IOC Postgraduate Research Grant – Final Research Report

Title: Paradoxes of Humanism. Advocacy, the Olympic Movement, and the 1980 Olympic Boycott

Author: Umberto Tulli, Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane, Naples, and Università di Bologna, Forlì Campus

Abstract: This research investigates the controversy which developed in the mid-Seventies on the appropriateness of having the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, given the well-known repression of political dissident and its consequences both on bipolar détente and on Carter's campaign to implement the Olympic boycott to punish the Soviets for their invasion of Afghanistan. It emphasizes the strong continuity between the 1978 controversy and the 1980 boycott campaign by suggesting two main arguments. Firstly, Carter's boycott campaign found some valuable allies among human rights NGOs and activists. Secondly, to sell the boycott both domestically and internationally, the Carter administration frequently referred to human rights abuses in the and to the internal exile of Andrei Sakharov. In addition, the President demanded emigrated to explain the boycott decision to the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) and to American athletes.

Keywords: Moscow Olympics; boycott; human rights; détente; Soviet dissidents Paradoxes of Humanism. Human Rights Advocacy, the Olympic Movement, and the 1980 Olympic Boycott

Introduction

In the five-year period leading to the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow – the first Games to take place in a communist Country – a growing controversy emerged in the and other Western Countries on the appropriateness of holding the Olympic events in the Soviet Union. Given the blatant violations of human rights in the USSR – many argued – Soviet policy was in opposition with both the Olympic Charter and détente. Consequently, according to them, the Soviets had lost the right to host the Games. Historians tend to dismiss this controversy. Nicholas E. Sarantakes recalled that the IOC's decision to award Moscow the Olympic Games produced some negative reactions among American conservative politicians. Similarly, according to David B. Kanin, this campaign was “a footnote” in the boycott effort which developed after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979.1 This essay suggests that the campaign which developed in the Seventies against the Moscow Games deserves some specific attentions. Firstly, it is a perfect case study of the interaction between international policy and the Olympic Movement and an example of the clash between two sets of universal values: those promoted by the Olympic Charter and those recalled by human rights activists. Secondly, it offers a fresh insight into the growing opposition to bipolar détente and the ability of anti-détente forces to exploit the Olympic Games as a weapon to stop the bipolar dialogue. Thirdly, the controversy based on human rights shaped the debate on the American-led boycott, after the Soviets entered Afghanistan. In this sense, albeit motivated by the military aggression, Carter’s boycott effort could benefit from the contribution of human rights.

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This study is presented in the form of a historical narrative. It tries to intertwine diplomatic history, human rights history, the evolution of the American political debate and Olympic history. The tools and the analysis of diplomatic history permit to focus on the diplomatic interaction between the main actors of the boycott crisis: the United States government, the Soviet Union, the International Olympic Committee. Through the study of human rights history, this research aims at underlying

1 David B. Kanin, A Political History of the Olympic Games, Boulder, Westview Press, 1981; Nicholas E. Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch. , the Olympic Boycott and the , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011 the rise of human rights in the Seventies and the crucial role played by NGOs such as Amnesty International, the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, Watch. Olympic history permits to understand the IOC's response to the boycott issue and the political controversies which shaped the Olympic movement. Finally, the domestic debate within the United States offers an interesting perspective on the growing skepticism toward détente and any form of bipolar cooperation.

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The conclusions of this essay are informed and guided by a number of primary sources gathered from multiple archives. In the archives of the International Olympic Committee (Lausanne, ), I have consulted several relevant collection, such as the papers of Lord Killanin, and Juan Antonio Samaranch, the documents relating to the Moscow Olympic Games and to the boycott controversies; and those relating to the American and Soviet Olympic Committees. At the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (Atlanta, USA), I had the opportunity to consult the collection relating to the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, the National Security Advisor , the human rights policy and the Olympic task-force directed by Lloyd Cutler. I have also consulted the collection of the United States Olympic Committee related to the Moscow Olympic boycott (Colorado Springs, USA). In addition, I have studied the files related to the Moscow Olympic Games held at the British National Archives (London) and those of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry. I also had the opportunity to study the primary sources held at the Columbia University Center for Human Rights Documentation and Research (New York), namely the papers of the American section of Amnesty International and the documents of Helsinki Watch. Finally, some gaps in the USOC documents have been filled out through the private collection of Dr. Karen Raj, who is currently working on a history of the Olympic movement in the United States. Where possible, I have preferred to cite these documents in notes through their call number instead of the traditional indexation (Archives, Box and Folder).

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A final note. Since the growing body of secondary literature on the 1980 Olympic boycott, this research will not present a detailed analysis of every single step which led to the final boycott. Rather, it will highlight some specific moments, when the human rights issue gained prominence and reinforced the support of the boycott solution. The Olympic Movement during the Cold War

Political considerations have always played a role in Olympic history. Political decisions had led to Germany's exclusion in 1920 and 1924, as well as Russia's self-suspension during the '20s and ‘30s. More recently, after the failure of the international boycott against the 1936 Berlin Olympiads, international politics dictated two contemporaneous boycotts at the 1956 Olympic Games: , Switzerland and the decided to hinder the Olympics to publicly condemn the Soviet invasion of ; while Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq protested against the Anglo-French seizure of Suez. A new boycott was carried out by black African States in 1976 to protest the presence of New Zealand at the Montreal Games. New Zealand, in fact, had intensified its sports ties with the racist government of South Africa, which was banned from the Olympiads since 1964.2 International politics played a major role during the “Cold War Olympic Games”. Since the end of War World II, the Olympic movement has provided the United States and the Soviet Union with an international forum to compete – literally and metaphorically – in the bipolar conflict. Since its beginning, the Cold War was fought on several fronts. Aware of the disruptive and catastrophic effects of a nuclear war, the two superpowers avoided direct military confrontations in favor of more subtle demonstrations of their own power. The American containment doctrine soon deviated from its original focus on political and military aspects to encompass every aspects of international life. Both the USSR and the USA developed two competing and holistic ideologies, which embraced culture and sport, using them as a weapon to show the world the superiority of each political model.3 Sports tensions emerged in connection with the 1948 London Games, when the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) suggested that the United States government should have fed all the Olympic athletes. The Soviet magazine Ogonyak denounced this provocative gesture, by calling it a “pork trick,” as it was made to create profits for American canned pork. The Soviet magazine accused the United States of trying to make an excuse in case they lost at the Olympics. According to the magazine the United States would claim that the food “had enhanced the physical power of European Athletes”.4

2 For example: Richard Espy, The Politics of the Olympic Games, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979; Allen Guttmann, The Olympics. A History of the Modern Games, Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1994 3 On the inception of the Cold War, see for example: Federico Romero, Storia della Guerra Fredda, l'ultimo conflitto per l'Europa, Einaudi, 2009; Melvyn Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind. The United States, the Soviet Union and the Cold War, New York, Hill and Wang, 2008 4 Richard Espy, The Politics of the Olympics, p.79 Behind these polemics there was the issue of Soviet participation to the Olympic Movement. Since the 1917 Revolution, the Russians (then, the Soviets) had been critical of the IOC, denouncing it as a bourgeois and imperialist tool to divert workers’ attention from the class struggle. After the second World War, in part to bypass the American containment and the consequent growing international isolation, in part to score some propaganda points, the Soviets developed a dialogue with the IOC asking to be admitted in the Olympic family. Within the IOC, Soviet actions were met with trepidation, great hopes and deep fears. Both President Sigfrid Edstrom and vice President Avery Brundage wanted to extend the Olympic boundary in order to include the Soviet Union and to mirror the new forces relationships. At the same time, they had a number of reservations, given their anticommunist stance, the conservative nature of the IOC and, above all, the Soviets’ inability to comply with the amateur clause of the Olympic Charter. Writing to Brundage, Edstrom explained his doubts:

“sport like everything else in Russia is organized by the State. There are no clubs like in our countries. It is a committee appointed by the State that runs everything with government money. The leader of the committee is consequently a paid man. (...) All athletes competing in foreign countries are especially trained at the expense of the State and are taught to compete in a fighting spirit".5

In another letter, he went further by almost admitting that he did not want communists inside the IOC:

There are three Olympic Committees at Present asking for recognition, , Hungary and Yugoslavia... The political influence in said countries is now communistic as a communist minority has the political power in each country supported by Russia, but politics must not mix in with sports, therefore we cannot turn them down because the political influence in their country is communistic. (...) I am against turning people down for political reasons. The greatest trouble will be to find men that we can have present in the IOC. I do not feel inclined to go as far as to admit communists there".6

Brundage agreed. According to him, the Soviets should remain outside the Olympic Movement, since “every time they (the Soviets) force a Federation to break its own rules in order to let them compete, Russian prestige is increased and Western prestige is decreased”.7 The dilemma the IOC faced was that under communist the rule, the Soviet Union could not completely adhere to the Olympic Charter. However, denying the Soviet Union acceptance into the Olympic Movement based on its politics also violated the Olympic Charter. In addition, the Soviets had posed some strict conditions on their participation which the IOC could not accept (i.e. Russian would become an official language of the IOC; the IOC would expel Franco's Fascist Spain; Soviet members would have been admitted in the Executive Board). Ultimately, the IOC turned Soviet

5 Letter, Edstrom to Brundage, 4 December 1946. I wish to thank Dr. Karen Raj for sharing this document with me. 6 Letter, Edstrom to Brundage, 3 September 1947. Dr. Karen Ray collection 7 Letter, Brundage to Edstrom, 21 January 1947. Dr Karen Ray collection application down because, at that time, the Soviets did not have a formal Olympic Committee. It was only in 1951, when the Soviets created a National Olympic Committee, that Soviet presence in the Olympic movement was finally accepted with a large majority (31 in favor, 3 abstentions).8 The following year, during the Helsinki Games, the Cold War officially entered the Olympic movement. Tensions emerged before the opening of the Games. Stalin’s fears and paranoia determined an atmosphere of official hostility. Stalin refused the passage of the Olympic torch in Soviet territory. Soviet athletes were housed in a separate Olympic village near the Soviet naval base at Porkkala. Soviet officials accompanied the athletes wherever they went and blocked every attempt of fraternization with Western athletes. to and when he obtained from the Finnish Olympic Committee the creation of a separate Olympic village for Soviet athletes.9 New York Times columnist Arthur Daley captured the Cold War meaning of the Helsinki Games:

