Mapping Out the Trump Era

Drew Angerer/Getty Images Mapping Out the Trump Era

Researcher’s Note: In the wake of the election of Donald Trump as the next United States president, the media has been saturated with noise about what it all means. In this report, which adds to our coverage of the issue, we show that media bloviation aside, geopolitics trumps politics.

The Trump Presidency and Geopolitical Realities 3

Considering Populism in the Wake of Brexit and Trump 7

The Role of Populism and the Media in Trump’s Election 12

Looking at the Map to Understand the World After Election Day 15

Understanding America’s Global Role in the Age of Trump 18

Manufacturing: A Campaign Promise That Cannot Be Kept 22

The Trump Doctrine: A Work in Progress 25

Taiwan, Trump and a Telephone 30

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The Trump Presidency and Geopolitical Realities

We hear all the time about how the world “should” won’t bury you in academic pretension or require a work. Self-proclaimed liberals and conservatives, fancy algorithm to model. But its simplicity doesn’t Keynesians and Reaganites, humanists and hawks, make it any less powerful. When you boil down the globalists and nationalists have crammed the air- frothy mixture of ideas, personalities and emotions waves and filled our Twitter feeds with policy pre- that have bubbled up over the past year, what is scriptions, promoting their worldview while scorning left are some fairly obvious answers on how we others’. But after the emotionally charged year this got to this point and, more important, where we has been, I suspect many people are growing weary are heading. of big theories and cursory character assassinations. Instead, it may be time to replace the pedantry with Geography Doesn’t Argue something more fundamental — and less divisive — in which to ground our thoughts and make sense of It all starts with the map. And not just any map, the world. but one that emphasizes topography over polit- ical borders. The beauty of such a map is that it Rather than focusing on what should happen, per- doesn’t leave much room for polemical debate. As haps we would do better to turn our attention to the Dutch-American geopolitical thinker Nicholas what will happen. And in this, geopolitics can come Spykman once put it, “Geography does not argue. It in handy. It is a deceptively simple tool, one that simply is.”

STRATFOR • 3 The map can tell us the basic facts about a particu- America. Meanwhile, Japan was starting to feel the lar nation or region. Is it massive or tiny, mountain- pain of its first Lost Decade, and China had begun its ous or flat? Is it a land power or an island? Is it stuck rapid ascent as the world’s economic “miracle.” between bigger powers or does it loom over smaller neighbors? Is it enclosed by geographic barriers Now consider the cycle we are in today, one that or split from within? Do its river systems run in a began with a crisis that shattered the world. direction that unites or divides? The map will show The 2008 collapse of the global financial sys- whether a place has navigable waterways and tem stripped away the prosperity that bound the coastal depth, where its biggest population centers European Union together, short-circuited China’s are, how much rain its lands get and how many low-end manufacturing boom and triggered a resources those lands contain, whether it rests in prolonged slump. Jobs were lost and disillusion- a temperate zone or an inhospitable wasteland, ment with the political establishments spread. At what infrastructure links it with others or isolates it, the same time, discontent began to boil over in and so on. the Islamic world as populations rose up against their ruling strongmen, all while the United States Then, we layer on history. How has the map shaped drowned in its Middle Eastern wars. Russia a nation’s behavior over the centuries? Regardless used these regional fires to blow smoke into of the prevailing personality or ideology of the time, Washington’s eyes, distracting it while Moscow what were the constraints that limited that nation’s rebuilt its influence in the Russian borderlands. options, or the compulsions that pulled it in a par- From this position of relative strength, the Russians ticular direction? What internal and external condi- squeezed Ukraine’s energy supplies and warred tions existed when the nation was most celebrated with Georgia to remind its neighbors of Moscow’s in its history? When it entered its darkest days? Do military might — and of the weakness of U.S. the circumstances emerging today resemble a cycle security guarantees. of the past? Once we find our place in the generational cycle, we Time is important. Geopolitics is the study of the can look to the future and weigh the bigger struc- human condition, and human history is told through tural forces at play. How will aging demographics, the passing of generations. On average, a new energy availability, climate change, migrant flows, generational cycle is completed every 20 years or expanding power vacuums, technological advances so. This means that the world we knew two decades and China’s economic evolution work together to ago and the world we will see two decades from now compound global stressors, create opportunities should look very different from the one we’re ex- and revive historical compulsions? This is where periencing today. If you’re skeptical, consider 2016. the “-isms” will rear their heads: Nativism, protec- Now subtract 20-25 years and see what picture you tionism, populism and nationalism will flow easily end up with. In the late 1990s, the United States from these broader forces as the world tries to was in the midst of an economic boom, and political steady itself from the hyperglobalization of the theorists in a postwar euphoria boldly claimed that previous generation. we had reached the “end of history” and that liberal, capitalistic democracy had triumphed over danger- Only at this point do we add in the individual. If you ous ideological thinking. Russia was still in sham- skip ahead, as many intuitively do, and try to glean bles, and the European Union was convinced that answers from what figures such as Donald Trump, closer integration would invite economic prosperity, Marine Le Pen or Rodrigo Duterte say, you risk positioning the Continent to better compete with falling into the deep chasm between intention and

STRATFOR • 4 reality. But when you organize the world into genera- ones. These countries tend to have the most acute tional cycles and base your understanding on a firm sense of their environment, and they often adapt geopolitical foundation, individuals form but a thin to the shifting tides of geopolitics before anyone film on what is already a thick body of analysis. The else sees them coming. The rim of states in Central leaders in question are then revealed as products of and Eastern Europe will have to soberly calculate their time, not aberrations in need of constant psy- the course of negotiations between Russia and choanalysis. And the structural forces that brought the United States at a time when core Continental them to power will be the ones to constrain, shape powers such as Germany are trying to manage the and bend their actions once in office, limiting the fallout from the European Union’s disintegration. possibilities as to what may actually transpire. For nations sitting on Russia’s front lines, such as Poland, now is the time to band together and bol- ster their defenses. But for those such as Hungary Imperatives Laid Bare that rest easier behind the shield of the Carpathian Mountains, now is the time to stay close to Moscow We find ourselves today at a particularly compel- and keep their options open. ling phase of this generational cycle. The election of straight-talking populists amid a stressful global Russia will surely run into roadblocks as it barters environment has laid bare the basic imperatives with the Americans, but it can use the perception of of the nation-state. Whereas idealism in better, a budding bargain with Washington to intimidate its more prosperous times does a good job of cloaking neighbors while taking advantage of the geopolitical unpleasant truths, hard survival instincts will drive forces pulling Europe apart to weaken the West’s behavior under more trying circumstances. resolve. As an island nation, the United Kingdom’s instinct will be to distance itself from the Continent And this is where geopolitics matters most. — and balance off of the United States across the Atlantic — as other European powers revive Russia’s sprawling landmass and lack of natural their age-old feuds. France, rooted in the southern defenses compel it to reach beyond its borders and Mediterranean, will become increasingly polarized build buffers against the West. As tension inside from Germany and its allies in Northern Europe as Russia increases, solidifying those buffers while nationalist forces chip away at their troubled union. Russia is still strong enough to do so will become a matter of urgency. Regardless of who sits in the Questions over the United States’ security commit- White House, Moscow has no choice but to as- ments in the Far East have presented an opportunity sume that the West will take advantage of Russia’s for China as well. The nations stretching from the inherent vulnerabilities to keep the Eurasian power Indochina mainland to the island chains of Southeast in check. Should the Kremlin perceive the next U.S. Asia are caught between China’s overbearing reach president to be a more pliable negotiator, its biggest and Japan’s reawakening. Even before the U.S. elec- imperative will be to try to reach an understanding tion, these countries were trying to chart a course that rolls back NATO’s encroachment in the former forward without the firm assurances of their long- Soviet Union. But this also means Russia cannot be time U.S. protector. Seeking strength in numbers, expected to make any concessions that fundamen- these small, exposed nations will try to coordinate tally weaken its grip on the critical buffer territory it with one another, acting under the larger umbrella has seized in eastern Ukraine. of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the hope that their collective voice will grant them some This is where it will become important to focus on level of parity with their bigger and more power- the smaller powers squeezed between the bigger ful neighbors. But in the face of economic stress,

