its bounds.
In order to review sources and systems of masculinities to gain insight into gender’s role in society, examining politics in general and presidential elections in particular from a gender perspective becomes indispensable. This work has illustrated that gender has been an integral part of American political culture and presidential elections since the inception of the United States. The ubiquitous yet often unnoticed link between masculinities and politics becomes apparent as soon as one scratches the topic’s surface. Throughout American history, the normative standard of American masculinity has been connected to the man occupying the Oval Office at a given time. Analyzing patterns and notions of masculine self- fashioning as well as tactics aimed at emasculating and feminizing opponents and their policies provides partial insight into how and why presidential candidates won elections and which zeitgeist fit particular gender expressions. In doing so, a better understanding of the masculine connotation of the nation and its highest office can also be gained. Theodore Roosevelt’s physical, rough-and-tumble masculinity resonated with Americans fearing that
142 pampered men would lead to a weak nation. Ronald Reagan’s sunny cowboy image enhanced the narrative of a morally, culturally, and militarily superior version of nation- and manhood defeating Communism and its Soviet embodiment. George H. W. Bush, although struggling with his masculine image, ultimately proved his masculine prowess by successfully feminizing his opponent Michael Dukakis and by extension Democratic policies and politics. Bill Clinton embodied a new version of Democratic masculinity, which had come to be perceived as feminine, and effectively masculinized his party through his Southern masculine persona and tough crime legislation. He inadvertently cemented his potent masculinity through scandals relating to infidelity and sexual misconduct, which although leading to his impeachment, boosted his popularity. George W. Bush’s exhibition of vengeful, strong, and militarized masculinity resonated with a grieving and shocked post-9/11 American society. Presidents of the past and present have always used their masculine self-expressions as means to bolster their electability; retain an image of stability and strength; and assure Americans of the nation’s courage, power, and influence.
As discussed in this work, Trump’s election has proven to follow similar patterns. This thesis has demonstrated that Donald Trump presented himself as an embodiment of traditional, normative, hegemonic masculinity through a variety of mechanisms. His highly xenophobic, racist, and anti-immigrant rhetoric mirrors policies of exclusion, which largely benefited white, heterosexual, male Americans throughout the country’s history. This long tradition of employing exclusionary policies and divisive rhetoric as a means to reaffirm white, heterosexual masculinity as superior, and maintain its hegemony over non-normative, frequently non-white forms of masculinities, has been illustrated in this thesis. The inflammatory, bellicose, and aggressive language Trump espoused on the campaign trail can be situated within normative preconceptions of masculinity as strong, aggressive, and unrepentant. His embrace of offensive language, rejection of political correctness, and often blatant bigotry echo an atmosphere of ‘aggrieved entitlement’ among, in particular, white male Americans, and further strengthen the hyper-masculine, truth-teller, and savior narrative Trump has created for himself. This thesis has illustrated that in this narrative, Trump becomes the hyper-masculine Superman who holds the only solution to reverse an emasculated, dystopian American reality.
Furthermore, this analysis has shown that his anti-intellectual attitude is reminiscent of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, two highly masculinized presidents, and occasionally transcends them by completely eschewing political decorum. Trump’s interaction with his opponents on both sides of the aisle, as well as with the media, is reminiscent of a schoolyard bully who asserts his masculinity using aggression, domineering language, and threats. Through his use of nicknames, his continuous mocking of physical
143 appearances, and his habit of interrupting others while speaking, he discredits and emasculates his opponents, while simultaneously establishing his superiority and domination. Moreover, his frequently shameless flaunting of personal wealth and self- aggrandizement aides to sell a hyper-masculine Las Vegas style version of the American Dream in which he establishes himself as the envied alpha male men should supposedly strive to become. He invents himself as the ultimate Self-Made Man, whose wealth, status, and ability to have relations with beautiful, young women are akin to badges of honor that prove his masculinity as well as sexual prowess. Finally, the rejection of and hostility towards femininity, a bedrock of hegemonic masculinity and macho behavior, is reflected in Trump’s objectification and degradation of women’s bodies, support for traditional gender roles, sexual misconduct, and ignorance of women’s issues. However, this thesis has also proven that a closer investigation of Trump reveals cracks in his masculine self-fashioning. His habits of deflecting, projecting, and communicating in a highly emotional and emotionalizing manner hint at the fragility of (hegemonic) masculinity. Mechanisms of overcompensation in the form of extreme aggression, hyper-masculine posturing, and deflection suggest underlying masculine anxieties and insecurities. In summary, this thesis has established that Trump used characteristics of traditional and hegemonic masculinity to suppress his opponents, dissonant voices, minorities, and women, throughout the 2016 presidential election. While instances of overcompensation and insecurities surfaced, his highly masculinized persona undoubtedly appealed to a large segment of American voters and eventually aided in his election.
