Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Erdoğan’s “New Turkey” WP Restoring the Authoritarian State in the Name of Democracy Günter Seufert S European and American commentators warn that Turkey is drifting back into authori- tarianism, citing excessive police violence against demonstrators, restrictions on free- dom of the press and internet, government interference in the judiciary, purges in the bureaucracy, and an anti-European policy shift. They note with astonishment that former prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was able to win the presidency on an in- creased share of the vote despite credible accusations of corruption, strife within the conservative camp and foreign policy failures. Erdoğan himself speaks of the “New Turkey” having succeeded the old, authoritarian Kemalist republic and brought forth a progressive democracy. How broad is support for Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) across society? What can be expected of the new government? How fundamental is the recon- struction of the political system, and what does the it mean for the future of democ- racy? How can and should Europe respond? Turkish and international observers agree Workers’ Party (PKK). The “New Turkey” is that the election of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said to have overcome the political tutelage as President of Turkey on 10 August 2014 that the old secular elites exercised over the marks a turning-point in the country’s po- majority with the backing of the army and litical development. The new president sees the judiciary. The new regime, it is claimed, himself not only as the head of state, but is therefore not only culturally authentic, also as guarantor of the will of the people. but also democratic. For the first time since the founding of the republic, it is asserted, the government, its policies and the personality of the presi- Erdoğan’s Electoral Success dent reflect the identity, the culture and Including parliamentary and municipal the political inclinations of the population. elections and constitutional referendums, And, it is also claimed, the cultural plural- Erdoğan’s presidential victory with 51.8 ity of the population is acknowledged for percent of the vote was his ninth successive the first time, as witnessed by the peace election win. His widely noted charisma negotiations with the banned Kurdistan alone cannot explain this prolonged series Dr. Günter Seufert is a Senior Associate in SWP’s EU External Relations Division SWP Comments 44 October 2014 1 of successes. What we are in fact seeing There are, admittedly, other reasons too under Erdoğan is the conclusion of a long- behind Erdoğan’s leap in support from term process in Turkish politics: the incre- 43.39 percent in the municipal elections to mental integration of the conservative almost 52 percent in the presidential. Firstly, religious majority and the Kurds into the Erdoğan succeeded in uniting behind him political system. Three military coups and the votes of smaller right-wing parties that the banning of 26 political parties are only did not put up candidates of their own, the most obvious examples of measures such as the Turkish-Islamist Felicity Party (SP), taken since 1960 to exclude Kurdish and the Turkish nationalist Great Union Party conservative Islamic actors from the Kemal- (BBP) and the Kurdish-Islamist Free Cause ist republic. Even the AKP only narrowly Party (HüdaPar). A repeat of that impressive escaped prohibition in 2008 – at a time result is therefore not expected at the June when it was governing with an absolute 2015 parliamentary elections. Secondly, majority. Prior to 2007, the political influ- many supporters of the “left-wing” Republic- ence of the generals through the National an People’s Party (CHP) and the “right-wing” Security Council and presidential vetoes Nationalist Action Party (MHP) were unable to had further restricted the options of con- bring themselves to give their vote to the servative governments. joint candidate of the two parties. Since the beginning of his career in the AKP, Erdoğan’s political discourse has con- sequently revolved around “democratisa- The New Government: Pro-European tion”, understood as asserting the will of Gloss on Authoritarian Reality the conservative majority against the politi- The new prime minister, former foreign cal control of the Kemalist elite. It was this minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, unveiled his project that gained Erdoğan his following first cabinet on 29 August 2014. A small across disparate classes, groups and regions sigh of relief was heard in Brussels, because and also found support abroad. foreign and European policy were entrusted During the clashes over the plans for to figures who are well-known in Europe. the Gezi Park in Istanbul in summer 2013 The new foreign minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Erdoğan instrumentalised this established served briefly as European Union affairs “democratisation discourse” to legitimise a minister and was from 2010 to 2012 Presi- blunt strategy of retaining power. Erdoğan dent of the Parliamentary Assembly of the has replaced the real decades-long political Council of Europe. His previous post as tutelage of the generals with an only imagi- European Union affairs minister was taken nary political “tutelage of foreign powers over by the career diplomat Volkan Bozkır, over the Turkish nation and its govern- previously Turkey’s permanent representa- ment”. This has enabled him to present tive to the European Union. The appoint- authoritarian moves against the opposition ment of the previous economy minister Ali and interference in the judiciary as mea- Babacan as one of the four deputy prime sures in defence of democracy and directed ministers and the retention of Mehmet exclusively against foreign agents and Şimşek as finance minister were also wel- stooges, above all the cadres of the preacher comed as both are regarded as competent Fethullah Gülen within the bureaucracy in their field and unideological. Moreover, (see Günter Seufert, Is the Fethullah Gülen the new Government Policy Statement at- Movement Overstretching Itself?, SWP Research tributes the European Union central impor- Paper 2/2014). He employed this rhetorical tance for the country’s modernisation, brandmarking exceptionally successfully seeking accession for the republic’s cente- in the run-up to the municipal elections at nary in 2023. the end of March 2014 and also in his latest But the manner in which the new gov- campaign for the presidency. ernment presents itself to the population SWP Comments 44 October 2014 2 speaks a different language that fits more tle of Atatürk’s successor, likewise leading with the many passages in the Statement the fight to liberate his country from West- referring to Turkey as a civilisation in its ern domination. In fact he believes he sur- own right, quite stark distinct from the passes his predecessor in this respect, be- European, with its own distinct “national cause his endeavours for the national cause values” rooted in Turkish Ottoman history. always have the majority of the population These inherent values of Turkish civilisa- behind them. tion not only have to be renewed, it is con- This mixture of nostalgic yearning for tended, but must also be asserted through- former national greatness, anti-Western out all state institutions, and the state must nationalism and conservative morality convey these values to the public. cannot produce clear domestic or foreign With state and government working to policy programmes. But the “New Turkey” culturally and morally homogenise the discourse establishes a new hierarchy of population, the “democratisation” deployed political identities, with the government to break the power of the secular elite has seeking to secure a monopoly over central been replaced by a new authoritarianism, political concepts such as nation, national this time in the guise of conservative reli- interest, justice, progress and religion. Gov- gious identity. ernment rhetoric holds up Erdoğan and After his nomination as party leader, the AKP as indispensable for the existence Davutoğlu accordingly defined the AKP as and future of fatherland and nation and a “cadre movement” that had appeared on discredits the opposition. Erdoğan and his the stage to revive and resurrect a deeply circles have no qualms about labelling oppo- rooted state tradition rather than as the sition politicians saboteurs, traitors and representative of the interests of large parts foreign agents. This all serves to legitimise of the population. Under his leadership this curtailing rights and liberties and to secure “restoration” will be continued without power for the current government and the interruption, he said. After assuming the governing party. party leadership, Davutoğlu declared that From this point it is but a small step to Turks would in future have to exercise their open rejection of so-called European values civil liberties within the constraints of a and any orientation on Europe at all, as pro- particular “moral formation” that was ap- pagated by Erdoğan’s chief economic advisor parently to be prescribed by the government. Yiğit Bulut. As it has with Russia, Europe has The ideology used to justify this authori- undermined Turkey’s culture in order to ex- tarian state and the restriction of civil liber- pand its own influence, Bulut writes in the ties is a hotchpotch of Turkish nationalism, pro-government Star newspaper. The only religious piety and enthusiasm for the pan-