STRATFOR • 5 political tumult, North Korea’s nuclearization and The fate of North America likewise hangs in the uncertainty over Washington’s role in the region, geopolitical balance. The United States rests at the they will eventually break with one another to tend heart of a continent endowed with many resources, to their own needs. And when they do they will be- navigable waterways, deep coastal ports and mas- come more vulnerable, giving China ample space to sive oceans that protect it from and link it to the rest assert its military dominance and extend economic of the world. The robust trade, infrastructure and concessions in an attempt to reshape the regional cultural ties the United States shares with Mexico status quo in its favor. and Canada cannot be abruptly severed without creating significant turmoil at home. To be sure, the The Middle East will be no less immune to this elemental forces currently fueling nativism, pro- geopolitical test. Turkey is determined to reclaim tectionism and anti-establishment sentiment in the its sphere of influence in the former Ottoman belt United States will force Washington to recalibrate reaching from Aleppo through Mosul to Kirkuk. its policies somewhat. But the unique advantages At the same time, Iran is trying to preserve its that destined the United States to become a global influence in the arc between the Persian Gulf and empire will reduce the chances of a dramatic re- Mediterranean Sea. As the two countries collide trenchment in its foreign policy. The United States amid the region’s broader ethno-sectarian struggle, will still be driven to capitalize on revolutionary the volatile Middle East will continue to draw in changes in technology to stay competitive and to the United States, as well as Russia, which will use build a North American economic powerhouse. And these conflicts as bargaining chips in its negotiation when it looks overseas, the United States will still be with Washington. Strategically speaking, neither compelled to prevent larger powers such as China the United States nor Iran is in a position to renew and Russia from dominating their neighborhoods tension in the Persian Gulf by throwing out their and will have little choice but to rely on regional nuclear deal. But domestic politics could put that partners with often-colliding interests to manage theory to the test. Meanwhile, Israel will wait and developing crises. react to the larger rivalries unfolding around it. Though the United States will maintain its relation- Still, the nuances of the United States’ policy ad- ship with Israel, it is unlikely to go out of its way justments and the time it takes to shape them will to support Israel in ways that could alienate the spread uncertainty in many parts of the world and region’s key Muslim powers. Regardless of the next drive nations to prepare for their worst-case scenar- administration’s personal preferences for allies, they ios. So now is the time to put our ears to the ground will not outweigh Washington’s strategic interest in and feel the earth tremble. We then need to raise maintaining working relationships with the countries ourselves up, dust ourselves off and watch the map taking the lead in reshaping the region. come alive. □

STRATFOR • 6 ERIC FEFERBERG/AFP/Getty Images

Considering Populism in the Wake of Brexit and Trump

The Brexit referendum and Trump’s victory have Wilders wants to get rid of Muslim immigrants but proven that populism can win elections, but what promises to protect the rights of gay couples, while exactly is populism? Though often used loosely, Poland’s Law and Justice leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski populism at base is a form of politics that seeks to claims to defend the country’s Roman Catholic roots mobilize a large segment of the electorate against a and wants to ban abortion. Philippine President common enemy. Rodrigo Duterte wants to execute drug dealers, while Bolivian President Evo Morales defends indigenous From voters in the United Kingdom deciding to leave farmers’ rights to grow coca. Populist parties in the European Union to Americans electing Donald France want to increase protectionism and restrict Trump as their president, many have described 2016 trade, while their British counterparts want to sign as the year of populism. But while the term populism multiple free trade agreements with the rest of is commonly used as shorthand to explain political the world. developments, it remains a rather vague concept. Even if populism is an elusive concept, it has com- Political leaders who have been described as populist mon characteristics that aid in its identification. often have very different ideologies and interests. In broad terms, populism is a form of politics that For example, Dutch Party of Freedom leader Geert seeks to mobilize a large segment of the electorate against a common enemy. In most cases, this enemy

STRATFOR • 7 Nationalist and Anti-System Parties in Europe Polls of voters show robust support across Europe for anti-system and nationalist Nationalist and political parties. Even if they fail to access power, their electoral strength will influence anti-system parties the agendas of more mainstream parties.

FRANCE Republican Party 34% National Front 28%

ITALY Democratic Party 33% Five Star Movement 29%

GERMANY Christian Democratic Union 33% Social Democratic Party 22% Alternative for Germany 14%

NETHERLANDS People's Party for 27% Freedom and Democracy Party of Freedom 27%

AUSTRIA Freedom Party of Austria 34% Social Democratic Party 27%

Sources: Elabe, Ixé, Infratest, Peil, Gallup Copyright Stratfor 2017 includes the political elites (usually the mainstream such as Mexico’s Lazaro Cardenas and Argentina’s parties and the government) and the groups that Juan Peron promised to fight the landowning class, back it (usually the wealthy, intellectuals and the redistribute wealth, and incorporate the masses in media). Populists claim to represent the little man the political process. Populism also needs an ex- against the wealthy, the powerful and the corrupt. ternal enemy, and the Latin American leaders were quick to identify “American imperialism” or “interna- Because populism sees politics as a battle between tional corporations” as forces constantly conspiring “us” (the virtuous and unsophisticated voters) and against the interests of “the people.” “them” (the corrupt elites who care only about their own interests), the concept of the enemy is key to This has not changed significantly in the 21st cen- populism. To begin with, populism needs a domes- tury. Populist governments in Latin America still tic enemy. Iconic Latin American populist leaders identify their local political adversaries as enemies

STRATFOR • 8 of the people, while “American imperialism” remains The Brexit Example a useful, vague scapegoat for domestic economic problems and to justify undemocratic policies. In The recent Brexit campaign offered many examples Europe, popular discontent after years of economic of what European populism looks like in the 21st stagnation and high unemployment has resulted century. Wanting to leave the European in itself is in the emergence of multiple anti-establishment not a populist idea even if many of the arguments parties. Following the populist model, these parties used by the pro-Brexit side were. The leave camp promise to fight an internal rival (the professional had a strong anti-establishment element, mount- politicians) as well as a clear set of external ene- ing frequent attacks on unelected bureaucrats mies, which range from immigrants that threaten in Brussels, financial elites in the City of London, the national identity to EU institutions that reduce and the local and foreign intelligentsia backing the national sovereignty. remain side. Conservative member of parliament Michael Gove captured the pro-Brexit zeitgeist Populism in the Americas generally has been per- when he said during a TV debate on the costs of ceived as promoting policies close to the far left, leaving the European Union that British voters had while in Europe it has been connected more fre- had enough of experts. Gove argued that the ex- quently to the far right. Issues such as land reform perts who predicted a serious economic downturn or wealth distribution have traditionally been more after leaving the European Union were the same pressing in the Americas (including in the United experts who failed to predict the financial crisis a States, where an agrarian Populist Party emerged decade ago. On Labor member of parliament quickly in the 1890s), while issues such as national identity supported Gove’s words, saying the only expert who and the threat of “outsiders” (whether immigrants matters is the voter. or minority religious or ethnic groups) have been more prominent in Europe. Some scholars even The Brexit campaign was also notable because it put speak of an “inclusive populism” (which seeks to immigration at the center of the agenda. European empower sectors of the population that have tradi- nationalists have traditionally targeted minorities tionally been neglected by the traditional elites, such such as Muslims and the Roma, but the pro-Brexit as the poor) in the Americas, versus Europe’s “ex- camp portrayed immigration from other EU coun- clusive populism” (which draws a line between the tries as the key problem to solve. Defenders of ethno-linguistic majority and certain minorities). Brexit said leaving the European Union was essen- tial to stop the arrival of workers from countries But populism cannot be categorized within the like Poland, Romania and Bulgaria who they said traditional left-right divide. For example, France’s abuse Britain’s welfare benefits, are more likely to National Front’s views on race could be seen as far engage in criminal activities and threaten local jobs. right, but its views on the economy are closer to the Supporters of the remain camp tried to present far left. Moreover, populist leaders tend to be prag- statistics showing that these claims are unfounded, matic and adapt their narrative to whatever rhetoric but when appeals to reason clash with appeals to they think will win them more votes. From this emotion, the latter often tend to prevail. point of view, populism is more of a strategy than an ideology, as the main narrative (the “us-versus- Following the referendum, the newly appointed them” point of view) can adopt nationalist, racialist, Prime Minister Theresa May felt the need to jump protectionist or anti-imperialist elements depending the populist bandwagon by saying that she would on the electoral needs of the leader and the specific defend the little man against the rich and the pow- circumstances of the country. erful, even if this meant hurting the interests of the financial elites in the City of London by limiting

