“Landed Republick”: Squatters, Speculators, and the Early American West

A thesis presented to

the faculty of

the College of Arts & Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

Joseph T. Ross

May 2018

©2018 Joseph T. Ross. All Rights Reserved. 2

This thesis titled

“Landed Republick”: Squatters, Speculators, and the Early American West”

by

JOSEPH T. ROSS

has been approved for

the Department of History

and the College of Arts & Sciences by

Brian Schoen

Associate Professor

Robert Frank

Dean, College of Arts & Sciences 3

ABSTRACT

ROSS, JOSEPH T., M.A., May 2018, History

“Landed Republick”: Squatters, Speculators, and the Early American West

Director of Thesis: Brian Schoen

This thesis examines the role that federal land policy played in the settlement and political development of the Northwest Territory from 1780 to 1802. In the waning years of the American Revolution the United States sought to acquire and use the lands of the trans-Appalachian West as a fund for extinguishing its public debt. The claims of the individual states and of Native Americans would be transferred to the United States, which would then exchange those lands for Continental securities. By placing emphasis on public creditors, Congress deliberately ignored the interests of actual settlers, including many who were squatting on these federal lands. At first the Confederation

Congress adopted a policy of uniform land sales overseen by the federal government, but with disappointing results. In 1787 Congress decided to privatize western settlement by selling large amounts of land to private companies at a discount, who would then resell the land to actual settlers for a profit. This was also a disappointment, as these land companies experienced a myriad of problems from Native American violence to legal disputes with settlers, all of which had to be solved by the federal government. Prompted by western settlers, including squatters, the federal government resumed the responsibility of western settlement. This thesis also shows how federal power was used to influence local politics. New laws allowed for squatters to negotiate with federal officials over the lands they wanted. One official, Thomas Worthington, used the 4 influence he had in these negotiations to incorporate the squatters into his own political interest. During the statehood movement of 1801-1802, Worthington was able to link this interest to the national Republican Party. The mobilization of his interest and the introduction of partisanship into the movement allowed Worthington to successfully accomplish statehood for Ohio. 5

DEDICATION

For my grandfather 6

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Like many of the speculators in this story, I can never repay my debts for this project. Much of the research was conducted while I was an undergraduate at The Ohio

State University. I would first like to thank the Ohio State Undergraduate Research

Office for a 2014 URO Summer Research Fellowship that helped alleviate the expenses of conducting archival research at the Library of Congress. Numerous archivists at many institutions, too many to name here, have been crucial to providing me access to the sources needed for this work. This includes the staffs of the Library of Congress, the

National Archives in Washington, D.C., Western Reserve Historical Society, the Ohio

History Connection, and the William L. Clements Library. Pat Madert of the Ross

County Historical Society and Linda Showalter at the Marietta College Library deserve special recognition for their enthusiasm for my research and the local knowledge they bestowed upon me.

While at Ohio State I had many professors who took care to foster in me an appreciation for historical analysis and who pushed me to be a better historian. Without their care and mentorship, I would not be in the position that I am now. They are Michael

Mangus, James Weeks, Nathaniel Swigger, Lucy Murphy, the late Andrew Cayton, and especially my adviser John Brooke. I have been fortunate to find similar professors at

Ohio University. The second chapter of this thesis was the basis of a seminar paper I wrote for Chester Pach, whose comments and criticisms helped form it into an article manuscript. Likewise, Sarah Kinkel has been a wonderful teacher and confidant, and her ability to challenge my thoughts and ideas has strengthened my skills as a writer and as a 7 scholar. And of course, there is my current adviser and mentor Brian Schoen, whose attention and interest in my project—despite being so far removed from his own—has convinced me that federal land policy may not be as boring as even I thought. Through engaging conversations, thought-provoking readings, and difficult moments of revisions,

Dr. Schoen has pushed me further than I thought I could possibly go. Although there is no doubt that my knowledge and professionalization has benefitted from his guidance, my confidence to be an active and successful member of the academy is the greatest gift he has given me.

There have also been many friends and family members outside of school who have helped me conduct my research and keep my sanity along the way. My good friends

Megan Walton and Wayne Johnson, as well as my Aunt Patti provided me with room and board on multiple occasions while conducting research in Cleveland, Indianapolis, and

Washington. I would also like to thank James O’Neil, Matt McClellan, Cristina Maze, and Devin Ricketson for their kindness and friendship over the years, especially these last two when I needed it the most. And last, I would like to thank my parents and my grandfather, whose continued love and support while I have been a student has kept me going in more ways than I can describe. 8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………... 3

Dedication………………………………………………………………………………... 5

Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………... 6

Abbreviations…………………………………………………………………………….. 9

A Note For Readers…………………………………………………………………….. 11

Introduction: The “Landed Republick”………………………………………………… 12

Chapter One: “Public Creditors who are Desirous of Satisfaction of Their Debts”……. 28

Chapter Two: “Strange Doings with Respect to Preemptions”………………………… 62

Epilogue………………………………………………………………………………… 94

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………. 99 9

ABBREVIATIONS

Unpublished Sources

Cutler Collection — Ephraim Cutler Family Collection, Marietta College Library, Marietta, OH

ETSMC — Early Territorial and Statehood Manuscript Collection, Ross County Historical Society, Chillicothe, OH.

“Langham’s Charges” — “Testimony relative to Elias Langham’s charges against Thomas Worthington, Supt. of Public Land Sales at Chillicothe,” August 21 to September 17, 1802, TWP, reel 15.

May Papers — May Family Papers, MS 0401, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH.

PTW — Papers of Thomas Worthington, MIC 35, Ohio History Connection, Columbus, OH.

Putnam Papers — Rufus Putnam Papers, Marietta College Library, Marietta, OH.

Register’s Ledger — Register’s Ledger (Credit System), 1801-1829, State Archives Series 391, GR1586, Ohio History Connection, Columbus, OH.

TWP — Thomas Worthington Papers, MIC 96, Ohio History Connection, Columbus, OH.

Published Sources

Correspondence of Symmes — The Correspondence of John Cleves Symmes, ed. Beverley W. Bond, Jr. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926).

JER — Journal of the Early Republic

Journals of Congress — Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, ed. Worthington C. Ford, et. al., 34 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-1937).

Letters of Congress — Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, ed. Edmund C. Burnett, 7 vols. (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1921-1936).

Ohio in the Confederation — Ohio in the Time of the Confederation, ed. Archer Butler Hulbert (Marietta, OH: Marietta Historical Commission, 1918). Papers of Hamilton — The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett, 28 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-1962).

10

Papers of Washington, CS — The Papers of George Washington: Confederation Series, eds. W. W. Abbot and Dorothy Twohig, 6 vols. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992-1997).

Papers of Washington, PS — The Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series, eds. W. W. Abbot and Dorothy Twohig, 10 vols. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1989-2005).

Records of the Ohio Company — The Records of the Original Proceedings of the Ohio Company, ed. Archer Butler Hulbert, 2 vols. (Marietta, OH: Marietta Historical Commission, 1917).

St. Clair Papers — The St. Clair Papers: The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair…, ed. William Henry Smith, 2 vols. (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1882).

Territorial Papers — The Territorial Papers of the United States, ed. Clarence E. Carter, et. al., 28 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934-1975. 11

A Note For Readers

Readers should note that I have retained original spellings and grammar constructions when quoting from original sources and manuscripts. 12

INTRODUCTION: THE “LANDED REPUBLIC”

In 1784 George Washington received an anonymous letter claiming that in

America “the true Center of Dominion ought and must be Land.” The previous year

Great Britain had ceded its claims to the trans-Appalachian West to the United States, which the writer considered a “Circumstance most interesting to every Friend of

Liberty.” Ignoring the land claims and residency of thousands of Native Americans in the region, the writer agreed with the Confederation Congress’s policy of using the territory

“as a National fund for defraying the Expences of the War.” However, it could only happen if Congress would sell the lands “at a Price favourable to the Actual Setler.”

There was now a “favourable opportunity for Erecting a Number of States, fortunate in being formed on the Principles of Equality.” Rather than engrossing the land into the hands of a “Land Jobber or Huckster,” the United States could promote in these western states “a more equal Division of Property, & a Wise system of Laws, formed on the true

Principles of Democratic Liberty.” Such “an equitable and generous Agrarian [policy],” the writer argued, was “a Regulation deemed from the Experience of the States and the

Testimony of every Political Writer, the most necessary & essential for the happiness prosperity & Duration of every Landed Republick.”1

While it is regrettable that the name of this letter’s author is lost to us, it is fortunate that the author’s sentiments respecting western land policy, political development, political economy, and an active federal government are still intact. Rather than viewing them as unrelated topics, Washington’s correspondent understood them to

1 Unknown to George Washington, 15 July 1784, Papers of Washington: Confederation Series, 1:514- 515. 13 be linked in vital ways. If the early American West was to be a democratic society, then common people needed to have access to property to claim their political rights. Western land policy would have to be structured to ensure favoritism for settlers rather than speculators. Doing so required a vigilant federal government willing to regulate western settlement to prevent monopoly and encourage widespread land ownership. Rather than a society with property and politics concentrated into the hands of the few, the West would be a more democratic society both politically and economically thanks to the actions of an energetic federal government.

Scholars have long been interested by the interconnection of these concepts.

Federal land policy has been a favorite subject for Progressive historians who viewed western settlement through the lens of class conflict but were not convinced ordinary settlers wanted an active federal government. Frederick Jackson Turner commended the

“liberal provisions” the Confederation Congress had adopted in respect to its western lands but maintained that actual settlers remained wary of the federal government.2

Beverley Bond agreed with Turner that early policies like the Land Ordinance of 1785 were “democratic,” but admitted that they favored speculators over actual settlers.3

Unlike Turner and Bond, John Barnhart was not willing to subtly praise these policies. As he states, “land was sold by the government in order to reduce the national debt, not to make freeholders of squatters or to enable the poor to improve their economic status.” It was the speculators who “were actively trying to direct” the federal government to their

2 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1921), 132-133, 320, quote on 133. 3 Beverley W. Bond, Jr., The Civilization of the Old Northwest: A Study of Political, Social, and Economic Development, 1788-1812 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1934), 8, 278, quote on 8. 14 advantage, not squatters or actual settlers.4 Paul Wallace Gates was less willing to acknowledge that the federal government supported either squatters or speculators, insisting that it was more of a compromise. However, his insistence that the land policy was crafted specifically to reduce the public debt implies that it was geared towards the public creditors, and thus the more affluent members of society.5 Malcolm Rohrbough also believed that earlier policies were meant to pay down the federal debt, but realized these policies also benefitted speculators over squatters because eastern elites pressured

Congress to act while western squatters simply ignored the federal government.6

Later historians studying federal land policy have also focused on the class conflict that the Progressives highlighted.7 Andrew Cayton agrees with Turner and others that squatters living in the Ohio Country were averse to the federal government. In

Cayton’s mind the squatters “wanted the distribution of land and the organization of society” to be “governed by local rules and customs rather than directed by the national government.” Because of this, Cayton argues, “congressmen and other prominent

Americans worried that the Ohio Country might prove to be a source of more discord than profit.” Federalists—men who supported strong central government—sought to counter the localism of the squatters by settling the West with like-minded individuals who would maintain order through their political ties to the federal government. This

4 John D. Barnhart, Valley of Democracy: The Frontier versus the Plantation in the Ohio Valley, 1775- 1818 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1953), 126-127. 5 Paul Wallace Gates, History of Public Land Law Development (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), 6 Malcolm J. Rohrbough, The Land Office Business: The Settlement and Administration of American Public Lands, 1789-1837 (New York: Oxford University Press,1968), 8-16. 7 An exception is Daniel Feller who ignores class conflict and highlights the need for revenue. Feller, The Public Lands in Jacksonian Politics (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 3-13. 15 included elite speculators like the Ohio Company of Associates and John Cleves

Symmes, both of who received massive grants of federal land. According to Cayton these private contracts “were more than profitable speculations: they were the means of insuring the introduction of order, system and regularity to the West.”8 Peter Onuf concurs with Cayton that squatters were defiant of the federal government and nationalists’ concerns centered around the types of settlers who would settle the West. In

Onuf’s view, the Confederation Congress passed the Land Ordinance of 1785 to “block out poor, lazy squatters” and instead attract market-oriented settlers from eastern states who would maintain crucial economic connections between the two sections. When the ordinance failed Congress then turned to speculators. Like Cayton, Onuf believes “the

Ohio Company purchase was consistent with the goals of” the nationalists.9

Cayton also examines how the nationalists’ plan for settlement encouraged political development in the western territory. He argues that members of the Ohio

Company and John Cleves Symmes used their influence to secure access to the federal patronage. Their positions within the newly formed Northwest Territory, particularly ones with the authority to appoint civil officers, allowed men like Governor Arthur St.

8 Andrew R. L. Cayton, The Frontier Republic: Ideology and Politics in the Ohio Country, 1780-1825 (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1986), 1-32, quotes on 4, 13 and 25. 9 Peter Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 21-43, quotes on 30 and 43. Both John R. Van Atta and Bethel Saler have echoed Cayton and Onuf’s earlier assertions that nationalists and their Federalists successors were untrusting of western settlers, and favored a land policy that would bring order and market-oriented settlers to the West. Although squatters figure prominently in Van Atta’s examination post-1820, he offers no consideration of their views towards the federal government in the earlier years of the republic. For Saler, the Ohio Company was part of the “Federalist venture” to place “place imperial authority above local power and abstract, detached pricniples over personalized, local ties.” Van Atta, Securing the West: Politics, Public Lands, and the Fate of the Old Republic, 1785-1850 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 18-62; Saler, The Settlers’ Empire: Colonialism and State Formation in America’s Old Northwest (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 52-57, quote on 53. 16

Clair and Ohio Company director Rufus Putnam to control the political and socio- economic makeup of their communities. Such opportunities were closed to individuals like the non-proprietor Thomas Worthington, whose aspirations for political advancement in the territory encouraged him to oppose both the administration of St. Clair and the federal government’s presence in the territory. For Cayton, this personal conflict between

St. Clair and Worthington explains the later partisan split between Federalists like St.

Clair and Republicans like Worthington, and Worthington’s eventual push for statehood.10 However, this narrative has been challenged by Donald Ratcliffe who believes that “local factions did not precede the generation of party spirit” in the

Northwest Territory. Nor was statehood an attempt by Worthington and his allies to disrupt the federal government’s presence in the territory. To Ratcliffe the statehood movement was supported by Republicans and opposed by Federalists because of “intense party spirit on national questions” rather than local concerns, least of all issues with the territorial government.11

More recently historians of the American national state have begun to build on

Cayton and Onuf’s work. Although they agree that early nationalists favored an active federal presence in the western territory to prevent disorder and ensure political and economic development, they are less inclined to recognize western animosity towards the central government (unless one were to consider Native Americans westerners, too).

Patrick Griffin has shown that western settlers of all classes—from squatters, to middle-

10 Cayton, Frontier Republic, 51-80. 11 Donald Ratcliffe, Party Spirit in a Frontier Republic: Democratic Politics in Ohio, 1793-1821 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), 13-74, quotes on 13. 17 class freeholders, to elite speculators of the Ohio Company—all urged the federal state to intervene in the Northwest Indian War and protect them from Native American violence.12 Susan Gaunt Stearns and Marion Nelson Winship describe how westerners demanded federal diplomatic action to open navigation of the Mississippi River, particularly at New Orleans, to American citizens.13 William Bergmann has also studied western support for the economic impact the federal government exhibited in the West, especially in regard to acquiring Native American land for settlement, investment in road construction, the opening of post offices to improve communication, and the overall increase in bureaucrats to administer federal authority. As he states, “westerners readily identified the close relationship between local economic growth and federal policies.”14

Rather than being inimical to the federal government, westerners were willing to exploit its advantages.

