Introductory Note to Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship Between Eritrea and Ethiopia by Scott W

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Introductory Note to Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship Between Eritrea and Ethiopia by Scott W Copyright © 2019 by The American Society of International Law DOI:10.1017/ilm.2019.4 INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO JOINT DECLARATION OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA BY SCOTT W. LYONS* [July 9, 2018] Overview of the Agreement Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki signed a historic agreement on July 9, 2018, in Asmara, Eritrea, ending over two decades of open hostilities and war. The Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship (Joint Declaration)1 marks a fundamental change for the Horn of Africa, with the reconciliation possibly altering the economic and political dynamics of the region. The Joint Declaration resulted from several key devel- opments occurring over a few weeks from June through early July 2018. Ethiopia announced its acceptance of the original Algiers Agreement,2 dated December 12, 2000, which had never been implemented, and its willingness to abide by the 2002 international Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) ruling3 that awarded disputed ter- ritory to Eritrea, including the border town of Badme. Previously, Ethiopia had rejected the ruling and asked for a new ruling. Ethiopia had also previously insisted that relations must be restored before any territorial resolution. President Afwerki agreed to negotiate, after stating for years that Ethiopia had to withdraw its troops from the dis- puted town of Badme first. A few weeks before the signing of the Joint Declaration, the Eritrean foreign minister visited Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, marking the first bilateral meeting between the two since the war began. The Joint Declaration states that the state of war between the two countries has come to an end; that they will work to forge close political, economic, social, cultural, and security cooperation that advances the needs of their popula- tions; that trade, diplomacy, and communication between the two will restart; that the 2002 boundary decision will be implemented; and that both countries will cooperate on regional peace.4 These various agreements mark fun- damental steps toward complete reconciliation. The 2000 Algiers Agreement was the previous attempt at an official end to the recent conflict. That Agreement, besides ending hostilities and repatriating prisoners of war, established two international commissions:5 the Boundary Commis- sion, which issued its ruling in 2002 that was rejected by Ethiopia, and the Claims Commission.6 Each commission com- prised five independent members7 and was designed to resolve the outstanding issues. However, it took until this new Joint Declaration in 2018 for both parties to finally recognize the international decisions and fully end the conflict. Reason for Conflict Eritrea and Ethiopia fought an armed conflict from 1998 to 2000. This followed the original thirty-year internal con- flict fought from 1961 to 1991 to establish Eritrean independence, which resulted in Eritrea forming its own state in 1993. The war beginning in 1998 stemmed from the failure to formally resolve the dispute over the 600-mile (1,000- kilometer) border between Eritrea and Ethiopia and multiple border committees and mediation failing to create a resolved demarcation. Before the 1998–2000 war, the two states originally sought to resolve the border issue by examining colonial treaties between Italy and Ethiopia. However, the two sides could not agree on an interpretation of the colonial treaties. When the mediations failed, Eritrea invaded Ethiopia in May 1998 and quickly declared the war finished, having recaptured the disputed territory. The conflict persisted with Ethiopia retaking all the disputed territory and some of Eritrea’s land, tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians killed between the two sides, extensive prisoners of war, and hun- dreds of thousands of people displaced from the border region. Eritrea was later found by the international commis- sion to have violated international law, as its invasion was not justified under principles of self-defense.8 Both sides were found liable to compensate for extensive damages in the claims process.9 Eritrea accepted the awards, while Ethiopia stated that the awards amount did not match the seriousness of committing the crime of aggression under international law.10 * Senior Lecturer and Africa Regional Program Lead for the Defense Governance and Management Team, Naval Post- graduate School. The views in this article are solely of the author in his personal capacity and do not represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense, any other agency, or the United States. 