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The Spies Who Came in from the Cold

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MAY 2020 The spies who came in Alert Clingendael from the Cold War Danny Pronk President Putin at a gala event dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the formation of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia. Source: Kremlin.ru Doing Russia’s dirty work In their recently published annual indirectly.1 One of the countries mentioned reports, the Dutch intelligence and with regard to these kinds of activities is security services AIVD and MIVD note that the intelligence services of other countries often play a key 1 General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), role in covert influencing operations. Annual Report 2019, 29 April 2020, accessed These organisations either target political 30 April 2020, https://www.aivd.nl/onderwerpen/ decision-making directly or focus on jaarverslagen/jaarverslag-2019; Defence Intelligence the manipulation of public perceptions and Security Service (MIVD), Annual Report 2019, 30 April 2020, accessed 30 April 2020, https://www. defensie.nl/downloads/jaarverslagen/2020/04/30/ jaarverslag-mivd Clingendael Alert Russia.2 This country has long been most Hacker, poisoner, soldier, spy adept at covertly influencing the perceptions and public opinion in other countries, which One of the most prominent cyber cases to can have a disruptive effect on policy-making date was the use of the so-called Advanced processes.3 However, as they are carried Persistent Threat 28 – aka Fancy Bear – hack out covertly, these activities have tended to group to meddle in the 2016 US presidential remain hidden in the shadows. Lately though, election. According to the report by US they seem unable to stay out of the limelight. Special Counsel Robert Mueller, twelve Recent operations by Russia’s intelligence Russian intelligence officers from the GRU services, in particular the military intelligence were guilty of hacking into the Democratic service GRU, are a case in point. Rarely has National Committee administration and the an intelligence service of a major power campaign for presidential candidate Hillary received so much public attention over such Clinton.5 Mueller’s findings fitted a clear a short period of time as the GRU.4 pattern in which the GRU was found by the National Cyber Security Centre in the UK to be almost certainly responsible for 2 See Mark Galeotti, Russian Political War: Moving an increasing number of cyber incidents in 6 Beyond the Hybrid (London and New York: past years. Routledge, 2019); Oscar Jonsson, The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines Between In another prominent case, the confidential War and Peace (Washington, DC: Georgetown medical files of a number of international University Press, 2019); and also Ivo Jurvee, “The athletes were released after a hack of the Resurrection of ‘Active Measures’: Intelligence World Anti-Doping Agency’s administration Services as a Part of Russia’s Influencing and management system.7 And in April Toolbox”, Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis, April 2018, 2018, the GRU attempted to gain access to accessed 24 April 2020, https://www.hybridcoe. the computer networks of the Organisation fi/publications/strategic-analysis-april-2018- resurrection-active-measures-intelligence-services- for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 8 part-russias-influencing-toolbox/ (OPCW) in The Hague. This was followed 3 See Ladislav Bittman, “Soviet Bloc ‘Disinformation’ in May 2018 by a spear-phishing attempt and other ‘Active Measures’”, in: Robert Pfaltzgraff, in which the GRU’s hackers impersonated Uri Ra’anan and Warren Millbert (eds), Intelligence federal authorities in Switzerland to target Policy and National Security (London: MacMillan OPCW employees, and thus again the Press, 1981), pp. 212-228; Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider’s View (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985); David V. Gioe, Richard Lovering and Tyler Pachesny, “The Soviet Legacy of Russian Active Measures: New Vodka from Old Stills?”, International Journal of Intel- 5 Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, Report On ligence and Counterintelligence, published online: The Investigation Into Russian Interference In 5 March 2020, pp. 1-26; Joseph S. Gordon, “Intro- The 2016 Presidential Election (Washington, DC: duction”, in Psychological Operations: The Soviet US Department of Justice, 2019). Challenge, edited by Joseph S. Gordon (London: 6 National Cyber Security Centre, “Reckless Westview Press, 1988); Richard H. Shultz and Roy campaign of cyber-attacks by Russian military Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet intelligence service exposed”, 3 October 2018, Strategy (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, accessed 23 April 2020, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/ 1984); Herbert Romerstein, “Disinformation as a news/reckless-campaign-cyber-attacks-russian- KGB Weapon in the Cold War”, Journal of Intelligence military-intelligence-service-exposed History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2001), pp. 54–67. 