Now and then: Navigating the security agenda between Russia and NATO

EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY POLICY BRIEF

Andrew Wood November 2019 The European Leadership Network (ELN) is an independent, non-partisan, pan-European NGO with a network of nearly 200 past, present and future European leaders working to provide practical real-world solutions to political and security challenges.

About the author

Andrew Wood was a member of the British Diplomatic Service between 1961 and 2000. He was posted three times to Moscow (1964-6, 1979-82 and 1995-2000, the latter as Ambassador), twice to Washington (1967-70 and 1989-1992) and twice to (1975-9 and 1985-9, the latter posting as Ambassador). He returned regularly to Moscow and other formerly Soviet countries on retirement in 2000 on behalf of UK based business interests for some years afterwards. He has been an Associate Fellow at Chatham House since 2005, and written a number of times for the Russia and Eurasia Programme there. He has also written for The American Interest and been interviewed by a variety of public media organisations on Russia related issues.

Published by the European Leadership Network, November 2019

European Leadership Network (ELN) 100 Black Prince Road London, UK, SE1 7SJ

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Published under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License OR © The ELN 2019

The opinions articulated in this report represent the views of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership Network or any of its members. The ELN’s aim is to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address pressing foreign, defence, and security challenges. Contents

Introduction 1

The bases of East West security management 1

After the Cold War 3

2019 4

What is to be done? 5

Conclusion 7

Endnotes 9 Introduction resent the change it brought about in Central Europe and the former . A summary of factors that The evolution of a wide-ranging made the Cold War what it was, and system of agreements and why it was possible to live through understandings moderating security the paradox between its potential for risks during the Cold War period was mutual catastrophe on the one hand built upon an extended, if sometimes and the evolution of systems meant to difficult, interchange between the guard against such a disaster on the and its NATO partners other may perhaps outline options to on the one hand, and the members ameliorate today’s risks. of the Soviet-directed on the other. Its evolution also The fundamental truths about the Cold required substantive exchanges as to War were threefold: its primary military competing aims and interests within expression was the deployment of the rival blocs. The system that then Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces with emerged and retained a degree of the potential to break through the practical effect even after the collapse lines held by the United States and of the USSR has since deteriorated its NATO allies; the threat of Mutually to the point of extinction, even as Assured Destruction inherent in the confrontation between Russia and nuclear weapons amassed by the NATO has been reborn. This brief Soviet Union, the United States and in considers what lessons, if any, are smaller quantity by and Britain; worth drawing for the situation now and the insecurity of what was then from the experience of navigating the the Soviet bloc, which fed into the Soviet-NATO interchange then. presumption inherent to the Stalinist system of capitalist enmity, which The bases of in its turn nurtured Western fears of Kremlin-based militarised ambitions Cold War East for extending its control still further. The Cold War was pockmarked with West security inter-bloc crises up to Gorbachev’s management establishment as General Secretary of the Communist Party, including crises Memories of the 1948 to 1989 Cold beyond Europe itself, from Korea to War have inevitably acquired a Afghanistan. mythological character and distorted both Western and Russian - especially Confrontation between the two Russian - beliefs as to our present super-powers, in tandem with their condition. The proposition that we NATO and Warsaw Pact colleagues, are engaged in a further round of was particularly dangerous when that contest is tempting for those who one or other of the contestants was

