1 Religion and the Northern Ireland Conflict
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Notes 1 Religion and the Northern Ireland Conflict 1. For the purposes of this section, when the word ‘nationalism’ is used without a qualifier, it refers to both Ulster Unionism and Irish nationalism, not solely Irish nationalism. Ulster Unionism is treated here as a form of nationalism. 2. For example, Akenson (1992) has demonstrated how the extraordinary histories and virulent nationalisms of the Ulster Scots, Afrikaners, and Israelis have been moulded by the idea that they are latter-day Israelites, or covenanted peoples chosen by God. However, Smith (1999) has identi- fied covenantal election myths also among the Armenians, the Copts, the Amharic Monophysites, the Greek and Russian Orthodox Christians, Irish Roman Catholics, and New England Protestants, while other versions of the religious election myth were present in ancient Sumer, Egypt, Greece, Rome, and Babylon; medieval Christian peoples, including the French, Swiss, English, Welsh, Spanish, Catalans, Poles, and Hungarians; and in non- Christian traditions, among Arabs and Persians, Sikhs, Sinhalese, Burmans, Chinese, and Japanese. Smith argues that the ideas of national mission and destiny characteristic of nationalism represent secular expressions – ‘lineal descendants’ – of these earlier religious notions of ethnic ‘chosen peoples’. 3. The political philosopher John Gray has written of how the teleological view of history (as a narrative that will culminate in a coming age of liberation and justice), which has been fundamental to so many nationalisms and a range of secular political projects from National Socialism to communism to American neo-conservatism, was borrowed from Christianity (Gray, 2007). 4. This identification of Catholicism with oppressive politics is still the basis for much Unionist thinking today; on ‘secular anti-Catholicism’, see Brewer and Higgins (1998: 151–64). 5. Describing quasi-religion, Wolffe looks to theologian Paul Tillich’s charac- terisation of religion as ‘being grasped by an ultimate concern’, and ‘taking something with ultimate seriousness, unconditional seriousness’. This then includes causes like nationalism and communism which have a cultural power and ideological structure which is similar to those of traditional reli- gion, and arouse a similarly totalising degree of commitment. Tillich calls these causes ‘quasi-religions’ or ‘secular faiths’ (Wolffe, 1994: 8). Sociologists tend to use the term ‘civic religions’. 6. The 2010 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (see http://www.ark.ac.uk/ nilt) showed that 55 per cent of people attended religious services at least once a month, with 32 per cent attending weekly. This compares with the 23 per cent attending monthly and 14 per cent attending weekly services in Britain, according to the 2011–12 British Social Attitudes Survey. Only 13 per cent in Northern Ireland said they had no religious affiliation at all; the figure for Britain was 50 per cent. 177 178 Notes 7. Racial contrasts have never been a significant feature of the Ireland conflict. Describing pre-partition Unionist discourse, Hempton and Hill stress that Catholics were regarded as inferior, not because they were Irish Celts, but because their religion made them inferior (Hempton and Hill, 1992: 183). On the similarities and dissimilarities between racism and sectarianism, see Brewer (1992). 8. Protestants, of course, also turned to religion to interpret events, but found opposite analogies. The Church of Ireland Gazette had this to say about Bobby Sands’s election to Westminster: ‘The people of Fermanagh-South Tyrone certainly chose Barabbas and they well and truly re-crucified Christ’ (cited in O’Malley, 1990: 165). 9. And the continued faction fighting within Loyalism and the emergence of dissident Republicanism is a useful reminder of this significance. 10. The collapse of the Combined Loyalist Military Command meant the UDA was reluctant to join the peace process – they are understood to have been dragged into the ceasefire by the UVF kicking and screaming. The UDA’s political party, the UDP, has folded. The UVF’s return to violence (particularly the murder of Bobby Moffett and the East Belfast riots in 2010) has caused oneleaderofthePUPtoresignindisgust(DawnPurvis)andthePUPtolose its only seat in the devolved assembly in Stormont. 2 The Personal Faith of Ex-Combatants 1. ‘God protected me, claims Loyalist Adair’, Newsletter, 6 September 2011. 3 Religion and Motivations for Violence 1. This is not quite right. For example, ‘crab suas’ means ‘fuck up’. He is refer- ring to the tendency to use expletives in their English version (as so often happens in other languages too, so universal has the f-word become in its English form). 2. This siege mentality is captured well in two books on Northern Protestantism, one which refers to them as having a ‘precarious belonging’ (Dunlop, 1995), the other of them being an ‘unsettled people’ (McKay, 2000). 