This is the author's Post-print version (final draft post-refereeing as accepted for publication by the journal). The definitive, peer-reviewed and edited version of this article is published as: Kleinhans, R. & W. van der Laan Bouma-Doff (2008). On priority and progress: forced residential relocation and housing chances in Haaglanden, the Netherlands. Housing Studies, vol. 23(4), pp. 565-587. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02673030802101641
On Priority and Progress. Forced Residential Relocation and Housing Chances in Haaglanden, the Netherlands.
Reinout Kleinhans and Wenda van der Laan Bouma-Doff Delft University of Technology, OTB Research Institute for Housing, Urban and Mobility Studies. Email: [email protected]
ABSTRACT There is a wide interest in the effects of forced relocation in the context of urban restructuring. This interest is also inspired by debates on gentrification and displacement. The prevailing idea is that especially the lowest income groups suffer from displacement in terms of their housing quality and increased rents. In addition, growing shares of forced movers are assumed to harm the housing opportunities of other house seekers, while competing within the social rented sector. Although several studies deal with the consequences of forced relocation, a broader perspective on housing chances is currently lacking. Moreover, most studies are qualitative, whereas a larger-scale quantitative analysis is needed to test assumptions mentioned above. This paper addresses these matters by analysing housing allocation data of the Haaglanden in the Netherlands and two cross-sectional surveys among forced movers in the region’s central city: The Hague. Findings indicate that housing chances for both forced and regular house seekers have not declined substantially since 2000. Moreover, most forced movers experienced dwelling progress, partly thanks to the design of the housing allocation model. However, low-educated, as well as and middle- and higher income households less often report dwelling progress. Explanations for these findings are provided.
KEY WORDS: displacement, forced relocation, social housing, dwelling progress, urban restructuring, The Netherlands
1. Introduction In many Dutch cities, early post-war neighbourhoods, in which low-cost social rented apartments often dominate the housing stock, are subject to considerable interventions. Middle-class and higher-income households lack attractive housing career opportunities and often leave, whereas low-income house seekers are highly dependent on these neighbourhoods. This results in selective out- and in-migration of different income groups (MVROM, 1997, 2000; Van Kempen & Priemus, 2002). In 1997, the Dutch government launched a highly ambitious restructuring program to tackle the problems of early post-war neighbourhoods. Demolition, sale or upgrading of social rented housing and new construction of more expensive owner- occupied dwellings create more variety in the housing stock. Until 2010, almost 60,000 social rented houses in prioritised areas will be demolished and replaced with new constructed houses, mostly owner-occupied (Dekker, 2006). Just as many households are directly affected: either they are forced to move out of the area due to demolition of their own house, or they succeed in moving to other social housing in the neighbourhood, whether or not upgraded or newly constructed. Because of the significant impact of forced relocation on the life of many residents, it is a recurring theme in the urban renewal and gentrification literature (e.g. Allen, 2000; Atkinson, 2004; Buron et al., 2002; Fried, 1967; Gans, 1991; Goetz, 2002; Rubenstein, 1988). In the gentrification literature, displacement appears as a synonym of forced relocation, which generally occurs when any household is forced to move from its residence by conditions affecting the dwelling or its immediate surroundings, such as demolition, ownership conversion of rental units and rent increases (Grier & Grier, 1978; LeGates & Hartman, 1981). Most studies on gentrification identify displacement as a significant problem (see Atkinson, 2004 for an overview), although Freeman and Braconi (2004) recently provided contrasting evidence that low-income residents in New York were less likely to become displaced from gentrified areas than expected. Still, the common premise is that low-income groups suffer most from displacement, in terms of the quality of their dwelling, increased rents and fewer housing opportunities in general. Exactly those issues are important in Dutch policy debate. Until recently, the knowledge of the effects of forced relocation was quite limited. Several evaluation studies have yielded more insights (City of The Hague, 2001; Kleinhans, 2003; Leveling & Vos, 2004; Steunpunt Wonen, 2003; Wolf &
2 Vriens, 2006). A common finding is the importance of the residents’ pre-relocation opinion of the forced move. For example, already existing moving plans seem positively related to resident attitudes after forced relocation. Moreover, forced movers with specific characteristics appear to have more options than others, as a result of specific aspects of the Dutch choice-based letting system for social housing allocation. The same institutional context that triggers forced relocation can strongly moderate its negative effects. In this paper, we will show that not all forced movers perceive forced relocation as a purely negative event. Many benefit from several compensation mechanisms in the relocation process. This is at odds with the mainstream literature on displacement, adding an important precondition of residents’ options within the context of the housing market. Therefore, this issue is relevant for any situation in which a choice-based letting system for social rented housing faces the challenge of forced relocation due to regeneration schemes, for example in major Dutch and British cities. Simultaneously, local policymakers are worried that the compensation mechanisms for forced movers and their growing shares among house seekers increase the high pressure on urban housing markets (VROM-Raad, 2002, p. 69; 2006, p. 86). Increased competition between forced movers and regular, non-urgent house seekers may harm the housing opportunities of especially the latter group (cf. Kullberg, 2002, p. 559-560; Van Kempen & Priemus, 2002, p. 247). However, a few studies actually looked into the longer-term effects on housing chances. Moreover, most studies that examine the risks of forced relocation are explorative of nature, whereas more quantitative studies are needed to test the prevailing assumptions. This paper aims to partly fill these gaps with quantitative analyses of housing allocation data and two identical cross-sectional surveys among two ‘cohorts’ of forced relocation movers (2001 and 2004). Our research question is twofold. First, does the supposedly growing share of forced movers go together with decreasing housing chances of various house seekers in the social rented sector, especially regular non-urgent house seekers? Second, what are the experiences of forced movers? And in particular: to what extent are perceptions of dwelling progress connected with respondents’ pre-relocation attitudes and their individual characteristics? Our study area is a major urban area in the Netherlands: the Haaglanden. Here, one of the biggest urban restructuring programmes in the Netherlands is currently in progress. Moreover, crucial data from different sources
3 are available here. Not only can we analyse regional allocation data, but also the City of The Hague has conducted identical surveys among relocated residents in different years. With these data, we analyse residents’ perceptions of dwelling progress. This paper is structured as follows. After the introduction, we briefly describe the literature on forced relocation and displacement. The third section explains housing allocation and relocation policies in the context of the Dutch urban restructuring programme. Section four analyses the long-term housing chances of different categories of movers in the Haaglanden region. Here, the central concept is the probability of success, i.e. the chance that a household acquired a vacant social rented house in a certain year. The fifth section switches to the resident survey and describes the data, measures and results. Finally, conclusions and recommendations for relocation policy are presented in section six.
