Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Erdoğan’s “New ” WP Restoring the Authoritarian State in the Name of Democracy

Günter Seufert S

European and American commentators warn that Turkey is drifting back into authori- tarianism, citing excessive police violence against demonstrators, restrictions on free- dom of the press and internet, government interference in the judiciary, purges in the bureaucracy, and an anti-European policy shift. They note with astonishment that former prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was able to win the presidency on an in- creased share of the vote despite credible accusations of corruption, strife within the conservative camp and foreign policy failures. Erdoğan himself speaks of the “New Turkey” having succeeded the old, authoritarian Kemalist republic and brought forth a progressive democracy. How broad is support for Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) across society? What can be expected of the new government? How fundamental is the recon- struction of the political system, and what does the it mean for the future of democ- racy? How can and should Europe respond?

Turkish and international observers agree Workers’ Party (PKK). The “New Turkey” is that the election of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said to have overcome the political tutelage as on 10 August 2014 that the old secular elites exercised over the marks a turning-point in the country’s po- majority with the backing of the army and litical development. The new president sees the judiciary. The new regime, it is claimed, himself not only as the head of state, but is therefore not only culturally authentic, also as guarantor of the will of the people. but also democratic. For the first time since the founding of the republic, it is asserted, the government, its policies and the personality of the presi- Erdoğan’s Electoral Success dent reflect the identity, the culture and Including parliamentary and municipal the political inclinations of the population. elections and constitutional referendums, And, it is also claimed, the cultural plural- Erdoğan’s presidential victory with 51.8 ity of the population is acknowledged for percent of the vote was his ninth successive the first time, as witnessed by the peace election win. His widely noted charisma negotiations with the banned Kurdistan alone cannot explain this prolonged series

Dr. Günter Seufert is a Senior Associate in SWP’s EU External Relations Division SWP Comments 44 October 2014

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of successes. What we are in fact seeing There are, admittedly, other reasons too under Erdoğan is the conclusion of a long- behind Erdoğan’s leap in support from term process in Turkish politics: the incre- 43.39 percent in the municipal elections to mental integration of the conservative almost 52 percent in the presidential. Firstly, religious majority and the Kurds into the Erdoğan succeeded in uniting behind him political system. Three military coups and the votes of smaller right-wing parties that the banning of 26 political parties are only did not put up candidates of their own, the most obvious examples of measures such as the Turkish-Islamist Felicity Party (SP), taken since 1960 to exclude Kurdish and the Turkish nationalist Great Union Party conservative Islamic actors from the Kemal- (BBP) and the Kurdish-Islamist Free Cause ist republic. Even the AKP only narrowly Party (HüdaPar). A repeat of that impressive escaped prohibition in 2008 – at a time result is therefore not expected at the June when it was governing with an absolute 2015 parliamentary elections. Secondly, majority. Prior to 2007, the political influ- many supporters of the “left-wing” Republic- ence of the generals through the National an People’s Party (CHP) and the “right-wing” Security Council and presidential vetoes Nationalist Action Party (MHP) were unable to had further restricted the options of con- bring themselves to give their vote to the servative governments. joint candidate of the two parties. Since the beginning of his career in the AKP, Erdoğan’s political discourse has con- sequently revolved around “democratisa- The New Government: Pro-European tion”, understood as asserting the will of Gloss on Authoritarian Reality the conservative majority against the politi- The new prime minister, former foreign cal control of the Kemalist elite. It was this minister , unveiled his project that gained Erdoğan his following first cabinet on 29 August 2014. A small across disparate classes, groups and regions sigh of relief was heard in , because and also found support abroad. foreign and European policy were entrusted During the clashes over the plans for to figures who are well-known in Europe. the Gezi Park in in summer 2013 The new foreign minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Erdoğan instrumentalised this established served briefly as affairs “democratisation discourse” to legitimise a minister and was from 2010 to 2012 Presi- blunt strategy of retaining power. Erdoğan dent of the Parliamentary Assembly of the has replaced the real decades-long political Council of Europe. His previous post as tutelage of the generals with an only imagi- European Union affairs minister was taken nary political “tutelage of foreign powers over by the career diplomat Volkan Bozkır, over the Turkish nation and its govern- previously Turkey’s permanent representa- ment”. This has enabled him to present tive to the European Union. The appoint- authoritarian moves against the opposition ment of the previous economy minister Ali and interference in the judiciary as mea- Babacan as one of the four deputy prime sures in defence of democracy and directed ministers and the retention of Mehmet exclusively against foreign agents and Şimşek as finance minister were also wel- stooges, above all the cadres of the preacher comed as both are regarded as competent Fethullah Gülen within the bureaucracy in their field and unideological. Moreover, (see Günter Seufert, Is the Fethullah Gülen the new Government Policy Statement at- Movement Overstretching Itself?, SWP Research tributes the European Union central impor- Paper 2/2014). He employed this rhetorical tance for the country’s modernisation, brandmarking exceptionally successfully seeking accession for the republic’s cente- in the run-up to the municipal elections at nary in 2023. the end of March 2014 and also in his latest But the manner in which the new gov- campaign for the presidency. ernment presents itself to the population