This thesis will add to these newer understandings of the national government’s role in the West while reexamining the work of Cayton, Onuf, and Ratcliffe. Much like the anonymous letter to George Washington, members of the Confederation Congress were optimistic for the trans-Appalachian West and the federal government’s ability to

12 Patrick Griffin, American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007). Terry Bouton has been critical of Griffin’s thesis, claiming that the prevalence of anti-federalism in the western counties of Pennsylvania indicate a distaste for strong central government. Bouton, “The New and (Somewhat) Improved Frontier Thesis,” Reviews in American History 35, no. 4 (Dec., 2007): 490-496. 13 Susan Gaunt Stearns, “Streams of Interest: The Mississippi River and the Political Economy of the Early Republic, 1783-1803,” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2011); Marion Nelson Winship, “The ‘Practicable Sphere’ of a Republic: Western Ways of Connecting to Congress,” in Kenneth R. Bowling and Donald R. Kennon, eds., The House and Senate in the 1790s: Petitioning, Lobbying, and Institutional Development (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002), 139-177, esp. 148-175. 14 William H. Bergmann, The American National State and the Early West (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), quote on 5. 18 settle it. The United States took an active role in securing the western territory, transferring to itself the claims of individual states to the lands north of the Ohio River and nullifying the claims of the Native Americans living there.15 Nationalists were also committed to a rigid system of sales that would provide order in the settlement of federal lands, but not one that would be inclusive of the squatters still living on those lands. The first attempt at uniform sales was the Land Ordinance of 1785, which was designed specifically to satisfy the public creditors of the United States by exchanging specie and loan office certificates for federal land. This policy necessitated larger tracts to retire as much public debt as possible.16 It also meant many would not be able to purchase the land, including the squatters. Instead of considering them in the ordinance, the federal government sent the western forces of the Continental Army to forcibly remove them off the land.17 However, this early confidence that members of Congress had quickly eroded as not only fears of western disorder crept into their minds—as Cayton and Onuf show— but a myriad of other problems took hold as well. Not only did squatting persist and threaten to disrupt the land ordinance, but surveying the land moved at a remarkably slow pace, particularly because of the escalating tensions between Native Americans and settlers in Kentucky.18 The value of federal lands also became a concern in the mid-1780s as Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia began selling their own state

15 For state claims see: Peter S. Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 75-102. For Native American claims see: David Andrew Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages: Indians, Federalists, and the Search for Order on the American Frontier (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 32-36, 38-44. 16 Territorial Papers, 2:12-18. 17 Cayton, Frontier Republic, 1-11. 18 For these tensions see: Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 55-76. 19 lands.19 When the federal lands were finally brought to auction in 1787 Congress’s fears were confirmed as only 578,000 acres—less than half of the Land Ordinance’s proposed survey—were brought to auction, and only 72,900 of that bid on and purchased.20

The optimism that members of Congress held in the early 1780s began to erode in the wake of the land auction, convincing many that a new strategy was needed. Rather than viewing the sale of federal land to the Ohio Company and John Cleves Symmes as a continuation of early nationalist policy—as Cayton and Onuf do—this thesis will argue that these sales were part of an entirely new land policy. Instead of overseeing western settlement itself by selling land directly to actual settlers, Congress opted to entrust this public responsibility to private land companies. I refer to this as privatization. The Ohio

Company and Symmes would act as middlemen, purchasing hundreds of thousands of acres of federal land for public securities at a discounted price while enjoying the exclusive right to sell that land to actual settlers for a profit.21 Not only did Congress grant them exclusive rights to federal land, but the speculators’ appointment to the principal territorial offices created by the Northwest Ordinance were also part of this

19 For public lands in the states see: Stephen Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry Clay (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: “The People,” the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 164; Robert D. Arbuckle, Pennsylvania Speculator and Patriot: The Entrepreneurial John Nicholson, 1757-1800 (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), 26-30; Paul B. Moyer, Wild Yankees: The Struggle for Independence along Pennsylvania’s Revolutionary Frontier (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); Alan Taylor, William Cooper’s Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier of the Early American Republic (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), and Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760-1820 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990); François Furstenberg, When the United States Spoke French: Five Refugees Who Shaped a Nation (New York: The Penguin Press, 2014), 227-287. 20 American State Papers: Finance, 3:24. 21 R. Douglas Hurt, The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720-1830 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1995), 168-174. 20 privatization strategy. The ordinance created five official positions to manage the territory’s affairs, and Symmes and three shareholders of the Ohio Company filled these positions, including the governor, secretary, and two of the three territorial judges.22

Although their positions within the territorial government remained subservient to national authority, the ordinance and their land grants gave the companies relative autonomy to pursue their private interests and develop the territory politically and economically how they saw fit, with minimal interference from the federal government.

The decision to privatize western development is better understood when considering contemporary understandings of political economy. As Andrew Shankman has shown, nationalists like Alexander Hamilton were concerned with the democratizing effects the revolution had on the economy. They were much more comfortable with a hierarchical structure that concentrated capital—and the decisions on how to utilize it— into the hands of an elite few. This was especially true for public resources, as the Society for the Establishment of Useful Manufactures demonstrates. Hamilton advocated using federally funded bounties to help capitalize the SEUM, giving its members access to credit that non-members could only dream of.23 Private use of public resources is also a topic analyzed by Terry Bouton. In his study of Pennsylvania during and after the revolution, Bouton convincingly shows how banking and credit had long been a public endeavor in the colony but following the revolution capitalists such as Robert Morris

22 For the appointments see: Cayton, Frontier Republic, 26-27. 23 Andrew Shankman, “‘A New Thing on Earth’: Alexander Hamilton, Pro-Manufacturing Republicans, and the Democratization of American Political Economy,” Journal of the Early Republic 23, no. 3 (Autumn, 2003): 323-352. 21 privatized lending institutions so they could profit on credit.24 Concentrations of capital are also part of Brian Murphy’s study of New York. Using incorporation and state- sponsored monopoly, capitalists in the empire state were able to privately fund public works and transportation projects, including steamboats and the Erie Canal.25

Privatization in the Northwest Territory worked in similar ways by taking a public resource—land—and granting private interests—the Ohio Company and Symmes—the exclusive right to manage it and profit from it.

Entrusting settlement to these companies was not “a stronger western policy” as

Cayton argues, but rather a weaker one.26 Although the United States wanted to defer its responsibility of western development to these land companies, it constantly found itself playing catch up with them. The Ohio Company and Symmes were not well-prepared or even able to respond and adapt to the realities of settling a wilderness. Increased Euro-

American settlement quickly upset the fragile peace that had been established between the federal government and Native Americans, and increased tension between the tribes and Kentuckians soon spilled over into the land companies’ settlements. As settlers began abandoning these settlements and refusing to purchase more land, the companies found it difficult to make their payments to the federal treasury and Congress responded by altering the companies’ grants.27 The federal government also had to intervene in legal

24 Bouton, Taming Democracy, 61-87. 25 Brian Phillips Murphy, Building the Empire State: Political Economy in the Early Republic (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). 26 Cayton, Frontier Republic, 23. 27 For the Northwest Indian War see: Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 55-159; Patrick Griffin, American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 183- 239. 22 disputes when Symmes began selling land outside of his patent.28 The Ohio Company was also plagued with legal problems when the non-proprietors of the territorial legislature—led by Thomas Worthington—passed taxes on the companies’ lands.29

Western agents for eastern proprietors found themselves unable to pay these taxes, and many lands were seized for delinquency. The democratization of territorial politics and the seizure of company lands was precisely the type of disorder that the nationalists had wanted to prevent in the territory. Members of Congress slowly realized that privatization was unstable and required more federal intervention at every turn. By 1796 Congress ended the land companies’ monopoly by passing a new bill that restored national administration of federal land.30

This thesis will also argue that many westerners—including Thomas Worthington and the squatters who lived near his home in Ross County—played a key role in convincing the federal government to take a more active approach to western settlement.

Rather than detesting federal intervention in territorial matters, as Andrew Cayton contends, Worthington embraced it. He understood that many of the squatters living near his home in Ross County wanted an active national government that appreciated their concerns, so he supported a federal land policy that focused not on public creditors, but on actual settlers. In 1800 he helped pass the Land Act of 1800 which opened four land offices in the territory, reduced the size of available tracts, and extended federal credit to

28 Cayton, Frontier Republic, 61-63. 29 Salmon P. Chase, ed., The Statutes of Ohio and of the Northwestern Territory… (Cincinnati: Corey & Fairbank, 1833), 168-174, 208-209. 30 For instance, see the Land Act of 1796 in: Territorial Papers, 2:552-557. 23 all purchasers.31 Worthington also secured an appointment as the register of the

Chillicothe land office, a position that gave him immense influence over the interpretation of the law. Before and during the sale of lands in 1801 Worthington negotiated with squatters and would-be speculators alike, determining what lands to sell and to whom. These negotiations allowed Worthington to build his own network of patronage like Governor St. Clair and Rufus Putnam had constructed for themselves, but instead of elite property holders this network was made up of former squatters.

The personal network Worthington created through these negotiations helped bolster his reputation in the territory, particularly among recent settlers and the squatter communities of Ross County. This process of negotiation is similar to what Gautham Rao has recently discovered at federal custom houses. As head of the treasury department,

Alexander Hamilton instructed his customs officials to be lenient in the collection of port duties. Securing the compliance of merchants was important since it would be their capital financing the federal treasury.32 Worthington was also careful to meet the needs of the citizens he worked with, but not because the federal government needed their support.

Rather, Worthington used the connections he made at the land office through his negotiation of authority to build a political interest that had larger implications for the

Northwest Territory.

31 For Worthington’s support of land reform see: Alfred Byron Sears, Thomas Worthington: Father of Ohio Statehood (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1958), 38, 54. For the land act see: Rohrbough, Land Office Business, 23-25. 32 Gautham Rao, National Duties: Custom Houses and the Making of the American State (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016), esp. 53-102. 24

Gautham Rao has also examined Worthington’s role as the Chillicothe land register, especially his personal interpretations of the Land Act of 1800. Although Rao sees Worthington bending the rules of the land office in ways that customs officials did,

Rao does not recognize the political implications of the register’s actions.33 Marion

Winship as also made similar arguments about Worthington, claiming that he utilized his federal authority to enhance his own fortunes. However, her examination looks mostly at the personal benefits—mostly economical, but somewhat political—the federal government bestowed on Worthington rather than his use of it to alter territorial politics from the bottom up.34

The personal network Worthington created became a critical component for the formation of Ohio’s Republican Party. Although Donald Ratcliffe dismisses the importance of personal connections in party formation, a closer examination of his evidence shows otherwise. Many of the county conventions and party handbills that were held and distributed during the statehood movement—and which Ratcliffe sees as expressions of spontaneous party spirit—were carefully organized by Worthington and the squatters who had directly benefitted from the land office negotiations.35 The partisan zeal expressed by these conventions, public prints, and the private correspondence of

Republicans in the territory originated with Worthington and his ability to link his personal network with the national Republican interest. When Worthington visited

33 Gautham Rao, “Thomas Worthington and the Great Transformation: Land Markets and Federal Power in the Ohio Valley, 1790-1805,” Ohio Valley History 3, no. 4 (2003): 21-34 34 Marion Nelson Winship, “Enterprise in Motion in the Early American Republic: The Federal Government and the Making of Thomas Worthington,” Business and Economic History 23, no. 1 (Fall 1994): 81-91. 35 Ratcliffe, Party Spirit, 44-74, esp. 59 and 62. 25

Washington in 1802 to advocate statehood, it was done with the loose understanding that his political connections in the territory would be utilized to support Thomas Jefferson.36

Akin to David Waldstreicher and Stephen Grossbart’s study of Abraham Bishop in

Connecticut, Worthington was a political “mediator” who forged the vital links between local constituency and national politics.37 It was this injection of partisanship that helped

Worthington build political unity and secure statehood for Ohio.

Worthington’s promotion of federal power and his use of it to democratize the

Northwest Territory complicates current understandings of the early national state.

Gordon Wood and others see the federal constitution—and the concepts of republicanism that informed it—as a check against the excesses of democracy that were created during the American Revolution.38 The land office challenges this narrative. Nor does it fully agree with the work of Robin Einhorn and Adam Rothman, who see Jeffersonian control of the federal government as being conducive of anti-democratic impulses through its protection and expansion of chattel slavery.39 It also adds to the more recent work of Max

Edling and Eliga Gould in that the early federal state was not only an attempt by the

36 Thomas Worthington to Abraham Baldwin, 30 Nov. 1801, PTW, reel 1; Ratcliffe, Party Spirit, 41. 37 David Waldstreicher and Stephen J. Grossbart, “Abraham Bishop’s Vocation; Or, the Mediation of Jeffersonian Politics,” JER 18, no. 4 (Winter, 1998): 617-657. 38 Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: The University Of North Carolina Press, 1969), and “Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution,” in Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter II, eds., Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and National Identity (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 69-109; J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774-1781 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940); Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007). 39 Robin L. Einhorn, American Taxation, American Slavery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Adam Rothman, Slave Country: American Expansion and the Origins of the Deep South (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005). 26 founders to emulate the fiscal-military states of Europe but was also used to directly advance the socio-economic status of its citizens.40 Such a view corresponds largely with

John Larson’s study of internal improvements and popular government action, but without the inevitable failure and popular backlash against such programs.41 Rather than a check on democracy, federal power was utilized by Jeffersonians to encourage democratization in the early American West.

This story demonstrates how malleable and how personal the Federalist and

Republican persuasions were in the early days of partisan activity, and how those persuasions were used to foster political development more broadly. Instead of being the steadfast proponents of a strong central government, early nationalists and their Federalist successors were quite willing to negate federal authority in favor of private, local interests. Inversely, many who would join the Republican Party were not always fearful of a centralized authority. Instead, they harnessed the energy of federal power to implement their ideas of political economy.42 And it was the connections that were forged

40 For emulation see: Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), and A Hercules in the Craddle: War, Money, and the American State, 1783-1867 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014); Eliga Gould, Among Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012). 41 John Lauritz Larson, Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 42 For historical understandings of Federalist and Republican attitudes see: David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), esp. 1-28; James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789-1815 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 3-121; Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca: 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980); John M. Murrin, “The Great Inversion, Or Court Versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolution Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816), in Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 368-454 27 in these decisions over political economy that helped advance not just economic development, but political development as well. As Joanne Freeman has shown, politics in the early republic were highly personal.43 However, Worthington’s interest was not built on personality alone, but rather his choice to use his federal authority to benefit those around him.44 It took men like Worthington to mediate between the local and national networks and bring them together as one.

43 Joanne Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). 44 Alan Taylor, “‘The Art of Hook and Snivey’: Political Culture in Upstate New York During the 1790s,” Journal of American History 79, no. 4 (Mar., 1993): 1371-1396. 28

CHAPTER ONE: “PUBLIC CREDITORS WHO ARE DESIROUS OF

SATISFACTION OF THEIR DEBTS”

Throughout the revolution and into the early years of the republic, the

Confederation Congress looked to the lands of the trans-Appalachian West as a fund for extinguishing the public debt. Without the authority to levy its own taxes, Congress assumed that they could satisfy public creditors by exchanging their Continental securities and loan office certificates for land titles.1 However, Congress could only sell this land to its creditors if it held sovereignty over it. Several state governments, various

Native American tribes, and countless numbers of Euro-American squatters claimed the western lands, particularly north of the Ohio River. These claims would have to either be nullified or transferred to the United States before the creditors could be satisfied. Sales would also be overseen by the federal government and structured to create compact settlements. This would make it easier for the United States to assert its authority within a vast borderland. Members of Congress worked hard to consider the numerous modes of sale and settlement proposed, compromising with the Land Ordinance of 1785.2 Although the ordinance was meant to answer the questions of both revenue and spatial control, it failed to do so. Surveys were prolonged and not completed; only a fraction of the surveyed land was sold; and the lands purchased were not concentrated. If Congress wished to gain revenue from its lands, it would have to adopt a different strategy.

1 E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 35-40; Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007), 78-79. 2 Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 21-43. 29

That strategy was privatization. Rather than overseeing western settlement itself, the federal government opted in 1787 to transfer this public responsibility to private land companies made up of nationalists and their Federalist successors. As members of the economic elite, the Ohio Company of Associates and John Cleves Symmes both had access to large amounts of public debt through their connections with the securities market, and they used these connections to create influence within the Board of Treasury.

They represented a growing, conservative backlash against the democratizing effects that the revolution had on markets and promised to create a hierarchical political economy that others—like Alexander Hamilton—had begun advocating for.3 They also offered large and rapid influxes of revenue into the federal coffers in exchange for millions of acres of federal land, which was highly appealing to Congress. Another demand was the creation of a territorial government staffed with company directors who could use the authority of the federal state to advance their company’s interests. Congress quickly assented to the speculators’ requests. At the behest of Ohio Company director Manasseh

Cutler, Congress passed the Ordinance of 1787, creating the Northwest Territory and filling four of its five offices with members from both companies. The Board of Treasury then drew up contracts for both associations, selling to each company one million acres at

3 For the conservative backlash see: Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1176- 1787 (Chapel Hill: The University Of North Carolina Press, 1969), and “Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution,” in Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter II, eds., Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and National Identity (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 69-109; J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774-1781 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940); Woody Holton, Unruly Americans. For the construction of a hierarchical economy see: Andrew Shankman, “‘A New Thing on Earth’: Alexander Hamilton, Pro-Manufacturing Republicans, and the Democratization of American Political Economy,” JER 23, no. 3 (Autumn, 2003): 323-352. 30 a discounted rate, and requiring both to survey the land according to the parameters of the

Ordinance of 1785.4 For the moment, the federal government was out of the land business and elite speculators were in.

