DOCSLIB.ORG

Fordham International Law Journal

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Fordham International Law Journal View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Fordham University School of Law Fordham International Law Journal Volume 39, Issue 4 Article 4 The Emerging Investment Landscape of Post-Sanctions Iran: Opportunities, Risks, and Implications on US Foreign Policy Christopher Beall∗ ∗Fordham University School of Law Copyright c by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj NOTE THE EMERGING INVESTMENT LANDSCAPE OF POST-SANCTIONS IRAN: OPPORTUNITIES, RISKS, AND IMPLICATIONS ON US FOREIGN POLICY Christopher Beall* INTRODUCTION: A NEW CHAPTER IN IRAN ........................... 841 I. IRAN UNDER THE SANCTIONS REGIME ............................... 845 A. Background & Historical Overview .................................. 846 1. Pre-Revolutionary Iran ................................................ 848 2. The Islamic Revolution & Regional Turmoil ............. 850 3. Reconstruction & Reform ........................................... 858 4. The Ahmadinejad Years ............................................. 865 5. Climax of Sanctions: Rouhani, Obama, & the JCPOA ........................................................................ 872 B. Legal Framework of the Iran Sanctions Regime ............... 874 1. The US Sanctions Regime Targeting Iran .................. 875 2. International Sanctions: Multilateral Resolutions ....... 891 C. The Costs of Sanctioning Iran ........................................... 894 1. Economic Costs .......................................................... 895 2. Political Costs ............................................................. 899 3. Humanitarian Costs ..................................................... 904 D. The JPA ............................................................................. 906 II. IRAN’S POST-SANCTIONS TRANSITION .............................. 908 A. The JCPOA ....................................................................... 909 1. The Agreement ............................................................ 909 * J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; M.S., 2013, Arizona State University; B.A., 2011, University of Colorado. I would like to thank Professor Susan Franck for inspiring me to think about the intersection of international relations, human rights, and foreign investment, as well as for her feedback and everything learned in her course on International Investment Law. I would also like to thank Stephanie Torkian and the Editorial Board of the Fordham International Law Journal, whose suggestions and edits made this note a reality. Finally, many thanks to Jessica Beall, whose love and patience was absolutely vital throughout the entire publishing process. 839 840 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:839 2. US Sanctions Lifting Under Section 4 of Annex II of the JCPOA: The “Footnote Six” Issue.................... 911 B. Investor Opportunities ....................................................... 915 1. Key Investment Sectors: Oil, Natural Gas, and Automotive ................................................................. 918 2. Alternative Sectors: Aviation, Finance, Consumer Goods, Tourism, and Renewable Energy .................... 926 C. Investor Risks in Iran ........................................................ 934 1. Commercial Risks ....................................................... 935 2. Political Risks ............................................................. 938 D. Iranian Investment Law ..................................................... 943 1. National Investment Law ............................................ 943 2. International Investment Law ..................................... 950 III. IMPLICATIONS ON US FOREIGN POLICY ........................... 953 A. Engagement Generally: The Post-WWII European Engagement Model ........................................................... 959 B. Engaging Iran: Europe’s Model of Critical Dialogue ....... 962 C. Engagement Today: Can the United States Engage with Iran? .......................................................................... 966 D. Steering Engagement Toward US Foreign Policy Interests ............................................................................. 971 1. Limiting Iran’s Nuclear Capacity & Regional Non- Proliferation ................................................................ 971 2. Encouraging Reform Within the Islamic Republic and/or Regime Change ................................................ 974 3. Enhancing Regional Counterterrorism........................ 981 4. Protecting Traditional US Allies: Saudi Arabia & Israel ............................................................................ 986 a. Ensuring the Interests of Saudi Arabia ................. 987 b. Ensuring the Interests of Israel ............................. 992 5. International Cooperation & Collective Security Across Today’s Middle East Conflicts ....................... 997 6. Old Friends & Old Enemies: Bolstering Europe and Curtailing the Regional Influence of Russia and China .................................................................. 1001 7. Advancing US Economic Interests ........................... 1005 8. Protecting Human Rights in Iran and Abroad ........... 1006 2016] POST-SANCTIONS US POLICY IN IRAN 841 CONCLUSION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SOUND US- IRAN ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY ................................... 