“There will be 71 nations in the Olympics at Helsinki. The U.S. would like to beat all of them but the only one that counts is Soviet Russia. The communist propaganda machine must be silenced so that there can't be even one distorted bleat out of it in regard to the Olympics. In sports, the red brothers have reached the put-up-or-shut-up stage. Let's shut them up. Let's support the United States Olympic team”.10

The United States and the Soviet Union strenuously fought to win the highest number of medals since the Helsinki Games. Their meaning went beyond sports terms: they represented the superiority of one political system over the other. The Americans could claim their victory against the Soviets (American athletes won 76 medals, while the Soviets 71) in Helsinki, but the Soviets won the medal count in 1956, 1960, 1964, 1972 and, above all, 1976, when the United States finished behind the USSR and the DDR.11 As this rivalry developed, it became increasingly apparent that the American sport system was ill-equipped to keep pace with that of the Soviet Union. In addition, American public frequently exorcized their Olympic weakness vis-à-vis the Soviets, denouncing the non-amateur nature of Soviet sports; the ideological indoctrination and brainwashing; the use of threats, punishments and rewards that the regime imposed on the athletes; the immoral use of drugs, steroids, hormones which were supposed to androgyny women athletes. As recently argued by Rob Beamish e Ian Ritchie, “steroids became... the atomic bomb of Cold War sport”.12

8 Robert Edelman, Serious Fun. A History of Spectator Sport in the USSR, New York & Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993; Baruch A. Hazan, Olympic Sports and Propaganda Games: Moscow 1980, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1992 9 See, for example, Allenn Guttmann , The Olympics, p.97 10 Arthur Daley, “Every Little Bit Helps”, New York Times, 10 June 1952 11 It is worth noting that the IOC has refused to accept such a classification, remembering that the Olympic Games are contests among athletes, not Countries 12 Rob Beamish and Ian Ritchie, "Totalitarian Regimes and Cold War Sport", in Stephen Wagg and David L. Andrews, East Plays West. Sport and the Cold War, Rutledge, London and New York, 2007, pp13 – 18 . See also Thomas M. Hunt, “Sport, Drugs, and the Cold War: The Conundrum of Olympic Doping Policy: 1970-1979” in OLYMPIKA: The International Journal of Olympic Studies, Vol.16, 2007, pp.19-42 Every American administration tried to develop its own approach to the Olympic Cold War. Eisenhower was the first American President to understand the importance of the Olympic campaign in Cold War politics. Eisenhower was shocked by a 1953 article on the Journal of Health, Physical Education and Recreation, where Hans Kraus and Ruth P. Hirschland denounced the weak conditions of American children. In July 1956, as a result of the alarming findings, the President created a Council on Youth Fitness at the Cabinet level and appointed a Citizens Advisory Committee on the Fitness of American Youth, composed of prominent citizens interested in fitness.13 Not only Eisenhower was preoccupied with physical readiness, he also understood the importance of sports (and especially Olympic sports) as a propaganda tool. Concerned with "the possible adverse psychological effects which a USSR victory at the 1956 Olympics in Melbourne, Australia, in November 1956 would have upon world opinion and attitude toward the U.S.", the Eisenhower Administration developed an important program to "minimize any adverse psychological" effects of a Soviet victory and to highlight Western athletic achievements. Specifically, it demanded the USIA (United States Information Agency), the CIA and the USOC to cooperate in a wide propaganda effort. USOC, in particular, was required to:

"protest to the International Olympic body which controls the conduct of the Games, pointing out the several facts in the case: a) that USSR athletes are all professionals; b) that the scoring system by nationality is not in keeping with the spirit of the Olympics; c) that scoring should be done on the basis of individual performance, as the purpose of the Olympics is to encourage individual participation; and d) that the communists are the only group that seek to base the accomplishment of their athletes on an ideological principle".14

The Kennedy and the Johnson administration followed a similar path: they increased USIA's special budget for propaganda actions through the Olympic Games and they reinforced the education program for American youth. Indeed, according to President Kennedy, “we face in the Soviet Union a powerful and implacable adversary determined to show the world that only the Communist system possesses the vigor and determination necessary to satisfy awakening aspirations for progress and the elimination of poverty and want”. Consequently, the “defense of freedom in the years to come” required American to be physically strong.15

13 Dwight Eisenhower, Message to the President’s Conference on the Fitness of the American Youth”, 19 June 1956, in Public Papers of the President of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, pp.577-599. See also Hans Kraus, Ruth P. Hirschland, “Muscular Fitness and Health”, in Journal of Health, Physical Education and Recreation, Vol. 24, December 1953, pp.10-17; Jack Walsh, 'Condition of Youth Alarms Eisenhower', Washington Post, 12 July 1955; Leonard Buder, 'Eisenhower Acts on Youth Fitness', New York Times, 20 June 1956; H. Rusk, 'The State of the Union's Health', New York Times, 22 July 1956 14 Memorandum from Ralph Busick for the Cultural Presentation Committee, “”Professionalization at the Olympic Games –Melbourne, Nov. 1956”, 30 November 1955, Historical Archives of the International Olympic Committee, Lausanne, (hereinafter IOC Archives), CD-Rom “White House Document”. 15 John F. Kennedy, “The Soft American,” in Sports Illustrated, 26 December 1960. See also Thomas Michael Domer, Sport in Cold War America, 1953-1963: The Diplomatic and Political Use of Sport in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, PhD Disseration, Marquette University, 1976; Thomas M. Hunt, “American Sport Policy and the Cultural Cold War: The Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Years”, Journal of Sport History, Vol.33, No.3 (2006), pp. 274 Détente and Olympism

At the end of the Sixties, bipolar relations began to change, inaugurating a period known as “détente”. As argued by historian Julian E. Zalizer, it was a “centrist national security agenda”, which avoided the “extremes of the era: massive military retrenchment (left) and massive military escalation (right)”. Détente represented both an attempt to develop a structural dialogue with the Soviet Union and China, capitalizing on their differences, and an attempt to develop a set of rules, norms, procedures within the Cold War order. Sports and the Olympic Movement did play an important, albeit mostly symbolic, role.16 Although peripheral in the crowded web of treaties between East and West, both sides of the Iron Curtain signed agreements and protocols to reinforce sports dialogue, while National Olympic Committees developed several exchange and cooperation programs. In the summer of 1971, for example, the Soviet Ice-Hockey federation invited Murray Williams, the coach of the American national team, to Moscow and offered him a tour of sports structures and a demonstration of training practices. The favor was returned in 1973, when the Soviet basketball national team went to the United States to play a 6-match series against American university teams. This competition was charged with specific meaning because it occurred just one year after the controversial defeat of the American basketball team at the 1972 Olympic Games.17 Sports’ crucial importance in détente was exemplifies by the Helsinki Agreement (1975), apex and seal of détente. In the so-called "Basket Three", the section devoted to human rights and cooperation in humanitarian fields, the United States, the Soviet Union and all the European Countries agreed on

“In order to expand existing links and co-operation in the field of sport the participating States will encourage contacts and exchanges of this kind, including sports meetings and competitions of all sorts, on the basis of the established international rules, regulations and practice”.18

In the following years, the Soviet Union developed even further this commitment: by the end of 1978, the Soviet National Olympic Committee had concluded cooperation agreements with NOCs

– 297. 16 Julian Zelizer, “Détente and Domestic Politics”, Diplomatic History, Vol.33, Issue 4 (2009), pp.653-670 17 Chris Elzey, “Cold War on The Court: the 1973 American-Soviet Basketball Series”, in North American Society for Sport History (NASSH) Proceedings, 2000, pp. 17-19; John Soares, “The Cold War on Ice”, in Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol.14, No.2, 2008 18 The text of the Helsinki Final Act is available on line: http://athena.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html from , , , , Netherlands, and , developing a system which would have led more than 30.000 athletes in the Soviet Union.19 Mirroring the very nature of détente, these progresses in sports cooperation did not represent the end of bipolar rivalry. Instead, they provided new ways and means to compete through the Olympic Games. Presidents Nixon and Ford chose to compete with the Soviets through a bureaucratic re- organization of the American sports system. After the disappointing performance at the 1972 Munich Games, Nixon studied the ways to redefine the American amateur system, which was based on several organizations and associations. In a 1973 memorandum, John F. Lehman wrote to National Security Advisor Kissinger that “the ineptness of the US Olympic Committee made a large contribution to our poor showing in Moscow… if this chaos is not corrected, our international performance will continue to decline, and in 1976 Olympics, our bicentennial year, we will be drubbed”.20 Between 1972 and 1975, the administration discussed several options and, finally, decided to proceed with the creation of a Presidential Commission on Olympic Sports. Due to inadequate funding and congressional delays, the Commission was slow to come into existence. An executive order was signed on December 28, 1974, but not formally issued. After many delays, a new executive order (11868) was drafted and the Commission was officially created on June 19, 1975. It consisted of 13 presidential appointees, two Congressmen appointed by the House Speaker, and two Senators appointed by the Senate President. On July 21, 1975, Executive Order 11873 increased to four the number appointed from each house of Congress. The other appointees were either former athletes or involved in amateur or professional sports in some way. As indicated in its first report to the President, the Commission was formed “partly in response to the continuing conflicts among various organizations involved with amateur sports in this country and partly in response to declining performance by the United States in international competition such as the Olympic Games”.21 In his signing statement, President Ford directed the Commission to make a “full and complete study and evaluation of the Unites States Olympic Committee,” investigate the jurisdictional problems which kept the US from consistently placing the best athletes into international competitions, and study all matters related to US participation in international competition. The Final Report, which was submitted to President Carter in 1977, proposed to define