1 The ELN / Now and then “The essential it inevitable that both of the major powers should place their strategies purpose of NATO firmly within that shared and expected was and remained binary context. containment, not While there were differences of the overthrow of perception within NATO during the Cold War, basic unity between the USSR.” the members of the Alliance was underpinned by the constraining realities of a divided Europe. That feared by its rival to have secured an did not prevent the construction and advantage in the relative “correlation of development of separate European forces” between them. The possibility institutions within Western Europe of the United States undertaking itself, but it limited their geographical a preemptive nuclear attack was scope and political choices. There seriously considered as a risk to were no parallels to these within the be faced by the Soviet Union when Warsaw Pact beyond the network of Andropov was General Secretary inter-party relationships built up and for instance. But as the Cold War controlled by the Communist Party of and the arms race that went with it the Soviet Union. Western countries developed, so too did the realisation had the further advantage over that containing its risks made a degree Warsaw Pact countries of recovering of cooperation and even collaboration solidly from the devastation of World between the rivals essential. No War II within the context of Western- Western power was able or willing developed international financial and to intervene in the course of crises trading institutions and agreements. inside the Soviet bloc. The essential These were strengths that fed into purpose of NATO was and remained a common set of general ideas that containment, not the overthrow of the buttressed policy discussions within USSR, the liberation of the Warsaw NATO and beyond. Pact states or the forcible reunification of Germany. The Soviet Union was It was this general framework that never able to secure its hold over enabled the NATO countries to make Berlin, central though that was for the a consistent effort over the years secure establishment of the German to reach accommodation with the Democratic Republic it desired. What Soviet Union over: nuclear testing, came over the years to seem to the and a balance of capacity between vast majority of analysts to be the the USA and the USSR as to their permanent division of Europe made nuclear weapons; an attempt to

2 The ELN / Now and then “The 1975 After the Cold War settlement.. The withdrawal of Soviet armed forces provided for an from central and eastern Europe, international say together with the peaceful reunification of Germany, in themselves altered on the framework that had before issues, including determined NATO’s security policies. in the USSR.” The subsequent collapse of the USSR appeared to most members of NATO as the prelude to even more far reaching changes which would justify achieve mutual and balanced force a considerable peace dividend from reductions; agreement on confidence reduced defence spending. Former building measures such as monitoring members of the Warsaw Pact were military manoeuvres and in due concerned to ensure the stability course to determine the geographical of central and eastern Europe, and stationing of military units; and the to insure themselves against the restriction of intermediate nuclear uncertainties of what was happening in missiles. The 1975 Helsinki settlement the Soviet Union, or later in Russia, by decided German borders that had securing recognised places in Western been disputed for years. It also structures for themselves. In practice, provided for an international say on that meant NATO, neither the EU human rights issues, including in the nor the countries themselves initially USSR, which had a more far reaching being ready for EU membership. The impact than the Soviet hierarchy had way that formerly Soviet countries imagined. None of these advances and Russia in particular developed would have been possible without long was more troubled, but the Western and concentrated effort and forward belief that they, and again Russia in planning within NATO, involving particular, were in transition, however committed work by individual countries, difficult it might be, towards “normality” whether European or North American. was quite general. Russia was no Insistent dialogue with Moscow was longer regarded in the Yeltsin years essential, too, whether in bad times as a present military threat. Putin was or good. The realities of the Cold seen, against some of the evidence, as War focused NATO, and many non- a reformer as his terms in the Kremlin member countries for that matter, on began. the central problem of maintaining so far as possible a balanced and secure The forces that had determined relationship within a divided Europe. western European countries to invest in security, to work together in NATO,

3 The ELN / Now and then and to look for new ways to curb “Any country’s nuclear and/or conventional military risks were accordingly weakened. international Transatlantic unity was over time policies are diminished. The supposition that one way or another, and given suitably determined in the restrained and respectful NATO first place by its behaviour, relationships with Moscow internal problems would become closer held sway at times even during the Cold War. and ambitions.” Against the evidence, they retain their force today, as witness the Obama reset, and the recent call by President of the Kremlin’s need to keep such Macron for warmer ties with Russia as zones under tight control. The urge a European country. somehow to preserve the interests of the presently powerful as the constitutionally prescribed period 2019 for Putin’s legitimate tenure of office ends in May 2024 reinforces Any country’s international policies that preoccupation, with regard to are determined in the first place by Ukraine not least. Russia’s rulers form its internal problems and ambitions. a continuum between protecting Insofar as Western decision makers their country’s domestic as well as have thought of Russia as a country international security, seeing both to in transition, their disillusion with be at risk from what they instinctively the reality of its transition not being regard as hostile activity from abroad. towards European norms but to Minister of Defence Shoigu’s interview authoritarianism has been tardy. of 22 September 2019, his first Political and military thinking within comprehensive public account of how Russia as publicly expressed is based he sees his latest role, was rife with on inherited Cold War assumptions, comments on what he considered with rivalry with the United States as Western intervention in internal at its heart. Security thinking has Russian affairs, and the importance of become an increasing and dominant the Russian armed forces in assuring preoccupation for Russia’s governing the internal stability of the Russian group since President Putin’s return state. Russia’s Ministry of Defence to the Kremlin in 2012. The myth that plays a particular role in this overall Russia needs buffer zones to keep process, public discussion none. it safe is of long standing, though Strategy documents are published repeatedly exposed as building in from time to time, but concrete insecurity for Russia itself because decision making is inherently secretive.