3. Perceptions of ‘the Troubles’ are full of mythology, on all sides, and we feel it is necessary to point out here that Protestants were not ‘put out’ of New Barnsley. They were persuaded to leave in an exodus orchestrated by Ian Paisley, and in a famous TV interview Brian Faulkner, the then prime min- ister, pleaded with them to stay, but to no avail. They were not so much put out as led out. Perceptions, however, are what matters for it is perceptions that link to emotions and then to behaviour. 4 Religion and Prison 1. Prison Fellowship is a worldwide evangelical ministry which promotes Christianity within prisons, provides practical care for prisoners and their families, and campaigns on criminal justice and penal reform issues. It was Notes 179 founded in the United States by Watergate conspirator and Christian convert Charles Colson (see Colson, 1979). 2. McClinton was infamous for once suggesting that Catholics should be beheaded and their heads left on the railings at Woodvale Park in North Belfast, but he underwent a religious conversion in prison to an extreme form of conservative evangelicalism. He was later pastor to the UVF and to the Loyalist Volunteer Force, whose most infamous member was Billy Wright, also known as King Rat, notorious for the murder of innocent Catholics. McClinton’s religious beliefs and his relationship with Wright are discussed in Brewer and Higgins (1998). 3. The issue of shorter sentences for those with religious conversions is not mythology and we return to it again below. Gerry Fitt, Member of Parlia- ment for Catholic West Belfast, protested about it several times in the House of Commons, since only Loyalists got this remission. The argument raged at the time. The prison authorities were Protestant and they did not think that Catholics were real Christians and therefore could not be born again in their conversion experience. Basher Bates, for example, was one of the Shankill Butcher gang and was sentenced to multiple life sentences in jail. The judge said he should never be released again. But within a few years he became born again and got out on Christmas and summer parole before being released. The reason given was that he was a serious Christian and had turned his life around. He was shot dead by fellow UDA people because he had shot a UDA man’s son. 5 Ex-Combatants and the Churches 1. A small number of clerics were responsible for public pronouncements on Republican and state violence over the course of ‘the Troubles’. These included Cardinal William Conway, Cardinal Tomás Ó Fiaich, Bishop Edward Daly, Car- dinal Cathal Daly and Monsignor Denis Faul. On their personal styles and emphases, see O’Connor (1993: 272–333) and Brewer et al. (2011). None sup- ported the IRA, although Cardinal Ó Fiaich, in 1978, voiced the Republican demand that the British should withdraw from Northern Ireland. 2. Some of these are well known. Fr Des Wilson, Fr Pat Buckley, and Fr Jim McVeigh were critical of the church hierarchy’s focus on IRA violence over violence by the security forces (O’Connor, 1993: 283–4). Several priests were involved in setting up vigilante groups to protect Catholic areas in 1969–70 (O’Connor, 1993: 276). Two Cistercians, Fr Thomas O’Neill and Brother Patrick Skehan, were arrested and convicted of attempting to drive escaped IRA prisoners across the border in 1971–72 (McElroy, 1991: 144). The most notorious case of clerical support for the IRA is that of Fr James Chesney who is believed to have been an IRA leader and involved in the July 1972 Claudy bombing in which nine people were killed. According to a report by the Police Ombudsman published in October 2010, the police, British government and Catholic Church colluded at the time to keep the priest’s role secret, probably in order to avoid inflaming community tensions (see Brewer et al., 2011: 3, 156–63). 180 Notes 3. The Evangelical Contribution on Northern Ireland was a ‘think and do tank’ that was active from the late 1980s until it morphed into the Centre for Contemporary Christianity in Ireland in 2005. ECONI eschewed both dis- engaged evangelical pietism and Paisley-style religious nationalism in favour of active peacebuilding based on biblical, evangelical principles. It comple- mented research, publication and conference activities with behind the scenes ‘Track II’ diplomacy. For a description and assessment, see Mitchel (2003), Ganiel (2008) and Brewer et al. (2011). 4. The Greek word ‘kenosis’ is a Christian theological term which means ‘empty- ing’. It is used to refer to the emptying of one’s own will in order to surrender to God, and God’s emptying of Himself in order to become fully human in Jesus. 6 Perspectives on the Past: Religion in the Personal and the Political 1. It is impossible to leave this point without drawing attention to the many superficial parallels with slavery. Black Americans saw in religion a refuge from a hostile (White) world as well as a source of identity and affirmation of their human dignity.