2. Forced Relocation and Displacement in the Literature
As already mentioned, forced relocation and displacement appear highly synonymous to each other. Displacement generally occurs where “any household is forced to move from its residence by conditions which affect the dwelling or its immediate surroundings, and which: 1. are beyond the household’s reasonable ability to control or prevent; 2. occur despite the household’s having met all previously imposed conditions of occupancy; 3. make continued occupancy by that household impossible, hazardous, or unaffordable” (Grier & Grier, 1978, p. 8; cf. LeGates & Hartman, 1981, p. 214). As this definition does not include any reference to housing policy or market forces, it is equally applicable to both gentrification and urban renewal. In some countries the question now emerges whether gentrification is becoming a deliberate strategy in urban regeneration policies (see e.g. Atkinson, 2004, p. 107; Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Uitermark et al., 2007). Residential displacement is one of the primary dangers mentioned by those concerned about exclusionary effects of market- as well state-driven gentrification (Newman & Wyly, 2006, p. 27). The common premise is that low-income groups suffer most from displacement, in terms of the quality of their dwelling, increased rents and fewer housing opportunities in general. However, the tendency to frame forced relocation issues in a gentrification discourse tends to ignore fundamental differences between these
4 phenomena, especially the institutional context. Whereas gentrification may displace residents from private rented houses, urban renewal efforts predominantly target social rented housing let by registered social landlords or housing associations. Moreover, social landlords are legally bound to specific compensation regulations (see section 2). In other words, the institutional context that triggers displacement through gentrification, or forced relocation through urban renewal, strongly influences the balance between positive and negative effects of forced residential moves. The urban renewal literature also points at individual factors that determine whether forced relocation yields positive or negative results. First, earlier research has shown that forced relocation due to urban renewal presents significant risks for residential satisfaction of households and their social ties in the neighbourhood (e.g. Fried, 1967; Gans, 1991; Goetz, 2002; Kleit & Manzo, 2006). Apart from its physical amenities, the home is an important foundation for security and trust. Home represents a continuity in life, a controlled territory (Ekström, 1994) and it helps shaping the identity of its residents. Forced relocation is basically a violation of these features. Hence, people may suffer from affliction, i.e. feelings of a painful loss, homesickness and inclination to idealise the former situation (Ekström, 1994; Fried, 1967). However, relocation is also an opportunity to improve the quality of the dwelling in which disadvantaged residents live (Baker & Arthurson, 2006; Buron et al., 2002; Rubenstein, 1988). Earlier research shows that households who were already considering or planning a move, perceive forced relocation quite differently from households who prefer to stay put (Kleinhans, 2003; Kleit & Manzo, 2006; Leveling & Vos, 2004). Likewise, Goetz (2002) found that involuntary relocated families reported fewer benefits from their moves, compared to voluntarily mobile families. This pattern emerged for employment, income, poverty, social interaction of children, and several items regarding neighbourhood satisfaction. If residents can agree with forced relocation, they are more prepared for substantial changes in their housing situation, which makes adaptation easier (e.g. Allen, 2000; Van Kempen & Priemus, 2002) and lowers unwillingness and protest. This indicates that residents’ attitudes are important, besides moving plans or actual dwelling improvement afterwards. According to Fried (1967), ‘pre-relocation evidences of preparedness for change are the most important factors determining post-relocation adjustment-adaptation and tend to dwarf the importance of post-
5 relocation situations and experiences’ (ibid., p. 100). However, he hurried to state that ‘objective improvement in the post-relocation situation does serve to counteract […] tendency towards low levels of adjustment-adaptation (ibid., p.99). Furthermore, he adds that objective improvements are more frequently associated with satisfaction for those who were ready to use the relocation as an opportunity for an increased range of choices. In sum, there may be a connection between pre-relocation agreement and perception of the dwelling situation afterwards. In the next section, we will explain how forced relocation is connected to the choice-based letting (CBL) for housing allocation. At first sight, this connection appears as a contradictio in terminis, so the choice aspect of CBL deserves some elaboration. Choice is a central issue in both the Dutch and English housing policies (e.g. DETR, 2000; MVROM, 2000). In both countries, the development of choice- based letting mechanisms is seen as closely associated with the rise of ‘new public management’ and customer choice more broadly in public services (Brown & King, 2005, p. 63). In her work on housing choice, Mulder (1996) described four choice approaches. These assume that people consider moving only after a certain trigger has set off an intention to move, such as job changes or changes in the household composition. Limited periods of housing choice are assumed, in which an intricate interplay between preferences, resources, constraints and opportunities ‘model’ choice. In short, choice is only necessary in reaction to trigger events and choice usually pertains a limited number of options. This gains more clarity if we look at the principles of CBL. In their evaluation of the CBL pilot programme, Marsh and colleagues (2004) describe how some interviewed housing officers felt that word ‘choice’ itself was misleading. Applicants may choose and bid for a property, but they can not necessarily have it. Bidding for a property initially only means to be considered for a property (cf. Brown & King, 2005, p. 64). An apparently broad range of options within CBL schemes is limited by eligibility regulations (Kullberg, 2002; Pawson et al., 2006), by the nature of the local housing market and levels of supply. Moreover, the ability to exercise choice is highly contingent on house seekers’ levels of understanding of the process and the availability of high-quality advice and support services available (Brown & King, 2005, p. 65; Kleinhans, 2003; Kullberg, 2002; Marsh et al., 2004, p. 71). Several of these findings are also applicable to forced relocation in the context of choice-based letting in Haaglanden.
