Abkhazian and Georgian- Ossetian Conflicts

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Conflict Generations For Peace Institute Research Analysis July - December 2014 1

Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian- Abkhazian and Georgian- Ossetian Conflicts

Edward Beswick 2014 Summer Field Research Intern The University of Oxford

Supervised, reviewed, and edited by Generations For Peace Institute: Sairah Yusuf, Nabila Hussein, Jadranka Stikovac Clark

/generationsforpeaceeersree @Gens_For_Peaceesree /generationsforpeaceeersree /in/generationsforpeaceeersree www.generationsforpeace.org Disclaimer: I, Edward Beswick, hereby confirm that the enclosed document is entirely my own work. I confirm that this written submission has, in no part, been copied from a book, article, encyclopaedia, or any other source, including the internet, except where such sections are clearly identified by the use of quotations. I confirm that all sources utilised have been correctly identified within the body of the text or in the final list of references. About Generations For Peace Institute About Generations For Peace enerations For Peace Institute (GFPI) enerations For Peace (GFP) is a Jordan- conducts, invests in, and disseminates based leading global non-profit peace- applied interdisciplinary research and building organisation founded by HRH Gbest practices in partnership with leading GPrince Feisal Al-Hussein and Sarah universities such as the Georgetown University, Kabbani in 2007. Dedicated to sustainable conflict the University of Oxford, the University of Western transformation at the grassroots, Generations Cape, as well as other institutes, research centres, For Peace empowers volunteer leaders of youth individual academics and researchers. As well to promote active tolerance and responsible as research on Generations For Peace’s own citizenship in communities experiencing different programmes, the Institute’s research projects forms of conflict and violence. also examine peace-building interventions by other organisations, therefore making broader In the last seven years, Generations For Peace has contributions to the fields of peace building and trained and mentored more than 8,700 volunteer conflict transformation in general. leaders of youth in 50 countries in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe. With our support, The overall objectives of the Institute reflect the their ongoing programmes address local issues of aspirations of Generations For Peace to make conflict and violence, and have touched the lives a practical difference to programme work on of more than 200,000 children, youth and adults. the ground, supporting a growing community of practice by demonstrating the impact of, and advocating for increased use of sport, art, advocacy, dialogue and empowerment activities for sustainable peace building. Table of Contents

List of Acronyms 6 List of Maps, Tables and Charts 6 1. Chapter One: Introduction 8 1.1 Overview 11 1.2 Argument 11 1.3 Structure 13 1.4 Georgia and its Ethno-Territorial Conflicts 14 1.4.1 Demography of Georgia 14 1.4.2 The History of the Conflicts 14 1.4.3 Political Situation and Definitions 16 1.5 Literature Review 17 1.5.1 The Specific Field: Conflict Mapping, Identity Frames and Psychocultural Interpretations 17 1.5.2 Literature on the Conflicts: Ethno-Political Conflict, Geopolitics and Grassroots Dynamics 19 1.6 Research Questions 22 1.7 Methodology 24 1.7.1 Method of Analysis 26 2. Chapter Two: Findings 28 2.1 Introduction 30 2.2 Section One: Understanding of Conflict 31 2.2.1 Georgians from Tbilisi: Conflict in Tbilisi and Georgia 31 2.2.2 IDPs: Perceptions of Abkhazia 33 2.3 Section Two: Origins, Causes and Consequences of the Conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 34 2.3.1 Origins 35 2.3.2 Causes 38 2.3.3 Consequences 42 2.3.4 Longevity 45 2.4 Section Three: Understanding of Conflict Dynamics 46 2.4.1 Contradictions 46 2.4.2 Attitudes 48 2.4.3 Behaviour 51 2.5 Section Four: State / Geopolitical level 52 2.5.1 Without Russia… 53 2.5.2 The Georgian Government 57 2.6 Section Five: The Future 58 2.6.1 Likely Future 58 2.6.2 The Ideal Situation 61 2.6.3 What Can be Done to Improve the Situation? 62 2.7 Conclusion 64 Table of Contents

3. Chapter Three: Generations For Peace Findings 66 3.1 Introduction 68 3.2 Delegates’ and Pioneers’ Interpretation of the Conflict 69 3.3 Delegates’ and Pioneers’ Experience of GFP 70 3.4 Strengths and Weaknesses 71 3.5 Main Areas for Improvement 72 3.6 Future Programme Ideas 73 3.7 Programmes Addressing the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 74 3.8 Delegates’ and Pioneers’ Involvement in the Research 74 3.9 Conclusion 75 4. Chapter Four: Recommendations and Conclusion 76 4.1 Recommendations 78 4.2 Conclusion 84 Bibliography 87 Appendices 90 Appendix A – Interview Questions 92 Appendix B – Interview List 94 Appendix C – Selected Recurring Themes and Metaphors 97 1. List of Acronyms

DP Dialogue For Peace DPP Dialogue For Peace Programme FSU Former Soviet Union GFP Generations For Peace GFPI Generations For Peace Institute IDPs Internally Displaced Persons 6 PE Participatory Evaluation Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts

2. List of Maps, Tables and Charts

Map 1.1: Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 15

Table 1.1: Total Sample Breakdown 24 Table 1.2: Sample of Georgians from Tbilisi 25 Table 1.3: Sample of IDPs living in Tbilisi 25 Table 2.1: Recurring themes mentioned by Georgians from Tbilisi when discussing ideal solutions 61 Table 2.2: Recurring themes mentioned by IDPs when discussing ideal solutions 62 7 Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 53 54 59 63 69 71 71 73 42 44 45 31 35 38 39 40

2. List of Maps, Tables and Charts and Tables Maps, of 2. List Chart 2.10: in Abkhazia and South Ossetia be like (IDPs) Without Russia what would the conflicts Chart 2.11: Tbilisi) from to these conflicts (Georgians What is likely to happen in the future Chart 2.12: Tbilisi) from (Georgians improved How could the conflict situation be Chart 3.1: What conflicts exist in Tbilisi (GFP Delegates and Pioneers) Chart 3.2: (GFP Delegates and Pioneers) GFP in Georgia of Strengths Chart 3.3: (GFP Delegates and Pioneers) GFP in Georgia of Weaknesses Chart 3.4: (GFP Delegates and Pioneers) for GFP in Georgia for improvement Main areas Chart 2.7: the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (IDPs) Consequences of Chart 2.8: Abkhazia and South Ossetia Reasons for conflict longevity in Tbilisi and IDPs) from (Georgians Chart 2.9: in Abkhazia and South Ossetia be like Without Russia what would the conflicts Tbilisi) from (Georgians Consequences of the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Georgia (Georgians from Tbilisi) from (Georgians South Ossetia for Georgia the conflict in Abkhazia and Consequences of Chart2.2: Tbilisi and IDPs from (Georgians in Abkhazia and South Ossetia the conflict Origins of Chart2.3: Tbilisi) from (Georgians conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia the Causes of Chart2.4: Tbilisi) from (Georgians in Abkhazia and South Ossetia the conflict of Russia and the causes Chart 2.1: Tbilisi) from (Georgians exist in Tbilisi What conflicts Chart2.5: Ossetia (IDPs) conflicts in Abkhazia and South the Causes of Chart 2.6:

1. Introduction © GFP 2013 | Tbilisi, Georgia Learn more about what Generations For Peace does in Georgia and 49 other countries in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Europe: 10 http://bit.ly/1EmMQ55 Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts © GFP 2012 | Tbilisi, Georgia

his report presents findings based on fieldwork conducted in Georgia between 24 July and 13 August 2014. The data was collected using semi- structured interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Internally Displaced TPersons (IDPs), and individuals from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to map the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. The report was completed for the non-profit peace-building organisation, Generations For Peace (GFP), which has run activities in Georgia since 2011.1 The fieldwork also included focus groups and a workshop with the organisation’s volunteers. Generations For Peace is a Jordan-based organisation that works to achieve sustainable conflict transformation at a grassroots level by promoting youth leadership, community empowerment, active tolerance and responsible citizenship. It is a volunteer movement that empowers and supports local people to bring about positive change in their communities. In the last seven years, Generations For Peace has trained and mentored more than 8,400 volunteer leaders in 50 countries and territories. The organisation has developed programme activities using sport, art, advocacy, dialogue, and empowerment. To train volunteer leaders GFP uses a cascading system to pass on essential skills. The organisation transfers its values, knowledge, model, and skills to volunteers working in societies affected by conflict who in turn select and train other volunteers in their own communities. After a stringent recruitment process, GFP selects volunteers to train as Delegates so that they can go back to their communities and implement programmes. After they have met set requirements and run programmes in their communities, they become a certified GFP Pioneer. Since 2007, over 600 ‘first generation’ Delegates have been trained by the organisation at International Camps who in turn have passed on their knowledge to more than 8,400 volunteers.2 This process enables the organisation to have a truly global outreach at a community level.

1 Discussion with Lama Hattab, GFP Programmes Director, at Generations For Peace Headquarters: Amman, Jordan. 18 July 2014. 2 All information taken from, Generations For Peace, ‘Introductory Booklet’, 1-6. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 11 This report firstly analyses varying interpretations the Georgian- of Abkhazian and Georgia-Ossetian conflicts by using conflict analysis and mapping, and secondly, it assesses current GFP’s organisational in the capacity country and, on that based assessment, provides recommendations for future that programmes these can address ethno-territorial disputes. It is 3 This research This research 4 Parallels between the Georgian situation the Georgian between Parallels 5

While this report does not deny Russia’s role in Georgia’s two ethno- in Georgia’s role While this report does not deny Russia’s 6 regions of Ukraine. Their actions came in the wake of the overthrow of President Yanukovych in Yanukovych President the overthrow of of Ukraine. Their actions came in the wake of regions conflict in an intra-state Russia becoming heavily involved February case of another 2014. It represents BBC, pursuing secessionist goals. Russians are ethnic In this case, however, region. in the post-Soviet co.uk/news/ 2014. http://www.bbc. 2014. Accessed 30 September 9 September ‘Ukraine Crisis: Timeline,’ world-middle-east-26248275 Amman, Jordan. 18 July 14. Amman, Jordan. 40 (2012). Nationalities Papers through this part of the organisation that this research was conducted. was conducted. that this research this part the organisation through of territorial conflicts, itregards the focus on the geopolitical level as unhelpful and and the current events in Ukraine only serve current and the the this framing of exacerbate to conflict. Since April 2014 pro-Russian separatists have fought against the Ukrainian authorities in two Eastern Eastern fought against the Ukrainian authorities in two have separatists 6 Since April 2014 pro-Russian Generations For Peace, ‘Introductory Booklet’, 2. ‘Introductory Booklet’, 3 Generations For Peace, Headquarters: at Generations For Peace Director, 4 Discussion with Lama Hattab, GFP Programmes and its Conflict’, 2008: The Main Consequences for Georgia ‘The of 5 Ghia Nordia, August War Georgia’s ethno-territorial disputes have often been regarded as backdrops to as backdrops regarded been ethno-territorial disputes have often Georgia’s a larger geo-political contest in the region. Since 2008, this has dominated the community. international the of thinking 1.2 Argument 1.2 Argument Despite running activities in the country since 2011, Georgia’s two ethno-territorial two runningDespite activities in the country since 2011, Georgia’s conflictsremain Previous activities unaddressed by have GFP. been successful at boosting Delegates’ and Pioneers’ confidence and organisational capacity, yet they have not been directly relevant to ethno-territorial conflict. This report has two main aims: firstly, it analyses varying interpretationsof Georgian-Abkhazian the and Georgian-Ossetian conflictsby using conflict analysis capacity organisational current assesses it GFP’s and mapping; and, secondly, in the country for recommendations provides and, based on this assessment, future programmes that can address these ethno-territorial disputes. The focus on the cultural dynamics the of conflicts allows for a detailed understandingof a conflict area that canbe targeted using peace-building programmes. This builds the perceive how Georgians a detailed analysis of to provide literature on previous conflict as well as an extensive comparisonof theof interpretations the different sides involved. The analysis is grounded at a grassroots level with the intention of helping to improve the lives of the people most affected by along with a heightened programmes, these for future recommendations It provides conflicts. awareness of the potential difficulties encountered interventiontransformation in Georgia. when planning a conflict 1.1 Overview In 2010, the organisation founded its research wing, the Generations For Peace For Peace the Generations wing, its research founded In 2010, organisation the practitionersexchange among and academics (GFPI), which promotes Institute Georgetown partnership with in is Institute The transformation. conflict in working University, the University of Oxford, and the University of Western Cape. contributes to changing this situation by providing an empirical, theoretical, empirical, theoretical, an by providing changing this situation contributes to and practical guide for future activities. It builds on the effortsof has involved scope the This in active research the country. theyears to expand GFP’s past few participation Delegates and Pioneers and serves of anonymous of as a form and peace- for both academics as having relevance as well for GFP, feedback building practitioners. counterproductive for any attempts at grassroots conflict transformation. The Georgian state’s attempts to maintain its territorial integrity and the Russian state’s attempts to continue its influence in the region detract attention from the ethno- territorial disputes at the core of these conflicts, which have killed thousands, displaced hundreds of thousands and divided once largely peaceful communities.7 Academics who have addressed the grassroots elements of these conflicts share

Useful resource: this view. John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov and Gerard Toal conclude that the Thomas de Waal, tendency to treat de facto states – such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia – as pawns The Caucasus: An Introduction. (Oxford: of international politics hinders understanding of their complexity and dismisses Oxford University Press, consideration for the needs of the people who reside within them.8 2010) 12 Challenging this understanding of the conflict forms the backbone of this report’s

Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts argument. Blaming Russia for these conflicts erases the complexity of the situation. It reduces the need to understand more proximate causes and focuses on national and international dynamics at the expense of community-level conflict. Put simply, most ethnic conflicts usually involve one side blaming or showing hostility toward the other – Arab and Jew, Protestant and Catholic, Hutu and Tutsi.9 However, in the case of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts this is not the Useful resource: case. The findings demonstrate that while Ossetians and Abkhazians understand Stefan Wolf, Ethnic the conflict as a product of Georgian aggression and the fight for survival in the Conflict: A Global Overview. (Oxford: face of that threat, the Georgians interpret the situation as a result of Russian 2006) meddling and manipulation aimed at maintaining control in the region and undermining Georgian sovereignty. This results in a situation of ‘displaced blame’, whereby the Georgian side shifts blame onto a third party which both denies their own complicity in events and denies the Abkhazian and Ossetians agency, as they are considered mere puppets of Russian neo-imperialism.10 This understanding of the conflict, based on competing post-colonial nationalist narratives, hinders attempts at grassroots peace building and results in contradictory interpretations, which furthers the conflicts’ intractability. Part of this conflict transformation should be a rethinking among the Georgians and IDPs about the idea that they are powerless in the face of Russian aggression. The findings show that the Georgian view is both deterministic and fatalistic in the sense that Russia is regarded as a constant menace working to undermine Georgians, never allowing them to be truly free; and, as a smaller, weaker country they are unable to challenge this situation. The community and ethnic dimensions of these conflicts need to become a central focus once more in order for grassroots actors to be able to bring about positive change. In other words, individuals on the ground cannot change the politics of the Kremlin but they can change the attitudes, perceptions, and stereotypes in their own societies. Despite the geopolitical situation, people in Georgia, Abkhazia, and Ossetia do have the ability to bring about positive change; empowering individuals with this realisation must form an integral part of any peace-building intervention. Therefore attempts at reconciliation need to focus on improving dialogue between Georgians/IDPs and the people living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Exposure to different perspectives will raise awareness of competing needs. For the Georgians

7 Thomas de Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 8 John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov and Gerard Toal, ‘Inside Abkhazia: A Survey of Opinions in a De- Facto State.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 27 (2013): 3. 9 Stefan Wolf, Ethnic Conflict: A Global Overview. (Oxford: 2006). 10 Argument made in Peter Kabachnik, Joanna Regulska and Beth Mitchneck, ‘Displacing Blame: Georgian Internally Displaced Person Perspectives on the Georgia-Abkhazia Conflict.’ Ethno Politics 20 (2012). Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 13 As events in As events continue Ukraine and the West’s relationship with Russia deteriorates, the geopolitical understanding of these conflicts is gain only set to wider currency. Now it is more important than the reset to ever the focus onto rather intra-state than inter-state dynamics of these conflicts. trust Forging and rebuilding will relationships impossible remain if achieve to explanations for the conflicts among the Georgians rest continue to a on the actions of men in handful of the Kremlin. The Fourth and final chapterconclusion. The recommendations are divided between includesimproving GFP capacity a listand addressing ethno-territorial conflict in Georgia. It finishes of recommendations by recommending and the mutual understanding, awareness, increase to dialogue in order transformational on going before argument, and findings the summarises conclusion The trust. and research. for future to suggest areas Chapter Three begins with a discussion of GFP Delegates’ and Pioneers’ begins with a discussion of Chapter Three understanding of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. It then goes on to discuss findings future on fromIdeas improvement. for the areas main interviewsthe and weaknesses, strengths, and workshopGFP’s regarding programmes and how to address the conflicts are also partof the discussion. It finishes with a brief considerationof how the Delegates committed, and Pioneers hard-working, found a the has GFP while that finds chapter This process. research capacity they will current at their volunteers in Georgia, of and imaginative core conflicts. Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian the address to able be not to achieve GFP needs to build up capacities in the territories separately in order this future goal. While they are doing this, GFP Georgia can address other issues ethno-territorial conflicts. to the country’s relevant Chapter Two discusses the findings of interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi as well as Tbilisi from Georgians interviews with of findings the discusses Two Chapter as IDPs in residing Tbilisi. The interviews held with people in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are integrated into this analysis. The discussion follows the used framework in the interviews, which origins, comprises causes and of consequences five of sections: the Georgian-Abkhazian conflictsOssetian and conflicts; Georgian- understanding in Tbilisi; of conflict dynamics;people’s understanding of geopolitical concerns; and, perceptions offinally, the future. For the IDPs, the conflict in Tbilisi section isreplaced with their memoryof their territoryof origin. understanding of dominates Georgian role This chapter illustrates how Russia’s Ossetians South and Abkhazians of sample small the uses it Moreover, conflict. the to illustrate how contradictory group perceptions of the conflict are. It suggests mutual the importance dialogue in building awareness, transformational of understanding, and trust. The report proceeds in four parts: conflicts, introduction, findings findings on GFP on Georgia, in ethno-territorial recommendations. and The Introduction a historyprovides and its conflictsGeorgia as well asof a demographic overview of the country and a discussion of definitions. It alsosecondary includes literature, a surveycollection. data for of the both used methodology the theoretical and questions research and the of discussion conflict specific. It finishes with a 1.3 Structure 1.3 Structure it will result in an increased understanding of the complexity of the situation to situation the of complexity the understanding of in an increased result it will counter the simplistic account provided by the Georgian government. As events the Russia deteriorates, with relationship the West’s continue and in Ukraine Now currency. wider gain to set only is conflicts these of understanding geopolitical importantit is more rather than onto the intra-state the focus than ever to reset will relationships rebuilding and trust Forging conflicts. these of dynamics inter-state Georgians the among conflicts the for explanations if achieve to impossible remain men in the Kremlin. a handful of on the actions of continue to rest 1.4 Georgia and its Ethno-Territorial Conflicts Although the focus of this research is Georgia’s two ethno-territorial disputes, it also seeks to assess what other conflicts exist in Georgian society that could be addressed by GFP. Therefore, a demographic overview of the country is given below to provide a background for later discussion. The section on the history of these conflicts provides information that serves as an aid to understanding the following chapters of the report.

1.4.1 Demography of Georgia 14 Georgia has a population of 4.3 million.11 In the only census carried out in post- Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts Soviet Georgia in 2002, ethnic Georgians accounted for 83 per cent of the population, compared with just 70 per cent in 1989. The country has numerous ethnic minorities including Armenians, Azerbaijanis, and Russians. By far the largest minority groups are Azerbaijanis and Armenians making up 6.5 and 5.7 per cent of the population respectively.12 Georgian is the main language of the country but Russian is still widely spoken, especially among the older generation and the Russified titular nationalities.13 There is a low level of proficiency in Georgian among the country’s ethnic minorities, which excludes them from Georgian-dominated public life.14 The country is overwhelmingly Orthodox Christian, at 83.9 per cent of the population. The second largest religious group are Muslims, at 9.9 per cent of the population.15 South Ossetia has a population of approximately 70,000 and Abkhazia 250,000. Both of these figures represent significant reductions on pre-war populations. While South Ossetia is largely ethnically homogenous, Abkhazia has a sizable Armenian and Russian population, as well as a notable Mingrelian-Georgian population that have gradually returned to the Gali (Gal) district of Southern Abkhazia since the mid-1990s.16

1.4.2 The History of the Conflicts17 Situated at a cultural and political crossroads, over the centuries Georgia has been the subject of competition between Persia, Turkey (the Ottoman Empire), and Russia. In the 19th century, the Russians incorporated Georgia into their empire following a protracted struggle to gain control in the region.18 The country briefly

11 UN Data, ‘Georgia.’ Accessed 10 September 2014. https://data.un.org/CountryProfile. aspx?crName=GEORGIA 12 Statistic discussed in Laurence Broers, ‘Filling the Void: Ethnic Politics and Nationalities Policy in Post- Conflict Georgia.’ Nationalities Papers 36 (2008): 277-279. 13 Among the Georgian ethnic category, there are several ethnic sub-groups, some of which speak dialects that are distinct from Georgian. The main groups are Mingrelian (some of whom lived in Abkhazia), Svans in Western Georgia and Ajarians in southwest Georgia. Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. (London: Ithaca, 2001) p. 87. 14 Traditionally Russian was the lingua franca spoken by Georgia’s various ethnic groups, but as levels of Russian proficiency among the Georgian citizens decline (most of the younger generation learn English rather than Russian) it will be increasingly difficult for different ethnic communities within Georgia to communicate. Broers, ‘Filling the Void.’ 279. 15 Aside from the overall population figure, these statistics do not include Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 16 BBC, ‘Abkhazia Profile.’ Accessed 4 September 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18175030; BBC, ‘South Ossetia Profile.’ Accessed 4 September 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- europe-18269210 17 Map 1.1: ‘Q&A Conflict in Georgia’, BBC. 11 November 2008. Accessed 17 September 2014. http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7549736.stm; Map 1.2: BBC, ‘South Ossetia Profile.’ Map: 1.3: BBC, ‘Abkhazia Profile.’ 18 Thomas de Waal, The Caucasus. 38-39. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 15 22 =27503 Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia Abkhazia Map 1.1: Georgia,

19 Following a 20 orientation, language, and religion as a precondition for relaxed visa conditions with EU member for relaxed as a precondition orientation, language, and religion with the EU, which ratified an Association Agreement parliament and in July 2014 the Georgian states, Ratifies EU Association Agreement.’ ‘Georgia Civil Georgia, trade area. free included a comprehensive 18 July 2014. Accessed 18 July 2014. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id paradise – a ‘Soviet Florida’. The country enjoyed a relatively high standard of living when compared living when compared of The country high standard a relatively enjoyed – a ‘Soviet Florida’. paradise the Union. Ibid. 82-83. of the rest to Houndsmill, 2013), 90. (Basingstoke: Reconsidered.’ Wars He pursued a policy of strengthening Georgia’s ties to the West through aiming through ties to the West Georgia’s strengthening He pursued a policy of for accession and with the NATO EU as well as restoring the country’s territorial in and government new a formed Coalition Dream Georgian the 2012, In integrity. The Margvelashvili. Giorgi by replaced was Saakashvili year following the October EU integration trajectory. has continued Georgia’s new government small civil war, he was he was small civil war, overthrown and replaced Soviet former by the Eduard Minister, Foreign 11 his During Shevardnadze. rule, the Georgian years of people became increasingly frustrated with poverty, and corruption and crime, in 2003 he was overthrown in a popular uprising known as the ‘Rose Mikhail Saakashvili, who Revolution’. replaced led the protests, him as President in 2004. co.uk/news/world-europe-17301647 Accessed 16 July 2014. http://www.bbc. Profile.’ 21 BBC, ‘Georgia sexual on gender, discrimination based of all forms a law banning passed 22 In May 2014, Georgia Emil Souleimanov, ‘Understanding Ethno-Political Conflict: Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia South Conflict: Karabakh, ‘Understanding Ethno-Political 20 Emil Souleimanov, Under Soviet rule, Georgia became a popular tourist destination and was idealised as a sub-tropical destination and was idealised as a sub-tropical became a popular tourist 19 Under Soviet rule, Georgia Georgia’s post-Soviet history disputes has been dominated by two ethno-political post-Soviet Georgia’s in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The emergence of a sovereign Georgia was experienced independence independence experienced Menshevik rule under 1917 1921 and between being incorporated before Union. into the Soviet In 1991, Georgia gained In 1991, Georgia independence. country’s Zviad Soviet President, first The embarked Gamsakhurdia, post- on a fervently nationalist course did much to that destabilise the country. fledgling The cast ethnic minorities as nationalists a potential fifth to undermine that desired column newfound country’s the freedom. paralleled by attempts to gain dominion by the country’s ethnic minorities.23 In the late 1980s, the Ossetians began to pursue a course independent of an increasingly nationalistic Georgia.24 The war of 1991-1992, between Georgians and Ossetians, had a devastating impact on the territory. A peace treaty was organised in 1992.25 The war in Abkhazia between 1992 and 1993 resulted in a mass exodus of ethnic Georgians that drastically altered the demographic composition of the territory.26 Following the wars, these disputes became so-called ‘frozen conflicts’, with no war and no peace.27 The situation in Georgia was brought to the world’s attention in August 2008 when the Georgian military’s response to a violent outbreak in South Ossetia resulted 16 in Russia’s invasion of the country.28 The war drastically altered the two conflicts

Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts by further entrenching the incompatibility of Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian- Abkhazian interests. In addition, Russia’s recognition of the breakaway territories has given legitimacy to their secessionist ambitions.29 On the international stage, ethno-territorial conflict in Georgia was therefore overshadowed by the country’s geopolitical contest with a resurgent Russia. Following the war, Russia has become increasingly involved militarily and economically with the territories, which has further cemented their estrangement from Tbilisi. In 2011, the UN estimated that overall there were 276,000 IDPs in Georgia as a result of the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.30 More recently, President Margvelashvili has taken a conciliatory tone towards the two breakaway territories. He stated in an interview in late 2013 that he desired to attract them back to a democratic Georgia.31 However, for Tbilisi, developments in the breakaway territories are largely out of reach, as the areas remain sealed off by Russian troops. Whether these troops are protectors or occupiers depends on people’s interpretation of the conflict.

1.4.3 Political Situation and Definitions Commonly known as de facto states, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are two of around 20 political entities in the world lacking widespread recognition.32 Several of these are in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Along with the two on the territory internationally recognised as Georgia’s, there is Trans-Dniester in Moldova and

23 Christopher Zurcher, ‘The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood.’ (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 131. 24 Ibid, 124. 25 The Ossetians are a largely Orthodox Christian ethnic group who speak a language related to Persian. Most Ossetians live in Russian North Ossetia. Thomas de Waal, The Caucasus. 145. 26 Kirill Shevchenko, ‘Introduction in Islam’; Tekushev et al (eds), ‘Abkhazia: Between the Past and the Future.’ (Prague: Median Orient, 2013). 13. 27 Although South Ossetia technically formed a de facto separate political entity, its border with Georgia remained open and people were allowed to travel freely. It remained badly damaged from the war and became a haven for smuggling. de Waal, The Caucasus. 145. In Abkhazia, tens of thousands of ethnic Armenians and Russians remained in the territory alongside the Abkhaz. Ethnic Mingrelians and Georgians began returning to the Gali (Gal to the Abkhaz) district of Southern Abkhazia. In Gali some Mingrelian-Georgians waged a low-level war, which escalated in 1998 causing many Abkhaz deaths and another exodus of ethnic Georgians following the response of the Abkhaz armed forces. In 1999, the territory held a referendum and declared independence. Ibid. 165-166. 28 Ghia Nordia, ‘The August War of 2008: The Main Consequences for Georgia and its Conflict.’ Nationalities Papers 40. (2012): 722. 29 Ghia Nordia, ‘The August War of 2008.’ 727. 30 UN Data, ‘Georgia.’ 31 Tabula, ‘President: Russian Proved Losers by Recognising Abkhazia, South Ossetia.’ 4 December 2014. Accessed 15 July 2014. http://www.tabula.ge/en/story/77769-president-russia-proved-loser-by- recognizing-abkhazia-south-ossetia 32 Discussed in O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal, ‘Inside Abkhazia.’ 2. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 17 Useful resource: Foundation, Berghof Glossary‘Berghof Conflict of Transformation’: http://bit.ly/1Gay7be

36 38 39

35 europe-29078541 europe-29078541 In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the ethnic the Ossetia, South and Abkhazia In 37 De facto states share several common common several share facto states De 33 International law surrounding has these entities been confused law surrounding International 34 ideas or interests among actors and/or groups pursuing mutually incompatible goals. It a social goals. pursuing mutually incompatible and/or groups among actors ideas or interests each conflict has its own distinct yet, human interaction; partphenomenon that is a universal of acts. It includes than just psychical much more and dynamics. Violence denotes features history, damage. that cause physical, social or psychological or systems attitudes, structures, actions, words, prevalent of conflict and violence than is understanding broader Both these definitions offer a much the multifarious and terms, of these the definition expanding in popular understanding. Through can be better on peoples’ lives this has diverse manifests itself in society and the impact ways conflict Accessed 7 july 2014. Transformation.’ Glossary Conflict Foundation, ‘Berghof of Berghof understood. publications/glossary/ http://www.berghof-foundation.org/ internationally recognised as Ukrainian, may become two more permanent de facto states in post- states de facto permanent more as Ukrainian, may become two recognised internationally BBC. 10 September Conflicts and the Kremlin’, ‘Ukraine Crisis: Frozen Jackson, Patrick Soviet space. 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- 2014. Accessed 10 September Between the Past and the Future.’ (Prague: Median Orient, 2013). 72. and the Future.’ the Past Between features: they usually arise from the breakdown of larger imperial structures, they imperial structures, larger of the breakdown they usually arise from features: state- and witness to extensive are they supported often are an by power, outside nation-building efforts, and subject to difficult property situations from arising displacements. This report argues that they are both, a situation captured by the term ethno- the term by both, a situation captured This report that they are argues territorial conflicts, which denotes an ethnic conflict arisingfrom a dispute over Ethnic territory. conflict is defined as one in which the of goals atleast one party understood primary and in which the terms in distinctly ethnic are fault line of distinctions. ethnic of are conflicts the these However, conflicts are also political. Firstly, there is the issueof status: the territories as integral parts the two the Georgian regards government of Georgian leaders themselves consider authorities Ossetian and Abkhazian the while nation, of independent countries. Secondly, there is can that the dimensions political and ethnic geopolitical both have conflicts the sum, factor In complicity. of Russia’s be defined as ethno-territorial or ethno-political. This definition is important for these conflicts. the one-dimensional geopolitical framing of overcoming Due to this political situation hanging over the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian- and Georgian-Abkhazian the over hanging situation political this to Due Ossetian conflicts there is confusion over the exact definition of these disputes. geopolitical) rather political (or that these are widely circulated it is In Georgia than ethnic conflicts. This themeoften came up in interviews for thisresearch. since the West’s recognition of Kosovo in 2008, which was firmlyRussia. Later opposedthat year by Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia following commitment its on backtrack to unwilling is West the While Georgia. with war the Kosovo. to recognise Russia refuses ‘territorial integrity’, to Georgia’s component is undeniable. In the wars of the 1990s, ethnicity formed the motive for main mobilisation and interests were understood in ethnic terms. The war in Abkhazia resulted in one of the greatest acts of ethnic cleansing seen in the FSU, with 200,000 ethnic Mingrelians-Georgians forced to leave their homes. Two other relevant definitions are conflict and violence. A conflict is defined as a clash of antithetical of antithetical clash conflict and violence. A conflict is defined as a definitions are other relevant 39 Two Events are moving fast, but the Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic, on territory Republic, and Lugansk People’s Republic moving fast, but the Donetsk People’s are 33 Events Nagorno-Karabakh Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. Discussed in O’Loughlin, Kolossov and Toal, ‘Inside Abkhazia.’ 2. ‘Inside Abkhazia.’ and Toal, 34 Discussed in O’Loughlin, Kolossov et al (eds), ‘Abkhazia: Experts Abkhazia’; Islam Tekushev ‘International View of Markendenov, 35 Sergey 27 July-11 August 2014. 36 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians 2. ‘Ethnic Conflict.’ 37 Wolf, 115. Wars.’ ‘Post-Soviet Zurcher, by the Abkhaz. is disputed term this 38 This use of 1.5 Literature Review 1.5.1 The Specific Field: Conflict Mapping, Identity Frames and Psychocultural Interpretations The overview above demonstrates how the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian- In Galtung’s ABC triangle, Ossetian conflicts arose from certain disagreements over territory and rights. Attitudes (A) These interests were understood in ethnic terms and when events escalated refer to the people mobilised along ethnic lines. Applying theoretical frameworks to this assumptions, situation allows for a deeper understanding of how these conflicts work; this, in cognitions, and emotions that turn, strengthens the researcher’s ability to suggest ways they could be addressed. one side has Every conflict has basic elements that enable the researcher to produce a map. This 18 towards the should decipher the different parties involved in the dispute, the contradictions Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts other; Behaviour from which it arises and the different dynamics that shape the conflict.40 One form (B) refers to the 41 mental, verbal of conflict mapping is the ABC triangle, developed by Johan Galtung. The ABC and physical triangle provides a simple way of breaking down conflict dynamics into just three acts expressed areas; therefore, it was easy to use as a basic form of participatory conflict analysis during a conflict; and incorporate into the interview questions used in this study.42 In the triangle, Contradictions (C) -in values, goals, ‘A’ stands for attitudes, ‘B’ for behaviour and ‘C’ for contradictions. Attitudes or interests- form refer to the assumptions, cognitions, and emotions that one side has toward the the basis of the other. Behaviour refers to the mental, verbal, and physical acts expressed during conflict; it is from a conflict. Contradictions – in values, goals, or interests – form the basis of the here that violent attitudes and conflict; it is from here that violent attitudes and behaviour arise. In a conflict, behaviour arise. each of these three elements influences the other to varying extents depending on its nature.43 For example, contradictions may trigger hostile attitudes that in turn lead to violent behaviour that further entrenches those contradictions. The ABC triangle provides a simple visualisation of conflict dynamics; it represents a framework for addressing conflict that accounts for structural considerations alongside cultural and behavioural factors. Identity is an integral part of ethno-political conflict. Ethnic identity connects individuals through perceived common past experiences and expectations of shared future ones.44 Central to identity and conflict is the issue of framing, which is defined as cognitive short cuts utilised by people to make sense of complicated situations. Frames help individuals understand their surroundings and portray them to others.45 Identity frames focus specifically on how people view conflict situations. Going back to Galtung’s triangle, an identity helps shape the attitudes people have and the way that they behave, as well as the sides they take when a contradiction arises. When an individual feels threatened by a conflict situation this tends to strengthen their group affiliations.46 In the conflicts addressed in this report, ethnic groups mobilised against what they regarded as threats to their group’s existence or ethnic homelands, in a time of great insecurity. These competing identity frames are vital to understanding conflict and the