STRATFOR • 9 immigration. On the other side of the Atlantic, world. In recent decades, political risk was seen as a Republican candidate Donald Trump was making problem for the developing world. But Brexit and the similar campaign promises, identifying immigrants American election have shown that political risk is and the financial and political elites as the enemies once again a key factor to take into account for com- to defeat. panies and investors doing business in the Northern Hemisphere. The most evident risk is the possibility populist forces could win control of more govern- The Return of Political Risk ments. Less obviously, moderate forces increasingly will have to adopt positions from their populist rivals Multiple factors explain the current wave of pop- if they are to remain politically competitive. ulism in the developed world, including growing income inequality, falling popular confidence in the As in the United Kingdom, where the risk of eco- political system, the failure by capitalist democra- nomic damage posed by Brexit did not end with the cies to reassure voters about their future well being, vote to leave the European Union, populism creates and general fears of “the other” (whether immi- and ongoing risk of economic damage. While pre- grants or ethnic minorities) at a time of slow eco- serving as much access to the EU’s internal market nomic growth, high unemployment and the constant as possible would preserve British trade links with threat of terrorist attacks. the European Union, political calculations and voter sentiment could lead to less economically Populism is a byproduct of democracy, and the efficient and profitable outcomes. In the same way, current wave of anti-establishment sentiment will prolonged border controls within the European not be the last one. Notably, this wave incorporates Union would affect cross-border trade by increas- a strong anti-globalization element. In Europe, the ing transportation costs. But domestic pressure United States and elsewhere, large numbers of and political calculations could make governments voters now oppose the free movement of people, decide to keep them in place regardless of their goods, services and capital. This creates challenges economic impact. not only for the European Union, an institution founded on the very principles now opposed Political risk has always been present in the de- by many, but also for global trade, investment veloped world, but for most of the postwar period and immigration. countries operated within economic, political and in- stitutional frameworks that provided a certain sense History has shown that in most cases, an “us-vs.- of predictability and stability. There also used to be them” dynamic generated by populism leads to the a basic consensus among European and American polarization of a society, with politics becoming a leaders regarding the virtues of globalization. In the fight against a rival to be crushed rather than coop- coming years, political uncertainty in Europe and erated with. In Latin America, this has often led to the United States will be one of the most important political violence. In Europe and the United States, challenges for investment and consumer sentiment, it is more likely to lead to increasingly dysfunctional forcing businesses to permanently adapt their political systems and the progressive radicalization strategies to an increasingly unclear environment. of the electorate. The year 2017 will be very important for Europe and the world in this regard as key countries including As a result, political risk, understood as measures France, Germany the Netherlands and potentially taken by governments that could hurt domestic or Italy will hold general elections where anti-estab- foreign investment, has returned to the developed lishment forces are likely to perform strongly.

STRATFOR • 10 The Brexit referendum and Trump’s victory have ing months and years they will have to prove that, proven that anti-globalization and populist agendas in addition to winning an election, they can also can win elections. Like-minded political parties in lead successful governments. But even if they fail Europe have praised both campaigns, with National to access power, populist forces will continue to Front leader Marine Le Pen saying that Trump will shape political and economic developments in 2017 show that “protectionism works.” This is precisely and beyond. □ the next challenge for populist forces. In the com-

STRATFOR • 11 WHITNEY CURTIS/Getty Images

The Role of Populism and the Media in Trump’s Election

While the rise of populism certainly played a role in Populism Defined and Distributed the rise of Donald Trump, so did the advent of all- news-all-the-time TV and the spread of social media Let’s start with a definition. Of the several via the internet. proposed, I prefer Fareed Zakaria’s for its authoritative succinctness: The latest issue of Foreign Affairs takes a global look at “The Power of Populism.” In seven articles running “What is populism? It means different things to from a lead interview with French far-right figure different groups, but all versions share a suspi- Marine Le Pen to a concluding essay by one of my cion of and hostility toward elites, mainstream favorite authors, Pankaj Mishra, this influential organ politics, and established institutions. Populism of the policy elite takes a hard look at the alarming sees itself as speaking for the forgotten ‘ordinary’ spread of populism. I find much of what is said to be person and often imagines itself as the voice of insightful and important, so I’ll devote most of this genuine patriotism.” column to humble summary. But I also find what is not said as significant as what is, so I’ll conclude by adding Certainly, Le Pen lives up to this definition. In her inter- some of my own reflections. view, both her French nationalism and her suspicions

STRATFOR • 12 about globalization come through clearly: “In many tility rates,” and, “This has a fundamental and negative countries, there is this current of being attached to the impact on economic growth.” nation and rejecting untamed globalization, which is seen as a form of totalitarianism.” Middle-class workers in stagnant economies in the West are then subject to a squeeze play: For Le Pen, German Chancellor Angela Merkel is the face of globalization every bit as much as Brussels or “Goods can easily be manufactured in lower-wage the International Monetary Fund is. “She imposed her economies and shipped to advanced industrial ones. views,” says Le Pen. While the effect of increased global trade is positive for economies as a whole, specific sectors get bat- “She imposed them in economic matters, but she also tered, and large swaths of unskilled and semiskilled imposed them by agreeing to welcome one million workers find themselves unemployed.” migrants to Germany, knowing very well that Germany would sort them out. It would keep the best and let the As I have put it, “For the upper classes, the world rest go to other countries in the European Union. There is their oyster. For the lower classes, the world is are no longer any internal borders between our coun- their competitor.” tries, which is absolutely unacceptable. The model imposed by Merkel surely works for Germans, but it is In his article on “Europe’s Populist Surge,” Cas Mudde killing Germany’s neighbors. I am the anti-Merkel.” puts forth the following definition: “populism is an ideology that separates society into two homogeneous Zakaria picks up the anti-immigrant theme, calling and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the immigration, “the final frontier of globalization.” The corrupt elite,’ and that holds that politics should be earlier frontiers of globalization were easier. Global an expression of ‘the general will’ of the people.” He communications, travel and tourism, as well as lower notes that, “Populists now control the largest share of prices for imported consumer goods, all inspired parliamentary seats in six countries: Greece, Hungary, the kind of optimism found in pundits like Thomas Italy, Poland, Slovakia, and Switzerland.” Friedman. But when it comes to the movement of peoples, Zakaria argues that anxiety about immigrants Again, why here and why now? Mudde offers an “is proving a better guide to voters’ choices than issues account that is consistent with the argument Philip such as inequality or slow growth.” He cites Japan as Bobbitt and I have been developing, namely, that the proof by counterexample: “The country has had 25 old ideological fault line between right and left is less years of sluggish growth and is aging even faster than relevant to understanding contemporary geopolitics others, but it doesn’t have many immigrants — and in than newer fault lines between openness and closure part as a result, it has not caught the populist fever.” with regard to economic globalization:

After noting the lack of populism in East Asia and its “To many Europeans, mainstream elites of all parties retreat in Latin America, Zakaria asks in one of his also seemed to share an essential powerlessness, subtitles, “Why the West, and Why Now?” Citing the owing to two massive transfers of authority that took global values surveys and demographic research of place in the second half of the twentieth century: from Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Zakaria notes that, national governments to supranational entities such as “Western countries, from the United States to Poland, the EU and the International Monetary Fund and from Sweden to Greece, have all seen a decline in their fer- democratically elected officials to unelected ones such as central bankers and judges.”