19 Baruch A. Hazan, Olympic Sports and Propaganda Games, p.31; C.R. Siekman, "The Boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games", in A. Bloed, P. Van Dijk, (ed. by), Essays on Human Rights in the Helsinki Process, Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, Marrtinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985, pp. 183-200 20 John F. Lehman, Memorandum to , 18 August 1973, in IOC Archives, CD-Rom “White House Document”. See also Thomas M. Hunt, “Countering the Soviet Threat in the Olympic Medals Race,” International Journal of the History of Sport 24 (June 2007), pp. 796-818 21 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology, Hearings Before Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology on the Amateur Sports Act, 95th Congress, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1978 a new amateur system, vertically organized and led by the USOC. In addition, USOC was required to be autonomous from the Federal government but, at the same time, it would have been economically dependent on the Congress.22 While the bureaucratic re-organization was under discussion, sports diplomacy during détente allowed Moscow to be selected as the host city for the 1980 Olympic Games. Soviet leaders started toying with the idea of having the Games in their country since 1962, when the 59th IOC Conference opened in Moscow. The IOC's conservative nature and the anti-Soviet attitude of many Western IOC members prevented the Soviets from submitting an application to host the Games. It was only in 1969, when détente started, that Moscow submitted its first application to host the 1976 Games. A year later, Montreal and Los Angeles entered the race. Despite the prestige of the Olympics, Nixon offered little support to the Los Angeles Olympic committee. As recently argued by historian N. E. Sarantakes, this attitude changed dramatically when a committeeman, Rodney Rood, “explained that the Soviet Union had decided to make a bid to host the gathering and that the selection process had quickly become a contest of prestige within Cold War”. When Montreal was chosen as the host city, after a second vote, Moscow angrily protested and accused the IOC of cheating in favor of the West. It was – TASS agency denounced – "a blow to the Olympic Movement and its ideals".23 Beyond the protests, however, Soviet leaders learned an important lesson: a vast campaign should have developed if they wanted to host the Games. In November 1971, with the submission of a new Moscow’s application, the campaign to host the 1980 Games officially started. Between 1973 and 1974, IOC's officials were frequently invited in Moscow. The Soviet campaign reached its climax in 1973, when Moscow hosted the World University Games. The event favorably impressed IOC's new President, Lord Killanin. Some four thousand athletes from seventy nations, tourists and journalists went to Moscow and the organizing committee was able to organize their permanence in the Soviet Union. Lord Killanin frequently expressed his own satisfaction with the Students Games:

"The World Student Game is not a dress rehearsal prior to an application by Moscow for the 1980 Olympic Games. But it is also quite natural that, while in Moscow as the IOC President, I make inquiries about administrative problems, communications, television. Telephone and other such problems. And I must say that everything I learned has been extremely favorable".24

22 Gerald R. Ford, 'Statement on the Establishment of the President's Commission on Olympic Sports, June 19, 1975', in Public Papers of the Presidents: Gerald R. Ford, 1975 vol. 1, 835-6 ; “Final Report of the President's Commission on Olympic Sports”, 13 January 1977, in IOC Archives, Folder D-RM-01-ETATU035; “Olympic Power Structure”, in Washington Post, 7 June 1977; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology, Hearings Before Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology on the Amateur Sports Act, 95th Congress, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1978. 23 N. Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch, p. 33 24 Baruch A. Hazan, Olympic Sports and Propaganda Games, p.75 In May 1974, IOC officials met in Vienna to choose the host city for the 1980 Games The ballot, which for the second time was between Los Angeles and Moscow, East and West, ended with the selection of the Soviet city. It was, in part, a natural choice, considering the brilliant, albeit short, Soviet tradition in Olympic sports and the excellent campaign communist authorities had developed. It was also a consequence of IOC's decision to award Lake Placid, an American city, the Winter Games. But it was, above all, a consequence of détente. As Lord Killanin wrote in his Memoirs:

"the vote in favor of Moscow was almost unanimous (and) in 1974 most of the West voted for Moscow. Had it become a political vote the IOC, which is basically, conservative, might have voted differently. But this was the height of East- West détente and, in any case, the voting was based purely on sporting grounds. The result was almost universally welcomed. (...) No doubt people thought in casting their vote for Moscow they were supporting the mood of détente. That apart, on the question of sporting infrastructure and organization there was only one candidate".25

The Soviets, too, considered the vote as a political demonstration of the correctness of their choice in favor of détente. As the Manual for the party activist reported:

“for the first time in history the Games will be held in a socialist country, the country whose foreign policy embodies, as it were, the major ideals of the Olympic movement, namely, the striving for peace, friendship and cooperation among nations”.26

However, in the United States and to a lesser extent in Western Europe, a growing controversy emerged on the appropriateness of having the Games in the Soviet Empire, given the repressive nature of Communist power. Sports and the Olympic Games were not only a tool to bring people together and to reinforce international dialogue. They also were a means to resist and criticize détente.

The declining stocks of Détente and the rise of the opposition against the Moscow Games

When Moscow was announced as the host city for the 1980 Olympic Games, detente was a declining process. Several factors can explain the growing difficulties detente was facing both in the United States and internationally. Among them, the American skepticism toward Soviet intentions and actions played a major role. The American critics of detente were led by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D. - Washington) who, in 1972 with Rep. Charles Vanik (D. - Ohio), introduced a particular amendment to the 1972 Commercial treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Exploiting Soviet decision to introduce an "exit tax" on all emigrants, Jackson and Vanik

25 Lord Killanin, My Olympic Years, London, Secker and Warburg Ltd, 1983, pp.172-173 26 Excerpt from the Manual for Party Activist in CIA Memorandum, “USSR: Olympic Games Preparations”, JCPL demanded to link the possibility to grant the USSR the "most favored nation" (MFN) commercial status to the respect of the right of free emigration. After a two-year legislative fight, which opposed the White House and the Soviet Union to Jackson and his supporters, the Jackson-Vanik amendment finally passed with a vast majority and signed into law in early January 1975. Moscow denounced the amendment as an intolerable interference in its domestic affairs and, consequently, renounced to the 1972 commercial treaty. A fundamental piece in detente was now missing.27 As the Jackson-Vanik dispute had demonstrated, the human rights issue stimulated a wide domestic consensus for a foreign policy founded on old moral and ideological certainties and which was able to highlight the human rights dimension in East-West relations. Indeed, during Jackson's campaign and in the following years, “a détente with a human face” became a constant slogan in the American political discourse. This stance was reinforced by a new wave of Soviet repression which shocked the American public.28 In 1975, American attention toward Soviet dissenters was at the apex: in January, President Ford signed the Jackson-Vanik amendment into law, and at the end of July he flew to Helsinki to sign the “Final Act,” intensifying the on-going debate over détente and human rights. The domestic opposition to détente arose when President Ford failed to meet the exiled Russian author Alexandr Solzhenitsyn. Senator Helms (Rep – NC) asked the President to explain his decision and the Washington Post cartoonist Herb Block criticized several times Ford and Kissinger’s decision.29 The double decision to be in Helsinki and to avoid the meeting with the dissident produced some criticism from Democrats as well. Senator Henry Jackson said “There are times in international diplomacy when the President of the United States ought to stay home”. Foreshadowing his upcoming presidential nomination challenge to Ford, former California Governor Ronald Reagan said that Ford’s trip to Helsinki had placed “our stamp of approval on Russia’s enslavement of the captive nations” and strongly declared “I am against it and I think all Americans should be against it”. All the major newspapers hosted negative articles and public attitudes focused upon the “betrayal of Soviet dissenters” and upon the “inviolability of the borders” theme. Newsweek writer Alfred Friendly, for example, wrote that “in practice basket III proves relatively empty”.30 However, the Helsinki Agreement was a real turning point in the as well as for dissidents in Eastern Europe. Indeed, two unexpected sources prioritized the human rights

27 Mario Del Pero, The Eccentric Realist. Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2010 28 Mario Del Pero, The Eccentric Realist; Paula Stern, Water’s Edge. Domestic Politics and the Making of Foreign Policy, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1979 29 George F. Will, “Solzhenitsyn and the President”, The Washington Post, 11 July 1975 30 , A Time to Heal: the Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford, New York, Harper and Row, 1979, p. 300; Hon. “Monitoring the Helsinki Accord”, in Congressional Record, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, p.7737; "Memorandum of Conversation", August 11-12, 1975, in NARA II, RG 59, Accession A1, 5552, box 1, Folder "Leg 7: Codel Albert"; Alfred Friendly Jr, “Cold War to Cold Peace”, in Newsweek, 21 July 1975. component of the Helsinki agreements. One was unofficial and based in Moscow – the Helsinki Watching Group – the other one was a congress-created body. They jointly worked in order to guarantee a real application of the “Third Basket”, through a public monitoring of Countries’ adherence to the Helsinki Accords. On September 9, 1975, back to Washington after being part of a Congressional delegation in Moscow, Millicent Fenwick (R. – NJ) introduced a bill calling for the creation of a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Members of Congress hailed favorably the Commission’s establishment. Representative Joshua Eilberg (D – PA) testified that “There should be no doubt that unless there is a constant public monitoring of how the various signatories to the Helsinki Declaration live up to the promises of the section on human rights they will be ignored by the Soviet Union and, quite probably, other East European Countries”. And in March 1976, Jackson announced his support for the Commission, reflecting a first shift in public perception of the Agreements. CSCE became the logical framework for the development of the campaign for the respect of human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.31 It was within this human rights campaign that a growing opposition to the Moscow Olympic Games began to question the possibility of having the Games in the Soviet city. In reality, early attempts to stop the Games from going to Moscow began in 1972, when Morton Riweck of the American Jewish Committee wrote a memorandum for the members of his association to explain them that the International Olympic Committee was considering Moscow as the host city. Denouncing IOC's poor attention toward Soviet abuses of human rights, Riweck defined a draft strategy to sensitize the International Olympic Committee to the human rights issue, proposing to address petitions to both the USOC and the IOC. He also specified that activists should avoid directly referring to an Olympic boycott, since it would have been detrimental to the aim of promoting the respect of human rights in the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Olympic Games were supposed to be a political tool with a clear "positive" function: they would have become a "leverage" for the advancement of human rights in the Soviet Union. However, this position was immediately contested within the American Jewish Congress and the many other organizations which composed the National Conference on Soviet Jewry. Several officials believed that a moderate position would have not modified Soviet repressive nature. Thus, they proposed to immediately start a campaign demanding the IOC not to accept Moscow as he host city and, eventually, threatening an Olympic boycott. To avoid any division within the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, the organization executive