40 Paul Wehr, ‘Conflict Mapping.’ In Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess (eds), Beyond Intractability. (Bolder: University of Colorado, 2006) http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/conflict_mapping/ 41 Johan Galtung, ‘Theories of Conflict: Definitions, Dimensions, Negations, Formations.’ (2009). 105. 42 See Appendix A. 43 Johan Galtung, ‘Theories of Conflict: Definitions, Dimensions, Negations, Formations.’ (2009). 105. 44 Marc Howard Ross, ‘Psychocultural Interpretations and Dramas: Identity Dynamics in Ethnic Conflicts.’ Political Psychology 21. (2001): 160. 45 Sanda Kaufman, Michael Elliott and Deborah Shmueli, ‘Frames, Framing and Reframing.’ In Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Beyond Intractability. (Bolder: University of Colorado, 2003) http:// www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/framing/ 46 Robert Gardner, ‘Identity Frames.’ In Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Beyond Intractability. (Bolder: University of Colorado, 2003) http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/identity_frames/ Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 19 Useful resource: Johan Galtung, ‘Theories Conflict: of Definitions, Dimensions, Negations, Formations’. (2009) Useful resource: Lederach, John Paul ‘Building Peace: Sustainable in Reconciliation Divided Societies’. DC: (Washington, Institute States United 1997) Press, Peace of Once this is 49 Recently this has 50 In many conflicts, parties do not agree 48 Psychocultural interpretations are shared, deeply rooted rooted deeply shared, are Psychocultural interpretations 47 This work seeks to contribute to this literature by conducting research by conducting research This seeks to contribute to this work literature 51 anthropological emphasis on shared culture to explain the development of shared worldviews. Marc Marc worldviews. shared of explain the development to culture emphasis on shared anthropological Political Theory in Ethnic Conflict.’ Interpretation ‘Psychocultural and Peacebuilding Ross, Howard 16. (1995): 524. Psychology 1997). 39. Press, Peace of Institute States United ‘Inside South Ossetia: A Survey Opinion in a De Facto of Toal, Abkhazia’; John O’Loughlin and Gerard Soviet Affairs 29. (2013). Post State.’ on when the conflict started, what to them for difficult often is it interpretations it to attach people intensity emotional is about, or who is involved.Given the need attempts perspective; yet, reconciliation opposing side’s acknowledge the to begin with acknowledgement of the other party’s point of view. There There has been a significant amountof academic literature addressing Georgia’s thesetwo worksethno-territorial often haveconflicts; however, been focused on macro perspectives. Using John Paul levels Lederach’s of leadership, Tier I (‘Top inter-ethnic the most attention when addressing by far has received Leadership’) III Tier and attention, less received has Leadership’) (‘Middle-Range II Tier conflict, analysis. from missing been often has Leadership’) (‘Grassroots 1.5.2 Literature on the Conflicts: Ethno-Political Conflict, Geopolitics and Geopolitics Conflict, Ethno-Political Conflicts: the on Literature 1.5.2 Dynamics Grassroots Collectively these theories enable the researcher to understand the dynamics of the to understand dynamics of the researcher Collectively these theories enable the understand conflict the the in involved people the how appreciate to and conflict and opinions their shape have people perspectives The elements. conflict different actions, and The form betterthe these basis understood, are the of conflict itself. can be addressed. effectively the conflict the more better understood by both sides then the other dynamics of the conflict can be theory Psychocultural interpretation addressed. framework a theoretical provides have in conflict situations. ethnic groups narratives for understanding the shared Ross, ‘Psychocultural Interpretations and Dramas.’ 160-161. and Dramas.’ Interpretations ‘Psychocultural 48 Ross, 531-532. Theory.’ Interpretation ‘Psychocultural 49 Ross, (Washington: in Divided Societies.’ Sustainable Reconciliation Lederach, ‘Building Peace: 50 John Paul ‘Inside and Mitchneck,51 Kabachnik, and Toal, Blame’; O’Loughlin, Kolossov ‘Displacing Regulska Psychocultural interpretation theory with the ideas about human development interpretation psychoanalytic 47 Psychocultural merges reasons reasons for its In intractability. addition, insights made in the area of social and how frames understanding advanced of a more cultural psychology can provide shape ethnic conflict. worldviews worldviews that stem from the This leads often to distortions human as need for certaintythe overrides need for the need to make sense accuracy. They of provide simple, coherent experience. narratives that can be used to explain past events and predict future action. been challenged, however. There have been several works addressing popular attitudes toward the conflicts among IDPs and people living in Abkhazia. Ossetia and in Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, wars: and intra-state Following the collapse of Inter-ethnic that argued has Souleimanov Emil wars. intra-state in interest renewed a was there This section reviews the main currents in the literature surrounding these conflicts. these surrounding literature the in currents main the reviews section This It proceeds in four parts: inter-ethnic conflict dynamics and attitudinal intra-state finally, and, transformation; wars;conflict and geopolitical status considerations; and public opinion. grounded grounded at a grassroots level with the specific projects. transformation aim of aidingfuture conflict ethnicity was an integral element of Georgian political discourse in the late 1980s.52 President Gamsakhurdia’s inflammatory rhetoric strengthened ethnic identification in the country and heightened conflicting interests.53 Christoph Zurcher echoed Souleimanov’s conclusions by arguing that in Georgia, each group mobilised in reaction to the other, and the Abkhaz and South Ossetians national projects were a defence mechanism against an increasingly nationalistic Georgia.54 Soviet ethno- federalism gave them the territorial boundaries, institutions, and symbols needed for separatist aspirations; all that was required was mobilisation and this came in reaction to Georgia’s nationalistic rhetoric. Both Souleimanov and Zurcher have shown that the conflicts, rather than being a product of ancient hatreds, arose in 20 a particular context and in a particular political climate. Peace-building efforts, therefore, should focus on transforming the estrangements along ethnic lines Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts caused by the country’s post-Soviet experience. Geopolitical considerations: A second major strand in the literature focuses on the geopolitics of the region. Particularly since the August 2008 war, this dimension of the conflict has complicated the situation described by the literature on intra-state wars. Ghia Nordia has argued that the war arose from a range of issues, including President Putin’s desire to restore Russia as a regional power and the West’s increasing involvement in the Caucasus.55 A consensus has emerged among third parties that Georgia, Russia, the West and the breakaway states all share responsibility for the war.56 Nordia argued that the war in 2008 has led to a conflict transformation, but not in the sense usually implied by the phrase. The war exacerbated the polarisation between Georgia and Abkhazia/South Ossetia and turned Russia into a main conflict party, resulting in Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts being overshadowed by the Georgian-Russian geopolitical contest.57 This report seeks to understand how the ‘transformation’ described by Nordia has shaped grassroots perceptions of these conflicts. Political status and conflict transformation: Aside from geopolitics, the predominant political issue in these conflicts is the official status of the two territories. Both sides refuse to compromise on this area. The literature on conflict transformation has discussed ways to overcome this deadlock. Celine Francis’ regarded the Georgia-Abkhazian conflict as predominantly a clash of desired statuses.58 She argued that grassroots initiatives could give voice to those in society who are supportive of a peaceful solution that could in turn overcome the political stalemate by influencing policy makers.59 Through dialogue, both sides can gain a greater understanding of their respective goals, interests and fears, which can help find a middle ground in the conflict over desired statuses. This report builds on Francis’ findings to suggest ways that grassroots peace-building efforts could overcome the political stalemate on status that has existed for over two decades. A report authored by Archil Gegeshidze and Ivlian Haindrava used interviews with experts on the conflict to produce a comparative analysis of perspectives

52 Souleimanov, ‘Understanding Ethno-Political Conflict.’ 21. 53 Ibid. 90-94. 54 Christopher Zurcher, ‘The Post-Soviet Wars.’ 142-144. 55 Nordia, ‘The August War of 2008.’ 722. 56 Sergey Markedonov, ‘International Experts View of Abkhazia.’ 67. 57 Nordia, ‘The August War of 2008.’ 229. 58 Celine Frances, Conflict Resolution and Status: The Case of Georgia and Abkhazia (1989-2008).’ (Antwerp: Brussels University Press, 2010). 20. 59 Ibid. 23. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 21

62 Due to the irreconcilability of the the of irreconcilability Due to the 61 This narrative of Russian culpability of This narrative Several works have sought to look Several works 64

Through blaming Russia, Georgians deny Russia, blaming Georgians Through 63 The current report builds on their findings by 65

66 Like Francis, they agreed that the issue of status predominates over predominates status of that the issue they agreed Like Francis, 60 Georgia-Abkhazian Conflict: Rethinking the Paradigm.’ Conciliation Resources: European Union (2011). European Resources: Conciliation Paradigm.’ Rethinking the Conflict: Georgia-Abkhazian 5. They argue that conflict resolution attempts prior to 2008 amounted to a zero-sum game with neither to a zero-sum to 2008 amounted prior resolution attempts that conflict They argue August before Policies Resolution ‘Conflict down on its demands. Ivlian Haindrava, back side willing to Conflict: the Georgia-Abkhazian of ‘Transformation Gegeshidze and Ivlian Haindrava, In Archil 2008.’ Union (2011). 11-14. European Conciliation Resources: the Paradigm.’ Rethinking of the Georgia-Abkhazian Gegeshidze and Ivlian Haindrava, In Archil ‘Transformation Conflict.’ Union (2011). 40. European Resources: Conciliation Paradigm.’ Rethinking the Conflict: which he defines as a anxieties’, on ‘cartographic discourse and South Ossetia centres on Abkhazia and imagery, This perspective, rhetoric fuelled by political territory. with the loss of preoccupation Kabachnik, that ‘Wounds Peter identity. national harms territories the two posits that the loss of Central Asian In Georgia.’ Integrity Heal: Cartographic Anxieties and the Quest for Territorial Won’t Survey that national He has also shown that similar anxieties exist in Abkhazia by arguing 30. (2012). Kabachnik, ‘Shaping Peter statehood. the territory’s in legitimising symbols and maps play a vital role of Journal the Abkhaz Geo-body.’ of Abkhazia: Cartographic Anxieties and the Making and Remaking – shows the incompatibility works 14. (2012): 402-403. Kabachnik’s Studies Balkan and Near Eastern of this conflict. at the centre building projects state different the two – of on a cultural level Archil Gegeshidze, ‘Introduction.’ In Archil Gegeshidze and Ivlian Haindrava, ‘Transformation of the of ‘Transformation Gegeshidze and Ivlian Haindrava, In Archil ‘Introduction.’ Gegeshidze, Archil Abkhazians agency in the conflict, overlooking their perspective and the possibility the and perspective their overlooking conflict, the in agency Abkhazians rather than being their own accord, that they came up with separatist demands of strings. the pulling Russia with puppets mere Gegeshidze and Haindrava’s work provided an innovative exploration of how an innovative of exploration work provided Haindrava’s Gegeshidze and this protracted conflict could be transformed; its however, focus is on analysing academic opinion. To achieve sustainable need to be analysed. popular perceptions grassroots conflict transformation Attitudinal dynamics and public opinion: at the attitudinal dynamics of these conflicts.Peter Kabachnik, Joanna Regulska, and Beth Mitchneck that have in dispute, argued the blame Georgian-Abkhazian abstract geopolitical entities such as and Georgia Russia. is displaced onto larger, For the Abkhazians it is the Georgians who caused the conflict whereas for the Georgians the Russians are to blame. incorporating non-IDP Georgians into the analysis. It incorporating also non-IDP expands Georgians beyond issues alter understanding interpretations detail how group in more blame to address of conflict dynamics. of conflicting parties’ goals, the aim should be transformation rather than resolution. than rather transformation be should aim the parties’ goals, conflicting and discourses as well interests the relations, of needs to be a transformation There impartialand deep a is argued, they needed, is What themselves. problems the as analysis the violence, of past, unequal of the repudiation of relations overcoming and dialogue the including space expansion new through of actors. The absence of trust between the different partiesremains a major obstacle in this process. Archil Gegeshidze and Ivlain Haindrava, ‘Prospects for the Transformation of the Georgian-Abkhazian the Georgian-Abkhazian of for the Transformation ‘Prospects Gegeshidze and Ivlain Haindrava, 62 Archil 123-126. and Mitchneck,63 Kabachnik, Blame.’ ‘Displacing Regulska 64 Ibid. 131. 65 Ibid. 134. that Georgian argues conflict, Kabachnik ethno-territorial attitudes toward addressing 66 In another work 61 60 and to suggest ways that these issues could be transformed by ‘rethinking the paradigm’. all other concerns; yet, they stated that a resolution of the conflict wouldrequire a solution to an array humanitarian, of social, and economic Agreeing problems. on status alone would not end these conflicts. Adding to work on grassroots conflict dynamics, O’Loughlin,Kolossov Toal and carried out an extensive survey public sentiments in the two prevailing to reveal 2008 after difference main the that found authors the Abkhazia, In states. facto de erases the complexity of the situation. among Abkhaz the In toward animosity of lack the interviewsthat noted authors the Abkhazia, with Georgian IDPs from the Georgian IDPs was striking. was a greater sense of security: prior to the war and Russian recognition, Abkhazia faced a remilitarising Georgia as an unrecognised de facto state, but afterwards it was recognised and its borders protected by Russian troops.67 The survey found that among the Abkhaz, Armenians, and Russians living in the territory there was This report a strong sense of solidarity with the Abkhazian state and belief in its legitimacy; seeks to build among the Georgians/Mingrelians, however, this was not the case.68 Abkhazia’s on an emerging non-Georgian residents appear to accept the military situation (Russian presence) literature that because of the territory’s geopolitical situation.69 All non-Georgian ethnic groups places emphasis 70 on the grassroots were in favour of independence, albeit with some variation. The authors argued dynamics of that the findings reveal a complexity that should challenge simplistic assumptions these conflicts 22 that regard Abkhazians as mere pawns in the geopolitical game. They concluded through looking by saying that non-Georgian Abkhazians are ‘contentedly irreconcilable to the Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts at popular 71 opinion and Georgian state’. understanding. In contrast, in South Ossetia the population showed considerably less optimism It uses theory 72 that focuses about their state and its future. Around 75 per cent of South Ossetians surveyed on the cultural reported that they have ‘mostly bad’ or ‘very bad’ feelings towards the Georgians, aspects of ethnic whereas 90 per cent had ‘very positive’ or ‘mostly positive’ feelings toward the conflict to reveal Russians.73 The authors concluded by stating that South Ossetia is more than just how competing 74 interpretations an occupied territory and ‘glib’ portrayals of it as such need to be avoided. Both shape of these surveys reveal a diversity of opinion that needs to be acknowledged by understanding the Georgian side prior to any attempt at reconciliation. This report builds on their of past events, findings by contrasting competing interpretations of the conflict situation. group interests, and future Collectively this literature has illustrated several elements to the conflict that prospects. complicate peace-building efforts. The geopolitical situation – especially since 2008 – has overshadowed the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgia-Ossetian conflicts. In practical terms, this reduces the chances for dialogue between the two sides due to a lack of opportunities for communication. In attitudinal terms, it means that the grievances and elements of contestation between the two sides are overlooked as individuals focus on Russian influence. Peace-building efforts need to focus on improving grassroots dialogue between Georgia and the two breakaway territories and transforming the pervasive one- dimensional view of the conflict. This report seeks to build on an emerging literature that places emphasis on the grassroots dynamics of these conflicts through looking at popular opinion and understanding. It uses theory that focuses on the cultural aspects of ethnic conflict to reveal how competing interpretations shape understanding of past events, group interests, and future prospects.

67 O’Loughlin, Kolossov and Toal, ‘Inside Abkhazia.’ 14. 68 Ibid. 22. 69 Ibid. 31. 70 While 79 per cent of Abkhaz favoured independence, Armenians were evenly split with 51 per cent wanting to be part of the Russian Federation and 44 per cent wanting independence. Likewise, Russians were also split with 58 per cent wanting independence and 38 per cent wanting to be part of Russia. Ibid. 31. 71 Ibid. 33-34. 72 O’Loughlin, ‘Inside South Ossetia: A Survey of Attitudes in a De Facto State.’ 152. 73 The negative attitudes towards the Georgians in South Ossetia are much more hostile than the attitudes of the non-Georgian groups in Abkhazia where roughly 50 per cent of Abkhaz, Armenian and Russians viewed the Georgians in a ‘good’ or ‘mostly good’ way. Ibid. 156-7. 74 Ibid. 163. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 23 How could Generations For Peace address the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia? conflict? this addressing to suited most be would programme of type What What are GFP’s current capabilities in the country? current GFP’s What are capacity in Georgia? GFP’s for improving the main areas What are What conflicts in Georgia could be addressed by the organisation in the near future? What perceptions do Georgians have and of their the role in the Abkhaz conflict? What and perceptions Ossetians Georgians do in the conflict? themselves and their own role of have shape understanding of and background age, gender, How do people’s the conflict? How are the origins, causes, consequences and longevity of these conflicts these of longevity and consequences causes, origins, the are How understood by Georgians? Behavioural: What actions or words fuel these conflicts? Behavioural: What actions or words values and beliefs contribute to these conflicts? What norms, Attitudinal: these dynamics understood by the opposing sides? How are What parties involved in these conflicts? are these conflicts? of the main features What are conflicts these to led have that contradictions the are What Contradictions: these expressed? and how are capacity do GFP volunteers currently have in Georgia? What is needed for needed is What Georgia? in have currently volunteers GFP do capacity the organisation to address the grassroots level of two Georgia’s ethno- territorial conflicts? the conflict? conflicts? conflicts? • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3. Based on the evaluation of previous programmes in the country, what 2. How 2. do How the different sides interpretHowconflicts? does these this shape 1. What is the nature of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Organisational Analysis and Recommendations: Analysis and Recommendations: Organisational Galtung’s triangle: Galtung’s Conflict Mapping: Conflict 1.6 Research Questions Questions 1.6 Research an form and interpretations has how perceptions illustrated literature The above integral part of two Georgia’s ethno-territorial disputes. the Moreover, situation the between dialogue of lack being a complete in there results on the ground opposing sides. This report has three main aims: first, it will assess the dynamics of the conflicts using Galtung’s triangle framework; second, narrative throughinterviews detailed, it looks at how the conflict is understood by capacity current the For Peace’s Generation using an assessment of opposing sides; and, third, the report in Georgia, that the conflicts could be addressed. suggests ways 1.7 Methodology This report used qualitative data gathered through individual semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions.75 The fieldwork lasted three weeks in July- August 2014; during this time, the researcher interviewed a total number of 35 people, although three of these were not used in the analysis. The main profile of interviewees, separated by respondent categories, is presented in Table 1.1 below. Semi-structured interviews were chosen because they allowed for a detailed, nuanced understanding of the ideas and perspectives of the conflict held among those involved. At the same time, interviews presented myriad difficulties such as poor recollections, misunderstandings, and power dynamics between the 24 interviewer and the interviewee. The researcher strived to overcome these Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts problems by explaining the nature of the research and by creating a relaxed environment prior to the start of the interview. All interviews were audio recorded with the permission of the interviewees. Another challenge was language barriers and translation. To avoid misunderstandings, the interview scripts used simple language and the researcher had synonyms ready in case a particular word was misunderstood.76 These interviews, designed around Galtung’s triangle framework along with other themes identified through the secondary literature, aimed to uncover how people understood the conflict as well as possible ways it could be transformed.

Number interviewed Number Analysed Respondent classification (n=35) (n=32)

Georgians from Tbilisi 14 12

IDPs based in Tbilisi 9 (7 interviews) 9 (7 Interviews)

GFP Delegates and Pioneers 7 7

Georgian academics 3 3

Abkhazians and S. Ossetians 4 3

Table 1.1: Total sample breakdown These categories were chosen firstly to gain an understanding of how the conflict is perceived in Tbilisi (where GFP has activities), and secondly to understand how the conflicts are understood by those groups directly affected by them – namely, IDPs and Abkhazians/Ossetians. GFP Delegates and Pioneers were interviewed to assess current capacity and future goals. Due to practical constraints, the research focused on looking at the Georgian perspective through interviewing a representative sample of the Tbilisi population.77

75 In this researchers’ opinion, the information provided by questionnaires lacks the detail and flexibility needed in order to gain a nuanced understanding of competing interpretations. Focus groups were ruled out as a research method; the snowballing technique used to gather respondents meant it would have been difficult to organise group interviews. In the end, however, the research did include one focus group with an IDP family. 76 Interviews conducted in Russian, with a translator present, represented further difficulty. Prior to these, the researcher met with the translator to run through the interview questions and explain the research aims. The researcher had these interviews transcribed so that the final text used for the analysis will be translated directly from the spoken language rather than through an interpreter in an interview setting. 77 Ideally, the research would have included an equal number of Georgian, Abkhazian, and Ossetia respondents to gain a balanced understanding of the different perspectives that exist in the conflict. However, given that the fieldwork was based in Georgia it was difficult to find respondents in the two territories. The researcher was unable to visit the territories due to safety concerns and therefore had to conduct interviews using Skype. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 25

79 - ers Any Any However, the However, workers workers workers 80 Occupation Occupation 2 private and 2 private public sectors public sectors public sectors public sectors 2 public sector 2 public sector 2 private and 2 2 private 2 private and 2 2 private 2 private and 2 and 2 private public sector work public sector men men Gender Gender women women women 2 women 2 men and 2 2 men and 2 men and 2 2 men and 2 2 men and The researcher chose to divide the The researcher 2 women and 1 2 women 3 women and 1 3 women 78 Sample of IDPs living in Tbilisi Sample of Sample of Georgians from Tbilisi from Georgians Sample of Age Age 50+ 50+ 30-49 30-49 18-29 18-29 Table 1.3: Table Table 1.2: Table 3 2 4 4 4 4 population being generally well educated this method of differentiation proved unhelpful. Dividing unhelpful. proved differentiation this method of educated population being generally well the snowballing given difficult, especially was deemed too the sample by income or profession the interviewees. gain access to used to method the researcher not distinguished by occupation. they were and Library Methods in Information Science’. Social Science Research of In B. Wildemuth, ‘Application 2009). 2. Libraries Unlimited, (Westpoint: Number of people Number of Number of people of Number The thinking was that those in the public sector have an behind this decision likely to follow the government’s more investment in public institutions and are working for international often those working in the private sector, line, whereas organisations, had more of a perspectival detachment from the state. Given the yearspast ten in the has seen this distinction is Georgia that reforms dramatic dividing a of means and realistic a useful it provided however, not unproblematic; small sample population by background. sample population over 30 by those who work in the public and private sector. Given that those aged 18-30 are more likely to be students or at the beginning of their working lives, lives, their working or at the beginning of be students to likely more that those aged 18-30 are 79 Given Content.’ Analysis of B. Wildemuth, ‘Qualitative Zhang and Barbara analysis discussed in Yan 80 Content Initially this was going to be achieved through educational qualifications; however, due to the Tbilisian due qualifications; however, educational through be achieved 78 Initially this was going to In addition to interviewing Georgians from Tbilisi, the researcher interviewed interviewingIn addition to researcher Tbilisi, the IDPs from Georgians from Abkhazia and South Ossetia living this and be, to intended was in it as representative as not was the sample This 1.3). Georgian Table capital (presented in demonstrates the weaknesses in the snowballing technique used. For the Georgians from Tbilisi sample (presented in Table 1.2), dividing the group For Tbilisi the from sample Georgians in (presented Table by age categories showed how different age groups view the conflict. Those in the highest age category lived part their adult lives under Soviet rule and of those in the youngest whereas situation in Georgia, the pre-conflict remembered category had no experience of Soviet rule a representative the population at both providing by gender was aimed and Division of grew up with these conflicts. sample and at establishing whether differentiate to attempt an represented – category– occupation this final The conflict. variable affected perception of the people by their professional backgrounds. sample was dispersed almost evenly by age and provides a point of contrast to the views of Georgians living in Tbilisi, as interviewing IDPs provided a perspective of individuals directly affected by the wars. Finally, the researcher managed to speak to one man and one woman from Abkhazia and one man from South Ossetia. Although this sample was not adequate enough to be used to draw independent conclusions on the Abkhazian and South Ossetian perspectives, it is used in the report alongside the aforementioned secondary literature to contrast it with the view of Georgians and IDPs. For the part of the report that deals with GFP capacity in Georgia, the researcher interviewed six Delegates and one Pioneer and held a workshop following these 26 interviews with four of those volunteers. The interviews also asked questions on Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation as well as areas that they felt could realistically be addressed in the future. The workshop built on the answers respondents had given in the interviews by going into more details on current weaknesses and the ways to overcome them.

1.7.1 Method of Analysis This research used the qualitative content analysis method. This provided a means of understanding and organising the interview data to make it comparable. Content analysis can be defined as a qualitative data reduction method that takes a volume of text and attempts to identify core consistencies or meanings.81 After studying the data, the researcher identified units of analysis by looking at themes or ideas that occurred regularly in the text. This was achieved through an inductive process: the themes that arose were rooted in the data itself. As the data was collected, the researcher started to identify certain core themes or ideas evident in interview responses. By working from the bottom up, this method ensured that the means of analysing the findings were drawn directly from the data collected. This method was especially useful when looking at perspectives people have on ethno-territorial conflict in Georgia. These recurring themes form the basis of group interpretations, and the method of analysis used therefore coincides with theory on identity frames and psychocultural interpretation.

81 Content analysis discussed in Yan Zhang and Barbara B. Wildemuth, ‘Qualitative Analysis of Content.’ In B. Wildemuth, ‘Application of Social Science Research Methods in Information and Library Science’. (Westpoint: Libraries Unlimited, 2009). 2.

Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 27

2. Findings 30 Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts © GFP 2012 | Tbilisi, Georgia

2.1 Introduction This chapter analyses data from the interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, IDPs residing in Tbilisi, and Abkhazians and South Ossetians. The structure follows that used in the interview questions, dividing this chapter into five sections. The first section has two different focuses. For the Georgians from Tbilisi, it analyses what conflicts they think exist in Tbilisi; for the IDPs, it focuses on memory and the IDPs’ understanding of what life was like before the war. This latter section is important because it informs IDPs’ subsequent perceptions and shapes their understanding of conflict causation. The remaining sections are: people’s opinions of the origins, causes, consequences and longevity of the conflicts; their understanding of the different conflict dynamics; people’s perceptions of geopolitical and state- level factors; and, finally, expectations about the future.82 While the sample from Abkhazia and South Ossetia was too small to offer concrete findings, the data collected from them is contrasted in this chapter to information provided by the Georgians and IDPs. To the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first time that someone has studied the prevailing public sentiments on these conflicts among the Tbilisi population. This sample should not be regarded as representative of the Georgian population, however. Tbilisi is wealthier than the rest of the country.83 Moreover, it is more geographically removed from both conflict regions in comparison to Georgia’s other major cities, such as Gori, Kutaisi or Batumi. Within Tbilisi, however, attempts were made to make the sample as representative as possible by accounting for age, gender and occupational background (as shown in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2). In terms of the variables used for the sample, neither age nor background produced clear differences in opinion overall. However, age did reveal results that are more mixed: on certain questions, there was a clear difference in understanding by age.