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speaks a different language that fits more tle of Atatürk’s successor, likewise leading with the many passages in the Statement the fight to liberate his country from West- referring to Turkey as a civilisation in its ern domination. In fact he believes he sur- own right, quite stark distinct from the passes his predecessor in this respect, be- European, with its own distinct “national cause his endeavours for the national cause values” rooted in Turkish Ottoman history. always have the majority of the population These inherent values of Turkish civilisa- behind them. tion not only have to be renewed, it is con- This mixture of nostalgic yearning for tended, but must also be asserted through- former national greatness, anti-Western out all state institutions, and the state must nationalism and conservative morality convey these values to the public. cannot produce clear domestic or foreign With state and government working to policy programmes. But the “New Turkey” culturally and morally homogenise the discourse establishes a new hierarchy of population, the “democratisation” deployed political identities, with the government to break the power of the secular elite has seeking to secure a monopoly over central been replaced by a new , political concepts such as nation, national this time in the guise of conservative reli- interest, justice, progress and religion. Gov- gious identity. ernment rhetoric holds up Erdoğan and After his nomination as party leader, the AKP as indispensable for the existence Davutoğlu accordingly defined the AKP as and future of fatherland and nation and a “cadre movement” that had appeared on discredits the opposition. Erdoğan and his the stage to revive and resurrect a deeply circles have no qualms about labelling oppo- rooted state tradition rather than as the sition politicians saboteurs, traitors and representative of the interests of large parts foreign agents. This all serves to legitimise of the population. Under his leadership this curtailing rights and liberties and to secure “restoration” will be continued without power for the current government and the interruption, he said. After assuming the governing party. party leadership, Davutoğlu declared that From this point it is but a small step to Turks would in future have to exercise their open rejection of so-called European values civil liberties within the constraints of a and any orientation on Europe at all, as pro- particular “moral formation” that was ap- pagated by Erdoğan’s chief economic advisor parently to be prescribed by the government. Yiğit Bulut. As it has with Russia, Europe has The ideology used to justify this authori- undermined Turkey’s culture in order to ex- tarian state and the restriction of civil liber- pand its own influence, Bulut writes in the ties is a hotchpotch of Turkish nationalism, pro-government Star newspaper. The only religious piety and enthusiasm for the pan- way to new strength, he says, is to return to of Abdul Hamid II, the last politi- the country’s own tradition. cally influential Ottoman sultan. It is poign- antly expressed in a recent propaganda video commissioned by the party to intro- The Party: Our Programme duce its new leader. The film presents Is Erdoğan! Davutoğlu as “the hope of the Muslim weary The ambiguity of the current AKP ideology and burdened”, “true to the message of the and the vagueness of the policies that flow prophet”, “descended from Ottomans and from it pose no difficulties for the party, Seljuks”, the “long-awaited spirit of [Otto- which has handed all decisive decisions to man Sultan] Abdul Hamid II” and “trusted its founder and former leader Erdoğan. “We advisor to the leader [i.e. Erdoğan]”, working stand with Erdoğan and his ‘New Turkey’ “for the umma, for the Turkish Muslim and against all who reject him and this religious nation, and for Allah”. Erdoğan ideal,” Yalçın Akdoğan tweeted on 13 August, for his part likes to see himself in the man- at the time still Erdoğan’s chief political