STRATFOR • 13 What Populism Is Not Politics in the 21st century are being perverted by a transition from traditional values to production val- With fears of fascism being fanned by writers like ues — good lighting, clear audio, to enhance politics Robert Kagan, it may be reassuring to read Sheri as entertainment, and politics as show biz. I credit Berman’s essay, “Populism Is Not Fascism.” Her Andrew Trabulsi for reminding me of Daniel Boorstin’s argument rests on two main points. First, fascism took 1962 classic, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in root in Europe between the world wars in conditions America. Boorstin argued that presidential debates that were far worse than what we see today. Second, and press conferences are “pseudo-events” in the populism may be illiberal, but it is not anti-democratic sense that they are less about reality than a kind of in the way that fascism was. “Most obvious, today’s pseudo-reality manufactured mainly for the sake of extremists claim they want not to bury democracy filling the news hole. but to improve it... In other words, they are certainly antiliberal, but they are not antidemocratic.” If I may extend Boorstin’s argument from what he could see in 1962 to what is even plainer today, the In his essay concluding this special section of Foreign shape of the news hole does as much to determine the Affairs, Mishra is at pains to dispel another mistaken “news” as does the unfolding of objective historical view of populism: that it is the result of the rise of events. The advent of all-news-all-the-time television radical Islam. Picking up on Berman’s attention to the channels that demand content 24/7, and the spread of anti-liberal slant of populism, Mishra writes: social media via the internet, both generate a con- stant hum of narratives that are poorly edited, often “A decade or so of liberal triumphalism gave way repeated and easy to digest by people on the go with to a new era of crises: the 9/ll attacks, the U.S. short attention spans. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the acceleration of climate change, the global financial meltdown and In the context of Boorstin’s insights into the media’s the subsequent Great Recession, the euro crisis, the influence on modernity, Trump can be understood as rise of ISIS, and the spread of a pervasive sense of the Andy Warhol of politics. Warhol was a founding anxiety and even terror.” genius of what came to be known as pop art. Recall his renditions of Campbell’s soup cans and Brillo soap Yes, the rise of the Islamic State is part of the picture, boxes, his splashy and repetitious images of Marilyn but Mishra’s litany of other causes places most of the Monroe and Elvis Presley. But in addition to the novelty blame elsewhere, rather than on Islam. of what he put on his canvases, like Trump, Warhol the man was a constant fixture in Manhattan’s nightlife and society pages. Warhol, it was said, was famous for Populism and the Media being famous.

Missing from Mishra’s list as well as from the other es- In an era when most millennials get their news from says, however, is the pervasive influence of the media Facebook and late-night TV, the virtualization of “re- and the power of celebrity. Donald Trump’s popularity ality” takes precedence over the reality of virtue. We among millions of Americans has less to do with his live in a new highly mediated “reality” that is defined policy positions than with his notoriety as a reality less by objective metrics and more by whatever we see TV star on his long-running show, “The Apprentice.” on all of those screens, from TVs to laptops to smart- However much he may castigate the media, he is an phones. And as the slang saying has it, if it don’t swing, expert at exploiting the media for his own purposes. it don’t mean a thing. □ This expertise is particularly important as the media insinuate themselves ever more deeply into our lives.

STRATFOR • 14 TIMOTHY A. CLARY/AFP/Getty Images

Looking at the Map to Understand the World After Election Day

We didn’t forecast Trump’s victory because we In the stream of post-election postmortems on jour- don’t forecast elections. But we do analyze the global nalism’s performance, “post-truth” is the handiest dynamics in play in elections, including rising nation- of explanations in a campaign season that took fibs alism, nativism and trade protectionism in the West. and fabrication to a new level. The Oxford English And we will start doing so by looking at the map. Dictionary has declared “post-truth” its International Word of the Year. A Google search on the term Nearly a month has passed since American voters yields some 240 million results. Layer what the can- gave the presidency, seemingly against all odds, didates said against the “fake news” manufactured to Donald Trump. And for nearly a month a global on Facebook and elsewhere and, for some, this is all chorus of pundits, pollsters and media prophets have but a civilizational threat. asked: How did just about everyone get it wrong? Amid the hand-wringing, the list of culprits is long: But the term is actually older than we think. It was Skewed models of voter bases. The demise of land- coined back in 2004 by the author Ralph Keyes. It line telephones. Underestimates of “lapsed voters.” took a while, but now it has transformed into a new The evolution of game-changing social media. meme alive in the media ecosystem. It is an illustra- Wishful thinking. tive case study of how memes emerge and dominate discourse, refracting perceptions of political reality.

STRATFOR • 15 But first, a bit of background. The term “meme,” The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a complete devised in 1976 by evolutionary biologist Richard sham, was first published in Moscow in 1903 and its Dawkins from the Greek “mimema,” or “something lies are still disseminated, and believed, throughout imitated,” was originally used to describe patterns of the world. The “missile gap” of the 1950s is closer belief that spread vertically through cultural inher- in history but no less untrue. Many readers are old itance (from parents, for example) or horizontally enough to remember the misleading Vietnam body through cultural acquisition (as in film or media). counts of the 1960s. Or think of Saddam Hussein’s Dawkins’ point was that memes act much like genes, purported weapons of mass destruction and a war carrying attributes of beliefs and values between that rages on some 13 years later. individuals and across generations. It is even a field of academic study known as “memetics.” Malicious intent, of course, is at work in the willful propagation of falsehood. But the narrative rivers of the media world all too often ignore the good or The Best of Intentions evil of their tributaries. Said differently, forest fires spread faster by creating their own wind; more often Today the term meme is more popularly applied to than not, the oxygen of the mainstream media is a videos, a bit of text, a viral tweet, becoming a fixture, meme or something like it. And it is often carried a short-lived canon if you will, in social media-driven forward by journalists with the best of intentions. consciousness. “Post truth” is just one in a long line of them. Tying Reality to the Soil Which is not to be dismissive of the underlying issue of partisans planting fabrications into the echo cham- I’ve written before that this propagation lies at the ber of partisan news media. I share the alarm at the heart of the difference between journalism and speed with which misleading charges or downright intelligence, so I won’t belabor the point again. But falsehoods can spread through the Twittersphere. a few examples are worth examining. The Arab And it’s not just an evil embedded in presidential Spring: It never really existed, and we said as much. campaigns. The new media age has many dark sides. The intractable clash between the United States I worry about “covert influence” that state intelli- and Iran: Our forecast of rapprochement was widely gence agencies — and not just Russia’s — can and do met with skepticism, but then it came true. The spread. Social media as a tool of terrorist recruitment inexorable rise of China: It’s not inexorable, and we is a real threat. While writing this column, I chanced write about this frequently. The new Cold War: It’s across the news that Facebook (inadvertently I’m not a good analogy to the current standoff between sure) enabled a far-right group in Germany to pub- Russia and the West. The “ever-closer” European lish the names and addresses of prominent Jews, Union? Well, no one’s making that argument now. Jewish-owned businesses and Jewish institutions But when we first challenged it years ago, we were on a map of Berlin to mark the 78th anniversary considered heathens. of Kristallnacht. And we’re still heathens. As to the specifics of this Still, you’d think from the post-truth discussion election cycle, we’re not going to run a victory lap; that darkness was descending to devour an age of we didn’t forecast the outcome because we don’t veracity, candor and honesty in our public discourse. forecast elections. But we do analyze the global The assault on authenticity, however, isn’t anything dynamics in play in elections, including rising nation- new. The cry “Remember the Maine” animated the alism, nativism and trade protectionism in the West Spanish-American War of 1898 with false claims. — themes that echoed throughout the presidential

STRATFOR • 16 campaign. For us, the overarching issue is not how geopolitics, one sage of the craft has said, “rids Trump vanquished Hillary Clinton. It’s how the politics of arid theory and senseless phrases” by United States will behave under these new cir- tying “permanent reality to the soil.” So we will start cumstances, which are unreadable to international by looking at the map. leaders, elites and publics — but not to us. We are not in an era of post-truth. We are in an era Can we expand our methodology to North America? of post-meme, at least at Stratfor. And challenging Yes, we can and we will. But we won’t start doing memes, I’ve come to be believe, is at the heart of it with existing narrative or memes. The work of what Stratfor does. □

