Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Resulting from the Algiers Process

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Naffet Keita

Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers process. Between euphoria and scepticism: traces of peace

Naffet Keita

Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers process. Between euphoria and scepticism: traces of peace About the author

Dr. Naffet Keita is a Senior Lecturer in philosophy as well as anthropology at the University of Bamako. He has been awarded by the UNESCO program MOST and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) for his distinguished academic work.

Dr. Keita lectures, among other topics, on: conflict mediation in Africa; migration caused by conflicts and crisis management. His distinguished expertise on conflict dynamics in the Sahel- region, is regularly covered by Malian media.

Imprint

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mali Badalabougou Est, Rue 27 Porte 49 BP. 428 Bamako Tel.: +223 20 22 44 24 E-mail: [email protected] www.fes-mali.org www.fes.de/de/referat-afrika/standorte/mali/

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ISBN: 978-99952-874-4-3

“Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.” TABLE OF CONTENT

Acronyms and Abbreviations 4 Foreword 6 Executive Summary 7 Introduction 8 i. Background and Purpose of the Study 9 ii. Objectives 9 iii. Research Questions 9 iv. Methodology 11

I. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 12 1.1. How Relevant is a “Political Economy Analysis” (PEA)? 12 1.2. How can a PEA add Value to this Work? 13

II. THE PEACE PROCESS IN MALI: AT A CROSSROADS 14 2.1. Conflicts in Mali: Revolts and Rebellions, Questioning the Nature of the State 14 2.2. The Structural Causes of Previous Peace Agreements’ Failure 17

III. Managing Diversity versus Political Overload 19 3.1. The Implementation of the Agreement and its Political Implications 19 3.2. Ambiguities of Institutional and Civic Appropriation 21 3.3. Segmentation, Fragmentation, Reconstitution and/or Reconfiguration: “Armed Movements counting on State Largesse” 23 3.4. Typology of the Key Participants in the Mali Peace Process 26 3.5. Reversal of Priorities: Lack of Leadership and/or Opportunism! 28

IV. AGREEMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY: REJECTION OR ACCEPTANCE? 31 4.1. Opposing the Agreement as a Means to an End? 31 4.2. Weak Anchoring of the Agreement at Local and Community Levels 33

V. CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING THE AGREEMENT 35

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 36 6.1. Potential for Change in Governance 36 6.2. Concrete Actions Needed 36

References 39 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADC Alliance for Democracy and change AEP Analysis Political Economy AQIM Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AMM Association of the municipalities of Mali APL Associations of Local authorities ARLA Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Azawad CAD Development Assistance Committee ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States CEN Conference of National Consensus CI Integration Commission CJA Congress for Justice in Azawad CMA Coordination of Azawad Movements CME Coordination of the Entente Movements CM-FPR2 Coordination of the Movements of the Patriotic Front of Resistance CNCA National Coordinating Committee for the Implementation of the Agreement CNRSS National Council for the Reform of the Security Sector CNSC National Council of Civil Society CRSS Commissioner for the Reform of the Security Sector COPAM Coordination of the Patriotic Organizations of Mali COPPO Collective Opposition Political Parties COREN Coordination of People from Northern Mali CPA Coalition of the People for Azawad CSA Follow-up/Monitoring Committee of the Implementation of the Agreement CSM Convergence to Save Mali CTS Safety Technical Committee CVJR Commission Truth, Justice and Reconciliation DDR Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration EGD General Meeting on Decentralization FAMA Armed Forces of Mali FES Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung SDS Defence and Security Forces

4 FIAA Arab Islamic Front of Azawad FOSC Forum of Civil Society Organizations FPA Popular Front of Azawad HCC High Council of Communities HCUA High Council for the Azawad Unit MAA Arab Movement of Azawad MARN Mission to Support National Reconciliation MINUSMA United Nations Integrated Multidimensional Mission for Stabilization in Mali MISAHEL Mission of the African Union for Mali and the Sahel MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad MOC Operational Coordination Mechanism MP 22 Popular Movement of March 22, 2012 MPA Popular Movement of Azawad MPSA Popular Movement for the Salvation of Azawad MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad MUJAO Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa MSA Movement for the Salvation of Azawad OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and development NGO Non-Governmental organization UN United Nations ORTM Radio and Television Broadcasting Office of Mali CSOs Civil Society organizations Platform Platform of the Signatory Movements of June 14th PRED Plan for Sustainable Recovery in Mali TFP Technical and Financial Partners RPM Rally for Mali SHS Humanities and Social Sciences EU European Union US-RDA Sudanese Union - African Democratic Rally

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FOREWORD The critical issue is hence the weakness of the State. The study also identifies a correlation between rebellions and crises in Mali and the nature and evolution of the state system. The This report is the product of an internal process study provides information and explores social that the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) has relations within communities underlying the carried out recently in order to enhance its conflict and its multidimensional impact. It un- contribution to building peace and security in derscores the erosion of certain values, such as Africa and in the world. After having initiated patriotism, nationalism and civic engagement. many activities and campaigns in different formats, the FES has decided to incorporate The study focuses on the structural causes of the “Political Economy Analysis” method in its the crisis, which are characterised by a number strategy in order to better understand issues of deficiencies in governance in several areas, analysed in its various studies and publications. the political implications of the Agreement, and ambiguities in its implementation at the levels In this respect, the creation of the Peace and of institutions and citizens. The segmentation, Security Centre of Competence in Dakar is a fragmentation, reconstitution and/or recon- means for FES to implement this new approach. figuration of armed movements only add to An analysis of topics addressed in the past has the complexity of issues due to the plethora of prompted the Centre to “decompartmentalise” parties involved and their expectations. With issues along the lines of national or regional regard to the peace process, the issues of leader- factors. Mali was assigned to the sub-category ship, involvement of civil society organisations, “Why do peace agreements fail?” and the weak embedding of the Agreement at the local or community levels are contributing This PEA examines the Agreement for Peace factors to deficiencies in governance, hence the and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the title of this study: “The Agreement for Peace Algiers Process that was signed between May and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the and June 2015. The sensitivity of the subject Algiers Process. Between euphoria and scepti- and the fact that the participants involved in cism: traces of peace.” the implementation of the peace process in Mali were not always available posed major This study can be seen as a snapshot of the obstacles to the execution of the study. It was situation surrounding implementation of the possible, however, to validate the information Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali gathered by the expert at a workshop attended resulting from the Algiers Process at a specific by some of the key participants in the peace time; that is, two years after its signing. It does process, with their contributions making it not claim to offer a comprehensive analysis of possible to complete the study. the challenges facing implementation of the Agreement, but it does shed more light on the The causes of the Malian conflict are deeply paucity of benefits it has meant for the Malian rooted in the social fabric of a country weakened people to date. by bad governance, with its corollary of social injustice and exclusion and, in many cases, Philipp M. Goldberg difficulties in accessing basic social services. Residing Representative

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Political Economy Analysis (PEA) of the The current crisis in Mali holds the potential for Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali a restructuring of the country’s overall system signed by the Government and various armed of governance, which could foster social groups in Bamako makes it clear that, in a cohesion as well as equity within and between fragile socio-political environment, the support communities and regions. Because of its depth provided by partners of the Government in and the trauma it has caused among the Malian strengthening the State system and consolidating population, the crisis constitutes an historic peace depends heavily on identification of opportunity to completely rethink institutional, points of departure for promoting an inclusive political and social approaches to various visions and lasting political settlement. Steps need to for the country. be taken to encourage political, institutional and economic reform in order to strengthen the The crisis reminds us that conceptualisation basic functions of the State by improving the of a project that aims to redesign the overall provision of public services and solidifying the governance of Mali must be a process that legitimacy of the State by shoring up its ability focuses on the challenges facing the country to meet the expectations of the population. from the local to the national level, inspired Finally, it identifies new approaches to working by proposals and experience of the various outside the State system in order to build parties involved. It must also be backed by coalitions for progressive change involving civil bold development policies – funded principally society, the private sector and the media. by the country itself - and appropriate security measures.

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INTRODUCTION ligerents, which is to say the armed groups and social groups, or even communities, that were signatories to the Agreement and that are in- creasingly portraying themselves as parties to i. Background and purpose of the the conflict. It will also help to understand the structural context of violence in the past, and study to provide a positive impetus towards restoration of trust between the parties, national The Government of Mali and several armed reconciliation, the inter-Malian dialogue, and rebel groups signed the Agreement for Peace facilitate the return of displaced persons and and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the refugees. A new approach to collective security Algiers Process under the aegis of the inter- holds out all of these possibilities. national community between May and June 2015. The document includes a Preamble, sev- Resolution of the serious multidimensional cri- en titles, 68 articles and four annexes. These sis in which Mali has found itself since 2012 pertain to the themes that were discussed dur- requires an analysis of interaction between ing the entire stage of negotiations (political organisations and institutions at the national and institutional reforms, defence and security, as well as the sub-national level of the actors development, reconciliation and transitional involved. justice). This process took almost eight months. The commitment of the signatory parties is cer- A diagnosis of the disease that is gnawing tainly in line with a lasting and definitive solu- away at sections of Malian society, especially tion to the recurring revolts and rebellions in in the northern and central regions, is urgently the so-called northern regions of the country. required. A look back in history and some col- However, these conflicts have spilled over into lective reflection will help us understand the the so-called central region and a large part of various aspects of the evil that is behind the the western Sahel, and has signalled the rise decay of Mali. The approach adopted here is of a new paradigm; namely, that violent con- based on an analysis of the political economy flicts are taking place more and more within of the signed Agreement – i.e., to explore all countries, pitting the State against organised the facts in all their various facets, to engage in groups claiming to represent their “communi- reflection, and to collectively discuss visions of ties”. how to end the crisis.

A good understanding of the Agreement for It is important to remember that, even looked Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and of the at within the boundaries of its current national contexts in which it was negotiated, signed and borders, the country of Mali is home to a mix- implemented can help understand the various ture of various peoples (ethnic groups) display- related issues in terms of their temporal, spatial ing dissimilar customs and lifestyles, and which and political dimensions. In order to meet the have experienced different power manage- expectations that this Agreement has given rise ment systems over the centuries. to, a comprehensive and careful analysis of the underlying political economy (AEP) is required. This study employs the PEA method in an at- This needs to explore the expectations of bel- tempt to facilitate a better understanding of

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the reasons for the failure of previous peace iii. Research Questions agreements, and provides a detailed analysis of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation The key issues guiding us in the collection of in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process. It data are: What are the contextual and struc- furthermore recommends measures to reinvig- tural problems that could influence the situa- orate implementation of the Agreement, and tion and what are the dynamics that could po- offers a framework for a new approach to col- tentially prevent implementation of the Agree- lective security. ment?