82 Graphs are used to display the most common answers to questions or differences based on the age variable, the total number of answers given is often larger than the sample itself, due to respondents giving more than one answer. 83 Stephen F. Jones, ‘Georgia through a Glass, Darkly.’ Open Democracy. 18 November 2013. Accessed 15 July 2014. https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/stephen-f-jones/georgia-through-glass-darkly Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 31

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Accessed 9 February 2014. http:// Georgia, and does not wish to return. Therefore, her interview Older IDPs Therefore, included in this category. is return. and does not wish to Georgia, IDPs interviewed the younger of had visited Abkhazia but several to returned have not to tended there. see family who remained usually to Abkhazia since the war, pride-event-2013-05-17 mains unresolved in people’s understanding. To this change understanding. people’s in unresolved mains Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews 17 May 2013. event", Pride Tbilisi mars violence Homophobic "Georgia: International, Amnesty 6 5 3 2 1 0 4

http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/georgia Georgians’ and IDPs’ understanding. This results in a simplistic interpretation of events that overlooks overlooks that events of interpretation simplistic a in results This understanding. IDPs’ and Georgians’ process. conflict the in role full a Ossetians or Abkhazians the denies and complicity Georgian were there that reveals Analysis were there < People aged 18 People The responses showed a clear distinction based on the age var age on the based distinction showedclear a responses The people. among case younger the was especially This was homophobia. conflict of form a of terms 85 86 87 Question Chart 2 Chart 2.2 2.2 Georgians2.2.1 from so that both sides can appreciate the other the appreciate can sides both that so The The overall argument argument The overall attempts at reconciliation. Moreover, the contradiction over territory at the core of both these conflicts conflicts these both of core the at territory over contradiction the Moreover, reconciliation. at attempts re violence against LGBT rights activists LGBT rights against violence

Church and older and older Church understand the term conflict as well as what conflicts, if any, exist any, if conflicts, what as well as conflict term the understand Homophobia. 2014] 2014] The overall argument that emerges from this section is that Russia’s role in the role Russia’s that is this section from emerges that The overall argument simplistic a in results This understanding. IDPs’ and Georgians’ dominated conflict the complicity and denies Georgian events that overlooks of interpretation Abkhazians or Ossetians a full role in the conflict process. Analysisreveals that there were extremely divergent views of the conflict among the different sides: there were disagreements over the history of the and conflicts, who is who preventing attempts is at to blame, reconciliation. Moreover, the over contradiction territory at the core of both these conflictsremains unresolved in people’s change this, transformational dialogue understanding.is needed To so that both reconciled. the other’s a way for them to be needs and find sides can appreciate People aged 18-30 who mentioned this conflict linked it to religion and generation, and religion to it linked conflict this mentioned who 18-30 aged People citing the Orthodox Church and older people as a major source of prejudice. rights activists at a violence against LGBT to referred people In their responses demonstration in 2013 on the International Day Against Homophobia. Amnesty International, “Georgia: Homophobic violence mars Tbilisi Pride event.” 17 May 2013. violence mars Homophobic Tbilisi Pride event.” “Georgia: 87 Amnesty International, One respondent, although technically not an IDP, grew up in Abkhazia, left university in go to grew to not an IDP, although technically 84 One respondent, 27 July-11 August 2014. 85 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians 27 July-11 August 2014. 86 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians The question above was asked of all Georgian respondents in Tbilisi. It aimed to reveal how people understand the term conflict as well as what conflicts, if any, distinction clear a showed responses The Georgia. of rest the and Tbilisi in existed based on the age variable. The most common response in terms of a conflict form was homophobia. This wasof especially the case among younger people. Question: In your opinion, what conflicts exist in Tbilisi? Question: In your opinion, what conflicts 2.2.1 Georgians from Tbilisi: Conflict in Tbilisi and Georgia Tbilisi: Conflict in Tbilisi and Georgia from 2.2.1 Georgians 2.2 Section One: Understanding of Conflict 2.2 Section One: Understanding of Unsurprisingly, IDPs Unsurprisingly, demonstrated a more specific knowledgeof conflict events. leaving conflicts, the by impacted directly were IDPs Tbilisi, of residents the Unlike younger the of Some territories. respective the in behind property and livelihoods IDPs interviewed have no memories of living in the territories or the their opinions and have informed or relations war This that their parents means itself. Only perceptions. one IDP interviewed South came from Ossetia, so the majority focuses on Abkhazia. analysis here of the respondents, aged 18-30, described it as a ‘shameful day’ for the country.88 The situation regarding the rights of sexual minorities in Georgia forms part of a wider political conflict between the political elites pursuing an EU trajectory (and the conditionality that entails) and the conservative influence of the Orthodox Church.89 Homophobic violence is apparent in Georgian society: in the wake of the 2013 demonstration, Human Rights Watch noted 34 incidents of violence towards LGBT people.90 The data indicated that younger people viewed this as a major conflict in Tbilisi. Respondents also discussed political conflict in terms of the divisions between political parties; however, this was described as happening within the confines of 32 legitimate political processes.91 Ethnic or racial conflict was mentioned in detail

Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts by only one respondent who spoke of negative stereotypes towards Armenians and Azerbaijanis and their lack of integration in Tbilisi society.92 No respondents discussed gender-based conflict. It was equally common to hear that there was no conflict in Tbilisi. This was especially the case among the 50+ category. This category incorporated a range of responses, however. The first type of response stated firmly that there was no conflict in Tbilisi. Another response was definitional, stating that there was tension – among political groups, for example – but nothing that could be defined as conflict.93 Although the interviews used a broader definition of conflict, older people were less responsive to this term than younger respondents. Another idea on this theme was that conflict is not native to Georgia. Authors have noted how Georgians have a self-image of themselves as hospitable, tolerant, and welcoming, which fuels the idea that conflict is forced on the country from outside.94 Three respondents discussed this theme: one from each age category. A 57-year-old man summed up the view: The Georgian nation is very tolerant […] all the conflicts are brought from outside […] look at the old town in Tbilisi, there are many different churches, mosques – this shows that Georgia is a tolerant, multicultural country and always has been.95 A 41-year-old man expressed a similar view, he argued that Georgia’s history had made the country particularly accepting. He said, ‘Georgians are very welcome[ing] people, they are tolerant towards nations and other peoples. Because of our history, […] we have big experience with other peoples’.96 These responses revealed a particular self-perception among the Georgians that has a bearing on how they understand conflict and the history of conflict on Georgian territory. In regarding themselves as hospitable, the Georgians hindered their own acknowledgement of complicity in past violence.

88 Interview 6 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014; Interview 8 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. 89 Democracy & Freedom Watch, ‘Georgian court acquits priest accused of anti-gay violence., 3 August 2013. Accessed 9 February 2014. http://dfwatch.net/georgian-court-acquits-priest-accused-of-anti-gay- violence-34858 90 Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2014: Georgia.’ Accessed 35 August 2014. http://www.hrw.org/ world-report/2014/country-chapters/georgia 91 Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014. 92 Interview 6 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. 93 Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014. 94 Kaufman, ‘Modern Hatreds.’ 94. 95 Interview 20 (Georgian from Tbilisi), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 2 August 2014. 96 Interview 17 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Georgian Partnership for Road Safety Offices, Tbilisi, Georgia. 1 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 33

101 102 104 A In 100 103 Human Rights 98 However, three respondents respondents three However, 97 If GFP expanded to other Georgian regions, regions, Georgian other expanded to GFP If 99 from Tbilisi), Ori Beli Hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014; Interview Tbilisi), Tbilisi, Georgia. from Ori Beli Hostel, Tbilisi), 31 (Georgian from 2014. 11 August Tbilisi, Georgia. residence, respondent’s Watch Watch reported that in 2013 there were reports of several attacks by on Christians in Georgian Muslims villages. Abkhazia was also depicted as a prosperous place, peaceful which situation. contributed A to the 23-year-old woman – a people […] together living harmonious and happy were territory‘People stated, – child when her family fled the citrus’. and tourism tea, of everything because had need and they wealthy were A woman 73-year-old reiterated this sentiment: ‘I remember the the prosperity, nature, the living – everything, everything was going so well… you could not do wrong there […] everything was good, this territory is unforgettable for me’. the time, harmonious and joyous, prosperous, past as a the regarding Through narrative put forward and tensions that existed. by the IDPs missed the problems be regained It also led to the simplistic assumption that that ideal could easily This focuses section on memory life was what and the IDPs’ understanding of like before the IDPs’ war. memories or perception of the two territories did not feature in the interview questions, but many spoke of what prior Abkhazia to was like the conflict. These descriptions describedsaid, woman Abkhazia35-year-old One harmoniously. together lived groups various where as a happy place play to use I together. happily lived we when] life my years13 [of the remember ‘I in the garden with Abkhazian children and I have good, sweet memories’. 2.2.2 IDPs: Perceptions of Abkhazia of 2.2.2 IDPs: Perceptions In summary, while younger people mostly considered homophobia, generational while younger mostly considered people In summary, or religious conflicts to be present in Tbilisi, older people generally believed that there were no conflicts in the city. In expressing the view that no conflict exists the Georgians in Tbilisi, answers occasionally over into characteristics of spilled as hospitable and tolerant. These findingsreveal that there is no overwhelming society. exist in Georgian on what conflicts consensus among Tbilisi residents Islamophobia could be a potential conflict to address. be a potential conflict to address. Islamophobia could Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2014: Georgia.’ Report 2014: Georgia.’ ‘World 99 Human Rights Watch, 100 Interview 8 August 2014. Georgia. Tbilisi, 30 (IDP), Subway restaurant, 4 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. friends residence, 101 Interview 21 (IDP), respondent’s 7 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. 102 Interview Peace, 29 (IDP), Café near the Bridge of 12 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. hostel, 103 Interview 35 (IDP), respondent’s 127. and Mitchneck,104 Kabachnik, ‘Displacing Blame.’ Regulska, Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014. 97 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians July 2014; Interview 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 98 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel 12 (Georgian from 6 (Georgian An additional question in this section was whether there in Georgia is that does conflictnot exist elsewhere in Tbilisi (excluding the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts). Four outof 12respondents stated that it was the know. to them for hard was it that or Tbilisi in same discussed Islamophobia, especially in Ajaria in Georgia’s South West, where there there where South West, discussed Islamophobia, especially in Ajaria in Georgia’s is a sizable Muslim population. All the people who discussed this were female, two from the youngest category and one from the oldest. The two respondents aged 18-30 cited examples of people opposing the building not of regarding mosques Muslims and as Georgian as they are not Christian. 49-year-old ethnically Abkhaz woman said, ‘I was born and grew up in Abkhazia. ethnically Abkhaz woman said, ‘I was and born grew 49-year-old We [the Abkhaz and the Georgians] grew We up had together. the best time’. their interviews, Kabachnik, Regulska, and Mitchneck found a similar idealisation conflict. the fuelled that animosity and grievances the overlooks that past the of once the geopolitical situation changed. This idea of a paradise lost was often followed, in people’s descriptions, by disbelief with what happened. The war was represented as a sharp rupture that no one could have foreseen. Implicit in this narrative was the idea that it was brought The idea that to Abkhazia from outside: the happy, harmonious life described would have the conflict continued were it not for outside forces meddling with the territory and pitching appeared out of nowhere and led friend against friend. A couple who fled Abkhazia with their family in 1993 stated: to a destructive We had such good relationships between Georgians and Abkhazians when war that ravaged the war first started and people began to kill each other we could not unsuspecting communities fails imagine that it was war. None of us could imagine that such a conflict could 34 105 to acknowledge arise because we had a perfect situation and perfect relations. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts actions taken on both sides. This In this view, the seeming harmony in Abkhazia ended abruptly and it took everyone nostalgic view of by surprise. A 23-year-old woman described her family’s experience by saying: Abkhazia resulted We left and we were thinking that […] right after a few days it would be in a collective memory that solved and we would go back. That’s why we didn’t take our luggage with us. idealised the But as you can see it is already 20 years and we cannot go back.106 past. The idea that the conflict appeared out of nowhere and led to a destructive war that ravaged unsuspecting communities fails to acknowledge actions taken on both sides. This nostalgic view of Abkhazia resulted in a collective memory that idealised the past. Thus, while there was no overwhelming consensus on what conflicts exist in Tbilisi among the Georgians from Tbilisi sample, for the IDPs the situation in Abkhazia and their memory of what the territory was like before war featured heavily in their discussion of conflict.

2.3 Section Two: Origins, Causes and Consequences of the Conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia This section aimed at gathering detailed, narrative data on how respondents understand the two conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia: their origins, causes, consequences, and the reasons for their longevity. In line with this report’s argument, Russia’s role dominated both samples’ responses. This was a psychocultural interpretation that linked diverse and complex historical events into a simple narrative. This narrative stated that Russia always wanted a way to undermine Georgia should it ever become independent. Answers had some variation, yet geopolitical considerations trumped all other factors throughout. By contrast, the Abkhaz and Ossetian view focused on the Georgians’ disrespect for their political rights and, later, what they perceived to be Georgians’ murderous aggression. Thus, there was a disparity in the competing interpretations regarding who is responsible for these conflicts.

105 Interview 13 (Focus Group) (IDP), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. 106 Interview 29 (IDP), Café near the Bridge of Peace, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 35

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of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia? and South Abkhazia in conflicts the of s Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia.02 Residence, Tbilisi), respondent’s from (Georgian knowledged, they were they knowledged, out of of out the Abkhaz or Abkhaz ac presented as a product of Russia manipulation. Another Another manipulation. Russia of a product as presented Abkhaz or Ossetians did not reach this decision their of own accord. The separatist of product a as presented was territories the on living people among sentiment Russia manipulation. Another respondent a echoed from people this socialised point and books by historical the saying that ‘changed in Russians the the period Soviet mentality’. anti-Georgian an with age young view of the conflict by assuming that the outcome was what Russia always wanted. it portrayed the people who live on the territories as having no agency or, Moreover, will. at the very least, as being passive dupes easily bent to Russia’s One 26-year-old One man 26-year-old articulated the latter motive by saying that ‘Russia always wanted Abkhazia, because it was their dream. Because they have good holidays in Abkhazia and have fun there. That was the reason why they took Abkhazia’. coveting the oversized neighbour as greedily The narrative depicted Georgia’s territory most attractive parts Georgian of taking it for its own simply because and it can. The themselves Georgians regarded as having been powerless to prevent this outcome. Russia’s presumed motives for taking the territories included a desire to maintain taking the territories included a desire motives for presumed Russia’s influence in the region, its wishterritory. Russian into Abkhazia incorporate to ambition Georgia for establishment’s Russian not to be independent, and the Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014; Interviews 27 July-11 August 2014; 107 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with IDPs, with Georgians July 2014; Interview 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 108 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel 20 from 8 (Georgian 27 July-11 August 2014. 109 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians 6 August 2014. Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 110 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 24 (Georgian July 2014. 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 111 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 8 (Georgian 2014. 7 August 112 Interview Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. from 27 (Georgian More historically rooted explanations provided by the Georgians from Tbilisi from by the Georgians explanations provided historically rooted More These explanations mostly overlooked the Abkhaz or the conflict. When Ossetians’ these groups role were acknowledged, in they the were depicted as puppets with Russia pulling the strings. A 19-year-old male stated, capable ‘somehow of Russia empowering was them [Abkhazians and South them that it Ossetians] is better to separate from us’. and saying to In response to the question listed above, the as being the origin of discussed Russian interests 11 and all IDP respondents out of 12 Georgians from Tbilisi conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, albeit with different motives. Question: In your opinion, what are the origins of the conflicts in Abkhazia and Abkhazia in conflicts the of origins the are what opinion, your In Question: South Ossetia? 2.3.1 Origins2.3.1 the Georgians from Tbilisi sample, the answer to the question was often quite firm: firm: quite often was question the to answer the sample, Tbilisi from Georgians the ‘I think the answer is simple, it is Russia’; or ‘Russia […] wanted [the] so everything no other causes’. no other reasons, startedterritories, are] that. [There from

11 tain influence in the region, its wish for for wish its region, the in influence maintain to a desire al, Tbilisi, Georgia. 06 August 2014. 2014. 06 August Georgia. Tbilisi, al,

Georgians from Tbilisi and IDPs: Origins IDPs: Origins Tbilisi and from Georgians , 18 d depicted as puppets with Russia pulling the strings. A 19 strings. the pulling Russia with puppets as depicted the the origins the are what opinion, your In :

te firm: ‘I think the answer is simple, it is Russia’; or ‘Russia [ ‘Russia or Russia’; is it simple, is answer the think ‘I firm: te old man articulated the latter motive by saying that ‘Russia ‘Russia that saying by motive latter the manold articulated were : Origins the Conflict of : Origins - of the conflict of the

2 ed 1 12 August 2014. 2014. 12 August

–

year

Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews Centr Hotel Tbilisi), from 24 (Georgian Interview 2014. 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Central, Hotel Tbilisi), from 8 (Georgian Interview orgia. 27 July 2014; Interview 20 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Tbilisi), from 20 (Georgian Interview 2014; 27 July Ge orgia. Tbilisi, Central, Hotel Tbilisi), from 8 (Georgian Interview Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews

in Abkhazia and South Ossetia South and Abkhazia in

respondent’s Residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 02 August 2014. 2014. August 02 Georgia. Tbilisi, Residence, respondent’s July July

ple living on the territories was territories on the among living people that the Abkhaz or Ossetians did not reach this decision of their own accord. The separatist sentiment sentiment Theseparatist own accord. their of decision this reach not did Ossetians Abkhazor the that

111 110 109 108

107 In response to to response In

with different motives. discussed Russian interests as being the origin of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, albeit albeit Ossetia, and South Abkhazia in conflicts the of origin the being as interests Russian discussed

Question 2.3.1 Origins 2.3.1

motives for taking the territories include territories the taking for motives often qui often causes’. no other reasons, no other are] [There that. from started everything

always wanted Abkha wanted always Abkhazia’. took why they reason was the That there. fun and have oversized neighbour as greedily coveting the most attractive parts of Georgian t Georgian of parts attractive most the coveting greedily as neighbour oversized ed regard TheGeorgians can. it because own simply its for outcome. this prevent overlook mostly explanations These into Russian territory. Russian into Georgia not to be independent, and the Russian establishment’s ambition to incorporate Abkhazia Abkhazia incorporate to ambition establishment’s Russian the and independent, be to not Georgia groups

Ossetians] and saying to them that it is better to separate from us’. from separate to better is it them that to saying and Ossetians] old male stated, ‘somehow Russia was capable of empowering them [Abkhazians and South and South them empowering [Abkhazians of was ‘somehow capable Russia male stated, old

2 Chart

listed above listed

Among Georgian the One26

107 zia, because it was their dream. Because they have good holidays in Abkhazia Abkhazia in have good holidays Because they dream. was their it because zia,

109

question

knowledged, they were they knowledged, the ac

Georgians from Tbilisi and IDPs: Origins IDPs: Origins Tbilisi and from Georgians origins the are what opinion, your In : te firm: ‘I think the answer is simple, it is Russia’; or ‘Russia [ ‘Russia or Russia’; is it simple, is answer the think ‘I firm: te were : Origins the Conflict of : Origins

2 12 August 2014. 2014. 12 August

– Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews Tbilisi), from 20 (Georgian Interview 2014; 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Central, Hotel Tbilisi), from 8 (Georgian Interview 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews Centr Hotel Tbilisi), from 24 (Georgian Interview 2014. 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Central, Hotel Tbilisi), from 8 (Georgian Interview

respondent’s Residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 02 August 2014. 2014. August 02 Georgia. Tbilisi, Residence, respondent’s July July that the Abkhaz or Ossetians did not reach this decision of their own accord. The separatist sentiment sentiment Theseparatist own accord. their of decision this reach not did Ossetians Abkhazor the that was territories on the among living people In response to to response In albeit Ossetia, and South Abkhazia in conflicts the of origin the being as interests Russian discussed with different motives. 107 108 109 110 111 2.3.1 Origins 2.3.1 Question often qui often everything started from that. [There are] no other reasons, no other causes’. no other reasons, no other are] [There that. from started everything motives for taking the territories include territories the taking for motives always wanted Abkha wanted always Abkhazia’. took why they reason was the That there. fun and have oversized neighbour as greedily coveting the most attractive parts of Georgian t Georgian of parts attractive most the coveting greedily as neighbour oversized ed regard TheGeorgians can. it because own simply its for outcome. this prevent overlook mostly explanations These Georgia not to be independent, and the Russian establishment’s ambition to incorporate Abkhazia Abkhazia incorporate to ambition establishment’s Russian the and independent, be to not Georgia territory. Russian into groups old male stated, ‘somehow Russia was capable of empowering them [Abkhazians and South and South them empowering [Abkhazians of was ‘somehow capable Russia male stated, old us’. from separate to better is it them that to saying and Ossetians]

2 Chart discussed the Soviet Union’s nationality policy. Younger respondents tended to depict this as causing problems because once the larger imperial structures broke down small groups of people were left with the materials needed for statehood without actually having statehood itself.113 In some explanations, this amounted to a long-term strategy to undermine Georgian independence. The metaphor of ‘mines’ or ‘bombs’ that could be detonated by Russia when the need arose featured often in the discussion, especially among respondents over 30. One 63-year-old woman stated that: [The Russians] planted little mines, little historical mines at the beginning of the Soviet Union. They planted three autonomous republics. So, […] if 36 something were to go wrong they [could] detonate those mines and they 114 Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts did. In this view, the autonomies of Abkhazia, Ossetia, and Ajaria were created to divide Georgia. A 58-year-old woman stated that, ‘the Russians have been feeding this mine for explosion and they exploded it when they need[ed] it’, for ‘keeping small countries like ours or big countries like Ukraine in disorder’.115 This metaphor delegitimised the separatist aspirations of the Abkhaz and South Ossetians by further entrenching the deterministic view of the conflict.116 Among the IDPs, every respondent said that the origins of the conflict came from Russia’s desire to maintain influence and control in the Caucasus.117 A frequent metaphor used in five out of seven interviews was that Russia wanted to ‘split’ the country in order to divide it and make it weaker. The 22-year-old IDP from South Ossetia stated that the Russians took the territory because ‘they want [to] cut Georgia in[to] two sides: West and East’.118 This kind of emphasis on unity and strength is typical of post-colonial narratives.119 To fulfil its wish to weaken and divide Georgia, Russia, in the IDPs’ interpretation, sought to create and provoke ethnic tensions. As with the Georgians, this was regarded as a long-term strategy: a shackle attached to the Georgian nation meaning that it could never be truly free from its erstwhile colonial master. An IDP family interviewed stated that ‘Russia had been working on this for years, for decades, for a long time’.120 Russia was depicted as creating divides where previously there were none. One 73-year-old woman said that ‘the third party started it all’ and that ‘the Georgians and Abkhazians never argued about anything […] they were friends and they had nothing to argue about’.121 As with the Georgians from Tbilisi, Russia, in this interpretation, was portrayed as driving a wedge between friendly peoples for its own private gain. To achieve this, two of IDP respondents pointed out, Russia

113 Interview 6 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014; Interview 12 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Ori Beli Hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. 114 Interview 33 (Georgian from Tbilisi), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 11 August 2014. 115 Interview 31 (Georgian from Tbilisi), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 11 August 2014. 116 Kaufman also notes this metaphor in his study of ethnic conflict from the beginning of the 2000s Kaufman, ‘Modern Hatreds.’ 94. The idea that the Bolshevik government, when they were establishing the Soviet State in the 1920s, had in mind a future-orientated strategy for a time when the Union no longer existed, seems unlikely. Recent historical work has sought to refute Georgian nationalists’ claims that autonomous republics were designed with the specific aim of undermining future Georgian sovereignty by arguing that the creation of the South Ossetia Autonomous Region in the 1920s was a peace-building attempt from below following the conflict at the time rather than an imperial divide and rule strategy. Saparov, Arsène, ‘From Conflict to Autonomy: The Making of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region 1818-1922.” Europe-Asia Studies. 62 (2010). 117 Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. 118 Interview 11 (IDP), Ori Beli Hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July 2014. 119 Broers, ‘Filling the Void.’ 286. 120 The family were the only respondents to use the ‘mine’ metaphor among the IDP respondents Interview. 13 (Focus Group) (IDP), Respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. 121 Interview 35 (IDP), respondent’s hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 12 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 37 This view 122 This showed that 129 Alongside this, the Abkhaz believed 127 The Abkhaz man interviewed expressed 125

128 Demographics dominate this argument. While 124 Russia, in this narrative, took on the role of a geopolitical of role Russia,on the narrative, took in this 123

126 [In the Soviet period] the population Abkhazian status the on then was from and downgraded. republic Georgian [Abkhazia] the of part became became a minority due to the policy of bringing ethnic Georgians into Abkhazia. [A] major partAbkhazians’ repress of the to population began were they Georgians also and government, they in had positions all important the language in schools and [the] conclusion was that [a] lot of Abkhazians language. own their forgot Conflict.’ Nationalities Papers 36. (2008): 322. Nationalities Conflict.’ on 31 July 2014. completed In summary, Russia’s role dominated the way Georgians and IDPs understood and IDPs dominated the way Georgians role Russia’s In summary, complex of reading coherent simple, a provided interpretation This conflicts. these undermine was to and its motive perpetrator was Russia the historical events: Georgian independence. While the legacy of Russian imperialism and continuing Russia’s influence in the region has shaped these conflicts, thisoverlooked other dimensions. When view mostly grievances among the Abkhaz or Ossetians were acknowledged they were perceived Georgia, as a ‘Abkhazia, saying, product by of view this Russian encapsulated respondent meddling. male A 19-year-old family and one family and Russia is not part the Georgian and Ossetia were of they interrupted us’. not only denied the Abkhaz agency in their wish to be independent from Georgia Georgia from independent be to wish their in agency Abkhaz the denied only not assertedbut also the Georgians from culturally distinct them makes that what is a fiction created by Russia to divide people. It consideredsole the for by an outside power was created as it illegitimate be to an identity Abkhaz claims to weakening Georgia. purpose of He went on to say that this created a feeling among the Abkhaz that they were being ‘pushed out’ by the Georgians. this view: the Georgians emphasise that they were majority on Abkhazian territory before the the Abkhaz war, emphasise how Soviet policy brought in Georgian migrants that eventually outnumbered them. The South Ossetian man described the origins of the conflict desire as Georgia’s to ‘nullify autonomies’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This interpretation contrasted sharply with the Abkhaz and Ossetian view. The Abkhaz interpretation focuses on periods of grave national threat such as deportationsforced attempts by the the 19th in and 20th centuries and perceived the Georgians to assimilate them. home-wrecker that divided the Georgian family for its own selfish needs. family for that divided the Georgian home-wrecker Interview 29 (IDP), Café near the Bridge of Peace, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. 122 Interview Peace, 29 (IDP), Café near the Bridge of July 2014. 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 123 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 8 (Georgian Unsolved and Abkhazia: Managing Diversity Identity in Post-Soviet 124 Rachel Clogg, ‘The of Politics Peter Kabachnik, ‘Shaping Abkhazia.’ p. 338. Kabachnik, ‘Shaping Abkhazia.’ 125 Peter 126 Interview 30 July 2014. Central (Skype Call), Tbilisi, Georgia. 14 (Abkhazian), Hotel 127 Interview 30 July 2014. Central (Skype Call), Tbilisi, Georgia. 14 (Abkhazian), Hotel 128 Interview 6 August 2014. Central (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 (Abkhazian), Hotel on 29 July 2014; 129 Interview Started (Skype call), Tbilisi, Georgia. Central 10 (South Ossetia), Hotel pushed Abkhazians to make them believe that they should be independent. One One independent. be should they that believe them make to Abkhazians pushed language, a Abkhaz the gave Russia that is conflict the of cause ‘the said, woman a history and a culture’ so that they would want to be independent. they were suffering oppression at the handsof the Georgians. Both Abkhazians interviewed this sentiment. The woman interviewed expressed stated that: the Abkhaz and Ossetians felt marginalised and threatened on their own territory. Notably, Russia does not feature at all in this interpretation; rather, the origins of the conflict lie with Georgian policy. After looking at the perspectives of all three groups on the origins of the conflict, it After is clear that interpretations based on victimisation and powerlessness dominated looking at the understanding of these conflicts. The Georgians’ and IDPs’ view held that Russia perspectives of all three groups never wanted them to be independent and so divided Georgian territory to on the origins weaken the Georgian nation; the Abkhaz and Ossetian view asserted that the of the conflict, Georgians oppressed them and sought to assimilate them and deny them their it is clear that autonomy. Each group has a self-perception of victimhood in these two competing interpretations 38 130 based on post-colonial narratives. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts victimisation and powerlessness dominated 2.3.2 Causes understanding of these conflicts. Question: In your opinion, what are the causes of the conflict? The Georgians’ Questions were asked both about the origins of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian and IDPs’ view held that Russia conflicts, as well as about the causes of these conflicts. There was some overlap in never wanted responses, but the different questions were maintained to distinguish between the them to be historical development of the existing conflicts and more proximate factors that independent led to fighting in the 1990s. and so divided Georgian GeorgiansGeorgians From From Tbilisi:Tbilisi: Cause Causes territory to 10 weaken the 9 9 Georgian nation; the Abkhaz and 8 Ossetian view 7 asserted that 6 the Georgians 5 oppressed them 4 3 3 and sought to 3 assimilate and 2 deny them their 1 1 autonomy. 0 Russia provoked the Manipulative leaders Abkhazians / Georgia was a failed situation Ossetians wanted state independence

Chart 2.3: Causes of the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia Chart 2 3: Causes of the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgians from Tbilisi) [n = 12] (Georgians from Tbilisi) The response to the question about causes included a diverse array of actors and factors. Four The response to the question about causes included a diverse array of actors and respondents discussed the role of manipulative leaders acting in self-interest. In this view, leaders factors. Four respondents discussed the role of manipulative leaders acting in were motivated by the pursuit of power and the goal of controlling resources.131 These leaders were self-interest. In this view, leaders were motivated by the pursuit of power and the able to take advantage of the chaotic situation in which nationalistic ideas prevailed to mobilise people 131 goal of controlling resources.132 These leaders were able to take advantage of the and rally support to their cause. In most peoples’ descriptions, these leaders remained nameless. chaotic situation in which nationalistic ideas prevailed to mobilise people and rally133 Only one respondent mentioned the role of Gamsakhurdia, post-Soviet Georgia’s first president. In 132 supportthis view, theto theirconflict cause. arose out Inof amost chaotic peoples’ situation indescriptions, which people werethese easily leaders provoked. remained nameless. Only one respondent mentioned the role of Gamsakhurdia, post-Soviet Georgia’sHowever, as first Chart president. 2 3 demonstrates,133 In this Russia view, still the dominated conflict Georgians’arose out explanations of a chaotic, with situation nine out of intwelve which respondents people werementioning easily Russia provoked. in one way or another. The main views on Russia as a contributing factor in the conflict are presented in the chart below. 130 Notions of victimisation feature prominently in ethnic psychocultural interpretations of conflict. Ross, ‘Psychocultrual Interpretation and Psychocultural Drama.’ 165. 131 Interview 6 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. 132 Interview 17 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Georgian Partnership for Road Safety Offices, Tbilisi, Georgia. 1 August 2014; Interview 28 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. 133 Interview 27 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014.