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advisor and today one of the new prime other prominent figure without a parlia- minister’s four deputies. Erdoğan does mentary seat is , who in December indeed embody one of the central traits of 2013 succeeded Interior Minister Muammer the AKP ideology, the fusion of state and Güler after corruption allegations forced nation into a single entity, with Erdoğan Güler and three other cabinet ministers to himself, as both representative of the state resign. Emrullah İşler, member of parlia- and tribune of the people, at its heart. ment since 2011, also joined the cabinet Where a man and his vision become under the same circumstances and served as programme there is no room for consulta- deputy prime minister in Erdoğan’s last tion, not even for discussion. And the party cabinet. This group of relatively young Erdo- organs do indeed have little say when it ğan loyalists is set to advance into the cabi- comes to defining the AKP’s political posi- net after the June 2015 parliamentary elec- tions. Members of party organs submit tions and continue his policies there. their opinions in sealed envelopes that are This will be all the easier owing to a passed to the party leader. When parliamen- second peculiarity of the AKP: At Erdoğan’s tary candidates are selected, their standing insistence the party upholds a provision in in the party is irrelevant. Prime Minister its statutes restricting its members of parlia- Davutoğlu, the new party leader, equates ment to three legislative periods. This will internal discussions with “discord” and prevent 73 of the current 312 AKP deputies “machination” and calls on members to from standing again, including four current come directly to him with their complaints. and former deputy prime ministers, 15 cur- While an extremely powerful leader and rent and former ministers, the current and correspondingly weak organs are typical for a former speaker of parliament and a large Turkish political parties in general, today’s number of individuals who hold or have AKP represents an extreme in three respects. held leading positions in the party. If the Firstly, Erdoğan has surrounded himself rule remains in force, Erdoğan will by the over the years with a circle of mostly 2015 election have rid himself of all the younger coopted advisors who depend di- heavyweights in the parliamentary group rectly on him because they have little or who possessed the potential to form the no following in the party and mostly not core of an internal party opposition. Bülent even a parliamentary seat. They include Arınç, and have the aforementioned Yalçın Akdoğan and often been mentioned in this context. They Yiğit Bulut. Bulut has no seat in parliament, would be as thoroughly politically sidelined Akdoğan only since 2011. Numan Kurtul- as today Abdullah Gül, Erdoğan’s predeces- muş, also without a parliamentary seat, sor as president. resigned his leadership of the newly-found- A third peculiarity of the AKP is that its ed left-Islamist People’s Voice Party (HAS) in decision-making centre in the person of September 2012 to take up Erdoğan’s invi- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan formally operates tation to join the AKP, where he is now one outside of the party and is thus immune to of the four deputy prime ministers. Süley- the influence of party members. Erdoğan man Soylu, former leader of the marginal has entrusted the running of party and cabi- Democratic Party (DP), was also enticed away net to the triumvirate of Ahmet Davutoğlu, by Erdoğan in September 2012 and is today Yalçın Akdoğan and Numan Kurtulumş, one of the AKP’s deputy leaders. İbrahim who have no meaningful base of their own Kalın became Erdoğan’s chief foreign affairs in the party. advisor in 2009, following the appointment All this works to hinder opinion-forming of his academic mentor Ahmet Davutoğlu to processes and block participation by party the post of foreign minister; today Kalın, structures in internal political decisions, who also has no seat in parliament, is depu- and brings to a halt the very dynamic that ty secretary-general of the presidency. An- generated the AKP’s long period of growth.