Privatization would not last. The proliferation of Euro-American settlements north of the Ohio River upset many Native Americans living in the region. Although several chiefs of the Wyandot, Delaware, and Shawnee had signed treaties that accepted the sovereignty of the United States over the land, there were many within the tribes that rejected them. Increased tensions led to violence, which threatened the Ohio Company and John Cleves Symmes with insolvency as many settlements were abandoned and company lands remained unsold.5 This was especially true for Symmes, whose payments to the United States had become dependent on new purchases. Things were so dire for

Symmes that he began selling land to settlers outside of his patent to raise funds, which eventually required federal intervention to settle these legal disputes.6 The Ohio

Company had legal matters of its own to deal with. When the Northwest Territory advanced to its second stage of government, the company lost its monopoly over territorial politics. The second stage came with a new territorial legislature which was filled with non-proprietors who began to tax the company’s lands.7 Western agents found themselves unable to pay the taxes on the eastern proprietors’ lands, which were seized

4 Andrew R. L. Cayton, The Frontier Republic: Politics and Ideology in the Ohio Country, 1780-1825 (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1986), 12-67. 5 For the Northwest Indian War see: David Andrew Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages: Indians, Federalists, and the Search for Order on the American Frontier (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008), 55-159; Patrick Griffin, American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 183-239. 6 Cayton, Frontier Republic, 61-63. 7 Salmon P. Chase, ed., The Statutes of Ohio and of the Northwestern Territory… (Cincinnati: Corey & Fairbank, 1833), 168-174, 208-209. 31 for delinquency. This put the western agents in a precarious situation, as they were expected by their eastern friends—particularly those in the federal government—to provide order and stability on this frontier. Democratization of politics and the seizure of speculators’ lands was not what they had in mind. Members of the new federal Congress began to understand that it could not rely on these private companies to ensure the ordered settlement that early nationalists had desired. By 1796 the federal government began resuming responsibility for western settlement.8

The privatization moment shows that early on the Confederation Congress was willing to pursue an active role in western settlement, but the realities of governance hindered the ability of the United States to pursue a more centralized policy. Many early nationalists and their Federalist successors became willing to experiment with private control of western development. This challenges Andrew Cayton and Peter Onuf who consider the federal government as solely responsible for western development. Both

Cayton and Onuf are convinced that the early settlement polices of the United States were structured to provide strict federal oversight of the trans-Appalachian West.9 Although the Ordinance of 1785 and the creation of the Northwest Territory were both federally sanctioned, their implementation through the hands of John Cleves Symmes and the Ohio

Company directors suggests that there was a significant amount of private control that at times was contrary to or problematic for the policy goals of the United States. Overtime the dominance that the Symmes and the Ohio Company had over territorial politics and

8 For instance, see the Land Act of 1796 in: Territorial Papers, 2:552-557. 9 Cayton, Frontier Republic, 12-32; Onuf, Statehood and Union, 2-66. 32 settlement deteriorated, not because non-proprietors were averse to the federal government, but because they became adept at using it for their own purposes.

⁎

During the American Revolution, the Confederation Congress found itself in desperate need of money. The Articles of Confederation did not give Congress the authority to levy its own taxes, so it turned to credit. In 1777 the American diplomats to

France—Silas Deane, Benjamin Franklin, and Arthur Lee—secured a loan of two million livres from the French government. With foreign credit established, Congress turned to domestic creditors. Loan offices were established in each state and offered bearer bonds with six percent interest. The French livres were used to back these loan certificates, which Congress hoped would rein in the continental dollars it had been issuing to pay for the war effort. Public creditors were happy to exchange their depreciating continental dollars for these loan certificates. Not only were they a better hedge against inflation, they were also easy to speculate in.10 Regardless, many members of Congress were optimistic about the loan certificates as a viable solution. John Adams believed “that a considerable sum of money will be obtained by their means.”11 Others were not as sanguine, believing the certificates were not enough. As one member put it, “the Loan

Office is at length considered as little better than new emissions [of paper money], and a

Tax seems the only adequate expedient.”12 Such a tax would not come though, and the

Continental Congress was forced to look elsewhere for revenue.

10 Ferguson, Power of the Purse, 35-40; Holton, Unruly Americans, 78-79. 11 Letters of Congress, 2:246-248, quote on 246. 12 Ibid., 2:257. 33

A possible solution was selling the lands west of the Appalachian Mountains. One of the earliest advocates of western land sales was Thomas Paine, who explained their revenue-generating potential in his pamphlet Common Sense. Rather than granting the land to court favorites as the kings of Great Britain had done, Paine proposed a public sale which would pay off current debts and fund the new government going forward.13

Silas Deane shared in Paine’s sentiments. Writing to the Committee of Secret

Correspondence from his post in France, Deane recommended purchasing the land north of the Ohio River from the Native Americans living on it and reselling it to foreign investors. He suggested the establishment of a new colony at the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, orchestrated by a company comprised of European shareholders.

This settlement would increase the value of the lands between the Mississippi and

Appalachians, and allow Congress to make further sales to European investors to defray the public expenses. “You want money,” Deane bluntly stated to Congress, and only

“land security” could “engage the moneyed interests of Europe in your favor.”14

Although the committee agreed with the propriety of Deane’s proposals, they doubted whether Congress could act. Until it could be determined if Congress held any land outside the claims of the states, any schemes for their sale would have to be put on hold.15

Members of Congress knew that the western lands were a sensitive issue but managed to use the lands’ potential as a national fund to transfer the states’ claims to the federal government. No one understood this subject better than Virginia’s Richard Henry

13 Thomas Paine, Common Sense (Philadelphia: R. Bell, 1776), 70-71. 14 Ohio in the Confederation, 1-4, quote on 4. 15 Letters of Congress, 2:509-510. 34

Lee. He recognized that states such as Maryland, Delaware, and New Jersey—none of which held claims to western lands—refused to sign the Articles of Confederation because Virginia claimed all the lands from Kentucky to the Great Lakes. “They are certainly envious of the wealth they suppose may flow from this source,” Lee wrote to

Patrick Henry. Instead of keeping the claim and the wealth it could generate, Lee suggested that Virginia cede the land north of the Ohio River to the confederation and use it for the “common good.” Such a move would alleviate the concerns of the smaller states, solidify “the bond of Union,” and provide the federal government with revenue from land sales.16 In 1780 a congressional committee reported that such land cessions should be encouraged, not just to provide for “the stability of the general confederacy,” but because they were “essential to public credit and confidence.”17 New York,

Massachusetts, and Virginia all responded to the request, and offered to cede their claims north of the Ohio River to Congress.18 Virginia, however, demanded certain stipulations, which the United States agreed to. Among other things, Virginia’s cession required the lands to be split into “distinct Republican States” and admitted into the union on an equal footing, that the lands between the Little Miami and Scioto rivers be reserved for

Virginian veterans, and that the remaining land “be considered as a common fund” for the use of the United States.19

When the British empire recognized American independence in 1783, they also ceded to the United States their land claims between the Mississippi and the

16 Ibid., 3:495-496. 17 Journals of Congress, 17:806. 18 For New York and Massachusetts see: Territorial Papers, 2:3-5, 10-12. 19 Ibid., 2:6-9, quotes on 7-8. 35

Appalachians. Although the commissioners in Paris negotiating the peace treaty did not take notice of thousands of Native American inhabitants, Congress did. A committee charged with considering the western tribes reported that it was impractical to expect the various nations to fully submit to the sovereignty of the United States and recommended

“that lines of property should be ascertained and established between the United States and them, which will be convenient to the respective tribes, and commensurate to the public wants.” It was imperative that the United States reserve a portion of these western lands “because the public creditors have been led to believe and have a right to expect that those territories will be speedily improved into a fund towards the security and payment of the national debt.” Congress resolved to send commissioners to meet with the western tribes, negotiate peace treaties, and establish these boundaries.20 Richard Butler,

George Rogers Clark, and Arthur Lee were appointed as commissioners for the United

States, and in 1785 they met with a group of Wyandot, Delaware, Chippewa, and Ottawa chiefs at Fort McIntosh. Although not the official position of the federal government, the commissioners argued that the United States considered itself sovereign over the land between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes by right of conquest.21 The Delaware and

Wyandot agreed to an allotment of the northwestern half of modern Ohio, “but with much reluctance.”22 The following year another treaty conference was held with some

Shawnee chiefs, and the commissioners allotted them lands west of the Delaware and

20 Journals of Congress, 25:681-689, quotes on 682-683. 21 For the right of conquest see: Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 30-31, 33, 40. 22 Ebenezer Denny, Military Journal of Ebenezer Denny, An Officer in the Revolutionary and Indian Wars, ed. William H. Denny (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1859), 55; Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Laws and Treaties, 7 vols. (Washington: 1903-1975), 2:7. 36

Wyandot reservation. When the Shawnee protested the terms by offering a mixed string of wampum—indicating war or peace—commissioner George Rogers Clark pushed the string off the council table with his walking stick and stomped it into the ground with his boot.23 Realizing the sternness of the Americans could not be broken, the attending

Shawnee agreed to the terms.24

News of the treaties prompted many nationalist-minded leaders to begin circulating ideas on how Congress could sell the western lands. Upon hearing of the first treaty, George Washington wrote to one member of Congress that settlements “ought not to be too diffusive,” suggesting instead that “compact and progressive Seating will give strength to the Union; admit law & good government; & federal aids at an early period.”25 As far as sales, Washington informed Richard Henry Lee that he hoped

Congress would “hit upon a happy medium price for the Western Lands, for the prevention of Monopoly on one hand—and not discouraging useful Settlers on the other.”26 Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts also believed that compact settlements were beneficial, but he was far more specific in his views regarding sales. He felt that

Congress should survey the land into townships, and then offer those townships for sale at a public auction. “In this way the settlements of that country may be effected with regularity,” he said, “and with much greater advantage to the United States.” However,

23 Denny, Military Journal, 72-73. 24 Kappler, Indian Laws, 2:16-18. 25 Papers of Washington, CS, 2:440. 26 Ibid., 2:182-183. 37 should Congress adopt a more irregular method for selling the land, Pickering was prepared to join the other “adventurers” and “make a scramble for them.”27

That “scramble” was the method of indiscriminate locations practiced in the southern states—particularly Virginia—and advocated for by some of their representatives in Congress. Rather than a square survey such as the townships in New

England, Virginia allowed settlers to mark out the best lands in any shape they saw fit while leaving unattractive lands unclaimed. This method caused problems for property owners as surveys often overlapped, bringing about innumerable cases of litigation.28 It was this difficulty that William Grayson of Virginia, Rufus King of Massachusetts, and other congressmen tried to avoid. Washington and Pickering’s letters were forwarded to

Grayson and King, and they worked hard to draft an ordinance with a uniform method of survey that would result in ordered, compact settlement.29 As a way to “accommodate both the Eastern and Southern States,” Grayson proposed to “sell these lands in townships and sections alternately.” The idea was “strongly objected to” at first, but several days later an official motion was made and passed unanimously, albeit reluctantly by both sides.30

Debate continued for several more days as congressmen bickered over the price of the lands, the size of the townships and sections, and how best to ensure creditors from all the states could be satisfied. It remained clear thought that any plan of settlement would

27 Charles King, ed., The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King: Comprising his Letters, Private and Official, His Public Documents, and His Speeches, 6 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1894-1900), 1:72-73, quote on 73. 28 R. Douglas Hurt, The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720-1830 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 166-168. 29 Papers of Washington, CS, 1:498; Letters of Congress, 8:94, 104; Life of King, 1:72. 30 Letters of Congress, 8:106, 115, 124, 133, 135-136, 141; Journals of Congress, 28:335, 339. 38 be overseen by the federal government. On May 20 the final version was passed by

Congress.31 The ordinance called for a geographer to be appointed and accompanied by one surveyor from each state. These men would only survey seven ranges of numbered townships, keeping in line with the concept of compact settlement that Washington and

Pickering had advocated for. Each township would be six-miles square and surveyed into thirty-six sections of 640 acres. Once these first seven ranges were surveyed, the

Secretary of War would receive by lot one-seventh of the townships and sections to be used to satisfy military bounties promised during the war. The remaining townships and sections would then be divided by lot among the various states and sold at public auction by their respective loan offices. Each state would alternate the sale between townships and sections; township 1 of the first range would be sold whole, followed by the sale of individual sections in township 2. The minimum price was set at one dollar per acre, and the full purchase price had to be paid in three months either in specie or loan office certificates reduced to their specie value. Any forfeiture of payment would result in the land being reclaimed by the United States and resold.32 Most of the members wrote confidently to their constituents that the price, quantity, and system of sale would achieve the desired object of paying off the public debt.33

By focusing the ordinance on the interests of the public creditors, Congress was deliberately ignoring the interests of the hundreds of Euro-American squatters who had

31 Journals of Congress, 28:251-256, 292-296, 298-303, 316-317, 328, 335, 339, 342-343. 32 Territorial Papers, 2:12-18. 33 James Curtis Ballagh, ed., The Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 2 vols. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1911-1914), 2:362; Letters of Congress, 8:130. Richard Dobbs Spaight of North Carolina was not optimistic about the ordinance. See ibid., 8:135-136. 39 illegally moved north of the Ohio River. Many of these squatters were willing to adhere to federal regulations, but Congress refused to offer them any leniency. There was no provision from Congress to secure to these intruders the cabins they had erected or the fields they had cleared, because national leaders considered them a nuisance.34 Richard

Henry Lee referred to these squatters as a “lawless banditti” who “must necessarily have involv’d us in continued Indian wars” and would eventually “prove destructive” to “our

Republican Constitutions.”35 Congress sent instructions to Colonel Josiah Harmar, commander of the United States Army, to “employ such force as he may judge necessary in driving off persons attempting to settle on the Lands of the United States.”36 Harmar ordered Ensign John Armstrong to lead a detachment of federal troops across the river and dispossess the squatters. Armstrong’s party razed several buildings and destroyed numerous fields of corn. When the federal troops began marching for the squatter community of Norristown, “a party of Armed Men” under the command of Charles

Norris confronted Armstrong at his camp. The ensign evaded bloodshed, convincing

Norris and his men to surrender their arms and help persuade the others at the settlement to abandon their homes.37 Several of them had sent a petition to Congress asking for preemption to the lands they occupied and expressing their desire to be “Safe under the protection of Government.”38 They asked Armstrong to let them stay until they received an answer. The ensign refused their request, but he did grant them two weeks to gather

34 Cayton, Frontier Republic, 1-11. 35 Letters of Congress, 7:365. 36 Josiah Harmar to Joseph Armstrong, 29 Mar. 1785, Josiah Harmar Papers, William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, (hereafter Harmar Papers); Journals of Congress, 25:689. 37 Joseph Armstrong to Josiah Harmar, 12 Apr. 1785, Harmar Papers. 38 Ohio in the Confederation, 103-106, quote on 105. 40 their things and prepare to leave. He then continued his march down the Ohio River, burning dwellings and sending whole families back to Virginia.39

While the army dealt with the squatters, federal surveyors made their way to the territory in July of 1786—over a year since the passing of the ordinance—to meet

Geographer Thomas Hutchins and begin marking the first seven ranges. When they met at Pittsburgh, the surveyors immediately declined to go further unless accompanied by federal troops. They were concerned about the “general ill temper of the Indians,” even though Hutchins tried to assure them that the Indian commissioners had secured their

“friendly disposition” through the recently signed treaties.40 These fears were not entirely unfounded though as the Shawnee and the Kentuckians had remained in a constant state of warfare since the revolution.41 Also, the Delaware and Wyandot who had agreed to allotment refused to provide Hutchins with protection or scouts, a clear indication that relations were not amicable. Both Captain Pipe and the Half King, two of the Wyandot’s more prominent chiefs, refused to “come and deliver up the Land.”42 They likewise informed commissioner Richard Butler that the surveying “may do mischief,” advising

“its best [to] let the Land alone till every thing is right.”43 To quell the concerns of his surveyors, Hutchins wrote to Colonel Harmar and requested a detachment of federal troops to accompany the surveyors.44 However, when the troops arrived the surveyors complained that the seven troops allowed for each surveying party were not enough, and

39 Armstrong to Harmar, 12 Apr. 1785, Harmar Papers. 40 Benjamin Tupper to Thomas Hutchins, 22 July 1786, Harmar Papers; Ohio in the Confederation, 144. 41 David Andrew Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 55-76. 42 Ohio in the Confederation, 154-157, quote on 156. 43 Ibid., 173. 44 Thomas Hutchins to Josiah Harmar, 22 July 1786, Harmar Papers. 41 requested each force be increased to twelve.45 These delays infuriated Hutchins, who reminded the surveyors of the importance of their work. He urged them to consider “the poverty of the publick Treasury, the want of means to discharge the foreign as well as the

Domestic debts,” and how their work would “contribute towards supporting the most important Interests of the federal government.”46 Throughout the fall Hutchins pressured the surveyors to complete their work, but their progress was again delayed by the onset of winter. In December 1786, Hutchins reported to Congress that the work was inevitably postponed and that only four of the seven ranges had been surveyed. He promised to begin formatting the surveys into proper plats and transmit them to Congress sometime the following year.47

Growing impatient with Hutchins—as well as the “considerable expence incurred” from surveying—congressmen began to consider modifying the land ordinance.48 The idea of indiscriminate location was again proposed, and again rejected.49

James Madison felt there was nothing Congress could do to promote the sales because many of the larger states like Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts had

“lands of their own at market.”50 Many of the country’s leading creditors, including

Robert Morris, as well as foreign investors, had already begun speculating in these state

45 Francis Hamtramck to Josiah Harmar, 16 Aug. 1786, Harmar Papers. 46 Ohio in the Confederation, 167-168, quote on 168. 47 Ibid., 174-175. 48 Letters of Congress, 8:503. 49 Ibid., 8:568. 50 Ibid., 8:562. 42 lands.51 One member even went so far as to suggest abandoning the sales altogether.52 In

April 1787 the Board of Treasury issued a report for amending the ordinance.

