BALKAN DIAL GUES ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF SERBIAN RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL HERITAGE IN KOSOVO AND THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN BELGRADE AND PRISTINA The BALKAN DIALOGUES is a project of the East West Institute (EWI)* implemented in cooperation with the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence (BFPE), first hosted in Belgrade in 2019, with high-level events taking place in Berlin in December 2019, Munich in February 2020, online in July 2020 and at the Belgrade Security Forum in October 2020. Comprised of decision-makers and experts from the six countries of the Western Balkans (WB6), along with the European Union, United States, and Russia, the dialogues are designed to help increase and deepen understanding while building trust between representatives of varying geopolitical interests present in the region today. The idea for this publication came from the community brought together by the initiative. Members of BALKAN DIALOGUES core team are Sonja Licht, Maja Piscevic, Cameron Munter, Ivan Vejvoda, John Jovanovic, Jovan Ratkovic, Marko Savkovic and Djordje Popovic. Thematic papers and the executive summaries are a product of four expert workshops held online in August and September 2020. *After East-West Institute ceased to exist in December 2020, the Balkan Dialogues initiative was transferred to the Atlantic Council in Washington DC. Opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent those of the Royal Norwegian Embassy, Balkan Trust for Democracy, the German Marshall Fund of the United States or its partners. Balkan Dialogues BALKAN DIALOGUES: ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF SERBIAN RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL HERITAGE IN KOSOVO AND THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN BELGRADE AND PRISTINA Igor Novakovic, Research Director, International Security and Affairs Centre (ISAC) and Council for Inclusive Governance (CIG) representative in Serbia Introduction¹ a. Stakeholders Stakeholders are: the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC); Government of Serbia; citizens of Serbia; Government of Kosovo, citizens of Kosovo (of Albanian and Serbian ethnicity) and the international community. Stakeholders' positions are different, while the most important driver for the continued relevance of this issue is identity (national/ethnic in the case of Serbia, state in the case of Kosovo). SOC has an ambiguous position: while the church “central authorities” officially reject the possibility that Serbia could recognize the independence of Kosovo and show an inflexible position towards Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, the SOC Eparchy of Raska-Prizren, which encompasses the most of the territory of Kosovo, showed much flexibility when dealing with central authorities and local authorities as well with the representatives of the international community. It has adopted a pragmatic approach, accepting in practice Ahtisaari Plan and trying to secure the best position for SOC in Kosovo. For the ruling elite in Serbia, status of Serbian religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo is one of the most important issues. According to unofficial information, Serbian ruling political elite tried at least since 2013 to put the status of Serb cultural and religious heritage on the Brussels negotiations agenda, but it was rejected. ¹ Paper is based on the policy study by Stefan Surlic and Igor Novakovic “Serbian Cultural and Religious Heritage in Kosovo from Ahtisaari Special Zones to the Final Status”, published by the National Convention on the EU in May 2020, http://regionalnirazvoj.org/upload/Plan/Documents/2020_06/2020_Serbian_Cultural_and_Religious_H eritage.pdf Serbia has been fully engaged in prevention of Kosovo's entrance to UNESCO for two reasons: 1. membership would add additional legitimacy to Kosovo's independence, 2. perception that Serb monasteries and holy sites in Kosovo would “become” a part of Kosovo's heritage. There are never confirmed rumours that Serbia allegedly managed to persuade Pristina to give a special status to important monasteries and holy sites during the “negotiations” over the land swap more than 2 years ago. Citizens of Serbia predominantly see Kosovo as the “cradle of national identity”, based predominantly on the myth or “pledge” of Kosovo, , but also on the fact that some of the most important Serbian monasteries and holy sites from Middle Ages are in Kosovo. There is a widespread disbelief on the good will of Kosovo authorities and citizens at large to take care of the heritage in a proper manner. This image is sealed with March 2004 unrest, when much of it was subject of violent attacks. In a recent public opinion poll (autumn 2019) conducted in Serbia, 57.1% of citizens stated that the Serbian cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo being endangered could motivate them to political and social activism. Possible recognition of Kosovo's independence is acceptable for 36.4% of citizens, but one of the conditions for it is the implementation of some kind of extraterritoriality for the Serb monasteries and holy sites.