If we are to obtain the desired results, the chal- We explored the following factors: conflicts lenge lying before us is to fully grasp new con- over resources, demography, ethnic tensions, stellations of power, and the relationships they violent (cross-border) conflicts, organised reproduce. Indeed, these relationships may crime, terrorism, the proliferation of small arms influence the implementation of the planned and light weapons, the colonial heritage, the activities, and have a significant impact on the significance of non-governmental actors as expected results, as well as the process – on parties to the conflict, the failure of the State hold for the time being – of organising a ref- (absence and weakness), privatisation of the erendum in order to amend the Constitution security sector, the weakness of democratic in- of 1992. At present it can be witnessed that stitutions, the role of security forces, the lack a large segment of the political class and civil of participation by civil and political society, the society organisations (CSOs) have rallied un- lack of transparency and responsibility on the der the banner “Antè A Bana” (“We refuse, part of elites vis-à-vis the citizenry, corruption it’s over”) in a protest movement; the armed of the elite and government administration, factions that are signatories to the Agreement impunity, the exclusion of the majority of the have been involved in armed clashes with one population from the “dividends of peace”, the another; with local elections being repeatedly political representation of government agen- postponed, particularly in areas where interim cies and their ability to fulfil their mandate in authorities have been established. accordance with the terms of the Agreement, the level of trust between social groups as well as between the State and the population, the ii. Objectives level of corruption and organised international crime, the migration of refugees and internally The main objective of this study is to com- displaced persons or “chronic” migration, un- prehend the true potential for change in the even economic development from one group- implementation of the Peace and Reconcili- ing to the other, and political/economic de- ation Agreement. Ultimately, it is hoped that pendence due to obligations/agreements with the study will provide insight into the hidden foreign partners. causes explaining the failure of previous peace settlements, a better understanding of the re- What are the relevant institutions that influ- spective interests of the actors involved, their ence power relations? degree of influence on implementation of the Agreement, and help identify the agents of Here, we wanted to determine how formal change. laws and rules, formal and informal social and

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cultural norms (such as gender, social class, of the various parties, their power relations, age, religion and ethnicity) and inequalities – at incentives and resistance to change, it would local, regional and national levels – influenced appear that the commitments made by gov- people’s commitments. ernment authorities and the signatory movements will be either very ambitious in terms of Regarding the actors and their attributes, we announced reforms, or realistic and feasible. tried to answer the following questions: Who Either way, the context will help determine po- are the relevant actors? How do relations be- tential leverage to make the system adopt an tween stakeholders as well as their power re- approach much more in line with public inter- lations play out? What is their framework for ests. action, and what are their capabilities and resources? What actions and what types of The PEA has often been perceived as a tool parties have a direct impact on the situation? used primarily to identify barriers and con- What are their motivations (financial, personal, straints. However, it has also been increas- political, cultural, etc.)? Who is able to influ- ingly used to identify opportunities, to take ence these actions? advantage of policy changes and to support reforms. By better understanding the politi- With regard to the analysis of the interplay be- cal constraints facing the Malian Government, tween the context and the parties involved, the stakeholders will become more efficient at following questions made it possible to untan- identifying “second-tier” reforms that need to gle the facts in the phenomena, and to deter- take place in key sectors like health, education mine the levels of: and basic infrastructure. Thus, the analysis may help to promote a greater sense of ownership • Interaction between the context and stake- of reform processes, and improve the prioriti- holders, their strengths and the impact on sation and sequencing of reform efforts. society; A PEA of this nature has its limits, of course. • Opportunities or obstacles created by this These relate to: interaction; (i) The extent and complexity of the problem; • Challenges brought about by changes as these affect the context as well as the (ii) The difficulty gathering reliable data or actors; and in-depth analysis of various key aspects, such as: Informal sources of power, access • Identify potential coalitions and platforms to economic privileges and their distribution in the analysis of stakeholders. systems in a very fluid context;

If the PEA is supposed to answer the question (iii) The linkages between political and eco- of the extent to which implementation of the nomic powers; Agreement can reform public governance in Mali, this implies either “rebuilding” the sys- (iv) The difficulty in translating the analysis into tem, or a “marginal” or “cosmetic” adjust- concrete proposals or plans of action for the ment of the same System. Given the interests partners that assist the Malian government.

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iv. Methodology

The methodological approach was based main- ly on documentary and archival research, and in-depth surveys of some of the key stakeholders involved in implementation of the Agree- ment. It was validated after we presented our mid-term findings during workshops organised in Mopti, Kayes and the District of Bamako.

The documentary research consisted of col- lecting qualitative data from various ministries, other government agencies and civil society as well as archival documents on strategic “gov- ernmentality” (Foucault, 1994: 237).

The information-gathering process was facili- tated by the involvement of historical actors such as signatories of various Agreements; former Commandants d’Arrondissement ou de Cercle (county officers), governors, local chiefs and authorities, leaders of social groups, etc. The whole process was based on a par- ticipatory approach, from the choice of target groups to the actual collection of data.

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I. THEORETICAL AND METH- incentives, relationships and power linkages ODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK between different groups and individuals. Such analysis may facilitate the implementation of Despite a long tradition of using methods from development strategies that are more feasi- the humanities and social sciences (SHS) char- ble politically, and therefore more effective if acterising a number of development agencies one has realistic expectations of what can be operating around the world, these have been achieved in a given period and considering grappling in recent years with the question of the risks involved.” [original quote in French in how to use the PEA to refine their strategies Mcloughlin, 2004: 1] and aid programs. There is no uniform con- ceptual framework for this approach, but the PEA helps understand the incentives, institu- OECD-DAC definition helps identify and/or tions and ideas that shape political action and capture some of its main components: its outcomes. As we will see, this can be ex- tremely useful when considering the feasibility “Political economy analysis involves the inter- of policy reforms, institutional changes and reaction between political and economic pro- alistic contributions that development partners cesses in a society: levels of wealth possessed and other donors can make as well as the risks by different groups and individuals, and the involved. processes that create, support and transform these relationships over time” [original quote in French in OCDE-DAC, 2003). 1.1. How relevant is “Political Economy Analysis” (PEA)? This definition focuses attention on politics in particular, as this is the sphere in which com- In view of the massive presence of partners petition and negotiations take place between and their multiple initiatives on the ground in interest groups with competing claims to post-crisis Mali, a PEA of the Agreement for rights and resources. However, it is also con- Peace and Reconciliation would be particularly cerned with economic processes that generate useful to development agencies, and it would wealth, and that determine how public policy help them understand the motivations of key choices are made. In fact, these processes are political stakeholders, how specific policies and closely related and are part of a unified set of programs are formulated, and the implications dynamics that influence the outcomes of de- of development strategies outlined previously. velopment efforts. PEA is programmatic. More specifically, it is For the sake of convenience in the analysis concerned with understanding the interests and operationalisation of the methodological and motivations of different social groups (in tool, we have chosen the following definition, particular, political elites and the signatory which we consider to be more explicit: movements) and the way the signatories of the Agreement manage the political outcomes “Political economy analysis (PEA) aims at plac- that may facilitate or hinder return to some ing development initiatives within an under- form of post-crisis normality. standing of the dominant political and economic processes in society – in particular the It also examines the role of formal institutions

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(the government and members of the Imple- Malians about the sincerity of the armed mentation Monitoring Group) in light of cer- groups that were signatories to the Agreement tain principles shared by the parties involved - due to the “demonstrated collusion” (Malikilé, for example, rule of law, elections, and infor- No. 52, 2017) between some of these groups mal social, political and cultural norms that and the undesirable terrorist movements at shape interpersonal interaction and political the negotiating table in Algiers, as well as and economic competition. splits and divisions between signatory groups espousing “ethnic” versus “community” lines. Finally, it attempts to assess the impact of values and ideas, including political ideologies, Analysis of these debates reveals some religion and cultural beliefs, on political behav- real risks with regard to the feasibility of iour and public policy. effective implementation of the Agreement. In fact, many members of civil society and the political class consider the Agreement in 1.2. How can PEA add value to this question as “something signed with forceps”, work? in reference to the statement made by the French ambassador to Mali at the time, Gilles The signing of the Agreement for Peace Huberson. In his words: and Reconciliation fuelled ambitions to carry out profound reforms in Mali due to “Those who will not sign the agreement will the exceptional attention that this country become obstacles to peace” (www.niarela. received at that time and the presence of more net, consulted on 26/12/17) - even though than 20 heads of state, official delegations the signing the document was conceived as a and international organisations. If it is true gradual process. that the Agreement was not signed at once by the armed groups, the issue today is how to put it into practice in concrete terms on the ground in spite of deadly clashes between the said armed groups and networks of terrorist activists on a number of fronts. How is the Malian Government demonstrating its will and capacity to break with practices that have suppressed and ankylosed the governance of people, communities, and government funds in the past, and how can it adopt a well-balanced approach to local development based on a shared vision? What latitude is there to initiate a qualitative change, and who are the agents for change/renewal?

These questions have weighed heavily on the minds of many Malians. However, they contrast with doubts held by many other

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II. THE PEACE PROCESS IN MALI: analysis of these different revolts and rebellions AT A CROSSROADS is therefore important in the continued search for durable solutions. 2.1. Conflicts in Mali: Revolts and Indeed, if we limit our analysis to the revolts Rebellions; Questioning the Nature and rebellions that have taken place in of the State independent Mali, it becomes clear that this recurring phenomenon is closely related to the The magnitude of the multidimensional emergence and development of the modern crisis resulting from the armed conflict in state system in the country. This correlation Mali necessitates the mobilisation of all our also helps explain the complex trajectories of historical, political, economic, social, cultural both the state-building process in Mali and the and structural capabilities. In this perspective, various legal instruments used to settle these the first step is to perform empirical and revolts and rebellions. documentary research in order to create a pool of knowledge and carry out an analysis of the • 1963-1964: This revolt erupted in a context causes of the crisis while disentangling the links of state-building in which the single-party of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation socialist regime increased the tax rates in Mali from the Algiers process. (a monopoly over taxation was being imposed). In line with the ideology of the To understand the causes of deadlocks in the ruling US RDA, the military hierarchy was process of implementing the Agreement for seeking to consolidate the foundations Peace and Reconciliation, it is necessary to look of the new nation-state. This explains the into its intelligibility. This means that we must choice of the military option as a means to question the underlying or officially omitted quell the revolt. causes of the conflicts that have existed in the northern regions of Mali from 1960 down to • 1990: A rebellion developed in tandem the present day, and that have spilled over into with domestic political demands aimed at the central regions and far beyond. We shall reforming the State and securing freedom, endeavour to remove these conflicts from both democracy and a multi-party regime. This the emotionally charged “community” basis rebellion articulated objectives relating to and the “tropism of the North” in order to public governance, calling for more atten- analyse them as instances of breakdown in the tion to the needs of young Malians (mostly day to day governance of the country. These of Tuareg origin) who had left the country conflicts are local in nature, but they have because of cyclical droughts (they had not permeated Malian society in its entirety to the received any government assistance), and extent that they are perceived to be serious to have them assigned to various State problems facing the State. agencies. Some political measures were quickly taken in order to curb this rebellion. A retrospective look at the period during These included: which various revolts and rebellions shook the northern regions of Mali shows that these - The Tamanrasset Agreement: This conflicts occurred in particular contexts. An was negotiated under the aegis of