“Considering the Surveyors have already been employed two Years,” the board did not feel it was “probable that in the course of another, they will have completely Surveyed the first seven Ranges.” They suggested cancelling the plan of splitting the land amongst the states, and instead proposed an immediate sale of all the lands to be held in New York

City at the seat of Congress.53 Desperate to rein in the loan office certificates, weary that more squatters would soon overrun the territory, and fearful that the competition from state lands would soon depreciate the value of federal land, Congress agreed to the report from the Board of Treasury and amended the ordinance.54

The federal land sale opened on 21 September 1787, four days after the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. In the course of two and a half weeks 578,572 acres were offered for sale, and only 72,974 were bid on and purchased.55 None of the bidders offered to buy any of the full townships, and most of the land was sold without any bidding at all. Sections that did cause competition were

51 Stephen Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry Clay (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: “The People,” the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 164; Robert D. Arbuckle, Pennsylvania Speculator and Patriot: The Entrepreneurial John Nicholson, 1757-1800 (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), 26-30; Paul B. Moyer, Wild Yankees: The Struggle for Independence along Pennsylvania’s Revolutionary Frontier (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); Alan Taylor, William Cooper’s Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier of the Early American Republic (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), and Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760- 1820 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990); François Furstenberg, When the United States Spoke French: Five Refugees Who Shaped a Nation (New York: The Penguin Press, 2014), 227-287. 52 Letters of Congress, 8:513. 53 Territorial Papers, 2:24-25, quote on 25. 54 Journals of Congress, 32:238-239. 55 Territorial Papers, 2:24; American State Papers: Finance, 3:24. 43 adjacent to the Ohio River, particularly sections opposite of Wheeling. Several of the federal surveyors attended the sale and walked away with lands they had marked out the previous year, including Robert Johnston who purchased nineteen sections, more than anyone else. This is remarkable considering that William Duer, one of New York’s most connected securities speculators and the secretary for the Board of Treasury, was present and only purchased six sections.56 Just as interesting are the people who did not purchase lands. None of the squatters who had petitioned Congress before their removal made any purchases, nor did any of the nation’s more prominent land speculators, such as Robert

Morris or George Washington. Despite years of hard work and anticipation, the land sale was quite lackluster.

Several factors may have contributed to this poor performance. For one, the distance from New York to the federal lands, as well as to other parts of the nation, could have been a reason for many not to attend.57 There was also the continuing threat of

Native American violence that the peace treaties did not seem to answer.58 The

Constitutional Convention likely also played a role, as many possible bidders were either tied up in Philadelphia or awaiting news of the convention’s outcome and its effect on the securities market.59 Others, like the squatters, simply could not afford to purchase a 640 acre section. Another reason is that the majority of the land being offered for sale was not suitable for commercial agriculture—nor is it still—and would have been reported as

56 Copies of the Account of Sales at New York and Pittsburgh, 1787-1796, State Archives Series 2032, Ohio History Connection, Columbus, OH (hereafter Account of Sales). For Robert Johnston see: Ohio in the Confederation, 179-180. For William Duer see: Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 272-275. 57 Letters of Congress, 8:589. 58 Ibid., 8:627-628. 59 Gordon S. Wood, “Interests and Disinterestedness,” 69-109. 44 such by the surveyors.60 Despite all these variables, there was one more that Congress was well aware of and which alleviated any concerns they may have had.

In the months prior to the auction, hundreds of public creditors had begun organizing in New England and New Jersey, pooling their securities together into two associations with the goal of receiving private contracts from the federal government. In

May 1787 the first group, the Ohio Company of Associates, petitioned Congress asking for a private sale, and rumors began to spread throughout Congress that millions of acres would soon be sold.61 John Cleves Symmes followed suit in August, asking for an even larger grant.62 It became evident to members like Richard Henry Lee, Edward Carrington,

William Grayson, and Nathan Dane that the scheduled auction would pale in comparison to these private sales, and they began to focus all their attention on these companies.

Considering the drudgingly slow pace of the federal surveyors and the constant need for revenue, Congress was more than willing to adopt a new strategy.

⁎

The Ohio Company and John Cleves Symmes each represented a growing consensus among nationalists and their Federalist successors that the practice of political economy should follow a hierarchical structure. Fearful of the social disorder brought on by economic democratization, Alexander Hamilton and others sought to concentrate credit and financial decisions into the hands of the elite, who could then dominate manufacturing and other areas of the economy.63 By portraying themselves as part of this

60 Ohio in the Confederation, 187-213. 61 Territorial Papers, 2:29; Letters of Lee, 2:423; Letters of Congress, 8:622, 631-632. 62 Territorial Papers, 2:70-71. 63 Andrew Shankman, “A New Thing on Earth,” 325-335. 45 political and economic elite, both companies were able to obtain their desired private contracts. Not only did they look the part, but they attempted to play the part, providing a vertical structure for land development. This was especially true for the Ohio Company, whose articles of association allowed its board of directors to meticulously manage the affairs of its settlement.64 John Cleves Symmes did not have this kind of systematic control, but he did establish himself as the leading developer in the Miami Valley.65

Although each group had a difficult time getting their contracts approved by Congress, the legislative wrangling in New York paled in comparison to the struggles of the

Northwest Indian War. Violence and abandonment threatened to dissolve the companies, and the federal government was looked to for help. Although the military was successful in defeating the Miami Confederacy, members of the new federal government came away realizing that western settlement could not be entrusted to private enterprises that could fail at any moment.

The Ohio Company was founded in January 1786 by Continental Army veterans

Benjamin Tupper and Rufus Putnam. Tupper was one of the federal surveyors in the

Seven Ranges and brought his knowledge of the western lands back with him to

Massachusetts. Putnam had been a leading advocate for settling the West with army veterans for years, using his connections with George Washington and others to obtain a grant, but his attempts for congressional approval had failed.66 This did not deter Putnam, and in March 1786 he and ten other representatives of Massachusetts veterans from

64 Records of the Ohio Company, 1:8-9 65 Hurt, Ohio Frontier, 160-164. 66 Records of the Ohio Company, 1:xxvi-xxviii. 46 various counties met at the Bunch of Grapes tavern in Boston to discuss joining the land company.67 These delegates agreed to raise a million dollars in continental securities to make a purchase of federal land from Congress according to either the Ordinance of 1785

“or on any other plan that may be adopted by Congress not less advantageous to the

Company.” The money would be raised by selling a thousand shares at one thousand dollars each, payable in loan office certificates. Leadership of the company would be shared by five directors, a treasurer, and a secretary, who would conduct the affairs of the company. Once the shares were sold and the land patented, it would be randomly distributed in equal parts to the shareholders. By March 1787 only two hundred and fifty shares had been sold. Putnam and others knew that “many inclined to become

Adventurers” but were fearful that the rules of the 1785 ordinance would prevent them from purchasing a contiguous tract. To ease these concerns the shareholders selected

Rufus Putnam, Manasseh Cutler, and Samuel Holden Parsons as the first three directors, and instructed them “to make application” to Congress “for a private purchase of

Lands.”68

In May 1787 Samuel Parsons presented a petition to Congress asking for a grant of land in the western territory. He described the associates as not only “Officers &

Soldiers of the late federal Army,” but also as “public Creditors who are desirous of

Satisfaction of their Debts in the federal lands.”69 In order to facilitate the petition, the company sent director Manasseh Cutler to New York to negotiate with Congress in

67 Massachusetts Spy (Worchester), January 19, 1786; Massachusetts Centinel (Boston), January 25, 1786; Records of the Ohio Company, 1:4. 68 Records of the Ohio Company, 5-12, quotes on 6, 8, 12. 69 Journals of Congress, 32:276. 47 person. He went armed not only with letters of introduction from some of New England’s most reputable men, but also with dozens of letters addressed to members of Congress, both a clear sign of his honor and status as a gentleman.70 For days Cutler found it difficult to bring many of the congressmen to terms. Some were made partners in the

Ohio Company to gain their interest. When things continued to stall out, Cutler threatened to leave the city and contract with one of the state governments instead.

Unwilling to call his bluff, Congress came to terms with Cutler.71 They agreed to sell the company one and a half million acres west of the Seven Ranges at two-thirds of a dollar per acre. One seventh of the purchase could be paid in military bounties, but the rest had to be in continental securities. $500,000 was to be paid down, giving the company a right to settle the land, and after a second installment of $500,000 the company would receive its patent. Congress also required the company to survey the land according to the 1785 ordinance within 7 years.72

While in New York Cutler also had a hand in structuring the new territorial government. He received a draft of the Northwest Ordinance “with leave to make remarks and propose amendments.” It is unclear what suggestions Cutler made to the committee, but he noted in his journal that “the amendments I proposed have all been made except one,” which was a moratorium on “Continental taxation until we were entitled to a full representation in Congress.”73 The Northwest Ordinance was meant to

70 For honor see Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). 71 William Parker Cutler and Julia Perkins Cutler, eds., Life, Journals and Correspondence of Rev. Manasseh Cutler…, 2 vols. (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1888), 1:203, 215, 230, 231-240, 292-305. 72 Territorial Papers, 2:80-84. 73 Life of Cutler, 1:242, 293. 48 provide a temporary colonial status for the western territories. Under a first stage of government, there would be a governor, a secretary, and three judges. While the governor performed the duties of the executive and the judges the judiciary, all four would come together to act as the legislative body and pass laws for the territory. Once 5,000 freeholders resided in the territory, it would advance to a second stage of government with a full legislature and a non-voting representative to Congress. When 60,000 people lived in the territory, it could apply for full statehood and join the union on an equal footing with the other states.74 Members of the Cutler family were convinced through family stories that the ordinance’s famous provisions for education and religion, and its exclusion of slavery north of the Ohio River, were Manasseh Cutler’s doing.75

When congressmen sought Cutler’s help in choosing the officers of the territorial government, he suggested members of the Ohio Company. Filling these offices with shareholders would give the company tremendous influence in the territorial government.

Cutler intended to recommend Samuel Parsons for governor, but when asked he found it politically expedient to support Arthur St. Clair because he had been one of the congressional members given a share in the Ohio Company in exchange for his support.76

Instead of governor, Cutler suggested Parsons as one of the three territorial judges, and

Ohio Company secretary Winthrop Sargent as territorial secretary. When William

Grayson and other members asked Cutler if he too would like a seat on the territorial court, he declined, recommending instead Rufus Putnam.77 Although Putnam went on to

74 Territorial Papers, 2:39-50. 75 Life of Cutler, 1:343-344. 76 Ibid., 1:298; Hulbert, Records of the Ohio Company, 2:241. 77 Life of Cutler, 298. 49 decline the appointment, it was given to company member James Mitchell Varnum.78

This gave the Ohio Company not just executive and judicial control of the territory, but legislative control as well.79

The Ohio Company used both its private contract from Congress and its authority through the territorial government to control economic and political development within its purchase. In 1788 Rufus Putnam led 48 settlers to the company’s land where they founded the town of Marietta at the mouth of the Muskingum River.80 Named after the queen of France, Marietta was pre-planned in New England, and Putnam’s party took great care to lay the town out according to the dictates of the company. Putnam had the company’s lands surveyed and prepared for division by lot for the shareholders, choosing tracks of land that would provide the most equitable quality to the members. Mill sites were identified and given out to worthy applicants. Dudley Woodbridge, an aspiring merchant in the Ohio Country, was one such applicant, and the company awarded him

160 acres to erect a grist mill.81 While men like Woodbridge owed their economic wellbeing to the company, others became dependent on the political patronage exerted by the company’s influence. When Governor St. Clair laid out Washington County around the company’s purchase, Rufus Putnam, Return Jonathan Meigs, Winthrop Sargent,

Benjamin Tupper, Archibald Crary, Ebenezer Sproat, Enoch Parsons, and other

78 Cayton, Frontier Republic, 13-14. 79 Territorial Papers, 42-43. 80 Rowena Buell, ed., The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam and Certain Official Papers and Correspondence (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1903), 107. 81 Records of the Ohio Company, 1:16, 20, 2:1-3. 50 shareholders were given commissions for the county’s government.82 This was exactly the type of order that Congress and the company had envisioned.

John Cleves Symmes was not as meticulous as the Ohio Company, which put his proprietorship in a precarious situation. In August 1787 Symmes petitioned Congress for a contract similar to what the New Englanders had proposed. He requested the track to include all the lands along the Ohio River between the two Miami rivers, which would extend up both until it reached the same latitude as the northern line of the Ohio

Company’s purchase.83 Rather than a group of veterans intending to settle the West,

Symmes brought together a network of securities speculators from New Jersey who hoped to profit off both loan certificates and western lands. Any of his associates could purchase as much land as they wished within the tract at the same price Symmes would pay Congress until the first of May 1788, when the price would be raised.84 Symmes never formalized these partnerships, which caused much uneasiness among his associates. They also became concerned when Symmes left for the Ohio Country “to take possession of the Lands” before he had finalized his contract with Congress.85 These fears were not unfounded, as Symmes had begun selling large amounts of western land before the Board of Treasury signed his indenture, which was necessary because otherwise he could not raise enough money to make his initial payments to Congress.86

82 Territorial Papers, 3:278-293. 83 Territorial Papers, 2:70-71. 84 John Cleves Symmes, To the Respectable Public (Trenton: 1787), 7-8. 85 Joseph Lewis to Jonathan Dayton, 21 Aug. 1788, Jonathan Dayton Family Papers, William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 86 Correspondence of Symmes, 29-35; Jacob Burnet, Notes on the Early Settlement of the North-Western Territory (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1847), 490-491. 51

This became a habit for Symmes, who found himself constantly dependent on new purchasers to make his payments.87

Symmes’s need for quick sales became a problem for the federal government when he began selling land outside of his patent. When Symmes left for the Miami

Valley, he instructed Jonathan Dayton—one of his associates—to complete the contract with Congress. The final indenture was radically different from Symmes’s initial request, limiting his track to only twenty miles along the Ohio River rather than the entire length between the two Miamis.88 Not knowing what the final contract looked like, Symmes sold 20,000 acres to Benjamin Stites east of the boundary line of the grant, who in turn began selling the land to other settlers.89 Federal officials were uncertain as to how to handle the situation. Governor St. Clair chastised Symmes and declared the settlers to be common squatters.90 It fell on Stites to try and remedy the situation, and he petitioned

Congress to alter the boundaries of Symmes’s purchase to include his own.91 In April

1792 Congress passed an act to allow the president to extend the patent, and in 1794

George Washington extended the grant east to the Little Miami River. However, because

Symmes had not fully paid for his lands, Washington limited the patent to a little over

300,000 acres, significantly less than the million acres in the indenture with the Board of

Treasury, and even less still than the original two million Symmes had requested.92

87 Correspondence of Symmes, 45, 51, 87, 100. 88 Burnet, Notes, 490-491. 89 Correspondence of Symmes, 34; Burnet, Notes, 46. 90 Territorial Papers, 2:342-350, 352-353, 3:349-356. 91 Annals of Congress, 2nd Cong., 1st sess., 480. 92 Territorial Papers, 2:388-389, 492-498. 52

Undeterred, Symmes began selling land outside of this patent as well, embroiling the federal government in a series of land disputes with his purchasers for years.93

The Ohio Company’s desire for order and Symmes’s need for revenue were disrupted when the Northwest Indian War broke out. Initially, Native Americans honored the peace treaties signed in 1785 and 1786, despite strong opposition to them. Indians frequently visited the new Euro-American settlements, expressing their desire “to live in peace and friendship with their new white brother’s.”94 Symmes even observed

“jealousy” from the Kentuckians because of the “friendly manner” that prevailed between his settlements and the various tribes.95 Such camaraderie did not exist between the

Kentuckians and the Indians. Unsanctioned violence had persisted between the two since the outbreak of the Revolution, with native warriors stealing horses and murdering isolated settlers, and Kentuckians mounting illegal expeditions north of the river to indiscriminately punish the “merciless Savages.”96 That changed when the federal government decided to intervene in the bloodshed. General Josiah Harmar marched north with a body of federal troops and militia in the fall of 1790 to attack the villages of the

Miami tribe.97 It did not take long for the tribes to retaliate. In early January 1791 a band of Delaware and Wyandot warriors attacked the Ohio Company settlement of Big

Bottom, killing twelve settlers and taking five captive.98 Rufus Putnam frantically wrote to Secretary of War Henry Knox, arguing that Big Bottom was only “a foreruner of other

93 Ibid., 3:16-18, 29-45, 57-58, 189-196; Act of March 3, 1801, ch. 23, 2nd Stat., 112-114. 94 Correspondence of Symmes, 41-40, 58-60, quote on 60; Memoirs of Putnam, 247. 95 Correspondence of Symmes, 78. 96 Henry Innes to John Brown, 4 Apr. 1788, Henry Innes Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. See also: Griffin, American Leviathan, 172-173, 191-192. 97 Nichols, Red Gentlemen & White Savages, 115-118. 98 Memoirs of Putnam, 112. 53 attacks of a more Serious nature & which may involve us in complet ruen unless prevented by Government.”99 Putnam was more frank to George Washington, claiming the Ohio Company “always had an Indupitable claim” to the “protection” of the federal government because the company had purchased its lands from Congress.100 Similar attacks began occurring throughout the Miami Purchase as well. A concerned Symmes informed Jonathan Dayton that “the Indians kill people so frequently that none dare stir into the woods to view the country, and people will not purchase at a venture as formerly.”101

Although the pleas from the land companies convinced the federal government to commit more fully to the war, it also brought new considerations regarding land policy.