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In its early years the party addressed not the constitution and other legal norms. only the interests of conservative Muslim Thus Erdoğan ignored Article 101 of the groups, but also integrated many centre- constitution, which stipulates that the right politicians, influential Kurds, individ- president must sever any party member- ual social democrats, as well as strongly pro- ship and resign from parliament as soon Western Muslims. As the moderate opposi- as he is elected. Erdoğan retained both, tion to the Kemalist state, the AKP enjoyed made sure he installed Davutoğlu as his broad support among the liberal public. successor, and only resigned from parlia- Today it is perceived in those quarters as ment after he was sworn in as president. itself wielding state power and quite pre- In view of the forcefulness of the new pared to turn authoritarian instruments power elite, there is a danger not only of against its opponents. erosion of the constitution and laws as con- straint and corrective on the executive, but also of the same happening to the judiciary. De facto Introduction of a As soon as corruption investigations Presidential System against members of Erdoğan’s cabinet In his speech of 27 August thanking del- began in December 2013, his government egates after his election as party leader, applied pressure on the Supreme Board Davutoğlu set the party an immediate goal of Judges and Prosecutors (SBJP), the legally of achieving a two-thirds majority in the independent self-governance body of the June 2015 parliamentary elections, which judiciary. The government achieved changes would allow the party and its government in its composition and the transfer to other to amend the constitution as it pleased. duties of the prosecutors and judges investi- The primary objective here concerns the gating the corruption cases, as well as by introduction of a presidential system. The decree more broadly restricting the scope fact that Davutoğlu sets this objective, of investigations by state prosecutors. working to weaken both the AKP-dominated A hastily cobbled-together judicial reform parliament and his own government, to the and pressure on the SBJP to appoint tame benefit of President Erdoğan, says a great judges secured the government influence deal about the balance of power between over first and second-instance decisions prime minister and president. affecting detentions and arrests. After the De facto, Erdoğan’s election as president involved judges and prosecutors had been has already transitioned Turkey to a presi- replaced it came as no surprise that the dential system, even if the constitution still pending corruption cases against four of provides for a parliamentary one. The new Erdoğan’s ministers and his son Bilal were cabinet clearly bears Erdoğan’s hallmark. dropped. His prime minister never tires of reiterating As well as interfering in the judiciary, that his policies are guided by Erdoğan’s the government exploits low standards to vision. Nor does the president shy from politicise prosecutions. For example, the publicly announcing the instructions he aforementioned cases were dropped on the has given or intends to give his prime grounds that the investigators had been minister for dealing with specific political involved in a plot to topple the government, problems. and the original prosecutors and police found themselves facing prosecution. The charges against leading members of a foot- Interfering and Politicising: ball fan club that played a decisive role in The Fate of Justice and Legality the Gezi Park demonstrations in Istanbul The reckless attitude towards the spirit of in summer 2013 were also “attempting to the constitution expressed in these actions overthrow the government” and topple the is also echoed in treatment of the letter of political order. Here too, prosecutors politi-

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cised the trial by focusing on supposed the government transferred control of political intentions rather than concrete Turkey’s biggest listening post from the provable crimes. armed forces to MİT. Technical neglect and Prime Minister Davutoğlu is also taking embarrassing revelations about top gener- sides in advance of the upcoming election als created the opportunity for this move, of SBJP members on 12 October 2014, saying as part of the government’s strategy of following his election as party leader that breaking the domestic power of the mili- he wanted to put an end to the judiciary’s tary. In response to investigations against control over politics. In his latest statement Hakan Fidan for “running errands for the Davutoğlu also claims that parts of the judi- PKK”, conducted by prosecutors close to ciary stand under foreign influence, which Fethullah Gülen, the government in March would appear to foreshadow further steps 2012 rushed a law through parliament to to shape the judiciary to the government’s strengthen the immunity of intelligence wishes. agents. And in August 2014 the service’s powers were expanded to grant it almost unrestricted access to documents and ar- A Stronger, Larger Intelligence chives of all government agencies, courts Service and non-state institutions. Its powers to As well as counter-intelligence, the National conduct large-scale electronic and digital Intelligence Organisation (MİT) is responsible eavesdropping without judicial control for both internal and foreign intelligence. were also expanded. The founding of a It shares responsibility for domestic infor- parliamentary committee to control the mation-gathering with the intelligence intelligence services, originally planned services of the police, the gendarmerie and for April 2014 is still awaited. the general staff, creating long-running inter-agency rivalries and conflicts. Until the mid-1990s MİT was regarded as Peace Talks with the PKK: the preserve of the military. The AKP gov- Substitute for Democratisation? ernment was the first to succeed in estab- Apologists for Erdoğan’s argue that his lishing a clear hierarchy of services and strong position is politically acceptable, placing MİT at the top. Today MİT is a cen- because only he and the AKP are willing to tral foreign and domestic tool of the gov- lead the negotiations with the PKK to a ernment. The negotiations with Abdullah conclusion. The eighteen-month cease-fire Öcalan’s PKK are conducted through MİT and the recognition of Kurdish identity, channels, and it remains responsible for rights and demands achieved during that coordinating official and unofficial co- period, they say, represent important steps operation with Sunni and Salafist groups towards democracy and are the precondi- fighting in the . A move in tion for further progress. January 2014 to seek a judicial review of But however true the theory that democ- these activities ended with charges against ratisation cannot advance without a solu- the investigating gendarmerie officers and tion of the Kurdish question, so problem- a news blackout. MİT also arranged the atic is the simple equation of greater cultur- exchange of 46 Turkish hostages for Islamic al freedom with greater political freedom. State prisoners, which took place on 19 Sep- In the pre-Erdoğan Kemalist state the de- tember. liberate exclusion of pious Muslims, Kurds, In May 2010 Erdoğan’s advisor Hakan Alawites and non-Muslims established a Fidan was appointed head of MİT. Between cultural monism that hampered or com- 2012 and 2014 his budget expanded by 40.2 pletely prevented political participation by percent; further increases are planned for all these groups. But the Kemalist state was the coming years. In the first half of 2011, politically pluralistic. Different political