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Algeria, and signed on 6 January 1991. tional fragility. These revolts were resolved It was never implemented as a result of at the political level, without any explicit the coup d’état that took place on 26 agreements being concluded. The State March 1991, however, and established new districts in the Cercles (counties) of Ménaka (Alata) and Tinessako - The National Pact: This was also ne- (Intadjédit). gotiated under the aegis of Algeria, with backing by prominent individuals • 2006: The Alliance for Democracy and (Edgar Pisani and Baba Miské), and fol- Change (ADC) staged a rebellion. The lowing several meetings was signed in Alliance accused the State of empower- Bamako on 11 April 1992. A National ing less influential tribes to manage public Conference (from 29 July to 12 August affairs at the expense of certain leaders 1991) and two technical meetings of Kidal and other large Tuareg and Arab (Segou and Mopti) were held prior to tribes (the ubiquitous presence of Kel the signing of the National Pact. This Affala/Ifoghas at local and national elective agreement was concluded on the eve of posts was attacked for its lack of trans- the second round of the Third Republic’s parency and failure to respect the rules of first democratic and multiparty presi- fairness between candidates as well as the dential elections. right to freely choose persons for political office. • 1994-2000: A series of local revolts and mutinies took place, according to some of - The signing of the Algiers Agreement, the parties involved motivated primarily by which was meant to correct some of delays in implementing the National Pact, these abuses, failed to eliminate social and secondly by frustrations on the part cleavages or tribal strife in the Adagh of of certain “ethno-cultural” groups from Ifoghas (Kidal). This rebellion probably the northern regions of the country. These had a spill-over effect, amplifying the groups accused the government of lavish- most recent conflict that broke out in ing too many privileges on armed “Arab- 2012. Tuareg” movements at the expense of the sedentary population. Frequent splits and • 2012: This rebellion erupted in the regions coalescences between armed groups along of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal following the tribal lines, and the formation of “ethno- return of soldiers of Malian origin who had cultural” self-defence groups were contrib- served in the Jamahiriya army in Libya. Mali uting factors. The revolts in question were was preparing to hold new general elec- unique in the sense that they broke out on tions for a new president of the Republic the eve of the general and local elections in and deputies to the National Assembly. a setting characterised by particular socio- The coup d’état of 22 March 2012 further political tensions (the so-called “tontine weakened the Malian State. Badiallo” affair and the advent of COPPO) and the beginning of a renewed term for Subsequently, it encouraged a successful incur- the President of the Republic, which in sion by the National Liberation Movement of reality was more a symptom of institu- the Azawad (MNLA) and its extremist Islamist

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allies, who managed to seize control of nearly lution 2085 (2012). The main objectives of the 2/3 of national territory. After the MNLA unilat- MINUSMA mandate are to stabilise the situa- erally declared the independence of Northern tion in the main towns and re-establish State Mali on 6 April 2012, it was driven out of the authority throughout the country. The Malian region by its allies, who then imposed the Sha- transitional authorities were strongly encour- ria on territory occupied by them. aged to hold presidential and legislative elections. The Security Council also assigned the Unlike all the other rebellions and revolts be- mission the task of facilitating implementation fore, which had not had any explicit ideological of the transition roadmap, including the na- foundations, the one led by MNLA had separa- tional dialogue and electoral process. tist objectives, and was organised into a political and an armed wing. It started in a context Moreover, the international community in gen- in which many tribes were trying to break free eral and ECOWAS in particular had to pool ef- from the yoke of “community” hierarchies, forts to thwart the coup attempt by Captain with organised groups intent on drastically re- Amadou Haya Sanogo, who toppled President ducing the power of the State over the north- Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) in March 2012, ern regions of the country in order to provide and return the country to a normal constitu- a sanctuary for AQIM and at present to Nusrat tional regime (Keïta, 2015). The crisis has also al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support had a profound impact on the people of Mali, of Islam and Muslims) under the aegis of Iyad marked as it were by the disintegration of so- Ag Ghaly and his ally Amadou Kouffa, from the cial ties and thousands of displaced persons Macina Liberation Front. Broader issues are also and refugees. involved, such as arms proliferation, hostage- taking and large-scale trafficking of drugs, mi- To sum up, this brief analysis indicates that grants and cigarettes. All this has contributed all the revolts and rebellions that took place to spreading the war that had gradually devel- erupted when the modern State was either oped in Mali’s Sahel and Sahara regions. under construction or undergoing institutional change or transition. The historical analysis of On 9 January 2013, the terrorist coalition conflicts in Mali also reveals some serious mis- launched an offensive in the so-called central takes on the part of the State as well as a de- and southern regions of the country. They parture from certain republican values such as were brought to a halt in Konna by the Malian patriotism, nationalism and citizenship. Indeed, armed forces, backed by French forces in Oper- analysis of the causes of various revolts and ation Serval. This military action was the initial rebellions points to weaknesses and mistakes step taken by France invoking U.N. Resolution committed by the State as the main factor in 2100 (2013). Subsequently, the U.N. Security all the upheavals. Paradoxically, the analysis Council created the United Nations Integrated also underscores the role of Malian “citizens” Multidimensional Mission for Stabilisation in who took up arms to attack national public in- Mali (MINUSMA) with a total force of around stitutions and destroy basic infrastructures that 13,000 peacekeeping troops. It replaced the were financed either from the State budget or International Mission for the Support of Mali by loans negotiated with Technical and Finan- (MISMA), which was placed under regional cial Partners (TFP). and African supervision in line with U.N. Reso-

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The first leaders of Democratic Mali adopted enough, the lax attitude of the administra- a unique approach, however. They held direct tion and the various forms of impunity that talks with former rebel leaders. This approach prevail in the State system, unequal access had a negative impact in the public sphere, in of citizens to jobs in the State administra- which a number of local chieftains were em- tion and defence and security agencies, broiled in power struggles. These power strug- failure to respond to the needs of the pop- gles have been a major factor conditioning ulation and hence the difficulty for many various actors’ local, regional, international people to answer the question “What does and geostrategic interests and are fraught with it mean to be a Malian?”; issues of considerable complexity (FES, Policy Paper Mali, December 2016). • Deficits in the financial sphere are mani- fested in widespread corruption and lack of transparency in the use of public funds, influence peddling, unequal distribution 2.2. The Structural Causes of Previous of government resources between regions Peace Agreements’ Failure and lack of transparency in the management of internal and external resources, There is no single, clear explanation for the especially on the part of national and in- failure of previous peace agreements signed by ternational NGOs, which have collected Mali in various crisis-resolution processes. The billions of francs from donors but have had interviews and review of the literature suggest no real impact on the living conditions of that a combination of exogenous and endog- the population. These NGOs are scarcely enous factors best explains the ineffective im- visible aside from the signs hanging in front plementation of the previous agreements and of their offices and their “4 by 4” vehicles; the lack of monitoring and evaluation. • Deficiencies in the judiciary are perceived in In this context, issues relating to governance the guise of injustice and impunity, trans- are often cited as the reasons for institutional, gressions of due process and non-enforce- financial, judiciary and communication defi- ment of court decisions; ciencies. This was the case with the proceed- ings of the Conference of National Consensus • Deficiencies in government communication [Conference d’Entente Nationale] that took manifest themselves in the lack of a frame- place in Bamako in 2017, which summed up work and insufficient exchange between the situation as follows: government institutions and the communities they govern; the effects of illiteracy, • The deficiency in institutional governance which excludes the majority of people from is characterised by the decline of State au- the official language of communication, thority, the absence of impact by govern- and a growing tendency among certain ment agencies throughout the country; media to spread disinformation. difficulties in implementing the process of decentralisation; favouritism, nepotism, The deficiencies in governance mentioned here clientelism and demagoguery that the are not exhaustive, but they do illustrate the previous regimes did not combat forcefully institutional fragility in which implementation

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of the peace agreements has taken place. It This summary of the structural deficits resulting becomes clear that, in addition to deficiencies from the combination of various factors does in the area of governance (and many other not provide an exhaustive analysis of the sub- contributing factors), the failure of past ject, but does offer some notion of the mag- attempts at implementing peace agreements nitude of the problem. What is also needed is has been due, among other things, to: a sober assessment of the various instruments that have been used in attempts to deal with • Failure on the part of signatories to live up recurring revolts and rebellions in order to draw to the commitments they have made and accurate conclusions and make useful recom- obligate themselves to in efforts to resolve mendations. various crises and armed rebellions; Regardless of the institutional form it will take, • Inadequate management of previous crises; any renegotiation of the underpinnings of State sovereignty will have a profound impact on the • Lack of monitoring and evaluation of northern and central regions of the country. previous agreements; Any such development will have to vanquish the avatars of nationalism as well as re-establish • Lack of a well-organized civil society in the appropriate conditions for the army to restore implementation and monitoring of the rule over regions over which control has been agreements; lost and for the government to carry on an all-inclusive dialogue (on how to deal with • Inadequate information-sharing and com- “murderous actors”, neighbouring countries munication mechanisms regarding imple- and immigrants, or the image of “us and mentation of the peace agreements on the them” based on exclusion). Hostage-taking, part of public authorities; the rearming of AQIM and the impact of all this on programs of regional and international • Spreading of disinformation by some leaders partners continue to be sources of concern. It of armed groups and media; is in this new context that democratic, political and socio-economic governance needs to be • The weak legitimacy of political and insti- brought into line with the relevant provisions tutional reforms carried out after signing of of the Agreement. the agreements in the eyes of the population.