Alexander Hamilton’s 1790 Report on Vacant Lands advocated a policy meant to continue the government’s support of “monied individuals and companies.” He suggested extending credit only to those who purchased large quantities of land—as the Continental

Congress had done for the Ohio Company and John Cleves Symmes—while also dropping the price to thirty cents per acre.102 Attempts to formulate the report into actual policy sputtered out in 1792.103

By 1796 congressmen were questioning privatization, and a new land act was introduced in the House of Representatives. Robert Rutherford of Virginia hoped that his fellow congressmen would “destroy that hydra, speculation, which had done the country

99 Memoirs of Putnam, 248. 100 Papers of Washington, PS, 7:208-209. 101 Correspondence of Symmes, 143. 102 Papers of Hamilton, 6:502-506, quote on 502. 103 Correspondence of Symmes, 267-275. 54 great harm.” He argued selling the western lands “to real settlers, industrious, respectable persons, who are ready to pay a reasonable price for it, and not sold to persons who have no other view than engrossing riches.” Similarly, William Findley of Pennsylvania argued against the practice of buying lands in associations the way that the land companies had, claiming that “it was inviting people into a snare, which would cast dishonor upon the Government.” Others, like John Nicholas, were unconvinced, and continued to believe that “large capitals…were necessary in a business of this kind.”104

The resulting legislation was the Land Act of 1796, which was an attempt to end privatization and return to federal management of western settlement. Western land would still be surveyed in townships of six miles square and subdivided into thirty-six sections. In addition, the alternate townships that were originally to be sold in full— rather than sections—would now be subdivided into four sections of three miles square.

Land would still be sold at auction, but the price per acre was doubled to two dollars. The auction would also be split, with any sections east of the Scioto River to be sold in

Pittsburgh, sections west of the Great Miami River sold at Cincinnati, and the quarter- townships sold in Philadelphia. A significant revision was the extension of credit for one year to any purchaser.105 Despite these changes, the ensuing auctions did worse than the one held in 1787. Only 48,666 acres were sold, nearly 30,000 less than the auction in

New York. Even worse, only one quarter-township was sold in Philadelphia. Most of the purchases were again along the Ohio River, and much of it was purchased by speculators,

104 Annals of Congress, 4th Cong., 1st sess., 328-329, 337. 105 Territorial Papers, 2:552-557. 55 particularly the partnership of Bezaleel Wells and James Ross of Pittsburgh.106 While seemingly unsuccessful, the Land Act of 1796 did signify that Congress was susceptible to change, and willing to move away from the larger land companies and adopt a more active role in managing western settlement.

⁎

The debate over land was not limited to just the halls of Congress, and it quickly became a political issue in the territory when Euro-Americans began settling on lands outside the bounds of the land company purchases. Once General Anthony Wayne defeated the Miami Confederacy and negotiated the Treaty of Greenville in 1795, settlers began flocking to the Ohio Country. Some found their way to the Ohio Company settlements, while more chose the better lands in the Miami Valley. Others settled on recently opened lands, including the tracts around Steubenville that Bezaleel Wells and

James Ross had begun selling.107

The largest wave of settlers made their way into the Scioto Valley, either settling in the Virginia Military District on the west bank of the river, or illegally squatting east of the river. Reserved by Virginia for its veterans, the military district was not under the purview of the land companies or the federal government. The district was open to indiscriminate location, with many speculators locating lands in the district and retaining a percentage of the acreage for themselves as a fee. Such men included Thomas

Worthington, Nathaniel Massie, and Duncan McArthur. Although they were the largest

106 American State Papers: Finance, 3:24; Account of Sales. 107 List of Sales of Lots in Steubenville, Ohio 1796-1803, MS 2372 Wells Family Papers, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH. 56 landowners in the district, the majority of the land was still patented to individual settlers.108 This influx of people, particularly politically-ambitious Virginians like

Worthington and Massie, spelled trouble for Governor St. Clair and the land companies.

The governor tried to curry their favor and control their aspirations with county appointments, but Worthington and Massie soon began to demand more autonomy within their district, leading to both political and personal strife.109 When the population became large enough to advance the territorial government to its second stage in 1799,

Worthington, Massie, and others who opposed the governor were prepared to use the new legislature to advance their own goals and break the authority of the land companies.110

One of the principal functions of government that the land companies sought to control was taxation, and the new legislature undermined that control. For seven years

Governor St. Clair, Judge Symmes, and the other Ohio Company members who served as justices of the court did not pass a single tax on themselves. That changed in 1795 when they created the first county levies, subjecting “free persons dwelling, or residing” within the territory to property taxes.111 This language exempted many of the Ohio Company’s shareholders who were non-resident proprietors, as well as many of John Cleves

Symmes’s associates in New Jersey. It was not until 1798 that the governor and judges decided to tax all “unimproved” land within the territory, but at a minimal rate. Every hundred acres would be assessed based on its quality as first, second, or third-rate land at

108 Hurt, The Ohio Frontier, 166-167. 109 Cayton, Frontier Republic, 68-80. 110 Territorial Papers, 3:514-515. 111 Chase, Statutes of Ohio, 168-174, quote on 170. 57 thirty cents, twenty cents, and ten cents respectively.112 The new legislature, led by non- proprietors like Thomas Worthington, William Goforth, and John Smith, increased this tax burden to eighty-five cents, sixty cents, and twenty-five cents respectively. They also exempted land that was sold by John Cleves Symmes outside the bounds of his patent, something that the governor and judges had not done previously.113 This was a clear gesture on the part of the non-proprietors to lend relief to the squatters who had been wronged by Symmes and forgotten by the federal government.

The new taxes caused anxiety among both the non-resident proprietors of the

Ohio Company and their agents in Marietta. William Rufus Putnam—the son of Rufus

Putnam—found himself inundated with well over a hundred requests from shareholders to pay the taxes on their land.114 One of his principals hoped that Putnam would give him

“timely notice” of new taxes and promised “to keep him in cash” so that they could be paid.115 Not everyone was able to forward money like this, and though Putnam was willing to “advance the money for the taxes and trust to their paying it,” he simply did not have enough cash on hand to do it.116 Others were confused by the taxes. Putnam had to explain to a fellow agent that “the reason why the taxes are more on one share than another is that Each lot is taxd according to the quality.”117 A couple of Rufus Putnam’s principals were not even sure how to calculate their tax and sent him ten dollars in the

112 Ibid., 208-209, quote on 208. 113 Ibid., 267-272. 114 Tax Account Book, 1800, William Rufus Putnam Collection, Marietta College Library, Marietta, OH. 115 Samuel Hershaw to Rufus Putnam, 30 May 1800, Putnam Papers. 116 William Rufus Putnam to John May, 24 July 1800, May Papers. 117 William Rufus Putnam to John May, 12 June 1801, May Papers. 58 hope that it would be enough.118 Others simply ignored the tax altogether.119 The result was that many saw their property sold because of delinquency.120 Jonathan Trumbull, the governor of Connecticut and a shareholder in the company, complained to Rufus Putnam that “if your rate of Taxes is to be continued I do not see but that the Lands must be swallowed up by them.”121 Although there was a great demand from proprietors and agents alike to recover the lands sold for delinquent taxes, nothing came to fruition.122

Members of Congress—who either owned shares in the Ohio Company or had influential constituents who did—began to lose confidence in the western agents, and contemplated ways to remedy the situation themselves. Manasseh Cutler wrote to his son

Ephraim from Washington that “there is great complaint here about ye Law in your

Territory.” Rumors had swirled around Congress that 40,000 acres had been seized for non-payment and then sold for one cent per acre. The elder Cutler recognized that “this has made a very unfavorable impression on members who would otherwise been disposed to do everything, consistently, for” the Ohio Company’s settlement.123 Rather than confiding in any of the company members at Marietta, Federalist senator James Ross turned instead to Thomas Worthington and asked if the territorial legislature would try and remedy the problem.124 Company members were not confident in the legislature’s ability to reverse its policy though. William Rufus Putnam tried to convince his principals

118 Thomas Hawthorne and Jonathan Peele to Rufus Putnam, 2 Dec. 1800, Putnam Papers. 119 John May to William Rufus Putnam, 19 Oct. 1802 and 14 Nov. 1804, May Papers. 120 Hawthorne and Peele to Putnam, 2 Dec. 1800, Putnam Papers; 121 Jonathan Trumbull to Rufus Putnam, 5 Aug. 1802, Putnam Papers. 122 Return J. Meigs to Ephraim Culter, 8 Dec. 1801, Paul Fearing to Ephraim Culter, 9 Dec. 1801, and Manasseh Culter to Ephraim Culter, 12 Jan. 1802, Cutler Collection. 123 Manasseh Cutler to Ephraim Cutler, 12 Jan. 1802, Cutler Collection. 124 James Ross to Thomas Worthington, 15 Jan. 1802, TWP. 59 that the territorial legislature was “young” and “like other young things—it wants experience.”125 Shareholders were not willing to wait for the territory to mature, though.

Members of Congress played with the idea of dividing the territory in two and regressing them both to the first stage of government without a territorial legislature, essentially ending the ability of non-proprietors to levy taxes. Paul Fearing, the territorial delegate to

Congress, had discussed this with several members who owned shares in the company, and suggested “there will be interest in such an arrangement as it will in some measure save a tax on their lands.”126 Although the Marietta representatives in the territorial legislature were able to convince enough members from the Miami Valley to assent to a division, their efforts to bring the decision to Congress were thwarted by Worthington, who had made his way to Washington and lobbied successfully for statehood instead.127

Without a legislative solution to the problem of taxation, the proprietors turned to selling off their lands, but with little success. Alexander Hamilton and Johnathan

Trumbull both tried to get rid of their company lands after realizing that the tax burden was not going away.128 When Daniel Jones authorized Rufus Putnam to begin selling his lands, Putnam replied “you must not conceive that any of the Lands will sell at the estimated prices at present or indeed at any price.” There were no purchasers to be had,

Putnam said, as many had “wholly turned towards” the Virginia Military District.129

William Rufus Putnam agreed, telling John May that “Emigrants are few into the

125 Putnam to May, 24 Jul. 1800, May Papers. 126 Paul Fearing to Ephraim Cutler, 18 Jan. 1802, Cutler Collection. 127 Paul Fearing to Ephraim Cutler, 3 Feb. 1802 and 19 Feb. 1802, Cutler Collection; Cayton, Frontier Republic, 76. 128 Papers of Hamilton, 25:48, 72, 26:56-58; Trumbull to Putnam, 5 Aug. 1802, Putnam Papers. 129 Rufus Putnam to Daniel Jones, 30 July 1800, Putnam Papers. 60

Company purchase.”130 May responded that he was “not a little surprised that there is no

Greater demand for our Land, while they are settling on both our flanks & in the rear.”131

Although he could not understand why the company’s lands were undesirable, others did.

“The Lands from Seventy to one hundred miles up the Muskingum are vastly preferable to those on the Ohio,” shareholder Benjamin Ives Gilman wrote to a friend, and “the borders of the latter river are beautiful as immigination can paint.”132 As more Congress lands opened up with better terms in 1801, Euro-American settlers just had better options for farmland than southeastern Ohio. As David Putnam wrote to one of his principals,

“the public lands have engaged the attention of purchasers for some time past and probably will for some time to come.”133

While the privatization moment of the Ohio Company and John Cleves Symmes was not a complete failure, it did fall short of the policy goals of the Continental

Congress. The revenue generated from these sales—approximately $800,000—was far below the expectations of Congress—William Grayson had estimated “six Millions

Doll’s of the domestic debt” would be extinguished—due in large part to Symmes’s inability to make his payments.134 Nor was the United States fully removed from overseeing settlement as privatization had promised to do. Symmes’s unscrupulous land deals involved the federal government in land disputes that the incorporation of the

Ordinance of 1785 into Symme’s contract was supposed to avoid. The United States also

130 Putnam to May, 12 June 1801, May Papers. 131 John May to William Rufus Putnam, 18 Sep. 1801, May Papers. 132 Benjamin Ives Gilman to Nicholas Pike, 17 May 1795, Western Reserve Manuscripts, MS 5362, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH. 133 David Putnam to Christopher Leffingwell, 21 Jan. 1802, Christopher and William Leffingwell Papers, MS 1164, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, OH. 134 Letters of Congress, 8:642; American State Papers: Finance, 3:24. 61 found itself acquiescing to the companies in ways that it did not want, particularly in regard to the Northwest Indian War. In order to ensure regular payments into the treasury and to protect the company’s settlements the federal government had to continue a war it did not want to wage. Political disorder was also an issue. Rather than stymieing the effects of democratization, the Ohio Company began to deteriorate in the wake of the non-proprietors’ ascendancy in the territorial legislature. Led by Thomas Worthington, the non-proprietors were able to effectively politicize the company’s lands through taxation and cripple their influence among eastern elites. Politicizing western land was a tactic that Worthington did not take for granted, and starting in 1799 he would turn federal land policy away from its focus on public creditors and direct it to serve his own personal interest. 62

CHAPTER TWO: “STRANGE DOINGS WITH RESPECT TO PREEMPTIONS”

As the privatization moment shows, many nationalists who would later subscribe to Federalist ideology and networks were willing to defer government authority to the inclinations of private interests. This is unexpected behavior for a political group that historians often characterize as supportive of strong central government.1 Just as surprising is the fact that many in the territory who would later become Republicans— including Thomas Worthington and several squatters—wanted a stronger federal presence in the territory. Rather than localists who were weary of centralized power,

Worthington and the squatters advocated for and expanded the federal government’s role in western settlement.2 Such an understanding contrasts with the arguments of Andrew

Cayton, who sees Worthington as hostile to federal interference in the territory because of his Virginian sensibilities of localism. In Cayton’s view, Worthington’s eventual push for statehood was a rejection of both the Northwest Territory and the federal government that sanctioned it.3 However, Cayton’s analysis ignores the role that federal land policy

1 For the Federalists see: Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); David Hackett Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), esp. 1-49; James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789-1815 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), esp. 3-52. For the role of networks in national politics see: Joanne Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). 2 For Republican ideology see: Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978); Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980); John M. Murrin, “The Great Inversion, or Court versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolution Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816),” in J. G. A. Pocock, ed., Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 368-453. 3 Andrew R. L. Cayton, The Frontier Republic: Politics and Ideology in the Ohio Country, 1780-1825 (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1986), esp. 68-80, and “Land, Power, and Reputation: The Cultural Dimension of Politics in the Ohio Country,” William and Mary Quarterly 47, no. 2 (Apr., 1990): 266-286. 63 played within territorial politics, particularly the statehood contest. Although

Worthington did want to overcome the barriers of the territorial government, he did not shy away from federal authority.

Worthington’s embrace of federal power can be seen in his support of an active government land policy that was inclusive of more than just public creditors and speculators. He recognized that a significant number of squatters had been left behind by both the Confederation Congress and the land companies. Many of these “intruders” lived along the Scioto and Hocking Rivers in Worthington’s home of Ross County, and they had no legal or financial means to obtain title to the federal lands they occupied.

This left the male heads of household on the fringes of civil society and prevented their participation within formal politics.4 The inability of these men to vote was a problem for

Worthington because political competition was stiff in the county seat of Chillicothe. He then took it upon himself to alter federal policy to make these lands not only available for purchase, but also affordable. In early 1800 Worthington travelled to Philadelphia and joined territorial delegate William Henry Harrison in passing the Land Act of 1800.5 This new land law helped secure the economic livelihoods of these squatters, propel their social standing, and made them active participants in the formal political process.

4 For my understanding of civil society see: John L. Brooke, “Consent, Civil Society, and the Public Sphere in the Age of Revolution and the Early American Republic,” in Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson, and David Waldstreicher, eds., Beyond the Founders: New Approaches to the Political History of the Early American Republic (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 207-250. For voting rights in the territory see: Territorial Papers, 2:44. 5 Alfred Byron Sears, Thomas Worthington: Father of Ohio Statehood (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1958), 38, 54. 64

The land act expanded the federal government’s presence in the territory by opening four local land offices and extending credit to all purchasers.6 Worthington was also able to secure an appointment as the register of the Chillicothe land office, a position that gave him tremendous influence over the implementation of the law.7 Two of his most important duties as register were to determine the order of the land sale and to approve or deny applications for mill-site preemptions.8 This created a dynamic where Worthington used his authority to negotiate with potential purchasers over which lands would be sold and to whom. By doing so he was able to help certain squatters, and in some cases speculators, obtain title to the lands that they wanted. Governor St. Clair later referred to these negotiations as “strange doings with respect to preemptions.”9 Similar negotiations are the basis of Gautham Rao’s recent study of federal custom houses. Treasury secretary

Alexander Hamilton urged his customs officials to be lax in the collection of port duties to secure the merchant class’s cooperation and apply their capital for the uses of the federal state.10 While the negotiations at both custom houses and land offices were crucial for the expansion of the early American state, the land office also played an important role in party development.

Worthington was responsible for bringing many of the territory’s settlers he had negotiated with at the land office into the national Republican interest. Although party

6 Territorial Papers, 3:90-92. 7 Malcolm J. Rohrbough, The Land Office Business: The Settlement and Administration of American Public Lands, 1789-1837 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 43. 8 Thomas Worthington to Arthur St. Clair, 8 Apr. 1801, PTW, reel 1; Oliver Wolcott, Jr. to Thomas Worthington, 21 Aug. 1800, TWP, reel 1; Territorial Papers, 3:96. 9 Territorial Papers, 3:251. 10 Gautham Rao, National Duties: Custom Houses and the Making of the American State (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016), esp. 53-102. 65 development in the territory is a subject analyzed by Donald Ratcliffe, he dismisses the role that personal connections played in the early formation of Ohio’s Republican Party.

