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2021 OSAC CSR Egypt.Pdf OSAC Country Security Report Egypt Last Updated: July 29,2021 Travel Advisory The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses Egypt at Level 3, indicating that travelers should reconsider travel to Egypt due to COVID-19. Exercise increased caution in Egypt due to terrorism and the Embassy’s limited ability to assist dual national U.S.- Egyptian citizens who are arrested or detained. Do not travel to the Sinai Peninsula (except for travel to Sharm El-Sheikh by air) or the Western Desert due to terrorism; or to Egyptian border areas due to military zones. Review OSAC’s report, Understanding the Consular Travel Advisory System. The Institute for Economics & Peace Global Peace Index 2021 ranks Egypt 126 out of 163 worldwide, rating the country as being at a Low state of peace. Crime Environment The U.S. Department of State has assessed Cairo as being a MEDIUM-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests. The U.S. Department of State has not included a Crime “C” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Egypt. The crime emergency line in Egypt 122; for tourist police, call 126; and for the fire brigade, call 180. Review the State Department’s Crime Victims Assistance brochure. Crime: General Threat Most criminal acts against foreigners tend to be crimes of opportunity, such as purse snatching and pickpocketing, that often involve young males. Semi-professional thieves target unaware visitors in restaurants and shops, stealing purses, phones, and purchased goods. Thieves have also broken into vehicles when valuables were clearly visible. There have been several instances where individuals passing on a motorbike have grabbed handbags, sometimes inadvertently injuring the victim. There were reports of criminal ruses against foreign visitors, often employing feigned concern over a stain/spill on an article of clothing; while helping to wipe the clothing, the criminal lifted a wallet from a purse or pocket. Be cautious to avoid being overcharged for various services, and for becoming victims of scams common in tourist destinations worldwide. Expect to encounter aggressive vendors at tourist attractions and archaeological sites. Some will offer “free” gifts to tourists which, once accepted, often lead to demands for money. Harassment can occur anywhere. Most tourist sites have specially designated tourist police who can assist in uncomfortable situations. Crime: Areas of Concern U.S. Embassy personnel traveling outside Cairo require advance Embassy approval. All U.S. Embassy personnel are advised to remain vigilant at all times. Review OSAC’s reports, All That You Should Leave Behind, Hotels: The Inns and Outs, Considerations for Hotel Security, and Taking Credit. 1 Kidnapping Threat Kidnappings have been reported in rural areas and with tribal communities. Kidnappings are less common in major cities. Some recent reporting includes: • In March, ISIS reportedly kidnapped 14 civilians from the village of Amoriya in Bir al-Abd. • In April, ISIS kidnapped and later killed a teacher and church founder in Bir al-Abd. The U.S. Department of State has not included a Kidnapping “K” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Egypt. Review OSAC’s reports, Kidnapping: The Basics and Active Shooter and Kidnapping Response Tips. Drug Crime Egypt is a transit point for cannabis, heroin, and opium moving to Europe, Israel, and North Africa; and a transit stop for Nigerian drug couriers. The country also serves as a money laundering site for drug profits due to lax enforcement of financial regulations A Supreme Standing Committee for Human Rights (SSCHR) report in 2019 stated, "the number of financial criminal cases related to the illicit trafficking and abuse of drugs amounted to 58 cases worth a total of over EGP 2,705bn." Consult with the CIA World Factbook’s section on Illicit Drugs for country-specific information. Terrorism Environment The U.S. Department of State has assessed Cairo as being a CRITICAL-threat location for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests. The U.S. Department of State has included a Terrorism “T” Indicator on the Travel Advisory for Egypt, indicating that terrorist attacks have occurred and/or specific threats against civilians, groups, or other targets may exist. Review the latest State Department Country Report on Terrorism for Egypt. The Institute for Economics & Peace Global Terrorism Index 2020 ranks Egypt 14 out of 163 worldwide, rating the country as having a High impact from terrorism. Terrorism: General Threat Terrorist groups continue plotting attacks in Egypt. Terrorists may attack with little or no warning, and have targeted diplomatic facilities, tourist locations, transportation hubs, markets/shopping malls, western