131 Interview 6 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. 132 Interview 17 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Georgian Partnership for Road Safety Offices, Tbilisi, Georgia. 1 August 2014; Interview 28 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 07 August 2014. 133 Interview 27 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. 07 August 2014. 33

Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 39 ), ),

138

18-29 30-49 50+ [a]nd how did how did [a]nd At times, … 134

(Georgians from Tbilisi) Tbilisi) from (Georgians

1 tia old man stated: manold stated: - 1 In the this conflict view,

year -

136 argue with us, but they were always always were they but us, with argue 1

Russian involvement as the sole cause cause sole the as involvement Russian Russia not mentioned Russia not mentioned

11 August 2014. 2014. 11 August 2014. 11 August

At times, this amounted to a denial that conflict conflict that a denial amounted to this times, At

– – 134 34 ain problem was that Georgians wanted wanted Georgians was that problem ain 0 the wars of the 1990s as being forced on Georgia Georgia on forced being as 1990s the of wars the in Abkhazia and South Osse South and Abkhazia in

2 of the causes elicited a greater acknowledgement of the the of acknowledgement a greater elicited causes the of causes 1 fromTbilisi sample cited

not include the role of Russia, but it portrays the grievances of the the of grievances the portrays it but Russia, of role the include not

Russia is one of the 11 August 2014. 11 August

iscussion iscussion

Georgians from Tbilisi: from Georgians South Ossetians. Three respondents mentioned their desire for for desire their mentioned respondents Three Ossetians. South While one woman simply stated that this was the case, the other other the case, was the this that one woman stated While simply

and South Ossetia (Georgians from Tbilisi) from and South Ossetia (Georgians Causes of the Conflicts of the Conflicts Causes 137 urther d urther 3

This view did view This s Georgian the

depicted conflict the of es Russia and the Causes of the Conflicts the of the Causes and Russia 135 138 135 ’ Chart the conflict in Abkhazia Russia and the causes of 2.4: In this view, the conflict arose from a desire among the Abkhaz and Ossetians to no to Ossetians Abkhazand among the desire a from arose conflict the view, this In

1 from

136 e caus Georgians from Tbilisi: Russia and the and the Tbilisi: Russia from Georgians 2 While one woman simply stated that this was the case, the other While one woman simply stated that this was the case, the other 137 : Russia and the causes of the conflict the causes of and the Russia : Between Georgians and Abkhazians there was not conflict, the conflict was between conflict the conflict, was not there and Abkhazians Georgians Between m Becausethe and Russians. Georgians them to independence give to want not did Russians and [the] independence with fighting are you that [said] they and Ossetia Abkhazia, in makeThey conflict it? do they other. each 4

Between Georgians and Abkhazians there was not conflict, the conflict was between Georgians and Russians. Because the main problem was that Georgians wanted independence and [the] Russians did not want to give independence to them…[a]nd how did they conflict do in Abkhazia, it? Ossetia and They they [said] make that you are fighting with other. each Russia is the sole cause Russia is the sole cause (Georgian from Tbilisi), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 11 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. residence, Tbilisi), respondent’s from (Georgian Interview 33 (Georgian from Tbilisi), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 11 August 2014. 11 August Georgia. Tbilisi, residence, respondent’s Tbilisi), from 33 (Georgian Interview Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews 2014. 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Central, Hotel Tbilisi), from 7 (Georgian Interview 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews Tbilisi from 33 (Georgian Interview 2014; 07 August Georgia. Tbilisi, Hospital, Tbilisi Tbilisi), from 27 (Georgian Interview

3 2 1 0 4 ix respondents ix n = 12] [ by an outside power working to undermine the country. country. the undermine to working power an outside by f Moving beyond Russia, and Abkhazians the of needs independence. respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. Tbilisi, residence, respondent’s

136 137 138 134 135 Chart 2 Chart S This view of th trying to find [one]. find to trying plained why she felt these grievances were illegitimate. She explained that both the Abkhaz and the both that She explained illegitimate. were grievances these why felt she explained privileges various had and own language, their speak to able were own schools, their had Ossetians to reason had ‘no groups Both Georgia. of part were when they longer be part of Georgia. of be part longer existed between Abkhazians or Ossetians and Georgians. One 57 and Georgians. Ossetians or Abkhazians between existed two groups that caused the conflict as incomprehensible. incomprehensible. as conflict the caused that groups two

of the conflict, especially among 50+ category. the especially conflict, the of explained why she felt these grievances were both illegitimate. the Abkhaz and Ossetians She had their own explained schools, were able to speak that their own language, and had [one].’ various privileges when find they were partto trying of Georgia. Both always were they but us, with argue to reason ‘no had groups Moving beyond Russia, further discussion of the causes elicited a greater Moving beyond Russia, furthera greater elicited causes the discussion of acknowledgement of the needs of the Abkhazians and South Ossetians. Three respondents mentioned their desire for independence. This view of the causes of the conflict depicted the warsof the 1990s as the country. undermine by an outside power working to on Georgia forced being The IDPs’ responses to this question revealed a more detailed understanding of in the chart presented responses are below. the conflict situation. Their This view did not include the role of Russia, but it portraysit Russia, but the of grievances of the role include the did not This view that caused the conflict as incomprehensible. two groups arose arose from a desire among the Abkhaz and Ossetians to no longer be part of Georgia. Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014. 27 July-11 August 2014. 134 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians July 2014. 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 135 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 7 (Georgian 27 July-11 August 2014. 136 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians 2014; Interview 7 August 137 Interview Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. from 33 27 (Georgian August 2014. 11 Georgia. Tbilisi, residence, 138 Interview Tbilisi), respondent’s from 33 (Georgian Six respondents from the Georgians from Tbilisi sample cited Russian involvement from the Georgians from Six respondents as the sole cause of the conflict, especially among the 50+ category. However, as Chart 2.3 demonstrates, Russia still dominated Georgians’ explanations, explanations, Georgians’ dominated still Russia demonstrates, 2.3 Chart as However, The another. or way one in Russia mentioning respondents twelve of out nine with main views on Russia as a contributing factor in the conflict are presented in the chart below. this amounted to a denial that conflict existed between Abkhazians or Ossetians man stated: One 57-year-old and Georgians. The IDPs’ responses to this question revealed a more detailed understanding of the conflict situation. Their responses are presented in the chart below.

IDPs:IDPs: Causes 7 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 3 2 1 0 Nationalism (on both The policies of the The rise of local Russia provoked the sides) Gamsakhurdia militias situation / provided the administration Abkhaz with arms and soldiers

40 Chart 2.5: Causes of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (IDPs) Chart 2 5: Causes of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (IDPs) [n = 7] Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts A chief factor was the nationalism that arose in the last years of the Soviet Union. A chief factor was the nationalism that arose in the last years of the Soviet Union. Five out of seven Five out of seven respondents stated that Georgian nationalism frightened or respondents stated that Georgian nationalism frightened or upset the Abkhazians and Ossetians. upset the Abkhazians and Ossetians. However, IDPs’ recognition of nationalism as However, IDPs’ recognition of nationalism as a contributing factor was not limited to the Georgians; a Abkhaziancontributing and Ossetian factor nationalismwas not limitedwas also tocited the as Georgians;contributing to Abkhazianthe conflict by and the IDPs. Ossetian The nationalismIDPs from South was Ossetia also saidcited, ‘[ Tas]he contributingOssetians wanted to to the separate conflict from Georgiaby the but IDPs. the GeorgianThe IDPs fromgovernment South did Ossetia not grant said, them ‘[T]hethis…[so Ossetians the] Osseti answanted start[ed] to war separate in Tskhinvali’. from139 Georgia The IDPs frombut theAbkhazia Georgian echoed government this view. A 73 did-year not-old grant woman them stated this…[so that [the Abkhaz] the] Ossetians were always start[ed] stating that war inAbkhazian Tskhinvali’. territory139 The was IDPstheirs ,from not Georgia’s. Abkhazia140 echoed this view. A 73-year-old woman stated that [the Abkhaz] were always stating that Abkhazian territory was theirs, Among the IDPs, there was also widespread criticism of Gamskhurdia and his policy towards ethnic not Georgia’s.140 minorities.141 Georgian militias, which entered Abkhazia at the beginning of the war, were cited as a Amongmajor cause the of IDPs, escalation there and was violence. also One widespread 49-year-old woman criticism said ofthat Gamskhurdia ‘everything started and with his policymilitias towards who entered ethnic Abkhazia minorities. officially to141 protect Georgian the railway, militias, but inwhich reality theyentered were repressingAbkhazia the at theAbkhazians beginning and robbingof the them’.war, were She went cited on asto describe a major these cause groups of escalationas ‘drug-addicts and and violence. Oneprisoners’. 49-year-old142 The IDPs woman presented said the that militias ‘everything as symbolic ofstarted the lawlessness with militias and chaos who of enteredthe time, 143 Abkhaziacausing both officially sides to be tomore protect aggressive the torailway, each other. but inThe reality IDPs show theyed awere greater repressing awareness theof AbkhaziansGeorgians’ complicity and robbing and contribution them’. toShe the wentviolence; on however, to describe these militiasthese were groups portrayed as ‘drug- as addictsimmoral lowlifes and prisoners’. distinct from142 the The larger IDPs Georgian presented population. the militias as symbolic of the

lawlessnessWhile competing and nationalisms chaos of werethe regardedtime, causing as contributing both sidesto the escalationto be more of the aggressive conflict, the IDPs to 143 eachfrom Abkhaziaother. stressedThe IDPs Russia’s showed role ina thegreater conflict awareness by provoking of the Georgians’ Abkhazians, andcomplicity giving them and contribution to the violence; however, these militias were portrayed as immoral 139 Interview 11 (IDP), Ori Beli Hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July 2014. lowlifes140 Interview distinct 35 (IDP), respondent’sfrom the hostel, larger Tbilisi, Georgian Georgia. 12 Auguspopulation.t 2014. 141 Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July – 12 August 2014. 142 Interview 21 (IDP), respondent’s friends residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 04 August 2014. While143 Interviews competing with IDPs, Tbilisi, nationalisms Georgia. 29 July were – 12 August regarded 2014. as contributing to the escalation 35 of the conflict, the IDPs from Abkhazia stressed Russia’s role in the conflict by provoking the Abkhazians, and giving them arms and military assistance.144 The Abkhaz’s military success and the brutality of the conflict was both explained through Russian involvement. The Abkhaz recapture of the region’s capital, Sukhumi, in 1993 was portrayed as a result of Russian assistance: [Sukhumi] was not occupied by Abkhazians it was occupied by the Russians. Abkhazians in this army [were a] minority. It was Russians, Chechens and many different types of [North] Caucasian people who were hired by [the] Russians.145

139 Interview 11 (IDP), Ori Beli Hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July 2014. 140 Interview 35 (IDP), respondent’s hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 12 August 2014. 141 Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. 142 Interview 21 (IDP), respondent’s friends residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 04 August 2014. 143 Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. 144 Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. 145 Interview 35 (IDP), respondent’s hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 12 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 41 Russia’s actual Russia’s in both the role Abkhazian and Ossetian wars is While elusive. the Georgians and IDPs placed emphasis great on this factor, the Abkhazian maintained that the conflict was fought independently of Russia. Russia’s involvement in the conflict cannot be denied, but it should not be regarded as a long- coherent term, do To strategy. the so overlooks the complexity of situation and the by played role diverse a more actors. array of Russia, 152 The Abkhaz people 149 The South Ossetian man interviewed for this 148 A 73-year-old woman recited a story of some people who people story some a recited of woman 73-year-old A The woman interviewed said that it was ‘unexpected when 146 150 A narrative that explains the atrocities of the conflict through the 147 In this view, unwarranted Georgian aggression triggered the wars of the the wars of triggered aggression unwarranted Georgian In this view, 151 1,000 armed volunteers from the Russian North from volunteers 1,000 armed after Caucasus joined the fighting the Georgian 119. Wars.’ ‘The Post-Soviet Zurcher, Abkhazians territory. entered army on 31 July 2014. completed early 1990s; the Abkhaz and Ossetians, facing an existential threat, had to defend themselves. In contrast to the Georgian narrative, Russia did not their and feature Georgians in the with their lies blame conflict: the of causes the of understanding violence and war. destructive politics, which triggered removed the eyeballs from a dead Georgian soldier and presented them to his them and presented soldier a dead Georgian the eyeballs from removed Norththe from people hired was it it; do didn’t ‘The Abkhazians said, mother; she Caucasus’. 146 Interview 29 July 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. 11 (IDP), Ori Beli Hostel, around that 12 August 2014. It is estimated Tbilisi, Georgia. hostel, 147 Interview 35 (IDP), respondent’s Soulemanov, ‘Understanding Ethnic Conflict.’ 122-123. 122-123. ‘Understanding Ethnic Conflict.’ 148 Soulemanov, on 29 July 2014; 149 Interview Started (Skype call), Tbilisi, Georgia. Central 10 (South Ossetia), Hotel 150 Interview 30 July 2014. Central (Skype Call), Tbilisi, Georgia. 14 (Abkhazian), Hotel 151 Interview 6 August 2014. Central (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 (Abkhazian), Hotel pp. 159-160. ‘The152 All discussed in de Waal, Caucasus.’ Russia’s Russia’s actual role in both the Abkhazian and Ossetian wars the is Georgians elusive. and While IDPs placed great emphasis on this factor, maintained the Abkhazians that the Armenians Local conflictviews. these between in somewhere waslies argues, Waal de foughtThomas independently of Russia. The truth, and Russians aided the Abkhaz fighters. Theweapons Abkhaz from also a Russian were military able base to take in during the disintegration the Abkhazia. of Soviet state and The military. help that did come Both conflicts took place was probably in the form freelance of assistance. When the Abkhaz launched an the of many which at point a – 1993 September late in Sukhumi capture to attack IDPs interviewed for this research fled the Abkhazian capital –Yeltsin President faced crisis in Russia, which ended in fightingof on Moscow. the streets Displaying similarities to the the Abkhaz IDPs’ and view, Ossetian perspective was focused on Georgian nationalism and military action. In would not Georgia meant that Ossetians feared Gamsakhurdia nationalism of Ossetia, the firebrand on march a ordered Gamsakhurdia when confirmed fear a quo; status the honour capital. Ossetian South the Tskhinvali, Four out of seven respondents mentioned the role of hired people from the Norththe from people hired of role the mentioned respondents seven of out Four used was presence Their Abkhaz. the help to ordered Russians the who Caucasus to explain the acts of brutality in the conflict. In were thisview, not committed the worst atrocities by the Abkhaz Chechens or and other people from Georgians, the North Caucasus, they because the ‘Abkhazians were committed by this.’ do never would [the] Georgians attacked, because they [the Abkhazians] did nothing to provoke them’. presence of external players detracts attention from the role played by Georgians played by Georgians role the playersexternal attention from detracts of presence and Abkhazians. like Georgia, was in chaos in the wake of state collapse. Its involvement in the research said that the conflict began when ‘obvious nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia’ Gamsakhurdia’ Zviad nationalist ‘obvious when began conflict the that said research became ‘the head of the Georgian government,’ the and conflict […] he that is [the] one ‘his to blame’. He went ideas on to describe brought the Georgian- Ossetian war as a conflict between ‘nationalism us’. and interviewed also placed the causes of the conflict on the actionsof the Georgian government. The man stated that the conflict was caused by theeveryone ‘invasionmobilised ofand Abkhazia’ 14 invaded army ‘Georgian the when 1992’ August against the Abkhaz. Russia’s actual role in both the Abkhazian and Ossetian wars is elusive. While the Georgians and IDPs placed great emphasis on this factor, the Abkhazians maintained that the conflict was fought independently of Russia. The truth, Thomas de Waal argues, lies somewhere in between these views. Local Armenians and Russians aided the Abkhaz fighters. The Abkhaz also were able to take weapons from a Russian military base in Abkhazia. Both conflicts took place during the disintegration of the Soviet state and military. The help that did come was probably in the form of freelance assistance. When the Abkhaz launched an attack to capture Sukhumi in late September 1993 – a conflictpoint at which cannot many beof thedenied, IDPs interviewedbut it should for this not research be regarded fled the Abkhazianas a long-term, capital – coherentPresident strategy.Yeltsin faced To docrisis so in overlooks Russia, which the endedcomplexity in fighting of theon thesituation streets andof Moscow. the role152 playedRussia, likeby aGeorgia, more wasdiverse in chaos array in theof wakeactors. of state collapse. Its involvement in the conflict cannot be denied, but it should not be regarded as a long-term, coherent strategy. To do so overlooks the complexity of the situation and the role played by a more diverse array of actors. 2.3.3 Consequences Question:2.3.3 Consequences In your opinion, what are the consequences of the conflict in Abkhazia andQuestion: South In your Ossetia? opinion, what are the consequences of the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

GeorgiansGeorgians from from Tbilisi: Tbilisi: ConsequencesConsequences 8 42 7 7

Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 6 6

5 4 4

3 2 2 2

0 IDPs Economic The loss of Damage to Trauma (personal Devastation territory Georgia's and public) reputation

Chart 2 6: ConsequencesChart of the 2.6: conflict Consequences in Abkhazia of and the South conflict Ossetia in Abkhazia for Georgia and (Georgians from Tbilisi) [n = 12] South Ossetia for Georgia (Georgians from Tbilisi) This questionquestion aimed aimed to bring to people’sbring people’s discussion discussion of the conflicts of upthe to conflicts the present upday. to Age the was present not a distinguishing factor in people’s answers.153 For the Georgians from Tbilisi, the most common day. Age was not a distinguishing factor in people’s answers.153 For the Georgians response to the question on consequences was the loss of territory. This category incorporates a from Tbilisi, the most common response to the question on consequences was range of responses. The first described the loss of territory in terms akin to Kabachnik’s cartographic the loss of territory. This category incorporates a 154range of responses. The first anxieties, in which Georgia is not the size or shape it should be. A 42-year-old woman described described the loss of territory in terms akin to Kabachnik’s cartographic anxieties, 154 in152 Allwhich discussed Georgia in De Waal, is The not Caucasus the , sizepp. 159 or-160. shape it should be. A 42-year-old woman 153 Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July – 11 August 2014. 155 described154 Kabachnik, ‘Wounds the situationthat Won’t Heal’. as ‘the violation of one space, Georgian space’. A 37 57-year-old man said simply that Georgia has ‘lost 25 per cent of its territory and there is [a] chance we might lose even more’.156 Other respondents portrayed the loss of territory as an occupation by Russia. A 23-year old woman stated that ‘[a] fter 2008, it is really awful, I feel like a live in an occupied country’.157 Since the war in 2008, the Georgian government has promoted the idea of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as occupied territories.158 These responses revealed an emotional attachment to the territories themselves alongside a belief that they are rightly Georgian. The responses on this theme also included a more nostalgic strand of thought, which was mournful about the loss of a good place to holiday, visit, or – at the very least – be able to access. A 41-year-old man gave an emotive response by saying:

153 Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014. 154 Kabachnik, ‘Wounds that Won’t Heal.’ 155 Interview 27 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. 156 Interview 20 (Georgian from Tbilisi), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 2 August 2014. 157 Interview 6 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. 158 Archil Gegeshidze, ‘New Realities After the August 2008.’ In Archil Gegeshidze and Ivlian Haindrava, ‘Transformation of the Georgia-Abkhazian Conflict: Rethinking the Paradigm.’ Conciliation Resources: European Union. (2011), 24. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 43 When the discussing territories loss of be to the desire move able to what within freely is considered space Georgian is a highly motif prominent in people’s responses. The loss of that freedom is considered a tragic consequence the war. of The economic war damage of was presented as holding back.Georgia An enormous burden was placed on the people Georgian and government at a time when change and was rejuvenation most needed.

166 164 In Tbilisi IDPs are the In Tbilisi IDPs are 162

159 165 167 A 57-year-old man reminisced about holidays he had he holidays about reminisced man 57-year-old A 160 The older generation remembered Abkhazia fondly while fondly Abkhazia remembered generation older The 161 Another echoed respondent this view by saying, ‘[the consequence is] a I lost part of my life, my space, and my people. I lost something that is very special to me, because I am [originally] from Western Georgia and I know Abkhazia… when I go back [to Western Georgia] I feeling have because I know I cannot go any further. a bad 163 August 2014. Abkhazia Abkhazia was depicted as a special despite it Georgians, being an integral part Abkhazia The loss of their location country. of that is no longer accessible was to regarded as the loss of a very good holiday destination. One or for some rest there hotel manager stated that he hoped one day he 26-year-old could ‘go investment’. some make to spent there as a child. a as there spent Half of the people who discussed IDPs linked their situation to broader economic the people who discussed IDPs linked their situation to broader Half of back. Georgia holding as presented was war of damage economic The problems. An enormous burden was placed on the Georgian people and government at a was most needed. time when change and rejuvenation due reputation, international Georgia’s people also that it harmed mentioned Two to the country being associated with war. Six respondents from the Georgians from Tbilisi sample discussed IDPs, with two sample discussed IDPs, with Tbilisi from Georgians the from Six respondents people from each age category mentioning this consequence. The situation was described in terms of go can’t the They situation. bad impact really a in it living are had ‘they that said had woman on 23-year-old displaced peoples’ lives. One back and they don’t have any power over their property. the younger generation – informed by their elders – had favourable impressions of loss the discussing When visit. can they day one that territoryhoped the and of Georgian within what is considered to move freely to be able territories the desire freedom that of loss The responses. people’s in motif prominent highly a is space war. the consequence of a tragic is considered big number of refugees, which is also a big problem for the Georgian economy’. Georgian the for problem big a also is which refugees, of number big Interview 17 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Georgian Partnership for Road Safety Offices, Tbilisi, Georgia. 1 Safety Offices, Tbilisi, Georgia. Partnership for Road 159 Interview Tbilisi), Georgian from 17 (Georgian Interview 24 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 6 August 2014. Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 160 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 24 (Georgian July 2014. 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 161 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 7 (Georgian 30 July 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. 162 Interview Tbilisi), Ori Beli Hostel, from 12 (Georgian August 2014. 11 Georgia. Tbilisi, residence, 163 Interview Tbilisi), respondent’s from 33 (Georgian 7 August 2014. Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 164 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 28 (Georgian 27 July-11 August 2014. 165 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians July 2014. 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 166 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 6 (Georgian 27 July-11 August 2014. 167 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians Other themes in peoples’ responses were trauma and damage to Georgia’s and damage to Georgia’s trauma were Other themes in peoples’ responses reputation. Two people discussed the emotional impact the conflictswar’. had[another] it and onsociety for trauma be was ‘[i]t that, a said woman One will level. public and personal there someday that fear in live we Because way. that remains most visible consequence of the war. Three respondents described the burden their burden the described respondents Three war. the of consequence visible most handle couldn’t ‘we stated, woman 63-year-old A country. the on placed situation the problem, we couldn’t handle so many refugees. So, they times’. were really hard economic problems. The economic damage of war was presented as holding Georgia back. An enormous burden was placed on the Georgian people and government at a time when change and rejuvenation was most needed.165

Other themes in peoples’ responses were trauma and damage to Georgia’s reputation. Two people discussed the emotional impact the conflicts had on a personal and public level. One woman said that, ‘[i]t was trauma for society and it remains that way. Because we live in fear that someday there will be [another] war’.166 Two people also mentioned that it harmed Georgia’s international reputation, due to the country being associated with war.167

IDPs:IDPs: Consequences Consequences 8 7 7 6 5 5 In contrast, 4 3 among IDPs, the 3 2 most common 2 1 response to the 0 question was that It ruined relations / We lost our home/ Abkhazia and Ossetia Trauma both public and the wars ruined divided people and homeland are destroyed personal relationships. families This reflects 44 their personal Chart 2.7: Consequences of the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (IDPs)

Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts Chart 2 7: Consequences of the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (IDPs) [n = 7] investment in In contrast, among the IDPs, the most common response to the question was these conflict. In contrast, among the IDPs, the most common response to the question was that the wars ruined that the wars ruined relationships. This reflects their personal investment in these Another relationships. This reflects their personal investment in these conflicts. All respondents mentioned consequence conflicts.this; the warAll respondentsdivided communities, mentioned friends, and this; families. the warThe ideadivided was linkedcommunities, to the perception friends, people and people stated families.had of TheAbkhazia idea before was thelinked war.168 to Also the attached perception to this was people the theme had that of AbkhaziaAbkhazia is destroyed. before the A was the loss of 168 war.21- yearAlso-old attached woman, who to lived this in was Abkhazia the untiltheme 2010, that said Abkhaziathat today, ‘it is looks destroyed. exactly how A it 21-year-did after their homes or 169 homeland: both old thewoman, war, everything who lived is ruined in Abkhaziaor destroyed’. until The 2010, consequences said that of today,division and‘it looks destruction exactly form edhow a the actual loss of it didsharp after cont rastthe to war, the p reeverything-war situation. is Both ruined sides wereor destroyed’.depicted as losing,169 The as the consequences beautiful and of where they used divisionharmonious and placedestruction they once formedinhabited noa longersharp exists. contrast to the pre-war situation. Both to live as well as sides were depicted as losing, as the beautiful and harmonious place they once the metaphorical Another consequence people stated in their responses was the loss of their homes or homeland. This loss of a place inhabitedincorporated no longerboth the actualexists. loss of where they used to live as well as the metaphorical loss of a place where they Anotherwhere theyconsequence belong. A 49- yearpeople-old woman stated expressed in their this responses sentiment bywas saying the: loss of their homes belong. or homeland. This incorporated both the actual loss of where they used to live as 165 Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July – 11 August 2014. well166 as Interview the metaphorical6 (Georgian from Tbilisi), loss Hotel of Central, a place Tbilisi, whereGeorgia. 27 they July 2014. belong. A 49-year-old woman 167 Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July – 11 August 2014. expressed168 Interviews this with IDPs,sentiment Tbilisi, Georgia. by 29saying: July – 12 August 2014. 169 Interview 29 (IDP), Café near the Bridge of Peace, Tbilisi, Georgia. 07 August 2014. 39 We lost our homes, our homeland, where were we grew up, we couldn’t have the future that we planned […] We always have the hope that we will go back and this puts big pressure on us, like a depression.170 In these expressions, the idea of homeland was connected to identity. The IDPs from Abkhazia spoke of the loss of their territory, and the fact that it is now largely inaccessible to them, as a loss of part of who they are. Through understanding how they remember Abkhazia, discussed at the beginning of this analysis, it is easier to grasp what it is that they feel they have lost. The interviewees from Abkhazia and South Ossetia discussed their estrangement from Georgia as a major consequence of the wars. All three said that the consequences for them were independence for their territories.171 The war was also depicted as creating a point of no return due to a deep, protracted estrangement. The man from Abkhazia stated that: Georgia became very far away from Abkhazia. People here participate in the life of the Northern Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, Greece, and other countries; Georgia for them is a black hole. And [I] imagine it is the same way from the other side.172 The respondent from South Ossetia repeated this idea of distance from Georgia by

168 Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. 169 Interview 29 (IDP), Café near the Bridge of Peace, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. 170 Interview 21 (IDP), respondent’s friends residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 4 August 2014. 171 Interviews with Abkhazians and Ossetians, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-6 August 2014. 172 Interview 14 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central (Skype Call), Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 45 The interviewees Abkhazia from and South Ossetia discussed their estrangement Georgia from as a major consequence of the wars. While the Georgians the depicted consequences as a loss of the territory, people who live in them described the conflicts as strengthening to their resolve from separate Georgia.

] … ] … ; or, ; While 177 173 ; or, ; 177 answers to the the to answers

Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 Georgia. Tbilisi, ’ These reveal a reveal These answers to the the to answers

Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 Georgia. Tbilisi, ’ planations included included planations These reveal a reveal These This could either be either could This 178

planations included included planations This could either be either could This 178 176 Russia does not want want not does Russia

Total Total Georgians from Tbilisi Georgians from IDPs 176 Russia does not want want not does Russia Total Total Georgians from Tbilisi Georgians from IDPs that of negative attitudes among attitudes negative of

Other ex Other

that (Georgians from Tbilisi and and Tbilisi from (Georgians

of negative attitudes among attitudes negative of

Other ex Other ] organisations like the UN the [ like organisations ]

Russia was depicted as Russia was depicted

This could either be the was

s interest. ’ (Georgians from Tbilisi and and Tbilisi from (Georgians

… 175

] organisations like the UN the [ like organisations ] 176 was

s interest. ’

… 5 they would have no work’ no have would they

5 they would have no work’ no have would they

2 depicted as hampering any progress by by progress any hampering as depicted

and the presence and the 3 11 August 2014 11 August 2014. 11 August IDPs, with Interviews 2014; 11 August was

Other factors – – – and the presence and the 3 11 August 2014 11 August 2014. 11 August IDPs, with Interviews 2014; 11 August was

Other factors 41 – – – 41 These reveal a lack of faith in the ability of faith in the ability of a lack of These reveal Russia

178 out of twelve respondents in the Georgians from Tbilisi Tbilisi from Georgians the in respondents twelve of out Russia

175

7 This, along with Russia’s unwillingness to allow for dialogue, dialogue, for allow to unwillingness Russia’s with along This, out of twelve respondents in the Georgians from Tbilisi Tbilisi from Georgians the in respondents twelve of out

175 in Abkhazia and South Ossetia South and Abkhazia in 7 Five This, along with Russia’s unwillingness to allow for dialogue, dialogue, for allow to unwillingness Russia’s with along This, 2 in Abkhazia and South Ossetia South and Abkhazia in Five 2 This isolation – caused, in this view, by Georgian policy, policy, Georgian by view, this in caused, – isolation This interests 5

(Georgians from Tbilisi and IDPs) from (Georgians 174 interests ongevity The conflict is in l 5

can use its considerable resources to prevent it from doing so. The so. doing from it prevent to resources considerable its use can politicians' / NGOs' si), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. 07 August 2014. 2014. 07 August Georgia. Tbilisi, Hospital, Tbilisi si), among the different sides among different the ongevity

The conflict is in l can use its considerable resources to prevent it from doing so. The so. doing from it prevent to resources considerable its use can politicians' / NGOs' si), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. 07 August 2014. 2014. 07 August Georgia. Tbilisi, Hospital, Tbilisi si), Georgians from Tbilisi and IDPs: from Georgians among the different sides among different the

onflict onflict Reasons for Longevity of the Conflict the of for Longevity Reasons c ity of politicians or NGOs to bring about meaningful change: an assessment an assessment change: meaningful about NGOs or bring to politicians of ity

9 onflict onflict c

ity of politicians or NGOs to bring about meaningful change: an assessment an assessment change: meaningful about NGOs or bring to politicians of ity

9 years of little progress. progress. little of years 4 Georgians from Tbilisi and IDPs: from Tbilisi and IDPs: Georgians

years of little progress. progress. little of years 20 ck of dialogue of ck

4 Georgians from Tbilisi and IDPs: from Tbilisi and IDPs: Georgians

Chart and South Ossetia Reasons for conflict longevity in Abkhazia 2.8: ; or, ; international or, organisations, ‘they are earning lots of money from 20 la Reasons for Longevity of the Conflict Reasons for Longevity 5

179 ck of dialogue of ck the situation

177

, and , improve to ion la : Reasons for Reasons for : Reasons for Longevity of the Conflict Reasons for Longevity Russia prevents 5

179 the situation dialogue / controls 8 n = 19] , and , improve to ion : Reasons for Reasons for : Russia prevents [ 12 August 2014. 2014. 12 August dialogue / controls 8

– n = 19] completed on 31 July 2014. completed [ 9 8 7 6 5 3 2 1 0 4 12 August 2014. 2014. 12 August Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews Tbili from 26 (Georgian Interview 2014. 06 August Georgia. Tbilisi, Central, Hotel Tbilisi), from 24 (Georgian Interview 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews

10 – IDPs) IDPs) 0 3 2 1 7 6 5 9 8 July July

179 175 176 177 178 As with the discussion of consequences, this question aimed at bringing respondents bringing at aimed question this consequences, of discussion the As with Chart 2 Chart present day as well as appreciating what people thought the mechanisms behind the conflict were. were. conflict the mechanisms behind the thought people what appreciating as well as day present the and that any progress hinders involvement Russian common most were that The two responses conflict is in the interests of politicians. international organisations, ‘they are earning lots of money from it [ money it of from lots earning are ‘they organisations, international ‘“working”’. and salaries good having and fun for coming are [NGO workers] they The understanding The understanding sides. different the between dialogue preventing lack of faith in the abil the in faith of lack on over based Georgians. the of view the in conflicts these of longevity the explain can general the the state: ‘politicians don’t want it to stop, if the conflict stopped conflict the if stop, to it want don’t ‘politicians state: the sample mentioned Russia in their answers. their in Russia mentioned sample the situat the people serves conflict the common most second was that response both sides. both 4 Interview 24 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 06 August 2014. 2014. 06 August Georgia. Tbilisi, Central, Hotel Tbilisi), from 24 (Georgian Interview 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews Tbili from 26 (Georgian Interview hampering any progress by preventing dialogue between the different sides. The sides. different the between dialogue preventing by progress any hampering and can use understandingimprove, situation to the want Russia does not that was common most second The so. doing from it prevent to resources considerable its response was that the conflict serves interest. people’s the Georgians depicted the consequences as a loss of territory, the people who live in live who people the territory, of loss a as consequences the depicted Georgians the Georgia. from separate to resolve their strengthening as conflicts the described them For the Abkhazian woman another consequence was we visas, get can’t the we Georgia, of because territory’s world, the from isolated isolation. are ‘[w]e that said She abroad’. education get can’t politicians or NGOs to bring about meaningful change: an assessment based on politicians or NGOs to unwillingness to allow for This, along with Russia’s little progress. over 20 years of state: ‘politicians don’t want it to stop, if the conflict stopped they wouldno work’ have rather than Russian occupation – furtherrather than Russian division and ill feeling. entrenches Interview 10 (South Ossetia), Hotel Central (Skype call), Tbilisi, Georgia. Started on 29 July 2014; 173 Interview Started (Skype call), Tbilisi, Georgia. Central 10 (South Ossetia), Hotel 174 Interview 6 August 2014. Central (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 (Abkhazian), Hotel 27 July-11 August 2014 175 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians 27 July-11 August 2014. 176 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians 2014. 7 August 177 Interview Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. from 26 (Georgian 6 August 2014. Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 178 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 24 (Georgian As with the discussion what people day as well as appreciating answers to the present respondents’ of consequences, this question thought the aimed mechanisms at behind bringing the and that the that Russian involvement hinders any progress were responses conflict were. The Georgians the in respondents 12 of out Five politicians. two of interests the in is conflict most common from Tbilisi sample mentioned Russia in their answers. Question: In your opinion, why have these conflicts lasted for as long as they have? 2.3.4 Longevity 2.3.4 Longevity saying that, ‘the final result I can say [is] that Ossetians will never want to became the became to want never will Ossetians that [is] say can I result final ‘the that, saying sure’. for it know I and years 20 for here live[d] [have] I again, Georgia partof it […] organisations like the UN […] they [NGO workers] are coming for fun and ‘“working”’. and salaries good having

