“The Third Rome” Holy Russia, Tsarism and Orthodoxy

Excerpts from “The Third Rome” Holy Russia, Tsarism and Orthodoxy By Matthew Raphael Johnson (Please get the full version of this book at your bookstore) Content: (In the book: 1. A few brief thoughts on the Russian state. 2. Beginnings of the Muscovite-Rus- sian state. 3. Ivan III, Holy Russia and serfdom. 4. Tsar Ivan IV “The Terrible.” 5. The time of troubles and the battle for Old Russia. 6. The early Romanovs: Michael, Alexis and Fedor. 7. The Russian peasant under serfdom). Here: 8. The Problem of Peter the Great. 9.The Reign of the Adorable Catherine. 10. Alexander I and Invisible Napoleon. 11. Nicholas I and the Decembrists. 12. The Slavophiles & the 19th Century. 13. Alexander II, Revolutionism and Emancipation. 14. The Reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II. 15. The Revolution of 1905 and the Duma Monarchy. 16. World War I and the Bolshevik Coup. From Darkness to Light: 8. The Problem of Peter the Great. Peter I, often termed “The Great,” though there are many other monarchs in Russia's history who deserve the title far more, is a problem. He is a historical as well as a scholarly problem. Given the nature of Russian society that he inherited from Alexis, his reign was unique, and, importantly, developed a schism in Russian society, one that had been growing for some time, between Old Russia and Europe, or, more accurately, Old Russia and some strange caricature of Europe in which the wealthy elite indulged themselves. Such terms, of course, are used here as concepts, as ideological movements. Both Old Russia and Europe had intelligent defenders, and the uprisings from Alexis to Catherine, including the rebellion of the streltsy, or the traditional palace guard that was synonymous with the Old Belief and Old Russia, during the early part of Peter's reign, are rebellions of Old Russia against Europe. Now, by “Europe” it is meant that system of thinking, developing at a rapid pace during this time, that specifically sets off western Europe from the rest of the world in a radical way: secularization, bureaucratization, capitalism, centralization, standardization and, in short, statism, were believed, in some twisting of human logic, to eventually and “inevitably” lead to “free- dom.” For the West, as the Slavophiles were to soon address (see chapter 12 of this work) in a brilliant and prophetic manner, had developed a method of thinking that, to put it simply, placed the greatest emphasis on the external linkage of concepts. These concepts and their formal link- ages (or “logical progression”) were contextless and complete divorced (in theory) from the thinker or the society. “Intellectuals” were being born in western Europe, and their ideas soon led to the counterpart of the intellect in the western sense, revolution. Without getting into the particulars of the Slavophilic argument — that will be done later — the importance for this chapter is that the arguments themselves came as a social reaction to a set of events, or more accurately, an ideology, that traces its fitful institutionalization to the reign of Peter. Of course, the recurring theme in Russian history is the adoption of methods that were not in the direct interest of the development of the Russian tradition for reasons of severe necessity and, specifically, military pressure. As always, what drove state policy was the existence of powerful neighbors on all sides, and, no matter how large Russia became or how large her army, her position remained precarious. It might not be an exaggeration to claim that, in spite of everything, the main thrust of imperial policy between Ivan III and Peter was the development of the institutions of standardization to continually challenge the sprawl of the Russian empire. “Empire” in this sense has none of the connotations of the British or Dutch empires, which were entered into through the pressure of an oligarchy for the sake of material gain, the dumping of excess production and the attempt to create new markets. Such empire building, continuing today through the American Department of State, can be judged morally. On the other hand, Russian empire building came very late, and existed almost solely as a result of a) the necessity of answering the development of British power in central Asia and India, and b) more generally, the continuing need for secure borders. In many ways, unfortunately, the nature of the Russian state and its geography made certain that neither goal was really ever met in the sense that, for example, the United States or Great Britain met their own goals. Peter's famous great embassy to western Europe shortly after his ascension to the throne 2 (after the death of the terminally ill Ivan V1) in 1696 exposed him to major