7 Nicole Perlroth and Tariq Panja, “Microsoft 4 Sergei Boeke and Ben de Jong, “Heads Rolling at the Says Russians Hacked Antidoping Agency GRU? Blundering Russian Intelligence”, Clingendael Computers”, The New York Times, 28 October 2019, Spectator, 23 October 2018, accessed 23 April 2020, accessed 24 April 2020, https://www.nytimes. https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/ com/2019/10/28/sports/olympics/russia-doping- heads-rolling-gru-blundering-russian-intelligence; wada-hacked.html Christian Esch, “The Rise of Russia's GRU Military 8 Huib Modderkolk, Het is oorlog, maar niemand Intelligence Service”, Der Spiegel, 19 October 2018, die het ziet (Amsterdam: Podium b.v. Uitgeverij, accessed 30 April 2020, https://www.spiegel.de/ 2019); Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, international/world/russia-and-the-rise-of-gru- Vooruitziend Vermogen voor Vrede en Veiligheid: military-intelligence-service-a-1233576.html Openbaar Jaarverslag 2018, April 2019. 2 Clingendael Alert OPCW’s computer networks.9 Recently, variety of non-attributable actions wherever American intelligence contractor Booz Allen and whenever required.13 Hamilton published a report detailing all cyber operations carried out by GRU hackers Finally, the attempted assassination of over a period of 15 years, linking them to Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury more than 200 espionage, disruption and in 2018 with a military nerve agent from the disinformation incidents and campaigns in Novichok group again raised suspicions 33 separate case studies.10 Booz’s findings about the GRU, mainly because Skripal mirror those made earlier by the cyber himself worked for the GRU when he security firm Symantec in 2018.11 was recruited by the British intelligence service MI6.14 The Skripal poisoning The GRU also played an important role in apparently served the combined purpose the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and in the of sending a political message to the West instigation of separatism in Eastern Ukraine and underscoring a continuing Russian that followed. A GRU officer also played campaign against traitors.15 a key role in the shooting down of flight MH17 over Eastern Ukraine, also in 2014.12 Over the years the GRU has demonstrated 13 Tor Bukkvoll and Åse G. Østensen, “The Emergence a willingness to develop and sponsor of Russian Private Military Companies: A New paramilitary organisations that further Tool of Clandestine Warfare”, Special Operations Russian national interests. This trend has Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2020), pp. 1-17; Daniel increased since the 2014 crisis in Eastern Brown, “3 countries where Russia’s shadowy Ukraine, where the Kremlin used many of Wagner Group mercenaries are known to operate”, these paramilitary organisations to fight in Business Insider, 27 April 2018, accessed 23 April the Donbass. The Russian government has 2020, https://www.businessinsider.nl/russia- also used private military companies such as wagner-group-mercenaries-where-operate-2018- the Wagner Group, consisting of a cadre of 4/?international=true&r=US ; Alexander Rabin, skilled operatives from GRU Spetsnaz, in a “Diplomacy and Dividends: Who Really Controls the Wagner Group?”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 4 October 2019, accessed 23 April 2020, https:// www.fpri.org/article/2019/10/diplomacy-and- 9 David V. Gioe, “Cyber Operations and Useful Fools: dividends-who-really-controls-the-wagner-group/ The Approach of Russian Hybrid Intelligence”, ; Matthew Cole and Alex Emmons, “Erik Prince Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 33, No. 7 Offered Lethal Services to Sanctioned Russian (2018), pp. 954–973. Mercenary Firm Wagner”, The Intercept, 13 April 10 Booz Allen Hamilton, Bearing Witness: 2020, accessed 23 April 2020, https://theintercept. Uncovering the Logic Behind Russian Military com/2020/04/13/erik-prince-russia-mercenary- Cyber Operations, 27 March 2020, accessed wagner-libya-mozambique/ 6 April 2020, https://boozallen.com/content/dam/ 14 David Omand, “From Nudge to Novichok: The boozallen_site/ccg/pdf/publications/bearing- Response to the Skripal Nerve Agent Attack Holds witness-uncovering-the-logic-behind-russian- Lessons for Countering Hybrid Threats”, Hybrid military-cyber-operations-2020.pdf CoE Working Paper, April 2018, Accessed 24 April 11 Symantec, “APT28: New Espionage Operations 2020, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/ Target Military and Government Organizations”, nudge-novichok-response-skripal-nerve-agent- 4 October 2018, accessed 23 April 2020, https:// attack-holds-lessons-countering-hybrid-threats/; symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/ Mark Urban,
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