10 IDPs) IDPs) July July

179 175 176 177 178 As with the discussion of consequences, this question aimed at bringing respondents bringing at aimed question this consequences, of discussion the As with Chart 2 Chart present day as well as appreciating what people thought the mechanisms behind the conflict were. were. conflict the mechanisms behind the thought people what appreciating as well as day present the and that any progress hinders involvement Russian common most were that The two responses conflict is in the interests of politicians. international organisations, ‘they are earning lots of money from it [ money it of from lots earning are ‘they organisations, international they [NGO workers] are coming for fun and having good salaries and ‘“working”’. and salaries good having and fun for coming are [NGO workers] they The understanding The understanding sides. different the between dialogue preventing lack of faith in the abil the in faith of lack on over based Georgians. the of view the in conflicts these of longevity the explain can general the the state: ‘politicians don’t want it to stop, if the conflict stopped conflict the if stop, to it want don’t ‘politicians state: the sample mentioned Russia in their answers. their in Russia mentioned sample the situat the people serves conflict the common most second was that response both sides. both dialogue, can explain the longevity of these conflicts in the view of the Georgians. Other explanations included the general lack of dialogue among the different sides and the presence of negative attitudes among both sides.179 IDP responses were similar to the Georgian sample: the majority (four out of The responses seven) said Russia prevents any progress. Two respondents expressed scepticism of both the with NGO work.180 The man from the IDP family expressed this view: Georgians from Tbilisi and No one wants the conflict to be finished because this is a source of money. IDPs suggest Even, for example, you [the interviewer] would not be here without that people this conflict. So, because of this conflict there exist lots of NGOs, lots of consider events 181 completely out missions, and lots of jobs. No one wants peace. 46 of their control. The responses of both the Georgians from Tbilisi and IDPs suggest that people Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts While there was acknowledgment consider events completely out of their control. In this view, the conflict will continue that the longevity for as long as it serves people’s interests. While there was acknowledgement that of the conflict the longevity of the conflict arises from a near complete lack of dialogue among arises from a the conflicting sides, most people considered themselves to be powerless to neat complete lack of dialogue change this situation. among the The two Abkhaz people interviewed explained the longevity of the conflicts conflicting sides, most people through the Georgian government’s refusal to compromise and accept their status considered – or at least sign a peace treaty that would offer the Abkhaz protection. Once this themselves to happens, they said, progress could be made towards resolving the issues at the be powerless heart of the conflict.182 This illustrated a gulf in understanding regarding who is to change this situation. The perpetuating the conflict among the different sides. Abkhaz people explained the longevity of the 2.4 Section Three: Understanding of Conflict Dynamics conflicts through the Georgian This part of the analysis builds on the narratives and interpretations analysed government’s in the previous sections to look at how they shape people’s understanding of refusal to conflict dynamics. Using the framework provided by Galtung’s ABC triangle compromise and accept their (encompassing contradictions, attitudes, and behaviours), this section provides a status – or at perspectival map of the conflict using data gathered from the interviews. least sign a peace treaty that would offer the Abkhaz 2.4.1 Contradictions protection. The contradiction at the core of the conflict is over territory. This has been demonstrated in the previous sections, especially in Section 2.3.3. In this case, the structural aspect of the conflict involves a clash over the desire for territorial integrity among the Georgians and the right to self-determination among the Abkhaz and Ossetians. The Georgians generally conceive these territories as essential parts of their country. Several statements people made demonstrated this stance: Interview 8: Abkhazia and South Ossetia have always been parts of Georgia […] Abkhazia and South Ossetia are part of Georgia, they are Georgia’s.183

179 Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014; Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. 180 Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. 181 Interview 13 (Focus Group) (IDP), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. 182 Interview 14 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central (Skype Call), Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014; Interview 25 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 6 August 2014. 183 Interview 8 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 47

191 In the 187 A 23-year-old 193 185 The idea of it being The idea of 188 184 This idea of ownership proven by historical record further by historical record ownership proven This idea of 189 While none of the IDPs interviewed While none of the idea that expressed The strong emotions that people attach to these cultural ideas emotions that people attach The strong 190 186 Among the IDPs, there was greater acknowledgement of the other 192 Interview 24: Abkhazia is Georgia’s and it will be Georgia’s again. I think and it will be InterviewGeorgia’s 24: Abkhazia is Georgia’s again. ours be will it when come will day the Interview 20: The territories are naturally part of Georgia. The fact that us’. of [all] for problem a is us part longer no are of they Abkhazians or Ossetians should not live on the territories, many believed it was the territories belong only to the the war meant that unfair that the outcome of Abkhaz or Ossetians. side of this contradiction at the centre of the conflict. A 73-year-old woman recalled woman 73-year-old A conflict. the of centre the at contradiction this of side that ‘they were always saying Abkhazia is theirs, not Georgia’s’. As with the Georgians from the Tbilisi, the main contradiction of these conflicts expressed by the IDPs was over This territory. was mixed with the IDPs’ desire to to their return homes. ofIn sevenfive interviews out people discussed their want territories these from moved forcibly were Georgians that fact The home. return to injustice; this is compounded by is cited as a great and can no longer live there parts historical of view, their in are, Ossetia South and Abkhazia both that fact the Georgia. A woman 35-year-old said, ‘[i]t is territory. Georgia’s original Georgia’s territory. [It is] wholly Georgian territory, all part of the ancient land of Georgia. How should it be that it is only for Abkhazians [to have]? Georgian case, it was very difficult to accept the other group’s demands while the the while demands group’s other very the was accept it to case, difficult Georgian the identity and associated with in the nation’s so deeply embroiled territories are fortunes. nation’s makes it very difficult forgroups to acknowledge other perspectives, especially when their own actions may be at the root of other groups’ anxiety. Interview 24 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 6 August 2014. Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 184 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 24 (Georgian 2014. 2 August Georgia. Tbilisi, residence, 185 Interview Tbilisi), respondent’s from 20 (Georgian 529. Theory.’ Interpretation ‘Psychocultural 186 Ross, 187 Ibid. 532. 188 Interview 8 August 2014. Georgia. Tbilisi, 30 (IDP), Subway restaurant, 7 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. 189 Interview Peace, 29 (IDP), Café near the Bridge of 190 Interview 29 July 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. 11 (IDP), Ori Beli Hostel, July 2014. 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 191 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 8 (Georgian 27 July-11 August 2014. 192 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians 12 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. hostel, 193 Interview 35 (IDP), respondent’s The other side of this contradiction, as described by the Georgians from Tbilisi, from this contradiction, as described by the Georgians The other side of was that the Abkhaz and Ossetians do not want to be part Georgia of and chose to be closer to Russia. Some respondents did not know why this was the case. The language used emphasised unity and ownership. The fact that not Georgia complete was deemed harmful and – wrong a historical is injustice. Metaphors a powerful form or nation often such as homeland part psychocultural of interpretations. Others acknowledged why, but did not believe that the reasoning behind it was reasoning the that believe did not but Otherswhy, acknowledged legitimate. entrenches entrenches the idea that Abkhazia is rightfully Georgia’s. The Ossetia IDP echoed this sentiment from by saying what South is now South Ossetia was ‘always part of Georgia’. a historical injustice was repeated elsewhere. A IDP 23-year-old woman argued, ‘There are lots of historical sources and documents belongs that to Georgia’. prove that Abkhazia respondent noted the competing interpretations of the conflict by saying that ‘the that saying by conflict the of interpretations competing the noted respondent 27th September, [the day] that we recognise as losing Sukhumi and Abkhazia, they celebrate as gaining independence’.194 The IDPs showed little resentment towards the Abkhaz themselves. Their anger and frustration homed in on the situation rather than their former neighbours. Their explanations showed a greater understanding of the situation than among the Georgians from Tbilisi. A 49-year- old IDP woman of Abkhazian descent summed up the contradiction at the centre of the conflict by saying that both ‘sides were fighting to defend their homelands’.195 In contrast, all three respondents from Abkhazia and South Ossetia stated firmly that they want independence but that the Georgians refused to accept this.196 The woman from Abkhazia expressed her frustration at the situation: ‘[E]veryone thinks that Abkhazia wants to be part of Russia, that it is under protection of it, 48 but it’s not true, we do not want and need to be part of Russia, we want to be

Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts independent’.197 When asked what was at stake for the Abkhazians in the conflict, the man responded by saying: When they [the Georgians] invaded they basically killed every single Abkhaz person they encountered, so for people here it is survival […] the resumption of violence is the number one fear in Abkhazia.198 The Georgian desire to restore ‘territorial integrity’ entirely contradicted the fact that the Abkhaz want to be independent and seek protection from future Georgian aggression. However, this opinion was not universal on either territory. For example, in a 2011 poll 73 per cent of people living in Abkhazia fully supported independence, 24.3 per cent felt it would be better if Abkhazia joined Russia, and just 0.6 per cent respondents, most of whom were Georgian-Mingrelian, desired for Abkhazia to be part of Georgia again.199 Therefore, while the sentiments expressed in this research may not be representative of all Abkhazians, an overwhelming majority does hold these opinions.

2.4.2 Attitudes The Georgians cited attitudes as a major source of conflict, especially those held by the Abkhazians and South Ossetians towards Georgians. Georgians could either not understand why the Abkhaz or Ossetians wanted to be separate from them, or explained the situation by assuming that inhabitants of the disputed territories were manipulated or indoctrinated. The below comments summarise the view: Interview 6: I hear that in Abkhazia information is not free… In Abkhazia they are taught that we are enemies. They are afraid of meeting us.200 Interview 26: Some Abkhazians think that Georgians everyday wake up and think [about] how to invade Abkhazia.201 Interview 27: The propaganda – that Georgians are enemies – works so well that it is quite widespread, absolutely on the grassroots.202

194 Interview 29 (IDP), Café near the Bridge of Peace, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. 195 Interview 21 (IDP), respondent’s friends residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 4 August 2014. 196 Interviews with Abkhazians and Ossetians, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-6 August. 197 Interview 25 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 06 August 2014. 198 Interview 14 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central (Skype Call), Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. 199 Kirill Shevchenko and Islam Teskushev, ‘Abkhazia in Public Opinion Polls.’ In Islam Tekushev et al (eds), ‘Abkhazia:Bbetween the Past and the Future.’ (Prague: Median Orient, 2013). 128. 200 Interview 6 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. 201 Interview 26 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. 202 Interview 27 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 49 205 Another IDP Another 206 These stories, whether or 207

203

204 However, they However, acknowledged that the Abkhaz or 208 The younger generation, growing up after the have they war, are When you. told kill and that come will if Georgians the you food your eat don’t grown up, they are full of hate and it is difficultpeople to have changeno idea this. how think Some they Georgia why looks is this or and what Georgians a of sight Georgian no looks and contact like. no have They stereotypes. bad have] they [why and them kill to want Georgians that government expresses similar ideas that the Abkhaz and Ossetians’ opinions cannot be trusted due opinions cannot be trusted similar ideas that the Abkhaz and Ossetians’ expresses government the they face. When the academics who conducted propaganda of daily onslaught the apparent to them informed he Reintegration for Minister Georgia’s survey opinion public approached Abkhazia in ‘informational under this kind of people as asking questions to was controversial that their project 5. ‘Inside Abkhazia.’ and Toal, O’Loughlin, Kossolov misleading results. produce would pressure’ August 2014. Georgia.05 woman recalled a story when she bought a tee shirt on a visit to Abkhazia saying Abkhazia shirtto storyvisit tee a a a on bought she recalled when woman it wear to not and careful be to her told nearby living People Abkhazian’. an am ‘I killed. be would she as Georgia, to returned she when IDPs’ discussion of attitudes was full of descriptions and personal about stories attitudes was full of IDPs’ discussion of described Ossetia South from IDP The hated. and disliked are Georgians the how the situation by saying: Interestingly, Interestingly, four out of seven IDP respondents – including oldest category all – said people that they were ready to in forgive Abkhazians. This the was not an interview question so more may have felt this sentiment, but not expressed it A directly. woman 23-year-old said, ‘I know certainly that all the IDPs are ready to forgive and go back. I am ready and my family is ready to forgive the people who killed my grandfather’. not they are exaggerated for effect,reveal a widespread perception among the by people in the two territories. disliked and feared are IDPs that the Georgians Ossetians are unwilling to do the same. Ossetians are Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014. The Georgian The Georgian 27 July-11 August 2014. 203 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians Interview 21 (IDP), respondent’s friend’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia.04 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia.04 residence, friend’s 204 Interview 21 (IDP), respondent’s 205 Interview 29 July 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. 11 (IDP), Ori Beli Hostel, Central (Skype), Tbilisi, as IDP), Hotel 206 Interview up in Abkhazia, categorised who grew 23 (Georgian 7 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. 207 Interview Peace, 29 (IDP), Café near the Bridge of 7 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. 208 Interview Peace, 29 (IDP), Café near the Bridge of This response acknowledged that a lack of communication and misinformation was communication and misinformation acknowledged that a lack of This response at the source of these hostile attitudes. Similar themes dominated the responses she how storyabout a told woman Georgian 21-year-old A Abkhazia. from IDPs of he Georgian was she out found child the When child. Abkhaz an with playing was bad’. were and ugly ‘looked they that thought he as surprised, was While this revealed an awareness of how the Abkhaz and Ossetians feel, it implied it feel, Ossetians and Abkhaz the how of awareness an revealed this While conclusions to come to these by an outside or power have that they been forced grievances. and fears their from credibility detracted This governments. own their it removed the need to Moreover, the consider why they However, feel that way. to a desire the situation with sadness expressed and speak of did respondents better communication. it through want to change The IDPs also cited negative attitudes among the Abkhazians and Ossetians as a major source of the conflict. TheIDPs showed a more nuanced understanding of it as a product existed, rather than regarding why these negative attitudes of Russian propaganda. A 49-year-old woman astutely summed up the situation by saying that ‘[t]he big problem between Georgians and Abkhazians is that all Georgians remember is the positive, whereas all [the] Abkhazians remember is the negative’ and that what remember the is ‘Abkhazians the short but war, the the long history’. remember Georgians One woman said this situation was only getting worse, when she was visiting Abkhazia she saw ‘every day on television reminders of the war, in this sense, time is against us. We [in Abkhazia] live in an informational vacuum. Time is against us and we are losing the informational war’.209 In this view, while the Georgians are While ready for peace, the Abkhaz face daily propaganda reminding them of the war. expressing Another theme on the attitudinal dynamics of the conflict was that Georgian- willingness to forget and Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetians relations had always been harmonious and forgive, IDPs the Georgians treated ethnic minorities in both territories well.210 Among the refused to Georgians from Tbilisi sample three out of four respondents over 50 stated this. recognise Abkhaz In response to the question, ‘Why is the conflict important to the Abkhazians and grievances. They 50 were willing to Ossetians?’ a 57-year-old man stated, ‘[There] is a mistake in your question… this Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts forgive what had conflict was not a conflict between Abkhazians [or Ossetians] and Georgians. The happened in the war was between Russians and Georgians.’211 Another 57-year-old man said, ‘[T] conflict, yet they he attitudes and behaviour of the Georgians [are] not to blame. Georgians never left the reasons why it occurred wanted the war... they wanted the opposite. They were always friendly with them unaddressed. and treated them well’.212 This view absolved the Georgians of any complicity in Nevertheless, the the conflict by depicting it as forced upon two friendly peoples by a meddling IDPs’ view gave outside power. greater agency to the Abkhazians’ Linked to this, four IDP respondents – including all respondents in the oldest role in the category – stated that they did not understand why the Abkhaz had any grievances. conflict than that expressed by the The perspective on the past was that the Abkhaz were a privileged people who Georgians from had everything that they needed. The couple from the family that was interviewed Tbilisi, even if it concurred: did regard their grievances as [The] Abkhazians widely spread the idea that Georgians oppress us and unfounded. [that] they were somehow more aggressive towards us [Georgians to the Abkhaz]. On the contrary, Abkhazians had big privileges, they were excluded from military service, and high government positions were belonging only to Abkhazians.213 A 73-year-old woman agreed with this view: [T]heir rights have never been restricted. I do not remember any violation of their rights, any restriction of their rights. What did they want more [of], I couldn’t imagine what…why? Because they had the best conditions of living, ever.214 The inexplicable nature of the Abkhaz actions only served to confirm, for the respondents, that Russia was pulling the strings and manipulating the Abkhaz. While expressing a willingness to forget and forgive, IDPs – especially older ones – refused to recognise Abkhaz grievances. They were willing to forgive what had happened in the conflict, yet they left the reasons why it occurred unaddressed. Nevertheless, the IDPs’ view did give greater agency to the Abkhazians’ role in the conflict than that expressed by the Georgians from Tbilisi, even if it did regard their grievances as unfounded.

209 Interview 21 (IDP), respondent’s friend’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 4 August 2014. 210 Interview 7 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014; Interview 20 (Georgian from Tbilisi), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 2 August 2014; Interview 33 (Georgian from Tbilisi), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 11 August 2014. 211 Interview 7 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. 212 Interview 20 (Georgian from Tbilisi), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 2 August 2014. 213 Interview 13 (Focus Group) (IDP), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. 214 Interview 35 (IDP), respondent’s hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 12 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 51 The 216 The lack of action The lack of 220 The Abkhazian man interviewed 215

218 One 23-year-old summed up the feeling by saying 219 This was coupled with a belief that no one has the will or desire desire or will the has one no that belief a with coupled was This 221 However, the However, idea that the Abkhazians or Ossetians hate and fear 217 When I speak to Georgians, they always say that we want to Abkhazia come but [that] to they will kill us, and I say to them all the time that Armenians, Georgians, host to glad be will we happen, will thing such no aggressive. not is who everyone , Interview 12 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Ori Beli Hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014; Interview Tbilisi, Georgia. , Interview Tbilisi), Ori Beli Hostel, 6 from 12 (Georgian 27 July 2014; Interview Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. from Tbilisi), Hotel 33 (Georgian from (Georgian 11 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. residence, Tbilisi), respondent’s 5 August 2014. Georgia. to address these conflicts. A 73-year woman said ‘ordinary that care about people’these conflicts any more. They care ‘about everyday do not life and concerns’ ‘nobody is thinking about these people […] we [have] never met Ossetians and we don’t know how they live for twenty years or even more’. O’Loughlin Kolossov and Toal, ‘Inside Abkhazia’; O’Loughlin and Toal ‘Inside South Ossetia,’ Abkhazia’; O’Loughlin and Toal ‘Inside and Toal, 215 O’Loughlin Kolossov 216 Interview 30 July 2014. Central (Skype Call), Tbilisi, Georgia. 14 (Abkhazian), Hotel 306. Abkhazia.’ Identity in Post-Soviet 217 Clogg, ‘The of Politics 218 Interview 6 August 2014. Central (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 (Abkhazian), Hotel 219 Interview 12 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Ori Beli Hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. 220 Interview Tbilisi), Ori Beli Hostel, from 12 (Georgian Central (Skype), Tbilisi, as IDP), Hotel 221 Interview up in Abkhazia, categorised who grew 23 (Georgian Likewise, the lack of communication was discussed in five out of seven interviews with interviews seven of out five in discussed was communication of lack the Likewise, this woman opinion expressed by saying, ‘the biggest problem IDPs. A 21-year-old that fuels this conflict is [that] they do not know who we are and we do not know who they are’. Due to Abkhazia and South Ossetia being much memory and the territory, Georgian in undisputed than far greater war was smaller of societies the impact of it forms a key component of national life. destroyed buildings that dominate the landscape also servelandscape the dominate buildings that destroyed reminders as potent of the war. described described the situation in the territory: ‘[I]t is a very small society and everyone knows each So, other. whenever you lose a soldier at a funeral there are of a relations, lot it is all connected to each People other. here have solidarity.’ Due to the conflicts having being ‘frozen’ for many years, behavioural dynamics featured less prominently in peoples’ answers. The most notable points on this in resident Tbilisi and the IDPs currently from both the Georgians dimension from Tbilisi was the lack of action and communication among Abkhazians, Ossetians, Tbilisi sample from in the 12 Georgians respondents Seven out and of Georgians. and that negative stereotypes communication perpetuated stated that the lack of Georgians did not know what the Abkhaz or Ossetians thought or wanted due to a lack of information. 2.4.3 Behaviour Undoubtedly, there was a fear among people on both territories about what the was a fear among people on both there Undoubtedly, Georgians might do in the the future. claims However, about indoctrination and issues that cause the attention away from unhelpful as they detract are hatred rather than being planted there are insecurity by implying that these sentiments by feelings. triggered Georgians was challenged by the Abkhaz woman interviewed: by the Abkhaz woman was challenged Georgians was seen as further the conflict byentrenching leaving the other two dimensions contradictions irreconcilable and attitudes negative – triangle ABC the in identified – unaddressed. and no one has the ‘will’ to do anything.222 This lack of action was regarded as prolonging the conflict and moving the prospect of reconciliation further away. It is important to note that respondents in the sample of Georgians from Tbilisi demonstrated a strong willingness to talk and communicate with Abkhazians and The responses Ossetians. In line with the argument put forward by Kabachnik, Regulska and revealed Mitchneck regarding IDPs, it can be concluded that the Georgians from Tbilisi that a lack of dialogue and showed remarkably little hostility or anger towards people living on the territories. communication In a typical statement, a 26-year-old man said, ‘I don’t have a problem with was widely Abkhazian people, Ossetian people. I like them. I would like to be friendly with regarded, all of them.223 This showed a willingness to build relationships with people in the especially 52 among younger two de facto states. All people in the lowest age category expressed sadness that Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts respondents, as they could not communicate or a frustration that they could not make friends with a major source people who lived on the territories. A 23-year-old woman said: of perpetuation of the conflict. [What is most upsetting is] the loss of each other. I would give everything There was also to talk to [an] Abkhazian. Once I met an Abkhazian girl in Prague, but I hope about what was so shocked that I couldn’t even talk. For years, I have been thinking dialogue could about meeting them to find out if we like the same music or literature achieve, with and so on.224 younger people seemingly very These responses revealed that a lack of dialogue and communication was willing to engage in programmes widely regarded, especially among younger respondents, as a major source of that aim to bring perpetuation of the conflict. There was also hope about what dialogue could the two sides achieve, with younger people seemingly very willing to engage in programmes together. that aim to bring the two sides together. This theme also featured in the responses of the Abkhazians and Ossetians interviewed. The lack of dialogue and compromise was cited as a major reason for the conflicts’ continuation.225 The Abkhazian man described this behavioural dynamic: You have two realities: one here and one on the other territory in Georgia and [in] this sense [they] became alien to each other… what happens here usually does not go on in Georgia and what happens in Georgia usually does not go on here.226 On both sides there was a recognition that the lack of communication further entrenches the contradictions and negative attitudes.

2.5 Section Four: State / Geopolitical level This section aimed to get people’s perspective on how the geopolitical dimension shaped the conflict. This is important, because these conflicts are predominantly framed in geopolitical terms and, therefore, understanding how this shapes people’s interpretations is needed in order to plan a peace-building intervention. Russia dominated the discussion of state and international politics for both the Georgians from Tbilisi and the IDPs. Georgian and IDP respondents often referred to Russia using the euphemisms ‘the third party’, ‘the outside force’, or ‘our neighbour’.227

222 Interview 35 (IDP), respondent’s hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 12 August 2014. 223 Interview 26 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014 224 Interview 6 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. 225 Interviews with Abkhazians and Ossetians, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-6 August 2014. 226 Interview 14 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central (Skype Call), Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. 227 Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 53

(Georgians 229 sier and there and there sier was out of the the of was out

be like

Russia

The IDPs also discussed discussed also TheIDPs 228 There would be no conflict There would be no conflict It would be easier to resolve

. [when] Russia will finish finish will Russia [when] .

227

231 y 2014. y

11 August 2014. 11 August

– Abkhazia and South Ossetia South and Abkhazia the extent to which people regard Russian Russian regard people which to extent the

by suggesting that once once that suggesting by 49 8 s in 230

lustrated 229

12 August 2014. 2014. 12 August

– . Georgian and IDP respondents often referred to Russia using using Russia to referred often IDPrespondents and Georgian . eight respondents in the Georgians from Tbilisi sample stated that that stated sample Tbilisi from Georgians the in respondents eight overnment and their feelings of social exclusion due to to due exclusion social of feelings their and overnment

IDPs above, the the Chart Without Russia what would the conflicts 2.9:

Georgians from Tbilisi: Without Russia… Tbilisi: from Georgians

228

in Abkhazia and South Ossetia be like (Georgians from Tbilisi) from in Abkhazia and South Ossetia be like (Georgians

question 231

the n = 12] … Russia Tbilisi: Without Georgians from [

four hours to solve the problem. the solve to hours four Without Russian involvement, what would the conflicts be like? be like? conflicts the would what involvement, Russian Without In this view, it is just a handful of neo-imperialists in the Kremlin – headed – Kremlin the in neo-imperialists of handful a just is it view, this In - : : : Without Russia what would the conflict the what would Russia Without : 230 Interview 26: [Without Russia] There would not be any conflict at all. The all. at conflict any be not would There Russia] [Without Interview26: all. at exist not would conflict Interview 24: [Without Russia] it could be solved by ourselves, in one day. day. one in ourselves, by solved be could it Russia] [Without Interview24: problem. the solve to hours twenty-four just take would It Interview 7: This conflict will finish the day after Russia is destroyed…. [when] Russia will finish its imperial life. problems could be solved easily: be solved could problems 9

232 causation entirely on Russian involvement involvement on Russian entirely causation ,

(Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 6 August 2014. Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. Tbilisi), Hotel from (Georgian … destroyed is Russia after day the finish will conflict This 7: Interview its imperial life. There would not be any conflict at all. The conflict would not exist exist not would The conflict all. at be any conflict not would There Russia] [Without 26: Interview at all. Interview 24: [Without Russia] it could be solved by ourselves, in one day. It would take just just take would It day. one in ourselves, by solved be could it Russia] [Without 24: Interview twenty Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews 29 July Georgia. Tbilisi, IDPs, with Interviews 2014. 06 August Georgia. Tbilisi, Central, Hotel Tbilisi), from 24 (Georgian Interview 2014. 07 August Georgia. Tbilisi, Hospital, Tbilisi Tbilisi), from 26 (Georgian Interview 27 Jul Georgia. Tbilisi, Central, Hotel Tbilisi), from 7 (Georgian Interview

227 228 229 230 231 fromTbilisi) ea be would dialogue that stated respondents four while conflict, no be would there il This stereotypes. negative be less would that gave answers respondents Four continuation. conflict the for reason sole the as involvement d place picture In response to to response In Chart 2 Chart the euphemisms ‘the third party’, ‘the outside force’, or ‘our neighbour’. ‘our or force’, outside ‘the party’, third euphemisms ‘the the … Russia Without 2.5.1 Question Georgians from Tbilisi and and Tbilisi from Georgians their frustration with the Georgian g Georgian the with frustration their inaction. government Other responses were less one-dimensional and acknowledged that problems that problems less one-dimensional and acknowledged were Other responses opportunities the situation; however, from would still exist if Russia was removed by Putin – who are the source of Georgia’s territorial woes. Georgia’s of the source by Putin – who are Question: Without Russian involvement, what would the conflicts be like? be like? what would conflicts the involvement, Without Russian Question: 2.5.1 Without Russia… 2.5.1 Without 228 Interviews 29 July-12 August 2014. with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 6 August 2014. Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 229 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 24 (Georgian 2014. 7 August 230 Interview Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. from 26 (Georgian July 2014. 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 231 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 7 (Georgian July 2014; Interview 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 232 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel 24 from 8 (Georgian In response to the question above, eight respondents in the Georgians from Tbilisi Tbilisi from Georgians the in respondents eight above, question the to response In respondents stated that would be no conflict, while foursample stated that there dialogue would be easier and there would be Russian as involvement the sole illustrated which people regard the extent to less negative stereotypes. This reason for the conflict continuation. Fourrespondents gave answers that placed on Russian involvement by suggesting that once Russia was out causation entirely could be solved easily: problems the picture, of The IDPs also discussed their frustration with the Georgian government and their government The also IDPs discussed frustration their the Georgian with inaction. due to government social exclusion feelings of This perspective ignored other elements the of conflict such as fears, grievances, and animosity among the different sides. It depicted a situation in which Russia interventionrepresented Russian future. united a back holding factor only the was the Of relations. friendly peaceful, be should what and was what to rupture sharp a eight who respondents believed that the conflict would not exist without Russian keen to point out that they did not have issues them were involvement, four of with the Russian people, but with the Russian government, specifically President Putin. This perspective ignored other elements of the conflict such as fears, grievances, and animosity among the different sides. It depicted a situation in which Russia was the only factor holding back a united future. Russian intervention represented a sharp rupture to what was and what should be peaceful, friendly relations. Of the eight respondents who believed that the conflict would not exist without Russian involvement, four of them were keen to point out that they did not have issues with the Russian people, but with the Russian government, specifically President Putin.232 In this view, it is just a handful of neo-imperialists in the Kremlin – headed by Putin – who are the source of Georgia’s territorial woes.

Other responses were less one-dimensional and acknowledged that problems would still exist if 233 forRussia peace was removed building from would the situation; be greater.however, opportunities These forresponses peace building acknowledged would be that 233 problemsgreater. wentThese responsesbeyond acknowledgeRussian involvement.d that problems Only went beyond a third Russian of the involvement sample .took Only athis view,third twoof the ofsample whom took thiswere view in, t wothe of whomyounger were incategory the younger – category both female– both female – and – and one one in 234 eachin each of ofthe the otherother age age categories. categories. This234 view This was view more constructivewas more for constructive peace-building effortsfor peace- as it buildingappreciates efforts that there as itis workappreciates to be done thatbeyond there challenging is work perceived to be Russiandone beyondneo-imperialism. challenging perceived Russian neo-imperialism.

IDPs:IDPs: Without Without Russia…Russia...

