ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA: WAR OR PEACE? 24 September 2003 ICG Africa Report N°68 Nairobi/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. BEYOND BADME: CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT ................................................. 2 III. 1998-2000: THE CONFLICT AND THE PEACE PROCESS................................... 4 IV. 2000-2003: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT ..................................... 5 A. THE DISPUTED BOUNDARY COMMISSION DECISION..............................................................6 B. DIPLOMATIC FALLOUT..........................................................................................................7 C. RISING BORDER TENSIONS....................................................................................................8 V. THE OCTOBER 2003 DECISION POINT ................................................................. 9 VI. A COMPREHENSIVE CONFLICT PREVENTION APPROACH ....................... 12 VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 15 APPENDICES A. MAP OF ERITREAN-ETHIOPIAN AREAS OF CONFLICT..........................................................17 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................18 C. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS.................................................................................19 D. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................25 ICG Africa Report N°68 24 September 2003 ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA: WAR OR PEACE? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The next few weeks will go far to determining conditions for demarcation to proceed, including whether Ethiopia and Eritrea resume a path toward the appointment of field liaison officers”, providing war – which took some 100,000 lives between 1998 security for the demarcation process, and pursuing and 2000 – or solidify their peace agreement. political dialogue. Ethiopia must decide whether to allow demarcation of the border to begin in October 2003 even though The governments of both Ethiopia and Eritrea face the international Boundary Commission set up harder line elements that believe too much has under the Algiers agreement that ended the fighting already been given away in the peace process and has ruled that the town of Badme – the original are unwilling to countenance further flexibility. flashpoint of the war – is on the Eritrean side. The Many Ethiopians are determined not to cede any outcome will have profound implications for both territory to Eritrea after having allowed its countries and the entire Horn of Africa, as well as independence. The most potent mobilising factor for international law and the sanctity of binding for Eritreans is the threat of encroachment by peace agreements and arbitration processes. The Ethiopia on their hard-won sovereignty. For international community, particularly the U.S., the Ethiopians who opposed Eritrean independence, the African Union (AU), and the European Union threatened loss of Badme is emblematic of the loss (EU), all of which played major roles in brokering of Eritrea, while for many Eritreans the fate of that the Algiers agreement, need to engage urgently to town of 5,000 cannot be separated from their worry help Ethiopia move the demarcation forward and to that Ethiopia may one day try to regain access to assist both parties to devise a package of measures the sea. For both sides, losing Badme would make that can reduce the humanitarian costs of border the sacrifices of the 1998-2000 conflict much adjustments and otherwise make implementation of harder to justify. the demarcation more politically palatable. While neither Ethiopia nor Eritrea wants to return The two warring states agreed at Algiers to to combat, incidents of isolated violence have been establish the Boundary Commission and accept its occurring with increasing frequency along the judgement as final and binding. The Commission border, as have reports of incursions by troops into made its ruling in April 2002. After a series of the neutral zone. There is no real dialogue between technical and political delays caused largely by the parties. Each views the other’s government as Ethiopia’s objections, in particular to the decaying and its military as weak and unprepared. disposition of Badme, it announced in July 2003 Each supports elements of the other’s opposition, that physical demarcation on the ground should and, perhaps most dangerously, underestimates the begin in October. On 12 September, the UN will of the other to hold together if there is a new Security Council extended the mandate of the military confrontation. All these are attitudes eerily United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea similar to those that prevailed prior to and during (UNMEE), which monitors the border, and called the war. on both parties to fulfil their commitments under the Algiers agreement by creating “the necessary Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace? ICG Africa Report N°68, 24 September 2003 Page ii The integrity of the peace agreement is on the brink of To the governments of the United States, the being compromised. Despite its renewal of the African Union and the European Union: UNMEE mandate and its correct insistence that the agreement be implemented immediately and without 3. Undertake an immediate public diplomacy renegotiation, the UN Security Council remains campaign that spells out for political elites in relatively unengaged and preoccupied with other Ethiopia and Eritrea the importance of full responsibilities. Washington, which negotiated the implementation of the Algiers agreement, the agreement in tandem with the AU, has largely benefits of compliance, and the costs of ignored the issue, despite its interest in regional collapsing the peace process, and develop a set stability. The AU has remained largely silent as well. of gradually escalating political and financial measures that could be applied against a party The international community cannot afford to look that blocks implementation of the agreement. away and hope for the best, however. Vigorous 4. Conduct missions to the contested areas of the diplomacy is needed now. While the parties should border in advance of the scheduled October not be permitted to deviate from implementing a 2003 start of border demarcation to explain the Boundary Commission decision that both agreed approach taken and absorb some of the would be “final and binding”, creative solutions responsibility for easing the political, security can be found to make implementation more and humanitarian difficulties that will ensue politically acceptable by reducing the security and when the parties implement the Boundary humanitarian impacts while demarcation proceeds. Commission’s decision. These diplomatic efforts should not be the prerequisite for implementation. But an early 5. Begin to discuss immediately with each party, demonstration that the international community is and coordinate with each other to the extent serious about finding ways to soften the losses possible on, the parallel initiatives cited in perceived by both parties would be a positive recommendation 2 above, which could include inducement for constructive action. Timing is the following measures: important since an Ethiopian decision not to (a) dual citizenship for affected cooperate with the October schedule could set in populations, maintenance of existing motion a rapid deterioration of the situation, and a citizenship in cases where small incident – whether unplanned or provoked by administration changes hands, and/or either side – could easily escalate out of control. codification of the rights of non- citizens living in either country; RECOMMENDATIONS (b) immediate opening of the border and negotiation of port access for Ethiopia; To the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea: (c) administration by UNMEE for a short 1. Implement the peace agreement promptly and face-saving period of the border areas fully and in particular provide the Boundary that are to change hands; Commission and UNMEE all necessary (d) mutual agreement, in the context of support and security guarantees so that technical alterations suggested by the two demarcation of the border can begin in October parties’ field liaison officers, on small 2003 pursuant to the Boundary Commission’s adjustments to the demarcation line to April 2002 decision. satisfy humanitarian, geographical, 2. Seek creative ways to facilitate implementation security or political needs; and of the Boundary Commission’s decision by (e) generous compensation and development negotiating parallel initiatives with the help of aid to affected local populations, the U.S., AU and EU aimed at reducing the including support for relocation, humanitarian impacts on the populations of the reconstruction of infrastructure, and border region and preventing conflict which restoration of livelihoods. might result from the demarcation process. Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace? ICG Africa Report N°68, 24 September 2003 Page iii To the UN Security Council: 6. Consider early expansion of UNMEE’s mandate so that it can administer for a short face-saving period the border areas that are to change hands, and instruct UNMEE once demarcation of the border has begun