4 The ELN / Now and then A recent analysis by Finnish experts1 Russia’s readiness in case of war, reported: “In its attitude towards and partly in pursuit of the quarrel NATO and cooperation with it, Russia between Washington and Moscow is systematically seeking a position as to who was responsible for the where the political systems of Russia’s 2019 demise of the Intermediate- Western partners bow to solutions that range Nuclear Forces agreement of conform to Russia’s security needs.… 1987. He has also announced that However, these perspectives that take Russia is helping China to develop Russia’s needs into account and the the ability to track incoming strategic solutions based on them often seem missiles as part of their developing to totally ignore the fact that Russia’s ‘partnership’. China has helped own actions are destabilising the Russia to build up its internal security international security system…. Russia apparatus, for example by improving considers the post-Soviet space to be its facial recognition technology, used the most important area for its foreign to scan recent protests in Moscow and security policy, as well as the area and beyond. The last proposal from most likely to see military conflicts.” Moscow for a review of European These convictions are bolstered by security issues was put forward by the increasingly repressive Kremlin President Medvedev during his brief response to domestic protest tenure of office, but it was so empty movements likely to become more of solid content that it gained no widespread as 2024 and its undecided traction. Suggestions that cooperation regime outcome loom ever larger. Fear on matters of, in principle, common for the future at home fuels fear of the concern like terrorism or controlling outside world. cyber risks, whether by Moscow or other capitals, have not been pursued either by Russia or by NATO powers, What is to be done? not least because of the difficulty of defining their nature. The omens for re-building a general framework for managing NATO/ NATO powers, too, have found it Russia confrontation similar to that difficult to suggest ways of improving which developed between NATO international security. This may in part and the USSR do not look good. be because of the inherent difficulty Extending the New START agreement of finding a common language and on nuclear weapons for another five set of values, including with Russia. years in 2021 by Russia and the USA The Alliance is, moreover, no longer remains uncertain. President Putin the major actor on the stage that it oversaw the latest armed forces was in the Cold War. It is indeed hard wide-scale exercise involving nuclear to decipher at present who is: there forces beginning on 17 October are differing voices from Washington; this year, designed partly for testing the European Union has its External

5 The ELN / Now and then Action Force but is also composed “..neither NATO of nations with differing attitudes towards Russia and different claims as an Alliance to international authority. Alliance nor any of powers and members of the European Union have shown solidarity at critical its individual moments, such as the seizure by members have Russia of Crimea and that country’s military intervention in Donbas in and or have ever had after 2014. Sanctions on Russia have plans for military been maintained and strengthened action against since then. But intentions over the longer term have been less clear. The Russia..” temptation to reach for a compromise solution over Ukraine, as was arranged by President Sarkozy on Georgia after blunt truth of the matter is that neither Russia seized parts of that country in NATO as an Alliance nor any of its 2008, is there despite the fact that the individual members have or have ever chance of Russia being true to its word had plans for military action against is no more credible now than it was in Russia but that the Kremlin today, as 2008. it did in Soviet times, fears that the principles that make the countries of There would, in principle, be a the Alliance in large measure more case for leading NATO powers to prosperous and more securely based reach for a common understanding are a threat to Russia’s rulers. They of where Russia may be heading are so, but Putin and his group can domestically as well as in its foreign never admit this, even to themselves. policies. There may perhaps be Hence their adherence to Cold War some movement in this direction at propositions. Hence also the necessity the next NATO Leaders’ Meeting for NATO and its individual member presently scheduled for December states to refuse to be bound, as they in London. Such a search might also are tempted to be, by a present- in due course include other Western day Russia-induced framework of states like or . Some assumptions governing the proper form of consensus as to the nature of relationship between them and Russia’s government and its prospects Russia’s ruling group. It will take time, would be essential, as it was during talk and effort within and outside NATO the Cold War, if NATO leaders are to move beyond the present impasse, to go beyond addressing particular as it did during the Cold War, but there international issues and to take full are no quick fixes. account of the tensions within today’s Russia that inform such problems. The