There would be no conflict 54

Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts The conflict would have been smaller and more managable 5

Chart 2 10: Without RussiaChart what 2.10: would Without the conflicts Russia inwhat Abkhazia would and the South conflicts Ossetia be like (IDPs) [n = 7] in Abkhazia and South Ossetia be like (IDPs) Among the IDPs, in five out of seven interviews respondents stated that without Russia the conflict Amongwould not the exist IDPs, and two in saidfive that out it would of seven have been interviews smaller and respondents more manageable. stated235 Like that the without RussiaGeorgians, the theconflict IDPs framed would the situationnot exist as oneand of twopowerless saidness that in itthe wouldface of Russianhave beenaggression smaller andand more governmental manageable. whim. In this235 view, Like the the Russians Georgians, always wanted the IDPs the territories framed; the the people situation who lived as one of powerlessness in the face of Russian aggression and governmental whim. In this view, the Russians always wanted the territories; the people who lived on

them, Abkhazians and Georgians alike, were unable to stop them. This narrative 232 Interview 8 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014; Interview 24 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel 236 depictedCentral, Tbilisi, Russia Georgia. as 06 aAugust common 2014. enemy that had wrought suffering on both sides. 233 Interview 12 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Ori Beli Hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014; Interview 6 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. Another234 recurring theme that arose when discussing Russia with both the Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July – 11 August 2014. 235 Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July – 12 August 2014. Georgians from Tbilisi and the IDPs was50 that Russia does not respect or look after the Abkhazians or Ossetians. This narrative was imbued with the idea that

they were better off under Georgian rule. A 42-year-old-woman expressed this view saying that ‘Russia is […] eating Abkhazia better than we ever could. In Abkhazia now they do not have Abkhazian schools, they do not have Abkhazian language – everything is Russian.’237 This view, discussed by four – especially older – respondents assumed that the Russians are trying to assimilate the two peoples, swallowing them up into Russian territory. The implication was that under Georgian rule their identity, culture, and traditions were respected. The narrative depicted the situation as a transition from rule by a benevolent country to rule by a malevolent one. The IDP respondents expressed this view in even stronger terms. A 73-year-old woman said: The main problem for Abkhazians is Russia. The Abkhazian people are cornered by Russia. They want to rebuild their country but they cannot because Russia will not allow them to. Everything is devastated, the cities

233 Interview 12 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Ori Beli Hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014; Interview 6 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. 234 Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014. 235 Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. 236 Gegeshidze found a similar theme in his work based on interviews with experts on the conflict. Gegeshidze, ‘Conflict Resolution Policy After 2008.’ In Archil Gegeshidze and Ivlian Haindrava, ‘Transformation of the Georgia-Abkhazian Conflict: Rethinking the Paradigm.’ Conciliation Resources: European Union (2011). 30. 237 Interview 27 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 55

244 The 242 238 Implicit in this view was that view in this Implicit 241 A argued 21-year-old that the 239 A 23-year-old respondent described how 243 240 and buildings are still devastated and destroyed... I have heard rumours Georgia. with better was it say people some that I was afraid [that the war in 2008] would go on and next time they would they time next and on go would 2008] in war the [that afraid was I occupy my state and come to Tbilisi… [then] I occupied will place, from where I have can’t go out to anywhere. My mother live has an in an uncle in Ukraine, who lives in Donetsk now and he is stuck there and he can’t [leave] […] [What is happening in Ukraine] is just further evidence that Russia used us all, they see our country as just some place on the and that influence ismap, all.and It a iszone just that of more evidence we live in a very awful place on earth: where somebody rules second. your a in life it change can and Georgia. 5 August 2014. Georgia. she had heard about Russian-only settlements in Abkhazia, which she believed could be the beginning of the ‘genocide of the Abkhazian people’. Soon, predicted, Russia would take she the area completely. The West is depicted as unwilling to challenge Russia due to its own interests. is depicted as unwilling to challenge Russia due to its own interests. The West Interview 13 (Focus Group) (IDP), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. residence, 238 Interview (IDP), respondent’s 13 (Focus Group) 30 July 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. residence, 239 Interview (IDP), respondent’s 13 (Focus Group) Central (Skype), Tbilisi, as IDP), Hotel 240 Interview up in Abkhazia, categorised who grew 23 (Georgian 7 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. 241 Interview Peace, 29 (IDP), Café near the Bridge of 27 July-11 August 2014. 242 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians July 2014. 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 243 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 6 (Georgian July 2014. 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 244 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 8 (Georgian Discussion of events in Ukraine often spilt over into a frustration with the West and spilt over into a frustration with the West events in Ukraine often Discussion of its unwillingness to help Georgia or Ukraine. man One said 19-year-old ‘I simply, see everyone [in the say West] that they support, but I do not see any action’. Russian foreign policy exacerbated feelings of powerlessness. Events in furtherof component ethnic and complexities the from away attention detracted scheme Ukraine grand Putin’s President of part another just as them seeing By conflicts. these the Soviet to Union rebuild people, took these a conflicts deterministic and view of the people, communities and ethnicities involved. overlooked the agency of The idea that the Abkhazians are waking up to the real nature of the side they ‘chose’ was also a recurring theme. The couple from the Abkhazians IDP family had said that to come back they ‘demographically: will soon to be destroyed’. Georgia because under Russian control, The Georgian and IDP interpretation of Russia’s role was further role by entrenched Russia’s of and IDP interpretation The Georgian is Russia that belief servedwhich Ukraine, Georgians’ in confirm events to current looking to expand and space. control Although post-Soviet only six respondents Tbilisi and IDP samples explicitly discussed events from among the Georgians over post- control to regain desire discussed Russia’s in Ukraine, many more or the EU, and its Soviet space, its to desire countries prevent joining from NATO manipulation conflictsof in neighbouring conflicts to serve strategic ends. Abkhazia needs to return to Georgia because the Georgians cared for it better and protected the Abkhaz’s rights. By portraying Russia as a malicious imperial power slowly working to liquidate the Abkhaz people, the IDPs Russians as a common enemy. construed the fears expressed by one 23-year woman sums up this view: fears expressed Russians are trying rid to of ‘get the She Abkhazians’. recalled a story of Russian the to back go to them telling and bar a in Abkhazians militaryabusing personnel mountains from where they came. One 57-year-old man argued this, along with giving the researcher a stark warning: In Europe people live in good houses, they smoke by a fireplace, they drink cognac and don’t want to live without heating and electricity. Europe cannot live without Russia and they say very good, very good The Georgian you occupied Abkhazia and very good, very good you occupied Ossetia… focus on Russia [and] they do nothing […] When there was war in Georgia, Ukraine did was at odds with nothing. And today the same thing happened in Ukraine. Tomorrow the responses Russia will go to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic and of the Abkhaz and Ossetians, into East[ern] Europe. Then it will go to Germany and then it will go to… the people who of course, England will be one of the last countries because it is very far – according to [away]… but, it will come. Because somebody has to stop it. If there is fire 56 the Georgian and here and this fire is a danger for me you look and say I cannot extinguish Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts IDPs narrative this fire. You see it and you see it is bad, but do nothing. Be sure that this – are being occupied and fire will come to you. [It will get] bigger, bigger and bigger and then it will assimilated by be impossible to destroy this fire. This fire will eat you… Today [the] fire the Russians. is Russia. There is only one possibility to stop Russia. All over the world In their view, people will not only say but do something… If Russia was destroyed and Russian military presence in the stopped dividing small countries, I think that the conflicts will stop all 245 territory provides over the world. security against a Georgian side This statement revealed the fear people have of resurgent Russian power. It also that has proven revealed that Georgia’s two ethno-territorial disputes are regarded as part of itself to be wider geopolitical threat, rather than an intra-state ethnic war. The very legitimate untrustworthy. anxiety triggered by events in Ukraine result in NATO and the West being seen as The military 246 presence was the only solution. For as long as the conflict is regarded as just geopolitical, then regarded as an the only solutions people suggest will involve governments and militaries. unfortunate It also needs to be noted that the Russia of 2014 is very different from the Russia of necessity. the early 1990s when the country was politically unstable and severely weakened, with a declining economy. The interpretation the Georgians have of the conflict, of a continually powerful Russia working to undermine Georgian independence, does not coincide with historical events. Through seeing Russia as a constant menace, the Georgian interpretation misses the more complex, grassroots dynamics of these conflicts. What is happening now alters perceptions of the past. The Georgian focus on Russia was at odds with the responses of the Abkhaz and Ossetians, the people who – according to the Georgian and IDP narrative – are being occupied and assimilated by the Russians. The Abkhazian man explained the feeling towards Russia’s role: Abkhazia was attacked many times since the end of [the war in 1993] and that ceasefire was violated many times and the people here regard the security [now] to be connected to [the] presence of Russian troops because there is an agreement between Abkhazia and Russia.247 In this view, Russian military presence in the territory provides security against a Georgian side that has proven itself to be untrustworthy. With regard to the situation in Ukraine, the South Ossetian respondent expressed an entirely different perspective to that voiced by the Georgians. He stated he is ‘really worried about the situation [in] Ukraine’ because ‘if something will happen [to] Russia’ then the ‘Georgian [government] will bomb everything in South Ossetia’. He went on to

245 Interview 7 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. 246 Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014. 247 Interview 14 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central (Skype Call), Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 57 Bad housing, Bad housing, inadequate poor aid, financial education and jib opportunities, and lack of into integration society were the main points raised in IDPs’ complaints.

255 The This 249 248 The government, they they The government, 254 One respondent said that the One respondent

253 251 Bad housing, inadequate financial inadequate housing, Bad 252 Nevertheless, doubts they expressed while 250 completed on 31 July 2014. completed on 31 July 2014. completed it. expressed Among the Abkhazians the and Georgian South Ossetians interviewed, however, government was characterised as being responsible for the conflict. The South the situation by stating: explained his view of Ossetian respondent government government has ‘not treat[ed] us like human beings’. argued, did not have the will or the desire to solve their problem. All respondents respondents All problem. their solve to desire the or will the have not did argued, in the highest age categorydid not want said they suspected the government them to return to their home territories. One man stated that the government income and aid. of sources because they are does not want the IDPs to return Interview 10 (South Ossetia), Hotel Central (Skype call), Tbilisi, Georgia. Started on 29 July 2014; 248 Interview Started (Skype call), Tbilisi, Georgia. Central 10 (South Ossetia), Hotel 249 Interview 6 August 2014. Central (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 (Abkhazian), Hotel on 29 July 2014; 250 Interview Started (Skype call), Tbilisi, Georgia. Central 10 (South Ossetia), Hotel 27 July-11 August 2014. 251 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians but not this view, the interview to shared may have linked question, so more 252 This was not directly 253 Interviews 29 July-12 August 2014. with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 12 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. hostel, 254 Interview 35 (IDP), respondent’s 30 July 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. residence, 255 Interview (IDP), respondent’s 13 (Focus Group) say he did not believe the Georgian government when they ‘promise[d] peace The calm current existed only because the government Georgian and friendship’. feared Russia and therefore did not act. If something were to happen to Russia, South Ossetia, in his view, would be in a very vulnerable position. The prevailing sentiment among the Georgians from Tbilisi with regard to their regard Tbilisi with from Georgians among the sentiment The prevailing was not the two territories was that the government policy toward government’s that stated others two while view, this expressed respondents Four enough. doing policy was. they did not know what government Question: How do you see the role of the Georgian government in these conflicts? conflicts? these in government Georgian the of role the see you do How Question: Government 2.5.2 The Georgian about Russia’s intentions for the territories, none of them expressed concerns concerns them expressed intentions for the territories, none of about Russia’s occupation. situation as an or described their present assimilation regarding This should not be taken to mean that respondents from Abkhazia military instead, the and role; was regarded presence Russia’s South positively of Ossetia spoke as an unfortunate The necessity. Abkhazian woman complained that they have still not received the support Russia promised them after the 2008 war. demonstrates demonstrates that for the Abkhazians and South Ossetians, of Russia’s role lack complete in a showed also the It violence. of prevention the to linked was conflict government. the Georgian of trust in the intentions aid, poor education and job opportunities, integration society into and lack of the were main points raised in these complaints. man from South Ossetia expressed scepticism intentions. about He Russia’s said, has and interest political only it’s think I […but] Ossetians love they that says ‘Russia respect’. and love with do to nothing Among the IDPs four out of seven respondents felt that they had been let down by down let been had they that felt respondents seven of out four IDPs the Among displaced. became they since government the [T]here was not a single positive activity from [the] Georgian government from beginning to the end, they acted to Ossetians just like Russians did with [the] Georgians, [the] politics of [a] big brother to [a] little one.256 All three respondents cited the Georgian government’s refusal to recognise their In Abkhazian territories or respect their autonomy as a major source of conflict perpetuation. and Ossetian The Abkhazian man interviewed stated that the Georgian government’s refusal to view, the sign a non-violence treaty and to recognise Abkhazia as independent means that Georgian 257 government was the ‘humanitarian spheres’ of the conflict remained unaddressed. The Abkhazia perpetuating woman went into more detail by saying that: the conflict by refusing to [The Georgian government] do[es] nothing for peace, Abkhazians always 58 respect or agree wanted peace but they [also] wanted to be independent, sovereign country Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts to the Abkhazians but [the] Georgians would never agree to that and never signed a peace or Ossetians treaty, if they didn’t want to take Abkhazia by force they would have demands. This signed that [peace treaty]. We are asking that if you are not recognising contradicts 258 the Georgian us as independent [then] at least do not isolate us from the world. view, which In this view, the Georgian government was perpetuating the conflict by refusing predominantly blamed Russian to respect or agree to the Abkhazians or Ossetians demands. This contradicts meddling for the the Georgian view, which predominantly blamed Russian meddling for the continuation of continuation of the conflict. the conflict.

2.6 Section Five: The Future The questions in this section were divided between what people felt was likely to happen and what would be their ideal solution. This distinction was inspired by the idea of envisioning: while people in conflict situations may disagree violently on current goals, they are able to come together on how they see an ideal future.259 This distinction is useful even when looking at just one perspective as it reveals the gulf between expectations and hopes. After asking people what they thought likely to happen and then what they desired to happen, the researcher asked them how these desired changes could be achieved. Their responses, therefore, mixed practicality with idealism.

2.6.1 Likely Future Question: What do you think is the most likely thing to happen in the future? Among the Georgians from Tbilisi sample, people’s responses to this question did not vary greatly. These responses are presented in Chart 2.10 below. The most common response, especially among older individuals, was that nothing could be achieved until Russia was weakened. This view held that no progress could be made until Russian policy changed or President Putin was removed. In this view, whatever the Georgians attempted, the more powerful Russia would be one-step ahead of the game and would hinder any reconciliation. Linked to this theme was the idea that the question could not be answered because it is out of individuals’ control.

256 Interview 10 (South Ossetia), Hotel Central (Skype call), Tbilisi, Georgia. Started on 29 July 2014; completed on 31 July 2014. 257 Interview 14 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central (Skype Call), Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. 258 Interview 25 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 6 August 2014. 259 Máire A. Dugan, ‘Envisioning.’ Beyond Intractability. In Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess (eds) (Bolder: University of Chicago. 2003). Accessed 9 July 2014. http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/visioning Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 59

262

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1 d 11 August 2014. 2014. 11 August

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What is likely to happen in the future to these conflicts to What is likely to happen in the future 3 This distinction is useful even when looking at just one perspective as it reveals reveals it as perspective one just at when even looking useful is distinction This

259 261 uture uture Georgians from Tbilisi: What is likely to likely Tbilisi: What is from Georgians 1 because it is out of individuals’ of out is it because hinder any reconciliation. Linked to this theme was the idea that the that idea theme was the this to Linked reconciliation. any hinder

, was that nothing could be achieved unti achieved be could nothing was that , the Georgians attempt Georgians the Chart 2.11: would be would it because happen

would Georgians from Tbilisi: What is likely to What from Tbilisi: Georgians What do you think is the most likely most likely the is What think do you 1 Russia is weakened : What is likely to happen in the future the happen in to likely What is 11: hatever hatever http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/visioning Nothing can happen until Nothing can happen until individuals would [T]oday we deal with an organised Russia. With a KGB officer inpower and KGB generals in power [who] dream about the restoration Union and about Soviet capturing new states Nazi […] Germany It is like of the after the collapse in the First World afterWar, 20 years [there] was the renaissance of Germany in the form of Nazism. The same processes we see here after 20 years of Soviet collapse. We see radical nationalism in supporting floor the Russia in propaganda nationalist radical and Russia in wings, conditions these thereso is no hope under [while] Putin’s Putin is alive. God created one wise thing: a human being dies. Therefore [a] dictator dies [...] Putin, I 61 hope, or will 2 die. yearsHe’s old. He will die [to] enough smart is Putin If chance. another have will Russians then and new [the] at look will Russians then NorthKorea in like successor a leave for successor the next 30 years until this dies, successor and then at this moment the Russian nation will have [another] chance […] if they don’t use this chance there is no chance to resolve these conflicts in Abkhazia . Ossetia and Máire A. Dugan, "Envisioning." Dugan, A. Máire 27 J Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews

2003) < 2003) 259 260 Chart 2 Chart would be their ideal solution. This distinction was inspired by the idea of envisioning: while people in in people while envisioning: of idea by the was inspired distinction This solution. ideal be their would goals on current violently may disagree situations conflict 2.6.1 Likely F Likely 2.6.1 Question: The questions in this section were divided between what people felt w felt people what between divided were section this in questions The 2.6 Section Five: T Five: Section 2.6 the gulf between expectations and hopes. After asking people what they thought likely to happen and happen to likely thought they what people asking After hopes. and expectations between gulf the them how asked researcher the happen, to desired they wh at then feeling of powerlessness among people. among people. powerlessness of feeling game and see an ideal future. an ideal see older Among the Georgians from Tbilisi sample, people’s responses to this question did not vary greatly. greatly. vary not did question this to responses people’s sample, Tbilisi from Among Georgians the below. 2.10 Chart in presented are responses These policy Russian made be until could progress no w view, achieved. Their responses, therefore, mixed practicality with idealism with practicality mixed therefore, responses, Their achieved. not be answered answered be not what what that Georgia should focus on a soft power approach. Following the war with Russia in 2008, the Following the war approach. power should focus on a soft that Georgia in a situation involved become more unwilling to this policy as they were Americans advocated ‘Inside Toal, and Kossolov, conflict with Russia. O’Loughlin, bring them into that could potentially 19. Abkhazia.’ This view coincided with the idea that Russia was not helping the Abkhazians or Ossetians and was instead trying to assimilate them. Due to this, eventually they Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014. 27 July-11 August 2014. 260 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians 30 July 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. residence, 261 Interview (IDP), respondent’s 13 (Focus Group) is impossible and force through back is the idea that winning the territories patience’ 262 ‘Strategic The other common response, with five outof 12 people saying this, was that if it could win back the territories with democracy, became a prosperous Georgia the promise of a better future. This falls into the line with the position taken by the Georgian government, backed by the calls West’s for ‘strategic patience’. This view, even among the academic community, held that no progress could be held that no progress community, even among the academic This view, made until Putin is removed and Russia changes; the outcome the of conflicts in one man. on the fate of Abkhazia and Ossetia rests The idea that nothing can happen until there is regime change in Russia was a is regime until there The idea that nothing can happen expressed research this for interviewed academic One Georgia. in view widespread this situation in very clear terms: Three people stated that they did not know what would happen because it because happen would what not know they did that stated people Three would be decided by governments. powerlessness among people. among people. powerlessness will become frustrated with their Russian overlords and wish to reintegrate with a rejuvenated Georgia. One 41-year-old man stated, ‘[w]e can help with education, with healthcare, we can bring them to European spaces, [and] we can help them in many directions’.263 A 48-year-old man said, ‘[a]fter ten or fifteen years the border will be opened’ and that when that happens he would put his ‘personal money’ into helping ‘rebuild Abkhazia’.264 One 26-year-old man cited how much development there had been in Batumi (Georgia’s main coastal city) and how Georgia could do the same with Abkhazia once the Abkhaz allowed them back.265 This understanding, however well-intentioned it may be, did not account for the fact that the Abkhazians and Ossetians want to be independent – or, at least, not 266 60 part of Georgia. It overlooked the contradictions at the centre of the conflict.

Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts For IDPs, the situation was different. IDPs’ expectations about the future were contradictory: six out of seven respondents said that the only hope lay with grassroots dialogue as governments had failed to address the issue, yet six out of seven also said that any improvement to the situation was beyond their control and could not be achieved until Russia was weakened.267 One man summed up the pessimistic sentiment by asking the English interviewer: Have you finished the conflict with Ireland yet, when do you plan to finish that conflict? Whatever happens, it [will] not be decided by Georgians and Abkhazians, it will be decided on a higher political level.268 This feeling of helplessness was matched by a concern that relations are irreparable. One woman said simply, ‘[W]hen I go back [to Abkhazia] and I see the people hate us and have bad attitudes towards us, my hope [of finding a solution] goes’.269 For many IDPs, after over 20 years of being displaced, faith in governments or hope for any reconciliation appears to have faded. For the third group, the Abkhaz and Ossetians, the perception of what was likely to happen in the future rested on the actions of the Georgian government. All three respondents held the view that if Georgia declared the territories independent, they would have better relations and cooperation.270 However, this is considered unlikely to happen. The Abkhazian woman stated: Regarding to current situation, logical conclusion is war, again, because I can see what is happening between Armenia and Azerbaijan, same conflict, one side wants peace, but with their terms and other side doesn’t want peace at all. Georgia is trying to get South Ossetia and Abkhazia, they are asking NATO and [the] USA [for help to do that].271 This revealed a fear among the Abkhazians that increases their distrust of the Georgian government.

263 Interview 17 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Georgian Partnership for Road Safety Offices, Tbilisi, Georgia. 1 August 2014. 264 Interview 26 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. 265 Interview 14 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central (Skype Call), Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. 266 O’Loughlin , Kossolov, and Toal’s survey in Abkhazia found that the overwhelming majority of people felt that their economic situation was far better than Georgia’s, despite the fact that few of them could actually make comparisons having not visited recently. O’Loughlin, Kolossov and Toal, ‘Inside Abkhazia.’ 14. 267 Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. 268 Interview 13 (Focus Group) (IDP), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. 269 Interview 29 (IDP), Café near the Bridge of Peace, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. 270 Interviews with Abkhazians and Ossetians, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-6 August 2014. 271 Interview 25 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 6 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 61 An ideal An ideal with solution Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent featured states the in none of sample Georgian answers.

274 8 6 3 3 2 0

272 Number of mentions Number of Tbilisi when discussing ideal solutions Recurring themes mentioned by Georgians from Recurring themes mentioned by Georgians One 23-year-old woman epitomised this view by saying, by view this epitomised woman 23-year-old One 273 Table 2.1: Table [T]he ideal solution would be for elderly people to sit down at tables on the border and talk about how many things they have in common, they friends were they traditions, have they remember, to things many so have this. remember be to need they relatives, were they and Theme mentioned Friendship Unity Peace Compromise movement of Freedom Ossetia Independence for Abkhazia and South Another overriding theme was unity, which came alongside peace, friendship, and friendship, peace, alongside came which unity, was theme overriding Another for wished all issue territorial the to solution a mentioned who Those compromise. willingness a expressed but Georgia, to returned be to Ossetia South and Abkhazia unity discussed who respondents six of out Three powers. extensive them grant to Ossetians or Abkhazians the with compromise to happy were they how expressed and grant them a large degree of autonomy in order to achieve this. However, featured states independent as Ossetia South and Abkhazia with solution ideal an in none of the answers. The idea of unification was expressed as an option that would enable all sides to have a better future. People’s responses revealed a widespread acknowledgement of the importance acknowledgement of a widespread revealed responses People’s relationships. dialogue and rebuilding of Interview 33 (Georgian from Tbilisi), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 11 August 2014. 11 Georgia. Tbilisi, residence, 272 Interview Tbilisi), respondent’s from 33 (Georgian 27 July-11 August 2014. 273 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians July 2014. 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 274 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 6 (Georgian The overriding idea in people’s responses was to have peaceful, friendly relations relations was to have peaceful, friendly responses The overriding idea in people’s woman suggested: again. One 63-year-old Although Although this question aimed to get people’s ‘perfect world’ scenarios, several people still gave practical responses. For the and Georgian compromise, peace, friendship, unity, were themes diverse,recurring yet sample, answers were freedom movement. of These themes are listed below along with the number of Tbilisi: from sample mentioned by the Georgian times they were Question: Question: In your perfect world, what would be your ideal solution conflicts? to these 2.6.2 The Ideal Situation Situation The Ideal 2.6.2 The idea of people living side by side in a harmonious situation featured in situation featured people living side by side in a harmonious The idea of answerscase especially the this was categories; yet, all age for respondents’ among the 18-29 category mentioning friendly relations in which all respondents scenario. ideal their in happily ever after’ and that ‘the most important thing is to bring people together’. ‘I people would bring be to happy is [to] thing live important in most a ‘the federation, that but and after’only ever if happily the three societies lived For the IDPs, the negativity about what was likely formed a sharp contrast to ideal futures. Respondents’ answers were diverse, yet recurring themes were returning home, living together again, being part of the same country (with a great deal of devolved powers given to Abkhazia), and peace. The overriding theme (for IDPs) Theme mentioned Number of mentions was returning Returning home 6 home and living together, just Friendship/living together again 6 as they had done before Unity (of Georgia) 5 the war. Uniting 62 Peace 2 Georgia was Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts again depicted Compromise 2 as an essential component of Independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia 0 this outcome. People’s answers Table 2.2: Recurring themes mentioned by IDPs when discussing ideal solutions placed firm emphasis on The overriding theme was returning home and living together, just as they had the want and done before the war. A 73-year-old woman said: need to rebuild relationships. This is our goal, our wish – we dream about it – to go back, to have In contrast, the [a] future [there] […] I just want to reunite Georgia back to its territory Abkhaz and and after this I will lead the people – my friends and my comrades and Ossetian view 275 emphasised everyone I know – back to Abkhazia. independence Uniting Georgia again was depicted as an essential component of this outcome. that would lead to peace People’s answers placed firm emphasis on the want and need to rebuild relationships, and better as is evidenced in the following quotation by a 21-year-old female IDP: opportunities for all sides. [I]f it were up to me I would end this conflict in peace and we would be reunited again as we were before. I do love Georgians and I do love Abkhazians. If it would be up to me, we would live together again.276 In contrast to the views expressed by the Georgians and IDPs, the Abkhaz and Ossetian view emphasised independence that would lead to peace and better opportunities for all sides. The Abkhazian woman and South Ossetian man’s responses are included below: Interview 25: For me, declaring [a] peace treaty, [and for Georgia to] stop isolating us from world, I don’t wish miracles and I know that Georgia will never declare us as independent but if they will agree on those two terms it will be a relief for both sides. [W]e understand that Georgia is interested in friendship with Abkhazia, Abkhazia would be also interested from economical point of view, both sides would be satisfied […] All of Abkhazian citizens’ dream, no matter the ethnicity, is to be independent, to live in peace and to have opportunities like all mankind does, even [the] kids, they want peace and independence.277 Interview 10: [The] ideal solution is declaring Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent countries, practically all Georgia does is [to] make the Russian influence to grow more and more in this region. If Georgia would just declare them, Ossetia and Abkhazia would have a choice, at this

275 Interview 35 (IDP), respondent’s hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 12 August 2014. 276 Interview 23 (Georgian who grew up in Abkhazia, categorised as IDP), Hotel Central (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 5 August 2014. 277 Interview 25 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 6 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 63 278 In -

279 fix

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Older people’s responses were were responses Older people’s 283 1

11 August 2014. 11 August

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… – el Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. 2014. 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Central, el situation be improved (Georgians from Tbilisi) Tbilisi) from (Georgians be improved situation to improve the situation improve the to happen in the future , saying idea, this echoed old

2 - a more unified stance on the issue. on the stance a more unified it would not take long to remind the Abkhazians what they have in have in they what Abkhazians the remind to long take not would it

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year - ed conflict conflict old respondent stated that he had often considered it, yet realised now that it it now that realised yet it, considered had often he that stated respondent old 2 - A 23

Two responses dominated Two responses

mselves 282 year - 280 Georgians from Tbilisi: What is likely to Tbilisi: What is likely from Georgians How could the conflict situation be improved (Georgians from Tbilisi) Tbilisi) from (Georgians How could the conflict situation be improved The said same that 19-year-old ‘it is all about people […] people 4 ome repeat comeor up with relationship building) 281 S This view, while promising in its belief that ordinary people can make a difference, make can a difference, people ordinary that belief its in promising while view, This

285 said that ‘it is all about people [ people about all is ‘it that said

: How could the How the 12: could Community level changes (dialogue, Georgia Georgia old

Chart 2.12: - not need any help from international organisations or the government. They government. the or organisations international from help need any not point Georgia depends only on [the] aggressive solution and Abkhazians Abkhazians and solution aggressive [the] on only depends Georgia point and are it, Ossetians youafraid because of know that modern war is not a joke. So, everything depends on Georgia, Abkhazia and Ossetia have no choice, when they [the Georgians] are blaming Russia in all this, it is it. resolve can he only and responsibility has Georgia because irrelevant,

Interview 8 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. 2014. 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Central, Hotel Tbilisi), from 8 (Georgian Interview 2014. 06 August Georgia. Tbilisi, Central, Hotel Tbilisi), from 24 (Georgian Interview Hot Tbilisi), from 8 (Georgian Interview 2014. 30 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Hostel, Beli Ori Tbilisi), from 12 (Georgian Interview 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews 29 July Georgia. Tbilisi, IDPs, with Interviews

5 3 2 1 0 4 back All IDP respondents over 50 said that they should be allowed to go back go to allowed be should they that 50 said over respondents IDP All

280 281 282 283 284 285 Promisingly, among the Georgians from Tbilisi, no one advocated the use of force to gain back the the back gain to force of use the no one advocated Tbilisi, from among Georgians the Promisingly, territories.One 19 What can be done be can What 2.6.3 year Russia needs to be stopped and that this this and that be stopped to needs Russia more mixed. more mixed. 2 Chart

on a geopolitical level. All people in the lowest age category agreed that there there that agreed age category lowest the in people All level. on a geopolitical needed. were both that stated One respondent sides. among different the dialogue did would be fruitless. would rebuild this bridge’. this rebuild listening. Just [to] go anywhere and learn about other’s cultures other’s about and learn go anywhere [to] Just listening. relationships by the by relationships common. completed on 31 July 2014. completed the situation? improve be done to 2.6.3 What can this view, the only factor preventing this is the stubborn policy of the Georgian the Georgian policy of the stubborn this is preventing the only factor this view, government. dominated: one solution was at a community level and the other on a geopolitical dominated: one solution was at a community level and the other on a level. All people in the lowest age category improved dialogue agreed among the different sides. that Onerespondent stated there that both needed to be were needed. more more mixed. Some repeated the calls for increasing dialogue and friendship and othersachieved this could only be stopped and that be Russia needs to said that once the West, EU back and/or Georgia NATO or come up with a more unified Interview 10 (South Ossetia), Hotel Central (Skype call), Tbilisi, Georgia. Started on 29 July 2014; 278 Interview Started (Skype call), Tbilisi, Georgia. Central 10 (South Ossetia), Hotel 279 Interview 6 August 2014. Central (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 (Abkhazian), Hotel July 2014. 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 280 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 8 (Georgian 6 August 2014. Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 281 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 24 (Georgian July 2014. 27 Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 282 Interview Tbilisi), Hotel from 8 (Georgian 30 July 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. 283 Interview Tbilisi), Ori Beli Hostel, from 12 (Georgian Promisingly, among the Georgians from Tbilisi, no one advocated the use of Tbilisi, no one advocated the use of from among the Georgians Promisingly, stated that respondent he had to gain force back the territories. One 19-year-old often considered it, yet realised now that it would be fruitless. In both these views, the ideal rested on the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent. For the respondents, progress can only be made once this is achieved. The Abkhazian woman added that if the Caucasus in could peace we ‘live would bloom and develop into [a] great and powerful region’. old echoed this idea, saying, ‘There needs to be a readiness for listening. Just [to] Just listening. for readiness a ‘Theresaying, be idea, to this needs echoed old go anywhere and learn about other’s cultures’. should take actions and people should start to rebuild this bridge’. stance on the issue.284 All IDP respondents over 50 said that they should be allowed to go back to Abkhazia, and that they did not need any help from international organisations or the government. They felt they could fix relationships by themselves – it would not take long to remind the Abkhazians what they have in common.285 This view, while promising in its belief that ordinary people can make a difference, overlooks the grievances from which the conflict arose and the change that has happened since the war took place over 20 years ago. In six out of seven interviews respondents emphasised that through forging relationships, they could rebuild mutual trust and understanding, which would enable them to forgive. Once they had reached that 64 stage, one woman said, ‘no-one can stand in our way’.286 Only one respondent

Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts believed that help from the US and EU was needed. People’s responses reveal that they are hopeful about what could be achieved if they were allowed back to Abkhazia, but they are unhopeful about whether that will become a reality.