STRATFOR • 17 Understanding America’s Global Role in the Age of Trump

The New Year, of course, is a time when many “Peace Through Strength” popularized by President reflect on the past and look toward the future. The Ronald Reagan in the 1980s is emerging as a past provides potential lessons and cautions for mantra of the incoming Trump administration, its those who would seek to find tomorrow’s solutions advisers and supporters. The risk of raising iconic in yesterday’s actions. In his 1994 book Diplomacy, personalities and policies from American history is former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote: that lessons may inadvertently be misapplied. The “The study of history offers no manual of instruc- concepts may be sound, but the interpretation and tions that can be applied automatically; history application in a different context may lead to wildly teaches by analogy, shedding light on the likely different results. consequences of comparable situations. But each generation must determine for itself which circum- Peace Through Strength stances are in fact comparable.” “Peace Through Strength” was a cornerstone of the While Kissinger is explicit on the importance of Reagan administration, an assertion that an eco- studying and applying history to policy, he is as nomically and militarily strong United States was insistent that history not be misapplied, that the necessary to ensure peace and stability internation- assessment of the past not lead to false conclusions ally by demonstrating the futility of challenging U.S. for the present or the future. Today, the concept of power. But times have changed, the world system

STRATFOR • 18 is far different than it was during the Cold War, Through Strength as the application of a policy threats have evolved, and the mythos of Reagan has of deterrence. “Since the dawn of the atomic age, perhaps superseded the reality of history. It is worth we’ve sought to reduce the risk of war by maintain- considering what Peace Through Strength meant ing a strong deterrent and by seeking genuine arms in the past, what it may mean in the present, and control. ‘Deterrence’ means simply this: making perhaps most important, just how one measures sure any adversary who thinks about attacking the American strength in the modern era. United States, or our allies, or our vital interests, concludes that the risks to him outweigh any po- It is hard to reconcile some current policy propos- tential gains. Once he understands that, he won’t als — rolling back free trade, increasing tariffs, attack. We maintain the peace through our strength; pulling back on the U.S. global role and leaving allies weakness only invites aggression.” to their own defense — with the underpinnings of the Reagan-esque Peace Through Strength, which Two months earlier, in his State of the Union encouraged free trade, an activist foreign policy and Address, Reagan had highlighted the dual eco- the strong support of distant allies. But it is also a nomic and military components of a policy of Peace very different moment in history. through Strength. “Our strategy for peace with freedom must also be based on strength—economic Reagan came to office at a time of double-digit strength and military strength. A strong American interest rates and chaotic oil markets, in a binary economy is essential to the well-being and security world of the U.S.-led West versus Soviet East, and of our friends and allies. The restoration of a strong, on the heels of a major U.S. intelligence reassess- healthy American economy has been and remains ment of the Soviet nuclear and conventional threat. one of the central pillars of our foreign policy.” The structure of the U.S. economy was still based on The dual concepts of a strong domestic American manufacturing with a strong export component, and economy and a strong defense capability were tied the coming computer revolution was just beginning. together into a single strategy with a global focus. Reagan even noted in his 1983 State of the Union address that “To many of us now, computers, silicon The incoming U.S. administration has picked up on chips, data processing, cybernetics, and all the other these two themes and revived the Peace Through innovations of the dawning high technology age are Strength concept. The focus is on rebuilding the as mystifying as the workings of the combustion en- American economy through manufacturing, in- gine must have been when that first Model T rattled frastructure development and tax reform, and on down Main Street, U.S.A.,” a comment that seems strengthening American defense in part through an rather quaint given today’s technology-driven lives. expansion of nuclear capacity. But the conditions are different now. Manufacturing and exports are no In the Soviet Union, Reagan had a single major for- longer as important to the U.S. economy, technology eign threat to contend with, and he coupled his push has created entire new sectors of economic activity, for missile defense systems (to negate the advan- and trade patterns have expanded into massive tage in Soviet missiles) with calls for reductions in networks spanning continents. Interest rates in nuclear arms. Peace Through Strength was intended double digits when Reagan took office are barely to deter conventional and nuclear attacks against rising above record lows today, and oil prices remain the United States and its allies by the Soviet Union hovering near lows, while U.S. domestic production and its allies. is on the rise. Technology has advanced the tools of warfare and disruption into the cyber realm, In his March 1983 Address to the Nation on Defense reducing the speed and confidence of identifying the and National Security, Reagan explained Peace

STRATFOR • 19 perpetrator and altering the perception of risk and beacon for others to emulate, or to be the active reward for state powers as well as non-state actors. crusading missionary, taking a direct role in bringing American principles and systems to the world. And, of course, there is no Soviet Union. Rather than a single superpower adversary, the United States Reagan was no isolationist; he did not seek re- faces the emergence of several regional powers, trenchment or withdrawal from the global role of the none exactly an opponent, but each seeking to United States. Instead, he promoted international- assert its own interests in the face of the single ism, free trade, active financial and defense support remaining global hegemon. The threat is seen less of allies, and a hands-on approach to world affairs. as a battle between nuclear-armed superpowers The Reagan administration sought through strength than as a struggle against non-state actors with a a greater capacity to fulfill what he saw as the U.S. very different risk-reward calculus. It is not clear, for role as the leader of the West, the bringer of democ- example, that a strong nuclear force will deter ter- racy, and the guiding light to the world. rorist attacks by non-state actors and their sympa- thizers. Even the large-scale U.S. military response It is this broader mission that appears, at least on in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks did not stop the the surface, to be lacking in the incoming admin- later emergence of the Islamic State or its promotion istration’s expression of Peace Through Strength. of militant attacks against American allies, interests America is exceptional, but exceptional and alone, and homeland. responsible for itself but not others. The goal is to make America great, but it is unclear to what end. Reagan’s Peace Through Strength was more than In part this may be the wide swing reaction to the simply about making America great: Reagan as- perception that the current Obama administration serted America was already great but just faced often appeared to focus on the interests, concerns, some problems. His policy was about making or verbal preferences of others over those of the America strong internally and externally so it could United States. In times of transition the pendulum carry out its broader global mission of spreading often swings wide before it moves a back a little democracy. Underlying Reagan’s policies was the toward the center. Reagan’s policies were a far cry recognition that American exceptionalism derived from those of his predecessor, and Barack Obama not only from its being powerful, but from its re- shaped himself as the antithesis of what was de- sponsibility to spread the American system to other rided as the cowboy-esque tendencies of the George countries. In the superhero trope, great responsibil- W. Bush administration. In each case, though, the ity came with great power. realities of the global system ultimately tempered at least some of the rhetorical and ideological differ- ences, or at least their application. Beacon vs. Missionary Perhaps the biggest challenge currently is simply Exceptionalism has long been a conceptual under- understanding just how to measure American power pinning of American foreign and domestic policy. in the modern world. During the Cold War, the America’s founding myths perpetuate the idea that intelligence community produced so-called “net as- this is a unique country, one that has refined a system sessments” and National Intelligence Estimates for of government and personal freedoms that are not the president and the administration to measure the merely the result of local conditions, but universal in net balance between different aspects of American application. The debate among American leadership, and Soviet power and those of their alliance struc- as Kissinger highlighted, has long centered on whether tures. These included economic, social, political and, to be the light on the hill, semi-isolated but a shining of course, military comparisons, though the latter

STRATFOR • 20 frequently defaulted to bean-counter comparisons asserted as such. The diffusion of global power is of the numbers of systems rather than providing a also creating a diffusion of global ideals. Global and holistic look at their overall effectiveness. The disso- domestic resistance to perceived over-globalization lution of the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc is strong, and the ability of the United States to as- gave rise to a clear preponderance of U.S. economic, sert its ideals and its right to lead the global system cultural, political and militarily power. is increasingly challenged from without and within.