31 Statement of Joshua Eilberg, 4 May 1976, in Hearings Before the Subcommettee on International Political and Military Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of the Representatives, 94th Congress, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1976. See also Sarah Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War. A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network, Cambridge University Press, 2011; Paul Goldberg, The Final Act: the Dramatic, Revealing Story of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, New York, Morrow, 1988 board appointed a special committee to define the organization's official position toward the possibility of having the Games in Moscow.32 In the same period, Moscow was hosting the 1973 World Student Games. The staging of this event was a sort of testing ground for the IOC final decision. Accordingly, Moscow authorities invited Killanin and other IOC officials to the opening of the event. While Killanin considered positively the Games, several incidents, protests and manifestations took place. After the victory of the Israeli basketball team, for example, activists for free emigrations organized a non-authorized rally demanding Soviet authorities “to let their people go”. Western newspapers reported that the rally had been violently suppressed by Soviet authorities. Representative Edward Koch (R. - New York) demanded the IOC not to vote for Moscow arguing that what happened during the University Games was a clear demonstration of Soviet inability to comply with the Olympic charter and its fundamental values.33 In this action, Koch was not alone. Between September and October, the International Olympic Committee and the U.S. Olympic committee (USOC) received several petitions, appeals, and letters of protest against the “immoral nature of Soviet power”, “the political nature of Soviet sports” and which emphasized that “it (was) morally wrong to recompense the Soviet anti-Semitism”.34 On the public level, IOC President Lord Killanin played down the importance of these protests, reaffirming the non-political nature of Olympic sports and explaining that the incidents at the University Games had been overstated by Western journalists.35 Privately, however, Killanin and Monique Berlioux, the Executive Officer of the IOC, wrote to Andrianov, Soviet representative within IOC, to explain that Western protests had weakened Moscow’s prospective to obtain the Games.36 In the weeks before the IOC was scheduled to vote, protests and actions multiplied. In June, some activists from the NCSJ demanded the IOC to vote against Moscow. Mirroring American activism, the British Association for Jewish Youth addressed the IOC similar petitions. Despite this growing opposition, IOC members voted almost unanimously to have the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. This decision increased the number of protests in the United States as well as in Western Europe. Loretta Rifkin, an official of the Jewish organization B'nai B'rith, protested vehemently, while Bill Bradley, who in 1964 had been an Olympian and in 1980 32 Both positions are outlined in Memorandum from Morton Riwek to David Geller, “1980: Olympics”, 20 December 1972, National Conference on Soviet Jewry Papers, Box 54, Folder Olympic Games, Center for Jewish History, New York 33 Congressman Koch Press Release, 11 September 1973, National Conference on Soviet Jewry Papers, Box 54, Folder Olympic Games 34 For example: Resolution adopted by the Association for Soviet Jewish Youth, 26th July 1973, in IOC Archives, Folder JOBOYCO-20433; Resolution adopted by the Society for Humanity and Social Reform, 7th August 1974, in IOC Archives, Folder D-RM-01-RUSSI006. See also the petition from the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry to the USOC, 23 September 1973, Box 279, United States Olympic Committee Archives (USOC Archives), Colorado Springs 35 Letter, Killanin to Sir Samuel Fisher Alderman, 3rd April 1973; Letter, Mme Monique Berlioux to Edward Koch, 12th September 1973, both in IOC Archives, Folder D-RM-01-RUSSI006 36 Memorandum, Berlioux and Killanin to Constantin Andrianov, “Re: Moscow Candidature for the 1980 Olympic Games”, 1st April 1974, IOC Archives, Folder D-RM-01-RUSSI006 would have been elected to the American Senate – demanded the U.S. to boycott the Games until the moment when real and mutual understanding among nations would have become a crucial aspects in the four-year festival.37 However, these negative reactions seemed to disappear in the following years. It was, in part, a natural consequence of the Olympic evolution. Since the host city had been chosen and the Games were still far, the Olympic issue lost momentum and importance in the public debate. It was also a consequence of Jimmy Carter’s election to the White House. During the electoral campaign and then, once in office, Carter proclaimed human rights "to be a fundamental tenet of American foreign policy". In November he wrote a telegram to , and, in December, Cyrus Vance met at the White House. In January, during a CSCE Commission’s hearing, Vance testified that the Helsinki agreement “imposes an obligation on all signatory states to expect that other signatories, including the United States, might raise questions about any and all violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” On January 26, the Department of State harshly criticized Czechoslovakian Government for arresting the activists of Charta 77 and, the following day, it expressed American solidarity to Andrei Sakharov. In the following months, Carter wrote to the Soviet scientist once again, met Vladimir Bukovski and protested the process against Yuri Orlov, Aleksandr Ginzburg and the other monitors of the Moscow based group. When Congress debated and authorized the presidential request to increase Radio Free Europe / Radio budget, Carter stressed “our most crucial audience for international broadcasting are in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where censorship and controlled media give the peoples of the area distorted or inadequate views of the U.S., as well as of crucial events within their own countries and in the world at large”. Finally, Carter appointed Arthur Goldberg as Ambassador to the CSCE Conference of .38 This new emphasis on human rights issues removed them as a political tool to criticize American foreign policy, thus reducing the possibility to protest against the American neglect toward IOC's decision to have the Games in the Soviet Union.

37 Loretta Rifkin a Lord Killanin, 26 December 1976, in IOC Archives, Folder CIO-1980-BOYCO- 205638; Bill Bradley “Five Ways to Reform the Olympics”, New York Times, 21 July 1976; Petition of the Association for Jewish Youth 26 luglio 1974, IOC Archives, JO-BOYCO-20433 38 Department of State Bulletin, n. 76, 14/02/1977, p. 122; Dante Fascell, “Report on International Broadcasting”, in Congressional Record, 95th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 8732 – 8733 and David Binder, “Carter Requests Funds for Big Increase in Broadcasts”, in New York Times, 23 March 1977 ; “From Helsinki to Belgrade,” in Washington Post, 9 August 1977, e Andrei Sakharov, “By Sakharov, And About Him”, in New York Times, 4 October 1977. For the appointment of Arthur Goldberg see, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977 - 1981, New York, Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983, p. 300.On the role of the CSCE Commission toward Belgrade, see Congressional Record, 95th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 30227 – 30230, 21 September 1977 e Vance’s letter to Fascell, 28 February 1977, in NARA I, RG 519 “Record of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,” Box 48, Folder 4 “State Department Correspondence”. See, also, Umberto Tulli, “Tra diritti umani e distensione. L'amministrazione Carter, il Congresso e l'Unione Sovietica” in Contemporanea. Rivista di Storia dell’800 e del 900, No. 2/2010, pp. 261-284 Soviet Trials and the Boycott Proposal

In early 1978, Carter’s human rights campaign toward the Soviet Union shifted from open to quiet diplomacy. Two reasons could explain this change. Firstly, Soviet authorities seemed able to comply with some of the American pressures on human rights. Despite the arrests of the members of the Helsinki monitoring groups, Soviet authorities allowed a greater number of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel and to the United States. In addition, they favored the reunification of some families divided by the Cold War and they stopped the jamming of Voice of America and all the other Western broadcasts in the Soviet Union. By shifting from open to quiet diplomacy, the Administration hoped to reinforce these trends and to favor a conclusion in SALT II negotiations for the reduction of nuclear weapons.39 Secondly, American domestic policy seemed to favor a change in the human rights campaign. At the end of 1977, Brzezinski pointed out that the primary problems for the human rights campaign could emerge from the domestic political debate and – above all – from Congress:

“Relations between Congress and the Administration in the human rights area are at a very low ebb. It is hard to accept, given your own deep commitment to this issue, but most human rights advocates in Congress believe that, were it not for their continuing pressure and vigilance, the Administration would renege on its commitment to human rights”.40

Brzezinski’s conclusions were confirmed by Anthony Lake who, in early January 1978, outlined a positive balance for the human rights policy. After reviewing the major actions undertaken for the promotion of human rights in the world, Lake highlighted that

“the human rights policy has helped us at least as much as it has produced changes abroad. Our Post-Vietnam, post- Watergate image has been greatly improved. To a large degree we have taken the ideological initiative from the Soviets. This boost our standing … in Europe, and helps in our relations with a number of LDC's. The policy is especially appealing – and encouraging – to many people living under repressive regimes”.41

Equally important, the human rights campaign was not detrimental to other US interests, “in any quantifiable way”. Especially with the Soviet Union, “it does not, in fact, seem yet to have interfered with SALT and other arms control negotiation, or US-Soviet dealings in other areas”. The major problems could eventually emerge in dealings with Congress. According to Lake's memorandum:

39 Memorandum from Jerry Goodman to the Files, “Meeting with Sec. Vance”, April 1978, Jerry Goodman Files, Box 8, Folder 3, Center for Jewish History, New York; CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, Significant Developments Related to the U.S. Stand on Human Rights – USSR and Eastern Europe”, NLC-31-39-1-15-8, JCPL 40 Memorandum from Brzezinski for the President, “Human Rights”, December 1977, NLC-126-10-7-1-2, JCPL 41 Memorandum from Anthony Lake to the Secretary, “The Human Rights Policy: An Interim Assessment”, NARA, RG 59, Warren Christopher Papers, Box 19, Folder 1 “those Congressmen most interested in human rights like what we say, but remain skeptical of our actions. Our role in legislation has so far been largely reactive, and is seen by many as damage-limiting. It is generally believed, for instance, that we would not be applying human rights criteria to economic assistance if Congress had not ordered us to do so”.42

Despite some minor differences, both analysis consolidated the idea that the human rights campaign had produced no negative consequence for détente and that the real challenges emerged from domestic politics. These conclusions were confirmed by the domestic reactions to Carter’s human rights policy at the end of 1977. All major newspapers hosted editorials condemning the American campaign for its shortcomings. Several journalists blamed Carter for his softening stand on human rights and for the many contradictions in his policy, since the permanence of contacts with several authoritarian regimes. Others criticized Carter’s firm stance on human rights violations in the Soviet Union. According to them, Carter didn’t come up to the expectations to reform American foreign policy, and he seemed to have revived the anti Soviet crusade of the early Cold War. Addressing these forms of criticisms, the administration progressively chose to discuss Soviet violations of human rights through quiet diplomacy channels while it decided to openly contrast human rights violations occurring within allied Countries.43 This shift, however, occurred when the Soviet Union was militarily engaged in the Horn of Africa and when it announced the starting of the trials against many well-known dissidents, such as Yuri Orlov, Nathan Shcharansky, Aleksandr Ginzburg. The Carter administration understood that these trials represented a crucial test ground: a strong reaction could have started a spiral of retaliations which would have been detrimental to détente and the SALT II negotiations; a cautious response would have confirmed conservatives and neoconservatives’ criticism toward Carter’s foreign policy. Accordingly, when the dissidents were sentenced, the American administration formally protested but hesitated before introducing some measures which eventually would have weakened détente with the Soviets.44 Within the United States these measures were perceived as inadequate. Academicians vehemently protested: the Committee of Concerned Scientists and the Scientists for Sakharov Orlov Shcharansky coordinated a campaign against Soviet authorities, while a delegation of scientists