1011 “[N]ot only should all friendships be safeguarded with the greatest devotion and good faith, but especially those which have been restored to goodwill after enmity.”1 INTRODUCTION On September 28, 2015, in his address before the United Nations General Assembly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declared, “a new chapter has started in Iran’s relations with the world.”2 This development emerges from the conclusion of over a year of negotiating efforts concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program with the P5+1, which resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”).3 By relaxing decades of trade and investment sanctions in exchange for the imposition of strict limitations on the development of Iran’s civil nuclear program, the JCPOA, according to Rouhani, “showcased the potential for constructive dialogue.”4 Within the United States, the terms and details of the JCPOA have been—like the sanctions regime that preceded it— 1. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 476 (Stephen C. Neff ed., 2012) (1625). 2. Hassan Rouhani, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Statement at the General Debate of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Sept. 28, 2015), http://gadebate.un. org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_Iran_en.pdf [hereinafter Rouhani Statement at the General Assembly]. 3. The P5+1 refers to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France—as well as Germany. In European parlance, the P5+1 is alternatively called the EU+3. See Joshua Keating, You Say P5+1, I Say E3+3, FOREIGN POL'Y (Sept. 30, 2009), http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/09/30/you- say-p51-i-say-e33/; see also Michael R. Gordon & David E. Sanger, Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lesson With Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2015, http:// www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-is-reached-after-long- negotiations.html; Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www. state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (providing a basic overview of the JCPOA). 4. Rouhani Statement at the General Assembly, supra note 2; see also John Mecklin, The Experts Assess the Iran Agreement of 2015, BULL. ATOMIC SCI. (July 14, 2015), http://thebulletin.org/experts-assess-iran-agreement-20158507 (summarizing how the JCPOA works). 842 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:839 controversial.5 The days and months following the signing of the JCPOA in Vienna on July 14, 2015 witnessed a deeply polarized array of high-profile comments and criticisms, from a wide variety of official and unofficial commentators.6 One way of explaining this controversy is the sizeable diversity of JCPOA stakeholders, each with uniquely situated interests and expectations concerning the deal’s aftermath. For the Obama Administration, which purportedly sought to halt Iran’s nuclear program in a way that would avoid another US war in the Middle East, the JCPOA was envisioned as bringing “extraordinary benefits to our national security and the peace and security of the world.”7 For the State of Israel, which has long considered Iran to be its most threatening regional rival, the JCPOA consisted of a “very bad deal,” representing a victory for “death, tyranny and the pursuit of jihad.”8 Lost in this simplistic dichotomy of “for the deal” or “against the deal” are the contours of those various interests, and how their architecture might influence, or be strategically used to influence, the post-sanctions environment emerging with the JCPOA’s implementation.9 The purpose of this Note is to explore the body of interests that comprise one such stakeholder group: international 5. See Daniel R. DePetris, A Frustrating Iran Deal for Republicans, THE HILL (Sept. 24, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/254756-a-frustrating-iran-deal-for- republicans (elucidating Republican opposition to the JCPOA); see also Peter Beinart et al., Is There a Viable Alternative to the Iran
Load more

Recommended publications
  • A WAY FORWARD with IRAN? Options for Crafting a U.S. Strategy
    A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? Options for Crafting a U.S. Strategy THE SOUFAN CENTER FEBRUARY 2021 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S. STRATEGY A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? Options for Crafting a U.S. Strategy THE SOUFAN CENTER FEBRUARY 2021 Cover photo: Associated Press Photo/Photographer: Mohammad Berno 2 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S. STRATEGY CONTENTS List of Abbreviations 4 List of Figures 5 Key Findings 6 How Did We Reach This Point? 7 Roots of the U.S.-Iran Relationship 9 The Results of the Maximum Pressure Policy 13 Any Change in Iranian Behavior? 21 Biden Administration Policy and Implementation Options 31 Conclusion 48 Contributors 49 About The Soufan Center 51 3 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S. STRATEGY LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BPD Barrels Per Day FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization GCC Gulf Cooperation Council IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IMF International Monetary Fund IMSC International Maritime Security Construct INARA Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act INSTEX Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGC-QF Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Qods Force JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action MBD Million Barrels Per Day PMF Popular Mobilization Forces SRE Significant Reduction Exception 4 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S. STRATEGY LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Iran Annual GDP Growth and Change in Crude Oil Exports 18 Figure 2: Economic Effects of Maximum Pressure 19 Figure 3: Armed Factions Supported by Iran 25 Figure 4: Comparison of Iran Nuclear Program with JCPOA Limitations 28 5 A WAY FORWARD WITH IRAN? OPTIONS FOR CRAFTING A U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Country Report Iran March 2017