But that massive gap is narrowing, not necessarily In relative strength, the United States is losing due to a decline in overall U.S. strength, but rather to ground, particularly by measures from the beginning the rise of regional powers — notably China and the of the post-Cold War period. But that does not mean re-emergence of Russia, but also smaller regional that any other single power will soon overtake the groupings that have been growing economically and United States. The United States remains the sin- militarily. Many worldwide argue that the United gle largest economy and the single most powerful States should no longer be the default global leader, military force in the world. The question is perhaps that other countries have the right to take their not whether the United States has strength, but how turn at broader international leadership, and that it intends to apply that strength, and whether the U.S. ideals are not universal and so should not be United States has vision beyond itself. □

STRATFOR • 21 STR/AFP/Getty Images

Manufacturing: A Campaign Promise That Cannot Be Kept

Throughout the race for the White House, and constitutional objections and resistance from President-elect Donald Trump vowed to renegoti- the U.S. business community. The NAFTA trade bloc ate trade deals to restore the manufacturing jobs is one of the largest in the world, and the trade part- that have all but vanished from the U.S. economy. nership it affords Mexico and the United States is In making this promise, he was not breaking new vital to both countries. Mexico is not only the United ground; President Barack Obama made similar States’ third-largest source of imports but also its assurances in his 2008 run for office. And much second-largest export destination, accounting for like his predecessor, Trump will face considerable almost $250 billion in 2015. Furthermore, much of challenges in fulfilling his pledge, constrained by the the United States’ trade relationship with Mexico, geopolitical, structural and institutional forces sur- unlike its trade ties with most other countries, is rounding him. Without a doubt, the next president heavily integrated into American supply chains, will usher in changes to U.S. economic and trade providing auto parts, raw materials and energy for policies. But he will likely find a wide gap between use in manufacturing. theory and practice as he tries to deliver on many of his campaign promises. In addition to the problems it would cause with the Mexican and Canadian governments, a sudden Despite Trump’s threats to unilaterally pull out of withdrawal from NAFTA would hurt U.S. companies NAFTA, any attempt to do so would meet with legal with significant operations in Mexico, such as Ford

STRATFOR • 22 and Wal-Mart. At the same time, pulling out of the today. (Exports rose just 1.6 percent on average free trade agreement and slapping hefty tariffs on each year from 2013-15.) imports would likely prompt Mexico to take similar action against the United States, diminishing export At home, the new president will face an even greater revenue. Consequently, the next administration challenge. Although Trump may be able to protect will probably take a slow, methodological approach existing manufacturing jobs in the United States, to its trade relations with Mexico, focusing on the revitalizing the country’s manufacturing sector and country’s compliance with environmental standards creating jobs in new industries will be a struggle. regulations and rules of origin. Trump may highlight Already, many companies are moving their manu- a few industries for scrutiny to goad Mexico City facturing operations from China to cheaper desti- to the negotiating table. But the new president will nations such as Indonesia. Moreover, many of the have more important things to worry about than products that the United States imports from China severing trade ties with Mexico — like appointing include components produced elsewhere in Asia. a Cabinet and filling the vacancy on the Supreme Most computer chips in exported Chinese electron- Court with a weak Republican majority in Congress. ics products, for instance, come not from China’s tiny superconductor industry but from other produc- Trump will have an easier time cracking down on ers in the region, such as Taiwan. Companies will be trade with China. Even so, he is unlikely to target loath to move away from their established supply all Chinese exports with cumbersome tariffs. The chains in Asia, or, for that matter, their consumer United States imports primarily finished products base. Asia boasts the largest growing consumer from China, such as smartphones, televisions, toys, economy in the world today. Only 40 percent of textiles, footwear and light bulbs — items no longer Apple Inc.’s revenue comes from North America, manufactured domestically. Building the factory while China alone accounts for roughly 25 percent. capacity necessary to enable the United States to phase out Chinese imports cannot happen over- Whether manufacturing returns to the United States night. In the meantime, jacking up tariffs on Chinese depends on long-term trends in technology and goods will only increase the price of those products, manufacturing, many of which will still be playing forcing Americans to pay more, consume less or out well after Trump leaves office. Over time, more purchase items imported from elsewhere. and more industries will adopt new manufacturing techniques, including automation, that are gradually Instead of introducing comprehensive restrictions revolutionizing how products are made. So far, most on Chinese goods, the Trump administration is more industrial robots are concentrated in the electron- likely to focus on specific areas, pushing for an- ics and auto industries, but they will become more ti-dumping regulations on industrial goods that the prevalent in the coming years. Even with the advent United States still produces, such as steel. Trump of new production techniques, manufacturing could could also explore other ways to challenge China, for well remain in countries with cheaper labor and a instance, through existing World Trade Organization more technologically proficient workforce than the regulations on Beijing’s manufacturing subsidies. But United States has to offer. Throughout Asia, workers if Trump took such measures to try to compel China with technology skills are readily available at a lower into more comprehensive talks on trade, he would cost, and they may be able to adjust to new tech- be disappointed. Beijing has spent the past decade nologies just as easily as American workers. And trying to diversify its economy, and though the even if changes in technology spark a renaissance United States is its largest trade partner, domestic in U.S. manufacturing, it will probably not create a consumption is driving much of its economic growth glut of new jobs, since machines will be doing the heavy lifting.

STRATFOR • 23 Though Trump’s trade and manufacturing policies geopolitical factors that stand in his way. But no appealed to many voters in the hollowed-out heart amount of renegotiating, or even abolishing, trade of the U.S. manufacturing industry, they will be deals will be able to restore the country’s manufac- difficult to bring to fruition. As president, Trump turing sector to its former glory. □ may take a more active approach to challenging the

STRATFOR • 24 TIMOTHY A. CLARY/AFP/Getty Images

The Trump Doctrine: A Work in Progress

The world is in a “frenzy of study,” Henry Kissinger does best, in fact. But how this quality applies to said in a recent interview. At home and abroad, foreign policy is a question that merits deeper explo- strategists and pundits are trying to piece together ration than knee-jerk displays of stricken disbelief. a blueprint of American foreign policy under U.S. After all, as Kissinger noted in his Dec. 18 interview, President-elect Donald Trump from a stream of “a president has to have some core convictions.” tweets, some campaign slogans, a few eye-catch- ing Cabinet picks, meetings at Trump Tower, and So what are Trump’s? From what we can discern so a pingpong match already underway with Beijing. far from his upbringing, the trajectory of his career Highbrow intellectualism can be a handicap in this and the profiles of those who have infiltrated his exercise. Commentators among the Washington inner circle, Trump prizes business acumen and a establishment have been quick to dismiss Trump’s “killer” instinct for managing affairs. He has enough foreign policy moves outright as erratic and corporate firepower in his Cabinet to fill the next self-serving over the past few weeks. In an op-ed Forbes’ list. By nominating ExxonMobil CEO Rex entitled “Trump Failed His First Foreign Policy Test,” Tillerson as secretary of state, he has demonstrated for instance, columnist David Ignatius admonished his belief that tough deal-making — identifying the president-elect for the “hot mess” his phone call sources of leverage and showing a willingness to use with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen precipitated. them — is the secret to running a country and pre- Trump makes people uncomfortable. It’s what he siding over the international system. Trump does not

STRATFOR • 25 fear nationalism; he sees it as the natural and right- tariffs against big trading partners, such as China, ful path for every state, the United States included, might have worked 20 years ago but not in today’s to pursue in protecting its interests. He also seems globalized environment. Raising import tariffs now to have internalized the idea that the United States could cause the price of goods no longer produced is losing its competitiveness and that internationalist domestically to skyrocket and disrupt international foreign policy is to blame. Finally, Trump apparently supply chains, turning many U.S. businesses into believes that U.S. foreign policy has become too pre- pawns in various overseas trade wars. dictable and overwrought with diplomatic formality. Better to say it like it is and call out institutions and It could be argued that China depends more heavily conventions that have outlived their usefulness. on exports than the United States does and cannot afford to risk its vital supply lines in a major confron- This, at least, is the worldview at a distance. When tation with the world’s most powerful navy. This, in we come in for a closer look, however, some of the effect, leaves Washington with the upper hand in its cracks come into clearer view. In 1953, General trade tussle with Beijing. In the search for additional Motors Co. CEO Charles Wilson was asked in his leverage against China, Trump has shown a willing- Senate confirmation hearing to become President ness to expire Washington’s “one-China” policy, a Dwight D. Eisenhower’s secretary of defense holdover from the Cold War that dodged the ques- whether his decisions in office could end up harm- tion of Taiwan’s statehood to drive a wedge between ing his company. He answered that they might but the Soviets and Communist China. that he could not imagine such a scenario since “for years I thought what was good for the country But that’s just one side of the equation. China has was good for General Motors and vice versa.” In twin imperatives to maintain access to export fact, what is good for a business will not always be markets and raw materials and to prevent an outside congruent with the national interest. A company is power from blockading its northern coast through answerable to its shareholders, just as a president the Taiwan Strait. If Trump’s policies interfere with is answerable to some degree to Congress and the these objectives, Beijing has levers it can pull to American public. But the mission of the CEO — max- retaliate. Should the United States play the Taiwan imizing value for its shareholders — entails different card to try to exact economic concessions from considerations when pursuing the raison d’etat Beijing, China can strong-arm U.S. companies and preserving a social contract with a nation’s operating on the mainland. Beijing can also use its citizenry. The latter entwines economic arguments enormous economic clout over Taiwan — whose with the social and moral obligations of the state, a semiconductor manufacturing and assembly in- nebulous territory where inefficiencies, compromise dustry is tightly intertwined with the mainland — to and the social consequences of massive deregula- threaten a disruption to the global tech supply chain. tion are unavoidable. Furthermore, as its recent seizure of an unmanned U.S. naval drone illustrated, China can flex its mar- itime muscle, albeit cautiously, to raise the stakes Driving a Hard Bargain in a trade dispute with the United States. Though Trump would rather leave it to regional stakeholders Trump sees it as his mission to repair the social such as Japan and South Korea to balance against contract with the American public by bringing man- Beijing, his compulsion to correct the United States’ ufacturing jobs back to the United States. This will trade relationship with China will draw him into be easier said than done, however. Across-the-board stormy security waters in the Pacific.