6 3. Restructuring, Housing Allocation and Relocation Policy
The Dutch restructuring policy primarily targets post-war urban neighbourhoods but also pre-war areas with relatively high shares of social rented housing. These neighbourhoods are located in many Dutch cites, but considerably more in the four major cities Amsterdam and Rotterdam (both 52%), The Hague (35%) and Utrecht (38%) (MVROM, 2006). Two white papers of the government (MVROM, 1997, 2000) and the Urban Renewal Act (Staatsblad, 2000) have firmly established the urban restructuring policy. The local authorities, housing associations and private property developers jointly prepare and carry out the physical measures, which should simultaneously improve the neighbourhood layout and infrastructure, services and public space. Understanding the process of forced relocation requires knowledge of the Dutch housing market and especially the social housing allocation system. In this section we will describe the Dutch institutional context, focussing on five important elements: (1) tenant protection in the Civil Code, (2) the allocation mechanism, (3) the detachment of income and rents in the social rented sector, (4) the certificate of urgency and (5) housing allowances. The Dutch Civil Code provides rent protection for tenants. The landlord, often a housing association, can only give notice in strictly defined situations, such as demolition or upgrading. Although housing associations are thus legally allowed to relocate their tenants if this necessary for urban restructuring, those tenants are entitled to three kinds of compensation. First and most important, they are entitled to relocation in a dwelling comparable in size, type and tenure. Second, they must receive a reasonable allowance for their relocation expenses. Since 1 July 2005, this allowance has been legally established at € 5,000 per household at the least. Third, tenants are eligible for extra assistance of the housing association, such as counselling in the search for a suitable house. Local arrangements are allowed if they comply with the basic principles prescribed in the Civil Code. The most common allocation mechanism in the Netherlands is the ‘advert model’ or the ‘Delft model’ (Kullberg, 1997, 2002). Vacant dwellings are advertised in a weekly newspaper and on the Internet. Advertisements detail the characteristics of the vacant dwellings. In addition, the qualifying conditions (suitability criteria) for future tenants are mentioned, such as dwelling size in relation to household
7 composition and income level in relation to rent level. House seekers interested in a certain dwelling must send in a reply coupon to the housing association or react through the Internet. Subsequently, the characteristics of the applicants are compared with the suitability criteria of the advertised dwelling. Then, for all eligible applicants, sequence criteria determine who is first in line. The dwelling is usually allocated to the applicant with the longest length of residence or waiting period (see Kullberg, 1997, 2002). Thus, the advert model demands active responses of house seekers to advertisements and meeting the eligibility criteria of social rented housing. While the advert model is subject to increasing criticism, it is by far the most common housing allocation system in the Netherlands. Moreover, it has inspired many British social landlords to introduce a comparable approach for letting vacant properties, known as choice-based letting (Brown & Yates, 2005; Marsh et al., 2004; Pawson et al., 2006). We will use this term in the rest of this article. Low-cost social rented housing is obviously intended for households with low incomes. However, once a tenancy agreement is fixed, an increase of the household’s income has no consequences for the rent level, in contrast to, for instance, public housing in the United States. Due to this detachment of income and rents, many households with above-average incomes remain living in social rented housing, resulting in a large share of ‘askew residents’ (scheefwoners). This is especially the case in large cities, where owner-occupied dwellings are relatively scarce and affordable alternatives are thus lacking (Van Kempen & Priemus, 2002, p. 241). Although this mismatch on the housing market is diminishing, there are still may people living in the social rented that have outgrown the so-called target group of social housing (cf. Van Kempen & Priemus, 2002, p. 243-244). Only if these households apply for another social rented house, which is the case during the relocation process, their current income is checked again. Then, substantial income growth may either direct these households to the more expensive parts of the social housing stock, or exclude them completely from the social rented sector. The Dutch choice-based letting regulations generally apply also to residents who are forced to move because of urban restructuring. Initially, they must seek a suitable alternative for themselves. However, they get a certificate of urgency that gives them priority over regular house seekers in the social rented sector. This speeds up the relocation process. When a mover with a certificate of urgency sends in a reply coupon for an advertisement, the vacant house is usually allocated to him, not
8 to a regular house seeker. A certificate of urgency is generally valid for one year, although under special circumstances the validity is extended for some time. If several house seekers with a certificate of urgency apply for the same house, it is allocated to the household whose certificate was previously extended or has the nearest expiration date (Stadsgewest Haaglanden 2004, p. 15). We emphasise that a certificate of urgency does not mean unlimited freedom, although it puts certificate holders in front of the ‘queue’ for social rented housing. Forced relocation movers must comply with the same suitability criteria as regular house seekers, such as income levels, age and household size. Their current situation on these criteria applies. Moreover, the certificate of urgency is often only valid for houses that are comparable to their current dwelling type. This restriction is established in the so- called options profile. The housing association demarcates the available relocation options in the options profile. Thus, the priority advantage of an urgency status is limited to comparable social rented houses anywhere in the housing market area. There are local exceptions from this general rule, to increase relocation options for families with two or more children or elderly people. This is also the case in our study area (Stadsgewest Haaglanden 2004, p. 15). Here, we want to underline that applying for other, less comparable dwelling types is both allowed and possible. Then, not the certificate of urgency is the main eligibility criterion, because it is not valid. In those cases, movers with a certificate compete with regular house seekers. The decisive criterion is the length of residence in the current dwelling or (since 1 January 2005) the waiting period. Currently, the competition between forced movers and regular house seekers is an important issue. There are growing concerns about the increasing magnitude of the urban restructuring efforts in Dutch cities. The pressure on local urban housing markets is already high. The premise is that the compensation mechanisms for forced movers and their growing share among active house seekers further increase the pressure (VROM-Raad, 2002, p. 69; 2006, p. 86). Growing numbers of movers with certificates of urgency will simultaneously compete for relocation options in the social rented sector. Moreover, the same urban restructuring policy which makes forced relocation necessary, also reduces the stock of affordable social housing (Van Kempen & Priemus, 2002, p. 247). The net result may be a decrease of available options in the social rented sector. Finally, an important aspect of Dutch social housing are housing allowances, which are intended for making rental housing of a certain quality affordable to low-
9 income tenants. The allowance varies with rent level, household income, and household size. Housing associations and local authorities administer the allowances. However, the tax authorities execute the actual program administration and payments since 1 January 2006. Recipients who move, can claim the housing allowance for their new dwelling up to a certain maximum rent (Priemus et al., 2005). Within this limit, forced relocation movers also maintain these rights, even if the rent of the relocation dwelling is higher than previously. The increase of the allowance largely compensates for the rent increase itself. A precondition is that their income at the moment of relocation has not risen to a level that exceeds eligibility criteria for housing allowances. To a certain extent, forced movers can thus relocate to more expensive housing without paying a substantially higher bill every month. Contrary, forced movers who are not eligible for housing allowances, must pay the net increase of their monthly rent after relocation. We assume that the discussed characteristics of the Dutch housing market and allocation system have a strong impact on the housing choices and opportunities of forced movers. In the next two sections, we will study this in more detail.