    _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Country Report Iran Generated on November 13th 2017 Economist Intelligence Unit 20 Cabot Square London E14 4QW United Kingdom _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For 60 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The Economist Intelligence Unit delivers its information in four ways: through its digital portfolio, where the latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising seminars and presentations. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. London New York The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 20 Cabot Square The Economist Group London 750 Third Avenue E14 4QW 5th Floor United Kingdom New York, NY 10017, US Tel: +44 (0) 20 7576 8181 Tel: +1 212 541 0500 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7576 8476 Fax: +1 212 586 0248 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Hong Kong Geneva The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit 1301 Cityplaza Four Rue de l’Athénée 32 12 Taikoo Wan Road 1206 Geneva Taikoo Shing Switzerland Hong Kong Tel: +852 2585 3888 Tel: +41 22 566 24 70 Fax: +852 2802 7638 Fax: +41 22 346 93 47 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] This report can be accessed electronically as soon as it is published by visiting store.eiu.com or by contacting a local sales representative.
    [Show full text]
  • Design Characteristics of Iran's Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
    Design Characteristics of Iran’s Ballistic and Cruise Missiles Last update: January 2013 Missile Nato or Type/ Length Diameter Payload Range (km) Accuracy ‐ Propellant Guidance Other Name System (m) (m) (kg)/warhead CEP (m) /Stages Artillery* Hasib/Fajr‐11* Rocket artillery (O) 0.83 0.107 6; HE 8.5 ‐ Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐12* Rocket artillery (O) 1.29 0.244 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐23* Rocket artillery (O) 1.82 0.333 120; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐14* Rocket artillery (O) 2.8 0.122 18.3; HE 21.5 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐25* Rocket artillery (O) 3.2 0.122 18.3; HE 30 Solid Spin stabilized Arash‐36* Rocket artillery (O) 2 0.122 18.3; HE 18 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐17* Rocket artillery (O) 2.9 0.33 190; HE 13 Solid Spin stabilized Shahin‐28* Rocket artillery (O) 3.9 0.33 190; HE 20 Solid Spin stabilized Oghab9* Rocket artillery (O) 4.82 0.233 70; HE 40 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐310* Rocket artillery (O) 5.2 0.24 45; HE 45 Solid Spin stabilized Fajr‐511* Rocket artillery (O) 6.6 0.33 90; HE 75 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐112* Rocket artillery (O) 1.38 0.24 50; HE 10 Solid Spin stabilized Falaq‐213* Rocket artillery (O) 1.8 0.333 60; HE 11 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐614* Rocket artillery (O) 6.3 0.355 150; HE 100 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat15* Rocket artillery (O) 5.9 0.355 150; HE 120 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐116* Iran‐130 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 100‐125 Solid Spin stabilized Zelzal‐1A17* Mushak‐120 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.61 500‐600; HE 160 Solid Spin stabilized Nazeat‐1018* Mushak‐160 Rocket artillery (O) 8.3 0.45 250; HE 150 Solid Spin stabilized Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
    [Show full text]
  • Deterring Iran After the Nuclear Deal
    MARCH 2017 COVER PHOTO NIEL HESTER | FLICKR 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036 202 887 0200 | www.csis.org Lanham • Boulder • New York • London 4501 Forbes Boulevard Lanham, MD 20706 301 459 3366 | www.rowman.com Deterring Iran After the Nuclear Deal PROJECT DIRECTORS AND EDITORS Kathleen H. Hicks Melissa G. Dalton CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS Melissa G. Dalton Thomas Karako Jon B. Alterman J. Matthew McInnis Michael Connell Hijab Shah Michael Eisenstadt Michael Sulmeyer ISBN 978-1-4422-7993-3 Farideh Farhi Ian Williams Kathleen H. Hicks 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Washington,Ë|xHSLEOCy279933z DC 20036v*:+:!:+:! 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org Blank MARCH 2017 Deterring Iran after the Nuclear Deal PROJ ECT DIRECTORS AND EDITORS Kathleen H. Hicks Melissa G. Dalton CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS Melissa G. Dalton Thomas Karako Jon B. Alterman J. Matthew McInnis Michael Connell Hijab Shah Michael Eisenstadt Michael Sulmeyer Farideh Farhi Ian Williams Kathleen H. Hicks Lanham • Boulder • New York • London 594-68742_ch00_6P.indd 1 3/13/17 7:13 AM About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. T oday, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organ ization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full- time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analy sis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M.
