WORKING PAPER 2017-05-ccr Preliminary version: August 2017 IDEOLOGY OR VOTERS? A QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF WHY LEFT-WING GOVERNMENTS SPEND MORE Benoît Le Maux CREM CNRS UMR6211, University Rennes 1 & Condorcet Center for Political Economy, France Kristýna Dostálová CREM CNRS UMR6211, University Rennes 1 & Condorcet Center for Political Economy, France Fabio Padovano CREM CNRS UMR6211, University Rennes 1 & Condorcet Center for Political Economy, France CONDORCET CENTER FOR POLITICAL ECONOMY UNIVERSITY OF RENNES 1 – CREM-CNRS www.condorcet-center.fr Ideology or Voters? A Quasi-Experimental Test of Why Left-Wing Governments Spend More∗ Benoît LE MAUX
[email protected] University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS, Condorcet Center for Political Economy Kristýna DOSTÁLOVÁ
[email protected] University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS Fabio PADOVANO
[email protected] University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS, Condorcet Center for Political Economy October 13, 2017 Abstract In the literature, there is a widespread consensus that left-wing governments raise taxes and public spending more than their right-wing counterparts. We demonstrate that this result must be interpreted with caution. What might seem a partisan effect, due to the direct impact of parties’ ideology on public spending, might actually be a selection bias, because changes in the distribution of voters’ preferences determine changes of the ideology of the government in office. We overcome this problem of observational equivalence by applying two identification strategies, regression discontinuity design and propensity score matching. Using data from the French local public sector, we show that left-wing governments facing the same economic situation as right- wing ones do not spend more, particularly in the case of social expenditures.