4. Probabilities of success
As mentioned in the introduction, the Haaglanden region is a major urban area in the southwestern part of the Netherlands (see figure 1), inhabited by almost one million people. Apart from the city of The Hague, it consists of the municipalities of Delft, Leidschendam-Voorburg, Midden-Delfland, Pijnacker-Nootdorp, Rijswijk, Wassenaar, Westland and Zoetermeer. The region has a regional authority that is responsible for spatial planning, environment, transport, employment, economic development and housing. The Haaglanden region clearly functions as one housing market. Like in many other parts of the Netherlands, the choice-based letting system is regionally organised. This does justice to the fact that residential mobility exceeds the administrative boundaries of cities and municipalities. Our first analysis concerns regional housing allocation data of Haaglanden covering the years 2000 till 2006. The Association of Social Landlords Haaglanden (Vereniging Sociale Verhuurders Haaglanden) provided data on households seeking social rented housing. Using thechoice-based letting model requires registration.
10 Subsequently, house seekers can send in reply coupons to the responsible housing association, or react though the Internet. Only if they do so at least once a year, they are recognised as active house seekers. Furthermore, we listed data on actual numbers of households who signed a new tenancy agreement. Three categories are distinguished: 1. Forced relocation movers with a certificate of urgency on grounds of urban restructuring, i.e. demolition or major upgrading of their dwelling. 2. Households with a certificate of urgency for medical reasons (e.g. disability) or social reasons, such as domestic violence or a burnt-down house. This category also includes other, less common forms of urgency. 3. Regular, non-urgent house seekers, from both inside and outside the region.
Figure 1 The Haaglanden region.
11 Table 1 in Appendix A shows that the total numbers of active house seekers in the Haaglanden region have fluctuated in our study period. Between 1999 and 2001, numbers rose from almost 60,600 to approximately 71,000. In the three consecutive years, the number stabilised at 71,500, followed by a decrease to almost 66,000 in 2005. This is almost entirely determined by changes in the number of regular house seekers. Their decrease in 2005 is largely due to an administrative correction of the Woonnet Haaglanden, the organisation running the regional choice-based letting system. In 2005, all house seekers that had reacted only once in the previous year (or longer), were informed that they must reconfirm their registration as a house seeker. Woonnet Haaglanden aimed at disposing their files of ‘deadwood’ registrations of households who are not seeking at all (cf. Pawson et al., 2006, p. 8-9). Less than one hundred households actually reconfirmed their registration. Despite substantial restructuring efforts since 1999, a majority of 95 per cent are regular house seekers. Just two per cent of all house seekers have a certificate of urgency due to restructuring. The most likely explanation for the strong increase of regular house seekers in 2001, compared to 2000, is the introduction of the Internet site in that year. From 2001 on, dwellings were not only advertised in a weekly newspaper, but also on a special Internet site. Probably, more people than usual registered as a house seeker and also tried their luck in that year. The total number of reactions increased with 29 per cent, from 920,805 in 2000 to 1,186,540 in 2001. In that year, already 43 per cent of all reactions was submitted through the Internet (Sociale Verhuurders Haaglanden, 2006). The numbers of restructuring urgency movers show a quite different pattern. From 1,134 house seekers in 2000, the figure dropped in the next two years. From 2002 onwards, the numbers increased substantially, peaking in 2005 with 1,549 restructuring urgency movers. This pattern reflects the growing share of social rented housing designated for demolition in the Haaglanden region. Contrary, the house seekers with a medical or social urgency status show a downward trend from 2001 onwards, especially marked between 2003 and 2004. The total number of actual moves in the region initially fluctuated around 11,500 between 2000 and 2002. Since 2003, it has increased to almost 13,500 in 2005. The main reason is a substantial programme of new housing construction in Haaglanden. While pressure on the regional housing market is high, it is not as blocked up as in other major Dutch urban areas, because of the substantial levels of
12 completed new housing (see Table 2 in Appendix A). Apart from owner-occupied housing, substantial and attractive social housing is also completed, but mostly on the edge of or outside the city of The Hague. This is part of an anti-segregation policy to lower the share of social rented housing in The Hague, but enlarging it in the remainder of the Haaglanden (Begemann et al., 2005). The result is a net decrease of social housing in The Hague, whereas the total social rented stock in Haaglanden has slowly increased until 2005. The numbers of relocated restructuring urgency movers initially decreased, but after a low point in 2002, they have more than doubled again. The growing share of house seekers in this category has clearly been accompanied with more actual moves. Nevertheless, during all years, at least 80 per cent of all vacant social rented housing has been allocated to regular house seekers. The data enable the calculation of the probability of success of securing a house. For the purposes of this paper, we define it as the chance that a household acquired a vacant social rented house in a certain year, following the rules of the Dutch choice-based letting model. Summarised in a formula:
Probability of success = N moves of category i in the social rented sector in year y N house seekers in category i in the social rented sector in year y
The probability of success is strongly determined by the demand for, and the supply of social rented housing in a housing market area. Higher numbers of active house seekers extend the length of the queue for dwellings, given a certain supply. Within this queue, sequence criteria, such as length of residence or registration date, determines the probability of success (Kullberg, 2002). When demand strongly exceeds supply, this may negatively influence the average probabilities of success. This type of information is very helpful when monitoring demand and allocation among different groups of house seekers. It paints a general picture of the statistical probabilities of getting a social rented dwelling, while constantly keeping an eye on the success rates of non-urgent house seekers. As mentioned earlier, not the housing chances and needs of urgent households, but those of regular house seekers are a concern among policymakers (cf. Marsh et al., 2004, p. 12). While monitoring probabilities of success is useful, it is just a starting point. The data do not fully explain variations in probabilities, numbers of house seekers and allocations.
13 One might expect that the probability of success is 100 per cent for all house seekers with a certificate of urgency, because they could, theoretically, never fail to acquire a house. Yet it is not (Table 3). There are several explanations. First, not all movers can use their certificate of urgency in the same calendar year in which it is granted. Second, not all movers move within the social rented sector, but acquire a private rented or owner occupied dwelling, or move to a nursing home. This also applies to households who left the Haaglanden region and movers who move in with their partner or other family, not using their certificate of urgency.
