10 Silver Squelchers & Their Interesting Associates
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Chronology, 1963–89
Chronology, 1963–89 This chronology covers key political and economic developments in the quarter century that saw the transformation of the Euromarkets into the world’s foremost financial markets. It also identifies milestones in the evolu- tion of Orion; transactions mentioned are those which were the first or the largest of their type or otherwise noteworthy. The tables and graphs present key financial and economic data of the era. Details of Orion’s financial his- tory are to be found in Appendix IV. Abbreviations: Chase (Chase Manhattan Bank), Royal (Royal Bank of Canada), NatPro (National Provincial Bank), Westminster (Westminster Bank), NatWest (National Westminster Bank), WestLB (Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale), Mitsubishi (Mitsubishi Bank) and Orion (for Orion Bank, Orion Termbank, Orion Royal Bank and subsidiaries). Under Orion financings: ‘loans’ are syndicated loans, NIFs, RUFs etc.; ‘bonds’ are public issues, private placements, FRNs, FRCDs and other secu- rities, lead managed, co-managed, managed or advised by Orion. New loan transactions and new bond transactions are intended to show the range of Orion’s client base and refer to clients not previously mentioned. The word ‘subsequently’ in brackets indicates subsequent transactions of the same type and for the same client. Transaction amounts expressed in US dollars some- times include non-dollar transactions, converted at the prevailing rates of exchange. 1963 Global events Feb Canadian Conservative government falls. Apr Lester Pearson Premier. Mar China and Pakistan settle border dispute. May Jomo Kenyatta Premier of Kenya. Organization of African Unity formed, after widespread decolonization. Jun Election of Pope Paul VI. Aug Test Ban Take Your Partners Treaty. -
1 Finance and Politics in the USA: from National City Bank to Citigroup
Finance and Politics in the USA: From National City Bank to Citigroup : an American bank or a world bank ? Christine Zumello Université Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris 3 Introduction As the theme of this year’s EBHA Conference hinges around the link between the wealth of nations and international business, this paper aims at trying to analyse the positioning, since its creation, of one American bank (Citibank) within the American political domestic scene and the wider globalization of financial services. The banking landscape in the USA has been shaped by various political and economic forces throughout the years and the interaction between banks and the state has, in the case of Citibank 1, been particularly close and has, in t 200political(?)” market forces. Indeed, the role of globalisation and the number of mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector in the USA which has increased in the last decade 2 has clearly contributed to the blurring of the frontiers between domestic and international boundaries in financial operations. Citigroup has managed to hold both a strong local-consumer base together with a wide international network which has involved it in a number of emerging markets and even micro-finance development today. Hence when one discusses the interactions between finance and politics, one realises that, in the United States, historical events have played a significant role in explaining the idiosyncrasy of the American banking landscape but one may wonder whether finance could have, on the domestic political scene in the USA, managed to outweigh politics or rather to free itself from political considerations. 1 Throughout this paper, and for readability purposes, we will often use the name Citibank and then Citigroup (since 1998) but the bank’s name has been modified to accommodate regulatory changes. -
Banknews Reprints of Articles About Your Community Bank • • 703.584.0840
Member BankNews Reprints of articles about your community bank • www.JohnMarshallBank.com • 703.584.0840 In 1992, he was hired by Chase Manhattan Personal John Marshall Financial Services as a Second Vice President originating and underwriting jumbo mortgages. In 1995, he Bank Expands returned to commercial lending and until 2002, he held AVP and VP commercial lending positions at Citibank, to Alexandria FSB, First Virginia Bank and F&M Bank of Northern Virginia. From 2002 until 2009, Mr. Johnson was Senior Vice President of commercial lending for Virginia Commerce Bank, where he was responsible for growing a small By Bob Tagert / reprinted from OldTownCrier.com commercial loan portfolio of $5 million into a $90 mil- lion portfolio with approximately $80 million in corre- As today’s banking world appears to be one acquisition sponding deposit and cash management relationships. In after another, it is nice to see a local bank, founded by 2009, he accepted the position as Chief Lending Officer people who are local to the area and employing profes- of 1st Commonwealth Bank of Virginia. sionals who know and live in the community. As the names of banks change as much as the weather, it is Johnson is the current Chairman of the Arlington refreshing to see a local bank making its presence felt. Industrial Loan Authority and has served on this board The bank was founded in 2006 and has their corporate since 2008. Mr. Johnson has been an active member of offices in Reston. John Marshall Bank is a strong commu- nity bank that is well capitalized and is one of the fastest growing banks in the DC Metro area. -
The Global Financial Crisis: Is It Unprecedented?
