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On Aims and Methods of Cognitive Ethology Author(S): Dale Jamieson On Aims and Methods of Cognitive Ethology Author(s): Dale Jamieson and Marc Bekoff Source: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1992, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1992), pp. 110-124 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192828 . Accessed: 26/01/2011 07:47 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The University of Chicago Press and Philosophy of Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. http://www.jstor.org On Aims and Methods of Cognitive Ethology1 Dale Jamieson and Marc Bekoff University of Colorado 1. Introduction In 1963 Niko Tinbergenpublished a paper, "On Aims and Methods of Ethology," dedicated to his friend Konrad Lorenz. This essay is a landmarkin the development of ethology. Here Tinbergen defines ethology as "the biological study of behavior" and seeks to demonstratethe "close affinity between Ethology and the rest of Biology" (p. 411). Building on Huxley (1942), Tinbergen identifies four major prob- lems of ethology: causation, survival value, evolution, and ontogeny. Concern with these problems, under different names (mechanism, adaptation,phylogeny, and devel- opment), has dominated the study of animal behavior during the last half century (Dawkins, et al. 1991; Dewsbury 1992). With his emphasis on the importance of innate structuresinternal to animals, Tinbergen was resolutely antibehaviorist. Yet he remained hostile to the idea that ethology should employ any form of teleological reasoning or make reference to "subjective phenomena" such as "hunger"or the emotions. He wrote that teleological reasoning was "seriously hampering the progress of ethology" and that "[b]ecause subjective phenomena cannot be observed objectively in animals, it is idle to either claim or to deny their existence" (1951, p. 4). Since the 1976 publication of Donald Griffin's landmarkbook, The Question of Animal Awareness, a growing band of researchershas been attempting to study the cognitive states of nonhuman animals (for samples of this work see Bekoff & Jamieson 1990, and Ristau 1991). Although vigorous debate surroundsthis research, cognitive ethology as a field has not yet been clearly delineated, adequately character- ized, or sufficiently explained. Our goal in this paper is to attempt for cognitive ethology what Tinbergen succeed- ed in doing for ethology: to clarify its aims and methods, to distinguish some of its va- rieties, and to defend the fruitfulness of the research strategies that it has spawned. This paper is divided into five main parts. In the first part we briefly sketch the history of ethology and explain the motivation behind the cognitive turn. Next we discuss the groundbreakingwork of Donald Griffin and the rise of cognitive ethology. PSA 1992, Volume 2, pp. 110-124 Copyright ? 1993 by the Philosophy of Science Association 111 In the third section we distinguish two varieties of cognitive ethology ("weak" and "strong")and provide some reasons for preferring the latter to the former. The fourth part of the paper is a discussion of one area of research in cognitive ethology: social play. Finally we make some concluding remarks. 2. The Story of Animal Behavior During the third quarterof the nineteenth century, Charles Darwin was the most importantcontributor to the foundations of animal behavior (Boakes 1984, Richards 1987). Darwin argued for mental continuity between humans and other animals, and claimed that "the lower animals, like man, manifestly feel pleasure and pain, happi- ness, and misery"(Darwin 1871, p. 448).3 According to Darwin monkeys are capable of elaborate deceit (1896), insects can solve problems, and many animals can deliber- ate about what to do (1871, 1896). Darwin's approach can be characterized as "anecdotal cognitivism." He attributed cognitive states to many animals on the basis of observation of particularcases rather than controlled experiments or manipulations. Darwin's follower, George Romanes, followed in the this tradition although he was more critical than Darwin of various cognitive attributionsto nonhuman animals. Even Lloyd Morgan, mainly remem- bered for his canon-"in no case may we interpretan action as the outcome of the ex- ercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpretedas the outcome of the exer- cise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale" (Morgan 1894, p. 53)-ac- cepted the Darwin-Romanes view of the continuity of mental states. Indeed, as Rollin (1989) points out, Morgan's canon is not only consistent with the view that animals have mental states, it actually presupposes it. Behaviorism arose in part as an attempt to overcome the anecdotal approach and to bring rigor to the study of behavior. Controlled experiments ratherthan field ob- servations provided the primary data, and basic concepts were supposed to be ground- ed in direct observation. Against this background, animal consciousness came to be seen as "... mystical, unscientific, unnecessary, obscure, and not amenable to study"(Rollin 1989, p. 68). Jacques Loeb, who was active from about 1890-1915, was an influential forerun- ner of behaviorism in biology. Although he believed that consciousness was an emer- gent propertyof higher organisms, he argued that all animal behavior could be ex- plained nonteleologically in terms of tropisms (Pauly 1987). Throughoutthe 1920s, with the work of Watson and others, behaviorism became increasingly influential. By 1930 the behaviorist revolution was complete and anecdotal cognitivism had virtually vanished from mainstream science. Classical ethology developed in Europe with the work of Lorenz and Tinbergen, and arrived in America in the post-World War II period (although as Dewsbury 1992 points out, there were contacts before the war). The roots of classical ethology were in the investigations of Darwin, Charles Otis Whitman, and Oskar Heinroth. Classical ethology signified a return to some of the ideas of Darwin and the early anecdotal cognitivists, especially in its appeals to evolutionary theory, the close asso- ciation with natural history, and the reliance on anecdote and anthropomorphismin motivating more rigorous study. Lorenz, who was trained as a physician, comparative anatomist, psychologist and philosopher, did little fieldwork but his knowledge of animal behavior was enormous. His method was to watch various animals, both domestic and wild, who lived near his 112 homes in Austria and Germany. He freely used anecdotes and did very little experi- mentation. Lorenz thought that empathy, intuition and emotion were importantin un- derstandinganimals and that science should not be pursued "in the belief that it is possible to be objective by ignoring one's feelings" (Lorenz 1988/1991, p. 7). He at- tributedto animals such states as love, jealousy, envy, and anger. Tinbergencomplemented Lorenz's naturalistic and anecdotal approaches by doing elegant, simple and usually relatively noninvasive field experiments. Tinbergen also worked with Lorenz on several classical problems, including egg-rolling in geese. Theoretically what was most importantabout Lorenz and Tinbergen was the em- phasis they placed on internal states such as "instincts," "drives," "motivationalim- pulses" and "outwardflowing nervous energy." On their view behavior is typically caused by internal states; external stimuli mainly release or block behavior. This em- phasis on internal states was in sharpcontrast with the behaviorist tradition. However by 1973 when Lorenz and Tinbergen were awarded the Nobel Prize (shared with Karl von Frisch), many thought that their grand theory was already in tatters (Kennedy 1992). As early as 1968 Patrick Bateson wrote that "[w]orship of the old gods and the intellectual baggage that went with it still survives quaintly in odd corers. But for the most part proponents of a Grand Theory have either been forced to close their eyes to awkward evidence or modify their ideas to the point of unfalsifiability" (p. 33). Marian Dawkins has written that "[m]ost contemporarytext- books on animal behaviour tend to dismiss 'instinct' altogether and attempt to consign it to honorable retirement"(Dawkins 1986, p. 67). In recent years no grand theory has arisen to replace the Lorenz-Tinbergentheory of instinct.
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