² This leads to a conclusion that without solving of this issue in a “territorial” manner, citizens of Serbia are not keen to accept a comprehensive settlement between the two sides. The Government of Kosovo (and local authorities) have an ambiguous position towards this issue. They see Serb religious and cultural heritage as part of the “overall historical and cultural heritage” of the newly formed state. For Pristina, the legislative framework resulting from Annex V of the Ahtisaari Agreement, shows that SOC was granted special protection status, which makes Kosovo a candidate for UNESCO membership and further on for full international recognition. For Pristina, this issue is thus solved with the Ahtisaari Plan, and with it Kosovo managed to “pay part of the price” for independence. However, in practice, successive governments showed reluctance (at best) towards the full implementation of the legal provisions, while the local governments often violated the legal provisions on protection, despite the decisions of the central institutions, including the Constitutional Court. ² Normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina from citizens perspective - What we know and what we feel? Centar za društveni dijalog i regionalne inicijative, Belgrade, 2019. Balkan Dialogues Citizens of Kosovo are mostly not interested in this issue. For most of them, it is only one of the obstacles to completing independence, as it is one of the footholds to Serbia's claim over Kosovo. However, there are vocal groups that see Orthodox religious buildings with a special status as symbols of delegitimization of Kosovo's sovereign government. The exclusive character and property rights that alienate cultural heritage from the citizens of Kosovo were attributed to the Serbian community, and the debate included a narrative of Orthodox churches built on the foundations of Illyrian-Albanian temples and the unacceptable option for the Orthodox Church in Kosovo to have a Serbian ethnic prefix. In various analysis and publications produced by the civil society in Kosovo, religious and cultural heritage is seen as universal and Christian, thus not Serb, i.e., not a part of Serb cultural heritage³ – which on the other side is unacceptable to Belgrade. Current regime The protection of cultural heritage sites is mentioned as an obligation in almost all international documents after the 1999 conflict. Since the provision of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on the return of personnel of the FR Yugoslavia with the mission of securing locations of Serbian cultural heritage has never been implemented, that role was taken over by the mission of UNMIK and KFOR within NATO. “The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement”, colloquially called “Ahtisaari Plan” is the basis for Kosovo's declaration of independence and constitutional design. With its detailed provisions, the “Ahtisaari Plan” aimed to normatively specify all mechanisms for the protection of cultural heritage, oblige Kosovo's political representatives to respect and promote the multicultural character of society in the state-building process and prevent the recurrence of any ethnically or religiously motivated attacks. The adoption of the Law on Protected Areas, the Law on the Historic Center of Prizren and the Law on the Village of Velika Hoca is a direct implementation of the Comprehensive Proposal into the Kosovo legislation. ³ Emancipimi Civil Ma Ndryshe, An Analysis of Numerous and Continuous Faults in Cultural Heritage; Series analysis “What went wrong?”, Prishtina, 2013, p. 15. 27 Ibid, p. 21. Annex V of the Plan is dedicated to the religious and cultural heritage of the Serbian community. It is clearly emphasized that “Kosovo shall recognize the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, including monasteries, churches and other sites used for religious purposes, as an integral part of the Serbian Orthodox Church seated in Belgrade.”⁴ The proposal guarantees the inviolability of the Serbian Orthodox Church's property, as well as the impossibility of its expropriation, and the church retains the full discretion “in the management of its property and access to its premises.”⁵ Regardless of its special status, which includes protection, rights, privileges and immunities, the SOC is obliged to act “in accordance with Kosovo law.”⁶ According to the Ahtisaari Plan, the obligation to guarantee the safety of cultural property lies with Kosovo's law enforcement agencies, and especially with the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)⁷. Ahtisaari Plan also includes a comprehensive