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III. MANAGING DIVERSITY der to canvass viewpoints regarding the “road- VERSUS POLITICAL OVERLOAD map” and “draft agreement”. Many members were conspicuous due to their absence, if not 3.1. Implementation of the Agree- to say their avoidance of duty; major institutional reforms accompanying implementation ment and its Political Implications of the Agreement have been initiated without the input of signatories to the Agreement and The ongoing crisis is not limited to the north- civil society. ern and central regions of Mali. It is a result of national deficiencies in civic engagement, a These doubts are based on a number of fac- weakening sense of duty, poor security condi- tors. It is not the first time that the country has tions and unequal development between re- signed an agreement with armed groups, or gions and territories. announcements and proclamations have been made of willingness to change the existing in- Due to the often violent outcomes produced by stitutional framework. the social crisis and various movements, mani- fested in new forms of exclusion, profound The “March 1991 Revolution” aroused very inequalities and persistent social gaps accom- similar expectations with regard to good gov- panied by multitudes of internally displaced ernance and economic and social recovery persons, the quest of all-inclusive governance following signing of the National Pact. Today, remains highly elusive. many analysts agree that implementation of the National Pact has not been accompanied It is nevertheless the case that the negotiation by any real monitoring or evaluation by the cit- process was preceded by a phase of vision-shar- izens that would fundamentally question the ing with discussions of possible reforms and var- present mode of governance. ious proposals in the wake of general elections in 2013. These visions and proposals are reflect- For the first time, the negotiation process has ed in different resolutions adopted in formats involved a handpicked selection of well-quali- such as the Etats Généraux de la Décentralisa- fied civil servants, each of whom has valuable, tion (EGD), Assises du Nord, Forum of Gao, Tim- in-depth knowledge of the parties involved as buktu Peace Week, COREN Forum, etc. well as experiences in the past with State governance and the many facets of politics in Mali. On top of all this, other negative political factors Some key civil society organisations have also have helped precipitate the social and political been involved. This process has also been influ- system into a context of political overload, inci- enced by a host of additional factors, however, vility and an armed dialogue. This situation has the most important of which have been: the impacted the legitimacy of the new institutions Government’s decision to replace Burkina-Faso that emerged from the general elections of as mediator after signing of the Ouagadou- 2013. These were accused of failing to consult gou Agreement on 18 June 2013, which made with the political classes in the negotiation pro- general elections possible in the first place, cess and signing the agreement. It should be non-renewal of the mandate for the Special noted that workshops were organised on be- Envoy of the Transitional President, the reper- half of the political class and civil society in or- cussions of the visit to Kidal by Prime Minister

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Moussa Mara, competition between Morocco firm commitments amounting to CFA 1.474 and Algeria to influence inter-Malian discus- billion as laid down in signed agreements sions, internationalisation of the negotiation and conventions. FCFA 965 billion has already process due to the presence of several media- been disbursed, including 807 billion in 2013 tors in addition to Algeria, which assumed the and 158 billion in 2014. While he welcomed lead role, constant reporting of the entire pro- the outcome of the dialogue and follow-up cess in social media, where even the smallest mechanism in place and urged partners to steps taken were leaked to the public before redouble their efforts in order to meet their the supreme authorities were informed, a situ- commitments, the Prime Minister reiterated ation that undermined the “public dialogue”, several principles dear to the TFP regarding the its outcomes, etc., while financial scandals sur- ultimate destination of these resources: rounding State governance also had an impact. “Of the 965 billion disbursed, 193 billion were The negotiating process and signing of the actually received by the Malian Treasury as Peace and Reconciliation Agreement have been budgetary aid and 140 billion were received as widely followed by the political class, particularly project aid. This adds up to 333 billion. In other opposition parties and a large number of civil words, 632 billion, or nearly two-thirds of the society organisations. The broad dissemination amount disbursed, was used without any in- of the text of the Agreement and its translation volvement of our national agencies”. into at least twelve of the country’s national languages have not been sufficient to alleviate In these circumstances, how could the Agree- criticism and facilitate true political acceptance ment resulting from the Algiers process, which by the citizenry, hence portraying the Agreement is associated with certain costs, be effectively as a political compromise that may be modified implemented in a weakened state in which aid to align with national realities and not merely partners hold the purse strings, the political class be seen as a legal document per se. and CSOs do not share the same views regarding the merits of the Agreement and aid part- Arguing that the Malian government is ners are becoming less and less accountable? corrupt, donor agencies are pumping billions to international, national and local NGOs to To reiterate, criticism of the Agreement is as carry out their activities directly without any follows: clear adherence to laws and regulations. Under these conditions, it is difficult to trace funds and “The Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation assess their impact on beneficiaries. During the violates the unitary nature of the Malian State third follow-up meeting following the Brussels (...); under this Agreement, regional councils Conference for Mali, the Prime Minister at the are to hold all political power with the excep- time, Moussa Mara, recalled that commitments tion of the national currency and foreign af- to assist Mali were made on the basis of PRED fairs. Their decisions are to be automatically Document for the period 2013-2014 to the put into effect; the State has dismantled itself tune of approximately CFA 2.155 billion francs, in the process of building a democratic system of which 25% were to be in the form of loans (...); In the absence of the State, what is to be and 75% outright donations. This means that done about the actions of community leaders the funds pledged in May 2013 ended up in who are members of different political parties,

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as there is a risk that they will not respect cer- The limits of administrative centralisation and tain key principles (territorial integrity, national the imperfections of decentralisation have by unity and republican form of the state); a pro- now become evident. Thus, there is a need to cess has been set in motion with the aim of implement a policy of regionalisation, and to weakening and destroying the armed forces, give local communities the opportunity to de- in turn weakening the State, etc.“ (excerpts of termine their elected representatives in order interviews conducted between October and to attain greater legitimacy and to more effec- November 2017). tively embed public action at the local level.

The Agreement is primarily of a political na- The Agreement gives rise to a need to amend ture, however: the Constitution (in art. 25), as it provides for the creation of a second chamber (chap. 3, art. “This agreement is political and not technical. 8). Revising a Constitution is a complex pro- The difference between a political document cedure in itself, but the fact that previous at- and a technical document is that the political tempts have failed calls for a reassessment of document sets the political framework and the arguments already forwarded in connec- the technical document aims at perfection... It tion with the creation of the second chamber. is time to understand the spirit of the Agree- The implementation of these provisions will al- ment”, as Ousmane Sy explained (remarks low better representation of the diverse mem- made in Ségou, October 2017). bers of Malian communities. The criteria for designating elected officials must go beyond Admittedly, it is necessary to adapt the offi- ethnic, sex and religious lines, however. cial texts for the purposes of implementation, which requires two sets of reforms, in the case The commitment of the signatory parties to at hand: laws and decrees governing the de- transcending the crisis is tied to implementa- centralisation process, local elections, and a tion of the actions recommended in the Agree- revision of the Constitution. ment. Some crises in Sub-Saharan African countries are due to the rigidity and inability of their institutions to devise a diverse system. It is 3.2. Ambiguities of Institutional and necessary to leave this legacy behind by easing Civic Appropriation control at the central Government level. The level of control can be reduced in such a way In the Agreement for Peace and Reconcilia- that it ensures true representation of diverse tion, the existence of the Malian State is not social and community groups. In Mali, organis- questioned, let alone its sovereign trappings. ing local elections is all about consolidating de- A careful reading of the “signatory parties” mocracy, and not imposing more restrictions. suggests that the State has been moved down It is a matter of enforcing already existing leg- from its pedestal to the level of the armed islation so that “drug traffickers” cannot buy movements. This is a red line that should not their way to legitimacy (supervision of elec- be crossed. The Agreement and the laws of the tions, providing funds to finance candidates’ Republic are hence not incompatible. The ex- campaigns, etc.). istence of the unitary state is not compromised because no other government can be set up.

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The Agreement explicitly refers to a Second problem of integrating members of armed Chamber. However, it leaves it up to Malians to groups will be the subject of further consul- decide what to call it (art. 6). It should be noted tations above and beyond the Agreement”, that most of the Government’s proposals that according to a political analyst on the ground have been included in the Peace Agreement (interview conducted in Bamako on 8 October emanate from such national deliberative for- 2017). mats as Assises sur le Nord, Etats Généraux de la Décentralisation, etc. Regrettably, however, to date none of the relevant institutions of the State of Mali have is- It is up to the people to assume ownership of sued any statement regarding the Agreement. this Agreement, however. An understanding, This was the case with the Roadmap and the an agreement only makes sense through the Draft Agreement, when many forums and de- primacy of enforcement. This is where jurispru- bates were organised in order to explain things dence is called upon. An agreement is not a to stakeholders, although these were boy- solution to be applied in a systematic way; it cotted by the political opposition. At the same is a tool that allows the parties to agree on a time, there seem to be no strong sense of lead- framework. The real solutions are to be found ership from the government regarding the im- in the implementation of the Agreement, and plementation process. Is the recent statement these will require all the ingenuity of Malians. (January 2018) issued by the United Nations Security Council not a good example of this? An agreement is not a cocktail of solutions. The Follow-up Committee for the Agreement Furthermore, it is clear that implementation of is only to monitor the process that is to en- the reforms will have to take place in the face able Malians to take charge and find appro- of economic constraints, both at the national priate solutions. This means that there can be (budgetary constraints, burden of debt ser- no question of renegotiating the content of vice, which has increased significantly in recent the Agreement, when respecting its terms is years) and international levels (characterised an indication of the level of commitment of by the persisting global financial crisis and the the signatory parties; it has more of a political volatility of export product prices in the world than legal value, in fact. Certainly, there will be market). fluctuations in its rate of implementation in the search for the resources required. There is additional cause for doubt. Mali is the “land of dialogue”, traditionally characterised In plain words, “the Agreement makes it pos- by inclusive consultations involving all the par- sible to shift from the language of arms to that ties in order to set out ambitious reform agen- of democracy.” The Government is weak, but das. However, its social construct is mired in it must not deprive itself of any resources that the prevailing overload at the political level. could strengthen its position: In the last ten years, the mandates of the ATT President would have produced a more than “To intensify the dialogue, to encourage a con- sweeping “consensus”— to be involved in frontation of ideas is much better than armed government action – were it not for the coup confrontation. This agreement is therefore of d’état that has polarised the political class and a coercive character - for peacekeeping. The civil society into several antagonistic camps.