Ratcliffe believes that party activism was a spontaneous reaction among common people in the territory rather than something carefully engineered by political elites.11 However, a closer examination of the relationships made at the Chillicothe land office and the statehood movement of 1802 shows that party development was heavily dependent upon

Worthington and the small coterie of former squatters he had brought into his own personal interest. County conventions and party handbills—which Ratcliffe sees as the work of independent partisans—were organized by men who had directly benefited from their negotiations with Worthington in the land office.12 Furthermore, it was Worthington who travelled to Washington in 1802 and convinced leading Republicans, including

Thomas Jefferson, that supporting Ohio statehood would bring Worthington’s political interest into the Republican Party. Like David Waldstreicher and Stephen Grossbart’s study of Abraham Bishop in Connecticut, Worthington served as a political “mediator” who linked local constituencies with national politics.13 Without Worthington’s efforts— and a strong federal presence to necessitate national partisanship—much of the territory may have remained a hodgepodge of factions disconnected from national parties like in other territories at the time.14

11 Donald J. Ratcliffe, Party Spirit in a Frontier Republic: Democratic Politics in Ohio, 1793-1821 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998), esp. 44-74. 12 Ibid., 59, 62, 13 David Waldstreicher and Stephen J. Grossbart, “Abraham Bishop’s Vocation; Or, the Mediation of Jeffersonian Politics,” JER 18, no. 4 (Winter, 1998): 617-657. 14 John Craig Hammond, Slavery, Freedom and Expansion in the Early American West (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007), esp. 96-123; Andrew R. L. Cayton, Frontier Indiana (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 226-260; Robert V. Haynes, The Mississippi Territory and the Southwest Frontier, 1795-1817 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010). 66

⁎

Prior to the first sitting of the territorial legislature, Worthington began to consider alterations to the federal land laws. In early 1799 he started a correspondence with John Brown of Kentucky and James Ross of Pennsylvania, both members of the

United States Senate who were serving on a committee charged with amending the Land

Act of 1796.15 Brown informed Worthington in July that “a bill nearly pursuing

[Worthington’s] ideas on the subject passed the Senate, but it was “postponed in the H. of

Representatives.”16 Although Worthington’s letters to Brown and Ross have not been found, his ideas were later sketched out in a petition endorsed by the territorial legislature that Worthington signed and helped deliver to Philadelphia. The petition stated that half of the public lands were “directed to be sold in too large Tracts,” and that the “Scarcity of money which is at present Experienced in the United States” made it difficult to purchase such quantities. Buying a single section required at least $1,280 to be paid within a year, and “if there should be a failure in any payment…of one day. nay an Hour may Subject the purchaser to inevitable Ruin.” The legislature suggested altering “the terms of sale So as to give a longer time for the different payments,” and that lands east of the Scioto

River “be offered for sale at the Town of Chillicothe” so that “persons disposed to purchase can be Comfortably Accommodated.”17 The petition’s request for a reduction in

15 Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 3rd sess., 2201-2202. 16 John Brown to Thomas Worthington, 22 July 1799, TWP, reel 1; Annals of Congress, 5th Cong., 3rd. sess., 2212. See also John Brown to Thomas Worthington, 14 Feb. 1799 and James Ross to Thomas Worthington, 6 Mar. 1799 and 5 Aug. 1799, TWP, reel 1. 17 Territorial Papers, 3:52-54. 67 tract sizes, the extension of long-term credit, and localized sales would become the key components of federal land reform.

Squatters who had settled in the Scioto and Hocking valleys were also desirous of reform. In August dozens of squatters—many of them former officers in the Continental

Army and state militias—drew up a petition asking for provisions similar to what the territorial legislature had proposed, while also proposing more radical steps. They asked

“that protection might be afforded to actual Settleers” and “that such a length of time may be offered for such settleers, to pay the purchase Money in.” Not only would this mean an extension of credit from the federal government, but also the first recognition of pre- emption rights that earlier squatters in the 1780s had advocated for and been denied.

Obtaining clear title to the lands they had labored on was extremely important, and they were fearful that the lands may “pass into the hands and become the property of such as have undergone no toil nor run no Risk to improve it.” Rather than see these lands become the property of eastern speculators who would never “Plow Sow or contribute to improve or to Support Society” in the territory, they wanted the right to purchase so that they “Might Enjoy the comfort and advantages resulting from Civilized Society and

Religious worship.” Another request was that “the land may be laid out at least a portion

Of it, in plantations so small that poor or weak families may not [be] totally Deprived of the benifit of it.” If the federal government decided to continue to sell its lands “in large

Sactions,” the petitioners “requested that those should be so laid out as not, to prevent the settlements from coming so compact.”18

18 Ibid., 3:62-63. 68

These petitions made their way to Philadelphia along with Thomas Worthington and William Henry Harrison, and became integral for federal land reform. Harrison arrived in Philadelphia as the territory’s non-voting member of Congress and immediately found himself heading a committee tasked with amending the existing land laws. Albert Gallatin—soon to be Thomas Jefferson’s treasury secretary—was also on this committee, having worked the previous two years to achieve reform.19 In February

1800 the committee reported a bill that called for a drastic expansion of the federal state’s role in distributing public lands. Not only would there be a land office in Chillicothe, but also in Cincinnati, Marietta, and Pittsburgh, each with their own respective districts of land to sell. The bill also offered four years of credit to all purchasers, regardless of the amount of land purchased. Tract sizes were also reduced; both the quarter-townships of

5,000 acres and the full sections of 640 stipulated in the Land Act of 1796 would all be reduced to half-sections of 320 acres. These half-sections would be offered first at a public sale, but unlike the 1785 and 1796 laws, the land could continue to be purchased by individuals privately from the government after the sale. The bill underwent several debates—including an attempt to offer preemption to the squatters, which was defeated— before making its way to the Senate.20 There it found its way to a committee that included

Worthington’s allies James Ross and John Brown.21 It was likely here that the Pittsburgh land office was moved to Steubenville, the center of Ross and Bazaleel Well’s speculative venture in the Seven Ranges. It is also likely that the Senate added the final

19 Annals of Congress, 6th Cong., 1st sess., 209-211; American State Papers Public Lands, 1:73. 20 Annals of Congress, 6th Cong., 1st sess., 537-538, 650-652. 21 Senate Journal, 6th Cong., 1st sess., 149-150. 69 bill’s provision for preemptions for squatters who had or were in the process of erecting a grist or saw mill.22

By May 1800 both the House and the Senate had come to the above terms, and

President John Adams signed the bill into law. Worthington had overseen the process, particularly in the Senate where he discussed both the provisions of the bill and a possible appointment for himself to the Chillicothe land office. That work paid off, and President

Adams nominated him register for Chillicothe.23 Worthington did not take the nomination lightly. He did everything possible to ensure that his new office would be prepared when the auction commenced. He brainstormed ideas for structuring the rules of the sale, made sure that other officials understood the land law, and secured the necessary ledgers to record the sales.24 For Worthington, the auction needed to be a success.

The position of register was extremely important for the implementation of the law. Worthington would have to set the schedule of the sale by delineating the order in which lands would be sold. A simple yet crucial task of scheduling meant deciding what full sections of land would be attached to fractional sections, a rule that was required by law. Fractions were sections of land that could not be surveyed as a fully square mile, usually because they were located along major river fronts. They also happened to be the most popular lands for squatters to occupy. He would also have to examine and rule on the mill-site preemptions. Squatters could claim a right to purchase a tract of land prior to

22 Annals of Congress, 6th Cong., 1st sess., 164; Territorial Papers, 3:96. 23 Alfred Byron Sears, Thomas Worthington: Father of Ohio Statehood (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1958), 38, 54. 24 Thomas Worthington to Arthur St. Clair, 8 Apr. 1801, Thomas Worthington to Joseph Swearingen, 22 Apr. 1801, and Thomas Worthington to Joseph Nourse, 2 May 1801, TWP. 70 the auction at the minimum price of two dollars an acre if they could prove they had erected or were erecting a mill.25 Worthington’s discretion over these two duties was crucial for the negotiations he was to have with potential purchasers.

Not everyone was as excited about the upcoming auction. Worried about the provisions of the land act, squatters living along the Hocking River organized another petition to send to Congress asking for changes to the new law. Leading this effort was

Samuel Carpenter, a captain in the militia who had illegally settled near the future site of

Lancaster. As an officer, Carpenter had access to the only civil organization in the area, and he used his rank to circulate this petition, securing 141 out of the 347 total signatures.

The subscribers expressed concern “that their small improvements” would “be exposed to a Publick Vendue to be outbid by an unfeeling Land-Jobber or Speculator.” To prevent this from occurring, the squatters asked Congress to “grant a preemption right, at Two dollars pr Acre, to the oldest improvement made on Sections and half Sections.” They also requested “that all fractions except those on Muskingum & Sciota Rivers may be sold Separate without adding them or any of them to entire Sections.” Such revisions would benefit Carpenter and others who had been the first to settle next to the Lancaster tract, the location of which created several fractional sections surrounding it. When

Congress received the petition, it was referred to a committee, which determined that the

“prayer of the said petition cannot be granted.”26

25 Territorial Papers, 3:98. 26 Ibid., 3:122-128; Annals of Congress, 6th Cong., 2nd. sess., 1040, 1054. For the squatter community see: William E. Peters, Ohio Lands and Their Subdivision, 2nd. ed. (Athens, OH: W. E. Peters, 1918), 191- 192; Charles C. Miller, History of Fairfield County, Ohio and Representative Citizens (Chicago: Richmond-Arnold Publishing Co., 1912), 128-129. For the militia see: Ronald P. Formisano, The Transformation of Political Culture: Massachusetts Parties, 1790s-1840s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 134. 71

With their petition denied, an uneasiness began to fall upon the squatter community, which Worthington would attempt to assuage in order to incorporate them into his personal network. Many not only feared they would lose their farms at the auction, but worse, that the federal government would evict them off the land before it was sold. Rumors began to circulate that Worthington, recently appointed as register for the Chillicothe land office, would order the squatters to vacate their cabins. Worthington had been in conversation with a county judge who had “complained” to the register “that a very great waste of timber was daily committed” near Lancaster, and requested him “to interfere.” Unacquainted with Worthington or his intentions, the squatters began to question him, asking if he felt it was his “duty to Interpose in favour of the united States in Cases of Trespasses Committed on their Lands by Individuals.” Worthington answered: “I do not consider it as my duty nor shall I in any case whatever Interfere unless a Law should be made, making it my duty.” Recognizing early on Samuel

Carpenter’s ability to reach a wide audience within the community, he reiterated his position to the militia captain in the hopes that he would do him “the Justice to represent this matter in its true colours” and relieve “any uneasiness to any neighbours.”27

With trust established, Carpenter became one of the first squatters to approach

Worthington and negotiate with him at the land office. Carpenter had settled on Fraction

7, Township 15, Range 18, which contained land on both sides of the Hocking River and adjoined Lancaster on the town’s southeast corner. Because it was a fraction, it was required to be attached to a full section, and Carpenter asked Worthington which section

27 Thomas Worthington to Alexander White, 17 Feb. 1801, and Thomas Worthington to Emanuel Carpenter and Samuel Carpenter, 19 Feb. 1801, PTW. 72 he planned on attaching it to. Worthington was considering Section 18, immediately south of Fraction 7. Carpenter rejected the idea, calling that section “Hilly & Rocky,” and asked instead for Section 8, immediately to the east, which was closer to the river’s course than Section 18. Worthington softly argued that it was his duty, for the benefit of the United States, to “try and sell the bad [land] with the good,” and insisted on Section

18. Carpenter stood firm, claiming “it as a matter of right, that the fraction No. 7 should be classed to No. 8 as the Sections in the Township counted that way.” After this series of give and take, Worthington finally agreed with Carpenter, and promised to attach

Fraction 7 to Section 8 at the auction.28

Agreeing to the order of the sale was one thing, but securing a winning bid was quite another, and Worthington would offer guidance to Carpenter through the use of intermediaries to help ensure he won his tract. When the sale began and Fraction 7 was announced, Worthington attached it to Section 8 as promised and Carpenter put in the first bid of two dollars, the minimum price. Henry Massie, a local speculator, “came forward & bid two more,” and he and Carpenter took turns bidding the other up by penny increments. During the exchange, it became clear to many that Massie “had been biding with a view to a different tract.” Worthington quickly had a local lawyer inform Massie

“that it was Mr. Carpenters Section that he was biding on.” Realizing his mistake, Massie stopped bidding and apologized to Carpenter for running “the Land up on him.” With no other bidders, the land was sold to Carpenter for $4.12 per acre. As he approached the sale table to pay the deposit on the purchase, he was stopped by both the lawyer and

28 Samuel Carpenter testimony, “Langham’s Charges.” 73

Edward Tiffin, Worthington’s brother-in-law, who advised him not to pay it. According to the rules of the sale, tracts which were sold but did not have the deposit paid would be offered for sale again the following day. After examining the rule himself, Carpenter did not pay the deposit, the tract was offered again the next day, and he was able to purchase it for the minimum price.29

With title to the land finally secured, Carpenter was able to fully establish himself as a leader of the Lancaster community. His first step was to shed his squatter identity by erecting a sizeable house “which took six thousand brick” to construct and had “three fire places.” Unlike the makeshift log cabins of most squatters, brick homes were symbols of permanence, signaling to the surrounding community an intent to stay. Carpenter also started a vineyard, another sign of his long-term investment in his land. He also hired a millwright from Pennsylvania to assist in the construction of both a gristmill and a sawmill. Many residents of Lancaster recalled that Carpenter’s mill was their first choice for grinding their flour, and its early success allowed Carpenter to pay off his land in seventeen months, despite the four-year credit allowed by the land act.30

Serving as de facto community centers, mills linked local farmers together through the interchange of goods and services, creating personal networks that aspiring politicians could tie into their own. Understanding this, Worthington was attentive to

29 Samuel Finley testimony, “Langham’s Charges,” Territorial Papers, 3:216-217. See also: Samuel Carpenter and Michael Baldwin testimonies, “Langham’s Charges,” and Register's Ledger. 30 Samuel Carpenter to Jacob Markly, 21 July 1802, and 20 Sep. 1802, Samuel Carpenter Papers, VFM 1233 (hereafter SCP), OHC; and Register’s Ledger. For the significance of brick houses see: Richard L. Bushman, The Refinement of America: Persons, Houses, Cities (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 238- 239. For the Carpenter’s local standing see: C. M. L. Wiseman, Centennial History of Lancaster Ohio and Lancaster People… (Lancaster, OH: C. M. L. Wiseman, 1898), 61-62, and Pioneer Period and Pioneer People of Fairfield County, Ohio (Columbus: F. J. Heer Printing Co., 1901), 100; Hervey Scott, A Complete History of Fairfield County, Ohio (Columbus: Siebert & Lilley, 1877), 247. 74 squatters who could qualify for mill site preemptions. John Crouse was one such squatter.

After failing to squeeze out a living as a millwright in the eastern states, Crouse and his family left their home in Pennsylvania and made their way west to Chillicothe in 1798.

Before arriving at the frontier outpost, the family came across Kinnikinnick Creek, a tributary of the Scioto River. Downstream from where the road crossed the creek, Crouse found two squatters, William McCoy and John Derush, hard at work on their corn- cracking mill, distilling maize into whiskey. Wishing to try his hand again at milling,

Crouse began haggling with McCoy and Derush, and soon found himself the owner of their milling operation. The family quickly built a cabin, and Crouse was soon offering his milling services to his fellow squatters living along the creek.31

Crouse’s purchase of the mill was a peculiar circumstance, one that would require some clever record keeping if he were to gain a preemption. The language of the land act was very specific in that “pre-emption of the section including such mill” could only be awarded to those who “shall have erected, or begun to erect, a grist-mill or saw-mill,” not someone who had purchased one. It could very well be argued on McCoy and Derush’s part that they had erected the mill and were thus entitled to both the preemption of the land and the mill, leaving Crouse with nothing. Worthington understood the problem and devised a solution when Crouse approached to him for a preemption. According to

Worthington’s ledger for the auction, the section that Crouse’s mill was situated on was sold to McCoy and Derush as a preemption, along with two fractional sections along the

31 For the importance of mills see: John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 321-325. For Crouse’s arrival see: Henry Holcomb Bennett, The County of Ross (Madison: Selwyn A. Brant, 1902), 434-435; John Crouse Day Book of Flour Distillery, VOL 457 (henceforth Crouse Day Book), OHC. 75

Scioto River. However, as the issued patent shows, Worthington allowed Crouse to act as an assignee for McCoy and Derush, making the payments on the land and receiving the title solely in his name when the payments were complete. This allowed Worthington to enter the preemption according to the provisions of the land act, while ensuring that

Crouse secured both the land and the mill.32

With his title secure, Crouse immediately began to feel the effects of inclusion in

Worthington’s network. He started a series of improvements to his milling operations, building both a dam and a race in the creek, and constructing a new flour mill. His increased grinding capacity and the flock of new settlers in the area boosted his business.

