Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision

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Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007* AHMET DAVUTOĞLU** ABSTRACT f a map of the complex web of global re- Turkey’s foreign policy needs a new orientation in the light of the new Ilations during the Cold War had been regional and global developments. drawn, Turkey would have been considered As a major country in the midst of a frontier country. As part of the Western the Afro-Eurasia landmass, Turkey is a central country with multiple block, it was a means of control in the South regional identities that cannot be among the Western powers extending to the reduced to one, unifi ed category. East and at the edge of the West. It was in- In terms of its sphere of infl uence, stitutionally in the West, and was considered Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, the most important country in NATO; it still Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black preserves this position. Aft er the end of Cold Sea country all at the same time. War in the early 1990s, a new notion of Tur- Turkey should appropriate a new position in its region by providing key emerged as a bridge country. As many new security and stability not only for problems emerged in the post-Cold War era, itself but also for its neighbors and among them the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the region. Turkey’s engagements from Africa to Central Asia and the crises in the Balkans, Turkey’s main objec- from EU to OIC are parts of new tive became the protection of its own stability. foreign policy vision. Domestically, Turkey maintained its stability amid the chaos Turkey needs to deepen and enrich its democracy, accommodate the that engulfed many of its near neighbors, and diff erences within its society, and the international community began to look to strengthen the coordination and Turkey as an island of stability and a bridge balance among its institutions in country between east and west. 2008 and the years that follow. Th ese initiatives will make Turkey a global actor as we approach 2023, * Th is essay is based on the transcript of a CNN Turk program the one hundredth anniversary of with Prof. Davutoğlu on January 2, 2008. the establishment of the Turkish ** Professor of International Relations, Ambassador and Chief Republic. Advisor to Turkish PM Insight Turkey Vol. 10 / No. 1 / 2008 pp. 77-96 77 AHMET DAVUTOĞLU Turkey’s diverse regional Today, in the new era marked by the composition lends it the aft ermath of September 11th, an accu- capability of maneuvering in rate redefi nition of Turkey’s position is urgently needed. Turkey’s new position several regions simultaneously has both an ideational and a geographi- cal basis. In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. As a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may be defi ned as a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unifi ed character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional composition lends it the capabil- ity of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area of infl uence in its immediate environs. Th ere are continental countries such as the United States and Australia. Coun- tries in this category, which are continents themselves in some cases, are located away from Afro-Eurasian heartland. One may include even Europe, India and China in this category. In territorial terms, they are geographically big enough so that they are not defi ned by reference to an external geographical region. Th ey are self-suffi cient in many respects and have developed distinct cultures of their own. Another cluster of countries could be considered island countries such as Japan and the United Kingdom. Situated at the edges of a continent, they main- tain special relations with the continental powers. Peripheral countries constitute a distinct category in that they belong to a region and could be defi ned by the characteristics of that region. Among all these classifi cations, Turkey holds a special position. Turkey’s ge- ography gives it a specifi c central country status, which diff ers from other central countries. For example, Germany is a central country in Central Europe, which is far from Asia and Africa. Russia is another central country in the lands of Europe and Asia, which is far from Africa. Iran is a central country in Asia, which is far from Europe and Africa. Taking a broader, global view, Turkey holds an optimal place in the sense that it is both an Asian and European country and is also close to Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean. A central country with such an op- timal geographic location can not defi ne itself in a defensive manner. It should be seen neither as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West. 78 Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007 Just as geography, history, too, may Turkey’s geography gives it a come to constitute a country as a central specifi c central country status country. Some countries play the central country role in their region as a refl ection of their cultural and historical heritage. For instance, Russia has a peculiar position of being a center of attraction because of its historical role. Germany has played such a role since the Roman-Germanic Empire. Turkey historically has been one of such centers of attraction. It was for this reason that when Turkey embarked on a successful nation-building process in the aft ermath of the Ottoman Empire, it gained population dynamism through immigration from neighboring regions. Th e eff ects of having diverse Caucasian, Balkan, Middle Eastern, Iraqi Turcoman and Anatolian elements, even in small groups, are seen in everyday life in today’s Turkey, where diverse cultural elements meet under the umbrella of the Turkish state. Turkey’s geography harmonizes these elements. Turkey occupies a center of attraction in its region; its cultural capital, Istanbul, spans two continents and is at once a Middle Eastern, Black Sea and a Mediterranean city. In terms of its area of infl uence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country. Given this picture, Turkey should make its role of a peripheral country part of its past, and appropriate a new position: one of providing security and stability not only for itself, but also for its neighboring regions. Turkey should guarantee its own security and stability by taking on a more active, constructive role to provide order, stability and security in its environs. Principles of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Since the year 2002, Turkey has begun to structure its policies on the basis of this new vision, keeping in mind well-defi ned targets, and looking to benefi t from its geographical position and historical assets. Five principles of Turkey’s foreign policy making process need to be mentioned here. First, if there is not a balance between security and democracy in a country, it may not have a chance to estab- lish an area of infl uence in its environs. Th e legitimacy of any political regime comes from its ability to provide security to its citizens; this security should not be at the expense of freedoms and human rights in the country. Administrations that substantially restrict liberties in order to provide security are or soon become authoritarian regimes. Since 2002, Turkey has maintained a position of promot- ing civil liberties without undermining security. Th is is an ambitious yet worthy aim, particularly in the post-September 11 environment, under the threat of ter- rorism, in which the general tendency has been to restrict liberties for the sake of 79 AHMET DAVUTOĞLU security. Turkey has protected civil liberties under all conditions, despite a serious challenge to it in 2007. Th e challenge was to carry out the struggle against terror without narrowing the sphere of liberties. Turkey successfully overcame this chal- lenge. In the fall of 2007, the Turkish military pursued a military operation against terrorist formations in Iraq for several weeks, with no negative impact on liber- ties in İstanbul, Ankara, Diyarbakır, or Van. Normal life continues, even while Turkey wages a war against terror. Th is successful balance is a matter of political culture. Turkish authorities did not declare state of emergency, elections were not postponed, and the election results did not infl uence the process in a negative way. Th ese results support the notion that Turkey’s most important soft power is its democracy. Th e election resulted in a parliament that fostered the struggle against terror. Despite concerns in early 2007, this experience demonstrated that the bal- ance between democracy and security is settled in Turkey. Second, a “zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbors” has been success- fully implemented for the past four years. Turkey’s relations with its neighbors now follow the right track in comparison to previous years. Th e most striking examples of Turkey’s success in the region are its relations with Syria and Georgia. Th ere is an intense economic interdependence with these countries. In contrast to that of 5-10 years ago, Turkey’s level of relations with Syria today stands as a model of progress for the rest of the region. It is the same with Georgia.
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