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FDR was opposed to the coup, COPAM and policies of virtuous public governance for the MP 22 were rather in favour of it, while the benefit of all Malian stakeholders as well as de- IBK-Mali 2012 coalition or even CSM adopted velopment partners. an ambivalent position. However, a large number of public policy documents adopted during this period were not sufficiently understood by 3.3. Segmentation, Fragmentation, various social groups, and have not generated Reconstitution and/or Reconfigura- the expected outcomes due to unsatisfactory tion: “Armed Movements Counting implementation and monitoring. This oft-re- on State Largesse” peated situation has created a great degree of scepticism among many stakeholders about the benefits of their involvement, and the ex- At the time the Agreement for Peace and Rec- tent to which successive ruling elites are really onciliation in Mali was signed between 15 May willing to change things. and 20 June 2015 together with the platform of the 14 June Movements and Coordination of In short, the national political dialogue, widely the Azawad Movements (CMA), the Govern- called for since the coup d’état of March 2012, ment of Mali had not yet sufficiently grasped has not materialised due to missed opportu- the heterogeneity of the signatory groups. nities and a failure to set clear agendas. Has the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in It is worth noting that the CMA was conceived Mali, which was supposed to benefit from ef- on 28 October 2014 in the wake of the peace forts by the entire political class and civil society process that was initiated in 2013 (Ouagadou- (art. 51), not suffered the same fate? gou Agreement). This alliance has a rotating presidency, and includes the following groups: Finally, we should underscore the decision by The National Movement for the Liberation the President of the Republic to repeatedly en- of Azawad (MNLA) and the High Council for trust government work to prime ministers who the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), a wing of the are not from his own political party, the Ras- Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), with other semblement pour le Mali (RPM) [Rally for Mali], groups claiming to be members of the CMA, the contexts surrounding their respective res- although they are not recognised as such by ignations in an atmosphere of distrust on the the founding members: The People’s Coali- part of RPM activists, financial scandals in con- tion for Azawad (CPA), a wing of Coordina- nection with the purchase of the presidential tion of the Movements and Patriotic Front of plane and equipment for the armed and secu- Resistance (CM-FPR2), the Movement for the rity forces, various reports by auditing agencies Salvation of Azawad (MSA), and the Popular highlighting the poor management of public Front of Azawad (FPA), which initially joined funds in a context of impoverishment, a fragile the CMA, but withdrew from it on 29 Novem- social and precarious security situation, etc. ber 2014. One of the last so-called members would be the Congress for Justice in Azawad Under these circumstances, many Malians (CJA), which opposed the establishment of have begun to seriously doubt the idea that interim authorities in Timbuktu and Taoudeni the signing of the Agreement constitutes a between March and April 2017. commitment to engage in a renewal of bold

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Each of these two major signatory movements These movements also fail to take local dynam- encompasses diverse groups, and the alliances ics into account. The fact of the matter is that between their respective sub-groups fluctuate they are living from the largesse of the State, according to their agendas and prevailing cir- and to a lesser degree from certain community cumstances. and ideological ties (religious and statutory). Thus, their aim is not really to strive towards At the time of the signing of the so-called the inclusivity so direly needed. This emerges Ouaga Agreement, the Honourable Bajan Ag from the declaration (undated) issued by a new Hamatou (a Member of Parliament from Mé- movement called Coordination of the Move- naka), argued that the cantonnement (dis- ments of the Entente (CME) (Malikilé, No. 42 arming of fighters) should be mandatory, and of 11/11/17). should take place parallel to the negotiations to achieve peace: This Coordination encompasses he following movements: CMFPR2, CPA, CJA, MPSA, MSA “After the cantonment, no one should be al- and FPA. For the CME, lowed to walk around with a weapon. No “At the meetings, it was more declarations of matter which country is helping us, it has to intent expressed than concrete target-oriented be done in good faith. However, we must ac- actions — policymakers still employ archaic knowledge the fact that some countries, in- methods that are no longer in line with realities stead of helping us, are causing us problems. in the country. This is disorienting and prevents If we confine and disarm the armed groups, real progress. In addition, communities are in- there will be no problem in Kidal” (http:// creasingly aware of their rights, and this new bamada.net/processus-de-negociation-la-nec- situation prevents things from happening the essaire-relance-laccord-de-ouaga-est-assez- way they did in the past.” complet-tout-est-dans-laccord ). However, the CME noted that two of its mem- While he added that the vast majority of the ber movements signed the Peace Agreement people in North Mali only desired peace, the on 15 May and that they have seats in the Honourable Member of Parliament denounced CSA, while its other members include move- some members of the armed movements living ments that were forced to leave the CMA and in Morocco and others in Burkina Faso. Reflec- Platform due to disagreements over internal tions like these help clarify the challenges and management practices and differing opinions. opportunities many countries in the African region see in positioning themselves as major It would appear that CME representatives re- players in the resolution of the Malian crisis. peatedly drew the attention of the other mem- The decision of the Malian authorities to make bers of the CSA to violations of the provisions Algeria the top mediator did not mean that an of the Agreement, and to the non-observance end has been put to these ambitions. Hence, of its fundamental principles by the so-called outside actors continue to influence some of signatory parties as well as by the CSA itself the leaders of these movements. This was the because it would not acknowledge the right case throughout the Algiers process, and it is of certain movements to participate fully in the also the case at present. process of implementing the Agreement.

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The CME believed that objectivity in the discus- Clearly, the state of mind evident among many sions cannot be achieved if key stakeholders representatives of these movements, and even are not heard: some agents acting on behalf of the State, is such as to make the process continuous until “The CSA and the Minusma, like the Govern- all their desires have been satisfied, namely. ment, know that the CME is one of the key players in the search for peace in Mali. It is the Since the independence of Mali, the part of the only coordination that never hid its intentions territory marked by some of the harshest geo- and never compromised with the principles graphical, climatic and hydrological conditions and purpose of the Agreement. Therefore, has been tamed by the rulers of the country as to desire its exclusion is to desire the mainte- a territorial continuum to be homogenised at nance of a situation that allows some other key the administrative level, and even at the affec- players with different intentions to prosper by tive level (Cf. Report by Bakara Diallo, 1959). means of a diversion...,” commented one CPA Hence, this pot-independent approach did not representative. differ significantly from the previous. It has caused frustrations to mount, triggering many This movement was making reference to the armed uprisings and enabling the reproduc- non-observance of articles 58 and 67 of the tion of “painful memories” that run contrary Agreement, which refer of the parties involved to a “national narrative” that emphasises unity, and address the make-up of the Monitoring and that neither accepts nor tolerates any dif- Committee. It wanted its member movements ferences. FPA and MPSA to be taken into account. This perspective did not allow one to fully All these factors contribute to strengthening grasp the diversity of Malian communities and the segmentation of the movements rather the signatory parties to the Agreement. One than encouraging them to interact and engage of the first consequences of the signing of the in a dialogue over local developments and the Tamanrasset Agreement in 1991 was the split- state-building processes. Such a context actu- ting up of the unitary movement called Azawad ally contributes to creating life-long “pension- People’s Movement (MPA) into at least three ers” with a vested interest in the multiplication entities: the Revolutionary Army for the Libera- of movements and their bodies. It prevents tion of Azawad (ARLA), the Popular Movement people from internalising the process. for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA), and the initial movement, the Azawad People’s Move- The same frenzy is observable when it comes ment (MPA). Later, the Arab Islamic Front of to organizing various forums and meetings Azawad (FIAA) was created as a result of divi- within and between communities. The recom- sions based on social status and/or categories, mendations issued at the end of such gather- affinities and birth rights among clans in the ings do not benefit the peace process in any home community. way. On the contrary, these meetings become pretexts to specify narrowly defined identities These latent divisions were managed with po- or community frameworks in order to benefit litical subtlety. Sometimes, solutions resembled from state access and privileges. embolisms bandaged in homeopathic doses. They only began to fall apart at the beginning

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of the Algiers Process (2014), tending to wors- across such a vast territory, the government of en following the signing of the Agreement, Mali has yet to demonstrate a strong political with each member of the two main groupings will when it comes to implementing coherent trying to reap the dividends of Agreement for and consensual initiatives in connection with itself. the building of a new type of state that will provide good governance in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. The logical 3.4. Typology of Participants in the consequence of such a situation is that the Mali Peace Process great hopes that prevailed upon the signing of the Agreement have now dissipated. This More than two years after the signing of the is due on the one hand to the recurrence of Agreement, it is still difficult to clearly identify armed clashes between the signatory groups, and explain how the population is benefitting. and on the other to the resurgence of inse- Although not welcomed without reservation, curity in large areas of the country. Lack of and interpreted differently by a number of leadership on the part of the Government has stakeholders, the Agreement does remain the caused rigid macro-policies to hold sway, when only framework in place for the resolution of it is dynamic, complementary policies that are the conflict and the advent of peace. Its sign- needed. ing was made possible thanks to strong support from the international community. With regard to the types of stakeholders involved, the most salient ones are: However, it has many shortcomings that need to be addressed in the course of its implemen- • National stakeholders: The parties involved tation. It has not put an end to insecurity be- at this level are the government as well cause the role of certain key players has not as the Platform and CMA). The CMA and been specified, there is a risk of duplicating Platform are part of a collective, but each roles between the issue-based bodies and is ultimately free to act according to its other institutions, the recurrent and unfulfilled agenda. Each stakeholder is composed demand for inclusiveness at the margins of the several diversified subgroups; discussions in Algiers, there has been no debate on the future of the country in the Na- • Informal stakeholders include those groups tional Assembly, there is ambiguity or silence that felt marginalised at some point during regarding what to to happen to the CMA and the peace process. These are sub-groups the Platform, and more particularly their lead- that were either part of the CMA or the ers, etc. What is needed is a new “National Platform, but which have now joined forces Pact for Peace and Good Governance” rooted to create the CME; in the cardinal values of the Republic. • Stakeholders that operate outside the Faced with the growing expectations of a pre- peace process have a great capacity for dominantly young population, and confronted mischief, and did not participate in the with complex security challenges (drug traf- Algiers process because they were not ficking, terrorism, smuggling of migrants, eligible (armed groups in the central region, hostage-taking, targeted assassinations, etc.) namely: “Islamists” in the Masina Liberation

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Front (FLM) and Nusrat al-Islam-wal- ment of Mali has set up the CNCA (National Muslimin - (Support Group for Islam and Coordinating Committee for the Implementa- Muslims) under the leadership of Iyad Ag tion of the Agreement). It is now part of the Of- Ghaly); fice of the High Representative of the President of the Republic. Its role is essential because the • Regional and international actors involved operational implementation of the Agreement in the negotiating process (Sahel groups); is primarily the responsibility of the Govern- ment. It is chaired by the Prime Minister and • The international community (UN, MISAHEL, includes permanent members like the Minis- EU, etc.); ters in charge of departments that are directly involved in implementing the Agreement, the • Permanent members of the U.N. Security Secretary General of the government and of Council (France, United States, etc.). the President’s Office, and the Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister. Article 57 of the Agreement provides for the creation, immediately after its signing, of a Fol- In a spirit of broad inclusiveness, associate low-up/Monitoring Committee of the Agree- members were also appointed to it, represent- ment (CSA) chaired by Algeria, the leader of ing: The National Assembly, the High Council the international mediation group. The CSA of Communities (HCC), trade unions, political includes the Government, the signatory move- parties, religious as well as women and youth ments and the mediator. umbrella organisations. It has a permanent Secretariat that performs the technical work. Its role is to monitor and ensure effective im- The difference between the two bodies is that plementation of the provisions of the Agree- the first one is charged with monitoring the ment. This has necessitated the creation of Agreement, while the second is assigned with different subgroups charged with handling the operational implementation of the Agreement. four themes listed in the Agreement (art. 62). It took almost a year for the CSA to become op- In order to ensure proper implementation of erational because of disagreements between the Agreement, and in addition to the Office the signatory movements, and the incessant of the High Representative of the President of disengagements that have resulted from the the Republic, various mechanisms have been many clashes within and between the signa- established, including: the signing of tripar- tory movements on the ground. On several tite agreements (Government of Mali, UNHCR occasions, the signatory movements were criti- and countries that hosted Malian refugees); cised for adopting an “empty chair” approach the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commis- especially when other movements created be- sion (CVJR) and its branch offices; the National fore and after the signing of the Peace Agree- Council for Security Sector Reform (CN-RSS); ment loudly expressed their firm intention to the Office of the Security Sector Reform (C- become members of the different implementa- RSS) and its specialised units; the National tion committees. Commission for Disarmament – Demobilisa- tion – Reintegration (CN-DDR); the Integra- In order to facilitate an understanding and im- tion Commission (CI); the implementation of plementation of the Agreement, the Govern- Transitional Justice through the development