2.7 Conclusion Responses from both the sample of Georgians from Tbilisi and the sample of IDPs illustrate that Russia and geopolitics dominate understanding of the conflicts. The historical dimensions of the conflict are simplified using theidea that Russia never wanted Georgia to be free; the conflicts arose from Russia’s pursuit of this goal. Analysis of the conflicts’ contemporary dimensions illustrates that both groups continue to regard Abkhazia and South Ossetia as essential parts of the Georgian nation. There was a widespread view that the Abkhaz and Ossetians are manipulated and taught to fear Georgians. This was coupled with an acknowledgement that the lack of communication among the different sides perpetuates the conflict and furthers its intractability. Among the Georgian sample, while neither the gender nor the background variables produced notable differences overall, age features as a distinguishing factor for certain questions. The 50+ category was more likely to deny that conflict exists in Tbilisi, while those in the 18-29 group mostly believed that a number of conflicts were present in the city, notably homophobia. Older respondents were more likely to emphasise Russia’s role in the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and deny that there had been any conflicts between Georgians and ethnic minorities living on Georgian territory. Respondents above 30 were more likely to believe that no progress could be made until Russia was weakened or challenged. Those in the youngest age category placed a stronger faith in the ability of dialogue and communication to bring about change, and demonstrated a strong willingness to participate in this process. The IDPs demonstrate a more detailed understanding of the conflict dynamics than the Georgians. Their collective memory of Abkhazia as an ideal place full of prosperity, friendship and unity, overlooks the grievances that gave rise to the conflict and leads to the simplistic assumption that they would be able to easily return to that point once the geopolitical situation changes. IDPs also placed a greater emphasis on Russia’s current role in the territory, depicted it as assimilation or, in one respondent’s words, the beginnings of genocide. Russia took on the role

284 Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014. 285 Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. 286 Interview 30 (IDP), Subway restaurant, Tbilisi, Georgia. 8 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 65 Currently, Currently, is the conflict by dominated irreconcilable two nationalist that narratives on the disagree the of nature conflict and who the main parties Through are. grassroots dialogue, both sides can become aware the other’s of interpretation the conflict of of and aware their own side’s complicity in Once events. this has been the achieved, substantial more the of areas conflict can be approached. The results show that there was a widespread acknowledgement, especially among acknowledgement, was a widespread that there show The results on a grassroots dialogue be needs to there and IDPs, that Georgians younger the narratives nationalist irreconcilable two by dominated is conflict the Currently, level. Through parties main are. the who and conflict the of nature the on disagree that the other’s interpretation of aware dialogue, both sides can become grassroots of the conflict and awareof their own complicity side’s in events. Once this has The approached. be can conflict the of areas substantial more the achieved, been of point a to come to need sides Georgian-Ossetian the and Georgian-Abkhazian willingness to achieve seems be a strong there mutual understanding. In Georgia this, especially among younger people. of a common enemy that wrought damage on both peoples. In terms of the age damage on both peoples. In of a terms common enemy that wrought of variable, while people in the youngest category emphasised that the Abkhazians 50 people over were taught to hate and fear the Georgians, or Ossetians are situation will be the pre-war and believe that their grievances likely to deny more easy to Coupled recreate. with this, all people in the 50+ category believed that they could easily return to the pre-war situation, if they were allowed to return. back and to be allowed to have the desire a strong people expressed Younger opportunities to rebuild relationships. In addition to this, in interviews four IDPs discussed their deprivation social and exclusion. feelings Given of out of seven IDPs in a countrynumber of the has population, this undoubtedly such a small of certainlyis IDPs with programme a Therefore, society. Georgian on impact great a worth an area in the future. addressing

3. Generations For Peace Findings © GFP 2012 | Tbilisi, Georgia 68 Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts © GFP 2012 | Tbilisi, Georgia

3.1 Introduction In order for this research to have practical value, it is important to assess what organisational capacity GFP has in Georgia. This helps to recommend ways that the organisation could address the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts in the future. By merging analysis of the conflicts with an assessment of current capacity, this report is able to present practical future goals for GFP. GFP’s activities in Georgia started in 2012 with Advocacy For Peace Events and subsequent training of volunteers. In the summer of 2014, there were 45 trained Delegates and two certified Pioneers in the country. In 2013-2014, these individuals held a programme with socially excluded children living at SOS Children’s Village, in Tbilisi, Georgia. The programme aimed to enhance the children’s self-esteem and self-confidence by enabling them to feel more included in their social environment.287 The Participatory Evaluation (PE) for this programme took place in Tbilisi in May 2014. For this research, seven GFP Delegates and Pioneers were interviewed: six women and one man. A workshop was held for four of them at the end of the research period. The aim of this workshop was to go over the weaknesses they had raised in the interviews and facilitate a discussion of how these could be overcome. The workshop was also used as an opportunity to ask them how they had found the research process and if they had gained anything from it. The structure of this chapter follows that of the interviews, in which Delegates and Pioneers responded to questions about their views on the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts, their own experiences, GFP’s strengths and weaknesses in Georgia, main areas for improvement, ideas for future programmes (including with Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and how they found involvement with research. This serves as a form of feedback for the organisation. Given that GFP is a volunteer movement that relies on the Delegates and Pioneers to plan, organise and implement programmes, understanding how they feel is vital before any recommendations can be made.

287 All information taken from, Generation For Peace, ‘Georgia: Country Conflict Analysis.’ Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 69 The most The most frequently mentioned conflict was ethnic/racial; in in comparison, the Georgians Tbilisi from sample, only one respondent mentioned ethnic conflict. Another notable was difference discussion of gender-based conflict; while from Georgians Tbilisi did not consider this be major to conflict in their for the GFP city, this volunteers the represented main conflict in Tbilisi.

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While Georgians from Tbilisi overall did from While Georgians – 293 Religious Discussion of the contemporary the Discussion of dynamics In comparison, in the Georgians from Tbilisi from In comparison, in the Georgians 288 291 in Tbilisi 290 the Georgian sample sample Georgian the based conflict. This, in the respondents’ view, manifests itself in in itself manifests view, respondents’ the in This, conflict. based On the geopolitical level, four out of seven respondents believed believed respondents seven of out four level, geopolitical Onthe did not consider either of these to be major be major to these of either consider not did - Conflict in Tbilisi Conflict

ction: the Georgians consider Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be to Ossetia and South Abkhazia consider Georgians the ction: 289

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only one respondent mentioned ethnic conflict ethnic mentioned one respondent only 3 These responses are presented in Chart 3.1. Chart in presented are responses These

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7 ns stressing GFP Delegates and Pioneers: Conflict Delegates GFP fromTbilisi sample Chart 3.1: What conflicts exist in Tbilisi (GFP Delegates and Pioneers)

s : What c : 1 Ethnic / Racial FP Delegates and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July 25 July Georgia. Tbilisi, and Pioneers, FP Delegates should be noted, however, that the volunteers were in the process of planning a programme addressing ethnic prejudice, prejudice, ethnic a programme addressing planning of process the in were volunteers the that however, be noted, should Delegates and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July July 25 Georgia. Tbilisi, Pioneers, and GFP Delegates with Interviews 25 July Georgia. Tbilisi, and Pioneers, GFP Delegates with Interviews 25 July Georgia. Tbilisi, and Pioneers, GFP Delegates with Interviews It 27 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Tbilisi, from Georgians with Interviews 25 July Georgia. Tbilisi, and Pioneers, GFP Delegates with Interviews 6 2 0 8 4 integral parts of their nation, while Abkhazians and South Ossetians do not want to be part of of be part to want do not Ossetians and South Abkhazians while nation, their of parts integral Georgian the As with Georgia. dominated by the central contradi central the by dominated the Abkhazia the it. mentioning respondents seven withG so it is safe to assume that this conflict would have been at the forefront of their minds when answering the question. Inter question. the when answering minds their of forefront the been at have would conflict this assume that to safe is it so

288 289 290 291 292 293 three respondents respondents three Chart 3 Chart this. discussing respondent every with racial, or was ethnic conflict mentioned frequently The most of lack and a general groups ethnic towards stereotypes negative are there that stated Respondents a mostly is prejudice This society. Georgian in tolerance discussed how Russia manipulated ethnic groups living on Georgian territory to turn them against them against turn to territory on Georgian living groups ethnic how manipulated Russia discussed neighbours. Georgian their discussion of conflic of discussion The most notable difference difference notable The most the conflict would not exist without Russia. As with the Georgians from Tbilisi sample, the themes the sample, Tbilisi from Georgians the As with Russia. without exist not would conflict the While Georgian While difference was discussion of was discussion difference Georgian unity and friendship dominated people’s discussion of their ideal futures. When discuss futures. ideal their of discussion people’s dominated and friendship unity out four with dialogue, need for on the emphasis a firm placed and Pioneers Delegates respondents for the GFP Pioneers and Delegates they represented the main conflicts in Tbilisi in conflicts main the represented they Delegates and GFP the Pioneers for the form of violence against women and a lack of respect towards towards respect of women lack a and against violence of form the

addressing ethnic prejudice, so it is safe to assume that this conflict would have been at the forefront been at the forefront would have assume that this conflict so it is safe to ethnic prejudice, addressing the question. Interviews their minds when answering and Pioneers,of Tbilisi, with GFP Delegates 25 July-11 August 2014. Georgia. Interviews August 2014. 25 July -11 and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. with GFP Delegates 288 Interviews 25 July-11 August 2014. and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. with GFP Delegates 289 Interviews 25 July-11 August 2014. and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. with GFP Delegates 290 Interviews 25 July-11 August 2014. and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. with GFP Delegates planning a programme of in the process were that the volunteers however, 291 It should be noted, 27 July-11 August 2014. 292 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians 293 The most frequently mentioned conflict was ethnic or racial, with every respondent every with racial, or ethnic was conflict mentioned frequently most The discussing this. Respondents stated that there are negative stereotypes towards is prejudice This society. Georgian in tolerance of lack general a and groups ethnic discussed also respondents three but Armenians, and Azerbaijanis at aimed mostly Russians. hostility towards people’s The most notable difference between the Georgian sample and the Delegates and Delegates the and sample Georgian the between difference notable most The in presented are responses These Tbilisi. in conflict of discussion the was Pioneers Chart 3.1. 3.2 Delegates’ and Pioneers’ Interpretation of the Conflict the Conflict of Pioneers’ and Interpretation 3.2 Delegates’ Georgians the of those to conformed largely and Pioneers’ Delegates’ responses from Tbilisi. Six out of seven respondents believed the allow not origin and Georgia of control the to desire conflictsRussia’s in in lay Ossetia South and Abkhazia it to be independent. Three respondents discussed Russia’s desire to discussed and four respondents territory, most attractive parts the Georgian take of the territoryliving on Georgian ethnic groups how Russia manipulated them to turn against their Georgian neighbours. difference was discussion of gender-based conflict. respect and a lack of violence against women of manifests itself in the form view, This, the respondents’ in towards women in the public sphere. of the conflict was dominated by the central contradiction: the Georgians consider Georgians the contradiction: central the by dominated was conflict the of Abkhazians while nation, their parts integral be to of Ossetia South and Abkhazia from Georgians the with As Georgia. of part be to want not do Ossetians South and Tbilisi and IDP sample, discussion of negative attitudes among the Abkhazians with four theme here, was a dominant the Georgians and Ossetians towards out of seven respondents mentioning it. not consider either of these to be major conflicts in their city, for the GFP Pioneers GFP the for city, their in conflicts major be to these of either consider not and Delegates they represented the main conflicts in Tbilisi. Thus, a programme seven respondents believed the conflict would not exist without Russia. As with unity and friendship dominated Tbilisi the themes of sample, from the Georgians discussion people’s of their ideal futures. When discussing the future, Delegates and Pioneers placed a firm emphasis on the need for dialogue, with four outof this. stressing seven respondents sample, only one respondent mentioned ethnic conflict. addressing one of these conflicts could serve the purpose of raising awareness among the Tbilisi population.

3.3 Delegates’ and Pioneers’ Experience of GFP Delegates and Pioneers were asked about their experience with GFP and what they felt had been the greatest successes so far. Their experiences were quite diverse: some respondents had been involved with the organisation since it began in Georgia two years ago while others had only received their training a few months before the fieldwork took place. Those who mentioned the International Training Camp held in Sochi, Russia, in March 2014, spoke positively of the experience 70 saying that it had been helpful and informative, and that they now have a much Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts better idea of the organisation’s aims and their role within it. They also said that they found meeting people from around the world, who were working on similar activities to them, extremely useful.294 One woman said she ‘felt like she was a member of GFP internationally’ after the Sochi Camp.295 In the workshop, GFP’s new Programming Framework was also discussed, which was introduced to Georgians at a Refresher Workshop held in the region in 2013.296 The feedback was that the Framework enabled them to feel much more confident in what they were doing and it made it easier to plan and organise programmes. The Monitoring and Evaluation Grid included in the Programming Framework helped them to reflect on their work and assess its impact. The Delegates and Pioneers said that non- GFP people who had been involved with the programme commented that it was a different and innovative approach to use. They concluded by saying that there are plenty of organisations that attempt peace building but GFP’s approach was ‘very different and very effective’.297 This feedback provides a confirmation that volunteers in Georgia are pleased with both the training provided by GFP and the programming methodology used by the organisation. In terms of their greatest success so far, all Delegates and Pioneers discussed the 2013-2014 programme held with residents of the SOS Children’s Village. The prevailing sentiment was of a great sense of achievement matched with a belief that their efforts had brought about tangible change. One Delegate summed up the view in her interview: The six-month programme in SOS village was very successful. All the children and teachers were involved. It was well organised. We were very organised. The result was really, really huge. What we planned we achieved: raising their motivation, making them more active. Everything we did for them we saw results.298 Another Delegate expressed a similar view: They [the children] had different attitudes, after the programme they changed – I felt that, and I saw that. That’s why I like GFP […] I feel that my time and energy is not lost […] you can feel happy because when you know that the change has been good, you feel good. GFP can really change society.299

294 Interviews with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July-11 August 2014. 295 Interview 1 (GFP Delegate), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July 2014. 296 Information taken from discussion with Lama Hatta,b GFP Programmes Director, GFP HQ Amman, Jordan. 16 July 2014. 297 Workshop with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Solo Hotel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 9 August 2014. 298 Interview 2 (GFP Delegate), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July 2014. 299 Interview 4 (GFP Delegate, Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi, Georgia. 26 July 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 71

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D Interviews with GFP Delegates and Pioneers: Interviews with GFP Delegates and Pioneers: 4 ing Pioneers: Main Areas for Improvement Areas for Improvement Pioneers: Main base Strengths of GFP in Georgia (GFP Delegates and Pioneers) GFP in Georgia Chart of Strengths 3.2: 4 it would

Weaknesses of GFP in Georgia (GFP Delegates and Pioneers) GFP in Georgia of Chart 3.3: Weaknesses : Main Main : Interviews with GFP Delegates and Delegates GFP Interviews with We need to We 4 regarding diversification was the need to expand to to expand to need was the diversification regarding enabl broaden our skill : Strengths : , , 2 Interviews with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July 25 July Georgia. Tbilisi, and Pioneers, GFP Delegates with Interviews 2014. 9 August Georgia. Tbilisi, Hotel, Solo and Pioneers, GFP Delegates with Workshop 25 July Georgia. Tbilisi, and Pioneers, GFP Delegates with Interviews 25 July Georgia. Tbilisi, and Pioneers, GFP Delegates with Interviews 2014. 9 August Georgia. Tbilisi, Hotel, Solo and Pioneers, GFP Delegates with Workshop feel happy because when you know that the change has been good, you feel good. GFP good. can feel you good, been has change the when know because you that happy feel society. change really We are motivated We Registration would help would Registration ; funding 309 310 311 312 313 After asking asking After agreed that in order to advocate and network, they needed an IT specialist as well as people with with people as well as specialist needed an IT they and network, advocate to order in that agreed h in working of experience Delegates’ and and Pioneers’ Delegates’ table at one of these events. these of one at table are often volunteer recruitment fairs and forums, and and forums, fairs recruitment volunteer often are all participants at the workshop agreed, they will need to register in Georgia. Georgia. in register need to will they agreed, workshop the at participants all

point point be the main areas for improvement. Two of the response the Two of improvement. for main areas be the This Georgia. in GFP register to need for was the improvements theme of on the point major Another workshop. the during detail in discussed and interviews the in people by three wasmentioned links with Tbilisi. volunteer base. The most common response was to broaden the skill base of the group by recruiting by recruiting group the base of The commonmost skill base. broaden the was to response volunteer workshop. the at in more detail was discussed This more volunteers. 5 3 2 1 0 4 Strengths and Weaknesses Chart 3 Chart 5 3 2 1 0 4 Interviews with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July 25 July Georgia. Tbilisi, and Pioneers, GFP Delegates with Interviews 2014. 9 August Georgia. Tbilisi, Hotel, Solo and Pioneers, GFP Delegates with Workshop Interview 4 (GFP Delegate, Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi, Geor Tbilisi, University, State Tbilisi Delegate, 4 (GFP Interview 2014. 26 July Georgia. Tbilisi, Central, Hotel Delegate), 3 (GFP Interview Geor Tbilisi, Hotel, Solo and Pioneers, GFP Delegates with Workshop

Chart 3 Chart workshop, those present said that their combined experience and training said that their combined experience meant workshop, those present mistakes. past from learnt have and doing’ are [they] what know ‘really they that Other strengths, mentioned in the workshop, were their educational background, educational background, their workshop, were in the mentioned Other strengths, aims. core passion about GFP’s contacts, and a shared These comments show that the programme increased the able to bring about and Pioneers,Delegates that they are as their belief as well confidence of the interviewed those among feeling real a was There society. their in change positive that their programme had improved the life skills of the children involved. The described as was also and implementing the programme designing of experience about confident more feel to them enabling volunteers, the for process learning a of possibility the for very prospect a is promising finding This programmes. future ambitious – activities in Georgia. – more future 300 Interview 26 July 2014. Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. Hotel 3 (GFP Delegate), 301 Interviews 25 July-11 August 2014 and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. with GFP Delegates 9 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. and Pioneers, Solo Hotel, with GFP Delegates 302 Workshop 9 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. Pioneers, and Solo Hotel, with GFP Delegates 303 Workshop Despite their confidence and sense of achievement, discussiondominated of weaknesses over strengths in people’s interview answers. All seven respondents In terms of strengths, interview strengths, discussed motivation, organisation, of In terms respondents yet strengths, as major and internationally) and connections (both within Georgia discussion of these did not go beyond stating that this was the case. 3.4 Strengths and Weaknesses and Weaknesses 3.4 Strengths After results’. feeling had uncertain we about that the saw impact ‘we of the PE, afterprogramme, they said felt Delegate reassured One 2014. May in PE the after After feeling uncertain about the impact of the programme, they felt reassured after the PE the in after reassured felt they programme, the of impact the about uncertain feeling After 2014. One Delegate said after PE, ‘we saw that we results’. had saw ‘we PE, that after said One Delegate 2014. Other strengths, mentioned in the workshop, were th were workshop, the in mentioned strengths, Other aims. GFP’s core about passion shared programme increased the confidence of the Delegates the of confidence the programme increased society. their in change positive about bring to able are – future of possibility the for prospect promising interviewed that their programme had improved the life skills of the children involved. The experience The experience involved. children the of skills life the programme had improved their that interviewed the for process a learning as described programme was the also and implementing designing of volunteers stating that this was the case. was the this that stating 302 303 299 300 301 In terms of strengths, interview respondents discussed motivation, organisation, and connections connections and organisation, motivation, discussed respondents interview strengths, of terms In beyo go not did these of discussion yet strengths, major as internationally) and Georgia within (both

3.4 3.4

and training meant that they ‘really know what [they] are doing’ and have learnt from past mistakes. past from learnt and have doing’ are know [they] what ‘really they meant that and training said the need for more volunteers was a major weakness; however, this incorporated a range of reasons. Four out of seven respondents stated that they do not have enough time due to work and study commitments and that recruiting more Delegates would reduce that burden and enable them to have more ambitious projects. Two respondents stressed that they need to find people who are more motivated and committed.304 In the workshop, it was said that the number of volunteers is not the problem; it is how devoted to their work those volunteers are.305 Another need was different backgrounds and skills within the group. In the workshop, the lack of diversity among the Delegates and Pioneers in terms of their geographical location, qualifications, and age was cited asa 72 major weakness. Yet, this was also regarded as a strength in the sense that they are close-knit group who can trust each other.306 Another point mentioned in Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts both the interviews and workshop was their poor ability to advertise and raise awareness of the organisation’s activities. One respondent stated, ‘[w]e are quite weak at advocating. Lots of people do not know we exist’.307 In the workshop, this was discussed further. Through advocacy, the participants agreed, they would be able to find more volunteers, funding and partners and, in doing so, overcome many of the aforementioned weaknesses.308 Discussion of weaknesses revealed a strong awareness among the Delegates and Pioneers of what needs to be done to make GFP more effective in Georgia. Although the researcher facilitated the interviews and workshop, most Delegates and Pioneers had already considered these problems as well as the ways that they could be overcome prior to this exercise.

3.5 Main Areas for Improvement After asking Delegates and Pioneers about weaknesses, the interview went on to discuss what should be the main areas for improvement. Two of the responses were linked to the idea of diversifying the volunteer base. The most common response was to broaden the skill base of the group by recruiting more volunteers. This was discussed in more detail at the workshop.309 Delegates and Pioneers agreed that in order to advocate and network, they needed an IT specialist as well as people with experience of working in human resources, public relations and accountancy/economics.310 The other point regarding diversification was the need to expand to other Georgian regions, yet maintain close links with Tbilisi.311 While this skill range may be ambitious, all of these skills would improve Delegates’ and Pioneers’ ability to achieve their future goals and improve their outreach.

304 Interviews with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July-11 August 2014. 305 Workshop with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Solo Hotel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 9 August 2014. 306 Workshop with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Solo Hotel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 9 August 2014. 307 Interview 5 (GFP Pioneer), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 26 July 2014. 308 Workshop with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Solo Hotel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 9 August 2014. 309 Interviews with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July-11 August 2014. 310 Workshop with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Solo Hotel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 9 August 2014. 311 Interviews with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July-11 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 73

316 314 If GFP is going to expand and GFP If 313 Registration would help overcome the Registration would help overcome 312 Main Areas for Improvement Main Areas Interviews GFP Delegates with and Pioneers: The idea for the programme focuses on the cultural dynamics of cultural dynamics of focuses on the programme The idea for the 315 We We want to organise a SOS village programme but similar in [a to refugee camp]. the In Tbilisi to one it organise would we be a quite had easy programme in with would refugees and be IDP people... good Teaching empowerment. for This would them, be a teaching very still good English idea need for the or refugees resources. but computer Empowerment we would skills be perfect – for IDPs. In Georgia lives a lot of Armenians and Azerbaijanis, we have stereotypes have we Azerbaijanis, and Armenians of lot a lives Georgia In against them, especially children. So we want to run a programme with together. work can groups ethnic three the that so them Main areas for improvement for GFP in Georgia (GFP Delegates and Pioneers) (GFP [n = 7] GFP in Georgia for Chart for improvement 3.4: Main areas this conflict, which fuels prejudices and negative attitudes. The programme could programme The attitudes. negative and prejudices fuels which conflict, this take place in Tbilisi. Another idea expressed during the interviews was to hold a One Delegate described this idea: with IDPs. programme 312 Interviews 25 July-11 August 2014. and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. with GFP Delegates 9 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. Pioneers, and Solo Hotel, with GFP Delegates 313 Workshop 314 Interview 25 July 2014. Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. Hotel 2 (GFP Delegate), 315 Interview 26 July 2014. Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 5 (GFP Pioneer), Hotel 316 Interview 25 July 2014. Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. Hotel 2 (GFP Delegate), The Delegates and Pioneers said that this programme would enable them to The Delegates and Pioneers said that this programme and expand their programme build on the skills they developed with the previous in ‘the big problem words, focus to ethnic conflict –respondent’s which is, in one our society’. When asked about future programme ideas, Delegates and Pioneersideas, Delegates and discussed programme When asked about future in ethnic minorities toward prejudice that addresses designing a programme and Azerbaijanis. One Delegate explained the idea: Tbilisi, specifically Armenians 3.6 Future Programme Ideas Programme 3.6 Future Another major point on the theme of improvements was the need for register GFP in to Georgia. This was mentioned by three people in the interviews workshop. the during detail in discussed and organise more ambitious programmes, all participants ambitious programmes, more the workshop agreed, at organise Georgia. in they will need to register aforementioned aforementioned weaknesses, and assist in finding partners and funding; it would there Tbilisi in that mentioned respondent One organisation. the to legitimacy add NGOs or fairs only registered and forums, and volunteer recruitment often are events. these of one at table a have can charities This was corroborated by the fact that the IDPs interviewed for this research expressed that they felt excluded from the rest of society, had received poor education, and lacked sufficient job opportunities.317 This programme would be located outside of Tbilisi, but within travelling distance. Both these programme ideas represented feasible and realistic options that would enable GFP volunteers to expand their capacity to help people in their community. Moreover, the focus on ethnic prejudice or the social exclusion of the displaced would bring them closer to the ultimate goal – as stressed in this research – of a programme addressing Georgia’s two ethno-territorial disputes.

74 3.7 Programmes Addressing the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian- Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts Ossetian Conflicts The final questions in the interview asked Delegates and Pioneers about their thoughts on the conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia and if it would be possible to have a programme there. Only four out of seven respondents gave responses of note. The resounding answer was that at their current capacity they would be unable to, a conclusion the researcher agrees with. Delegates and Pioneers expressed several concerns with regard to addressing these conflicts and anticipated several problems. A major theme was the logistics of such a programme. One Delegate said simply, ‘they cannot come here and we cannot go there’.318 Another suggested that this could be overcome by holding the programme on a neutral territory, but this would involve a huge cost.319 Another problem was that they have no contacts in either of the territories and that even if they found people to contact they might be unwilling to cooperate with them.320 On top of this, one Delegate expressed concerns about the language barrier: most people in the territories – especially younger people – speak Russian and none of the current Delegates and Pioneers have fluent Russian language skills.321 Another expressed concerns about the magnitude of the conflict: ‘[W]hen you talk about really large conflicts it is really hard to see how [it can be addressed]. It is like a puzzle and you only have one piece. It is too big’.322 They all agreed that they needed to hold a few more programmes before they could seriously consider addressing the Georgian- Abkhazian or Georgian-Ossetian conflicts.

3.8 Delegates’ and Pioneers’ Involvement in the Research Given the intractability of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts and the widespread perception that nothing can be achieved until Russia is weakened, the Delegates and Pioneers expressed concern or scepticism with regard to the research aims and the idea of organising a programme that addresses these conflicts. However, their involvement in the research process appears to have altered that perception somewhat. Several Delegates were heavily involved with the research through finding contacts, helping with translation, and interpretation during interviews. Those who were involved stated that they had found what might be termed participatory research helpful.

317 Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. 318 Interview 1 (GFP Delegate), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July 2014. 319 Interview 3 (GFP Delegate), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 26 July 2014. 320 Interview 5 (GFP Pioneer), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 26 July 2014. 321 Interview 5 (GFP Pioneer), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 26 July 2014. 322 Interview 4 (GFP Delegate, Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi, Georgia. 26 July 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 75 All those who participated in the research agreed that it that agreed participatedwho those research All the in 324 Another ofsaid, this conflict,‘I dimensions forlearnt the medifferent it 323 Workshop with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Solo Hotel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 9 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. Pioneers, and Solo Hotel, with GFP Delegates 323 Workshop 9 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. Pioneers, and Solo Hotel, with GFP Delegates 324 Workshop This chapter builds on the findings of this report the Georgian- as well as ways to address capacity, organisation GFP Georgia’s to suggest ways improve to Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. It utilises the analysisof conflict in Georgia to suggest potential structures for future peace-building programmes. suggest practical goals while the conclusion deals with the The recommendations findings. the report’s implications of In conclusion, the researcher believes that Delegates and believes that Delegates and Pioneers should In conclusion, the researcher ethnic prejudice addressing a programme continue with their plans to organise in Tbilisi. This and will confidence.their increase Alongsideabilities, this, capacity, help will This Georgia. partsof other into expand to ways find to look should they GFP Delegates and Pioneers in the countrydiversify of the background as well as enable the organisation to address conflicts that exist elsewhere in Georgia. have volunteersuseful to also be would It geographical live within closer who proximity to Abkhazia and South Ossetia if eventually a programme these involving two territories is organised. GFP volunteers will not be able to get to this and lack of trust, poor communications, issues of due to stage alone, however, a before separately regions two these in capacity build to need will GFP contacts. can be organised. joint programme 3.9 Conclusion volunteers who of and imaginative core have a hard-working in Georgia GFP are pleased with their progress. They skill base, including an expansion of scope in many directions, GFP Georgia’s are a ambitious However, and programmes. future by looking addressed be to to issues and expand reach, geographical veryexpressed them working number of feasibility of the doubts about legitimate of logistics the about concerns had also They Ossetians. South or Abkhazians with these address to desire strong a expressed Nevertheless,they programme. a such conflicts with future activities and, through participating in theresearch, become optimistic that this could happen. increasingly They They learnt more about the conflicts, theconflicts, competing and perspectives how within these the might and PioneersDelegates participated who the they had found asked how were addressed be by GFP.the At workshop, the research and if it had been helpful for them. One participant stated, ‘[A]fter the [a] we might have a GFP chance to manage I understoodthe future that in research ridiculous absolutely was thought I which Ossetia, and Abkhazia with programme before’. had improved their understanding of the conflict dynamics and the ways it might it ways the and dynamics conflict the understandingtheir of improved had Georgians- and Georgian-Abkhazians The programme. future a by addressed be Ossetian conflicts are certainly not easy toaddress due to the complexityof the that has lasted longer than and a societal estrangement geopolitical situation opinion among those involved in the research two decades; of yet, the change that prospect the hope for place provides took that it weeks in the few process these conflicts in the future. these volunteers can address was like conflict analysis on a personal, relational, cultural, and structural level. So, level. structural and cultural, relational, personal, a on analysis conflict like was helpful’. really was that

4. Conclusion and Recommendations 78 Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts © GFP 2012 | Tbilisi, Georgia

he recommendations begin by suggesting programmes within Georgia GFP could address in the near future along with steps that can be taken to improve the organisation’s capacity in the country. The next section Tconsiders the situation in Abkhazia and Ossetia: firstly, it discusses problems and then goes on to suggest programme ideas.

4.1 Recommendations Possible Future Programmes: Short Term • A Programme Addressing Inter-Ethnic Prejudice in Tbilisi: Delegates and Pioneers should continue with their plan to organise a programme addressing stereotypes of ethnic minorities in Tbilisi. This will increase their skills through running a programme that is relevant to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to its ethnic and cultural elements. The programme should work to challenge negative attitudes, break down stereotypes, and foster social inclusion among ethnic minorities. Through this, Delegates and Pioneers can build on the experience they gained from the programme with the children living at SOS Children’s Village. • A Programme Working with IDPs: A programme working with IDPs would also be a way to achieve similar ends. IDPs form a significant part of the Georgian population and face poor living conditions, job opportunities, and social exclusion, as demonstrated in the responses of people interviewed for this research.325 A programme empowering IDPs and fostering their inclusion in Georgian society would certainly be a feasible goal for the group. There is a sizable IDP population in Tbilisi, where the GFP volunteers are based, and there are IDP camps located nearby to the city. As a major social problem in Georgia, having a programme addressing IDPs would be an excellent way to make a positive impact and raise awareness among the

325 Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 79 html An academic An 329 A programme addressing this 328 There is a need for the organisation to need for the organisation is a There Getting people who are displaced involved involved displaced in who are people Getting 326 Human Rights Watch have noted the prevalence the prevalence have noted Human Rights Watch This measure will add credibility to the organisation to the organisation will add credibility This measure 327 Delegates and Pioneers need to come from a and PioneersDelegates from come to need 331 GFP needs to register in Georgia. Three respondents Most of the GFP Delegates and PioneersDelegates GFP the have similar Most of Moreover, if the conflicts in Abkhazia or Ossetia are to be addressed, addressed, be to are Ossetia or Abkhazia in conflicts the if Moreover, 330 the organisation would also be useful for future programmes on Abkhazia Ossetia. and South In the interviewsHomophobia: with Georgians Addressing Programme A as being a major homophobia mentioned the respondents Tbilisi, half from conflict in their society. prejudice could be run in Tbilisi partnershipin prejudice with other organisations people. LGBT acceptance of tolerance and to promote working in the city Expansion Outside of Tbilisi: – conflicts has interviews, the Georgia in revealed As Tbilisi. beyond expand Tbilisi. of outside primarily exist that – Islamophobia as such population of GFP activities. GFP of population interviewed for this research mentioned that a major problem in regions with interviewed in regions mentioned that a major problem for this research large Azerbaijanis and Armenians populations is a lack of integration into Georgian society among those groups. They often do not speak Georgian and face economic and social exclusion. A programme empowering them and providing life skills would be very beneficial for Georgian society, he said. more more diverse background. GFP in Georgia mostly consists of an extended studying social science and humanities whom are many of friendship group, at the same While university. their closeness is a strength, the group lacks weakness a is This age. and qualifications, background, of terms in diversity experiences. and opinions, worldviews, of array wide a include not does it as could expand its Georgia GFP diverse group, having a more Through outreach. Expanding Skills: and increase its capacity partnerships. to advocate, acquire funding, Increasing Diversity: and make qualifications and skills.There is a needto include an IT specialist, someone with knowledge about marketing or to broaden this range of skills public relations, and a Russian speaker (preferably Russian speakers). This having volunteers who live near the territories would be extremely useful. Advocacy For Peace Events could be held in the cities of Gori (very close to South Ossetia), Kutaisi and Batumi (both reasonably close to Abkhazia). and their up in these regions the Delegates and Pioneersgrew Some of contacts will certainly useful for this purpose. prove Local Registration: mentioned this in the interviewswas discussed at length and this matter workshop. the during of of homophobic violence in the country. • • • • • GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Solo Hotel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 9 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. and Pioneers, Solo Hotel, GFP Delegates

Steps to Improve Capacity and Outreach and Outreach Capacity Improve to Steps UNHCR, ‘Georgia.’ Accessed 23 September 2014. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48d2e6. Accessed 23 September 326 UNHCR, ‘Georgia.’ Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014. 27 July-11 August 2014. 327 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians Report 2014: Georgia.’ ‘World 328 Human Rights Watch, 27 July-11 August 2014. 329 Interviews Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. from with Georgians 31 July Tbilisi, Georgia. University, 330 Interview 15 (Academic), Tbilisi State with 331 Interviews 25 July-11 August 2014; Workshop and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. with GFP Delegates will enable the group to increase its advocacy abilities and implement new programmes. • Greater Horizontal Connectivity: It would be beneficial to foster greater communication among GFP Delegates and Pioneers internationally. This would allow for the exchange of ideas and experiences. Some volunteers mentioned feeling like they were part of an international GFP community and this could help foster that empowering view. GFP could set up a forum online for Delegates and Pioneers to communicate outside of International Camps or trainings. • Regional Exchanges: The Caucasus is a patchwork of different ethnic and 80 linguistic groups divided by mountains and several militarised borders. GFP Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts currently have volunteers in Russia (including Chechnya), Azerbaijan, and Armenia, all of them active since 2010.332 Conflicts in the region have notable similarities. Sometimes they have been directly linked – such as the wars in Abkhazia and Chechnya – and sometimes they share similar origins, namely Soviet nationality policy. Therefore, as GFP builds up capacity in the region, Delegates and Pioneers will be designing programmes that address similar issues. The exchange of ideas, past mistakes and experiences among these individuals would be beneficial. In a similar way to the recommendation above, GFP could help facilitate this exchange with a regional online forum or organise regional activities by bringing Delegates and Pioneers together from across the Caucasus.