businesses, restaurants, resorts, and local government facilities. Terrorists have conducted attacks in urban areas, including in Cairo, despite the heavy security presence. Terrorists have targeted religious sites, to include mosques, churches, monasteries, and buses traveling to these locations. Several terrorist organizations operate in Egypt. The self-proclaimed ISIS-Sinai Province terrorist group (also sometimes known as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), an ISIS affiliate) is the most active terrorist group in Egypt; it pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014. There are also ISIS in Egypt, Harakat Sawa'd Misr (HASM), Liwa al-Thawra, al-Qa’ida-linked groups, Harket Elmokawma Elsha'biya a.k.a. “Popular Resistance,” and other various smaller terrorist groups. Terrorist attacks can occur anywhere in the country. 2 Terrorist attacks are primarily, but not exclusively, due to the actions of violent extremists operating out of the northern Sinai Peninsula, which continues to be unstable. Terrorist organizations are primarily active in the northeastern parts of the Sinai governorate. Most attacks in North Sinai target the Egyptian government (military installations and personnel). Egyptian security forces launched “Operation Sinai 2018,” resulting in a significant intensification of military activity in North Sinai. Terrorists have also conducted attacks in the Western Desert – the large, mostly isolated area west of greater Cairo and the Nile Valley. Egyptian news and social media reported a number of terrorism-related incidents in 2020 and 2021. These included: • In October 2020, an explosion inside a military facility killed or injured at least 14 Egyptian soldiers west of Sinai. • An IED killed an Egyptian soldier and four family members at their home in Iqtiya. • A car bomb killed one civilian and injured two others in al-Marih, southwest of Bir al-Abd, North Sinai. • An explosion killed seven Egyptian border guards west of Bir al-Abd, North Sinai. • In December 2020, ISIS claimed to have killed one person and injured three others after the detonation of an explosive-laden house in al-Mutla, Rafah. • In January 2021, suspected ISIS militants kidnapped seven workers from a poultry farm in Bir al- Abd. • Two Egyptian soldiers died and four others were injured after an attack on their vehicle south of Bir al-Abd. • In February 2021, an IED attack killed two Egyptian soldiers and injured two others in their vehicle south of Sheikh Zuweid. • In March 2021, an IED explosion killed two Egyptian children in Tufaha, south of Bir al-Abd. Social media reported Egypt’s security forces thwarted 90 terrorist attacks in 2020. While the incidents above do not confirm that extremist elements are targeting private-sector interests, the expansion of attacks targeting civilian interests raises concerns about wrong-place, wrong-time violence leading to collateral damage. To mitigate this, the Egyptian government maintains a heavy security presence at major tourist sites, especially the resort town of Sharm El-Sheikh and the many temples and archaeological sites located in and around Cairo, Luxor, Aswan, and Abu Simbel. Political Violence and Civil Unrest Environment The U.S. Department of State has assessed Cairo as being a HIGH-threat location for political violence directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests. Elections/Political Stability Recent elections in Cairo have been peaceful, with strong police presence at the polling stations. 3 Protest & Demonstration Activity Political protests are rare. Egypt’s demonstrations law prohibits gatherings of more than ten people without advance permission from the Interior Ministry. If protests do break out, they could result in clashes with police and security forces. In the past few years, the size and frequency of demonstrations have decreased markedly. In the past, demonstrations have led to violent clashes between police and protesters, resulting in deaths, injuries, and property damage. Peaceful demonstrators and bystanders may be subject to questioning, detention, arrest, and conviction for participating in or being in proximity of unauthorized demonstrations. While there may be periods when crowds appear celebratory or non- threatening, criminal acts could still occur under the anonymity a large crowd provides. Authorities quashed previous unauthorized demonstrations in a relatively short time. It is illegal to photograph police stations, military barracks, and certain other sensitive public buildings, or their respective personnel; authorities enforce the law in the context of demonstrations. For more information, review OSAC’s report, Surviving a Protest. Law Enforcement Concerns: Security Agencies The Interior Ministry supervises law enforcement
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