42 ibidem 43 Tad Szulc, “Is Jimmy Carter losing Faith? The Plot Against Human Rights”, NARA, RG 59, Warren Christopher Papers, Box 15, Folder 8; Leslie Oelsner, “Civil Liberties Group Says the President Has Erratic Record on Human Rights”, New York Times, 29 January 1978; Jahangir Amusegar, “Rights and Wrongs”, New York Times, 29 January 1978; Richard Burt, “Carter Asks for No Cut in Arms Aid to Marcos Despite Negative Human Rights Report”, New York Times, 6 February 1978; Karen E. House, “U.S. Officials Worry Over Inconsistencies in Human Rights Plan”, Wall Street Journal, 11 May 1978; Stanley Hoffmann, “The Hell of Good Intentions”, Foreign Policy N. 29 (Winter 1977- 1978). 44 Memorandum, from Melvyn Levitsky for the Secretary, Marshall Shulman, William Leurs, M. Garrison, “The Shcharansky Case”, 18th February 1978, NLC-15-94-6-1-5, JCPL. announced the cancellation of its mission in the USSR. The National Conference on Soviet Jewry demanded the American Government to suspend all the programs of cooperation with the Soviets in the cultural, scientific and technological fields, while dozens of activists from the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry gathered in front of Aerflot offices in New York, demanding to be transferred to Moscow as political prisoners. A number of Congressmen, too, demanded a radical change in détente. Donald W. Riegle (R. - Michigan), for example, claimed that the trials opened enough room to doubt the Soviets' intentions, while Robert Dole (R. – Kansas) introduced a resolution calling for the interruption of all the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, including the SALT II. Senator Packwood (R. - Oregon) demanded the federal government to exit from the CSCE, because Soviet actions had turned it into “an empty treaty”.45 Within these protests, the Olympic issue gained new prominence. Soon after the sentences, both NGOs and American conservative politicians requested the American government and the USOC to obtain from the Soviets an official commitment for the respect of human rights in order to participate in the Moscow Games or, eventually, not to take part at all. The American Council of Captive Nations demanded the American athletes to go to Moscow in order to publicly condemn the Soviets for the repression of political dissidents. From the pages of the Ukrainian Weekly, the editors of that magazine joined the American Council of Captive Nations, arguing that because of the logistical problems of boycotting the Olympics or relocating the Games elsewhere, athletes should participate, but make their disapproval of the Kremlin's policies known to the world. The magazine suggested that athletes should wear T-shirts with "Free Orlov Now" or that appropriate statements should be made during the awards ceremonies.46 Congress, too, addressed several appeals to the Olympic authorities to avoid that the Games could take place in Moscow. At the end of July, for example, 22 Representatives wrote a letter to Killanin to denounce the fact that the IOC appeared an accomplice in repression. A few days after, Rep. Robert Drinan (D. - Massachusetts) introduced an amendment to the Amateur Sport Act which

45 Paul Simon, "Scientists Protest Arrests of Orlov, Shcharansky", Congressional Record, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 12th May 1978, pp 13535; "Nobel Winners Protest Soviet Dissident Trials", New York Times, 20th May 1978. Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Scientists Cancel Trip in Protest Over the Trial of Orlov", New York Times, 21st May 1978. See also Charles Rhéaume, "Western Scientists' Reactions to Andrei Sakahrov's Human Rights Struggle in the Soviet Union, 1968-1989", Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.30, N. 1 (2008), pp.1-20; Memorandum from Jerry Goodman to the File, 30 October 1978, Box 7, Folder “Jerry Goodman”, National Conference on Soviet Jewry Papers, Center for Jewish History, New York; Leslie Maitland, "Leaders Across the U.S. Denounce Sentencing of Dissidents", New York Times, 15th July 1978; Donald W. Riegle, “Shcharansky and Ginzburg“, Congressional Record, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 11th July1978, p. 20152; S.Res.506 "A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the compliance of the Soviet Union with the provisions on human rights of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki Accords"; Bob Packwood "The Helsinki Accord", Congressional Record, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 14th July 1978, pp.20908; Letter, Douglas J. Bennet to Senator Percy, 14th August 1978, in "Accession WHCF –CO", Box CO-59, Folder CO-165, "9/1/79 – 12/31/79", JCPL 46 The Ukranian Weekly, 8 October 1978 denied federal funds to cover travel expenses for those athletes who decided to go to Moscow.47 After it was defeated, Drinan explained that the U.S. should employ all the necessary means to avoid a new disaster, as occurred during the 1936 “Nazi” Olympic Games.48 A few days later, Senator Wendell Anderson (D. Minnesota) and Representative Jack Kemp (R. New York) introduced a similar Resolution demanding to move the Games outside the Soviet Empire which specified that “the Soviet Union continue to demonstrate a disregard for basic human rights guaranteed by the Helsinki Accords and the Soviet Constitution”.49 Mirroring political activism, NGOs and human rights activists addressed petitions and appeals both to the USOC and to the IOC, demanding to move the Games from Moscow.50 The intensity of these pressures forced both Olympic and political authority to reaffirm their commitment to the Moscow Games. USOC President Robert Kane publicly confirmed that:

“The United States Olympic Committee is diametrically opposed to any organization injecting politics into the Olympic movement, we wholeheartedly support the aim of the Olympic movement… the United States Olympic Committee has been following world events closely. We view that current issue on human rights as one of a political nature, not one of sports. As such it is far apart from sports and the Olympic games and should be settled at the national level. However, as President, I pledge that the United States Olympic Committee will continue to support the principle of human rights as it applies to the Olympic games, under the international Olympic committee charter”.51

The White House, too, intervened in the issue. Albeit the President confirmed the importance of human rights in his foreign policy, he also hoped for American athletes' participation to the Moscow Games. To reinforce the American commitment toward the Games, the White House sponsored an international conference on Olympism, whose aim were both at explaining Olympism's values and at showing American athletes' preparedness toward the Moscow Games. However, while he publicly stressed that “politics and sports should not mix”, privately he authorized the creation of a White House Working Group on the Olympics, “to develop a positive Olympic public relations strategy that is consistent with domestic and foreign policy considerations (such as) human rights concerns”.52 Despite this early attempt to define a political strategy toward the Games, the general perception was that Carter had abandoned Soviet dissidents. Jack Kemp (R.

47 Letter to Killanin, 27 July 1978, IOC Archives, Folder JO-1980-BOYCO- 205703.; H. R. Rep. No. 95-1267, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978, pp. 45-46 48 R. Drinan, “A U.S. Boycott of Moscow Olympics?”, in Daniel Patrick Moynihan Papers, Box 1588, F. 6, Library of Congress, Washington DC. See also Jack Kemp, in Congressional Record, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 3 August 1979, pp.22832-22833 49 Kemp-Anderson Resolution, Box 4, Folder Mailings 1978, NCSJ Papers 50 See, for example, the Box “Boycott Letter”, coll. M282 at the United States Olympic Committee Archives (USOC Archives), Colorado Springs 51 R. Kane, 20 July 1978, IOC Archives, Folder PJO-BOYCO-205354 52 Carter's speech, 21st July 1978, IOC Archives, Folder CIO-PT-KILLA-MEMO-M001-4105 (Juin – Juillet 1978); Memorandum from Bob Berenson and Joe Onek, “Establishment of a White House Working Group on the Olympics”, 27 March 1979, Domestic Policy Staff: Joseph Onek Files, Box 77, Folder Sports and Olympics, JCPL; “International Conference – The Spirit of Sport”, July 1979, Box 15, Staff Offices, Domestic Policy Staff, Human Resources – Berenson, JCPL – New York), for example, criticized the White House's weak position and then denounced that starting the process the Soviet Union had lost the right to have the Games in Moscow. 53 Similarly, the National Conference on Soviet Jewry chose a stronger stance on the issue. In early 1979, NCSJ director Sol Goldstein invited the organization's members to write to the American sponsors of the Games to

“express our concerns regarding the Olympics’ impact on Soviet Jewry… remind them that any regression in the Soviet Jewry situation linked to the Olympics could create a cooler climate of relations in which business would suffer. They should support coverage of related topics of interest, e.g. emigration, the Israeli team, interviews with refuseniks, etc”.54

If these actions did not succeed, the organization would have openly participated to the boycott campaign.55 The Campaign to Remove the 1980 Olympics from Moscow took a stronger stance. It prepared thousands of postcards which demanded to “boycott the Gulag Games”. Some local chapters of Amnesty International threatened to “politically exploit the Moscow Games” to inform world public opinion and tourists in Moscow an Soviet political harassments.56 In the following months, attention toward the Games did not decrease. Instead, it became a complete international and transnational phenomenon. From the Soviet Union, political dissidents blamed Soviet authorities for the “Olympic repression” and demanded Western governments and human rights activists to protest for the constant violations of human rights. In September 1979, for example, Sakharov demanded the IOC to ask the Soviets to stop persecutions against Soviet human rights activists.57 Other dissidents signed appeals and petitions against the Moscow Games. Among them, Bernard Karawatsky proposed to hold the Games in Montreal while former Olympic champion and political prisoner Vladimir Skutina denounced:

“it is absurd, illogical and a paradox to bring the Olympic flame and the other Olympic symbols into the capital of a totalitarian and the most cruel State in the history of humanity. It is like spitting in the face of all those people who respect conventions on human rights, it besmirches the memory of millions of victims of fascist-communist terror and of the barbaric atrocities they suffered. The Olympic flame should spark off the feeling of freedom for millions of enslaved people and through that to burn down the power of terror, oppression and stupidity. And not otherwise!”.58

Similar reactions took place in Rome, Paris, London and other Western cities, where activists demanded their governments to sanction Soviet disregard toward human rights and the IOC to

53 J. Kemp in Congressional Record, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 17 August 1978, pp.27034 – 27036. See also J. Kemp, in Congressional Record, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 3 August 1979, pp. 22832 – 22833 54 Memorandum, Sol Goldstein to the Board of Governors and Interested Parties, January 1979, Box 54, Folder Olympic Games, NCSJ Papers 55 ibidem 56 Amnesty International News Release, “Amnesty Condemns Treatment of Helsinki Monitors”, 24 June 1979, Box 201, Folder 6, NCSJ Papers 57 See, for example, Andrei Sakharov's Appeal, 25 September 1979, IOC Archives, Folder JO-BOYCO-20433 58 Conditions Required to the Soviet Union Before the 1980 Olympic Games, 30 June 1979, Bergens Tidende; and Red Stain on the Olympics; “Red stain on the Olympics”, Daily Telegraph, IOC Archives, Folder PT-KILLA-ARTPR-8011 shatter the silence on human rights.59 In the Netherlands, the four major political parties formed a “Committee for the Olympic Games, the Helsinki Agreements and Human Rights”.60 In Great Britain, the polemic was particularly harsh. In a late May 1978 editorial, The Guardian reported that “British sportsmen and women should refuse to compete in the Soviet Union because of the imprisonment of Yuri Orlov” and, in August, the Liberal Party launched a campaign to “embarrass the Kremlin over its treatment of dissidents by having the Olympics moved from Moscow or by persuading as many countries as possible not to take part. Demonstrations at the Games are a second string and a parallel Games, held outside the Soviet Union at the same time as the Olympics, is another idea”.61 Foreign Minister David Owen declared in an interview on television broadcasting ITN that the Soviets “should not take it for granted” that the 1980 Games would take place in Moscow:

“this is not essentially an issue for governments. Governments don’t compete in the Olympics. If the British people and people around the world grew to feel that the Soviet Union was just reading totally roughshod over the sort of ethic and principles which still underlie the Olympics than I believe the Olympics would come increasingly under question and it wouldn’t matter what a government said. We would be forced by our electorate. They have to recognize that we are sensitive to what people think in this country. For instance, when professor Orlov was charged I refused to sign a bilateral sports agreement between the and the Soviet Union… not hey certainly should not take it for granted”.62

Neither the IOC nor the Soviets could ignore these protests. In September, Killanin angrily reacted and in an interview to the Guardian he declared: “it was suggested recently in an English magazine that competitors in the Games at Moscow should take the opportunity to demonstrate. If anyone does that when I am presenting a medal, I will rip it from his neck”. 63 Privately, Killanin's reactions were different. He had to acknowledge that the Games were in danger. Accordingly, he wrote to the President of the Soviet Olympic Committee, V. Smirnov, suggesting that a number of threat were emerging and that, to minimize them, the Soviet committee should have assumed a conciliatory profile toward international pressures.64 Killanin’s suggestion and international pressures obtained the opposite effect: in late 1979, Soviets exacerbated the repression against any form of political dissent. They developed a public campaign to avoid any contact between Muscovites and western tourists. They defined a plan to limit Western human rights NGOs’ activities and visibility. They cleaned up Moscow from undesirable people. At the end of November 1979, Soviet authorities

59 For example, Telegram, 10 July 1978, IOC Archives PT-KILLA-MEMO-M001-4105 (Juin – Juillet 1978); Alliance Anticollectiviste Universelle's Appeal to Killanin, 29 August 1979, IOC Archives, Folder JO-1980-BOYCO- 205639; Moscou80: Boycott des jeux Olimpiques commissionato dalla Solidarité avec les Travailleurs et les peuples d’URSS, in IOC Archives, Folder JO-1980-BOYOCO-205444 60 D. Kanin, A Political History 61 The Guardian 20 May 1978, IOC Archives, Folder PT-KILLA-ARTPR-8011; Liberal Party Organization, “The Moscow Olympic Games”, 31 July 1978, FCO 28/3546 – 1980, National Archives, London 62 Transcript of P. Sissons interviewing D. Owen, 24 August 1978, in FCO 28/3547, National Archives, London 63 The Guardian, 15 September 1979, IOC Archives, Folder PT-KILLA-ARTPR-8011 64 Letter, Lord Killanin to Smirnov, 6 November 1978, IOC Archives, Folder JO-BOYCO-20433 could be satisfied with their accomplishments: despite the international protests, Moscow was ready to host the athletes, the journalists and Western tourists.65

After Afghanistan. Selling the Boycott to the American Public

When knowledge of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reached the international community, the reaction of condemn was almost unanimous. The most outraged member of the international community was, expectedly, the United States, where the program to reinforce détente sharply crumbled. Members of the Carter administration had been following events in Afghanistan with growing concerns. The foreign policy elite speculated on the reasons behind Moscow's intervention. According to George Kennan, three major threats forced Moscow to invade Afghanistan. The most visible was Moscow's fear to lose control over the Afghan friendly regime: to avoid the creation of a second fundamentalist and anti-Soviet State along the border (after Iran), Moscow decided to intervene. The second dimension of the threat emerged from Soviets’ fears about radical Islamists' influence on their own Muslim areas of Central Asia. And finally, the defensive interpretation proposed that the Soviet Union acted out of fears of Chinese influence in the area. The three issues suggested that the Soviet Union just wanted to protect its own security. A second explanation pointed out the opportunity the Soviet Union had to increase its power. According to Kissinger, for example, the Soviets believed that the United States would not challenge their actions because it had failed to do so in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, Moscow had realized that détente had deteriorated to the point that it had nothing to lose. Finally, Brzezinski proposed another interpretation. Recalling his 1978 analysis on the “arc of crisis”, Carter’s NSA argued that the Soviet Union saw Afghanistan as a step toward the oil-rich Arab Peninsula and the Indian Ocean.66 In March, Brzezinski tried to summarize this debate, “by highlighting two conflicting interpretations of the invasion: some saw it as an aberration from, and other as a symptom of, Soviet behavior”. However, behind this division, there was a “solid unanimity regarding the measures” the Administration promoted to punish the Soviets.67 In less than a week, Carter proposed a series of strong anti-Soviet initiatives, starting the so-called “Second Cold War”. Among these, the administration proposed to postpone, cancel, relocate and 65 CIA Memorandum, “USSR: Olympic Games Preparations”, JCPL 66 These different perspectives are in Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, “An Assessment of the Afghanistan Situation: Implications for Trade and Diplomacy in the 1980s“, Washington DC, Government Printing Office, 1981 67 Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the President, NSC Weekly Report 134, 28 March 1980, Zbigniew Brzezinski Donated Historical Materials, Box 42, Folder Weekly Reports 102-120, JCPL eventually boycott the Moscow Olympic Games. The idea of boycotting the Games was brought up during an emergency meeting of NATO representatives in Bruxelles. West German ambassador Rolf Pauls asked whether it would be possible for the NATO members to send teams to Moscow as if the invasion had not occurred. He compared attending the Moscow Games to the democratic nations’ decision to participate in the 1936 Games in Berlin, which – he argued – gave Hitler a monumental propaganda victory and represented the apex of appeasement. The 4th of January, the American President publicly announced the new American anti-Soviet commitment and, through several bold statements, he defined his administration political response. He contrasted the Afghan invasion to the 1956 and 1968 invasions of Hungary and Czechosolovakia, respectively, suggesting that the recent invasion was a major threat because Hungary and were “basically subservient to the Soviet Union”, whereas Afghanistan was a sovereign, non-aligned, and deeply religious nation. He explained the strategic importance of Soviet actions, referring directly to Brzezinski’s arch of Crisis and to the global flux of oil: a “Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a steppingstone to possible control over much of the world’s oil supplies”.68 With this ideas in mind, Carter presented his policies to the nation. He definitively abandoned his liberal agenda, outdoing his critics in exacerbating the dangers now facing the Country. Indeed, the President adopted one anti-Soviet policy after another, authorizing new weapons system, isolating the USSR, imposing trade restrictions and promoting the Olympic boycott. Over the next few months, the Olympic issue became the centerpiece of the administration’s policies and of public attentions.69 The domestic side of the campaign to sell the boycott was not among the first items on his agenda. Since Carter’s speech – when the boycott was still a vague idea – the American public was quite willing to accept the boycott. A San Francisco Examiner poll of January 11th found that 75% of citizens in the area were in favor of a boycott. Shortly thereafter, a Gallup Poll for Newsweek revealed that 78% of American citizens favored an alternative site. The Washington Star conducted a survey that revealed even stronger support: 86% of the respondents endorsed a boycott; 80% favored a relocation. The White House, the UOSC and the International Olympic Committee were overflowed by mail, petitions and appeals against the Games in Moscow. Interestingly, a third of the mail received by the Olympic organizations between January and February recalled Soviet violations of human rights, the Helsinki Accords, or Andrei Sakharov's domestic exile which was announced by Soviet authorities on January 22nd. Another poll was conducted by the New York

68 John Vinocur, “Idea of Olympic Boycott Broached at NATO Meeting”, New York Times, 1 January 1980; Bernard Gwertzman, “Carter Speech”, New York Times, 5 January 1980; Jimmy Carter’s Speech, 4 January 1980, in Public Papers of the President of the United States: Jimmy Carter, Washington DC, Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 23-24 69 Z. Brzezinski to the President, 29 December 1979, in Accession Zbigniew Brzezinski Donated Historical Materials,Box 17, Folder SouthWest Asia – Persian Gulf – Afghanistan, JCPL times and CBS Television between February 13th and 17th. It strongly reaffirmed public support of the boycott (72% with a margin of error of 3%). Two local polls conducted by the USOC in Colorado and California, where people were expected to be less supportive of the boycott, did not change the picture. In Colorado, they found that 83% of the population shared Carter’s program, while in California 87%.70 Sports and political columnists commended Carter's boycott proposal. The editorial board of Washington Star blessed it since it would have effectively punished Soviet imperialism. Washington Post conservative columnist George Will appreciated the boycott because it “would help put an end to the dangerous delusion that, regarding the Soviet Union, the period of maximum danger has passed. A boycott would be a fireball in the night, arousing Americans from the slumbers of détente”.71 Congress, too, wasted no time in showing its bipartisan support to some Olympic sanctions. Conservative Democrats such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Henry “Scoop” Jackson were outspoken supporters of Carter's decision.72 Liberal democrat Senator Byrd agreed and suggested that the Games should either be moved or boycotted. The Republican National Committee adopted a similar stance, approving a resolution calling upon the USOC not to participate to the Games. Even Bill Bradley, Democrat Senator and former Olympic athlete, announced his support of the boycott. At the end of January, both the House and the Senate approved Resolution calling to move, postpone, cancel or boycott the Games.73 On January, 20, the President announced to the news program Meet The Press his definitive decision on the issue:

“neither the American people nor I would support the sending of an American team to Moscow with Soviet invasion troops in Afghanistan. I have sent a message today to the USOC spelling out my own position, that unless the Soviets withdraw their troops within a month from Afghanistan that the Olympic games be moved from Moscow to an alternative site, or multiple sites, or postponed or cancelled”.74

True, this firm stance – and the wide support it had – was dependent on the perception of the USSR as a threat to global peace and security. But, both in Congressional debate and in the NGOs’ activities, references to Soviet violations of human rights were abundant. In this sense, it is worth noting that pro Soviet dissidents NGOs adhered to Carter's campaign. The NCSJ, for example,