    [Show full text]
  • The Gulf Military Balance in 2019: a Graphic Analysis
    Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy The Gulf Military Balance in 2019: A Graphic Analysis Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan With the Assistance of Max Molot Working Paper: Please send comments to [email protected] REVISED December 9, 2019 Photo: ARASH KHAMOUSHI/AFP/ Getty Images Introduction 2 The military balance in the Gulf region has become steadily more complex with time. Conventional forces have been been reshaped by massive arms transfers, and changes in major weapons, technology, and virtually every aspect of joint warfare, command and control, sensors, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Missile warfare is changing radically as diverse mixes of ballistic and cruise missiles, UAVs and UCAVs, and missiles are deployed. Precision-guided, conventionally armed missiles are becoming a key aspect of regional forces, and so are missile defenses. The threat of nuclear pro0liferation remains, and at least one state – Iran - is a declared chemical weapons power while the Assad regime in Syria has made repeated use of chemical weapons At the same time, asymmetric forces, “proxy” forces, and various forms of military advisory and support missions are playing a growing role in local conflicts and gray area operations. So are local militia and security forces – often divided within a given Gulf state by sect and ethnicity. Terrorist and extremist forces continue pose serious threats, as do political tensions and upheavals, and the weaknesses and failures of some regional governments to meet the needs of their people. The most serious sources of Gulf conflicts are now the tensions between Iran and the Arab Gulf states, and the role played by terrorists and extremists, but civil war and insurgencies remain an additional threat - as does the links between Iran, Syria, and the Hezbollah.
    [Show full text]
  • Geopolitics of the Iranian Nuclear Energy Program
    Geopolitics of the Iranian Nuclear Energy Program But Oil and Gas Still Matter CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & CSIS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES A Report of the CSIS Energy and National Security Program 1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006 author Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 Robert E. Ebel E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org March 2010 ISBN 978-0-89206-600-1 CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & Ë|xHSKITCy066001zv*:+:!:+:! CSIS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Geopolitics of the Iranian Nuclear Energy Program But Oil and Gas Still Matter A Report of the CSIS Energy and National Security Program author Robert E. Ebel March 2010 About CSIS In an era of ever-changing global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decision- makers. CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to the simple but urgent goal of finding ways for America to survive as a nation and prosper as a people. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent public policy institutions. Today, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. More than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focus their expertise on defense and security; on the world’s regions and the unique challenges inherent to them; and on the issues that know no boundary in an increasingly connected world.
    [Show full text]
  • Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge Met Through Patient and Forward-Looking Policymaking
    CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Support RAND Purchase this document TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Corporation View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Containing Iran Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge Robert J. Reardon Supported by the Stanton Foundation C O R P O R A T I O N The research described in this report was supported by the Stanton Foundation.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran Page 1 of 43
    2010 Human Rights Report: Iran Page 1 of 43 Home » Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs » Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor » Releases » Human Rights Reports » 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices » Near East and North Africa » Iran 2010 Human Rights Report: Iran* BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices April 8, 2011 The Islamic Republic of Iran, with a population of approximately 77 million, is a constitutional, theocratic republic in which Shia Muslim clergy, and political leaders vetted by the clergy, dominate the key power structures. Government legitimacy is based on the twin pillars of popular sovereignty--albeit restricted--and the rule of the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution. The current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not directly elected but chosen by a directly elected body of religious leaders, the Assembly of Experts, in 1989. Khamenei's writ dominates the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. He directly controls the armed forces and indirectly controls internal security forces, the judiciary, and other key institutions. The legislative branch is the popularly elected 290-seat Islamic Consultative Assembly, or Majles. The unelected 12-member Guardian Council reviews all legislation the Majles passes to ensure adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles; it also screens presidential and Majles candidates for eligibility. Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, a member of the Alliance of Builders political party, was reelected president in June 2009 in a multiparty election that was generally considered neither free nor fair. There were numerous instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of civilian control.