Table 3. Probability of success in the Haaglanden region, per cent
Category 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Restructuring urgency movers 72.2 74.8 57.2 70.3 68.7 68.4 Medical/social urgency status 53.2 59.5 59.7 61.7 65.7 61.7 Regular house seekers 16.3 13.4 14.5 15.3 15.3 18.2
The probability of success for regular house seekers has been relatively stable on about 15 per cent, except for a dip in 2001 and a peak in 2005. In 2001, there were substantially more regular house seekers than before, while the number of newly established tenancy agreements for this group reached a low point of 9,037. In 2005, it was the other way round: the lowest number of regular house seekers since 2000 combined with the highest number of newly established tenancy agreements for this category. Again, the substantial programme of new housing construction is the main cause, followed by the administrative correction in the number of regular house seekers in 2005. As intended by the relocation policy, the probability of success for house seekers with certificates of urgency is much higher than the chances of regular house seekers. For movers with a medical or social urgency status, the probability of success has increased steadily to 66 per cent in 2004, then slightly dropping in 2005. For the restructuring urgency movers, a different pattern emerges. Their probability of success initially peaked at 75 per cent in 2001, with a sharp decrease in 2002 (57 per cent). Subsequently, the probability of success fluctuated around 70 per cent. Data from the biannual Monitor Relocation The Hague (Monitor Herhuisvesting Den Haag), which started in 2004, suggest that it generally takes nine to eleven months for residents to find a new dwelling in the social rented sector. Elderly
14 people and households with more than five persons need on average some more time to relocate, up to thirteen months. This implies that the validity of the certificate of urgency is quite frequently extended after one year, i.e. the general period of validity (City of The Hague, 2005b, 2006). These data provide important management indicators for housing associations. First, they clearly indicate whether relocation efforts on city and regional level are in line with relocation and restructuring timetables. Second, they highlight those households and groups that need on average more time to relocate and, hence, may need additional attention or even support. Third, these data enable agreements between housing associations with regard to feasible numbers of relocation per year. In sum, the long-term relocation perspectives of restructuring urgency movers have generally declined just slightly since 2000, despite rising numbers of households in need of relocation. The general picture is a continuing ability of local authorities and housing associations to relocate residents from restructuring sites. The high numbers of completed new housing have certainly helped in this respect (see table 2). While we cannot prove it with the available data, the resulting moving chains appear to have maintained availability of vacant social rented dwellings. We also conclude that, irrespective of fluctuations in numbers of house seekers and available dwellings, the growth in the numbers of forced relocation movers appears not to be associated with the housing chances of regular, non-urgent house seekers in the social rented sector. Regular house seekers have much smaller probabilities of success than forced movers, but their chances have increased slightly since 2001.
5. From administrative data to residents’ perceptions
Data collection This section focuses on the second research question: which factors explain dwelling progress? In 2001 and 2004, the City of The Hague conducted a survey among residents who had to deal with forced relocation due to restructuring. The survey targeted four restructuring areas in 2001, of which three were studied again in 2004 (see figure 2 and table 4). The research areas represent different neighbourhood types in The Hague that are subject to urban restructuring: Transvaal and Spoorwijk are dense, inner-city neighbourhoods constructed before the Second World War.
15 However, Morgenstond and Vrederust are spacious, semi-peripheral neighbourhoods built shortly after the Second World War. As the focus is on respondents who moved from dwellings slated for demolition, both the blocks and the respondents in 2004 are different from those in 2001. Vrederust is only included in 2001, as there was no substantial relocation programme going on in 2004.
Figure 2 The research neighbourhoods in The Hague
The research design for both years is identical. The starting point was a database of movers of whom both the previous and current addresses were available. Because of problems with finding and linking old and new addresses, the research populations are smaller than the actual numbers of relocated movers. The main problem lies in the administration of movers. The housing associations retained the former addresses of forced movers for a limited period of time. Consequently, many movers who relocated two years or more before the research, could not be retraced. Moreover, information was lost by inaccuracies in the practice of administration and replacement of forced movers by temporary renters (not included in our research population), which erased address records of the movers of interest. It appears that these problems were random in nature, but we cannot establish this for sure.
16 From the research populations, random samples of movers were drawn. The City of The Hague sent these movers a research announcement letter. Subsequently, interviewers approached potential respondents and conducted face-to-face interviews, based on a written questionnaire. If necessary, the interviewers finalised questionnaires through a follow-up with the respondent by telephone. Several interviewers were non-native Dutch and fluent in Turkish or Arabic, to overcome potential language problems with respondents from ethnic backgrounds. Note that respondents were only questioned some time after relocation. The questionnaire included questions on the previous and current dwelling, housing and neighbourhood satisfaction, moving intentions, the search process, opinions of the available options and respondent’ socioeconomic characteristics.
Table 4. Response levels for each area of origin, 2001 and 2004
Restructured Area 2001 2004 Sample Response (n) Response % Sample Response (n) Response % Spoorwijk 149 34 22.8 200 66 33.0 Transvaal 213 46 21.6 283 87 30.7 Morgenstond 130 32 24.6 200 72 36.0 Vrederust 514 131 25.5 - - - Total 1,006 243 24.2 683 225 32.9 Source: City of The Hague (2001, 2005a).
From table 4, it appears that response levels are not very high, but were generally higher in 2004 than in 2001. There are two reasons for this. First, the research population was substantially bigger in 2001, compared to 2004. Second, in 2001 the interviewers had to cover movers from four origin areas instead of three, which enabled less concentrated efforts per origin area. Third, the available resources allowed more approaches of potential respondents in 2004 than in 2001. Each address could be approached several times if the potential respondent was not at home, whereas only one approach was possible in 2001. These limitations require some modesty with regard to scope and representativeness of the data. As we lack accurate data on the characteristics of all relocated movers, we cannot compare the response with the total population. Therefore, the results are illustrative for the experiences and opinions of forced relocation movers, but not necessarily representative.