70 N. Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch, p.45, 52, 76, 86, 113. See also Letter, San Francisco Human Rights League to the USOC, 16 February 1980, Box Boycott Decision, Collection M282, USOC Archives, Colorado Springs; Background Report by Office of Media Liaison on the Moscow Olympic Games, in Accession WHCF – Sports, Box RE-3, Folder “1/1/80 – 5/31/80”, JCPL; Allen J. Mayer, “An Olympic Boycott?”, Newsweek, 28 January 1980, pp.20- 21; Steven R. Weisman, “As Deadline Passes, White House Says Its Olympic Decision Is Final”, New York Times, 21st February 1980; “Polls on the issue of the Olympic sanction”, 19 January 1980, Box Boycott Decision, Collection M282, USOC Archives, Colorado Springs 71 Washington Post, 6 January 1980 72 See Treaser’s article in New York Times, 12 January 1980. 73 Congressional Record, 22 January 1980, p.59, 320; Congressional Record, 28 January 1980, pp.854-858. 74 Jimmy Carter, Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Address to the Nation, 4 January 1980, on line: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=32911#axzz1i0lsYKMv (last access: 20 November 2011) reaffirmed its condemn toward the Moscow Games and, by the end of January, it organized a series of conferences which agreed on denouncing that the Soviets were pushing forward “an Olympic crackdown” of all dissenters' activities. The Committee of Concerned Scientists publicly supported Carter's boycott while a number of Amnesty International local sections joined the pro-boycott camp. Helsinki Watch shared Carter’s position, too.75 However, human rights were just a secondary issue in the boycott campaign. White House official declarations had underlined two interrelated aspects: the threat represented by Soviet aggression and the need to avoid a new form of appeasement. Based on these two pillars, Carter's strategy seemed to work. Between the end of January and the first days of February, only the American athletic community was in opposition. Accordingly, it became the target of the White House campaign. For months, the White House privately discussed with USOC officials and publicly lobbied athletes and USOC delegates. It showed little reticence in presenting the boycott question in patriotic terms. A dissenting opinion became “un-American”. Secretary of State Vance, for example, used such a tactic when he compared the Berlin Games with the Moscow Games, describing the attendance of the Games as a slap in the face of American ideals and the triumph of appeasement.76 In early March, however, the boycott issue had lost momentum. Despite the huge support of the first months, the American public started to be less enthusiastic about the boycott. It was, in part, a consequence of the IOC, USOC and athletes' responses, which denounced the White House attempt to politicize the Olympic Games. It was also a consequence of Soviet campaign, which denounced the American attempt to turn the Games in a Cold War battlefield. But, above all, public opinion began to shift as a consequence of the 1980 Winter Games, which took place in Lake Placid in February. During the Games, the American all amateur ice hockey team impressed the public and, during the final, it humiliated the Soviet ( almost professional) team. The “miracle on ice”, as it was soon renamed by the press, was a huge obstacle for the boycott campaign. As Nicholas E. Sarantakes suggested:

“As impressive as the hockey team's success was in athletic terms – and it was extraordinary – their gold medal was far more significant to the psyche of the nation. “it was what America needed in troubled times”, an official of the U.S. Amateur Hockey Association explained a few weeks later. Their win produced a release of emotion and national pride that swept a country searching for something to bolster its pride. Their triumph was also of immense importance to the international Olympic movement. The national euphoria that those twenty men produced in the United States helped blunt the efforts of the carter administration to destroy the modern incarnation of the Olympics”.77

75 “Olympics the Final Phase”, 28 January 1980, Box 4, Folder Mailings 1978; and Memorandum from Jerry Goodman, “Olympic Games – Supporting Groups”, 13 March 1980, both in National Conference on Soviet Jewry Papers, Center for Jewish History, New York; Helsinki Watch, “Sakharov Questionnaire and Olympic Actions”, 3rd March 1980, Archives, Helsinki Watch Collection, Box 63, Folder 4, Center for Human rights Documentation and Research, New York. 76 Bernard Gwertzman in New York Times, 16th January 1980 77 Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch, p.1 Indeed, it demonstrated both that the American public wanted to participate in the Summer Games and that it wanted to see American athletes humiliating the Soviets in sports. Marshall Brement of the NSC soon realized that the “miracle on ice” had changed the public mood. He warned Brzezinski and Carter that “the Olympic situation seems to be disintegrating (and) if we are not careful our magnificent hockey win may fuel domestic sentiment against the boycott”.78 A public opinion poll showed that the American public was less supportive of the boycott. Upon request of the USOC, the Roper organization demanded: “Now that the Winter Games are over, would you say that they made you feel more proud of our country, or less proud, or didn't affect your feelings one way or the other?” The poll found that 57% replied “more proud”. It also asked if the U.S. should still boycott the games, finding that 58% was still supportive. In another one, conducted at the end of March by the same organization, only 49% of American citizens were still supportive of the boycott.79 Public support was beginning to fade. It was at that time that the Administration modified its strategy. Given the growing difficulties, White House officials developed a strong lobbying action on the USOC, which was scheduled to give the definitive vote on the boycott issue on April, 12th. The White House responded hosting a special reception for the U.S. Olympic team, on March, 20th. During the meeting, the President delivered an impressive presentation, speaking in a solemn and sober tone, Carter explained why he was determined to boycott the Moscow Games. Albeit the athletes were losing their once-in-a-life opportunity, some of them shared Carter's fears and became supporters of the boycott. Given this division in the athletic community, the USOC proposed a new compromise that would have allowed athletes to boycott the opening and the closing ceremonies as well as the medal presentation. In addition, USOC President Robert Kane said, the American athletes could have demonstrated against Soviet aggression and violations of human rights.80 The White House did not consider this proposal and continued with its boycott campaign. A number of Congressmen accepted White House suggestion to write to the USOC demanding to support the boycott proposal. In addition, Lloyd Cutler began contacting major corporate donors to the USOC, advising them to cut their donations to the USOC.81 In early April, just a week before the USOC was scheduled to vote on the boycott, the White House demanded a number of Soviet émigrés to publicly take a positive stance on the boycott and to

78 Memorandum from Brement for Brzezinski, 25 February, 1980, Folder Olympics 6/79-2/80, Box 48, Subject Files, National security Advisor Files, JCPL 79 Memorandum Cutler to Carter, March 24, 1980, Folder Olympic Memos/ Correspondence to the President, Box 103Lloyd Cutler's File, JCPL. The second poll is recalled in a letter to the USOC, 4th April 1980, Box Boycott Decision, Collection M282, USOC Archives, Colorado Springs 80 Memorandum from Joe Onek and Bob Berenson for Lloyd Cutler, “Olympic Posture”, Folder Olympic Memos/ Correspondence to the President, Box 103 Lloyd Cutler's File, JCPL; 81 See N. Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch, pp.131-179 discuss the issue with USOC officials. Albeit both the Carter library and the USOC archives have a very vague record of this meeting, it is possible to argue that it helped the White House in obtaining USOC's support.82 On April 11th, before a closed session of nearly 250 athletes and sports officials, Mondale delivered his final speech for the boycott campaign. In an emotional discourse, the vice President presented the 1980 Olympic Games as the 1936 Nazi Games. He emphasized that Hitler had used the Olympic Games to score some propaganda points and to globally legitimate his policies. The failure to boycott was one element which led to the Second World War. The United States were facing the same dilemma: “History holds its breath, for what is at stake is no less than the future security of the civilized world”. The USOC delegated were burdened with an enormous responsibility: the future of freedom in the world. Indeed, the USOC delegates accepted this responsibility and voted in favor of the boycott. President Kane then announced publicly: “I am completely satisfied that it was the rights decision. At the same time, I am desperately sorry for American athletes who have been hurt by it”.83

The International Campaign

Albeit the domestic campaign had to face some obstacles in March and April, the real threat to the boycott came from the international response because, to be effective, the boycott required a vast international participation. To increase the chances of success, Carter demanded Lloyd Cutler to lead a specific task-force for the boycott effort. Cutler quickly undertook a number of decisions. He tried a dialogue with Killanin and the IOC to move the Games. He proposed the summon of “Alternative Olympics”, a sort of counter-Olympics to all freedom-lovers nations. He lobbied American athletes and the USOC, till the point to threaten economic sanctions or the suspension of athletes' passports. He persuaded NBC TV station and Coke to renounce to their multimillionaire contracts with the Moscow Organizing Committee. He demanded Muhammad Alì to undertake a diplomatic mission to sell the boycott to African nations.84 To some extent, the international campaign to sell the Olympic boycott followed a trajectory similar to the domestic campaign. At first, it prioritized the shock and the threat to global peace posed by

82 “Your Meeting with U.S. Athletes”, Folder Olympic Memos/ Correspondence to the President, Box 103 Lloyd Cutler's File, JCPL 83 Washington Post, 15 April 1980 84 N. Sarantakes, op. cit., pp. 75-113; Stephen R. Wenn, Jeffry P. Wenn, “Muhammad Ali and the Convergence of Olympic Sport and U.S. Diplomacy in 1980: A Reassessment from Behind the Scenes at the U.S. State Department”, in OLYMPIKA: The International Journal of Olympic Studies, Vol.II (1993), pp.45-66 the invasion and, later, it discovered other issues, such as Soviet violations of human rights at home (exemplified by the domestic exile of Andrei Sakharov) and abroad (in Afghanistan). Several reasons permit us to understand why the White House chose not to prioritize human rights in the first months. Firstly and foremost, the President did not want to turn his human rights campaign in a clear anti- Soviet propaganda tool. Human rights were the benchmark of Carter’s foreign policy and, since 1977, the President had been referring to them as a move beyond the Cold War. What he called “a total commitment to human rights” could not become an anti-Soviet tool to score some propaganda points.85 Secondly, the Administration truly believed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a threat to global peace. Consequently, the renewed American firmness did not require any additional explanation. Finally, among the targets of the American campaign there were many authoritarian regimes - especially in Africa – and the rhetoric use of human rights could have been detrimental to the boycott campaign. However, given its political importance and Olympic tradition, Western Europe was the center of most intense lobbying. If in the United States domestic politics favored a strong position vis-à-vis the Soviets, in Western Europe domestic dynamics favored a different solution. Great Britain was the most supportive of the American sanction and of the boycott idea in particular. Prime Minister Tatcher urged Europeans to follow US lead. Despite this tough line, the British government was not completely in line with its Prime Minister, the public was quite skeptical and the British Olympic Association was against any boycott proposal. France and Germany were in clear opposition with the boycott solution. Western European Allies began to change their positions at the end of January, when the Soviets exiled Andrei Sakharov to Gorki. Human rights activists in Bonn, Paris, Rome and London demanded their government to punish the Soviets. They fired petitions and appeals at the IOC, in order to cancel or move the Moscow Games.86 Soviet dissidents, too, showed their solidarity with Sakharov. In New York, Tatiana Yankelevich, Sakharov's stepdaughter and spokeswoman for the human rights activists in the Soviet Union, organized a rally demanding to boycott the Games. Alexandr Ginzburg, Leonid Plyusch and other prominent dissidents organized a Committee to Boycott the Games. Shcharansky's wife also called for a Western boycott of the Olympics.87 The move against Sakharov immediately pushed the Olympic question on the top of European governments' agendas. A few days later Sakharov’s exile, both the Netherlands' government and the