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of a national policy document on transitional interim authorities became a priority issue and justice; the adoption of the policy document contributed to mounting tensions, while this called National Convention on Human Rights; issue was originally only a marginal provision the Conference d’Entente Nationale (CEN); the of the Agreement. drafting of the Charter for Peace, Unity and Reconciliation; the mapping of Malian terroirs The redeployment of the government admin- (provinces); establishment of the Mission to istration everywhere across the country in the Support National Reconciliation (MARN) and wake of the redeployment of the Army is not its regional offices; the creation of goodwill yet a reality. This would facilitate the return of missions in the regions of Kidal, the Inner Delta the refugees and displaced persons as well as and the Niger Bend/Loop; and appointment of the launch of socioeconomic activities, how- the Carter Center as an independent observer ever. It would also facilitate the disarming and charged with objectively evaluating the imple- reintegration of fighters from eligible armed mentation phases of the Agreement (chap. 20, movements, and the organisation of local arts. 63 and 64). elections everywhere. According to the representatives of the signatory movements we in- terviewed, “disarmament is not for tomorrow; 3.5. Reversal of Priorities: Lack of we will maintain pressure by keeping our arms Leadership or Opportunism? in plain sight in order to obtain the benefits of MOC, DDR and more” (interviews performed The Mali peace process is suffering from prob- on 14 October 2017). lems such as the setting of short deadlines for the interim period, the achievement of objec- At the same time, the local press is reporting tives (30 to 60 days after the signing of the that certain movements are taking money from agreement), etc.; deadlines that are difficult unemployed young persons from the central to meet because trust-building measures have and northern regions in exchange for recruit- not been fully carried out by the parties, in ing them. Payments of terms of MOC, cantonment, integration of ex- combatants, DDR, CN-RSS, etc. Such a context “FCFA 800,000 for those who want to enlist corroborates the notion that the signing of the in the ranks of the Famas, FCFA 1,200,000 for Agreement provided benefits to the signatory the regiments of Guards and Gendarmerie and parties only. The movements have determined FCFA 3,000,000 for the customs service; etc. that many major reforms were undertaken “(Cf.” Northern Mali: Demobilisation, disar- without sufficient input from the parties. At mament and reintegration process (DDR) The the same time, many people feel excluded armed groups take money for job positions”. from the process, and have resurrected some (Le Sursaut of 4 December 2017 and Info-Ma- good old practices associated with neo-com- tin of 8 December 2017). munitarianism; hence, the untimely setbacks in installing the interim authorities. Two years after signing of the Agreement, the order of the priorities would appear to have In fact, these findings reveal a reversal of the been turned upside down; the key players are order of priorities in the process of implement- bogged down in unproductive debates over ing the Agreement. For example, setting up implementation of the Agreement; the Gov-

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ernment is lagging behind in the execution of that significant progress has been made, both reforms; disarmament has not begun, nor has movements mention certain shortcomings and redeployment of the administration. The armed difficulties, including: movements and interim authorities are sharing power, but failing to provide security at the lo- • The fact that the interim authorities present cal level. Thus, it is not surprising to see people in many regions are not functional; reproving these authorities wherever people • The fact that the interim authorities do not feel they have not been enfranchised; and par- exist at the Cercle and communal levels; ticularly when appointed or co-opted leaders • The fact that no specific law has been are not legitimate in the eyes of the people. enacted to create territorial subdivisions in the Regions of Taoudéni and Ménaka, and It is urgently necessary to remedy this situation the Cercles of Achibagho and Almoustarat; by setting goals that are clearly defined over • The lack of consensus on the recommen- time, and by getting stakeholders to focus dations made by the Conference d’Entente their efforts on essential missions. The State Nationale (CEN), and on the process for must exercise its leadership in implementing the drafting of the Charter for Peace, Unity the Peace Agreement. This is the only way for- and National Reconciliation (Article 5 of the ward; it allows the State to single out the nu- Agreement); merous parties that are acting in bad faith be- • The violation of the Agreement, given cause they actually have no interest in peace, the fact that the National Assembly has and are eager to prolong this process in order enacted new laws and the President of the to keep generating and reaping benefits from Republic of Mal has put them into effect. the current situation. In other words, the process of revising the Constitution was suspended; the texts for At the twentieth regular session of the Fol- the Free Administration Act, the Code of low-up Committee of the Agreement (CSA), Local Communities, and the Electoral Act discussions focused on the following points: are still to be adopted; A memo on progress to date was presented, • Failure to take into account certain aspects signatory movements used the “empty chair” in the administrative reorganisation of the ploy because they had not received the ex- northern regions intended to increase the pected bonuses, they threatened one another, level of accountability within various insti- the prospect was discussed of organising lo- tutions of the Republic of Mali; cal elections by the end of the year, the par- • The lack of appropriate measures for the ties adopted an updated timetable and agreed safe return of refugees, although tripartite on modalities for operationalising the MOC in agreements have been signed between Kidal and Timbuktu. the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger; a decision was made In reaction to the memo and to the possibility to facilitate registration of refugees on of sanctions from international agencies, the voters’ lists; Coordination of the Movements of Azawad • The lack of measures for better represen- and the Platform (signatory movements to tation of the population of the northern the Agreement) recently decided to state their regions at the levels of State institutions, points of view publicly. While they believe large departments and the bureaucracy;

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• The lack of a common global strategic 2. Take into account various articles of the vision that takes into account the innovative Peace Agreement in writing: the new security and national defence mechanisms Constitution, the Community Code, the text recommended by the National Committee on self-government, and the Electoral Law; for the Reform of the Security Sector; 3. Effective operationalisation of the National • The delay in deploying MOC battalions in Council for the Reform of the Security Sector Kidal and Timbuktu; (CNRSS) in order to design a comprehen- • The change in the status of the police as sive strategic vision and innovative security stipulated in the Agreement, which aims and national defence mechanisms”; at substituting local police forces for the 4. Postpone local elections (Regions, Cercles, national police force on the basis of the and Communes) in the northern regions/ new but non-consensual Code of Territorial Azawad; Authorities; 5. Set up the interim authorities at the • The fact that the other disarmament sites regional level and finalize this action at the validated by the CTS have not yet been built; Cercle and Communal levels, so that they • The fact that the so-called “Development meet the most urgent needs of the popula- Zones of the northern regions” have not tion and contribute to the creation of jobs yet been established; for young people; • The unilateral decision to set up Regional 6. Expedite the process of creating adminis- Development Agencies in the northern trative districts, the return of refugees, the regions; census of the population of the so-called • The lack of transparency regarding the northern regions/Azawad; management of the resources used by the 7. Seek and build a consensus regarding the government in the context of the contin- Charter that resulted from the Conference gency and normalisation plan; of National Consensus”; • The fact that the International Commission 8. Expedite appropriate measures for greater of Inquiry that is to shed light on crimes representation of the populations in the committed from 1960 to present day has northern regions/Azawad in the institu- yet to be incepted. tions, major departments and State administration; The Carter Center has been selected as the 9. Expedite the creation of “development consensual independent observer for the en- zones” in the northern regions; tire process. However, the signatory move- 10. Establishment an International Commission ments have made more than a dozen so-called of Inquiry; “urgent recommendations” that are to be in- 11. Role and responsibilities of the interna- cluded in a timetable duly taking into account tional community, in conceptualising the the following priority points: commitments mentioned in article 54 of the Agreement; identification of missions 1. “Revise all legislative and regulatory provi- and responsibilities; establish a timetable sions already voted, but that are deemed to carry out activities and actions under the non-consensual and not in conformity with auspices of the Monitoring Committee. the Agreement;

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IV. AGREEMENT AND CIVIL by absolute uncertainty. In the long chain of SOCIETY: REJECTION OR events at the time, it was, in its own way, a ACCEPTANCE? second instance of breaking with the past. The first moment coincided with the beginning of Operation Serval, which produced some posi- 4.1. Opposing the Agreement as a tive effects. Means to an End? For Gaoussou Drabo, a journalist and former When one examines the long-term relationship minister in the government, between “political power” and “civil society» in Mali, it becomes clear that the prevalence “The signing of the Agreement does not elimi- of opposing viewpoints held by these key stra- nate all unknown factors. But it makes it pos- tegic players remains a constant. The signing sible to move forward, while asking the right of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation questions. Indeed, Malians have very specific in 2015 is no exception to this rule. Indeed, expectations concerning the restoration of se- an important segment of Malian civil society curity. Some of what they endured during the led by the Forum of Civil Society Organisations months of occupation kept them from falling (FOSC) voiced its opposition to the terms of the for either unwarranted optimism or general Agreement as soon as it was signed. scepticism. The majority of the population are trying to find the necessary balance between In Mali, civil society organisations emerged in a measured hope and an indispensable pru- a historical context of post-independence dete- dence. They are aware of the fact that the rioration of the socio-political situation, causing Agreement will not automatically remedying certain problems to resurface such as environ- the most difficult situations. These will only mental degradation, food shortages, unequal be resolved at the end of a laborious process access to natural resources and the related is- of reconciling positions and establishing a sues of management and exploitation, the neg- minimum level of trust. The signed document ative correlation between technological/eco- does not preclude the possibility of misunder- nomic progress and population growth, lack of standings, friction or even divergence in prin- qualified human resources and failure to take ciple. Moreover, it does not send out a signal gender issues into account (Keita, 2008:11). immediately putting pressure on those actors that are still reluctant to respect its terms Today, Malian civil society is an essential stake- (www.maliweb.net, consulted on 26/12/17). holder in the governance of the country. The involvement and contributions of civil society Various resolutions adopted by the United Na- organisations to the process of implementing tions have advocated ways of getting the par- various political and institutional reforms, and ties to prevent conflicts, and when they break in political dialogues, constitute a good indica- out, to solve them through peaceful means. It tor of the vitality of Malian democracy. is true that international, regional and community-based actions are currently being prepared The signing of the Agreement by the parties in order to improve or alleviate the situation represents the completion of a painful se- that has given rise to conflicts (international quence of actions which had been marked justice, humanitarian assistance, deployment