17 Measurement and methods In our analysis, residents’ perception of dwelling progress is the dependent variable. We measured it with the following question: “If you compare your current house with your previous one, did you benefit from the relocation or not? Respondents could respond with ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘no opinion’; the first coded 1 and the last two 0, resulting in a binary variable and the need for a logistic regression model. This question was framed in a block of questions that exclusively concerned the current dwelling and comparison with the previous one. All neighbourhood-related questions were posed in a different part of the survey. In this way, we tried to focus respondents’ attention, enabling them to provide a clear distinction between dwelling and neighbourhood outcomes due to relocation. We include several explanatory variables. First, individual characteristics, such as age, household income and household composition are likely predictors of the relocation success. These factors affect ‘normal’ moving behaviour, but are also proxies for households’ resources and restrictions, and the opportunities and constraints they face (Mulder & Hooimeijer, 1999). Moreover, household composition and income are standard qualifying conditions for social rented dwellings, not only for regular house seekers, but also for relocation movers with a certificate or urgency. Second, length of residence is expected to increase residents’ opportunities on the housing market and dwelling progress, as it is a sequence criterion (cf. Kullberg, 2002, p. 555, 570-572; see section 3). Here, length of residence in the previous dwelling is a dummy, distinguishing between residents that lived less or more than five years in the previous dwelling. Third, we want to know whether level of education makes a difference for the relocation result. Previous research emphasised the importance of education and specific skills in relation to successful search efforts in choice-based letting systems (e.g. Kullberg, 2002; Kullberg & Sjoer, 2001). Pawson and colleagues (2006) acknowledge that the required active participation may damage the prospects of disadvantaged applicants with language deficiencies, learning difficulties or lack of literacy. Additionally, BME applicants with little command of the language may have problems with effectively using choice-based letting systems (Kullberg, 2002, p. 566, Pawson et al., 2006). This may not only be related to misunderstanding, but also to problematic communication with housing officers (Brokken et al., 2001; Van Kempen & Idamir, 2003). Thus, ethnic background is included. In Dutch statistics, a person belongs to an ethnic
18 minority if at least one of his parents is born abroad, regardless of his own country of birth. In section 3, we described how housing allowances may improve residents’ opportunities in finding a new and better dwelling. Unfortunately, we could not include data on housing allowances in the analysis, as these data are only available for 2004 and not for 2001. The same applies to satisfaction with the previous house. In addition to socioeconomic characteristics, pre-location attitudes are included. Earlier research has shown a relation between levels of understanding and approval before the relocation and dwelling progress afterwards (Allen, 2000; Fried, 1967; Kleinhans, 2003; Goetz, 2002, p. 121-122). We addressed this issue with a question that probed whether respondents reported a certain level of approval and understanding, regarding their forced move (0 = No / no opinion; 1 = Yes).. As mentioned on section two, pre-relocation intentions may also matter. A useful proxy for measuring relocation willingness to move is whether residents had pre-relocation moving intentions or not, regardless of their motives. Hence, the dummy variable ‘moving intentions’ reflects whether or not respondents were already considering a move when they received notice of the forced relocation. A final independent variable is perceived neighbourhood difference. It is a dummy variable indicating that respondents state that their current neighbourhood is better than the previous one. Unfortunately, we could not properly include a measure indicating whether or not residents relocated within the same neighbourhood, which may be a relevant for the relocation impact on residents’ social ties (see section 2). Apart from data problems, we come across the ‘eternal’ issue of definition. The administrative neighbourhoods in The Hague are much bigger than what residents typically define as a neighbourhood, i.e. an area of 5–10 minutes walk from one’s home (Kearns & Parkinson, 2001, p. 2103). Such a measure is lacking in the available survey data.
19 Table 5. Summary statistics: per cent of respondents reporting dwelling progress
Characteristic Per cent Survey year 2001 0.80 2004 0.83 Neighbourhood Transvaal 0.85 Spoorwijk 0.84 Morgenstond 0.80 Vrederust 0.79 Age less than 35 years) 0.83 35 – 50 years 0.77 50 – 65 years 0.85 65 and older 0.87 Household composition Single-person household 0.79 Single-parent household 0.78 Couple without children 0.83 Couple with children 0.88 Education (highest completed level) Primary school 0.78 Lower professional education 0.82 Medium or higher professional education/ university 0.88 Other 0.76 Net household income less than € 1,100) 0.82 € 1,100 - € 1,700 0.84 > € 1,700 0.78 Ethnic background Native Dutch 0.84 Ethnic minority 0.79 Length of residence in previous dwelling 0-2 years 0.74 3-5 years 0.77 6-10 years 0.84 More than 10 years 0.86 Understanding No/no opinion 0.72 Yes 0.87 Pre-relocation moving intentions No 0.79 Yes 0.89 Neighbourhood difference No / no opinion 0.71 Yes, current neighbourhood better than previous one 0.91
Notes: Dwelling progress: “If you compare your current house with your previous one, did you benefit from the relocation or not?” 0 = no / no opinion; 1 = yes, I did benefit with regard to my dwelling.
20 Results A simple frequency distribution of our dependent variable, dwelling progress, reveals an impressive result of the relocation (see table 5). Almost 80 per cent (2001) and 83 per cent (2004) of the forced movers claim that their current dwelling is an improvement, compared to the previous one. Overall, 93 per cent of all respondents relocated within the social rented sector. This is not uncommon, compared to other Dutch cases (Kleinhans (2003); Leveling & Vos (2004); Steunpunt Wonen (2003). Only four per cent moved to an owner-occupied dwelling and the remainder acquired a private rented dwelling (0.6 per cent), moved into a nursing home or found another solution.
Table 6. Top 10 reported improvements with regard to the new dwelling
Feature Share of respondents (n=380) mentioning this feature Size of the new dwelling 40% Insulation 29% Maintenance 25% Dwelling type 25% Number of bedrooms 20% Quality bathroom and/or kitchen 20% Size of the rooms 14% Location 13% View 11% Size of the balcony or garden 9% Note: the data refer only to respondents of both 2001 and 2004 that indicated dwelling progress (n=380). As each respondent could indicate more than one feature, the total percentage exceeds 100 per cent.
The most mentioned improvement aspect is the size of the dwelling, followed by better insulation, maintenance of the dwelling, and dwelling type (see table 6). Separate analyses by the City of The Hague confirm that many forced relocation movers managed to leave multi-family blocks and to move into apartments with elevators, single-family dwellings and maisonettes. Many residents acquired dwellings with much more floor space, especially respondents from the 2004 survey (City of The Hague, 2001, 2005a). Finally, the technical quality of the new house is often higher, especially with new construction. This is no surprise, since in general social rented dwellings in the worst state are demolished first. Thus, realising dwelling
21 progress is a realistic opportunity for many movers (cf. Rubenstein, 1988). But what is the role of respondents’ individual characteristics and pre-relocation attitudes? Table 7 presents the results of our multivariate analysis. We first consider age, household composition, education and ethnic background. Couples with children are significantly more likely to report dwelling progress. This is most likely the result of the housing allocation model in the Haaglanden region. For families with children and elderly people, the options profile is somewhat extended to increase their relocation options (see section 3 and Stadsgewest Haaglanden 2004, p. 15). However, unlike families with children, we find no statistical evidence that elderly people benefited significantly more from this than other age groups. Respondents with a medium professional education or higher are also more likely to report a perceived improvement. In other words, human capital and skills appear as valuable resources in the search for another dwelling. Educated people are more likely to deal successfully with the complexity of the housing allocation model and related information of the housing market than low-educated people (cf. Kullberg, 2002; Van Kempen & Őzűekren, 1998). This raises the probability of successfully choosing a relocation dwelling that meets the household’s preferences. In contrast, households with somewhat higher net incomes (above € 1,700 per month) are significantly less likely to report dwelling progress. This category seems to fall between two stools. They are clearly not the lowest income households, but they can apparently neither afford to buy an owner-occupied house. As less than one per cent of all respondents relocated into private rented housing, this is not an attractive alternative. The most likely explanation is twofold. First, heir income levels exclude them from the least expensive social rented housing when relocating. Second, many of them are probably also not (anymore) eligible for a housing allowance. This means that they must pay the net increase of their monthly rent after relocation, whereas relocating movers who are still eligible for a housing allowance, benefit from its dampening effect on the rent price (see section 3). In sum, for middle- and higher income households, it is more difficult to attain a favourable price-quality relation when relocating in the social rented sector than for the lower income households.