STRATFOR • 26 A Different Kind of Negotiation negotiate with Moscow. But negotiating access to Russia’s Arctic shelf on ExxonMobil’s behalf is not Just as Trump regards the one-China policy as a the same as conducting talks centered on Russia (or relic of the Cold War worth revisiting, he intends China, for that matter) trying to get the West out of to update Washington’s relationship with Moscow. its backyard. As Trump sees it, the United States is not fighting an existential battle with Russia deserving of Cold Russia has no illusion that a shuffle of personalities War-era collective security commitments. Russia is in the White House will reverse U.S. policy and cede no longer preoccupied with forging an empire under the former Soviet sphere to it. The United States an ideology that is anathema to Western capitalism. will still be compelled to keep a check on Russia’s Instead, Moscow is focused on the more basic task moves in Europe just as Moscow will maintain its of constructing a national identity and insulating the levers across several theaters, from cybersecurity state and its borderlands from Western encroach- to arms control to proxy wars in the Middle East. ment in anticipation of greater domestic turmoil to Though Trump’s administration may change the come. As Kissinger recently put it, Russian President tone of the conversation and broach the topic of Vladimir Putin is like one of Fyodor Dostoevsky’s tactical concessions, Russia will still be driven by an characters, for whom “the question of Russian unrelenting distrust of Western intentions that will identity is very crucial because, as a result of the keep defenses up on both sides. Nonetheless, the collapse of communism, Russia has lost about 300 very notion of a private bargain developing between years of its history.” If Russia were to try to build a Washington and Moscow will inject uncertainty state by expanding its already sprawling territory, into long-standing collective security arrangements nationalism would not be enough to hold it together. as the European Continent is undergoing another Consequently, Putin is trying to defend the areas Machiavellian moment in history where the asser- surrounding his country and compel the West to tion of state interests is breaking the bonds of its recognize and respect that sphere of influence. flawed union.

Taking a less alarmist view of Russia’s intentions, the An Unlikely Precedent Trump administration sees an opening to develop a new understanding with Moscow, one that could Despite the changes that Trump will doubtless bring put to rest the question of Crimea and perhaps to the presidency, his foreign policy is not as un- recognize Russia’s influence over eastern Ukraine. precedented as the world’s pundits may claim. The Syria, a peripheral issue for both Moscow and bridge between President Barack Obama’s foreign Washington, would be recognized as such. Since policy doctrine and the one evolving under Trump sanctions are a drag on business and Russia sorely is not entirely sturdy, but the foundation is there. needs investment, Trump could ease the measures As president, Obama was a realist. He considered to get a dialogue moving on what an understanding it his mission to rebalance the United States after would look like without sacrificing the U.S. military the country had overextended itself fighting wars in presence along Europe’s eastern flank. the Islamic world. His resistance to expanding U.S. military commitments in the Middle East was deeply Should Tillerson be confirmed as secretary of state, ingrained; as he said in an interview in The Atlantic, Trump would rely on his knowledge of Kremlin “it is literally in my DNA to be suspicious of trib- personalities and their internal feuds to advance alism.” He held strong convictions that the United the negotiations. After all, if a company needs good States would once again be trampled under a sectar- inroads with the Kremlin to do business in Russia, ian horde in the Middle East if it tried to extend its the same must go for a government that wants to

STRATFOR • 27 ambitions beyond the more immediate and visible themselves, irrespective of the long-term conse- threat of the Islamic State. He also pressured even quences of undermining time-honored collective close U.S. allies such as the United Kingdom to pay security arrangements. Though a departure from an their fair share in security commitments because, already defunct two-state solution in Israel’s favor as he put it, “free riders aggravate me.” Obama was acknowledges the current reality, it also risks further a follower of 20th-century American theologian destabilizing the balance of power in the Middle East Reinhold Niebuhr, who held a rather Hobbesian view as Turkey continues its resurgence and multiple civil of the world as a struggle among self-interested wars rage on. A short-term escalation with Beijing groups. (It was Niebuhr who wrote, “God, grant me over trade and Taiwan could cost Washington the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, a much bigger strategic discussion over China’s the courage to change the things I can, and the wis- attempts to achieve parity with the United States in dom to know the difference.”) The current president numerous spheres, from cyberspace to the seas. built a foreign policy on extreme restraint while addressing his own set of geopolitical anachronisms: the United States’ relationships with Iran and Cuba. Keeping the World on Its Toes

But Obama, unlike Trump, applied an internation- Perhaps the greatest difference between the Obama alist lens to his realist views. He wanted his allies and Trump foreign policies lies in what may be to pay their share but was resolute in keeping the Trump’s biggest virtue: his unpredictability. Obama U.S. security umbrella over their heads. He viewed has been criticized as overly cautious in his foreign foreign trade as a means to build alliances and policy and thus too much of a known entity for contain conflicts. Still, protectionism was already U.S. adversaries. Trump, on the other hand, gives well underway during Obama’s tenure. Since the the impression that he is willing to throw caution 2008 financial crisis, the United States has led G-20 to the wind and rely on instinct in shaping foreign countries in carrying out discriminatory trade mea- policy. This matters immensely for U.S. allies and sures on selective industries (particularly metals), adversaries alike that have to be kept on their toes according to a report by Global Trade Alert. At the in developing their long-term strategy while avoiding same time, Obama saw that the world was changing the unexpected with the world’s superpower. with technology and that old jobs would give way to advances in manufacturing. He preferred to think Regardless of who occupies the presidency, the in longer horizons, at times to his own detriment: United States’ strong geopolitical foundation gives For Obama, the long-term impact of climate change it options. As opposed to more vulnerable coun- was existential compared with the short-term threat tries in less forgiving locales, the United States, posed by the Islamic State. buffered as it is by two vast oceans, can debate the merits of isolationism and intervention. George By contrast, Trump’s realism is steeped in nation- Kennan, a diplomat during the Cold War era, may alism and tends to be more myopic in assessing have captured the immense power of the country’s threats. His solution to displaced American labor is unpredictability best: to punish foreign trade partners rather than to retool the workforce to adapt to demographic and techno- “[American democracy is like] one of those logical change. Under Trump, climate change con- prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this cerns will take a back seat to the more immediate room and a brain the size of a pin: He lives there desires to ease regulations on business. Rather than in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little play a restrained globalist role, the next president attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath would sooner respect countries’ rights to defend — in fact, you practically have to whack his tail

STRATFOR • 28 off to make him aware that his interests are being Aloofness in international affairs is a geopolitical disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about luxury, but it cannot be taken for granted. That may him with such blind determination that he not be the basis for the Trump doctrine. □ only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat.”

STRATFOR • 29 Taiwan, Trump and a Telephone

With his characteristic bluntness, U.S. President- trade deals and arms sales. This dual approach is elect Donald Trump has, at least briefly, wiped away predicated on the United States’ acceptance and some diplomatic niceties and sent China a clear promotion of what is essentially a piece of elaborate message: If Beijing wants to sit at the grown-ups’ diplomatic fiction. table, it will have to act like an adult.