238 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS [VOL. 58: Since the formal end to the fighting in June 2000, which concluded with the never previously implemented peace deal, there had been continuous tension and intermittent skirmishes between the two neighbors as they coexisted in an in-between status of not formally at war and not at peace for almost two decades. UN Peacekeepers were posted for an extensive period to form a buffer between the two sides, often suffering from interference from Eritrea. However, Ethiopia and Eritrea continued to battle, with the two fighting over the border town of Tsorona as recently as June 2016, resulting in hundreds of claimed deaths.11 Results Since the July 2018 peace agreement, thousands have streamed across the largely open border, reuniting with fam- ilies and conducting cross-border business for the first time in two decades. Embassies were reopened and formal diplomatic relations were re-established. Commercial flights between the two capitals resumed. Ethiopian commer- cial ships began docking at the Eritrean port, a critical step for landlocked Ethiopia, which had sent almost all its foreign trade through the Djiboutian ports since Eritrean independence. Even telephone lines between the two coun- tries were re-established. They had previously been cut due to the ongoing conflict and the completely closed and repressive Eritrean society. The peace agreement and formal end to the conflict was a surprising development after decades of open hostility, and it has the ability to influence greater stability in the Horn of Africa. The hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea had pre- viously impacted Djibouti, one of Ethiopia’s most important economic allies. That alliance had resulted in continuous tension between Eritrea and Djibouti since 2008, and the two states had been in disagreement about their own disputed border at the Dumiera Mountains along the Red Sea, which Eritrean troops had occupied. Just a couple months after the Ethiopian-Eritrean agreement, on September 11, 2018, Eritrea and Djibouti signed an accord ending their border dispute.12 Ethiopia’s military participation in Somalia’s fight against al-Shabab had also been a source of contention, and viewed as destabilizing by Eritrea, but is now likely to be received more positively. Eritrea has been under a UN arms embargo since 2009 due to allegations of support to Somali militants. Eritrean and Ethiopian relations related to Somalia may also improve. The Joint Declaration represents an important step to ending conflict in the region. ENDNOTES 1 Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship Between Eritrea and international law. Article 5 set up a neutral Claims Commission Ethiopia, Eri.-Eth., July 9, 2018, http://www.shabait.com/news/ to arbitrate claims by the two governments against each other local-news/26639-joint-declaration-of-peace-and-friendship- and by nationals of each of the two countries. between-eritrea-and-ethiopia [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. 7 The Boundary Commission consisted of Sir Elihu Lauterpacht 2 Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Demo- (president), Bola Adesumbo Ajibola, Professor W. Michael cratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State Reisman, Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, and Sir Arthur Watts. of Eritrea, Eth.-Eri., Dec. 12, 2000, 2138 UNTS 94, UN The Claims Commission consisted of Judge George Aldrich, Doc. S/2000/1183 [hereinafter Algiers Agreement]. This John Crook, Professor Hans van Houette (the president), James agreement followed the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Paul, and Lucy Reed. Most were important figures in the founding Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic and history of the American Society of International Law. of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, Eth.- 8 Partial Award: Jus Ad Bellum - Ethiopia’s Claims 1–8 (Eri.- Eri., June 18, 2000, 2138 UNTS 86. Eth.), 2006 ILM 430 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005). 3 See Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border Between 9 By August 2009, the Claims Commission had delivered fifteen the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of partial and final awards on liability totaling hundreds of mil- ’ Ethiopia (Eri.-Eth.), 25 INT L ARB.AWARDS 83 (Apr. 13, 2002). lions of dollars to individuals and their respective governments, 4 See Joint Declaration, supra note 1. but had no mechanism to enforce payment and collect funds. 5 See Algiers Agreement, supra note 2. 10 See Matheson, supra note 6. 6 See Michael Matheson, Eritrean-Ethiopian Claims Commission 11 Ethiopia and Eritrea Blame Each Other for Border Clash,BBC Damage Awards,ASILINSIGHTS (Sept. 4, 2009), https://www. NEWS (June 13, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa- asil.org/insights/volume/13/issue/13/eritrea-ethiopia-claims- 36515503. commission-damage-awards [hereinafter Matheson]. Article 4 12 Horn of Africa: UN Chief Welcomes Djibouti Agreement of the Agreement created a neutral Boundary Commission to Between Eritrea, Ethiopia and
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