22 Table 7. Logistic regression analysis of dwelling progress
Dependent variables (N= 301) Dwelling progress B SE Exp(B) Survey year (0 = 2001; 1 = 2004) -0.254 0.357 0.776 Age (ref = < 35 years) 35 – 50 years -0.453 0.410 0.636 50 – 65 years 0.048 0.494 1.049 65 and older 0.805 0.655 2.237 Household composition (ref = single-person household) Single-parent household 0.218 0.452 1.244 Couple without children 0.640 0.539 1.896 Couple with children 0.905* 0.387 2.472 Education (ref = primary education) Lower professional education 0.463 0.387 1.589 Medium or higher professional education/ university 1.126* 0.516 3.083 Other 0.051 0.456 1.052 Net household income (ref = < € 1,100) € 1,100 - € 1,700 -0.249 0.382 0.779 > € 1,700 -1.026* 0.498 0.359 Ethnic background (0, 1; 1 = ethnic minority) -0.310 0.348 0.733 Length of residence in previous dwelling 0.670* 0.346 1.954 (0 = up till five years; 1 = more than five years) Understanding (0, 1; 1 = yes) 0.657* 0.327 1.929 Pre-relocation moving intentions (0, 1; 1 = yes) 0.834* 0.408 2.303 Neighbourhood difference 1.755*** 0.346 5.785 (0, 1; 1 = current neighbourhood better than previous one) Constant -0.180 0.587 0.835 -2LL 276.515 Model Chi-square 65.560 Df 17 Significance 0.000 Nagelkerke R2 0.267 Notes: Dwelling progress: “If you compare your current house with your previous one, did you benefit from the relocation or not?” 0 = no / no opinion; 1 = yes, I did benefit with regard to my dwelling. Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 (two-sided). Method = Enter.
Length of residence in the previous dwelling also has a positive impact on the probability of dwelling progress. Again, the housing allocation design in Haaglanden is most likely the primary cause. Respondents who lived more than five years in their previous house are more likely to report dwelling progress. Apart from their certificate of urgency, they could also stake their length of residence in the search process, applying for dwellings beyond their options profile. In several cases, forced movers with a substantial length of residence were able to relocate into a type of dwelling that had not been accessible through their certificate of urgency. This
23 increased their relocation options, because a substantial length of residence strongly improved their chances in the competition with regular house seekers. Residents who expressed a certain amount of understanding and approval before the relocation are more likely to report dwelling progress afterwards. Adapting to the new dwelling may have been easier for residents not coping with the stress of a fully involuntary move (cf. Allen, 2000; Fried, 1967; Goetz, 2002, p. 121-122). A clear association also appears between pre-relocation moving intentions and post- relocation dwelling progress. We expected pre-relocation understanding and moving intentions to be strongly correlated. In other words, people with moving plans may react with more understanding towards the relocation itself. However, a bivariate analysis shows only a moderate but significant correlation (phi=0.286, p<0.000). Hence, residents who were already planning a move are more likely to report progress in the new dwelling, but this is not necessarily accompanied with approval of the forced relocation. Finally, perception of neighbourhood improvement is strongly related to self- reported dwelling progress. Clearly, neighbourhood perception is part of the overall evaluation of the new house (cf. Amerigo & Aragones, 1997; Parkes et al., 2002). Further bivariate analysis (not shown) indicate that neighbourhood improvement is predominantly attributed to more quietness and privacy, less litter on the streets, better access to public transport, a ‘better composition of the neighbourhood population’, more parking space and better playgrounds for children. A move to a more attractive living environment, whether or not a different neighbourhood, thus contributes to the satisfaction with the new dwelling. To conclude, most forced movers experienced dwelling progress. This is partly the result of the fact that they leave the most unpopular social rented dwellings that are usually in the worst state and demolished first. The remainder of the social rented housing stock is often of better quality and more popular. For the other part, the housing allocation model helps to quickly relocate, but there are differences in the extent to which the model benefits forced movers. For instances, couples with children and households with a substantial length of residence seem to benefit slightly more often. On the other hand, low-educated as well as middle- and higher income households less often report dwelling progress, indicating that some groups are less able to make gains by way of the system than others.