During the early research phase for this thesis, I was once asked whether there was enough evidence to write about masculinities and presidential politics and whether such a topic was in need of discussion. Then, I replied with a tentative yes. Now, after completion, my answer has not changed but become even more resounding. Evidence for the breadth of this topic are the numerous avenues that I was unable to explore due to space constraints in this work but would have merited investigation. While briefly touched upon, there was little room to comparatively analyze the expressions of masculinities of other presidential primary candidates such as Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Bernie Sanders. Furthermore, a juxtaposition of Trump’s masculinity with patterns of female masculinity92 exhibited by Hillary Clinton would have likewise been enlightening. Moreover, due to this paper’s focus on Trump’s masculine self-fashioning, a comprehensive media analysis of Trump’s portrayal by various news agencies was neglected; this, too, would have been informative. Presidential
92 The term “female masculinity” is intrinsically linked to Judith Halberstam’s important study by the same title (1998). Utilizing her approach to survey Hillary Clinton’s gender expression is certain to further insight into gender dynamics in presidential politics.
144 masculinities and their representation are certainly in need of further research. Concepts of masculinities and their reach is fascinating, challenging, and unquestionably indispensable in gender studies. Trump’s expression of masculinity appealed particularly strongly to voters and undoubtedly was a crucial factor in his victory. His self-representation as a strong leader, his ceaseless repetition of ‘winning’, his aggressive, violent and even vitriolic language use, and his self-promotion as a competent and ruthless businessman, are qualities his supporters value highly and at the same time echo the discourse of hegemonic, traditional masculinity within the highly masculinized arena that constitutes the American presidential election.
This analysis of American presidential masculinity offers an insightful glimpse into cultural perceptions of American masculinities, normative standards of hegemonic masculinity, and gender’s role on the political stage. Hardly any other event is as closely watched by the public, thoroughly dissected by the media, and influential in shaping perceptions of the United States around the world as American presidential elections. An exploration of how gender factors into this media and political spectacle is therefore of utmost importance to achieve a deeper understanding of mechanisms such as the move to the right observable in American politics, particularly within the GOP; the importance of law and order rhetoric in presidential elections; and the hyper-masculinized self-fashioning of candidates as strong, decisive, unrepentant, and unrelenting leaders, which have become increasingly prevalent in recent decades. Furthermore, in order to understand phenomena such as the glass ceiling and female underrepresentation in politics; the global swing to the right; and the marginalization and disenfranchisement of women, communities of color, the LGBTQAI+ community, and marginalized and subordinate masculinities, the men who represent the hegemonic standard must be considered. Hegemonic masculinity, or in Trump’s case even toxic masculinity, can only be sustained through systems of oppression and violence, complicity, and a lack of recognition and awareness. An analysis of Trump’s masculinist rhetoric can help understand the mechanisms and aesthetic patterns that are still at work in modern patriarchal discourse, especially in U.S. politics. This thesis has demonstrated how a homogenous, traditional and hegemonic ideal of white masculinity, embodied in the form of Donald Trump, has profited from an uneven playing field constituted by centuries of patriarchy, white male leadership and hegemonic standards of masculinity, which resulted in the exclusion of gender and racial diversity. Furthermore, I have demonstrated that through his traditionalizing and weaponizing of masculinity, Donald Trump activated a sense of ‘aggrieved entitlement’, racialized and sexualized fears and anxieties, as well as a nostalgic sense of a white male utopian past in his supporters. Therefore, an understanding of Trump’s surprise victory, despite a myriad of scandals and falsehoods, is only possible by including
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Trump’s particular masculine self-fashioning as well as its strong resonance within an American political, historical and cultural landscape, in the discourse.
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