Conference on Global Economic Crisis: Impacts, Transmission, and Recovery Paper Number 1 The Global Financial Crisis: Is It Unprecedented? Michael D. Bordo Professor of Economics, Rutgers University, and National Bureau of Economic Research and John S. Landon-Lane Associate Professor of Economics, Rutgers University 1. Introduction A financial crisis in the US in 2007 spread to Europe and led to a recession across the world in 2007-2009. Have we seen patterns like this before or is the recent experience novel? This paper compares the recent crisis and recent recession to earlier international financial crises and global recessions. First we review the dimensions of the recent crisis. We then present some historical narrative on earlier global crises in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The description of earlier global crises leads to a sense of déjà vu. We next demarcate several chronologies of the incidence of various kinds of crises: banking, currency and debt crises and combinations of them across a large number of countries for the period from 1880 to 2010. These chronologies come from earlier work of Bordo with Barry Eichengreen, Daniela Klingebiel and Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria and with Chris Meissner (Bordo et al (2001), Bordo and Meissner ( 2007)) , from Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff’s recent book (2009) and studies by the IMF (Laeven and Valencia 2009,2010).1 Based on these chronologies we look for clusters of crisis events which occur in a number of countries and across continents. These we label global financial crises. 1 There is considerable overlap in the different chronologies as Reinhart and Rogoff incorporated many of our dates and my coauthors and I used IMF and World Bank chronologies for the period since the early 1970s. -
Why Basel II Failed and Why Any Basel III Is Doomed
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Lall, Ranjit Working Paper Why Basel II failed and why any Basel III is doomed GEG Working Paper, No. 2009/52 Provided in Cooperation with: University of Oxford, Global Economic Governance Programme (GEG) Suggested Citation: Lall, Ranjit (2009) : Why Basel II failed and why any Basel III is doomed, GEG Working Paper, No. 2009/52, University of Oxford, Global Economic Governance Programme (GEG), Oxford This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/196313 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu • GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME • Global Economic Governance Programme Centre for International Studies │ Department for Politics and International Relations The Global Economic Governance Programme was established at University College, Oxford in 2003 to foster research and debate into how global markets and institutions can better serve the needs of people in developing countries. -
Franklin Square National Bank OMB No. 1024 0018
NPS Form 10-900 0MB No, 1024-0018 (Expires 5/31/2012) United States Department of the Interior RECEIVED 2280 National Park Service SEP 2 6 2015 National Register of Historic Places Nat. Register of Historic Places Registration Form National Park Service This form is for use in nominating or requesting determinations for individual properties and districts. See instructions in National Register Bulletin, How to Complete the National Register of Historic Places Registration Form. If any item does not apply to the property being documented, enter "N/A" for "not applicable." For functions, architectural classification, materials, and areas of significance, enter only categories and subcategories from the instructions. Place additional certification comments, entries, and narrative items on continuation sheets if needed (NPS Form 10-900a). 1. Name of Property_ historic name Franklin Square National Bank other names/site number ---Franklin---------------- National Bank ---------------- 2. Location street & number 925 Hempstead Turnpike not for publication city or town Franklin Square .__ _ ___, vicinity state --------NY code NY county Nassau code 059 zip code _1_1_0_1_0 ___ 3. State/Federal Agency Certification As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act, as amended, I hereby certify that this __x_ nomination_ request for determination of eligibility meets the documentation standards for registering properties in the National Register of Historic Places and meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60. In my opinion, the property _x_ meets __ does not meet the National Register Criteria. I recommend that this property be considered significant at the following level(s) of significance: national __x_ statewide .JLlocal Signature of certifying official/ Ille State or Federal agency/bureau or Tribal Government In my opinion, the property _meets_ does not meet the National Register criteria. -
An Open Letter to Walter Wriston