His method for doing so? A 10-minute phone call to Understanding Trump’s the president of Taiwan. But passing such a mes- Phone Call With Taiwan sage isn’t as simple as it sounds. The phone call broke a 40-year diplomatic precedent, something At the risk of inciting angry letters and accusations no U.S. president or president-elect has done since of naivety, let me say frankly that Taiwan exists. Washington withdrew its recognition of Taipei in I know because I was there last year, ahead of its the 1970s in exchange for closer ties with Beijing. general elections in January 2016. Taiwan has its For decades, the United States has stuck to the own independent government, laws, military and “one-China” policy, which says that the government police force. It also holds its own elections and in Beijing is the only legal representative of China. chooses its own president. That president sent Yet at the same time Washington maintained its Trump a congratulatory greeting in early November lines of communication with Taiwan, including after the results of the U.S. vote were in, and few

STRATFOR • 30 eyebrows were raised in the United States or China. Road infrastructure and trade initiative, and solidify- But a phone call is another matter entirely, one that ing its maritime claims in Asia’s enclosed seas. shatters the facade of Washington’s diplomatic nar- rative and reveals — in a way perhaps only a political outsider like Trump could — that there is clearly Playing the ‘Taiwan Card’ something silly about selling weapons to a country that, according to the official line, doesn’t exist. (Or Despite commentators’ speculation that Trump was about engaging in the linguistic acrobatics needed to either uninformed or acting recklessly, it is highly say that Washington recognizes one China without unlikely that either Taiwanese President Tsai Ing- making claims as to which China that is.) wen or Trump made the phone call without careful consideration. It is no accident that news of the Diplomacy often requires subtlety and the use of conversation emerged on a Friday, when it would careful phrasing, parsing each word and punctua- have less impact on global markets but was guaran- tion point in every sentence. At times, though, this teed to become the highlight of weekend talk shows. caution seems to become an end unto itself. Even Based on recent comments made by those who before Washington formally shifted its recognition advise or influence Trump, including John Bolton’s from Taipei to Beijing, there were those in the U.S. January editorial in The Wall Street Journal, the political establishment arguing that there should new president is clearly signaling a willingness to not be a one-China policy at all. Instead, they said, use the “Taiwan card” to reshape the United States’ Washington should recognize either both govern- relationship with China. Beijing’s currency manipu- ments or Taiwan’s alone (which itself would have lation, aggression in the South China Sea, refusal to forced the creation of another diplomatic fiction). encourage North Korea to curtail its nuclear weap- Against the backdrop of the Cold War, the United ons program, and any number of other issues could States chose to follow its current path — acknowl- be countered by Washington’s threat to renew its edging only Beijing — in an effort to weaken any recognition of Taiwan — or so the argument goes. Sino-Soviet bloc that might form and add to the pressure on Moscow’s eastern frontier. From China’s perspective, Taiwan is, to use a worn- out phrase, a red-line issue. Any event that alters But the Cold War is over, and the Soviet Union has the island’s status quo or pulls it further from the fallen apart. Despite Russia’s actions in Ukraine, mainland’s grasp merits an immediate and firm Syria and Europe, the global dichotomy between response from Beijing. China has already reabsorbed Washington and Moscow is not the same as it once Macao and Hong Kong, leaving Taiwan the only was. And neither is China. From a relatively weak holdout, unique for its history as a stronghold for the and isolated power in 1979, China has grown into defeated Kuomintang army rather than as a colonial one of the largest economies in the world whose holding of a foreign power. The last remnant of the trade and investment ties span the globe. After Chinese civil war, Taiwan’s annexation by China several massive overhauls, the Chinese military is would mark an unequivocal and final victory for the emerging as a modern fighting force with at least Communist Party. some ability to project power. Chinese troops operate in the Gulf of Aden, train with Russia in But emotions are not the only things governing the Arctic, and participate in U.N. peacekeeping Taiwan’s future. More than once the island has been missions in several different countries. China is no compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier, a base longer a backwater bastion against the Soviets’ east- of operations from which to challenge the Chinese ward expansion. Rather, it is a country pressing ever mainland, should a strong foreign power decide to outward, engaging in an aggressive One Belt, One ally with Taiwan. Like its independence, Taiwan’s

STRATFOR • 31 ties to other countries undermine Beijing’s plans to Cutting Through the Diplomatic Fog control the South and East China seas. Such control — or at least, the power to restrict or deny other By holding a phone call with Tsai — however brief countries’ activities in the seas — is critical to secur- and limited in scope it may have been — Trump has ing China’s trade and economic interests. Beijing has brought the issue of Taiwan’s political status to the already shown its willingness to assert its claims, via fore in a way that is sure to drive deep policy de- island building, in spite of international consterna- bates in the United States. But it will also raise ques- tion and heightened U.S. naval activity in the region. tions about how Washington deals with the Chinese mainland. Of course, this is not the first time these No matter how much China might rail against any issues have arisen from a U.S. presidential election. change in the U.S. dialogue with Taiwan, Beijing set Perhaps the most notable was when Ronald Reagan a precedent, however unintentionally, for Taipei’s criticized the United States’ initial decision to break recognition when it agreed to open a relationship diplomatic ties with Taipei and suggested that he with South Korea in 1992. Prior to that year, most would rethink the decision once in office. China countries perceived only one government — intervened at the time in much the same way it whether in Pyongyang or Seoul — as Korea’s legiti- has now by criticizing the statement, speaking with mate seat of power. With the end of the Cold War, Reagan’s running mate (George H.W. Bush, a known however, trade arrangements among former Soviet China hand), and arguing that reality would inter- countries collapsed. China had also resumed its vene to keep Reagan from reversing Washington’s plans for economic opening and reform after briefly warming relationship with Beijing. putting them on pause in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown. Forming a relationship with the Still, 1979 was a long time ago. China is a big coun- rising South Korea was an economic and political try that demands international respect. Beijing, win for China, since it meant that Seoul had severed however, also cleverly plays on its need to “save its connection to Taipei, presenting China with a way face,” the idea that dealings with China must be to take advantage of Korea’s industrial and eco- delicate — avoiding sensitive issues and, above all, nomic growth. keep from casting the country in a negative light. Chinese officials also have no qualms when it comes Instead of recognizing only one Korea, however, to roundly criticizing the words and actions of other China and Russia accepted both North and South governments, but they deride any criticism of Beijing into the United Nations in 1991. In doing so, Beijing as foreign interference. China rarely even has to inadvertently opened the door to both sides of a enforce this untenable double standard: The United civil war: Each country holds claims to the territory States and the West have taken it upon themselves of the other, yet they are considered equals on the to try to maintain a manner of dialogue that satisfies international stage. Even the United States, which China’s expectations. In the Track II talks between has formal diplomatic ties with only South Korea, U.S. and Chinese figures, it isn’t uncommon for the recognizes the North’s existence and right to U.N. latter to berate their American counterparts while membership. Washington’s concerns about North the former offer declarations of cooperation and Korea have to do with disagreements over the legit- critiques of their own government’s policies. imacy and policies of the government in Pyongyang, not the existence of the state itself. Taiwan, on the Abandoning this approach has its consequences, other hand, is currently barred from most interna- though. Diplomacy does require finesse, even if tional groups and organizations because it is not there is certainly room (or an outright need) for recognized as a country. bluntness at times. Taiwan is and will continue to be a red line for China, and Beijing will sacrifice other

STRATFOR • 32 areas of its foreign policy to preserve the island’s By doing what he did while still president-elect, status, if not fully incorporate it into the mainland. when many still consider his comments and actions Should the United States become more confron- to be rash and off-the-cuff, Trump has given himself tational in its stance toward China, the effects will some room to walk back his rhetoric, as many of be felt by other countries throughout Asia, each of his staff began to do over the weekend. Even so, he which is now trying to determine whether Trump’s has made his point, creating enough uncertainty in call was an accidental gaffe or a calculated signal of Chinese leaders’ minds that they will remember it a shift in U.S. policy to come. long after the media buzz has died down. □

Editor’s Note: Rodger Baker, Adriano Bosoni, Reva Goujon, David Judson and Jay Ogilvy all contributed analyses to this report.

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