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parties had the chance to form the govern- The European Union’s Dilemma ment, while the courts and veto powers like In view of the situation as outlined, it is the military – democratically legitimated very questionable whether Turkey still or not – constrained the power of the gov- fulfils the Copenhagen criteria that were ernment. Erdoğan’s “New Turkey” is un- the political precondition for starting doubtedly culturally more pluralist than accession negotiations. This presents the the Kemalist state, but ruled by political European Union with a dilemma. Turkey monism. Only one party has any chance to is too important in economic, foreign form a government, the judiciary’s hands policy and security terms for Brussels and are increasingly tied, and actors that once the EU member states simply to forget enjoyed veto power are frozen out. about exerting influence on . But they cannot ignore the fact that the inter- nal drive towards democratisation sparked Summary: Power Relations in by the rise of the AKP has exhausted itself the “New Turkey” for the moment. The period when it was © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Unlike the government and the pro-govern- sufficient for the Union to keep a willing Politik, 2014 ment press would have one believe, Erdo- Turkey at arm’s length and administer the All rights reserved ğan’s “New Turkey” is not characterised by status quo is over. It is also a fact that the These Comments reflect growing democracy. Nor is the successful Union has failed to integrate Turkey in its solely the author’s views. integration of the conservative Muslim popu- foreign and security policy over and above SWP lation into political decision-making and the the accession talks, however such an inte- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik associated expansion of political participa- gration might have been imagined. Euro- German Institute for tion attributable to President Erdoğan’s “New pean Union can only regain influence if it International and Security Affairs Turkey”. It is true that the AKP achieved revives the accession talks. both, but that process occurred between Turkish support for EU membership has Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 2005 and 2011 rather than more recently. increased significantly, from 45 percent in 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 The situation today is characterised by 2013 to 53 percent in 2014. As this demon- Fax +49 30 880 07-100 the consolidating power of one person and strates, in a time of crisis for the Turkish www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] a concomitant relativisation of the influ- political system the European Union can ence of institutions without which democ- once again become the guiding light of ISSN 1861-1761 racy is inconceivable: the political parties democratic developments. Explicitly secu- Translation by Meredith Dale (including the AKP), parliament, the judi- lar forces, the Alawites, and even parts of (English version of ciary, codified law and the constitution. the religious conservative spectrum see SWP-Aktuell 60/2014) Erdoğan stands outside the influence of his themselves facing government repression. party, which however retains its hegemony Against this background, European stand- over parliament. Following a series of ards of fundamental rights, freedom of the purges the government has the bureauc- press and the judiciary can again become racy and in particular the police firmly in the common denominator of an otherwise hand. The weakening of the Kemalist ideol- often uninspired and bland opposition. ogy robs the once influential military of One concrete step towards invigorating the possibility to mobilise the minimum of negotiations and injecting a new dynamic public support required for intervention in towards democratisation would be to exer- the political process. The press is, as amply cise pressure on the government of documented, exposed to existential pres- to abandon its blockade of talks on chapters sure from a government that is simulta- 23 (justice and basic rights) and 24 (security, neously tightening its grip on the judiciary. freedom and justice). Another could be to The intelligence service has been finan- include demands for rule of law and trans- cially and technically upgraded gained parency in the negotiations over visa-free expanded powers, and stands de facto travel and revising the customs union, in under the authority of the president. both of which Turkey has great interest.

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