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of military forces, special arrangements and security context, one could identify and differ- agreements, etc.). entiate the nature of the collective action to be carried out. When one takes into account the Even though the Agreement states the mecha- current socio-political and security conditions, nisms likely to consolidate peace, while seeking it becomes clear that political and civil society to create a degree of trust between the parties organisations must face up to a number of is- on a consensual basis, the issue of disarma- sues, such as how to stabilise State institutions ment remains a problem. This is also the case and how to implement the Peace and Recon- with the repatriation of refugees and the re- ciliation Agreement at a steady pace. turn of displaced persons, and the restoration of public order. However, the mass training of Indeed, the current situation is characterised by military and security personnel by the EUCAP a level of insecurity that civil society organisa- Sahel and the strengthening of capabilities by tions and political parties assess using differ- MINUSMA in terms of human rights protec- ent criteria. In the meantime, the number of tion coincide with some initiatives taken by the attacks on humanitarian missions doubled in government aimed at reforming and strength- 2017 year on year, and this in a context where ening State institutions. the humanitarian crisis seems to be: “(...) forgotten because the response to this Unfortunately, the Government of Mali only crisis in Mali is one of the least funded in the accepts political participation in the restoration world. Almost 20 per cent of the population and consolidation of peace through informal [suffer from] food insecurity and 1.2 million consultation channels despite the existence of a people need water, hygiene and sanitation rich regional and conventional toolset through- services. The absence of local authorities or out the African continent (Joiner, 2006). the weakness of their capabilities hinders the In particular, the process of implementing the delivery of basic services, and the prevailing Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation is not insecurity also hinders the delivery of aid to sufficiently explicit when it comes to the formal vulnerable communities in some parts of the role that political and civil society organisations country”, as Baldo reports (www.tamoudre. must play if the objectives of the Agreement org, Retrieved on 07/12/17). are to be successfully achieved (art. 51). Since signing of the Agreement, civil society According to the Forum of Civil Society Organi- organisations opposed to it have continued sations (FOSC): to criticise the peace process. Though it may “The sense of dialogue and consultation that strike one as sterile criticism, it is more akin should lead to a better synergy between par- to deliberately sitting on the fence or postur- ties of all types within the process of imple- ing than making any constructive criticism. It menting the Agreement is far from becoming should be noted that civil society organisations a reality”. as a whole face many challenges that affect their actions in relation to the peace process in The true inclusiveness of political actors and Mali, such as the low capacity to influence and civil society in the process is apparently of the mobilise ordinary citizens, the lack of available civic engagement type. By determining, even resources, and the co-opting of civil society or- on a hypothetical basis, the socio-political and ganisations by government authorities.

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4.2. Weak Embedding of the With regard to the significance of the Agree- Agreement at the Local and ment, and how important its implementation Community Levels is to the future, Mali-Mètre n ° 07 showed that more than half (57.2%) of the respondents Throughout the implementation of the Peace throughout the country believed that imple- and Reconciliation Agreement, civil society mentation of the Agreement was very impor- organisations had to monitor and control the tant or important to the future, compared to actions of both State authorities and their part- 24% of respondents who considered it of little ners. Such a role is of critical importance in a or no significance, while 18.9% of respond- decentralised system, not only at the central ents had no opinion on the matter. government level, but also at the regional and local levels. Ideally, civil society organisations The percentage of citizens who believed that should get involved in the process leading to implementation of the Agreement was very political and institutional reforms, as well as important or important is greater in cities lo- on-going efforts concerning the CNRSS, DDR, cated in the northern regions of Mali (including CI and transitional justice because these steps Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal) than in the cities lo- affect all the different layers of Malian society cated elsewhere. As to whether the implemen- (Daffé, 2015: 123). tation of the Agreement had started or not, the opinions of persons surveyed were as fol- The level of awareness regarding the peace lows: Approximately one-third of the respond- process and implementation of the Agreement ents (32.0%) said that the process had not yet seems very low among ordinary citizens at the begun, compared to 25% of respondents who local and community levels. Indeed, as the vari- stated the opposite, and almost 43% (42.7%) ous editions of “Mali-Mètre” (FES) aptly illus- who said they did not know anything about trate, the embedding of the Agreement seems this. Inhabitants of cities located in the north- limited in scope. ern regions of Mali were most likely to argue that the implementation process had actually Indeed, in 2015, the sixth edition of Mali-Me- started (49% in Timbuktu, 45% in Kidal and tre (n° 06) showed that only 19% (less than 44% in Gao). one in five) of citizens knew the terms/content of the Agreement. A few months later, the pic- According to the eighth edition of Mali-Mètre ture was hardly better in the seventh edition of (n° 08), the two top priority actions to be im- Mali-Mètre (n° 07), which reported that the plemented by State authorities were reconcili- vast majority of respondents in the survey ation (13.9%) and disarmament (13.5%). Fi- (81.8%) did not know the terms/content of nally, Mali-Mètre n° 08 reported that 42% of the Agreement. There were correlations be- respondents (more than two out of five) between the level of awareness and level of ed- lieved that there was no significant progress ucation (52% at university level and 72% at made in implementing the Agreement (15% secondary level compared to 83% at primary considered that there was absolutely no pro- level and 88% of respondents with no formal gress) compared to 30% of respondents to the education), and the gender of the respondents survey who believed that progress was being (87% women versus 77% men). made in implementing the Agreement.

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Thus, we can see that progress in implement- The involvement of civil society organisations ing the Agreement is slow and there are many in the process of implementing the Agree- difficulties associated with the process. To illus- ment is paramount. Unless they provide gen- trate this, one can cite the complexity of the uine support at the local and national levels, process, the persistence of insecurity in both there will be great difficulties throughout the the northern and central regions, with a ten- process. This is why these organisations need dency to spill over into other parts of the entire to mobilise local communities and build on country, a limited political dialogue between endogenous/shared values to foster national the majority and opposition parties, between unity. Establishing a mechanism for permanent decision-makers and civil society, a fragile level dialogue between all the parties involved in the of trust between the State and armed groups implementation of the Agreement will help to and within armed groups, a weak communica- address all pertinent issues and alleviate all the tion strategy on the part of the government, misunderstandings between stakeholders (Sy, the absence of the State and its decentralised Dakouo and Traoré, 2016). This will also help offices across large stretches of national territo- process the “painful memories” resulting from ry, resulting in limited access to basic social ser- and entrenched through recurring conflicts, vices for the population, the notorious weak- and to create a framework for the successful ness of the State and the lack of clear guide- implementation of the Peace and Reconcilia- lines with reference to the strategy adopted by tion Agreement. the government.

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V. CHALLENGES IN IMPLE- MENTING THE AGREEMENT

The implementation of the Peace and Recon- communities have ties with illicit networks ciliation Agreement is characterised by the in- of traffickers that operate across borders. volvement of multiple key players with diver- Hence the need for more cooperation gent interests. The political and institutional between nation states. reforms being implemented are giving rise to conflicts arising from personal strategies, and iii. The need to demonstrate an enlightened the weakness of the political leadership is not political leadership with regard to the helping efforts to manage the peace process process – the lack of vision and a unified strategically. In this vein, the peace process policy framework; DDR and CI started is causing many intrinsic challenges to sur- before the CNRSS, for example. face that are impeding implementation of the Agreement. Similarly, there are extrinsic chal- iv. Multiplicity of signatory parties (opposi- lenges related, inter alia, to the resurgence of tion between CMA, Platform and CME insecurity, which is having a significant effect at present) as well as national and inter- on the peace and reconciliation process. Over- national issues, as opposed to the limited all, we have identified six (6) major challenges number of key players around the negoti- facing implementation of the Agreement: ating table and at the signing of previous agreements. Finding resources to match i. Appropriation at the national level, and commitments made by government and an all-inclusive approach in implement- TFP (Brussels and OECD processes). ing the Agreement. This challenge relates to the ability of political and civil society v. Level of involvement of important partners leaders to mobilise the population in order such as the members of the UN Security to make a rational contribution to the im- Council (G 5 Sahel). These are supervising plementation process of the Agreement at the implementation process. local, regional and national levels. vi. Implementation of UN Security Council ii. Involvement of individuals and commu- Resolution 2374 on sanctions against nities in the initiation of a dialogue with people who block implementation of the non-signatories to the Agreement, particu- Agreement. larly parties that come from Mali. These

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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS think about inclusiveness. Renewal of the system of governance is critical in this regard.

All across Mali, people fail to understand the Our recommendations are of a two-fold nature: terms of this Agreement. There is a lack of ex- Those relating to the potential for a change in planation and debate, two necessary or even governance, and those involving concrete ac- indispensable ingredients for successful imple- tions to be taken. mentation of the Agreement. This is why every action taken in this context becomes an opportunity for more debate all the way up to 6.1. Potential for a change in a controversial discussion of policy, which, de- governance spite its usefulness in a democratic society, has no intrinsic added value when one considers After long months of negotiations, this Agree- the gravity of the situation. ment, like all the recommendations from the previous meetings of importance organised by local authorities (Association of the Municipali- 6.2. Concrete Actions Needed ties of Mali – AMM), the Government of Mali (Meeting on Decentralisation, National Confer- a. All the parties involved see the benefit of ence on the North) and CSOs (COREN, among conducting a political dialogue. This dialogue others), provides for major reforms of the sys- must take into account ongoing changes and tem of governance in Mali. In this sense, reform mutations within communities, as it broadens of the education sector, the system of govern- the potential for inclusive participation to other ance through regionalisation as set out in the signatory and non-signatory groups. Agreement, the judicial and security sectors are decisive steps that offer Mali a real chance, or It requires a systemic presentation that attracts even opportunity, to establish a deeply rooted the attention of all actors across the country. democratic system that can help ensure the This approach needs to focus on several target stability and credibility of the institutions and groups, and be adjusted to conform to the na- parties involved. ture and role of each group: i. The institutions of the Republic and leaders The experiences that Malian people have en- of the political parties; dured and the expectations of the population ii. Forums for discussions and exchanges at either confirm or refute the relevance of certain the State level and within decentralised issues because the State is no longer in the hab- and branch offices with the representatives it of reflecting upon its own structure, its mode of key professional and civil society organi- of functioning, and possible changes in its envi- sations. ronment over the medium and long terms. On many occasions, participants to a number The State as well as the regions and terroirs of forums, symposiums and conferences have (provinces) under it are no longer monolithic. pointed out the indispensable need to re-es- Today, and even more so tomorrow, we will tablish the conditions for clear-minded, proac- have to consider a plurality of key players, and tive governance to reassess all existing research

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documents and publications that would allow Already, as stated in the recommendations is- the parties involved to understand the past in sued by participants in the conference “What order to provide a sound basis for generating political systems for the Sahel-Saharan region? constructive opinions. Such an approach can Observations on political and security solutions help build a bridge between decision-making to the crisis in Mali and some options for stability centres and policy research centres/think-tanks in the Sahel-Saharan region” (2014), two sound in the country in order to facilitate the decision- approaches have been forwarded on how to making process via a rigorous historical analysis create the conditions for a true dialogue: of the crises that have affected all communities, and to finally grasp their nature fully by taking “The introduction of structural and innovative into account the factors contributing to change. solutions in fundamental Malian laws and reg- This can be an opportunity for academic and ulations, financial systems and corresponding research centres in Mali to be of service to the timetables, and first of all the leadership role of country and justify their existence. the government”.