Two of his new customers were “Cornell Worthington” and Joseph Tiffin, Worthington’s other brother-in-law and owner of a popular tavern in Chillicothe. Not only had Crouse’s mills become a center of economic activity, they were also a hub of social and political life. Crouse found himself the administrator of many of his neighbors’ estates, and on several occasions, was chosen as a legal guardian for orphaned children. He also constructed a Methodist church near his lands. When the local militia drilled, they did so on Crouse’s property. During elections, Crouse’s house was open to all politicians to make appeals to the electorate and served as his township’s polling location. Without

Worthington’s legal maneuvering, Crouse may not have enjoyed such success.33

32 Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 55, 1 Stat. 78. For the preemption see: Register’s Ledger; John Crouse, William McCoy, and John Derush, patent, August 19, 1803, CV-0002-111, Bureau of Land Management, accessed May 25, 2017, https://glorecords.blm.gov/details/patent/default.aspx?accession=0002- 111&docClass=CV&sid= pnbxppos.5mh#patentDetailsTabIndex=1. 33 Crouse Day Book; Bennett, County of Ross, 435-437. 76

Carpenter’s and Crouse’s influence in their county militias, and the dependence people had in their mills, made them ideal targets for Worthington to incorporate into the

Republican interest. Their opinions mattered to those around them because of their prominent socio-economic standing, and they would owe their newfound position to

Worthington’s willingness to bend the federal land laws in their favor. It was through

Crouse and Carpenter that Worthington would build grassroots political networks among former squatters and recent settlers, each of which would become an integral part of his support for statehood. Although these are both prominent examples of successful negotiations at the land office, the experiences of Carpenter and Crouse were not shared by all. For some, these negotiations failed, sometimes for personal reasons and sometimes for legitimate ones, but they would nonetheless be used against Worthington by his political enemies.

⁎

Filled with emotion, excitement, and aggressive behavior, the land auction was ripe for conflict. It would not take long for tempers to flare and aspiring rivals to challenge Worthington’s authority at the sale. On the second day Worthington began by auctioning off sections northwest of Lancaster in Township 15, Range 19. Once all the sections had been offered, a second call was made for any of the unsold sections, a standard rule set up by Worthington and explained at the opening of the sale. Not hearing any calls, Worthington proceeded on to the next township. “Before much progress had been made,” Surveyor General Rufus Putnam recalled hearing “some persons without the bar calling for section No 28 in the Township Just gone through.” Pushing his way 77 through the mass of people and shouting at the top of his lungs was Elias Langham, a member of the territorial legislature and Worthington’s local political rival. Approaching

Worthington, the elder Langham “intimated his desire to have Section No. 28” offered for sale again. Understanding that he was being watched by friends, local elites, and the common citizenry, Worthington stood firm against Langham’s attempt to publicly undermine his authority. He informed Langham that he “was then too late, that he ought to have attended to the proclamation that was made after the crying of that Township,” and “that it would now be breaking the order of Sale which had been established.”34

Angered by Worthington’s unflinching stance, Langham began “censuring the

Registers conduct in Severe terms importing that the section [was] passed over in

Silence—in order that [Worthington] or some of his friends might have an opportunity of obtaining it at” the private sale for the minimum price. In response, many began to

“mention publicaly Langham’s impertinence,” calling him “troublesome” and questioning his outburst. Believing that “Langham was determined to quarill if he could find any ground for it,” Rufus Putnam pulled Worthington aside and advised him to offer the section again. As Worthington’s friends tried to calm Langham and deescalate the situation, the register agreed to an exception, offering Section 28 a second time the following morning. However, Langham arrived late again, and was informed that the land was sold to squatter James Wells. Langham “expressed considerable displeasure,” but was stopped from approaching the register by one of Worthington’s friends, who then told him “that he ought to be more punctual in his attendance” and “observed to him in a

34 Territorial Papers, 3:216-217; Samuel Finley testimony, “Langham’s Charges.” 78 funny way that it was a great hardship that the sale had not been postponed until it was convenient for him to attend.” Chided, Langham would not interrupt the sale again, but it would not be his last attempt to undermine Worthington.35

Controversy continued when Worthington began favoring some squatters over others. One example concerned Mathew Taylor’s preemption denial at the High Bank

Prairie. Located south of Chillicothe and across from where Paint Creek emptied into the

Scioto River, the High Bank Prairie was the most desired tract of land in the entire

Chillicothe district. Taylor had constructed a floating mill next to the prairie, which sat on two boats and was attached to the bank by grapevines. When Taylor entered

Worthington’s office to request a preemption, the register turned to his fellow land officer

Samuel Finley, as well as to several local lawyers about the legality of such a mill. Finley

“did not think Congress had contemplated such mills & the Law did not embrace them, as they were very temporary & so constructed as to be removeable at pleasure.” Because

Taylor’s mill “had no connexion with the Land or even with the bottom of the river,”

Finley and others felt that the preemption should not be given. This opinion corresponded with that of previous treasury secretary Oliver Wolcott, who recommended to

Worthington “that the actual and continued occupancy of a mill-seat connected with improvements of any nature upon the land” be the qualifications for a preemption. It was after considering all of this advice that Worthington denied Taylor’s request.36

35 Samuel Finley, Noah Zane, and Edward Tiffin testimonies, “Langham’s Charges”; Territorial Papers, 3:216. See also: William Creighton, Jr., testimony, “Langham’s Charges.” 36 Samuel Finley testimony, “Langham’s Charges”; Oliver Wolcott to Thomas Worthington, 21 Aug. 1800, TWP, reel 1. See also: Isaac Dawson, Joseph Harness, and William Long testimonies, “Langham’s Charges.” 79

The denial had major ramifications for the public sale, because Taylor was not the only squatter interested in purchasing the prairie. Benjamin Kerns was a squatter and a potential buyer, and he visited the register’s office before the sale to inform Worthington he “had a notion of purchasing” it. He hoped to go from squatter to speculator, purchasing the various fractions and sections that divided the prairie, but was not confident he could afford them all alone. Kerns hinted to Worthington that if “some body would take a part of it” he would be able to comfortably purchase it. Picking up on the allusion, Worthington “said that he had no desire of purchasing there, & that [Kerns] had better look at Lands on Kinikinick or Hockhocking or smaller tracts.” Worthington even offered to ride with Kerns to visit alternative locations that he felt were just as good.

Determined to purchase at the prairie, Kerns dropped his grandiose plan of acquiring the entire tract and proposed that they only bid on the “upper purchase” at the northern end of the prairie. Worthington replied, “if [I] should take any it would be a part of the upper purchase,” and he agreed to “accommodate” Kerns.37

This accommodation meant securing the land at a reasonable price, which

Worthington would do by eliminating competition during the auction. He first paid a visit to Joseph and George Harness, two of Kerns’s fellow squatters who also planned on purchasing the prairie. Through persuasion, Worthington convinced them not to bid on the “upper purchase,” and promised that in return Kerns would not bid on the southern portion. Worthington had a much more difficult time convincing his political nemesis

Governor Arthur St. Clair not to bid. A speculator himself, St. Clair entered

37 Benjamin Kerns testimony, “Langham’s Charges.” 80

Worthington’s office and explained he was interested in purchasing the prairie. The register immediately advised against it, arguing that “besides the persons who were in possession some of whom intended to be purchasers, there were some monied men present” from Virginia “who declared an intention to have it, let it be bidden up to what price it would.” St. Clair asked what price that might be, and Worthington replied “that those gentlemen were resolved to go to sixteen or sixteen [doll]ars & a half per Acre.”

Eight dollars was the highest the governor admitted he was willing to pay, but

Worthington smugly claimed he “would not get it at that rate.” Undeterred, and unsure of the fractions and sections containing the prairie, St. Clair asked Worthington to inform him when the land was up for bid the next day.38

Ignorance like St. Clair’s over the location of the prairie was not uncommon.

Although colloquially known as the High Bank Prairie, the survey system of the United

States had split the tract into several fractions and full section across two different townships and in two different ranges. Though some interested buyers had done their homework and learned the survey numbers ahead of time, others had not, including St.

Clair. This general lack of knowledge about the sale would prove advantageous to some and injurious to others, and Worthington’s little effort to mitigate against it would encourage further resentment from Langham, St. Clair, and others.39

When the sale reached the first fraction containing the southern end of the prairie, a frenzy of bidding ensued between George Harness and Jeremiah McLene. Harness had

38 Joseph Harness testimony, “Langham’s Charges”; Territorial Papers, 3:249; Bennett, County of Ross, 359-360. 39 Jeremiah McLene and Abraham Claypool testimonies, “Langham’s Charges.” 81 the winning bid, paying $4.10 an acre. As the sale moved to the sections near the northern end of the prairie, St. Clair “observed less anxiety among the people as usual.”

Curious which lands were being offered, he inspected the township plat and noticed “that the land which was up was nearly opposite to Paint Creek.” The governor “mentioned aloud the situation which was repeated by the Cryer, and was not contradicted by the

Register or any more precise description mentioned by him.” Despite St. Clair’s announcement, and Worthington’s silence, “no anxiety appeared,” likely due to the fact that St. Clair described the mass of numbers being called as “opposite to Paint Creek” and not the more familiar “High Bank Prairie.”40

Soon, the auctioneer called out Fraction 5, Township 7, Range 21, and

Worthington attached both it and Fraction 6 to Section 7, which amounted to 1,320 acres of the “upper purchase” of the prairie. Benjamin Kerns immediately met the opening bid of two dollars, but was quickly followed by Elias Langham who called out $2.01. The squatter promptly “turned round to him & told him that was [his] bid.” Recognizing this faux paux, Langham attempted to save face while under the ire of the squatters. He apologized to Kerns, announced that he was “principled against ousting old Settlers who have improved the Lands,” and promised “not [to] bid another cent” against Kerns who

“was an old Settler.” Kerns then raised his bid to $2.02 and waited. No one else spoke up to bid after the exchange with Langham, and in the usual time the most coveted 1,300

40 Territorial Papers, 3:249; Abraham Claypool, Isaac Dawson, Walter Buelly, William Key, James Kilgore, and Jeremiah McLene testimonies, “Langham’s Charges”; Register’s Ledger. 82 acres of land in the Chillicothe district was sold for just two cents over the minimum price.41

Complaints soon arose over the sale of the prairie, and rumors of an unfair collusion between Kerns and the register were soon justified when the names of the purchasers were entered into the sale book. Wasting no time, Worthington approached local speculator Felix Renick after the prairie was sold and offered Renick his stake in the land. As he had told Kerns, he was not interested in being an owner of the prairie, and he made a deal with Renick to sell his part for $1,500. It did not take long for this story to reach Langham, who confronted Kerns later that day, claiming that “he did not wish to injure him, But if he had known that Col. Worthington was to have had any part in the land he would have run it up.” After more words were exchanged, Langham began warning Kerns “to take care for [himself].” Kerns asked Langham if he would “injure me or make a sacrifice of my property to injure Col. Worthington,” to which Langham again warned him to “take care…lest [he] might loose [his] land.”42

Langham’s warnings were not in vain, as Kerns soon found himself despised and hated by his former neighbors. They were unhappy that their fellow squatter had turned to speculators in order to secure the prairie for himself, and many soon began to experience their worst fears as Kerns started his transition from squatter to landlord.

Those who stayed found themselves tenants of their once fellow squatter, who began to charge them rent not only for the present year, but also back rent from their time as

41 Benjamin Kerns and Barnabas Lambert testimonies, “Langham’s Charges”; Register’s Ledger. 42 Benjamin Kerns testimony, “Langham’s Charges”; Thomas Worthington, diary entry, June 3, 1801, PTW, reel 1; Felix Renick and Isaac Dawson testimony, “Langham’s Charges”; Register’s Ledger. 83 squatters. Many paid Kerns the rent to avoid having to pay more expensive legal fees to challenge him, but one squatter eventually took Kerns to court, which ruled that Kerns did not have the authority to charge rent to those living on the public lands. In a show of what American folklore would label frontier justice, many of these former neighbors— possibly encouraged by Langham—sneaked onto Kerns’s farm in the fall and burned his entire wheat harvest. While Kerns was preoccupied with the fire, others made their way into the apple orchards he had recently planted, uprooted each sprout, and burned their roots so they could not be replanted. As this premeditated attack made clear, there were both winners and losers at the land sale, and not all titles were considered legitimate by the community.43

While not the only negotiations to occur at the Chillicothe land office, these interactions would become significant over the course of the next year as the Northwest

Territory moved toward statehood. Worthington’s network proved instrumental in denouncing his opponents in the territory, particularly Elias Langham. When Langham attempted to discredit Worthington by charging him with corruption and abuse of office, former squatters flocked to the register’s defense.44 The squatters also proved invaluable in providing Worthington with the legitimacy necessary to push for statehood.

Advancing Ohio out of the territorial stage of government was Worthington’s strategy to overthrow the political monopoly that Governor St. Clair and the Ohio

43 Isaac J. Finley and Rufus Putnam, Pioneer Record and Reminiscences of the Early Settlers and Settlement of Ross County, Ohio (Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1871), 87; Bennet, County of Ross, 357. 44 For Langham’s charges against Worthington see: Elias Langham, “Langham’s Notice,” ca. 1802, copy, TWP, reel 21; Ratcliffe, Party Spirit, 108. 84

Company had created for themselves. In the winter of 1801-1802 Worthington went to

Washington and used the small reputation he had as the land register to foster national support for his movement. Once federal approval was secured, Worthington introduced partisanship into the statehood contest through his private correspondence and

Chillicothe’s local newspaper. Rather than just an opposition faction, Worthington and his allies styled themselves as Jeffersonians and worked diligently to elect him to Ohio’s constitutional convention. In doing so Worthington was able to link both the personal interest he had built in the territory with the growing interest that Thomas Jefferson and his supporters had constructed in the nation’s capital.45

One immediate benefit of Worthington’s networking came when Elias Langham began accusing the register of illegally collecting fees for the recording of sales at the auction. Langham, as well as Governor St. Clair, were of the opinion that the register could only receive his fees after the auction, during private sales, but as Worthington and others argued, he was entitled to the application fee for any sale, public or private. To put the matter to rest, Worthington manufactured a suit to be brought against him by Noah

Zane. The proprietor of Lancaster, Zane sued the register for $100 in the Fairfield County court, which was presided over by Samuel Carpenter, and his cousin Emmanuel

Carpenter. After hearing arguments, the court was “unanimously of opinion [that] the

Defendant was authorized to receive the fees.”46

45 Freeman, Affairs of Honor, 62-104; Waldstreicher and Grossbart, “Abraham Bishop,” 635. 46 Fairfield County Court of Quarter Sessions, Minute Book, 1801-1803, OHS, GR3542; Langham to Worthington, 4 Aug. 1801, TWP, reel 2; Thomas Worthington to Albert Gallatin, 11 May 1801, PTW, reel 1; Territorial Papers, 3:175-176. See also: Gautham Rao, “Thomas Worthington and the Great Transformation: Land Markets and Federal Power in the Ohio Valley, 1790-1805,” Ohio Valley History 3 (2003): 29-30. 85

Connections such as these were unavailable to Elias Langham. He simply did not have the authority or the influence to help squatters obtain title to their lands, and thus could not build the working relationships that Worthington had. Instead, Langham decided his best bet was to tarnish Worthington’s reputation. He started by writing a notice—which he planned to publish in Chillicothe’s Scioto Gazette—outlining

Worthington’s “conduct and arrangments during the sales of the lands belonging to the

United States.” Langham claimed—perhaps correctly—that the register was personally responsible for “at least ten thousand dollars” being denied to the US treasury through his partnership with Kerns and others at the auction. Such an act was “too reprehensible to pass unnoticed” and “only fit for a tyrants yoke.” He pointed out “the sale of section

Number 28 in the forks of Hockhocking, the Sale of the high bank prairie, [and] the classing and sale of the section & fraction purchased by Col. Saml. Carpenter.” Should

Worthington come forward and answer these charges, Langham promised that “enquiry will be made touching the propriety of granting several other mill preemptions, and who,

(if any) are interested with the persons who have obtained them.” Langham did give warning to Worthington before submitting the notice to the printer, so that he “may be perfectly prepared to Answer” the charges. However, Worthington had a private conversation with Nathan Willis, the printer of the Gazette, and the notice was never published.47

Langham’s attempts to discredit Worthington in the press were an abysmal failure, and the register’s friends soon began writing to the Scioto Gazette defending

47 Elias Langham, “Langham’s Notice,” n.d., TWP, reel 21; Elias Langham to Thomas Worthington, 4 Aug. 1801, TWP, reel 2; Territorial Papers, 3:175. 86

Worthington and rebuking Langham. He was denounced as a “creature of the governor’s” and an opponent of the territory’s best interests. One correspondent called out Langham’s behavior at the land auction, describing him as “a pimp or pitiful spy” who “was continually watching about the office and at the public sales, to find something like a charge to bring against the register.” The writer referred to Langham as “a man hardened in iniquity,” and in contemplating the source of Langham’s contempt for Worthington, surmised that Langham had wanted the office of register for himself, but he “was neglected—there’s the rub.”48