Click here for Full Issue of EIR Volume 9, Number 38, October 5, 1982 such problems successfully, on a "case-by-case basis," are behaving as dangerous fools. The internationalportion of the debt-rollover problem during the weeks and months imme diately ahead is in the order of $700 billion. At Toronto, the IMF could not muster a mere $100 to $120 billion. The "IMF solution" is a suicidal pipe-dream. An open letter to This is not only my opinion. Olivetti Chairman de Be nedetti, who is certainly no political ally of mine, says pretty Walter Wriston much the same thing about this silly "IMF solution." So do many other leading financial specialists in Europe. by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. Otherwise, many among the leading international finan cial specialists agree that my proposed solution would work as indicated, and also agree that it is the only sane alternative Leading British press are currently echoing the privately ex to a general, chain-reaction collapse throughout most of the pressed opinion among leading financial authoritie through � world during the weeks and months immediately ahead. out Europe. A group of leading U.S. commerclal banks, The difficulty, they insist to my representatives, is "What including Citibank, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Han comes next?" The indicated sort of financial-paper reorgani over, and Continental Illinois, are at the verge of collapse. zation can stop the collapse, but, they emphasize, what meas I do not rejoice at this news. Although the officials of ures are needed t'O develop the levels of productive output these banks ordinarily judge themselves to be my adversar required to ensure payment of the reorganized debt? ies, in some cases my avowed enemies, I am obliged to Some fellows in London and elsewhere are thinking in attempt to save these commercial banks for the sake of our the proper direction. -
The Social Structure of Financial Crisis Governance, 1974 and 2008
The Social Structure of Financial Crisis Governance, 1974 and 2008 Pierre-Christian Fink Columbia University Running head: Financial Crisis Governance Word count: 7,100 * Pierre-Christian Fink, Department of Sociology, Columbia University, 606 West 122nd Street, MC 9649, New York, NY 10027. E-mail: [email protected]. FINANCIAL CRISIS GOVERNANCE 2 The Social Structure of Financial Crisis Governance, 1974 and 2008 Abstract: Crises are moments of uncertainty in which existing routines no longer apply. Yet across some crises, patterns of governance repeat themselves. This article defines the conditions under which crisis governance is partially predictable, and identifies mechanisms operative in such cases. The argument is developed through a comparison of governance during the financial crises of 1974 and 2008, drawing on original archival research. In both cases, the institutional set-up led to the Federal Reserve becoming the leading institution in crisis governance. The Federal Reserve recombined forms of expertise from its two main departments (monetary policy and financial regulation) that are separate during normal times. As a consequence, it conceived of both crises as runs not on banks but on the money market, through which banks and other institutions increasingly fund themselves. Because the framing of the crisis as a money-market run implied even more risk—a disaster for the entire economy—than that of a bank run, the Federal Reserve hid its framing from Congress and the public. To solve the crisis, the Federal Reserve and its allies from banks and executive agencies sought to stabilize the money market by repurposing old tools to create so-called funding facilities. -
And Consumer Credit in the United States in the 1960S
Christine Zumello The “Everything Card” and Consumer Credit in the United States in the 1960s First National City Bank (FNCB) of New York launched the Everything Card in the summer of 1967. A latecomer in the fi eld of credit cards, FNCB nonetheless correctly recognized a promising business model for retail banking. FNCB attempted not only to ride the wave of mass consumption but also to cap- italize on the profi t-generating potential of buying on credit. Although the venture soon failed, brought down by the losses that plagued the bank due to fraud, consumer discontent, and legislative action, this fi nal attempt by a major single commer- cial bank to launch its own plan did not signify the end of credit cards. On the contrary, the Everything Card was a har- binger of the era of the universal credit card. irst National City Bank (FNCB) of New York (now Citigroup), one F of the oldest leading commercial banks in the United States, intro- duced the Everything Card in the summer of 1967.1 FNCB was a pioneer in fostering consumer fi nance in the United States. The bank saw an opportunity to increase business by creating an innovative system that would enable masses of consumers to purchase a variety of goods and services on credit. By becoming the principal tool of consumer credit, credit cards revolutionized the banking business. Indeed, “where it couldn’t gain territory with bricks and mortar, Citibank tried to do so 2 with plastic.” The author wishes to express her gratitude to Lois Kauffman of the Citigroup Archives, Citi’s Center for Heritage and Strategy, New York City. -
SEC News Digest, 07-14-1982