Only a deep-going assessment like this makes Unfortunately, within the framework of the possible a transition from gathering information 10th EDF it was disclosed that the EU delegation to using knowledge to construct different scales had signed a convention with the Malian Gov- and establish a globalised context. This would in ernment and provided an estimated amount of turn allow us to depart from certain traditional EUR 5,000,000, but implementation has not values - important as these may have been in produced any tangible or visible results to date. the past - and help pave the way to modernity. This program was carried out in the name and on behalf of Mali by the same EU Commission A critical debate, and a rigorous approach to that should have been closely monitoring this mutual understanding must also make it possi- type of financial engineering. ble to deconstruct certain “painful memories”, which some individuals are turning into what The Malian Government signed the Convention Amin Maalouf (1998) terms “murderous iden- on 15 May 2014, with the execution timeframe tities”, and myths surrounding or crystallising being 60 months, starting from its effective op- positions regarding certain “terroirs” viewed as erationalisation date, with an initial operational separatist in nature and the root causes of the implementation phase of 36 months and a sec- negative perceptions that exist at interpersonal ond, final phase of 24 months. The technical or community levels. and administrative provisions (DTA) laid down in Annex II of the Convention (Program RACO- Implementing this recommendation implies MA, Agreement No. ML/EDF/023-900) men- analytical work, some reflection on how to run tion two (2) components: Component 1 is enti- the public administration as an art form of lo- tled “Conducting historical research in order to cal officials, as well as new charismatic leaders understand the causes of the conflicts between (from religious and youth groups) that use so- Malians”; Component 2 aimed at setting up “a cial networks extensively, and a shared under- platform that will allow exchange/interactions standing of existing obstacles, shortcomings about the theme of radicalisation, and the mo- and flaws. A partial or piecemeal understand- dalities for combating this problem in Mali”. ing is not enough.

37 Naffet Keita | Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers process

b. Reaffirm and update the leadership role from the period of French colonisation and of the government, given the major crisis in that are still fuelling inter-community con- governance, the demands forwarded by com- flicts. This will only occur when an effective munities to make them an integral part of the communication strategy materialises in the process even though there are already duly Habermasian sense of the term, in various mandated representatives and institutions. The venues, as a series of debates that enable actions of the key political players and signa- the involvement of the people at the local tory movements must converge at a clear and level; shared vision of the commitments they sub- • An orderly assessment of implementation scribe to, and that take into account the ac- of the Agreement and all commitments knowledgement of communities and the revolt made by the State vis-à-vis its partners of the young generations against the existing through the creation of an ad hoc gov- order as has been documented. This requires ernmental agency in which local experts/ the following actions: researchers may continue to analyse the situation and make recommendations. • Writing an all-encompassing history of the various terroirs (provinces) and communi- c. Emphasising the eminently political aspect of ties that make up the Malian society along the Agreement. This political aspect must pre- the lines of reporting the “National Malian vail throughout its process of implementation, Narrative”; which must not suffer from the malice and hid- • Revisiting the contemporary history of the den agendas of politicians. country and its true economic potential. Such an exercise will inevitably lead us to d. Along with international and national NGOs, integrate economic factors into the study. ensure that the State of Mali, which has very It will clarify the linkages between notions limited resources, also benefits from the fund- of economic growth, the demographic ing of national public policies, and not turn dividend and crisis context, and ensure that it into a hindrance to their appropriation and we design economic alternatives rooted in implementation. After all, “customer service” a preference for endogenous financing, must benefit the State more than the commu- which is a sine qua non condition for sus- nities and consultancy agencies! tainability and for protecting the country against supranational (bilateral and multi- e. Make sure that financial considerations do lateral) hidden agendas; not prevail over the need for political leadership • An in-depth reform of public institutions given the creation of multiple bodies charged and agencies to foster emergence of a with implementing the Agreement. new type of interaction between the State and its citizens from a context in which Beyond the contexts of sub-regional and region- these agencies document the expecta- al cooperation, the U.N.’s permanent members tions to be met and the roles to be fulfilled must facilitate the empowerment of African by traditional leaders. These actions must troops in terms of logistics (air transport and se- sustain the constant and flexible imple- cure means of communication) so that they un- mentation of institutional reforms in order dertake effective action against terrorist groups to overcome remnants of issues inherited throughout the Sahara and Sahel regions.

38 Naffet Keita | Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers process

REFERENCES

1. « Nord du Mali : Processus du Démo- 9. FES, Mali-Mètre. Enquête d’opinions: bilisation, Désarmement et Réinsertion que pensent les Maliens? Friedrich Ebert (DDR) Les groupes armés monnayent les Stiftung-Mali. Bamako, n° 07, 21-30 postes » ! in: Le Sursaut, le 04 déc. 2017 décembre 2015. (http://www.maliweb.net/la-situation- politique-et-securitaire-au-nord/nord- 10. FES, Mali-Mètre. Enquête d’opinions: mali-processus-demobilisation- que pensent les Maliens? Friedrich desarmement-reinsertion-ddr-groupes- Ebert Stiftung-Mali. Bamako, n° 8, 25 armes-monnayent-postes-2702032.html) novembre – 6 décembre 2017.

2. Actes de la Conférence d’Entente 11. http://www.maliweb.net/la-situation- Nationale. Bamako. 2017. politique-et-securitaire-au-nord/crise- malienne-lexpert-independant-de-lonu- 3. Bureau Politique National de la CNAS- tire-sonnette-dalarme-2708152.html Faso Hèrè (Convention Nationale pour une Afrique Solidaire), rendu public le 12. http://niarela.net/nord-mali/la-cma- 31 octobre 2014. condamnee-a-signer-laccord-de-paix- dalger 4. Convention de financement du programme ARCOMA (n° ML/FED/023- 13. http://bamada.net/processus-de- 900). negociation-la-necessaire-relance-laccord- de-ouaga-est-assez-complet-tout-est- 5. Daffé, Mamou. « La société civile au Mali: dans-laccord Opportunités et Questionnements ». in : Cahiers du Mapinduzi 4, Les sociétés 14. http://www.maliweb.net/politique/ civiles en Afrique. Mapinduzi Unit, 2015. lavenir-politique-au-mali-la-deuxieme- parenthese-972762.html 6. De Foucault, Michel. Dits et écrits, 1945-1988. Paris : Gallimard, 1994 15. The OECD DAC definition of political economy analysis is available at:http:// 7. Déclaration de la CMA et de la www.oecd.org/dac/governance/ Plateforme du 20 octobre 2017. politicaleconomy; see also S. Collinson, Power, Livelihoods and Conflict: Case 8. FES, Mali-Mètre. Enquête d’opinions: Studies in Political Economy Analysis for que pensent les Maliens? Friedrich Ebert Humanitarian Action, Humanitarian Policy Stiftung-Mali. Bamako, n° 06, 18-25 Group Report 13, Overseas Development mai 2015. Institute, 2003.

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16. Info-Matin du 08 décembre 2017 (http:// 23. Rapport, « Quelles constructions poli- www.maliweb.net/la-situation-politique- tiques dans la zone sahélo-saharienne ? et-securitaire-au-nord/integration-ex- Réflexion sur les pistes de solutions combattants-erigee-fonds-de-commerce- politiques et sécuritaires pour une sor- monnayage-places-a-millions-de-nos- tie de crise au Mali et la stabilité de la francs-2713412.html). zone sahélo-saharienne », in : Journées d’études et de réflexion organisées par le 17. Keita, Naffet. L’état civil des organisations Gouvernement de la République du Mali, de la société civile au Mali. Dakar : en partenariat avec la MINUSMA, la FES OSIWA/ CODESRIA, 2008. et Promediation, Bamako, CICB, 24-26 juillet 2014, 40 p. 18. Maalouf, Amin. Les identités meurtrières. Paris : Le Livre de Poche, 1998. 24. Sélection de Documents-clés de l’Union Africaine Relatifs aux Droits de l’Homme 19. Malikilé, n°42, du 11 novembre 2017. de Julia Dolly JOINER, Commissaire aux affaires Politiques (Union Africaine), 2006. 20. Malikilé, n°52, du 23 novembre 2017. 25. Sy, Ousmane ; Dakouo, Ambroise et 21. Mcloughlin, C. Political Economy Analysis: Traoré, Kadari. Dialogue national au Mali: Topic Guide (2nd Ed.). Birmingham, UK: Leçons de la Conférence Nationale de GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2014. 1991 pour le processus de sortie de crise. Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2016. 22. Rapport Bakara Diallo, 1959.

FES Peace and Security Series No. 32

About the FES Africa Peace and Security Series As a political foundation committed to the values of social democracy, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) aims The lack of security is one of the key impediments at strengthening the interface between democracy to development and democracy in Africa. The ex- and security policy. FES therefore facilitates political istence of protracted violent conflicts as well as a dialogue on security threats and their national, lack of accountability of the security sector in many regional and continental responses.The FES Africa countries are challenging cooperation in the field of Peace and Security Series aims to contribute to security policy. The emerging African Peace and Se- this dialogue by making relevant analysis widely curity Architecture provides the institutional frame- accessible. The series is being published by the FES work to promote peace and security. Africa Security Policy Network.

About the publication The new peace accord, Accord pour la paix et la the Platform and two groups forming part of the réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d’Alger CMA. The remaining CMA groups signed the accord [Accord for peace and reconciliation in Mali on 20 June 2015. This publication critically examines emanating from the Algiers process], was formally the implementation of the peace agreement until signed on 15 May 2015 by the Government of Mali, December 2017.