    [Show full text]
  • Us Policy Towards the Islamic Republic of Iran Hearing
    S. HRG. 111–746 U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION APRIL 14, 2010 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services ( U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 62–667 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. VerDate Aug 31 2005 13:35 Dec 07, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62667.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director (II) VerDate Aug 31 2005 13:35 Dec 07, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 0486 Sfmt 0486 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62667.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB C O N T E N T S CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I
    IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE - I The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions FIFTH WORKING DRAFT By Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner Revised July 11, 2012 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 2 Acknowledgements This analysis was made possible by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. It draws on the work of Dr. Abdullah Toukan and a series of reports on Iran by Adam Seitz, a Senior Research Associate and Instructor, Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University. 2 Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 6 Figure III.1: Summary Chronology of US-Iranian Military Competition: 2000-2011 ............................... 8 CURRENT PATTERNS IN THE STRUCTURE OF US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION ........................................... 13 DIFFERING NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 17 US Perceptions .................................................................................................................................... 17 Iranian Perceptions............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Anderson Cooper and Situation Room (CNN)
    US-Iran Media Resource Program National Iranian American Council 9 month report Program supported by: Connect US Fund, OSI, Colombe Foundation, Ploughshares Fund The US-Iran Media Resource Project is aimed at ensuring that the national media has the best information and interpretation available in a timely manner on the sensitive negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear program. The project has provided the news media with objective, balanced and well-documented analyses of important developments, highlighting potential openings for a peaceful settlement that might otherwise be unnoticed and deepening the understanding of the motives of involved actors. The fundamental goal of the program has been to prevent war between the US and Iran. The proposed solution towards preventing war has been to push for direct US-Iran negotiations through overwhelming public and media support for such a shift in policy. Evaluation: The project has made a significant impact on the debate in the US by producing unique analysis disseminated widely both to the media and directly to decision makers, briefing journalists in order to improve the accuracy of their reporting, advising TV and radio producers, and giving interviews to the media. The evaluation of the project during its first 9 months is based on both qualitative and quantitative measurements. Quantitatively, the project has produced an impressive number of deliverables, including seven (7) in depth Issue Briefs, twenty-two (22) Editorial Memos, and eight (8) statements. These written analyses have addressed a variety of issues, all pointing to the superiority of direct US-Iran negotiations versus military or economic warfare. These analyses, in turn, were either quoted or influenced otherwise reporting in major newspapers as well as important news shows, such as Meet the Press (where NIAC’s analysis was directly quoted by Tim Russel).
    [Show full text]
  • Petroleum: an Engine for Global Development
    OPEC th International Seminar Petroleum: An Engine for Global Development 3–4 June 2015 Hofburg Palace Vienna, Austria www.opec.org Reasons to be cheerful It was over quite quickly. In fact, the 165th Meeting whilst global oil demand was expected to rise from of the OPEC Conference finished two hours ahead of 90m b/d to 91.1m b/d over the same period. In ad- Commentary schedule. Even the customary press conference, held dition, petroleum stock levels, in terms of days of for- immediately after the Meeting at the Organization’s ward demand cover, remained comfortable. “These Secretariat in Vienna, Austria on June 11 and usually numbers make it clear that the oil market is stable and a busy affair, was most probably completed in record balanced, with adequate supply meeting the steady time. But this brevity of discourse spelled good news growth in demand,” OPEC Conference President, Omar — for OPEC and, in fact, all petroleum industry stake- Ali ElShakmak, Libya’s Acting Oil and Gas Minister, holders. As the much-heralded saying goes — ‘don’t be said in his opening address to the Conference. tempted to tamper with a smooth-running engine’. And Of course, there are still downside risks to the glob- that is exactly what OPEC’s Oil and Energy Ministers al economy, both in the OECD and non-OECD regions, did during their customary mid-year Meeting. They de- and there is continuing concern over some production cided to leave the Organization’s 30 million barrels/ limitations, but with non-OPEC supply growth of 1.4m day oil production ceiling in place and unchanged for b/d forecast over the next year, in general, things are the remainder of 2014.
    [Show full text]