tI.S. SEetlRITIEG I.N9 COMMISSION ANItOUNCEIENTS EXCHANGE COMMISSION SEC GOVERNMENT BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION The. Securities and Exchange Commission is planning the first SEC Government Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation in an attempt to establish a dialogue on the capital formation problems besetting the small business community. This program will provide a forum for small businesses, government regulatory agencies, and private sector organizations concerned with small business issues to discuss the existing impediments to small business capital formation particularly in the areas of taxa- tion, securities and credit. The Forum is scheduled to be held September 23-25, 1982, in Washington, D.C. The format of the Forum provides that participants will meet in working discussion groups of 15-20 persons to cover eight major issues with the intent of developing specific recommendations. In order to achieve these objectives, the size of the Forum must be limited. Each participant must be generally familiar with all the dis- cussion papers being prepared for distribution prior to the Forum. Further, each participant will be requested to act as a discussion leader on one major issue. Members of the public interested in being considered for active participation at the Forum should promptly complete and return the biographical sheet available from the Office of Small Business Policy, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 500 North Capitol Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549 by August 2, 1982. The biographical sheet will facilitate the selection of small busi- nesspersons, lawyers, accountants and others who are knowledgeable in small business issues and who could make the most meaningful contribution to the Forum. -
Empire A: Infectious Disease Evaluators: Louis Portas, Lebanon VAMC
Group 2 May 2, 2017 Session V Session V – Empire A: Infectious Disease Evaluators: Louis Portas, Lebanon VAMC; Sharon Blum, Winthrop Univ; Jacqueline Costantino, South County Health 1:20 pm Danan, Eleanor Use and effectiveness of peri-operative cefoxitin or cefotetan versus cefazolin The Johns Hopkins plus metronidazole for prevention of surgical site infection in abdominal surgery patients 1:40 pm Effendi, Muhammad Evaluation of antimicrobial stewardship interventions and acceptance rate in a Yale New Haven Hosp large tertiary academic medical center 2:00 pm Rebrin, Nastja Time Out! Implementation of pharmacist-driven antimicrobial stewardship Baystate Med Center huddles on general medicine floors at an academic medical center 2:20 pm Liu, Erica Optimizing ciprofloxacin use for suspected urinary tract infections: reducing Yale New Haven Hosp inappropriate use and the risk of C. difficile infection 2:40 pm Steiner, Roman Evaluation of initial vancomycin dosing strategy for complicated infections in patients 36 Christiana Care to 50 years of age with normal renal function Session V – Empire B: Infectious Disease Evaluators: Rose O’Flynn, Philadelphia VAMC; Amanda Sowell, The Johns Hopkins Hosp; Joleen Bierlein, Maine Med 1:20 pm Cabanas, Gregory Clinical outcomes with the use of fosfomycin for the treatment of Klebsiella Jersey Shore pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC) urinary tract infections (UTIs) 1:40 pm Sangiovanni, Ryan Re-treatment with vancomycin (VAN) and subsequent risk of acute kidney injury Albany Stratton VAMC (AKI) among Veterans’ -
Newyork-Presbyterian Hospital Annual Report
Letters from Home 2006-2007 Annual Report NEWYORK-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL Important Telephone Numbers THE ALLEN PAVILION OF NEWYORK-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL NEWYORK-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL/ WEILL CORNELL MEDICAL CENTER General Information (212) 932-4000 Patient Information (212) 932-4300 General Information (212) 746-5454 Admitting (212) 932-5079 Patient Information (212) 746-5000 Emergency Department (212) 932-4245 Admitting (212) 746-4250 Patient Services (212) 932-4321 Ambulance Services Dispatcher (212) 472-2222 Development (212) 821-0500 Emergency Department NEWYORK-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL/ Adult (212) 746-5050 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER Pediatric (212) 746-3300 General Information (212) 305-2500 Psychiatry (212) 746-0711 Patient Information (212) 305-3101 Human Resources (212) 746-1409 Admitting Marketing (212) 585-6800 Main Reception (212) 305-7091 NewYork-Presbyterian Sloane Hospital for Women (212) 342-1759 Healthcare System (212) 746-3577 Ambulance Services Dispatcher (212) 305-9999 Patient Services (212) 746-4293 Development (212) 342-0799 Physician Referral Service (800) 822-2694 Emergency Department Psychiatry, Payne Whitney Manhattan Adult (212) 305-6204 Referrals and Evaluation (888) 694-5700 Pediatric (212) 305-6628 General Information (212) 746-5700 Psychiatry (212) 305-6587 Public Affairs (212) 821-0560 Human Resources (212) 305-5625 Marketing (212) 821-0634 WESTCHESTER DIVISION OF NEWYORK-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL Patient Services (212) 305-5904 Physician Referral Service (877) NYP-WELL General Information (914) 682-9100 Public Affairs (212) 305-5587 Payne Whitney Westchester Referrals and Evaluation (888) 694-5700 MORGAN STANLEY CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL Table of Contents OF NEWYORK-PRESBYTERIAN Physician Referral (800) 245-KIDS Letters from Home — 2 General Information (212) 305-KIDS Patient Information (212) 305-3101 Noteworthy — 24 Admitting (212) 305-3388 Leadership Report — 26 Emergency Department (212) 305-6628 Facts and Financials — 31 Dr.