6 The ELN / Now and then Conclusion “There are particular risks Pleas for the revival of dialogue between Russia and the West such inherent in the as that recently published by a present state group associated with the European Leadership Network2 are not of militarised uncommon. But if as is argued above, confrontation there is little present likelihood of between Russia making tangible progress towards the eventual development of some sort and NATO in of over-arching and enduring security Europe..” arrangement for Europe as a whole, then the present choice is limited to particular security issues. It is not instrumental during the Cold War in just “the West” however defined and widening the more general agenda. Russia that would need to be included in a process that might begin to move There are particular risks inherent us away from a less acrimonious in the present state of militarised relationship. Other formerly Soviet confrontation between Russia and countries as well as non-NATO NATO in Europe, around the Baltic member states have interests that states and potentially in Georgia as need to be respected too. Arguing Russian border creep forwards there for dialogue and mutual trust in the continues. It is evident too that the abstract is empty of meaning. situation in Ukraine is still serious. It could in that context be sensible If New START could be extended for a for NATO to look into ways to avoid further period beyond 2021, that might accidental clashes with Russian perhaps do something to persuade armed forces and to consider what both the United States and Russia to can be done to moderate them without see whether there might possibly be somehow by inference implying that mutual advantage in other nuclear- existing Russian actions are legitimate. related options. There is perhaps The European Leadership Network an argument for such issues to be report of 7 February3 suggests some reviewed in a select NATO context possible approaches. There have been in due course, if only to reinvigorate precedents in Syria, which did not, internal Alliance debate on wider however, extend to Russia’s “private” security issues. Bilateral US-Soviet forces. The Russian armed forces discussions and eventual substantive have a record of reckless behaviour negotiations on nuclear matters were subsequently denied that needs to be

7 The ELN / Now and then kept in mind, to say nothing of warfare “..how Cold conducted over a wider dimension than has been traditional that makes it War confidence questionable how far any initiatives in building measures this general area can be used to further wider security interests in the longer that still exist, term. NATO’s Military Committee would including those have the judgement and contacts to advise how far exploring possibilities in stemming from the area might be useful. the 1975 Helsinki Accords, might There might also be a case for discussion within NATO of how Cold be brought up to War confidence building measures that date.” still exist, including those stemming from the 1975 Helsinki Accords, might be brought up to date. NATO’s concrete results in discussion with Secretary-General confirmed in a today’s Kremlin but as a means for speech of 23 October that NATO NATO or other western organisations allies and partners had put forward to ponder an agenda that might a package of proposals in the OSCE become to a degree practicable as to modernise the Vienna Document. and when Moscow begins to look for a There could well be mutual benefit in more productive relationship with other re-establishing agreed standards for European states. That will depend on the way that military exercises are what is at present unpredictable, how reported and verified, or how armed and when Russia may emerge from its forces are to be deployed. Russia present authoritarian cul-de-sac. has also signed onto obligations affecting, for example, human rights. The Kremlin’s respect or disrespect Endnotes for those obligations is a basis for trust or mistrust of Russia in the West and 1. Russia of Power: ISBN: 978-951-663-065- beyond it. 9 print ISBN: 978-951-663-066-6 pdf, pp55

These last references to a wider 2. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork. spectrum, based on what was in the org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ELN- end achieved as the Cold War proper Contact-Group-Statement-on-Stereotyping- evolved over time, and as interchange and-Dialogue-October-2019.pdf between the West and the USSR developed in the context that then 3. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork. prevailed, remain relevant not so much org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ELN- because they are likely to make for Contact-Group-Statement-on-Stereotyping- and-Dialogue-October-2019.pdf

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