Former squatters within Worthington’s interest were also instrumental in providing legitimacy for his support of statehood. In December of 1801 the territorial legislature followed Governor St. Clair’s advice and voted to offer their assent to

Congress for a division of the territory along the Scioto River. The Division Act was the attempt by St. Clair and the Ohio Company to reverse the legislature’s influence— particularly taxation—by regressing the territory back to the first stage of government and indefinitely stalling statehood.49 Quick action was needed to block the bill in

Congress. Samuel Carpenter wrote to Worthington in strictly partisan terms when he commented on the division act, recognizing St. Clair’s scheme “to destroy the republican interest, as it is well known that a great majority of republicans is in the counties of

Fairfield Ross & Adams,” all of which would be most affected by the division. Within

48 Scioto Gazette, September 11, 1802 and September 18, 1802. See also: Ibid., December 19, 1801 and September 4, 1802. 49 Paul Fearing to Ephraim Cutler, 18 Jan. 1802, Cutler Collection; William Rufus Putnam to Paul Fearing, 3 Jan. 1802, Samuel P. Hildreth Collection, Special Collections, Marietta College Library, Marietta, OH; Jacob Burnet to Paul Fearing, 17 Dec. 1801, Paul Fearing Collection, Special Collections, Marietta College Library, Marietta, OH. 87 days a “committee for the County of Fairfield” met to discuss the act, deciding to

“appoint and constitute Thomas Worthington Esquire [their] agent at the present

Congress” so that he could “use his utmost exertions to prevent” the division act. The committee felt their actions justified because “the said act is conceived to be unconstitutional, improper, unjust, and if carried into effect will be attended with the most harmful consequences.” Five men signed this extralegal writ as representatives of the people, including Emmanuel Carpenter and James Wells, the squatter who

Worthington sold Section 28 to, rather than Elias Langham.50

Worthington not only succeeded in blocking the Division Act, but also brought together the leading Jeffersonians in Washington—including President Jefferson—to support Ohio statehood. William Branch Giles of Virginia became an integral partner in the House, promising Worthington that the committee considering the territory “will be prepared to receive any communication respecting the object of their appointment which

[he] may think proper to make.”51 Worthington happily obliged, making several suggestions to Giles. Of note was his proposal concerning voters that that if any “time of residence previous to the elections should be required…it should be short,” which clearly favored recent arrivals through the land office.52 He also reached out to John Randolph of

Roanoke and Nathaniel Macon, the Speaker of the House.53 When Worthington reached out to Senator Abraham Baldwin, he was sure to use partisan language, claiming that

50 Samuel Carpenter to Thomas Worthington, 13 Dec. 1801, Charles Elmer Rice Collection, MSS 1, Ohio History Connection, Columbus, OH; Philemon Beecher, et. al., to Thomas Worthington, 28 Dec. 1801, TWP, reel 2. For the division act see: Cayton, Frontier Republic, 74-76. 51 William Branch Giles to Thomas Worthington, 4 Feb. 1802, ETSMC. 52 Thomas Worthington to William Branch Giles, 20 Mar. 1802, ETSMC. 53 Thomas Worthington to John Randolph, 10 Feb. 1802, ETSCM; Thomas Worthington to Nathaniel Macon, 23 July 1802, PTW, reel 1. 88

Governor St. Clair and “all good federalists” were fearful “that [Ohio] will give three republican votes” in the next presidential election.54 Another partisan tactic Worthington used was trying to portray St. Clair as anti-French, which would appeal to Francophile sensibilities of many Jeffersonians.55 Worthington also met with President Jefferson on three separate occasions while in Washington, engaging in “conversation on political subjects.”56 By bringing statehood to the nation’s leading Republicans and framing it as a partisan issue, Worthington helped secure passage of the Enabling Act of 1802, calling for a constitutional convention in the territory.57

By making the passage of the enabling act a partisan issue, Worthington ensured that the same party spirit would trickle into the territory. His correspondence with political allies became increasingly partisan in the leadup to the constitutional convention. He confidently assured one correspondent that “Hamilton adams Clairmont,

Ross & Fairfield Counties will elect republicans” and “without any doubt Washington will send 4 Strong Federalists or anti-State Government men.”58 He reiterated these feelings to Postmaster General Gideon Granger, stating “The County of Washington in which Marietta lies, is the only Federal County in the Terry. except Trumbull should be so. So far as I can at present determine 2/3 of our convention will be republicans.”59

Friends began to write back to Worthington using similar language. Return Jonathan

Meigs, Jr. informed Worthington that “Federalism has raged [in Marietta] this Spring

54 Thomas Worthington to Abraham Baldwin, 30 Nov. 1801, PTW, reel 1. 55 Thomas Worthington to Nathaniel Massie, 14 Jan. 1802, TWP, reel 2. 56 Thomas Worthington, diary entry, January 18, 21, and 25, 1802, PTW, reel 1, quote from January 21. 57 Act of April 30, 1802, ch. 40, 1 Stat. 173-175. 58 Thomas Worthington to James Caldwell, 8 June 1802, PTW, reel 2. 59 Thomas Worthington to Gideon Granger, 12 June 1802, PTW, reel 2. 89 with intolerant fury,” and added that “it cannot be tolerated by some that you should have had more Influence with Congress than” Paul Fearing, the territory’s delegate to

Congress in 1802.60 James Pritchard, another friend, wrote that he “shall be much gratified if Governor St. Clair should be removed from office and a Republican appointed.”61 Even opponents of Worthington, particularly those from the Ohio Company purchase, began seeing things through partisan lenses.62

Former squatters also played a pivotal role in framing statehood as a partisan issue. In late August of 1802, John Crouse and six others published a handbill in the

Scioto Gazette—a Chillicothe newspaper that Worthington sponsored—asking for

“positive assurance of the opinions of those who appear willing to serve in the convention.” Candidates were asked their positions on several topics, including “whether they are, or are not, advocates for the formation of a state government” and “whether the present administration of the general government, is or is not approved of by them.” The handbill was well coordinated, as it was published with the responses of Worthington, and Edward Tiffin and Michael Baldwin, his closest allies. Other candidates would have to wait a week or longer to have their responses published.63

In his response Worthington assured his readers of his commitment to statehood.

He attacked the Ohio Company and John Cleve Symmes’s domination of the territorial government by describing it as “arbitrary and aristocratic in its principles, and oppressive

60 Return Jonathan Meigs, Jr. to Thomas Worthington, 18 May 1802, TWP, reel 2. 61 James Pritchard to Thomas Worthington, 23 Mar. 1802, TWP, reel 2. 62 Benjamin Ives Gilman to Paul Fearing, 14 Jan. 1802, 4 Feb. 1802, and 20 Feb. 1802, Samuel P. Hildreth Collection, Special Collections, Marietta College Library, Marietta, OH. 63 Scioto Gazette (Chillicothe), August 28, 1802. For Worthington’s sponsorship of the paper and his relationship with its editor see: Ibid., October 10, 1800; Sears, Thomas Worthington, 70. 90 and partial in its administration.” He reminded the Gazette’s viewers of “the late exertions” he had made “to bring about a change from the present colonial system of government to that of an independent state.” He wanted no doubt in the people’s minds that it was he who was responsible for it, and that this change was “calculated to promote the happiness and satisfaction of the people.”64

Worthington was also sure to proclaim his attachment to the Jefferson administration. Many had understood that the land companies had benefitted from the previous administrations of George Washington and John Adams. Reflecting on

Jefferson’s defeat of Adams in 1800, one Ross County resident proclaimed to his fellow citizens “we may rejoice that the system of peculation and speculation, which has corrupted our country, will be torn up by the root—that a spirit of industry will be substituted in the room of a desire to amass fortunes by speculation and intrigue.”65 In addressing the handbill’s question about the Jefferson administration, Worthington said

I have uniformly advocated these great republican principles, that all men are by nature free and equal, born with equal rights and privileges; that these rights consist in ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’ that all power flows from the people; that in free governments, the great controuling powers ought to remain inviolate and sacred in the possession of the citizens; that the people are fully competent to govern themselves; that they are the best and only proper judges of their own interest and their own concerns.

Worthington was also steadfast in his belief in “those old genuine Whig principles of liberty, upon which [the] revolution and independence was founded.”66

64 Scioto Gazette (Chillicothe), August 28, 1802. 65 Ibid., January 8, 1801. 66 Ibid., August 28, 1802. 91

By contrasting the land companies’ control of the territorial government with that of the Jefferson administration, Worthington was able to connect the interest he had built in the land office with the larger partisan battle brewing in the nation’s capital. The day before the election, “Some of the People” of Green and Pickaway Townships in Ross

County picked up on Worthington’s address to the handbill and wrote him a letter of support. John Crouse’s preemption was located in Green Township, his home having become the township’s center of civil activity, and it is more than likely the letter was drafted and signed there. These former squatters and recent settlers found Worthington to

“be the most likely to promote the happiness and welfare of a people engaged in various pursuits of domestic ease.” These were also men who were excited that they had only recently been given the right to vote, claiming that this election was “the day of our political birth.” Worthington had helped in making them citizens, and recognizing his interest as their own, they placed their confidence in him to create “a Government giving eaqual rights and privledges to all who bears a share of the general burdens.”67

The citizens of Green Township understood that not only would their newly purchased property give them suffrage for territorial elections—something squatters had been denied previous to the land auction—but the taxes they were assessed earlier in the year would give them and many others the right to vote for the constitutional convention.68 When election day arrived, it became evident that the opening of Congress lands and the polarization of politics had a drastic impact on the voters, and it was clear that Worthington’s network was quite successful in mobilizing purchasers to favor the

67 Some of the People to Thomas Worthington, 11 Oct. 1802, 1991.161.98, ETSMC. 68 For election laws see: Territorial Papers, 2:44; Act of April 30, 1802, ch. 40, 1 Stat., 174. 92 register. Whereas the election of 1800 had given Worthington 188 votes for the territorial legislature, a year and a half of selling public lands and negotiating at the land office netted him 716 votes for the convention. Langham’s numbers are even more telling of

Worthington’s success in the land office. 1800 had seen Langham best Worthington with

196 votes, but he lagged far beyond Worthington in 1802, with only 443.69

The election of delegates to Ohio’s constitutional convention shows just how effective Thomas Worthington was in using his position at Chillicothe’s land office to further his own political aspirations. His willingness to negotiate at the land office with both squatters and speculators provided him with direct political benefits. Wielding the authority of the federal state, he was able to influence the socio-economic lives of those beneath him, knowing when to be generous and when not to be. Recognizing this influence as a symbol of gentility, both squatters and speculators within this network reciprocated Worthington’s clout with unwavering electoral support. Each decision he made had drastic impacts not just on those whom he negotiated with, but also their friends and neighbors who would be affected by how fractions and sections were classed, and who received preemptions and who did not. Rather than fearing the federal government, these squatters came to respect it and work with it.

Political development occurred because of these negotiations. Despite public challenges from Elias Langham at the sale, Worthington stood firm and proved himself capable in the presence of adversity, helping to establish himself as one of the leading figures in the territory. While Langham and others questioned his practices as the

69 Ibid., October 16, 1800. 93 register, Worthington emerged unscathed and was able to successfully secure partisan support for statehood, creating the genesis of a party machine. By tapping into the political battles of the national stage, and introducing party rhetoric into the statehood contest, Worthington was able to secure statehood for Ohio and his place in the constitutional convention.70

70 For quote see: Territorial Papers, 3:251. 94

EPILOGUE

Between 1780 and 1802 federal land policy and its effects on the early American

West experienced significant changes. Initiated to diminish the national debt and provide federal authority over the western territory, it quickly fell victim to the growing influence of elite sensibilities of political economy and its emphasis on private interest. This privatization moment soon gave way as the realities of local control settled in, requiring federal intervention. It was through the federal government that many westerners, including Thomas Worthington, instituted their own concepts of political economy that were more inclusive of non-elites. And it was in the negotiation of that political economy that local interests were formed and later tied to national politics.

Nationalists in the Confederation Congress were optimistic about the prospects the western territory had to offer the United States, and they were confident that they could properly manage them. The Land Ordinance of 1785 was their plan for providing federal oversight of western settlement while ensuring a steady extinguishment of the public debt. However, the persistence of squatting, the slow pace of surveying, the rising competition of state lands, the lack of significant sales at the federal land auction, and a growing belief that capital and property should be concentrated into the hands of an elite few convinced them that a new policy was needed.

That policy was privatization. Rather than overseeing western settlement themselves, members of Congress transferred the public responsibility of federal land distribution to private land companies. Acting as middlemen, the Ohio Company of

Associates and John Cleves Symmes bought hundreds of thousands of acres of federal 95 land at a discounted rate and resold it to actual settlers for profit. The federal government also gave these companies political control of the West by making them the principal officers in the new Northwest Territory. Taken together, the exclusivity of their land contracts and their authority to dictate political matters in the territory allowed private interests to dictate the economic and political development of the West.

Privatization would not last as the companies soon became ill-equipped to deal effectively with the Northwest Indian War and a more populous territory. As the violence between Native American tribes and the Euro-Americans living in Kentucky spilled into the land companies’ settlements, settlers began to abandon the company towns and cease purchasing new lands. This spelled trouble for the companies, as they were dependent on these sales to not only profit, but also to make their payments to the federal government.

In response, the United States became actively involved in the conflict. There were also concerns over proprietor John Cleves Symmes selling land outside of his patent, which eventually took federal legislation to set straight. The Ohio Company also faced legal challenges, as the first territorial legislature was convened in 1799. While the company had previously held virtual control of territorial politics since 1788, non-proprietors in the legislature led by Thomas Worthington taxed the companies’ lands for the first time.

Company agents were unable to pay these taxes, and many proprietors saw they lands seized by the county sheriff for delinquency. The democratization of politics and disorder brought from these legal disputes convinced many in Congress to reconsider privatization and resume federal responsibility for western settlement. 96

Taking advantage of changing attitudes, Thomas Worthington travelled to

Washington in order to affect a more egalitarian land policy that was inclusive of the squatters the federal government had left behind. By utilizing federal power he was able to bring squatters into the formal political process, thereby creating a personal network of politically active supporters. This network became crucial for securing Ohio’s statehood, as it formed the corps of his political base in the territory and his primary bargaining chip for securing Republican support at the national level. By linking his local constituency to national politics, particularly the administration of Thomas Jefferson, Worthington was able to effectively secure statehood through partisanship and personal networks.

Although this thesis is limited in time and scope to the Northwest Territory, there remains other subjects for further study. Private land companies did not just spring forth in 1787; they were the prominent method for English colonization of North America.

Virginia, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Pennsylvania to name a few were all settled mostly through private endeavors. Even in the immediate years prior to the revolution, private land companies were greedily eyeing the trans-Appalachian West, spurred on by investments and influence from prominent colonists such as Benjamin Franklin, Robert

Morris, James Wilson, and others.1 How were these companies affected by the revolution? Were they comparable to the Ohio Company and John Cleves Symmes? Why did the Confederation Congress break from an earlier imperial tradition of entrusting settlement to private interests and adopt a centralized western policy?

1 List of the Proprietors of the Indiana Company, October 28, 1781, and List of the Proprietors of the Illinois and Wabash Company, n.d., Papers of the Continental Congress, M247, reel 52, item 41, vol. 10, p. 520-526, 532, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. 97

There is also ample evidence that other land offices besides Chillicothe became sites of political development. In the Indiana Territory, the Vincennes land office became a central hub of oppositional writing against territorial governor William Henry Harrison.

Land office register John Badollet, a close confidant of Albert Gallatin, led the charge against Harrison and his attempts to introduce slavery into the territory. Negotiations over fractions and mill-sites would have also occurred at the Jeffersonville land office.

Jonathan Jennings, who would go on to become Indiana’s first state governor, ran this office and quickly rose in territorial prominence from that position.2 Another register was a little-known politician from Illinois who served at the Springfield land office in the early part of his political career: Stephen A. Douglas.3 There was also the process of confirming or denying French, Spanish, and British grants in many regions of the trans-

Appalachian West. At the Kaskaskia land office in the Illinois Territory, this process took ten years and led to political conflict over accusations of fraud and corruption.4 Debates over the proper place for squatters within society also raged in the Mississippi Territory, informing the opinions of federal judges and land officers alike.5 Were similar processes of negotiation used to create political networks in these offices? Was federal control of settlement supported in these territories? Did French and Spanish speaking people view federal land policy differently than Anglo-Americans? Did the presence of slavery in

2 Andrew R. L. Cayton, Frontier Indiana (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 226-260. 3 “Douglas, Stephen Arnold, (1813-1861),” Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, bioguide.congress.gov, accessed March 20, 2018, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index= D000457. 4 James E. Davis, Frontier Illinois (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 120-121. 5 Adam Rothman, Slave Country: American Expansion and the Origins of the Deep South (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 2005), 169-170. 98

Mississippi affect views of federal land policy in ways that were unnecessary in the northern territories?

These are future avenues for research and discussion. While this thesis in no way tries to redefine the political culture of the early republic in general, it does provide evidence that contradicts and complicates many long-time understandings of it. Rather than fearful of central authority, western Republicans harnessed it for their own purposes.

It is hoped that further evidence and analysis can help shed light on how pervasive the land offices—and the negotiations that took place in them—were to territorial settlement and development. 99

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