developments in technology. For Peter, his interest was in building up a military that could continue to compete with the westerners on their own terms, as no other terms existed. Russia's defeat by Sweden at Narva in 1700 led him to reconsider military policy and, importantly, the building of a modern navy, which Russia had theretofore lacked. It was not long before Sweden, both on land (the battle of Poltava in 1709) and on sea (the battle of Hango in 1714), was utterly destroyed by Peter in what has been known as the Great Northern War. Russia had long since proven its utter superiority in mobilizing men and money quickly for campaigns. Sweden, for the first time in Russian history, was no longer a threat to the state, and the modern, pacific Sweden is a direct descendant of Peter's victory. The city of St. Petersburg after these defeats, was Russia's symbol of a newfound confidence and ability to confront Europe in any respect. Within a few years, Russia went from having no navy at all to one that successfully took on one of the greatest military powers in the world, Sweden, defeating them decisively on numerous occasions. Such a rapid progress is a unique event in history and proves the nearly inhuman power of the Russian state, as well as the increasing deca- dence of the formerly fearsome western powers. Of course, Poland, here too, was also severely weakened, for Charles XII of Sweden, one of the most important military minds of the day, had decisively defeated the Polish state before being destroyed in turn by Peter. It appeared the historical tide was changing towards Russia. Great Britain, always convinced of her inherent right to rule the world, was getting nervous. George I of England claimed in 1721: “The Russians should be feared more than the Turks. Un- like the latter, they do not remain in their gross ignorance and withdraw once they have com- pleted their ravages, but, on the contrary, gain more and more science and experience in matters of war and state, surprising many nations in calculation and dissimulation.” (quoted in Hosking (2000), 193). The Great Northern War was one of the seminal events of Russian history and of the history of central and eastern Europe. Although Russian trade and industry grew at a rapid pace once the Baltic Sea was forever secured, it was done at the expense of old Russia. The reason that Peter's reign presents a problem is that Peter had repudiated the “myth” of Russia, trading it for great power status and a certain “acceptance” by the west. Peter's talented biographer, Lind- say Hughes, speculates that, during Peter's Great Embassy tour of western Europe, he was initi- ated into a Masonic sect. Given the ideology of Masonry, such a view makes sense, in that the gnostic core of technology, at the expense of traditional Christian agrarianism, was a major prop in the Masonic ideal, or pseudo-ideal. That the western Lodges would have seen Peter as a weapon to use against the traditional order is nearly an irresistible conclusion. On the other hand, to dismiss Peter as an occultist, a political version of the array of tiny sectarian cults, derived largely from the Jewish Kabbalah in Russian history would be a mistake. Peter's reforms might well have been necessary given the political and military situation facing the country from both Poland and Sweden before the Northern War. As usual, as Peter ascended the throne, the country was surrounded by enemies, and, after the defeat at Narva, it became clear that, again, Russia's integrity and even existence were at stake unless the military was modernized. Because of this, a veritable gaggle of reforms were necessary. It is the basic consensus of the literature, and for once one that this author shares, that Peter's reforms were done at least from the proximate cause of Narva and the Swedish problem. After the Northern War, that problem was permanently erad- icated. 3 The structure of Peter's reforms is exhaustive. Nothing was left untouched. Initiatives in higher education were stressed, again largely from practical, i.e., bureaucratic and military, purposes. Serfdom was extended and tightened. Women were included in more social functions. Previ- ously, (noble) women were isolated in the part of the house called the terem. This has been mis- interpreted. This was not an invention to exclude women from society. It was an idea, borrowed from the Byzantines, used to protect women from attacks from barbarians. It need not be re- peated that a sign of victory for an enemy in barbaric times was to take and violate women. Mon- gols, Turks and other barbaric peoples who regularly harassed Old Russia would do this, and fe- male “domestic” slaves fetched a high price if they were attractive.

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