24 6. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper has reported the results of empirical research into the housing chances and perceptions of movers confronted with forced relocation in the Haaglanden region. Despite several data problems that limit the representativeness of the surveys, this study provides an added value to earlier explorative studies. The combination of two identical cross-sectional surveys and time series data of housing allocations and house seekers enabled us to go beyond a single cross-sectional measurement. The evidence suggests that the share of forced relocation movers has been increasing since 2002, both in absolute and relative terms. Nevertheless, the long- term relocation perspectives of restructuring urgency movers have declined only slightly since 2000. The general picture is a continuing ability of local authorities and housing associations to quickly relocate residents from restructuring sites. We also conclude that the increasing share of forced relocation movers appears not related with the housing chances of regular, non-urgent house seekers in the social rented sector, in spite of the fears of both policymaker and scholars. Regular house seekers do have much smaller probabilities of success than movers, but their chances have actually increased slightly since 2001. The main explanation is a substantial programme of new housing construction, which resulted, amongst others, in a net increase of the social rented housing stock in the Haaglanden, but a net decrease in the city of The Hague (Begeman et al., 2005). Additionally, the significant rise in regular house seekers’ probability of success in 2005 is largely explained by a administrative correction in the allocation system. Our second research question concerned the association between perceptions of dwelling progress on the one hand and respondents’ pre-relocation attitudes and their individual characteristics on the other hand. First of all, most forced movers reported dwelling progress after relocation. Many of them moved from relatively unpopular social rented dwellings, whether or not in a bad state of repair, to larger and higher-quality dwellings. Second, residents who expressed a certain amount of understanding and approval before the relocation are more likely to report dwelling progress afterwards. The same applies to those residents who were already planning a move before the notification of forced relocation. Various moving motives are conceivable such as changes in jobs and household composition. But residents who were looking for opportunities to improve their housing situation, have succeeded
25 often in their attempts (cf. Kleinhans, 2003, p. 495). Following the original definition of displacement, these residents could be labelled as displacees, but they clearly do not class themselves as such (see also Atkinson, 2000, p. 310). The design of the housing allocation model in the Haaglanden appears to moderate the potentially negative effects of forced relocation and displacement due to urban restructuring. First, the extension of their options profile has provided couples with children with a broader range of relocation options. This has raised their chances of dwelling progress compared to other household types with a certificate of urgency. Second, a longer length of residence in the previous house has the same positive impact on self-reported dwelling progress. It enables relocation movers to successfully apply for attractive social housing beyond their options profile. If they did not benefit from their certificate of urgency, they successfully staked their length of residence in their application. To conclude, the institutional context of forced relocation is essential in explaining experiences of forced movers and their perception of dwelling progress, despite the obligatory nature of the move for most of them. This finding is at odds with the mainstream literature on displacement. However, some groups are relatively less able to make gains by way of the system than others. Low-educated people are less likely to benefit from forced relocation than more educated people, as they are less able to deal with the complexities of the housing allocation and relocation process. Other research points out that this is also a more general problem for regular house seekers (Brokken et al., 2001; Kullberg, 2002; Pawson et al., 2006). This is a worrisome finding. While choice-based letting systems were, among other reasons, introduced to improve clarity and transparency, the result may be that transparency is highly dependent on educational attainment and therefore not an asset equal for all house seekers. Moreover, households with somewhat higher, but still relatively low net incomes appear to fall between two stools. Apparently, their relocation into social rented housing indicates that they could not afford to buy a dwelling. They were also excluded from the least expensive parts of the social rented sector and from eligibility for a housing allowances, which might have dampened their higher rent costs after relocation. Altogether, they are slightly less likely to benefit from the relocation. Our findings have several policy implications. First, investing time and effort in public support for urban restructuring projects seems worthwhile, considering the
26 relation between pre-relocation approval rates and dwelling progress. We suggest making explicit how residents can benefit from relocation, and actually providing a clearly visible range of relocation choices and good practice examples. Disapproval may then ease a little, but the effects of investing in public support must not be overestimated. New housing construction is crucial for the public support for urban restructuring projects, as probabilities of success for regular house seekers in Haaglanden have not been harmed. However, it is unclear whether other major Dutch housing market regions can measure up to the substantial construction programme of Haaglanden. This region is quite ahead and unique in its connection between urban restructuring and the anti-segregation policy to lower the share of social rented housing in The Hague, but enlarging it in the remainder of the region. Second, the finding that education can make a difference with regard to dwelling progress, gives reason for concern. The Dutch choice-based letting system is intended to provide equal access and housing opportunities for those in need of social housing. Hence, forced relocation movers should receive proper assistance during their search process. Counsellors of housing associations should make efforts to ensure that their clients really understand the relocation process in general and the choice-based letting model principles in particular. This may require a more outreaching approach from counsellors to residents, already in the early stages of the relocation process (cf. Kleinhans, 2003, p. 494-496). Third, a move from social rented to owner-occupied housing is still very difficult, in view of the small minority of relocation movers that acquired owner-occupied housing. Housing associations can help bridging the gap, by offering parts of their social rented housing for different forms of sale, with discounts and risk-reducing conditions. An earlier study has shown that this can contribute to the freedom of choice and housing opportunities for those who are ‘outgrowing’ the social rented sector, but lack the financial power to move into regular owner-occupation (see Gruis et al., 2005). Further research should clarify to which extent this option can be properly integrated into a forced relocation process.
Acknowledgement The authors wish to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Dutch government through the Habiforum Program Innovative Land Use and Delft University of
27 Technology through the Delft Centre for Sustainable Urban Areas. We are also indebted to the anonymous referees, for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.
References
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32 Appendix A
Table 1. House seekers and actual moves in the Haaglanden region
Category 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Actively house seeking N % N % N % N % N % N % N % Restructuring urgency movers n.a - 1,134 1,8 903 1,3 843 1.2 1,204 1.7 1,549 2.2 1,505 2.3 Medical/social urgency status n.a - 2,278 3,7 2,660 3,8 2,418 3.4 2,396 3.3 1,853 2.6 1,681 2.6 Regular house seekers n.a - 58,995 94,5 67,355 95,0 68,173 95.4 68,032 95.0 68,084 95.2 62,750 95.1 Total 60,566 - 62,407 100.0 70,918 100.0 71,434 100.0 71,632 100.0 71,486 100.0 65,936 100.0
Actual moves (i.e. newly esta- N % N % N % N % N % N % N % blished tenancy agreements) Restructuring urgency movers 699 5.6 819 7.0 675 6.0 482 4.1 847 6.7 1,064 8.4 1,029 7.6 Medical/social urgency status 779 6.3 1,210 10.4 1,584 14.0 1,444 12.2 1,478 11.6 1,217 9.6 1,038 7.7 Regular house seekers 10,918 88.1 9,627 82.6 9,037 80.0 9,870 83.7 10,390 81.7 10,412 82.0 11,413 84.7 Total 12,396 100.0 11,656 100.0 11,296 100.0 11,796 100.0 12,715 100.0 12,693 100.0 13,480 100.0 Source: Association of Social Landlords Haaglanden (Vereniging Sociale Verhuurders Haaglanden). Data specially provided at request.
Table 2. Demolition of social rented housing and new construction in Haaglanden, absolute numbers
Data 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total social rented housing stock 158,379 159,283 159,242 159,394 159,718 160,629 159,910 Demolished social rented housing* 245 835 1,218 838 433 1,164 1,391 Newly constructed social housing 1,128 685 1,048 1,043 1,464 603 876 Newly constructed private rent 596 873 277 456 886 843 853 Newly constructed owner-occupied 3,700 3,531 4,963 5,600 4,203 3,956 3,900 * The demolition figure also includes houses that were destroyed by fire or other major accidents. Precise numbers are unknown, but these cases constitute only a small fraction of the number of purposively demolished dwellings. Source: ABF Vastgoedmonitor.