85 Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of CIA, “Results of the NSC Meeting”, 2 gennaio 1980, in Accession Zbigniew Brzezinski Donated Historical Materials, Box 17, Folder “SouthWest Asia – Persian Gulf – Afghanistan, 12.26.79 – 1.4.80”, JCPL 86 “Introductory note”, IOC Archives, F. JO-BOYCO-205444 87 Letter, Ginzburg to Lord Killanin, 21 April 1980, IOC Archives, JO-1980-BOYCO-205707: A.D. Sakharov, “Statement on the Moscow Olympics“, Chronicle of Current Events, no.56 (Aprile 1980, pp.86-88; A.O. Sulzberg Jr., “Byrne Wants Olympics Alternative to Be Held in New York City”, New York Times, 31 January 1980 national Olympic committee announced that they would have supported the boycott. A similar position was shared by the Norwegian and the Danish Olympic Committees.88 In Western Germany, polls reported a shift in public attitude toward the Games. German Christian Democrats supported the boycott. In a meeting with U.S. Officials, CDU leader Heinrich Lummer stressed that

“the defenders of human rights must ask themselves the question what powers they possess to help justice prevail they don't have a lot of choices. A big one is the plea to the world's conscience and the mobilization of world's public. The aggressor and violator of the human rights must be isolated intellectually and politically. Under this aspect, a boycott of the Olympic Games cannot simply be denied by pointing at the neutrality of sports. A unified boycott would seriously impact the Soviet Union, both internally as well as in foreign affairs”.89

This position was then reinforced by East German former political prisoners who demanded Schmidt to support the boycott.90 In France, where both the government and the national Olympic committee were in opposition with the boycott proposal, the Sakharov affair began to demonstrate that public attention to human rights violations could have been an issue to have European support. From Le Nouvel Observateur, Jean Daniel tried to define similarities between the 1936 Nazi Games and the 1980 Communist Games:

“Le communisme est-ce le nazisme? Non. L'Union Sovietique a-t-elle des points communs avec l'Allemagne hitlérienne? Certians. Les Jeus Olympiques de Moscou announcent-ils la guerre comme, en 1936, les Jeux de Berlin? Qui peut l'exclure? Pourrions-nous, enfin, regretter d'avoir participé à ces Jeux comme on a regretté d'avoir participé à ces de Hitler? Jean-Paul Sartre et Raymond Aron, une fois encore réunis, le pensent ».9178

French human rights activists organized rallies to support Sakharov and to demand their government to punish the Soviets for the blatant violations of human rights. They were joined by 100 French intellectuals, who wrote an article for the communist newspaper L'Humanité, and by a boycott committee, led by the former Olympic athlete Jonquères D’Oriola. By the end of the month, also the European Parliament voted to support the Olympic boycott.92 Despite this growing support for an Olympic boycott, Carter did not completely succeed in his campaign. According to David B. Kanin, the administration failed to use human rights violations in the Soviet Union to its full advantage in garnering support for the boycott. He correctly pointed out that only after the arrest of Andrei Sakarov on January, 22, did some Western Europeans begin to support his Olympic boycott. Prior to Sakharov’s arrest Western European nations partly disagreed

88 Memorandum from Lloyd Cutler for the President, “Olympics”, 20th March 1980; and Memorandum of a SCC meeting, “Iran/Afghanistan”, 20th March; “Summary of Positions on Summer Olympics”, May 1980, all in IOC Archives, Cd-Rom “white House Documents” 89 Quoted in N. Sarantakes, Dropping the Torch, pp.91-92. 90 ibidem. See also David Kanin, The Olympic Boycott in Diplomatic Context, p.30 91 Jean Daniel, “Berlin 36 – Moscou 80”, Le Nouvel Observateur, 28 January 1980 92 Jean Marie Brhom, 1936. Jeux Olympiques à Berlin, Bruxelles, André Versaille Editeur, 2008, pp.40- 42 ; “EEC Pressure to Boycott Olympics and European Parliament in Tough line on Olympics”, both in Financial Times, 16 febbraio 1980; “EEC Assembly Backs Boycott of Olympics, in International Herald Tribune, 16 February 1980 with Carter’s new course but, once the knowledge of Sakharov’s arrest reached global audience, boycott supporters increased.93 Recent archival findings, however, offer a different picture. Since the end of February, the Administration was worried by the declining popularity the boycott option was finding in Western Europe. According to Brzezinski, this was in part due to the decline in interest in the Sakharov affair and the Administration had to reverse this trend, eventually recalling Soviet violations of human rights.94 From Moscow, American ambassador Watson suggested to modify the boycott campaign and to prioritize the human rights dimension, because “the final months of Soviet preparations for the Olympic Games have been accompanied by an extremely severe and wide crackdown on dissenters”. After documenting several incidents and cases of repressions, the Ambassador had to admit that “unfortunately, we are not aware of any statements by Soviet authorities explicitly linking actions taken against dissenters with the upcoming Olympics”. Nevertheless, “the dissenters themselves believe (we think correctly) that the repressive actions of the Soviet authorities are in part linked with a desire to rid Moscow and other Olympic cities of undesirable elements”.95 The department of State collected these stories. At the end of May, it edited a booklet on Soviet violations of human rights during the Olympic period which was distributed to the NATO allies. The conclusion – wrote Brzezinski in a memorandum to Carter – was unequivocal:

“participation in the Moscow Olympics will not only signify an attitude of indifference toward the continuing occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, it will also have the effect of ignoring a major, Olympic Games related crackdown against human rights activists in the Soviet Union”.96

Carter tried to valorize this political unity with European governments but the final decision rested with the National Olympic Committee. Rejecting any attempt to let politics enter in the Olympic movement, several NOCs announced their participation in the Moscow Games (Italy, France, Spain and Great Britain). However, their governments introduced some restrictions on the participation of athletes from the military field and denied the use of their national flags during the Games. Despite a number of defections – Brzezinski concluded – the American government could be satisfied with the international reaction to the boycott proposal. Contrary to the “IOC and Soviet propaganda... we achieved most of our aims:”

“the four most important nations in the world in Soviet eyes - i.e. United States, China, Germany and Japan – are not attending... although the results in Europe were disappointing, we should not lose sight of the fact that the boycott was 93 Kanin, A Political History, 126-128; Hulme, The Political Olympics, 52 94 Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the President, “NSC Meeting“, 18 March 1980, NLC-17-131-4-2-2, JCPL 95 Watson's Telegram to the department of State, 21 April 1980, in IOC Archives, Cd-Rom “White House Documents” 96 Z. Brzezinski to the President, “NSC Weekly Report 144”, 6 June 1980, in Z. Brzezinski Donated Historical Materials, Box 42, F. 1 “Weekly Reports, 71-81”, JCPL totally successful in East Asia... many of the most important countries that will be sending teams have governments which strongly support the Olympic boycott. … Finally, I know of no Soviet dissident or expert in the Soviet Union who does not believe that the boycott will convey an effective message to the Soviet people”.97

Conclusion

As Soviet troops entered Afghanistan on December 1979, they started a chain of events that ended with the American decision to lead the largest Olympic boycott in the history of the modern Games. This initiative was quite successful. According to a January 1980 memorandum, to be meaningful, the boycott had to involve at least thirty Countries and to find the support of the American public. 98 Indeed, when the Games opened more than eighty countries strayed home and more than 70% of American citizens were still supportive of Carter's decision. Previous historical analysis have explained this wide consensus through two interrelated elements: the conservative shift in the American public opinion and the shock caused by the invasion of Afghanistan. In this paper, I have suggested a third interpretation: the boycott campaign was so popular because it was advanced and then sponsored by Soviet dissidents and several Western human rights groups. Indeed, during the Seventies, human rights moved from the periphery to the center of international politics. They started to shape (or, at least, to be evaluated in) every major decision in the international system. This growing awareness overwhelmed also the Olympic Movement. In this sense, since the Mexico City Games of 1968, the Olympic Games had already emerged as an important forum to protest (denounce) human rights violations across the globe. When Moscow was selected as the host city for the 1980 Olympic Games, a growing controversy emerged on the appropriateness of having the Games in the Soviet Union. Two different groups began to question Moscow’s right as host city. On the one side, human rights activists and NGOs demanded the Soviets to respect human rights as a prerequisite for having the Games in Moscow. On the other one, conservative and neoconservative politicians tried to use the Olympic polemic to stop bipolar détente. These two groups joined the forces after 1978, when Soviet authorities sentenced Yuri Orlov, Aleksandr Ginzburg, Natan Shcharansky and other well-known dissidents. They both protested Soviets actions and demanded the IOC to move the Games away from Moscow. This early controversy contributed to Carter’s boycott campaign to punish and isolate the Soviets for their aggression against Afghanistan. Initially, Soviet violations of human rights was not a top priority for the White House, nevertheless their consideration started to change thereafter as a strong critique of the abuses was used to win both the domestic and international opposition toward

97 ibidem 98 Memorandum of NSC meeting, 2 January 1980, NLC-17-2-18-3-9, JCPL the boycott solution. Despite the wide support Carter’s proposal had, the 1980 boycott was a failure of Olympic proportion for the White House and for the human rights groups involved in it. Human rights activists joined Carter’s campaign with no hesitation, thus reducing the originality of their proposals. Human rights became just a second and smaller pillar in the shaky boycott effort. On this last aspect, a paradox became increasingly clear: the clash between two different visions about humanism and its values. On the one side, given Soviet brutal repression, it was morally repugnant to have the Games in Moscow. Accordingly, the boycott was a necessary choice to protest the violations of human rights. On the other one, there was Lord Killanin. The IOC President was not naïve. He knew that politics was within the Olympic movement. However, he also knew that the Olympic Games were the only international forum where sports and athletes' ability had a greater impact than political divisions. To preserve the Olympic movement from such a blatant attempt to politicize it meant to preserve an international forum for cooperation and mutual understanding which, especially during times of tensions, was required to build bridges, not to destroy them.