Recommendations for GFP in Abkhazia and South Ossetia The remainder of the recommendations focuses specifically on addressing the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. Firstly, this section looks at the challenges the organisation is likely to face when addressing these conflicts and, secondly, it goes on to suggest ways to approach this challenging conflict situation.

Challenges of Working in Abkhazia and South Ossetia • Geographical Divide: Getting either Abkhazians or Ossetians and Georgians in the same place will be challenging without holding a programme in another country. It is difficult for Georgians to visit Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and vice versa. On both sides, participants are likely to be unwilling or apprehensive about visiting the others’ territory. • Lack of Trust: There is a lack of trust within the conflict, especially among the Abkhazians and Ossetians towards the Georgians.333 This is certainly not unique in conflict situations, but it does compound the difficulties of the spatial divide because in order to bring people together there needs to be an element of trust. • Surveillance Problems: Throughout the fieldwork, the researcher heard speculation about monitored communication and observation of social media by either the Abkhazian, Ossetian or Russian authorities; this

332 Discussion with Lama Hattab, Programmes Director, Generations For Peace Headquarters: Amman, Jordan. 25 August 2014 . 333 Interviews with Abkhazians and Ossetians, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-6 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 81

335 In order to In order

Once GFP is in Abkhazia, in is GFP Once A programme focusing on personalon focusing programme A 336 Although the researcher is unable provide provide unable is researcher the Although 334 If a programme is to be held involving two groups of of groups held involvingbe two is to programme a If a programme idea would be bring Georgians in the Gali region of Abkhazia of region Gali the in Georgians bring be would idea programme a Surveys who have returned show that Georgians and the together. Abkhaz socially. and politically excluded, feel implement a programme concerning Georgian-Abkhazian or Georgian- Ossetians divides, GFP would first need to build up capacity by advocating and recruiting volunteers in the two territories. Due to a lack of trust and the difficulties with communication, it would be extremely challenging to volunteers to expand or for Georgian Georgia from a programme organise operations into the two territories. Thus, although the eventual aim will be be to capacity building needs begin with to sides together, two bringing the worked This on will separately. help forge trust and increase opportunities for cooperation. Ossetia: South or Abkhazia inside Programmes Building Capacity in Abkhazia and South Ossetia: people in separate geographical locations, the evaluation process and process geographical locations, the evaluation people in separate impact could be problematic. of measurement This will create difficulties as none of the GFP Delegates or Pioneers fluent Russian speakers. the spoke to were researcher Divided Impact: and relational dynamics could have a meaningful impact here. A Ossetia in South with the small Georgian similar could be organised programme there. community who remain applied specifically to people living in Abkhazia or South Ossetia who were were who Ossetia South or Abkhazia in living people to specifically applied engaged in communications with Georgia. One Abkhaz man interviewed was afraid to talk and gave such limited answers that the interview could sample. the in included be not evidence of surveillance, of evidence appearsto perception generated by this the fear be very real. research, this for interviewed academic an to Language Barriers: According in population non-Georgian among the spoken widely is not Georgian Abkhazia. In the territory, Russian is the most widely spoken language. • • • • Overcoming Challenges in Abkhazia and South Ossetia Challenges in Abkhazia Overcoming While the above section provides guidance on the type of changes that are changes that are guidance on the type of While the above section provides necessary in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is important to specify what programme exact can be put in place in these regions. The researcher suggests that type appropriate most the (DP) would be Programme Peace For a Dialogue of programme in this situation. There is a need to raise mutual understanding of the other’s perspective to forge trust, a safe space for facilitated honest of cooperation (DP) allows the creation Dialogue For Peace and build relationships. change prioritised by of six expressions the exchange that can contribute towards GFP: building acceptance, fostering cooperation, ensuring inclusion, developing Programme Type: Dialogue For Peace Dialogue For Peace Type: Programme 334 Interview 1 August 2014. Central (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 19 (Abkhazian), Hotel August 2014. 12 Georgia. Tbilisi, residence, 335 Interview Tbilisi), respondent’s from 34 (Georgian 24. ‘Inside Abkhazia.’ and Toal, 336 O’Loughlin, Kossolov, respect, taking responsibility, and building trust.337 It is also important to note that although this form of programme has been developed by GFP, it has not actually been used in practice.338 The Georgian situation represents a challenging, yet promising conflict context in which to trial this programme method due to the near complete lack of communication. Four key elements of this programme type are discussed below, along with a discussion about the impact this could have on the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian- Ossetian conflicts. • DP Opens Minds to Multiple Truths and Different Perspectives: Through conversation DP can raise awareness of ‘multiple truths’, meaning 82 that there can be many different perspectives in a conflict situation.339 As Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts illustrated in this report there exist competing perspectives on the Georgian- Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts that are little understood by the different sides. Dialogue could transform this situation so that both sides acknowledge the other’s view. For the Georgian side it will break down the one-dimensional view that Russia is solely responsible for this conflict. • DP Expands Views and Reduces Polarisation: Conflicts lead to polarisations and oversimplified dichotomies of ‘us’ versus ‘them’; this Manichean view reduces people’s understanding of the complexity of the situation, which leads to assumptions and unhelpful generalisations regarding the other groups involved.340 In the case of the Georgian- Abkhazian and the Georgian-Ossetian conflicts, generalisations dominate people’s understanding and the actions and attitudes of governments are often considered as akin to the actions and attitudes of the wider population. Dialogue could break down these simplifications and enable both sides to appreciate the diversity of stances that exist within the conflict. • DP Supports Improved Communication: The absence of inter-group communication in conflict situations creates a lack of understanding that in turn fosters fear, stereotypes, and insecurities; the goal of DP is to establish constructive communication to raise conflict awareness and encourage cooperation.341 In the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts, DP could alter this situation by breaking down stereotypes and reducing insecurities. A major source of the conflict – agreed upon by all sides – is the lack of communication between the different sides.342 • Dialogue is not Debate: Whereas in debates different sides want their perspective to dominate, dialogue endeavours to create new knowledge and a deeper appreciation of different perspectives.343 In Georgia’s two ethno-territorial disputes there are issues – such as those over territory – on which people refuse to compromise. Dialogue For Peace can change this situation by facilitating an environment that can mellow peoples’ convictions through broadening their perspectival horizons.

337 O’Loughlin, Kossolov, and Toal, ‘Inside Abkhazia.’ 24. 338 O’Loughlin, Kossolov, and Toal, ‘Inside Abkhazia.’ 24. 339 Generations For Peace, ‘Dialogue For Peace.’ 1-2. 340 Generations For Peace, ‘Dialogue For Peace.’ 341 Generations For Peace, ‘Dialogue For Peace.’ 3. 342 Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014; Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014; Interviews with Abkhazians and Ossetians, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-6 August 2014. 343 Generations For Peace, ‘Dialogue For Peace.’ 3. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 83 This The 344 These could be on history, politics, culture, politics, culture, on history, could be These Sessions can be held that involve the exchange Sessionsheld that involve the can be While the suggestion of conducting programmes using conducting programmes While the suggestion of This can involve meeting at a regular time each week to week each time at a regular This can involve meeting have structured dialogue on previously agreed upon topics. DP Online: the internet presents problems – for example, it is difficult to foster trust foster to difficult is it example, for – problems presents internet the and cooperation online, and connectivity problems abound – these can be Both overcome. involved sets groups in of a can programme be located in a place that they feel safe, and conversation between them can be facilitated. carefully Given the the constraints conflict of situation, this may be the only way to bring to two sides together at a low cost. It represents a feasible way to connect geographically divided groups. economic development, or other turns in it take can group each then interests. and theme different a on centred Each session can be to either share texts with each other or make presentations. It can begin less sensitive with topics such as music, art, or food and then, conflict. the to linked issues onto move continues, programme the as Limitations: participantshold webinars/ Skype to such as can use programmes questions asking of form simple the take can This conferences. online facilitated by GFP volunteers. to each other, Online Exchanges: of stories, experiences, or interview responses filled in different by groups. For example, groups fill awareness out raise to questionnaires online them assessing exchange then their and conflict the of view the other sides’ view. of Thematic Sessions: • • • • will be a useful way of raising awareness of the in this discussions way can facilitate within Structuring the programme conflict among people. what conflict, the importantin is what about groups homogenous relatively the are conflict dynamics, and how these dynamics could be by addressed peace-building future A programmes. is there where group a already level also can It facilitate. and organise to simpler be will cooperation and trust of programme. serve for an inter-group preparation of a form as Online disputes and border aforementioned Given the Programmes: geographical separation at the core of these conflicts, it is very difficult to bring both sides One together. way to overcome this problem would be to hold activities programme online. In this scenario, DP a remains feasible option. Programmes done in this way could be as regular and run for as long as ordinary programmes. An Intra-Group Programme Before an Inter-Group Programme: • • provide a guide that can help break down barriers and facilitate productive discussion. Generations discussion. productive and facilitate down barriers a guide that can help break provide ‘Dialogue For Peace.’ For Peace, Although the DP booklet suggests that sessions should not be structured, using a loose structure will structure loose a using structured, be not should sessions that suggests booklet DP the Although 344 This final partofrecommendations the suggest ways to a structure Dialogue For Peace Programme that is geared specifically to conflicts. theGeorgian-Ossetian Georgian-Abkhazian and Suggested Suggested Structure for a Dialogue For Peace Programme Addressing conflicts and Georgian-Ossetian the Georgian-Abkhazian 4.2 Conclusion This research has addressed the attitudinal dynamics of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts using 32 semi-structured interviews with The findings three distinct groups: Georgians from Tbilisi, IDPs, and Abkhazians and South demonstrate Ossetians. It has built on previous literature by looking at the perspectives held that since the on the conflicts by each of these groups. Along with that literature, it has sought war in 2008, to alter the focus of conflict analysis from a geopolitical to a grassroots level. The the current geopolitical analysis of the Georgians from Tbilisi sample used the variables of age, gender, situation is and background. This was then contrasted to the perspectives of IDPs and people discussed as if living in the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Unlike previous works, the 84 it has always data gathered includes a thorough exploration of perspectives on the conflicts been this way; Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts this results in in their historical, contemporary, and potential future manifestations, with the a deterministic ultimate aim of aiding the design of future peace-building programmes. The view of the report has also made practical recommendations, specifically designed for GFP. past. As To do this, the researcher interviewed seven of the organisation’s volunteers and the report demonstrates, held a workshop to assess GFP’s organisational capacity in the country. Thus, this emphasis the report presents conclusions that are relevant to both academics and peace- overlooks the building practitioners. other actors involved, The main argument is that understanding of the conflict among the Georgians reduces from Tbilisi and IDPs is dominated by geopolitical factors, specifically the role of people’s Russia. What began as an ethnic conflict triggered by competing nationalisms capacity for self-reflection, in the 1990s, has turned into a key flashpoint of a regional geopolitical contest. and leads to This perception is further entrenched by events in Ukraine, which moves focus overly simplistic away from the community-level dynamics of these conflicts towards the actions interpretations of governments. The findings demonstrate that since the war in 2008, the current of these conflicts; geopolitical situation is discussed as if it has always been this way; this results in a which, in turn, deterministic view of the past. As the report demonstrates, this emphasis overlooks hinder people’s the other actors involved, reduces people’s capacity for self-reflection, and leads ability to act by to overly simplistic interpretations of these conflicts; which, in turn, hinder people’s making them feel powerless. ability to act by making them feel powerless. Thus, the inability to look beyond the Thus, the conflicts’ geopolitical dimensions needs to be overcome in order to bring about inability to community-level transformation. look beyond the conflicts’ The findings show that among the Georgians and IDPs the conflicts’ historical geopolitical dimensions are widely considered to be a result of a long-term Russian strategy dimensions to weaken Georgia and undermine the country’s ability to be independent. needs to be overcome This interpretation links diverse historical events into a clear, coherent narrative in order to powered by a constant motive of Russian imperial interests. This view hinders bring about understanding of the complexity of the situation. Moreover, it is very distinct community- from the Abkhaz and Ossetian view, which holds that these conflicts arose due level transformation. to Georgian nationalism and mistreatment at the hands of the Georgians. These two competing interpretations need to be reconciled through dialogue in order to reach a stage of mutual understanding. Respondents’ interpretation of the contemporary dynamics of the conflicts are symptomatic of how polarised the situation has become. The contradiction over the territory at the centre of these conflicts remains irreconcilable: while the Georgians continue to regard Abkhazia and South Ossetia as integral parts of their nation, the Abkhaz and Ossetians do not want to be part of Georgia and many of them support independence. This stalemate is furthered by a lack of mutual understanding and stereotypes between both sides, usually the idea that Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 85 Within Georgia, the research has been limited in terms of geographical scope. There remain, however, several areas uncovered by this work that would by this work uncovered several areas however, remain, There improve understanding sample, of the conflictslarger anda the abilityto tospeak design peace-building to endeavouring Despite further. explored if interventions, Abkhazia interviewsfrom people three with include to able only was research this and South Ossetia. This compounds a pre-existing problem in the literature and the international community, which privileges the Georgian perspective. More research needs to be carried out in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to gain a more peace- areas what and conflicts these view people how of understanding detailed building interventions could address. This report has expanded on previous literature by providing a comprehensive a comprehensive by providing This report literature on previous has expanded analysis of how the conflict is understood Georgians by the To from Tbilisiauthor’s knowledge, it and IDPs. is the first time a surveyof prevailing Whereas sentiments population. Tbilisi the among out carried been has conflicts the towards Kabachnik, Regulska and Mitchneck’s work focused on IDPs surveys from issues such as incorporated a range of Abkhazia and Toal’s O’Loughlin, Kolossov or conditions, this reportand economic legitimacy state detailed has presented of the conflicts with the ultimate goal findings focused specifically on perceptions practical recommendations. providing of In these conflicts, Tier I (Top Leadership) in Lederach’s model is in a deadlock with deadlock a in is model Lederach’s in Leadership) (Top I Tier conflicts, these In mutually irreconcilable aims that shows few signs of abating. Therefore, conflict transformation attempts have to depend on the grassroots. What is needed is a Leadership) Leadership) to and Tier III (Grassroots the Tier I (Top detachment of overcome the fatalism that pervades view of the conflict.people’s This is already on all sides, who distinguish between respondents the of among many apparent and populations by stating their ill that governments feeling lies with the former not the latter. This programmes peace-building sentiment Future level. can community the be at trust utilised and relationships, in order to rebuild connections, in their ability to bring need to encourage community-level actors’ self-belief about positive change. All three groups’ perception of the future rests on the and IDPs, involved ideals, among the Georgians yet, future governments; actions and policies of Georgian The situation. pre-war the to return a and trust, relationships, rebuilding majority the for what peaceful, does not account however future, the of view of the Abkhaz and Ossetians actually want. The Abkhazians and Ossetians, who for future a desire about the past, expressed considerably less nostalgic are be part not to friendship,cooperation and their desire but mostly emphasised of Georgia. In the conflicts, what is most striking is the lackof communication, which – as the findings show myths – and fuels simplifications stereotypes, about the opposing side. The and Georgians IDPs this a of expressed awareness strong to desire a notable younger respondents, and, especially among causal process alter this situation. the opposing group hates or fears them. The lack of communication perpetuates perpetuates communication of lack The fears them. or hates group opposing the the contradictions and attitudes that fuel these conflicts. it Moreover, results in the myths creation of about the situation the of other group. The Georgians and Russians, the by mistreated being are Ossetians and Abkhaz the that believe IDPs’ view This territories. their of control full take and them assimilate trying to are who close territories’ their considers which view, Ossetian and Abkhaz the with clashes aggression. Georgian against future protection of with Russia as a form relation A comprehensive survey of prevailing public sentiments towards these conflicts across Georgia would be a useful area for future research. Through this, it could be established which parts of the Georgian population programmes should target. Opinion surveys conducted in the regions could reveal a very different It is time to perspective towards the conflicts. overcome the As events in Ukraine continue – a conflict which shows clear parallels to the geopolitical situation by Georgian situation, due to the emergence of two de facto states arising out empowering of a ethnic conflict influenced by an outside power – there is a need for more grassroots actors comparative literature on conflicts in the region.345 The surveys carried out in to bring about post-Soviet de facto states across the region are positive steps in this direction. change at their 86 level and help Comparative literature could establish commonalities in these conflicts that Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts rebuild trust in could aid the design of peace-building interventions through the exchange of societies that knowledge on a regional level. have been deeply divided for Keeping in mind these limitations, this report has provided a detailed analysis of more than two how the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts are understood by decades. those involved. This analysis can, in turn, improve conflict interventions. What is most striking in both the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts is the lack of dialogue and interaction, which is entrenched by militarised borders and unaddressed displacements. Altering this situation needs to be the top priority for peace-building practitioners. As Russian foreign policy and the geopolitics of the post-Soviet region increasingly dominate headlines around the world, the communities and people directly affected by the region’s ‘frozen’ conflicts should not be forgotten. It is time to overcome the geopolitical situation by empowering grassroots actors to bring about change at their level and help rebuild trust in societies that have been deeply divided for more than two decades.

345 Jackson, ‘Ukraine Crisis: Frozen Conflicts and the Kremlin’. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 87 http:// http://www.bbc.co.uk/

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Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts September 2014. Accessed 10 September 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-europe-29078541 Jones, Stephen F., ‘Georgia through a Glass, Darkly.’ Open Democracy. 18 November 2013. Accessed 15 July 2014. https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/stephen- f-jones/georgia-through-glass-darkly Kabachnik, Peter; Joanna, Regulska and Beth Mitchneck, ‘Displacing Blame: Georgian Internally Displaced Person Perspectives On the Georgia-Abkhazia Conflict.’ Ethno Politics 20 (2012). 123-140, Kabachnik, Peter, ‘Shaping Abkhazia: Cartographic anxieties and the making and remaking of the Abkhaz Geo-body.’ Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 14. (2012): 397-415. Kabachnik, Peter, ‘Wounds that Won’t Heal: Cartographic anxieties and the Quest for Territorial Integrity In Georgia.’ Central Asian Survey 30. (2012). 45-60. Kaufman, Sandra, Michael, Elliott and Deborah, Shmueli, ‘Frames, Framing and Reframing.’ In Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, Beyond Intractability. (Bolder: University of Colorado. 2003). http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/ framing/, Kaufman, Stuart J., ‘Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War.’ (London: Ithaca. 2001). Lederach, John Paul, ‘Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.’ (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. 1997). Map 1.1: BBC, ‘Q&A Conflict in Georgia.’ 11 November 2008. Accessed 17 September 2014. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7549736.stm Map 1.2: BBC, ‘South Ossetia Profile.’ Accessed 4 September 2014.http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/world-europe-18269210 Map 1.3: BBC, ‘Abkhazia Profile.’ Accessed 4 Septmber 2014.http://www. bbc.co.uk/ news/world-europe-18175030 Markendenov, Sergey, ‘International Experts View of Abkhazia.’ Islam Tekushev et al (eds), ‘Abkhazia: Between the Past and the Future.’ (Prague: Median Orient. 2013). 65-83. Nordia, Ghia, ‘The August War of 2008: The Main Consequences for Georgia and its Conflict.’ Nationalities Papers 40. (2012): 721 – 738. O’Loughlin, John, Vladimir Kolossov and Gerard Toal, ‘Inside Abkhazia: A Survey of Opinions in a De-Facto State.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 27. (2013). 1-36. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 89 http://www. http://www. www.unhcr.org/ https://data.un.org/ http://www.tabula.ge/ http://

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5. Appendices Appendix A – Interview Questions

For GFP Delegates and Pioneers 1a) Your involvement with GFP • How long have you been involved with the organisation • What have you been involved with • What do they consider to have been the most successful or to have had the greatest impact

92 For IDPs

Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 1b) When did you leave Abkhazia/South Ossetia? How long have you been in Tbilisi?

For everyone 2) In your opinion, what conflicts exist in Tbilisi? • How does the rest of Georgia compare to Tbilisi (are there conflicts that exist in Tbilisi that do not exist in the rest of the country)

3) In your opinion, what are the origins/causes/consequences of the conflicts in Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia? a. Origins b. Causes c. Consequences d. Reasons for longevity (why have these conflicts lasted for as long as they have?)

4) What issues do you regard as being the most important for the people involved these conflicts? • What is at stake for them (alternatively ask why does it matter to people) • What is the most important issue for you personally?

5) How do the attitudes and behaviour of the different sides shape these conflicts? • Georgian, Abkhazian, and South Ossetian

6) How do the attitudes and behaviour of the Georgian government (both the current and previous governments) shape the conflict?

7) What role do you consider Russia to have in these conflicts? • Without Russian involvement, what would the conflicts be like?

8) What do you think is most likely to happen in the future? • If you were able to choose, what would be the ideal way for these conflicts to be resolved? • How could this be done?

9) Is there anything else would like to add regarding these questions? Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 93 What do you think has been the most successful thing so far? the most successful you think has been What do for improvement? be the main areas you consider to What do Everyone What would be needed in order to achieve this? to achieve in order What would be needed Tbilisi? from Could this be done Peace, For Art Peace, For Advocacy Peace, For (Sport done be this could How For Peace)? Empowerment in Georgia? in Georgia? aimed at addressing the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts? • • • • • • GFP related questions questions related GFP capabilities GFP’s of weaknesses and strengths the consider you do What 10) 11) Do you think that GFP volunteers would be able to organise a programme programme a organise to able be would volunteers GFP that think you Do 11) 13) Do you have any questions for me? questions for me? any 13) Do you have 12) Is there anything else you would like to add? you would like anything else 12) Is there Appendix B – Interview List Interviews with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July-11 August 2014. Interviews with Georgians from Tbilisi, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July-11 August 2014. Interviews with IDPs, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-12 August 2014. Interviews with Abkhazians and Ossetians, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July-6 August 2014. Interview 1 (GFP Delegate), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July 2014. Gender: Female / Age: 23 / Occupation: Student / Ethnicity: Georgian 94 Interview 2 (GFP Delegate), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 25 July 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts Gender: Female / Age: 23 / Occupation: Psychology / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 3 (GFP Delegate), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 26 July 2014. Gender: Female / Age: 23 / Occupation: Student / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 4 (GFP Delegate, Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi, Georgia. 26 July 2014. Gender: Female / Age: 22 / Occupation: Student/Screenwriter / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 5 (GFP Pioneer), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 26 July 2014. Gender: Male / Age: 23 / Occupation: Student / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 6 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. Gender: Female / Age: 23 / Occupation: Student / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 7 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. Gender: Male / Age: 57 / Occupation: Photographer / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 8 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 27 July 2014. Gender: Male / Age: 19 / Occupation: Student / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 9 (Academic), Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July 2014. Gender: Male / Age: 30 / Occupation: Assistant Professor / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 10 (South Ossetia), Hotel Central (Skype call), Tbilisi, Georgia. Started on 29 July 2014; completed on 31 July 2014. Gender: Male / Age: 56 / Occupation: Publisher / Ethnicity: Ossetian Interview 11 (IDP), Ori Beli Hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 29 July 2014. Gender: Male / Age: 22 / Occupation: Psychologist (Hostel worker) / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 12 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Ori Beli Hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. Gender: Female / Age: 23 / Occupation: Unemployed / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 13 (Focus Group) (IDP), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. Gender: Female / Age: 22 / Occupation: Student / Ethnicity: Georgian Gender: Female / Age: 57 / Occupation: Housewife / Ethnicity: Georgian Gender: Female / Age: 57 / Occupation: Retired / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 14 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central (Skype Call), Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 July 2014. Gender: Male / Age: 38 / Occupation: Media Assistant / Ethnicity: Abkhaz Interview 15 (Academic), Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi, Georgia. 31 July 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 95 Gender: Male / Age: 61 / Occupation: Professor / Ethnicity: Georgian Gender: Georgian Ethnicity: / Professor 61 / Occupation: / Age: Male Interview 16 unused (Georgian from Tbilisi), Georgian Partnership for 2014. 1 August Georgia. Tbilisi, Safety Offices, Road Georgian Ethnicity: / Coordinator Project Occupation: / 24 Age: Gender:/ Female Interview 17 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Georgian 1 August 2014. Georgia. Tbilisi, Safety Offices, Partnership for Road Gender: Ethnicity: Georgian / 41 / Occupation: Chairman Male / Age: Interview 18 (GFP Delegate), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 1 August 2014. Gender: Female / Age: 25 Office / Ethnicity: Georgian Prosecutors’ / Occupation: Witness/Victim coordinator Georgia. in Tbilisi, (Skype), Central Hotel (Abkhazian), unused 19 the Interview 1 August 2014. Gender:Ethnicity: Georgian 37 / Occupation: Not given / Male / Age: Interview 20 (Georgian from Tbilisi), 2 August 2014. Georgia. respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Gender: / Ethnicity: Georgian Retired Male / Age: 58 / Occupation: Interview 21 (IDP), respondent’s friends residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. August 2014. 4 Gender: Lawyer / Ethnicity: Abkhazian Female / Age: 49 / Occupation: Interview 22 unused (uncategorised due to filled quota), Hotel Central, 4 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. Gender: Student / Ethnicity: Georgian Female / Age: 22 / Occupation: Interview 23 (Georgian who grew up in Abkhazia, categorised as IDP), 5 August 2014. (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. Central Hotel Gender: Student / Ethnicity: Kartveli Female / Age: 21 / Occupation: (Georgian) Interview 24 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 6 August 2014. Gender: Hotel Manager / Ethnicity: Georgian Male / Age: 26 / Occupation: Interview 25 (Abkhazian), Hotel Central August 2014. (Skype), Tbilisi, Georgia. 6 Gender: Female / Age: 25 / Occupation: Abkhazia Political Party employee / Ethnicity: Interview 26 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. Georgian Ethnicity: / Medicine of Professor Occupation: / Gender:48 Age: / Male Interview 27 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Tbilisi Hospital, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. Gender: Georgian Female / Age: 42 / Occupation: Psychiatric Doctor / Ethnicity: Interview 28 (Georgian from Tbilisi), Hotel Central, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 August 2014. Gender: Female / Age: 40 / Occupation: Doctor / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 29 (IDP), Café near the Bridge of August 2014. Peace, Tbilisi, Georgia. 7 Gender: Female / Age: 23 / Occupation: Receptionist / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 8 August 2014. Tbilisi, Georgia. 30 (IDP), Subway restaurant, / Ethnicity: Georgian Gender: Female / Age: 35 / Occupation: Translator Interview 31 (Georgian from Tbilisi), 11 August 2014. Georgia. respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Gender: Female / Age: 58 / Occupation: Administrator / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 32 (GFP Delegate), Solo Hotel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 11 August 2014. Gender: Female / Age: 24 / Occupation: Student / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 33 (Georgian from Tbilisi), respondent’s residence, Tbilisi, Georgia. 11 August 2014. Gender: Female / Age: 63 / Occupation: Teacher / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 34 (Academic), Marriot Hotel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 12 August 2014. Gender: Female / Age: 56 / Occupation: Journalist/Academic / Ethnicity: Georgian Interview 35 (IDP), respondent’s hostel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 12 August 2014. Gender: Female / Age: 73 / Occupation: Teacher (retired) / Ethnicity: Georgian Workshop with GFP Delegates and Pioneers, Solo Hotel, Tbilisi, Georgia. 96 9 August 2014. Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts Overcoming Geopolitics: Grassroots Transformation and the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian Conflicts 97 5 1 5 5 6 5 6 6 n/a Number of Number of Mentions in the IDP sample (n=7) 3 0 4 0 7 4 6 8 n/a Number of Number of in Mentions the Georgian Tbilisi from Sample (n=12) Conflict is not native to Georgia Conflict is not native was a lost (the idea that Abkhazia Paradise place prior harmonious and prosperous happy, the war) to Autonomies are ‘mines’ or ‘bombs’ planted by planted ‘mines’ or ‘bombs’ are Autonomies territoryRussia on Georgia divide the country to into Georgia or ‘split’ ‘cut’ Russia wants to different parts and manipulated Abkhazians and Ossetians are and fear Georgians hate taught to harming and the Abkhaz The Russians are Ossetians and trying them and assimilate to their territory take be beneficial would Georgia the unity of Future: for everyone be best if everyone It would was friends Future: again together and lived home Returning Future: Theme or Metaphor Theme or

Appendix C – Selected Recurring Themes and Metaphors and Themes Recurring – Selected C Appendix

About About the Summer the Summer Field Research Field Research Intern

Edward Beswick Generations For Peace awards two research Edward Beswick grew up near Leeds, in the grants annually to selected postgraduate North of England. Between 2009 and 2012 students pursuing Masters or Doctorate he attended the University of Manchester studies at the University of Oxford. where he completed a BA in History, focusing The awardees conduct a field research specifically on the 20th century history. In which takes place during the University’s 2013-2014 Edward attended the University summer vacations. The multi-disciplinary of Oxford to study for a MSc in Russian and field research is focused on an activity or East European Studies. For the course, his programme implemented in one or more research focused on Russia, minority rights, countries in which Generations For Peace and globalisation. Throughout his studies, volunteers operate. In terms of outputs, Edward has developed interests and gained each awardee is expected to provide a knowledge of current affairs, international full research report focused on the local politics, the history of war, development and activity/programme, including a detailed human rights. Edward’s specific interests write-up of the research conducted and include inter-group perspectives in conflict, any practical recommendations for the the sociocultural dynamics of conflict, and activity/programme organisers; and conflict mapping. The main geographical a supplementary report with further focuses of his research interests are in meta analysis and recommendations for Europe, Russia, the Caucasus and Central Generations For Peace regarding activity/ Asia. When not working, Edward enjoys programme adjustment and opportunities music, reading, hiking, cooking, travelling for further research. A key objective of and photography. Generations For Peace in supporting research grants is to support knowledge transfer and capacity development therefore, it is also expected that the awardees will use their best endeavours to demonstrate (within the limits of practical context of their particular research situation) some knowledge transfer to and capacity development of the local actors.

/generationsforpeaceeersree @Gens_For_Peaceesree /generationsforpeaceeersree /in/generationsforpeaceeersree www.generationsforpeace.org